Chinese Translation of Economy, Society, and History

by Stephan Kinsella on May 16, 2025

经济、社会与历史, Chinese translation of Economy, Society, and History (epub; pdf; word; pdf-bilingual version; word-bilingual version). Translated by Li San, edited by Dao (李三译道老师校). Text of bilingual version below.

米塞斯编译社译丛

经济、社会与历史

Economy, Society, and History

[美] 汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普著

李三译道老师校

2025年5月

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传递逻辑的力量

——奥地利学派丛书编译总序

哲学家休谟曾指出：“尽管人们在很大程度上受着利益的支配，但是即使是利益本身，以及所有的人类事务，也完全是由观念支配的。”经济学家凯恩斯也曾说过：“经济学家和政治哲学家的思想，不论正确与否，都要比人们通常所理解的力量大。事实上，这个世界就是由极少数思想统治的。”

无论我们多么不同意凯恩斯的经济学见解，他的这个论断无疑是对的。事实上，我们人之所以为人，不仅仅是因为我们遗传了自己祖先的生物性状，还因为我们接续了很多前人的思想观念。思想观念不同于基因遗传，它既不是“预装”的，也不是一成不变的，它是在接受前人观念的基础上形成自己的观念。

正如休谟所言，支配我们个体行动的根本因素，是我们的观念。但我们无法独立思考出自己关于经济、政治和社会问题的所有答案，我们需要借助前人的思想阶梯向上攀爬。

独立思考，大多数时候是一个褒义词，但如果刻意强调独立思考，却因此忽视了先贤们的那些智慧结晶，独立思考也许就会变成胡思乱想、失去章法。在具备真正的独立思考能力之前，我们需要阅读真正的优秀经典，进而锻造健全的思想观念。

只是“酒香也怕巷子深”，优秀经典并不会自动呈现在我们眼前，有些经典深藏于浩瀚的书籍文献之中亟待挖掘，而有些经典未必是我们熟悉的母语写就。所以至少有三项工作非常重要：其一，发现经典；其二，翻译经典；其三，解释经典。

奥地利学派丛书的编译工作，目的就是挖掘经典、引介经典、翻译经典，传递逻辑的力量，放大思想的光芒。

众所周知，奥地利学派并不属于主流经济学，国内外大学大都不会把奥地利学派的著作作为教科书。但是奥地利学派的影响力并未因此衰弱式微，相反，各行各业知道和认可奥地利学派的人越来越多。

他们对于奥地利学派的探索和财富追求无关，纯粹是出于对科学知识的热爱，出于对理论和逻辑的追求。正是这种热爱，让奥地利学派的思想火种遍布全球。

经过多年的努力，海外奥地利学派已经进入常态化发展阶段，既有长期运转的米塞斯研究院，也有学术期刊。其中米塞斯研究院，作为奥地利学派思想传播的主阵地，提供了一个学术宝库，其书库涵盖了从纯粹经济原理，到自由主义理论，再到修正主义历史的大量经典文献。

其中作者既包括奥地利学派历代代表人物的代表性著作，也包括部分小众作品或者原来没有打算出版的稿件，还有像霍普、萨勒诺等在世奥派学者的最新著作。总之，米塞斯研究院的很多著作值得挖掘。奥地利学派丛书的编译工作，将主要引进米塞斯研究院的经典书籍。

我们之所以相信市场的力量，更多的也是因为相信逻辑的力量。经济学，终究是某种意义上的“经世济民”之学，其理论可以是纯粹形式逻辑的，但其作用却不能仅仅局限于理论。正确的经济学理论，以及基于此的思想观念，需要更多的人知道，需要影响大众的观念，进而影响人类的历史进程和文明走向。

为众人抱薪者，不可使其扼于风雪；为自由开路者，不可使其困于荆棘。寻求真理的过程，注定是艰难的。一个人可以走得很快，但一群人能够走得更远。

最后感谢米塞斯研究院，感谢各位译者的辛勤付出，感谢各位资助者的慷慨支持。对知识和真理的追求使我们相遇，让我们继续把逻辑的力量传递下去。

米塞斯编译社，成立于2023年1月1日，是奥地利学派经济学经典著作民间编译爱好者的自发性组织。

米塞斯编译社

2023年元月

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序言

One of the more depressing claims made by some libertarians during the past ﬁfty years is that the battle for liberty is to be won or lost by arguing about economics. As with all but the grosser falsehoods, there is a degree of truth in the claim. Production and trade are important activities in any community. In those communities where debate over these things is possible and thought important, there tends to exist a power of coercion willing and able to act on the outcomes of such debate. For this reason, anyone worried about the establishment of state socialism and its great and terrible consequences needs a set of arguments that stand by themselves and that demonstrate both the evils of state control and the beneﬁts of voluntary exchange.

过去五十年里，一些自由意志主义者提出的较为令人沮丧的观点之一是，自由之战的成败取决于经济层面的辩论。和绝大多数并非过于离谱的谬误一样，此观点有一定的道理。生产与贸易在任何社群中都是重要的活动。在那些能够就这些事务展开辩论且认为此类辩论很重要的社群里，往往存在一种强制力量，它愿意且有能力依据这类辩论的结果采取行动。基于这个原因，任何担忧国家社会主义的建立及其带来的巨大且可怕后果之人，都需要具备一套独立的论据，既能揭示国家控制的弊端，又能彰显自愿交换的益处。

But the claim that this is all we need remains depressing. Any movement that accepts it opens itself to entry and control by men of undoubtedly high intelligence, but whose preferred mode of reasoning is a wooden economism. Since most people cannot or do not choose to understand the less obvious truths of economics, this mode of reasoning will win no arguments outside those areas regarded as economic. Within those areas, it may become dominant. It may remain dominant there even after some variety of statism has become dominant in every other subject. But, as we have seen since the end of the Cold War, a grim and searching despotism is possible that has no interest in controlling the price of bread or in who owns the railways. A libertarian movement deﬁned by the quality of its economic reasoning, and by nothing else, then becomes a waste of space.

但声称这就是我们所需的全部，这依然令人沮丧。任何接受此观点的运动，都容易被一些人渗入并掌控，这些人无疑智商很高，但其偏好的推理方式却是刻板的经济主义。由于大多数人无法或不愿去理解那些较为艰深的经济学真理，这种推理方式在那些被视为经济领域之外的地方，是无法赢得辩论的。在经济领域内，它或许能占据主导。甚至在某种形式的国家主义在其他所有领域都占据主导之后，这种推理方式在经济领域仍然可能占据主导地位。但是，正如我们从冷战结束后所看到的那样，一种冷酷且严苛的专制统治是有可能存在的，它对控制面包价格或谁拥有铁路并不感兴趣。那么，一个仅由其经济推理的质量来界定，而无其他界定因素的自由意志主义运动，就变得毫无意义。

This large and permanent truth—that libertarianism is more than an argument about economics—is what makes the work of Hans-Hermann Hoppe so important. If more than competent in economics, he is ultimately a philosopher with historical tastes. He stands in the same line as Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer. He is unusually qualiﬁed to appreciate and build on the work of his immediate masters, Murray Rothbard and Ludwig von Mises. We should particularly welcome this present book, which is a publication for the ﬁrst time of lectures given almost a generation ago—lectures that were seen at the time as a profound contribution to the libertarian debate, lectures that the passage of time has shown to be not merely profound but also predictive. The approach taken by Hoppe is not that liberty is good because it lets us have cheaper electric toasters. His argument instead is that any defence of liberty is and must be identical to the defence of civilisation itself.

汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普的著作之所以意义非凡，就在于这个伟大而永恒的真理——自由意志主义不仅仅只是关乎经济学的争论。如果说霍普不仅精通经济学，归根结底他更是一位具有历史眼光的哲学家。他与亚当-斯密和赫伯特-斯宾塞一脉相承。他具有非同寻常的天赋，能够欣赏且在其直系大师默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）和路德维希-冯-米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）著作的基础上更上一层楼。我们尤其应该欢迎这本书，它首次出版了几乎一代人之前的演讲——这些演讲在当时被视为对自由意志主义辩论的深刻贡献，时间的流逝，表明这些演讲不仅深刻，并且具有前瞻的预测性。霍普所采取的方法，并不是说自由之所以是好的，是因为它能让我们拥有更便宜的电烤面包机。相反，他的论点是，任何对自由的捍卫是且必须是对文明本身的捍卫。

Though common till a few generations ago, talk nowadays of higher or lower states of development is out of fashion. Even so, human beings appear to be diﬀerent from every other species on our planet because of our comparatively immense rational faculties and because of our physical mediocrity. No bodies as slow and weak and undefended as ours could have evolved without the compensations of intelligence—or, having evolved, could have survived. Equally important for our survival was the anatomy of our throats. Why this is as it is cannot be explained. But it allowed the development of language. This is what completed our separation from the other animals. Without language, we could have used our brains to keep ourselves and our children alive in small groups. With language, our physical need for cooperation set us on a path of capital accumulation that begins with teaching a child how to shape bones into ﬁshhooks and may end with our self-transformation into what our ancestors would have regarded as demi-gods.

尽管就在几代人之前，谈论发展程度的高低还是很常见的，但如今这种话题已不再流行。即便如此，人类确实与地球上的其他物种都有所不同，这是因为我们拥有相对强大的理性能力，同时身体条件却较为平庸。若没有智力作为补偿，像我们这样行动迟缓、身体虚弱且缺乏防御能力的生物，既不可能进化出来，即便进化出来了，也无法存活。对我们的生存同样重要的是我们咽喉的构造。至于为何如此，尚无法解释。但正是这种构造促成了语言的发展。而语言让我们彻底与其他动物分道扬镳。如果没有语言，我们或许能靠大脑让自己以及后代在小群体中勉强维生。但有了语言，我们对合作的生理需求，引领我们走上了资本积累之路。这条道路始于教孩子如何把骨头制成鱼钩，而终点或许是将我们自身转变为祖先眼中的半神。

From language and cooperation, moreover, comes a stronger sense of property. This sense, as Hoppe shows (pp. 16–18), is not a consequence of our intelligence or any speciﬁc path of cultural development. It is natural to at least all the higher mammals. It is natural to very young children, even before they learn to speak or reason. The sense of property, though, is greatly enlarged and elaborated by the fact of our development. From this comes a tendency toward specialisation and a corresponding need to trade. Alongside this, the science of law has grown, as a means of ensuring property and enabling its peaceful transfer.

此外，从语言和合作中产生了更强的财产意识。正如霍普所指出的（第16-18页），这种意识并非我们智力或特定文化发展路径的结果。至少对所有高等哺乳动物来说，它是与生俱来的。甚至在幼儿学会说话或进行推理之前，他们就有这种意识。然而，我们的发展进一步扩大并细化了这种财产意识。由此产生了专业化的倾向以及相应的交易需求。与此同时，法律科学逐步形成，作为保障财产和实现财产和平转让的一种手段。

In any survey of our development, the obvious limitation is that we have no standard of comparison outside ourselves. Let us imagine that we are under observation by the sociologists and economists of some alien race. Is watching us a bored ticking of boxes? “Yes, they’ve ﬁnally discovered the plough. After a few millennia of wrong turns, they have alphabetic writing. They’re making use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and have a crude nuclear technology. Next stop, either self-annihilation or meaningful life extension … .” Is that us? Or should these hypothetical observers be sending frantic messages home, reporting some galactic miracle and asking for greater funding? It would be nice to know where we stand—assuming, that is, we are not alone and that talk of comparative development has any meaning. There is no doubt, however, that we existed in something like our present shape as a race of illiterate hunter-gatherers for several hundred thousand years until the end of the last ice age, just ten thousand years ago. Since then, we have grown from a few million to seven billion, and the majority of this growth has happened since the birth of many people who are still alive. Since it could not have happened by itself, we can take this expansion of numbers as a measurement of our overall progress.

在审视人类发展时，一个明显的局限在于，我们缺乏自身之外的比较标准。不妨设想，我们正处于某个外星种族的社会学家和经济学家的观察之下。他们观察我们，是否就像无聊地在一个个选项上打勾？“没错，他们终于发明了犁。在历经数千年的弯路后，他们掌握了字母文字。他们开始利用电磁波，还掌握了初级的核技术。下一步，是自我毁灭，还是迈向生命的延续……？” 这说的是我们吗？又或者，这些假想中的观察者是否会心急火燎地向母星发回消息，汇报某个银河系奇迹，并请求更多资金支持？要是能知道我们处于何种位置就好了 —— 当然，前提是我们并非宇宙中唯一的生命，而且谈论相对发展水平是有意义的。然而，毫无疑问的是，在直到一万年前上一个冰河时代结束之前的几十万年间，我们一直以类似如今的形态，作为目不识丁的狩猎采集者存在着。从那以后，我们的人口从寥寥几百万增长到七十亿，而这其中大部分增长发生在许多如今依然健在之人的有生之年。鉴于这种增长不可能凭空发生，我们可以把人口的这种爆炸式增长视为衡量我们整体进步的一个指标。

Yet, though impressive—whether we imagine some group of excited alien observers, or just look how we did until the end of the last ice age—there is a worm in the bud of our progress. The generality of our achievement in the past ten thousand years has come about from private interest and free exchange. This is not to say that force has been absent or even unnecessary. All civilisation needs defensive force. Individuals need to defend themselves and their dependants from thieves and other low parasites. Communities need to defend themselves from organised bands of those who get their living from consuming what they have not produced. Between these two extremes, there is a need for courts to rule on the nature and fulﬁlment of contracts, and for their decisions to be enforced against non-consenting losers in the judicial game. In short, every community must have a place for defensive force, and much of this defensive force will be collective. But if force has not been, and could not be, absent from our progress, how much of this force needed to be coercive?

然而，尽管我们的发展令人瞩目 —— 无论是想象一群兴奋的外星观察者，还是回顾我们在上一个冰河时代结束前的状况 —— 但我们的进步之花中依然暗藏隐患。在过去一万年里，我们取得的总体成就源于个人利益和自由交换。这并不是说武力从未存在，甚至并非不必要。所有文明都需要防御性武力。个人需要保护自己及其家属免受盗贼和其他卑鄙寄生虫的侵害。社群需要抵御那些有组织的团伙，这些人靠消耗非自己生产的东西为生。在这两个极端之间，需要法庭对契约的性质和履行情况进行裁决，并针对司法博弈中不服从判决的败诉方强制执行判决。简而言之，每个社群都必须有防御性武力的容身之地，而且这种防御性武力大多是集体性的。但是，如果武力在我们的进步过程中一直存在且不可或缺，那么其中又有多少武力需要是强制性的呢？

The answer for Hoppe, and for every other principled libertarian, is none. Private interest and free exchange are all that is needed to take us from the mud to the stars. So far as it is needed, defensive force can be as easily provided from within a voluntary system, as good bread and clean water can be provided. There is no utility in allowing the emergence of “one agency, and only one agency, the state … [having] the right to tax and to ultimate decision-making (p. 179). Our greatest error as a species has been, time after time, to allow the emergence of these agencies of armed coercion. Until the twentieth century, states were limited in the harm they might do by the poverty of their host communities. They might rob and murder on a scale that still appals. At the sametime, the number of direct parasites was hardly ever out of four ﬁgures, and the number of their exclusive clients always hard to keep near the top of ﬁve ﬁgures. Also, if they could rob and murder, their powers of more detailed inspection and control were limited in ways we often no longer understand.

在霍普以及其他每一位秉持原则的自由意志主义者看来，答案是零。个人利益与自由交换足以引领我们从蒙昧走向辉煌。就防御力量的必要性而言，它完全像优质面包和洁净水源一样，在自愿体系内轻松实现供给。允许“一个且仅有一个机构，即国家……拥有征税权和最终决策权”（第179页）则毫无益处。作为一个物种，我们最大的错误在于一次次地放任这些武装胁迫机构的出现。在20世纪之前，由于所在社群的贫困，国家所能造成的危害受到限制。它们可能实施的抢劫和杀戮规模之大，至今仍令人震惊。与此同时，直接依附于国家的寄生虫数量几乎从未超过四位数，而那些能独享国家庇护的人，其数量也总是很难维持在五位数顶端。此外，即便它们能进行抢劫和杀戮，其更细致的监察与控制能力也受到种种限制，而这些限制方式如今我们常常难以理解。

Our misfortune in the past hundred years is that greater wealth has meant greater taxable capacity, and therefore an almost unlimited growth in the size of states and in the numbers of the parasites they support. There is probably no point in describing the malicious freakishness of the modern state in America or Britain. On the one hand, I live in England and earn some of my bread from an institution funded by the British state. It would be unwise to say all that I think. On the other hand, this is not only a malicious but a metastatic freakishness. Whatever sounds bizarre today will border on normality compared with whatever is in fashion a year from today.

过去一百年里，我们的不幸在于，财富增长意味着更强的应税能力，因此国家规模以及国家所供养的寄生虫数量几乎无节制地膨胀。或许没必要去描述美国或英国现代国家那种恶意且荒谬的行径。一方面，我生活在英格兰，部分收入来自英国国家资助的机构。把我所想的全说出来并不明智。另一方面，这不仅是恶意的，而且是一种会不断恶化的怪异现象。如今听来离奇古怪之事，与一年后流行的任何事相比，都近乎常态。

Hoppe has no easy comfort to dispense here. Indeed, part of his analysis is as bleak as that of any English Tory after 1945. If an individual makes a mistake, he will tend eventually to be aware that he has made a mistake and either to correct it or to wish he had corrected it in time. At the worst, his example will stand as a warning to others. In the natural sciences, mistakes tend to be self-limiting—they will lead to falsiﬁed predictions, and these will be followed by are-examination of the alleged facts. But, when the wrong turn is made into statism,

not everyone holding this error must pay for it equally.Rather, some people will have to pay for the error, while others, maybe the agents of the state, actually beneﬁt from the same error. Because of this, in this case, it would be mistaken to assume that there exists a universal desire to learn and to correct one’s error. Quite to the contrary, in this case, it will have to be assumed that some people instead of learning and promoting the truth, actually have a constant motive to lie, that is, to maintain and promote falsehoods, even if they themselves recognize them as such. (p. 180)

霍普在此并无任何轻松慰藉之言。事实上，他的部分分析就如同1945年后任何一位英国保守党人那般悲观。如果一个人犯了错，他最终往往会意识到自己犯了错，要么去纠正，要么希望自己当时已及时纠正。最坏的情况是，他的例子会成为对他人的警示。在自然科学领域，错误往往具有自我限制——它们会导致预测失准，随后人们会重新审视所谓的事实。但是，当错误地走向国家主义时，

并非每个秉持这种错误观念的人都需同等地为此付出代价。相反，有些人将不得不为这种错误买单，而另一些人，比如国家的代理人，实际上却从同样的错误中获益。正因如此，在这种情况下，若认为存在一种普遍的学习并纠正错误的愿望，那就大错特错了。恰恰相反，在这种情况下，必须假定有些人非但不会学习并宣扬真理，实际上还有持续说谎的动机，也就是说，刻意维护并宣扬谬误，即使他们自己也很清楚这些是谬误。（第180页）

Of course, the politicians themselves are among the main villains here. Perhaps more to blame, though, are the intellectuals. These have a compelling and permanent interest in spreading the falsehood of state necessity.

The market demand for intellectual services, in particular in the area of the humanities and the social sciences, is not exactly high and also not exactly stable and secure. Intellectuals would be at the mercy of the values and choices of the masses and the masses are generally uninterested in intellectual and philosophical concerns. The state, on the other hand, as Rothbard has noted, accommodates their typically overinﬂated egos and is willing to oﬀer the intellectuals a warm, secure, and permanent berth in its apparatus, a secure income and the panoply of prestige. And indeed, the modern democratic state in particular has created a massive oversupply of intellectuals. (pp. 182–83)

当然，政客们本身就在其中扮演主要角色，是罪魁祸首。不过，或许更应受指责的是知识分子。他们在宣扬国家不可或缺这一谬论方面，有着强烈且持久的利益诉求。

市场对知识服务的需求，尤其是在人文与社会科学领域，既不算高，也不稳定、不可靠。知识分子将受制于大众的价值观和选择，而大众通常对知识和哲学问题不太感兴趣。而另一方面，正如罗斯巴德所指出的，国家迎合了他们往往过度膨胀的自负心理，并且愿意在其机构中为知识分子提供一个温暖、安稳且永久的职位，一份稳定的收入以及种种声望。事实上，现代民主国家尤其造就了大量过剩的知识分子。（第182-183页）

On the other hand, there is hope. What this is I leave you to ﬁnd out for yourself by reading Hoppe’s lectures. They say more than I can in this foreword. If I must give a teaser, though, all statism is malevolence and rests ultimately on the consent of the oppressed. Let the eyes of the oppressed be opened, and there will be no more statism. Eyes will not be opened by the wooden economising of my second paragraph. They will be opened by a study of history and anthropology to which these essays can be taken as an introduction.

另一方面，希望依然存在。至于这希望究竟是什么，请你通过阅读霍普的讲座自行探寻。它们所传达的内容，比我在这篇序言中所能讲述的更多。不过，如果非要给个引子的话，所有的国家主义都是邪恶的，且最终都依赖于被压迫者的认同。一旦被压迫者开眼觉醒，国家主义便将难以为继。我在第二段中那种刻板的经济分析无法让人们睁开双眼。而研读历史和人类学却可以，霍普的讲座便可作为此类研读的入门引导。

Sean Gabb Deal, England June 2021

肖恩·加布

迪尔，英格兰

2021年6月

自序

In June 2004, at the invitation of Lew Rockwell, I spent one week at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, to present a series of lectures: one in the morning and one in the afternoon, for ﬁve days, in an intimate setting, before a live audience of some ﬁftyplus students and professionals.

2004年6月，应卢·罗克韦尔（Lew Rockwell）的邀请，我在阿拉巴马州奥本市的米塞斯研究院待了一周，举行了一系列讲座：连续五天，每天上午一场、下午一场，在一个较为私密的环境中，面向五十多位学生和专业人士现场开讲。

The goal, as set by Lew Rockwell, was an ambitious one: to present my view of the world and its inner workings. Accordingly, the lectures were to be a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary intellectual endeavor, touching upon questions of philosophy, economics, anthropology, sociology, and history.

卢·罗克韦尔（Lew Rockwell）设定的目标雄心勃勃：让我阐述自己对世界及其内在运行机制的看法。因此，这些讲座将是一次广泛的跨学科知识探索，涉及哲学、经济学、人类学、社会学和历史等诸多领域的问题。

My lectures were not based on a written text, but on notes, supplemented by only a few handouts. Hence, the somewhat informal tone of the following text and its occasional personal and conversational asides. Based on personal experience I do not expect this fact to diminish but rather to actually enhance the appeal and accessibility of the present work, however, and thus felt no need now for any stylistic changes.

当时，我的讲座并非基于书面文稿，而是依靠笔记，并辅以少量讲义展开。因此，以下讲座的风格略显随意，偶尔还会有一些个人化的闲谈旁白。基于个人经验，我并不认为这会削弱文本的吸引力，反而觉得它实际上会提升它的可读性。所以，我认为现在无需对文本风格做任何刻意的修改。

As well, I came to the same conclusion not just regarding style but substance as well. It is nearly twenty years ago now that I presented the following lectures. They were audio taped at the time and a CD was produced. But I never looked back nor listened to these recordings. Indeed, I hardly ever listen to recordings of my own speeches, and in general, insofar as intellectual rather than theatrical or artistic matters are concerned, I much prefer the written over the spoken word. Revisiting now, for the ﬁrst time, in its written form what I had orally presented in 2004, then, I was quite pleasantly surprised and reached the conclusion that I should not ﬁddle around with anything but let everything stand as is. This is not to say, of course, that there is nothing more to say about the wide-ranging subject matters of the following work, but rather, if I may be so immodest to say so, that it is a remarkably solid stepping-stone for more and better things still hopefully to come.

同样，我不仅在文风上保持原样，在内容方面我也未做改动。这些讲座距今已将近二十年。当时讲座录制了音频，并制作成了CD。但我从未回过头去听这些录音。实际上，我几乎从不听自己演讲的录音，而且一般来说，涉及学术问题而非戏剧或艺术方面而言，相较于口头表述，我更偏爱书面文字。那么，如今我首次以书面形式重温2004年口头讲述的内容时，着实感到惊喜，并得出结论：我不应随意改动任何内容，就让一切保持原样。当然，这并不是说对于以下这部作品所涉及的广泛主题已无话可说，而是——如果允许我可以稍微不那么谦虚地说——它是一块非常坚实的垫脚石，有望助力未来产出更多、更出色的成果。

As a matter of fact, I have not stopped reading, writing, and lecturing myself since 2004, and the curious reader may already ﬁnd quite a few additional observations, considerations, and deliberations in my own subsequent works, replete with further references. Among others, there is the second, expanded edition of The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (2006), A Short History of Man (2015), Getting Libertarianism Right (2018) and, most recently, the second, greatly expanded edition of The Great Fiction (2021). As well, those preferring things live and in color may want to take a look at some of the many video recordings made of my speeches in recent years, most notably my regular presentations at the annual Property and Freedom Society (PFS) meetings,all of which are electronically available on my personal home page, www.HansHoppe.com.

事实上，自2004年以来，我自己从未停止阅读、写作与讲学。好奇的读者或许已能在我后续的作品中发现不少额外的观察、思考与研讨内容，且这些作品都有丰富的参考文献。其中包括《私有财产的经济学与伦理学》第二版扩充版（The Economics and Ethics of Private Property ，2006年）、《人类简史》（A Short History of Man，2015年）、《搞对自由意志主义》（Getting Libertarianism Right，2018年），以及最近出版的《伟大的虚构》第二版大幅扩充版（The Great Fiction，2021年）。另外，那些更喜欢生动鲜活内容的读者，不妨看看近年来我诸多演讲的视频记录，尤其是我在年度财产与自由协会（PFS）会议上的定期演讲，所有这些视频录像的电子版皆可在我的个人网站 www.HansHoppe.com 上找到。

Finally, the reader may ﬁnd it of interest to learn a bit about the personal circumstances and the temporal-historical context, in which the present work should be placed. As brieﬂy mentioned in lecture four, when I presented my lectures, in June of 2004, I was in the middle of some major trouble with UNLV, my university. A student had accused me of having violated some standard of “political correctness” and thus creating a “hostile learning environment” for him, and the university had thereupon initiated an official investigation into the matter that would drag on for almost another year. Afterward, in 2005, I told the whole sordid story in an article titled “My Battle with the Thought Police.”1 Yet while I ultimately emerged triumphant from the scandalous aﬀair, it had some lasting impact on my life. Not only had one year of my life been stolen from me as a result, but I had lost much of my former enthusiasm as a teacher and my appreciation of academic life. I had seen ominous signs of the increasing spread of “political correctness” all throughout society before, of course, but I felt myself immune from this, in my eyes, mental disease. In my teaching, I had recognized and accepted no intellectual taboo whatsoever, and, whether because or despite of this, I had enjoyed great popularity among my students. All the while, in my position as a tenured, full professor, I had considered myself well protected by my university from any and all interference with academic freedom. This belief had been severely shattered, and in light of an increasing number of similar events at other universities around the country at the same time, I came to the realization that for me, with my wide-ranging, interdisciplinary intellectual interests, university teaching henceforth would always mean having to choose between self-censorship, on the one hand, or harassment on the other.

最后，读者或许会有兴趣了解一些个人情况以及本作品所处的时代及历史背景。正如在第四讲中简要提到的，2004年6月我举行这些讲座时，正深陷与我所在的内华达大学拉斯维加斯分校（UNLV）的重大麻烦之中。一名学生指控我违反了某些 “政治正确 ”的标准，从而为他营造了 “充满敌意的学习环境”，学校随即对这件事展开了官方调查，该调查持续了近一年。之后在2005年，我在一篇题为《我与思想警察的斗争》[1] 的文章中讲述了整个荒唐不堪的事件。虽然我最终从这一丑闻事件中胜利脱身，但它对我的生活产生了一些持久的影响。这不仅让我损失了一年的光阴，也让我失去了曾经作为教师的热情以及对学术生活的热爱。当然，在此之前，我就已看到 “政治正确 ” 在整个社会中日益泛滥的不祥之兆，但我曾觉得自己不会受到这种在我看来属于精神疾病的影响。在教学中，我从不承认、也不接受任何知识上的禁忌，不管是正出于此还是尽管如此，我都深受学生的喜爱。一直以来，作为一名终身教职的正教授，我曾认为自己受到学校的充分保护，学术自由不会受到任何干扰。但这种信念已被彻底摧毁，鉴于同一时期美国其他大学类似事件越来越多，我意识到，对于有着广泛跨学科知识兴趣的我而言，未来如果继续从事大学教学，意味着我将不得不在“自我审查”和“持续骚扰”之间做出选择。

Luckily, I was to be quickly rescued from this dilemma by some fortunate turn in my personal life, however, that allowed me to resign from my university position and continue my scholarly work outside of official academia. Looking back now, I would say “just in time,” because matters only got worse, and rapidly so. During my student days, in Germany, universities constituted to a large extent still anarchic orders made up of dozens of little autonomous intellectual kingdoms and ﬁefdoms, freely competing or cooperating with each other, and university students made up no more than 7 or 8 percent of an age group. Since then, universities have been increasingly transformed into huge, highly centralized organizations, ruled by a central committee of bureaucrats and a steadily growing mass of administrative assistants, while students now, in the US, make up more than 50 per cent of an age group. Under these circumstances, with a bureaucratic central committee in charge, and whether by commission or omission, universities,then, pressured by so-called anti-fascist student mobs and Black Lives Matter hoodlums and egged on therein by some professorial frauds, fakes and fools thus catapulted to public prominence, have been increasingly turned into indoctrination camps of “political correctness,” or “wokeness,” as deﬁned by a few theoreticians of “cultural Marxism.” And not quite unlike Mao’s erstwhile cultural revolution with its Red Guards, then, this wokeness movement has made great strides toward its goal of subverting and ultimately destroying all traditional Western standards of human excellence, merit, achievement and, indeed, normality and all things normal, and silencing, ousting or beating into submission anyone daring to dissent from the one and only correct, woke political party line.

不过，幸运的是，我个人生活中一些幸运的转机迅速将我从这一困境中解救出来，并使我得以辞去大学教职，在官方学术体制之外继续我的学术工作。现在回想起来，我会说 “来得正是时候”，因为情况只会变得更糟，而且迅速恶化。我在德国求学时，大学在很大程度上仍是一种无政府状态，由几十个自治的学术小王国和领地组成，它们相互自由竞争或合作，大学生在同龄人中所占比例不超过7%或8%。从那时起，大学越来越多地转变为庞大的、高度中心化的机构，由一个官僚组成的中央委员会和数量不断增加的行政助理管理。而如今在美国，大学生在同龄人中所占比例超过50%。在这种情况下，由官僚中央委员会掌权，无论是主动作为还是不作为，在所谓反法西斯学生暴徒和 “黑命贵” 流氓团伙的压力下，又受到一些教授骗子、冒牌货和蠢货的煽动——这些人借此迅速成为公众焦点，大学日益沦为 “政治正确” 或 “觉醒主义”（由一些 “文化马克思主义” 理论家所定义）的滥觞之地。这与毛泽东当年的 “文化大革命” 及其红卫兵运动并无二致，“觉醒主义” 运动在实现其颠覆并最终摧毁西方所有关于人类的卓越、功绩、成就以及正常状态和所有正常事物的传统标准这一目标上取得了巨大进展，并同时打压、驱逐任何敢于对唯一伟光正的 “觉醒” 政党路线表达异议之人，直至最终迫使他们屈服。

Today, in contemporary university, in the US, the UK, Germany, and many other Western countries, then, many things said or noted in the following can no longer be said or noted without fear of serious repercussions: without open calls for cancellation, censorship, apology, confession of guilt or even harassment, threat and loss of job and livelihood. The more reason, then, to thank Lew Rockwell, the Mises Institute, and in particular the many generous donors, who have made the present publication possible.

如今，在美国、英国、德国以及其他许多西方国家的当代大学里，以下所谈及或提及的许多内容，若再公开表达，就难免会引发严重后果：可能会遭遇公开的抵制呼吁、审查、要求道歉、认罪，甚至是骚扰、威胁，乃至失去工作与生计。正因如此，我们更应感谢卢·罗克韦尔、米塞斯研究院，尤其是众多慷慨的捐赠者，是他们让本书得以出版。

Hans-Hermann Hoppe

May 2021

汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普

2021年5月

第一讲人的本质与人类生存状况：语言、财产与生产

What I want to do in this seminar is to reconstruct world history from the bottom up, from the beginning of mankind to the present, and gradually enlarge and expand the picture. I will give you a brief overview of what I have planned, but let me say from the outset that I have never given these lectures in this form before. I have presented some of these topics in various lectures, and in my class on comparative systems I talk about subjects similar to the subjects that I will deal with in this seminar. But never before have I presented lectures structured in this way.

此次讲座，我欲自下而上地重构世界历史，从人类起源直至当下，逐步丰富和拓展这幅历史画卷。先简要概述一下我的计划，但我先声明一点，我之前从未以这种形式做过这些讲座。我在不同讲座中曾提及过其中一些主题，而且在我的比较制度课程中，也探讨过与本次讲座类似的主题。但我之前从未以这样的架构讲授过这些内容。

To give you some basic idea as to how this whole thing is structured, in the ﬁrst lecture I want to talk about the nature of man, comparing men with animals and illuminating the major diﬀerences, and characterizing what one can call the human condition, the condition that mankind ﬁnds itself confronted with. In the second lecture, I will talk about the spread of humans across the globe and the development, i.e., the extensiﬁcation and the intensiﬁcation, of the division of labor. And the third lecture deals with the next element in human and economic development, that is, the development of money and the expansion of the use of money and the consequences that money has for the development of the division of labor. The next fundamental element, lecture four, will be the theory of time preference, and of capital and technology, and of economic growth.

为了让你们对整个内容的架构有个基本了解，在第一讲中，我想探讨人的本质，将人类与动物进行比较，阐明主要差异，并描述所谓的人类生存状况，即人类所面临的状况。在第二讲，我会讲述人类在全球的扩散，以及劳动分工的发展，也就是劳动分工在广度和深度上的拓展。第三讲将探讨人类与经济发展中的下一个要素，即货币的发展、货币使用范围的扩大，以及货币对劳动分工的发展所产生的影响。下一个基本要素将在第四讲介绍，即时间偏好理论、资本与技术理论，以及经济增长理论。

All of the lectures, by the way, will contain theoretical elements as well as historical elements. I am not a historian by profession. My advantage is that I know more theory than most historians, and because of that I reconstruct history in a slightly diﬀerent way than a historian might do it.

顺便说一下，所有讲座都将包含理论元素和历史元素。我并非专业历史学家。我的优势在于，相较于大多数历史学家，我对理论的了解更为深入。正因如此，我重构历史的方式可能会与历史学家略有不同。

The ﬁfth lecture will deal with ideological factors that have an inﬂuenceon social and economic development, that is, in particular, religion; this will be a lecture on comparative religions and comparative ideologies. Lecture six will be dealing with details of the theory of private property and the issue of how societies would defend property, i.e., property rights, with special reference to feudal societies and what defense mechanisms would be used in modern societies where we can take some ideas from the feudal age. In lectureseven we will deal with parasitic behavior, that is, exploitative behavior and the origin of the state. And lecture eight will be based on something that I have done in my book Democracy: The God That Failed, discussing the transition from monarchical states or monarchical governments to democratic governments. Lecture nine will deal with states and imperialism and war. And the ﬁnal lecture will address some strategic issues; that is, how do we go from here to a society that is free, or at least more free than the current one.

第五讲将探讨影响社会和经济发展的意识形态因素，尤其是宗教；这将是一场关于比较不同宗教和不同意识形态的讲座。第六讲将深入探讨私有财产理论的细节，以及社会如何捍卫财产，即财产权，重点会提及封建社会，以及现代社会可借鉴封建时代哪些理念来构建防御机制。第七讲我们将探讨寄生行为，也就是剥削行为以及国家的起源。第八讲将基于我在《民主：失败的上帝》一书中的观点，讨论从君主制国家或君主制政府向民主政府的转变。第九讲将探讨国家、帝国主义与战争问题。最后一讲将阐述一些策略问题，即我们如何从当前状态迈向一个自由的社会，或至少是比现在更自由的社会。

So, with this, let me begin to talk about the nature of man and the human condition and speak in particular about three elements that are unique to mankind. First is language, the second is property, and the third is production or technology. Now, you realize that when we begin all of this here, we are already talking. We are already using some of our capabilities, some of our skills and achievements that are the result of human evolution; that is, the reconstruction that I will oﬀer of human history already makes use of some of the tools that have only gradually evolved in the course of time. Actually, the origin of language is dated back roughly to somewhere between 150,000 and 50,000 years ago. All of these estimates are, of course, as you can imagine, rather vague;nobody was around at that time to record exactly when they started talking. But these are the numbers that some geneticists and biologists and anthropologists give us for the beginning. And you will notice something else, from the fact that we begin all of this enterprise by talking to each other, that humans are social animals.

那么，话不多说，就我开始讲人的本质和人类生存状况，尤其要谈谈人类独有的三个要素。第一是语言，第二是财产，第三是生产或技术。此刻，大家应该意识到，我们一开始探讨这个话题，就已经在交流了。我们已经在运用自身的一些能力、技能，这些都是人类进化的成果。也就是说，我对人类历史的重构，已经用到了一些随着时间推移逐步进化而来的工具。实际上，语言的起源大致可追溯到15万至5万年前的某个时期。当然，大家可以想象，所有这些估算都相当粗略、模糊，毕竟当时没有人在一旁准确记录人类何时开始说话。但这是一些遗传学家、生物学家和人类学家给出的起始时间范围。从我们以相互交谈、开启这个探讨的过程，大家还会注意到另一件事，即人类是社会性动物。

You are aware of the fact that there are people who are interested in game theory, for instance, who seem to have trouble sometimes explaining why people cooperate at all and do not ﬁght each other all the time. But the funny thing is that this debate already takes place using language, which, in a way, from the outset, explains that there must be something wrong with this idea that mankind at some point was, so to speak, deciding whether they should ﬁght each other or whether they should not ﬁght each other. Obviously, as soon as mankind began to talk with each other, they must have already recognized that there are certain advantages to doing this and to being social in one’s endeavors. And it’s perfectly clear from the outset what the great advantage is of having a language available and communicating with other people, since we can convey knowledge to other people in a much faster way than would be possible if we simply had to look at what other people are doing and then try to reconstruct the ideas that are behind what they are doing. Through the use of language we have the possibility of communicating directly what it was that led us to do this or led us to do something else.

大家都知道，比如有些对博弈论感兴趣的人，有时似乎很难解释为什么人们会选择合作，而不是一直相互争斗不休。但有趣的是，这种争论本身就已经在借助语言进行了，从某种程度上说，这从一开始就表明，那种认为人类在某个阶段要 “决定” 是相互争斗还是不争斗，这种观点肯定存在问题。显然，人类一开始相互交谈，就必然已经意识到这样做以及在活动中保持社会性会有某些好处。从一开始就很清楚，拥有语言并与他人交流有很大的好处，因为与仅仅通过观察他人行为，然后试图推断其背后的想法相比，我们可以用快得多的方式将知识传递给他人。通过语言的运用，我们有可能直接传达是什么促使我们做这件事，或促使我们做其他事情。

Now, with language, two ideas emerged and I use here the ideas that were developed ﬁrst by an Austrian psychologist, Karl Bühler, who also had some inﬂuenceon Karl Popper, who uses his ideas. Karl Bühler makes the point that when we look at language, we can distinguish between four diﬀerent functions, two of which we ﬁnd already on the animal level and two of which are unique to humans. On the animal level, we ﬁnd the use of symbols or sounds that express something like pain, for instance. That is an expressive function of language, which we can ascribe easily also to animals and say, in this sense, that they can express some internal feelings. On the other hand, language has sometimes a signal function; that is, we can produce sounds that indicate there is some danger coming, warn other animals to run away, or something like this. And this, of course, is also possible for humans to do. Language has an expressive function for us and also has this signal function, to make other people aware of things.

现在，关于语言，产生了两种观点。这里我采用的是奥地利心理学家卡尔·比勒（Karl Bühler）首先提出的观点，他对卡尔·波普尔（Karl Popper）也有一定影响，波普尔就运用了他的观点。卡尔·比勒指出，如果我们审视语言，可以划分出四种不同的功能，其中两种在动物层面也能找到，另外两种则为人类所特有。在动物层面，比如我们会发现动物使用符号或声音来表达类似痛苦的感受。这是语言的表达功能，在这个意义上说，我们也可以轻易地将其归于动物，认为它们能够表达一些内在感受。另一方面，语言有时具有信号功能，也就是说，我们可以发出声音，表明有危险来临，警告其他动物“快逃跑”之类的。当然，人类也能做到这点。语言对我们来说具有表达功能，同时也有这种信号功能，能让其他人意识到某些事情。

That is, for expressions and signals, whether that is true or not is not really an issue, but when we say, “this is such and such,” then it becomes possible to ask, “Is that really the case?,” and we can try to ﬁnd out whether this is the case or not. So, the idea of tools comes into being, because language has a descriptive function and the most primitive descriptive propositions would be of the type “this is such and such”; that is, having a proper name or an identifying expression, and then a general term characterizing a particular object as having some general characteristics.

在动物王国中不存在具有描述功能的语言，即那种表述 “这是如此这般” 的语言。随着语言描述功能的出现，“真理” 的概念首次应运而生。也就是说，对于表达和信号而言，其是否真实并非真正的问题，但当我们说 “这是如此这般” 时，就有可能追问 “真的是这样吗？”，并且我们可以尝试弄清楚是否真的如此。所以，工具的概念由此产生，因为语言具有描述功能，而最原始的描述性命题会是 “这是如此这般” 这种类型，即有一个专有名称或识别性表述，然后用一个通用术语来描述某个特定对象具有某些一般特征。

The second unique human function of language is the argumentative function, that we have complex statements connected by “and” and “or,” several statements combined with each other, and that we investigate whether certain arguments are valid or not and investigate whether we draw inferences in the correct way or incorrect way and so forth. And you realize that it is precisely this last function, this argumentative function, that we must also use as a tool, if we now want to make a more precise distinction between the abilities of man on the one hand and the diﬀerent abilities of animals on the other.

语言的第二种人类特有的功能是论证功能，即我们会用 “与”“或” 等词连接复杂的陈述，将多个陈述相互组合，探究某些论点是否有效，考察我们进行推理的方式正确与否等等。你会意识到，正是这最后一个功能，即论证功能，我们也必须把它作为一种工具来使用，如果我们现在打算更精确地区分人类的能力与动物的不同能力。

And I want to follow here with philosopher Brand Blanshard, who has pointed out some important diﬀerences between animals and humans. I want to begin with a short quote from Blanshard in a book, Reason and Analysis, where he says this about animals and then draws a conclusion that this is somehow still very diﬀerent from what mankind can do. He asks, “What does it mean to have human reason or human rationality?” And he answers, “It cannot be consciousness, of course, because no one can sensibly doubt that animals feel fear and hunger and pleasure and pain.” Animals can also make mistakes, which we recognize, as when, for instance,a dog drops a bone for a more inviting bone that he sees in the water. And since only judgments can be mistaken, animals must also in some way be able to make judgments to come to the conclusion that “I made a wrong judgment.” And since judgment is thought, we can also say that animals think, but they do, obviously, not think in the same way as humans do.

在此，我想借鉴哲学家布兰德·布兰沙德（Brand Blanshard）的观点，他指出了动物与人类之间一些重要的差异。我先引用布兰沙德在《理性与分析》一书中的一段话讲起，他谈到动物的情况，然后得出结论，认为这与人类所能做到的仍有很大不同。他问道：“拥有人类理性意味着什么？” 他回答说：“当然不可能是意识，因为没人会合理地怀疑动物能感受到恐惧、饥饿、愉悦和痛苦。” 动物也会犯错，这一点我们都知道，比如，一只狗可能会为了去够水中看起来更诱人的骨头，而丢掉嘴里的骨头。既然只有判断才会出错，那么动物在某种程度上肯定也能做出判断，进而得出 “我做出了错误判断” 的结论。既然判断就是思考，我们也可以说动物会思考，但显然，它们的思考方式与人类不同。

Now, what is the diﬀerence between our way of thinking and their way of thinking? Let me emphasize four points in this connection which partly overlap. The ﬁrst thing to be noted is that animal thought is always tied to perception, whereas human thought can wander around, go back to the past, wander to the future, can think about objects that are far away, can even think about objects that have never existed. Animals cannot think in this way. Whatever they’rethinking, it requires some present cue, some observation from which their thinking arises. We can imagine, for instance, that animals can also think, to a certain extent, about things that are absent, as if a dog sits in front of a house because the dog knows that his master has gone into the house and waits there patiently until the master comes back out. But even there you can still see that it is tied to perception. If he had not seen the master go into the house, he would not do what he does, sitting there waiting. And in any case, he cannot think about things that are far away, or impossible, or things in the far distant future. So, that’s the ﬁrst thing: animal thought is tied to perception and human thought is, in this way, freed up from perception.

那么，我们的思维方式与它们的思维方式有何不同呢？就此我想强调四点，这几点部分存在交集。首先要注意的是，动物的思维总是与感知紧密相连，而人类的思维，则如同脱缰野马，既能回溯往昔，又能驰骋于未来想象之中，甚至构建出那些从未在现实中留下痕迹的概念与景象。动物无法这样思考。无论它们在思考什么，都需要一些当下的线索，一些能引发其思考的观察。例如，我们可以想象，动物在一定程度上也能思考不在视线范围内的事物，就像一只忠犬守候在屋前，因为它知晓主人已进屋，便耐心地等待主人再次出现。但即便如此，你仍能看出这与感知紧密相连。若未见主人进屋之举，它便不会如此守候。更遑论那些遥不可及、纯属虚构的构想，或是关于遥远未来的沉思，这些对于动物而言，都是难以触及的思维领域。所以，第一点就是：动物的思维与感知紧密相连，而人类的思维则以这种方式从感知中解放出来。

That brings me to the second point. There is one other phenomenon, the diﬀerence between humans and animals, that shows they can not do this. Even if you think they might think about this sort of stuﬀ, they have no way of conveying this type of information to us. Or you can say, animals can’t abstract in the way that humans can abstract. Certainly, animals can see shapes and colors and they can perceive smells and things like this, but it doesn’t seem to be the case that they have a concept of shapes, of triangles, or a concept of green or blue or yellow, or a concept of diﬀerent types of smells. Again, this is an aspect of what I just mentioned; it is tied to speciﬁc events, but they cannot abstract from the speciﬁc event and build a general concept. If they could, then we would expect them to form a word for these things, and it is not that animals are not capable of producing sounds. Many animals do have the equipment to produce sounds. So, this does not explain why they don’t have words. Obviously, despite the fact that they can form sounds, they cannot form what we refer to as words, sounds to which we attach a certain abstract idea of which we ﬁnd various instances in the real world.

这就引出了我要说的第二点。还有一个现象能说明人类与动物之间的差异，表明动物无法做到人类能做之事。即便你觉得动物可能会思考这类事情，但它们也没办法将这类信息传达给我们。或者可以说，动物无法像人类那样抽象思维。当然，动物确实能看到形状、颜色，亦能闻到气味之类的，但它们似乎并没有形状的概念，比如三角形的概念，也没有绿色、蓝色或黄色的概念，或者不同气味类型的概念。这又是我刚才提到内容的一个方面，动物的认知与特定事物相关联，但它们无法从特定事物中抽象出普遍概念。如果它们能做到，那我们应该会期待它们为这些事物创造出词汇，而动物并非没有发声能力。许多动物都具备发声器官。所以，这并不能解释它们为什么没有词汇。显然，尽管它们能发出声音，但却无法形成我们所说的词汇，也就是那些我们赋予了某种抽象概念，且能在现实世界找到各种实例的声音。

The third thing that distinguishes mankind from animals is that animals cannot make explicit inferences. Again, this has something intimately to do with the two points that I already made. Animals can, of course, make inferences, but these inferences are implicit. That is to say, if you have a chicken and you give a piece of food to the chicken that is too big, doesn’t ﬁt into its mouth, and it is desperate that it can’t eat it. Then, if you throw another piece of roughly the same size in front of it, the chicken might refuse to even try to do the same with the second piece of material because it recognizes that it didn’t work with the ﬁrst, it’s not likely to work with the second. But again, due to the lack of concepts, they cannot make explicit inferences; that is, infer from one concept to another and thereby be able to say why such-and-such caused such-and-such a problem and why it would be in vain to try the same thing twice that already didn’t work in the ﬁrst case.

人类与动物的第三个区别在于，动物无法进行明确的推理。这同样与我之前提到的两点密切相关。当然，动物能够进行推理，但这些推理是隐含的。也就是说，假设有一只鸡，你给它一块太大、塞不进嘴里的食物，它会因吃不到而着急。然后，如果你在它面前再扔一块大小差不多的食物，这只鸡可能甚至都不会尝试去吃第二块，因为它意识到第一块吃不了，第二块很可能也吃不了。但同样，由于缺乏概念，它们无法进行明确的推理，也就是从一个概念推导出另一个概念，从而阐述清楚为什么这样或那样的情况会导致这样或那样的问题，以及为什么已经失败过一次的事情，再次尝试依然是徒劳的。

The most important diﬀerence between animals and humans is the fact that animals do not have what we call self-consciousness. They do have consciousness, but not self-consciousness, and what I mean by selfconsciousness is that they cannot mentally stand back and reﬂect on their own behavior. They cannot pause and criticize their own behavior, think about why their behavior was successful or unsuccessful. They do not have anything like norms or principles against which they can judge their own behavior and criticize their own behavior. Let me on this point again quote Blanshard on this most important of diﬀerences, that is, the human capacity for self-conscious reﬂection. There he says,

Finally, human reason has added an extra dimension to the animal consciousness in the form of self-consciousness. An animal lacks the power, which is the source in ourselves, of so much achievement and so much woe, of standing oﬀ from itself and contemplating what it is doing. It eats, sleeps and cavorts, but never pauses in the midst of a meal, to take note that it’s eating greedily, never asks, was it not unseemly to sleep the hours away …1

动物与人类之间最重要的区别在于，动物不具备我们所说的自我意识。它们确实有意识，但没有自我意识。我所说的自我意识是指，它们无法在脑海中后退一步，反思自己的行为。它们不会停下来，批评自己的行为，思考自己的行为何以成功或失败。它们没有任何类似规范或原则的东西，以此来评判和批评自己的行为。关于这一最重要的区别，即人类的自我意识、反思能力，我在此再次引用布兰沙德的话：

最后，人类理性以自我意识（self-consciousness）的形式，在动物意识之上增添了一个额外维度。动物缺乏这一维度的能力，而这种能力是我们人类诸多成就的源泉，也是诸多痛苦的根源。人类能从自身抽离出来，审视自己正做之事。人和动物一样进食、睡觉、嬉戏，但后者从不会在进食途中停下来，反思自己是否有饕餮之欲，也从不会问，虚度光阴是否有失体统……[2]

You see, in some respects, of course, humans have not developed that far beyond.

…apparently, never reﬂects, as it leaps and runs, that it is a little oﬀ-form today. It makes mistakes, but having made one, it cannot sit down and consider what principle of right thinking is violated. Because it cannot contemplate its own behavior it cannot criticize itself; being below the level of self-criticism, it has no norms; and having no norms, it lacks one great obvious essential to the life of reason, namely, the power to be guided by principle.2

你看，在某些方面，人类当然并没有发展到远超动物的程度。

……显然，当它（动物）蹦跶奔跑时，从来不会反思自己今天的状态有点不对。它会犯错，但犯了错之后，它无法静下心来思考自己违背了正确思维的哪条原则。因为它无法审视自己的行为，所以无法自我批评；由于达不到自我批评的层次，自然也就没有准则；而没有准则，它就缺失了理性生活中一个显而易见又至关重要之因素——按原则行事的能力。[3]

And Blanshard then summarizes all of what I tried to convey up to this point, by saying the following:

When we say that man is a rational animal, then, we seem to imply that he can command ideas independently of sense, independently of perception, that he can abstract; that he can infer explicitly and that he can sit in judgment on himself. The highest of animals can do none of these things. The stupidest of man, if not a pathological case, can in some measure do them all.3

接着，布兰沙德总结了我至此试图阐述的所有内容，他说道：

当我们说人是理性动物之时，仿佛意味着他能够独立于感觉、独立于感知掌控观念，能够进行抽象思考；能够进行明确的推理，还能够审视自己。最聪慧的动物也做不到这些事。而即使最愚笨之人，只要不是病理性的，在某种程度上都能做到。[4]

So much about the human ability, the human language ability, is characterized in particular by our abilities of self-reﬂection, self-criticism, self-control, and so forth.

关于人类能力，尤其是人类的语言能力，其特点在很大程度上体现在我们的自我反思、自我批评、自我控制等能力上。

These capabilities we can now use in order to describe the human condition, which will be my next step. And this human condition can be characterized in the following way: mankind ﬁnds itself equipped with consciousness, and discovers that we have a physical body, and discovers that there is something outside of the physical body, what economists call “land,” that is, nature-given resources, things outside, independent of our bodies. And what we learn immediately is that our bodies are constantly and permanently pressed by various needs, and that we have to act in order to satisfy these needs. What man immediately discovers is that certain things he can control directly; that is, we can all discover that we can directly control our own bodies. I can just say “I lift my arm” and my arm is lifted, or “I lift my leg” and my leg will go up. And we realize that nobody else can control my body this way.

接下来，我们可以用这些能力来阐述人类生存状况，这将是我接下来要讲的内容。人类生存状况可以用以下方式来描述：人类发现自身具备意识，察觉到我们拥有一个肉体，还发现肉体之外存在着某些东西，经济学家称之为 “土地”（“land”），也就是自然赋予的资源，那些独立于我们身体之外的事物。我们很快就了解到，我们的身体始终不断地受到各种需求的驱使，我们必须采取行动来满足这些需求。人类很快就会发现，有些事物他可以直接控制；也就是说，我们都能发现我们可以直接控制自己的身体。我只要说 “我举手”，我的手臂就举起来了，或者说 “我抬腿”，我的腿就会抬起来。而且我们意识到，这种对身体的直接控制是他人无法僭越的。

Everybody can do that with his own body, of course, but we have this ability of directly controlling something only with very limited things. I cannot control you directly; I can only control you by being in direct control of my own physical body ﬁrst; then I can, of course, make an indirect attempt to also control you. This explains why we have the concept of I, of me, because certain things only I can do, and that distinguishes me from the outset from everybody else. This is what I can do and nobody can do this to my arm in the way I can do it. We can also say that we discover then, immediately, what we mean by having a free will. I can just want this; I just pick this up and that’s it. There’s nothing that forces me; it’s just my own wanting it, so that makes it so. And we also develop, immediately, some sort of idea of what it means to cause something. I am the cause of this bottle of water being in my hand and I am the cause of now drinking out of it. We recognize our unique relationship that we have to our own physical body and that other people have to their own physical bodies. We know that because of this, I am not you, and you are not me. We understand the concept of cause and we understand the concept of free will. Then we recognize, second, that there are other things out there that we can only control indirectly, with the help of those things that we can control directly. With the help of our body, we can attempt to control things that exist external to our own physical body. We refer to those things as means.

当然，每个人都能对自己的身体做到这一点，但我们这种直接控制事物的能力，仅适用于非常有限的事物。我无法直接控制你；我只能先直接控制我自己的身体，然后，我当然可以尝试通过间接方式来控制你。这就解释了为什么我们有 “我” 这个概念，因为某些事情只有我能做到，从一开始这就将我与其他人区分开来。这是我能做到的，而没人能像我控制自己的手臂那样控制我的手臂。我们也可以说，我们很快就明白了拥有自由意志意味着什么。我想要这个，就直接将把它拿起，如此而已。无人强迫于我，仅仅是我自己想如此行事，所以结果如此。同时，我们也会立即形成某种观念，知道 “原因 ”意味着什么。我是这瓶水在我手中的原因，也是我现在畅饮这瓶水的原因。我们认识到自己与自身肉体之间独特的关系，同时也认识到其他人与他们自身肉体之间的关系。我们知道，正因如此，子非吾，吾亦非子。我们理解了因果的概念，也理解了自由意志的概念。其次，我们认识到，还有其他一些事物，我们只能借助那些我们能直接控制的东西，以间接方式来控制。借助我们的身体，我们可以尝试控制存在于我们身体之外的事物。我们把这些事物称作手段。

And we realize also that there exist things that we cannot control at all. We cannot control sunshine or rain; we cannot control the movement of the moon or the stars. Those things we refer to as the environment, which we have to take as a given, as something that is beyond our control. The borderline between those things that we can control and those things that we cannot control, the borderline, so to speak, between those that are means and what is the environment in which we act, is moveable; that is, certain things might come within our reach and can become controllable that were initially not controllable.

我们也意识到，存在一些我们根本无法控制的事物。我们无法控制阳光、雨露，无法控制月亮或星星的运行。我们将这些事物称为环境，将其视为给定的、超出我们控制范围之外的东西。可以说，我们能够控制的事物与无法控制的事物之间的界限，也就是手段与我们所处行动环境之间的界限，并非固定不变；也就是说，某些起初我们无法控制的事物，后来可能会进入我们的掌控范围，变得可以控制。

Just think of something simple like building a tool, for instance, that makes it possible for you to reach something up high that you initially couldn’t, or reach heights that you could initially not reach, or down to depths that you initially could not reach. The borderline between the range of objects that become means and the range of objects that remain environment, this boundary is movable or ﬂexible. It might well be the case that one day, we will be able to just move the moon around by waving certain types of tools or instruments, but currently we are not able to do so.

想想一些简单的事，比如制造一个工具，它能让你够到原本够不着的高处的物品，或者达至原本无法企及的高度，又或者触及原本够不到的深度。能够成为手段的事物范围与仍属于环境范畴的事物之间的界限，是可变动的、灵活的。很有可能有一天，我们只需挥动某些工具或器械就能够移动月球，但目前我们还做不到。

Then, man learns that some of the means, some of the things that he can control, that he can move, that he can manipulate, can be referred to as “goods” and others can be referred to as “bads.” Goods would obviously be those means that are suitable in order to satisfy some needs that we have, and bads would be objects that we can control, but that would have negative repercussions on us, that would not satisfy any needs but, to the contrary, may harm us or even kill us.

接着，人类认识到，在那些自己能够控制、移动和操纵的手段之中，有些可称为“财货”（“goods”），有些则可称为“劣货”（ “bads”）。显然，财货是指那些有助于满足我们某些需求的手段，而劣货则是我们能够控制，但会对我们产生负面影响的东西，它们不仅无法满足任何需求，反而可能伤害我们，甚至危及生命。

At this point, let me read you the deﬁnition of goods. “Goods” are means that can be controlled and which are suitable for the satisfaction of human needs or ends. I will give you the deﬁnition that Carl Menger provided us with. Menger pointed out that there are four requirements for objects to become goods for us. The ﬁrst is the existence of a human need. The second requirement is such properties as render the thing capable of being brought into a causal connection with a satisfaction of this need. That is, this object must be capable, through our performing certain manipulations with it, to cause certain needs to be satisﬁed or at least relieved. The third condition is that there must be human knowledge about this connection, which explains, of course, why it is important for people to learn to distinguish between goods and bads. Thus, we have human knowledge about the object, our ability to control it, and the causal power of this object to lead to certain types of satisfactory results. And the fourth factor is, as I already indicated, that we must have command of the thing sufficient to direct it to the satisfaction of the need. In this sense, for instance, eventhough we might consider sunshine to be a good or rain to be a good, neither would be an economic good, because we have no control over the objects that are capable of producing sunlight or rain. Only objects that we can bring under our control, and then lead to certain results, would be referred to as economic goods. Man then learns that some goods are immediately useful. We refer to those goods as consumer goods. They can be appropriated and almost instantly turned into some form of satisfaction. And we also learn that most things, however, are only indirectly useful. They require that we must transform them in some way, that wereshape them in some way, that we move or relocate them in some way, using our intelligence in order to lead to satisfaction. And those objects that we have to do something intelligent to, before they lead to satisfaction, we would call producer goods.

此时，我给大家读一下财货的定义。“财货”是能够被掌控且适合满足人类需求或目的的手段。我将给出卡尔·门格尔为我们提供的定义。门格尔指出，物品要成为我们的财货，需满足四个条件。第一，存在人类需求。第二个条件是具备某些属性，使该物品能够与满足这一需求建立起因果联系。也就是说，通过我们对该物品进行某些操作，它必须能够使某些需求得到满足，或至少得到缓解。第三个条件是，人类必须知晓这种联系，这当然也就解释了为什么人们学会区分财货和劣货很重要。因此，我们对物品有所了解，具备掌控它的能力，且该物品具有产生特定满意结果的因果效力。正如我已提到的，第四个因素是，我们必须能够充分掌控该物品，以使其用于满足需求。从这个意义上说，例如，尽管我们可能认为阳光或雨水是有益的，但它们都不是经济财货，因为我们无法控制能够产生阳光或雨水的物体。只有那些我们能够掌控并进而产生特定结果的物品，才会被称为经济财货。接着，人类认识到有些财货能立即发挥作用。我们将这些财货称为消费品（consumer goods）。它们可以被占有，并几乎能立刻转化为某种形式的满足。然而，我们也认识到，大多数物品只是间接有用。它们需要我们以某种方式对其进行改造、重塑，或以某种方式移动或重新归置它们，运用我们的智慧来实现满足。而那些在带来满足感之前，我们必须运用智慧对其做处理的物品，我们称之为生产品（producer goods）。

And man also recognizes—and this brings me to my second main point—besides language, the concept of property. I already made the point with respect to our physical bodies, where it is intuitively clear that people recognize that “this is my body, because I am the only one who can do this with it and nobody else can.” I have a unique relationship to my body, a relationship unlike what anybody else has. When it comes now to economic means, a similar idea arises. Those people who appropriate certain objects, and bring them under their control in order to satisfy certain desires, have thereby also, of course, established a unique relationship to those things that they have appropriated for the ﬁrst time, and they consider those things also theirs. Maybe not in the same direct way as with my body, but as an extension of my body. I used, after all, my body in order to appropriate these things and in this sense I have a unique relationship with these objects as well. Let me read to you, in this connection,a quote from Herbert Spencer, who also explains the naturalness of the idea of property. He says

that even intelligent animals display a sense of proprietorship, negating the belief propounded by some that individual property was not recognized by primitive man. When we see the claim to exclusive possession understood by a dog, so that he ﬁghts in defense of his master’s clothes, if left in charge of them, it becomes impossible to suppose that even in their lowest state, men were devoid of those ideas and emotions, which initiate private ownership. All that may be fairly assumed is, that these ideas and sentiments were ﬁrst less developed than they have since become.4

而人类也认识到——这引出了我的第二个要点——除了语言，还有财产的概念。关于我们的身体，我已经指出，人们凭直觉就清楚地认识到“这是我的身体，因为只有我能对它做这些，而其他人都不行”。我与我的身体有一种独特的关系，这种关系不同于其他任何人与我身体的关系。当涉及到经济手段时，类似的观念便浮现而出了。那些占有某些物品，并将其置于自己控制之下以满足特定欲望之人，当然也因此与这些被他们首次占有的物品之间建立起了一种独特的关系，并且也将这些物品视为己有。也许不像我与自己身体的关系那样直接，但可以看作是我身体的一种延伸。毕竟，我是利用自己的身体来占有这些物品的，在此意义上来说，我与这些物品之间也存在一种独特的关系。关于这种联系，在此我想引用赫伯特·斯宾塞的一段话，他也解释了财产观念的天然性。他说：

甚至，聪明的动物也表现出一种所有权意识，这否定了一些人所主张的原始人不认可个人财产的观点。当我们看到狗明白排他性占有物品的概念，比如若它被托付看守主人的衣物，它会奋起保护这些衣物，就很难想象即使处于最原始状态的人类，会缺乏催生私有制的那些观念和情感。我们只能合理地假设，这些观念和情感最初并不像后来那样发展得那么成熟。 [5]

While in the early stages, it is difficult, not to say impossible, to establish a mark of individual claims to part of the area wandered over in search of food—and I’ll come to that subject later on in a future lecture—it is not difficult to mark oﬀ the claims to moveable things and to habitations, and these claims we ﬁnd habitually recognized.

在人类早期阶段，设置个人权利主张的标识，用以划定涉足的觅食区域，即便并非不可能，也是相当困难的——我会在后续讲座中探讨这个话题。然而，对可移动之物和住所标识所有权主张却并不困难，而且我们发现，这些权利主张通常会得到认可。

It is perfectly clear that moveable objects, tools, and so forth that people have were at all times recognized as their private property in those objects. In the most primitive of men, the concept of private property exists, not only with respect to his physical body, but also with respect to those appropriated means of production that indirectly satisﬁed his various desires.

显而易见，人们所拥有的可移动的物品、工具等诸如此类的物品，一直以来都被视为他们的私有财产。即使在最原始的人类当中，私有财产的概念也是存在的，不仅体现在他们对自身身体的认知上，也体现在那些被占有的、间接满足其各种欲望的生产资料上。

Now let me elaborate a little bit on this concept of property by introducing a second person, call him Friday, and then, you recall, we are already talking with each other, so we have to assume that these types of Fridays existed from the very outset of mankind. With a second person present, it becomes possible that conﬂicts over scarce goods can arise. It is not possible that conﬂicts arise over things that are in superabundance, or that conﬂicts arise with regard to events caused by the environment. We cannot inﬂuence the environment, and if there exists a superabundance of goods, then it is possible that people may have different ideas of what should be done or should not be done with a good, because whatever I do, it doesn’t aﬀect what other people can do with the same type of good, because it simply exists in superabundance.

现在让我通过引入第二个人来详细阐述一下“财产”这个概念，我们称他为“星期五”（译者注：引用自《鲁滨逊漂流记》中的角色）。大家需要记得，我们已经在彼此交流了，所以必须假设这类“星期五”从人类诞生之初就已存在。当有第二个人出现时，围绕稀缺资源的冲突就有可能发生。不过，在资源极为充裕过剩的事物上，或是与环境导致的事件相关的方面，冲突是不可能发生的。我们无法影响环境，而且如果存在极度丰富的资源，那么人们可能会对某一资源“应该如何使用或不应该如何使用”有不同的想法，因为无论我怎么做，都不会影响其他人对同一类资源的使用——原因很简单，这类资源极其丰富。

From the most primitive stages of mankind on, what people recognize is how to solve these possible conﬂicts with regard to scarce resources. They will point out that, “Look, I have an objective, perceivable, noticeable connection to such and such a thing, because I have appropriated it, I have control over it, I have used it for this type of purpose, and I have all of this done before you ever came along and wanted to do something with the same object. So, my claim is better justiﬁed than yours. As a matter of fact, your claim is not justiﬁed at all, because you cannot point to any objective link established between your body and a particular object, whereas I can point to a particular visible, noticeable, intersubjectively ascertainable link between me and a particular object.”

从人类最原始的阶段开始，人们就认知到，该如何解决与稀缺资源相关的潜在冲突。他们会指出：“看，我与某一事物之间存在一种客观的、可感知的、显而易见的联系——因为我已占有它、控制它，并将其用于特定目的。而且，这一切都是在你出现并想对同一物体采取行动之前就已经完成。因此，我的主张比你的主张更具正当性。事实上，你的主张根本站不住脚，因为你无法指出你的身体与某一特定物体之间建立的任何客观联系，而我却能证明我与该物体之间存在一种可见的、显著的、主体间可确定的联系。”

We can recognize this by the fact that people are, again, from the most primitive stages on, willing to defend these objects from invasions by other people. If I were not willing to defend something, if I do not put up the slightest resistance against somebody taking my axe or my arrow, then I indicate, in a way, that I do not consider it to be my property. If I show the slightest resistance, saying no or pushing my hands in the direction of the person trying to take it away from me, this indicates clearly that I regard myself as being the owner and having a special control over these things. Again, we can see this if we look at small children. If they have disputes over whose toy this is, the typical response of children is to say, “Look, I’m already playing with the car and you are not.” And if they put absolutely no resistance up, then they indicate that, for the time being, they have abandoned it and made it available to others. So again, very primitive sentiments. In this sense, we can probably assume that the development of children, in a way, repeats, to a certain extent, the development of mankind as a whole. What we ﬁnd in children, we also ﬁnd already in primitive man.

我们可以从这样一个事实中认识到此点：从最原始的阶段开始，人们就愿意保护这些物体，防止他人侵犯。如果我不愿意保护某样东西，如果有人拿走我的斧头或箭，我丝毫没有抵抗，那么在某种程度上，我就在表明我不认为它是我的财产。如果我稍有抵抗，说“不”，或者伸手阻拦试图拿走它的人，这就清楚地表明我认为自己是所有者，对这些东西有特殊的控制权。同样，观察一些小朋友亦能明了此点。如果他们为某个玩具属于谁而争吵，孩子们典型的反应是说：“看，我已经在玩这个小汽车了，你不能玩。” 如果他们完全不抵抗，那就表明，他们暂时放弃了这个玩具，让给别人了。所以说，这是非常原始的情感。从这个意义上说，我们或许可以认为，孩子的成长在一定程度上，某种意义上重演了整个人类的发展历程。我们在孩子身上看到的，在原始人身上也早已存在。

Now, let me come to the third unique capability of mankind, besides language and the recognition of property. That is that man can produce things, that man is a producer, that he’s capable of developing technology. You realize that animals live, so to speak,a parasitic life, in the sense that they never enhance the endowment of the world. They eat something, and in a way, diminish the amount of things that are available on Earth, but they never add anything to it.

现在，我们有了对语言和财产的认知，接下来谈谈人类的第三种独特能力。那就是人类能够生产物品，人类是生产者，有能力发展技术。可以说，你会发现动物过着一种寄生式的生活，从某种意义上讲，它们从不增加世界的资源储备。它们消耗某些东西，在一定程度上减少了地球上现有物品的数量，但却从不增添任何东西。

Mankind is unique in the sense that they have, as compared with most animals,a distinctive lack of specialized organs and of instincts, which makes them basically incapable of survival unless they develop substitutes for this lack of natural equipment that they have. Men have no natural weapons with which to defend themselves, or nothing to speak of. We have practically no instincts that guide us automatically to do this and that and avoid this and recognize dangers without having to know about it. What we can say is that man needs culture in order to survive in nature.

人类之所以独特，是因为与大多数动物相比，人类明显缺乏专门的器官和本能。这使得人类若不发展出替代物，来弥补自身天生条件的不足，基本上就无法生存。人类没有天然的武器来保护自己，或者说几乎没有。实际上，我们也没有能自动引导我们做这做那、避开已知和未知危险的本能。可以说，人类需要依靠文化（culture ）才能在自然界中生存。

And the tools, the most important tools that man has, are, on the one hand, his hands and, on the other hand, of course, his brain. But, neither one of these tools can be described as a highly specialized tool. They are useful for a wide variety of purposes, which is an advantage, but it is also obviously a disadvantage to begin with. We just have to learn what we can do with our hands and don’t automatically know what our hands can possibly do and we have to learn what our brain is capable of doing and do not automatically, like most animals, know to what uses to put our brainpower. Men must then intelligently transform nature, by using brains and hands in particular. There are certain patterns in the development of technology that we can perceive if we look at the development of mankind as a whole.

人类最重要的工具，一方面是双手，另一方面当然是大脑。但这两种工具都不能被描述为高度专业化的工具。它们用途广泛，这是优点，但显然也是最初的缺点。我们必须学习能用双手做什么，并非生而自知双手可做什么；我们还得学习大脑有哪些能力，并不像大多数动物那样，生来就自动知道如何运用脑力。于是，人类必须运用智慧改造自然，尤其是要借助大脑和双手。如果我们从人类整体发展的角度来看，我们能察觉到技术发展存在某些模式。

Here I follow a German sociologist and anthropologist, Arnold Gehlen, whom I recommend quite highly. I think one of his books has also been translated into English. It’s called,simply, Man, I believe. Gehlen does not have a very good reputation, because he had some sort of connection with the Nazis. But that does not make his observations any less important. So, he points out that there are attempts during our technological development to substitute for the lack of organs that we have. Then, technology serves a purpose of relieving us of insufficient capabilities, and then it has the tendency of strengthening our naturegiven capabilities. Let me read you a quote from him (the quote is in German, so I have to ad lib here a little bit, in translating):

在此我借鉴了德国社会学家兼人类学家阿诺德·盖伦（Arnold Gehlen）的观点，我极力推荐他。我记得他有一本书也被翻译成了英文，好像就叫《人》。盖伦的名声不太好，因为他与纳粹有某种藕断丝连。但这并不影响他见解的重要性。他指出，在技术发展过程中，我们试图弥补自身所欠缺的器官功能。因此，技术的作用在于弥补我们欠缺的能力，同时倾向于强化我们天生的能力。我给大家读一段他的话（原文是德语，所以翻译时我得稍作即兴发挥）：

Man is, in every natural environment, incapable of survival and because of this needs culture due to a lack of specialized organs and instincts. Without an environment that is speciﬁc to his species, in which he would ﬁt in, without inborn purposeful behavior and behavioral patterns due to a lack of speciﬁc organs and instincts, with less than perfectly formed senses, without any weapons, naked in his habitus embryonic, insecure in his instincts, he must rely on action and on intelligent transformation of those circumstances that he happens to ﬁnd.

Hands and brains might be considered to be specialized organs of man, but they are specialized in a diﬀerent sense than animal organs are. They can be used for many purposes. They are specialized for unspecialized purposes and achievements and they are, because of that, suitable for unpredictable circumstances arising in the world. The culture of primitive people, thus, consists ﬁrst of its weapons in their tools, in their huts, in their animals and gardens, all of which is changed,transformed, cultivated, that is, by newly formed nature, by intelligent action.5

人类在任何自然环境中，都无法仅凭自身生存，正因如此，由于缺乏专门的器官和本能，人类需要文化。没有适合人这一物种的特定环境，也缺少因特定器官和本能而天生固有的目标性行为及行为模式，感官发育并不完善，没有任何武器，生存状态宛如胚胎般脆弱，本能也不稳定，人类必须依靠行动，依靠对所处环境的智慧改造。

手和大脑或许可被视为人类的专门器官，但它们的“专门化”与动物器官的专门化意义不同。它们可用于多种目的，是为实现非特定目的与成就而专门化的，正因如此，它们适用于应对世界上不可预测的各种情况。因此，原始人的文化首先体现在他们的武器、工具、棚屋、饲养的动物以及开垦的田园之上，所有这些都是通过智慧的行动，被改变、改造、培育出来的，也就是由新塑造的“自然禀赋”（nature）所造就。[6]

The ﬁrst achievements of men are substitutes for lacking organs, weapons, for instance. Also, ﬁre, as some form of natural protection and shelter.

人类最初的成就，比如武器，是对器官功能匮乏的替代。至于火，它可被视作为某种形式的自然防卫和庇护。

The second type of tools that are developed are developed in order to strengthen naturally given abilities, like using stones in order to strengthen the power that a ﬁst has, for instance, or hammers as tools that strengthen natural given powers, or microscopes, as instruments that are more developed than the natural human organs, eyes, or telephones as instruments that strengthen and surpass the natural given abilities that we have through our ears. And then he points out that there exist techniques that relieve humans by saving them labor. For instance,a wheeled wagon, which allows us to carry weights that we could not carry naturally, and instruments that even combine all of these things, that is, they are in some sense, substitutes for lacking things, in some respects surpassing natural abilities and in some sense relieving us, saving us labor that otherwise would be necessary, for instance, an airplane. An airplane allows us to ﬂy, which unaided we cannot do at all. It surpasses all natural abilities that exist in this regard, and it takes work away completely insofar as it transports us, without any eﬀort on our own part, from one place to another.

第二类被人类开发出来的工具，是为了增强天生的能力。例如，使用石头来增强拳头的力量，或者使用锤子这类工具来加强我们天生的力量；再比如显微镜，是比人类的自然器官眼睛更发达的工具；还有电话，它强化并超越了我们的耳朵所具有的天然能力。接着，他指出，还有一些技术可以减轻人类的劳动负担。比如，带轮子的手推车，能让我们搬运仅靠自身力量无法搬运的重物；还有一些工具甚至融合了上述所有功能，也就是说，它们在某种意义上是对缺失能力的替代，在某些方面超越了人类的自然能力，同时也在某种程度上减轻了我们的负担，省去了原本必需的劳动。比如飞机，它使得我们能够飞行，假如没有外力辅助，这完全是我们无法企及的。飞机在这方面超越了所有现存的自然能力，能毫不费力地将我们从一个地方运送到另一个地方，彻底免去我们所需付出的体力劳动。

And Gehlen also points out that there exists in the history of technological development another tendency that we can recognize, and that is a gradual substitution of inorganic materials and forces for organic materials and forces. Initially, we used stone and wood and bone. The Stone Age ends roughly 8,000 years ago and then in the next stage, we already create some sort of artiﬁcial materials, bronze out of copper and tin, that begins roughly at 4,000 BC, or on the North American continent, only about 1,000 years ago. And then the next material, again, already further removed from the nature-given materials, would be iron, which comes into use around 1,200 BC, roughly, and then of course, ﬁnally, steel, which is a development of our relatively recent past. Instead of organic materials, we increasingly use cement and metals and coal. All of these things replace wood as burning material. We use steel ropes in order to replace leather and hemp ropes. We use synthetic colors instead of natural coloring materials. We increasingly use synthetic medicines instead of natural herbs, and so forth, and we make ourselves successively independent of natural energy sources.

盖伦还指出，在技术发展史上，我们还能认识到另一种趋势，即无机材料和力量逐渐取代有机材料和力量。最初，我们使用石头、木材和骨头。石器时代大约在8000年前结束，随后在接下来的阶段，我们已经制造出某种人造材料，即由铜和锡制成的青铜，这大约始于公元前4000年，而在北美大陆，则大约是在1000年前。接下来的材料，又进一步远离了天然材料，那就是铁，大约在公元前1200年开始使用，当然，最后是钢，这是相对较晚近时期的发展成果。我们越来越多地使用水泥、金属和煤炭，而非有机材料。所有这些东西取代了木材作为燃烧材料。我们用钢丝绳来取代皮革绳和麻绳。我们使用合成颜料而非天然着色材料。我们越来越多地使用合成药物而非天然草药等等，我们逐渐摆脱了对天然能源的依赖。

For along time, mankind was dependent on his naturally available energy sources, on forests growing up again. And the natural speed of trees growing up put a limitation on the speed of development that mankind could take. They were also dependent on natural, physical forces, such as the power of horses and oxen and things like this, which also could not be deliberately enlarged or empowered. And in the development of technology, gradually, we strip ourselves of these limitations by using ﬁrst, coal and oil and then also water power and then of course, ﬁnally, atomic forces, which make us essentially independent of the growth of natural materials.

长期以来，人类一直依赖自然界现成的能源，比如再生的森林资源。树木的自然生长速度限制了人类发展的速度。人类还依赖自然的物理力量，比如马和牛的力量等，而诸如此类的力量也无法被刻意增强。在技术发展的过程中，我们逐渐摆脱了这些限制，先是使用煤炭和石油，接着利用水力，当然，最后还用上了原子能，这使得我们基本上不再依赖天然材料的生长。

To conclude, let me quote again from Gehlen, who sees a logic in the development of human technology, a logic that we can see only if we look back from the present. In the past, we would not have been able, probably at the beginning of mankind, to predict that these would be the stages that technological development would go through, but looking backward, we can somehow understand that there was a certain inherent logic at work. He says,

This process of technological development has three stages. On the ﬁrst stage, that of the tool, the force necessary for work and the necessary mental eﬀort, still have to be done by the human subject itself. The tools somehow make it easier for us, the strengthen our forces, give us more force than we normally have, and reduce somehow the mental eﬀort that is necessary, that we have to perform in conducting certain tasks. And in the second stage of the machine, steam engine and cars and so forth, the physical force is already technically objectivated; that means we don’t need any force anymore on our own part; all the force is generated by the machines. And ﬁnally, on the third stage of technological development, which is that of the automaton, even the mental eﬀort that the subject had to show in the previous stages becomes unnecessary or of very minor importance. And with each of these three stages, the instrument, the tool, the machine, and then ﬁnally, the automaton, the objectivation of the fulﬁllment of the purposes of technology comes closer to its ultimate purpose, and in the automaton, it is ﬁnally reached because we can do things without our physical or mental contribution.6

最后，让我再次引用盖伦的话，他认为人类技术发展存在一种逻辑，关于这种逻辑，只有当我们从现在回顾过去时才能看清。在过去，可能在人类诞生之初，我们无法预测技术发展会经历这些阶段，但回顾往昔岁月，我们能在某种程度上理解，有一种内在逻辑在发挥作用。他说：

这一技术发展的过程分为三个阶段。在第一阶段，即工具阶段，工作所需的力量和必要的脑力劳动，仍需人类主体自身来完成。工具在某种程度上简化了我们的工作，增强了我们的力量，赋予我们比平常更多的力量，并且在一定程度上减少了我们执行某些任务时所需付出的脑力劳动。在第二阶段，即机器阶段，如蒸汽机和汽车等，物理力量已经在技术上实现了客观化；这意味着我们自身不再需要出力，所有力量都由机器产生。最后，在技术发展的第三阶段，即自动化阶段，就连人类主体在之前阶段必须付出的脑力劳动也变得不再必要，或者只占非常次要的地位。随着这三个阶段——工具、机器，最后到自动化的发展，技术目的实现的客观化越来越接近其终极目标，而在自动化阶段，这一目标最终得以实现，因为我们无需付出体力或脑力就能完成任务。[7]

第二讲人类在全球的扩散：劳动分工的扩展与深化

In this lecture,1 I want to talk about the spread of humans around the world and the extension and the intensiﬁcation of the division of labor. The subject will be continued to a certain extent into the next lecture. Homo sapiens, mankind as we know it, with about the cranial volume that we have now, is estimated to be about 500,000 years old, and takes on the current appearance roughly about 100,000 years ago. And as I mentioned in the previous lecture, the point when the language capability developed, is dated somehow from between 150,000 to 50,000 years ago. There is general agreement, not complete agreement, but pretty much unanimous agreement, that mankind spread out from Africa, and if you take a look at Figure 1, which is taken from the Cavalli-Sforza book, he gives you some rough dates about this process. So, his estimation is that people began to leave Africa 60,000–70,000 years ago, maybe up to 100,000 years ago, and that the ﬁrst spreading was to Asia. We have the oldest ﬁndings of human skeletons, in China, dated at 67,000 years old.

在本次讲座中,[8] 我想探讨人类在全球的扩散，以及劳动分工的扩展与深化。这一主题的部分内容将会延续到下一讲。我们所熟知的智人，其脑容量与我们现在相近，据估计约有50万年历史，大致在10万年前形成了如今的外貌。正如我在上一讲中所提到的，语言能力大约在15万至5万年前开始发展。人们普遍认同（虽非完全一致，但基本达成共识）人类起源于非洲并向外扩散。如果你看一下图1【取自卡瓦利-斯福尔扎（Cavalli-Sforza）的著作】，他给出了这一过程的大致时间。他估计，人类在6万至7万年前，甚至可能早在10万年前就开始离开非洲，最先扩散到亚洲。我们在中国发现了最古老的人类骨骼，距今6.7万年。

And then, from China, they traveled to Australia, which he dates roughly at 55,000 years ago. And this travel time—I will have more to say about that—took about 10,000 years from Africa to Australia. One will have to say here something about the possibilities of this traveling. You have to keep in mind a few glacial periods, actually four glacial periods in the last 900,000 years and each of those lasted about 75,000 years. The last one of these glacial periods lasted from 25,000 years to about 13,000 years ago. During these glacial periods the level of the oceans dropped considerably because snow accumulated on the mountains and less water melted, so that the gaps between Southeast Asia and what is now Indonesia and Borneo and Australia became rather small. They did not disappear completely, but they were small enough that they could be traversed by very small boats. The Sahara Desert, for instance, is only 3,000 years old. Before that, it was not exactly the most fruitful of areas but, nonetheless,a region that could be used for hunting and gathering activities and also for agricultural purposes.

之后，智人从中国出发，前往澳大利亚，据他估算，这大约发生在5.5万年前。这段旅程——关于这一点，我稍后会详述——从非洲到澳大利亚大约花了1万年。在此，我们要提及这种迁徙的可能性。你需要记住，过去曾有几个冰河时期，在过去90万年里实际上有4个冰河时期，每个时期持续约7.5万年。最后一个冰河时期从2.5万年前持续到约1.3万年前左右。在这些冰河时期，海平面大幅下降，由于雪在山上堆积，融水减少，所以东南亚与如今的印度尼西亚、婆罗洲和澳大利亚之间的海域变得非常狭窄。虽然它们并未完全消失，但已窄到可以乘坐小船穿越。举个例子，撒哈拉沙漠只有3000年的历史。在此之前，它虽称不上是物产最丰饶的地区，但仍是一个可进行狩猎采集活动，甚至从事农业生产的区域。

The next break of the population is the breakoﬀ to Europe, which CavalliSforza dates around 40,000–43,000 years ago, and the latest split-oﬀ is the one to America, across the Bering Strait, for which again, only very rough estimates exist; they range from 15,000 years to 50,000 years ago. And the spreading of the population on the American continent is estimated to have lasted about 1,000 years, from the North, all the way down to Patagonia, which would be something like eight miles per year, so not a large distance per year.

接下来的人口迁徙分支是（从中亚）前往欧洲，卡瓦利•斯福尔扎（CavalliSforza）估计这发生在约4万至4.3万年前。而最近的一次分支，则是跨越白令海峡前往美洲，对此同样只有非常粗略的估计，时间范围在1.5万年前到5万年前。据估计，人类在美洲大陆的扩散持续了约1000年，从北美洲一路南下至巴塔哥尼亚，速度约为每年8英里，所以每年迁徙的距离并不远。

The spreading, at this time, is either by foot or, when that was signiﬁcantly faster, by boat. Boat travel remained the fastest way of traveling until the domestication of horses, which occurs only some 6,000 years ago. Until that time, nothing but walking was possible, and as a matter of fact, as you probably know from your history lessons, that was pretty much the only way of transportation that existed on the American continent until the arrival of the Europeans. We always picture these Indians on horses, but of course, there existed no horses whatsoever and there existed actually, on the American continent, not even wheels. That is to say, people transported things by schlepping some wooden planks behind them, on which they had whatever they had to transport.

在这个时期，人类的迁徙要么徒步，假如想要加快速度，那就乘船。在大约6000年前人类驯化马之前，乘船一直是最快的出行方式。在那之前，除了徒步别无他法。事实上，你们可能从历史课上学到过，在欧洲人抵达之前，徒步几乎是美洲大陆上唯一的交通方式。我们总是幻想印第安人骑在马上，但实际上，当时美洲大陆根本无马，甚至连轮子都没有。也就是说，人们搬运东西时，无非是在身后拖着一些木板，把要搬运的东西置于其上。

During these early times, until about 10,000 to 12,000 years ago, all of these populations, all of these people were hunters and gatherers, moving around at low speeds, mostly in small bands of 50–60 people, but several bands usually had some sort of connection. There exist biological reasons why minimal group sizes have to be about 500 people in order to prevent some sort of genetic degeneration, so one can expect that even if they were in small bands, that there was some sort of communication and intermarriage and so forth, with people of this group size.

在这些早期阶段，直到大约1万至1.2万年前，所有这些人群都以狩猎和采集为生，迁徙速度缓慢，大多以50到60人的小群体活动，但几个小群体之间通常存在某种联系。从生物学角度来看，为防止出现某种基因退化，群体规模最小需达到500人左右，所以我们可以推测，即便他们以小群体形式活动，也会与规模相近的群体有某种形式的交流、通婚等。

The density of population was, as you can imagine, extremely low. The estimation is that in hunter-gatherer societies, you can have only one person per square mile. For more, for a larger population, the Earth did not produce enough foodstuﬀ to support it. The population growth was extremely slow, partly because of birth control techniques used by people, by long breastfeeding, and things of that nature, and of course, because of high mortality rates. The estimation is that 100,000 years ago, at the beginning of this process that I’m talking about, the population size was about 50,000 in the world; 50,000 on the entire globe.

正如你能想象到的，当时人口密度极低。据估计，在狩猎采集社会，每平方英里只能养活一人。再多的话，地球就无法产出足够的食物来维持更多人口了。人口增长极为缓慢，部分原因是人们采用了节育手段，比如长时间母乳喂养之类，当然，也因为死亡率很高。据估计，在我所说的这一进程开始的10万年前，全球人口约为5万；整个地球上只有5万人。

And 10,000 years ago, that is a period I will talk about a little bit later, the so-called Neolithic Revolution, when people began to settle down and begin agricultural existence, the numbers there are between 1 and 15 million and the estimation that most people accept is about 5 million. So, from 100,000 years to 10,000 years ago, 90,000 years of time, the population increases only from 50,000 to 5 million, and that is roughly a doubling of the population every 13,000–14,000 years.

而在1万年前——我稍后会详细谈到这个时期，即所谓的新石器革命时期，那时人们开始定居下来，过上农耕生活——人口数量在100万到1500万之间，大多数人所接受的数字估计约为500万。所以，从10万年前到1万年前，在这9万年的时间里，人口仅从5万增长到500万，大致相当于每1.3万至1.4万年，人口才翻一番。

To give you some sort of ballpark ﬁgure what the speed of population doubling is now, from the 1950s on, populations doubled every 35 years. So, you can see, based on this ﬁgure, what extremely small growth of population took place during this period. The groups, basically, simply broke away from each other, as I said, many times by boat, frequently also by foot. There existed then, for a considerable amount of time, 90,000 years or so, very little communication and intermingling between these breakaway groups, which explains the fact that quite diﬀerent genetic stocks of people developed, because very limited interbreeding took place. In addition, there were the glacial periods, which cut oﬀ, sometimes for 10,000 or so years, communication between groups that were not far apart from each other distance-wise. The Alps, for instance, became essentially impassable, so people who were in the north lost all contact with people who were in the south.

让你们大致了解如今人口翻倍的速度，自20世纪50年代起，人口每35年就会翻倍。所以，从这个数据可以看出，之前那个时期人口增长极为缓慢。正如我所说，这些群体之间基本上就是相互分离，很多时候通过乘船，也常常徒步。在相当长的一段时间里，大约9万年左右，这些分离的群体之间交流和融合都极少，这就解释了为什么会形成差异颇大的人类基因种群，因为群体间的通婚极为有限。此外，冰河时期也时常会造成咫尺天涯，阻断相互间距离并不遥远的群体之间的交流，有时甚至会阻断约1万年之久。例如，阿尔卑斯山在那时基本无法通行，于是山北之人与山南之人便完全老死不相往来。

Then there is the weather: the rains in Eurasia come mostly from the west, going eastward, so most of the snow accumulated in the west and the drier climates were in the east. People moved from the west to the east and then partially after the glacial periods were over returned back to more western regions. So, practically no contact between these groups. Of course, this is particularly pronounced in cases such as Australia and Borneo, which then became separated by large bodies of water, as compared to the periods when you could easily cross these straits. And there exists a general law, which is easy to grasp, that genetic distance increases in correlation with physical distance and with the separation in time.

接下来是气候因素：欧亚大陆的降雨大多来自西部，自西向东移动，所以大部分积雪都堆积在西部，而东部气候则相对干燥。人们从西部迁往东部，冰河时期结束后，又有一部分人迁回更靠西的地区。所以，这些群体之间几乎没有联系。当然，在澳大利亚和婆罗洲等地，这种情况尤为明显，与曾经可以轻松穿越这些海峡的时期相比，它们如今被大片水域隔开。这里有一个很容易理解的普遍规律：遗传距离会随着物理距离的增加和时间上的分隔而增大。

I provided you with two charts that give you some rough indication of this. I have no intention of going into that in great detail, but Figure 2 is a tree diagram, which indicates roughly the distance in the genetic material of the populations living in these major areas and reﬂects in a way the breaking, the periods when populations broke away from each other. It indicates, for instance, that the ﬁrst split occurred between Africa and Asia and then the second split occurred between Asia and Europe and the third one was Asia and America, and it indicates also the wide genetic distance, so to speak, between Africa, on the one hand, and the Oceanic population, on the other.

我给你们提供了两张图表，大致展示了这方面的情况。我不打算详细讲解，图2是一个聚类图，它大致显示了生活在这些主要地区的人群在遗传物质上的差异，从某种程度上反映了不同人群分离的时间节点。例如，它表明第一次分离发生在非洲和亚洲之间，第二次是在亚洲和欧洲之间，第三次是在亚洲和美洲之间。它还显示了，比如说，非洲人群与大洋洲人群之间在遗传上的巨大差异。

Figure 3 is more detailed, as you see: it has on the left side the genetic relationships, how far or close some of the major ethnic groups are genetically, and on the right side, how close or distant they are in terms of their languages. There’s obviously some sort of correlation between the genetic groups and the linguistic groups, but by no means a perfect one, which can be explained mostly by invasions by various people, who then spread their own language also in regions that were originally genetically diﬀerent. Or sometimes you have regions that are genetically quite close, but they have brought languages from far away distances. An example would be, for instance, in the European scenery, the Finns and the Hungarians and the Turks, which have somewhat closely related languages, even though they are physically quite far removed from each other. I’ll come back to this type of topic about diﬀerent ethnicities and related subjects in a later lecture. For the current purpose, this is entirely sufficient, just to get some sort of feeling for how the separation and the movement of hunter-gatherers, with very little contact with each other, automatically brings these results about.

如图3所示，它更为详细。左边展示的是遗传关系，即一些主要族群在基因层面的远近亲疏；右边呈现的则是这些族群在语言上的异同。显然，基因族群和语言族群之间存在某种关联，但绝非完全对应。这主要是因为不同人群的入侵，他们将自己的语言传播到原本基因不同的地区。或者有时，某些地区的人群在基因上非常相近，但他们使用的语言却来自遥远的地方。例如，在欧洲，芬兰人、匈牙利人和土耳其人，尽管他们在地理位置上相距甚远，但他们的语言却有一定的亲缘关系。我会在后续讲座中再次探讨这类关于不同种族及相关主题的内容。就目前而言，这些足以让大家大致了解，狩猎采集者彼此分离、鲜有联系的迁徙活动，是如何自然而然地产生这些结果的。

This separation and very limited cooperation between diﬀerent groups, brings also about,a tendency to create a large variety of languages. You will see, later on, there exists, of course, also a tendency for languages to be reduced in number, when the contact between various groups becomes intensiﬁed. That is, when the division of labor is no longer restricted to these small groups, but becomes more extensive and more intensive, including ever larger regions of the population, then there is a countervailing tendency because then there exists, of course, a need for people to communicate with each other, and one can recognize that it is an advantage to speak languages that are spoken by very many people. If you are living more or less enclosed in small groups and the division of labor is restricted to these small groups, then there is no disadvantage to just having a diﬀerent language for each one of these groups.

不同群体之间的这种隔离以及极为有限的合作，还导致了另一种倾向，即产生种类繁多的语言。当然，稍后你们会看到，当不同群体之间的交流接触变得更加频繁时，又会出现语言数量减少的趋势。也就是说，当劳动分工不再局限于这些小群体，而是变得更加广泛和深入，涵盖越来越大范围的人口时，就会出现一种相反的趋势。因为此时，人们之间显然有相互交流的趋势，而且人们会意识到，使用多数人都说的语言是有优势的。如果人们生活在相对封闭的小群体，且劳动分工仅限于这些小群体，那么每个小群体拥有不同的语言也并无损失。

Currently, there exist about 5,000 to 6,000 languages. To give you an extreme example, 1,000 of these 5,000–6,000 languages are spoken in Guinea, and half of these 1,000 languages have no more than 500 speakers. That is pretty close to the number that I gave you for what the minimum size of a group has to be in order to avoid negative genetic eﬀects. There are only a few languages in Guinea that are spoken by more than 100,000 people. This also tells us something about the state of development of this place that obviously, that is not a place in which the division of labor is very extensive and intensive. They are still living rather isolated and have only a division of labor within their little tribes, without much need to learn other languages, or for one language to take over other languages and become the dominant one. The division of labor, at this stage, is of a very, very limited kind—obviously, women tend to be more the gatherers; men tend to be more the hunters. There are some people who make tools, but the number of tools and instruments is also very limited. So, by and large, very small numbers of diﬀerent professions, if we can talk about that at all; there is probably no one who is really specializing full time in certain types of activities.

目前，世界上大约有5000到6000种语言。举个极端的例子，在这5000-6000种语言中，有1000种在几内亚使用，而这1000种语言中，有一半的使用者不超过500人。这与我之前提到的为避免负面遗传效应所需的最小群体规模相当接近。在几内亚，只有少数几种语言的使用者超过10万人。这也让我们了解到这个地方的发展状况，显然，这里的劳动分工并不广泛和深入。人们仍然生活在相对隔绝的状态，仅在自己的小部落内部进行劳动分工，不太需要学习其他语言，也没有一种语言取代其他语言并成为主导语言的需求。在这个阶段，劳动分工的程度非常非常有限——显然，女性更多是采集者，男性更多是狩猎者。有一些人制作工具，但工具和器具的种类也非常有限。所以，总体而言，如果我们还能称之为职业的话，职业种类的数量亦是极少；可能没有人真正全职专门从事某些特定类型的活动。

The division of labor even shrinks at times during this period, which leads to a situation where people unlearn things that were already part of the accumulated knowledge of mankind. Those things took place, in particular, in the cases of New Guinea and Australia and Tasmania, places that for tens of thousands of years were completely isolated from anybody else and could not even occasionally adopt techniques or knowledge that had been accumulated in other parts of the world. For instance, the Australian Aborigines still used stone tools around the year 1800 in Tasmania, which was cut oﬀ for some 10,000 years from any other place; these people must obviously have known, at some point in time, the technique for constructing boats, but when they were rediscovered, they were not able to make boats. They must, at sometime, have had the capability of using bows and arrows, but when they were rediscovered, they were not able to use arrows and bows because the population had become too small and no inﬂux of innovation came in, so these people with the smaller populations simply became less informed and less knowledgeable than they must have been at the beginning. The same is also true, by the way, for Eskimos and Polynesians. The Polynesians also had partially unlearned the ability to make boats, even though they must have had this ability at some point in the past—unless they were very good swimmers.

在历史长河某个时期，劳动分工有时甚至会萎缩，这导致人们遗忘了人类长期积累的某些知识。这种情况在新几内亚、澳大利亚和塔斯马尼亚等地尤其明显，这些地方与世隔绝了数万年，甚至无法偶尔借鉴、采纳世界其他地区积累的技术或知识。例如，1800年左右，塔斯马尼亚的澳大利亚原住民仍在使用石器，而塔斯马尼亚已与其他地方隔绝了约一万年；显然，这些人在过去某个时候肯定知晓造船技术，但当他们被重新发现时，却已不会造船。他们在过去某个时候肯定具备使用弓箭的能力，但被重新发现时，却不会使用弓箭了，因为人口变得太少，又没有新技术的流入，所以这些人口较少的群体，相比最初时，见识和知识都变得更加匮乏。顺便提一下，爱斯基摩人和波利尼西亚人也是如此。波利尼西亚人也部分地忘却了造船能力，尽管他们在过去某个时候肯定具备这种能力 —— 除非他们都曾是游泳健将。

As a little side remark, there is an explanation for why Polynesians tend to be a very fat people, namely that fat people had a survival advantage on longboat trips where they didn’t know where they would end up. So, people who had accumulated a lot of body fat had a higher chance of ﬁnally ﬁnding the Fiji Islands or wherever they landed, which is an explanation why we still ﬁnd massive, massive people in these places, far more massive than you ﬁnd in other regions of the world.

顺带提一下，波利尼西亚人往往体型很胖，这是有原因的。在长途划船旅行中，胖子更有生存优势，因为他们不知道最终会抵达何处。所以，体内积累了大量脂肪的人，最终找到斐济群岛或其他登陆地点的几率更高，这就解释了为什么在这些地方，我们仍能看到很多体型庞大的人，他们的体型比世界上其他地区的人要庞大得多。

We now arrive at one of the great revolutions in human development and that is a so-called Neolithic Revolution, which took place about 10,000–12,000 years ago. The main explanatory factor for this was that land became gradually scarcer and scarcer and more valuable, and pressure arose to ﬁnd a solution to the problem of how to feed the people who could not walk around and breakaway and ﬁnd new hunting and gathering places. They had to make it possible for people to live in larger numbers on smaller territories. Before, land was more or less treated as a free good, and if it is treated as a free good, there exists of course no incentive to appropriate it, to establish property in the land.

我们现在谈到了人类发展进程中的重大变革之一，即所谓的新石器时代革命，它发生在大约1万至1.2万年前。这一变革的主要原因在于，土地逐渐变得越来越稀缺、愈发珍贵，于是产生了要找到办法解决如何养活那些无法四处迁徙去寻找新的狩猎和采集地的人们的压力。人们必须让更多人能够在更小的区域内生活。在此之前，土地或多或少被视为一种免费资源，而如果它被当作免费资源，人们当然就没有动力去占有它、确立土地所有权。

In the previous lecture, I explained that it was perfectly natural that people considered their bow and arrow to be their bow and arrow and the axe they carried to be their axe and so forth, and when they hunted buﬀalo, if I had hunted one down, then, of course, that became my buﬀalo. But property in land is a relatively new invention, so to speak, and the explanation is that land, all of a sudden, is perceived to be scarce. And as soon as it comes to be perceived as scarce, there will be attempts made by people to fence pieces oﬀ from other pieces, to mark places oﬀ from other places and claim them as mine or yours. The places where agriculture starts are naturally those places that have, by nature, an abundance of suitable plants; that is, where you have wild corn and wild wheat and wild rye, etc., people settle there and then begin to cultivate existing plants so as to breed better products. These are the places that we describe as the Fertile Crescent, what is today the Middle East around Iraq and Syria, on the one hand, and on the other hand, China, that is, places that are located close to rivers, and then later on, of course, also Egypt.

在上一讲中，我解释过，人们理所当然地认为自己的弓箭就是自己的，随身携带的斧头也是自己的斧头，诸如此类。当他们捕猎水牛时，如果我捕杀到一头，那这头水牛自然就归我。但可以说，土地所有权是一项相对较新的发明。原因在于，土地突然之间被意识到是稀缺的。一旦人们意识到土地稀缺，就会试图把一块块土地圈起来，与其他不同地方标记区分开，并宣称这块是我的，那块是你的。农业兴起之地，自然就是那些天生就有大量适宜植物生长的地方，也就是有野生玉米、野生小麦、野生黑麦等作物的地方。人们在那里定居下来，然后开始栽培现有的植物，以培育出更好的品种。这些地方就是我们所说的“新月沃土”，一个是指如今伊拉克和叙利亚周边的中东地区，另一个则指中国，也就是那些靠近河流的地方，当然，后来埃及也发展起了农业。

Figure 4 deals with examples of domesticated plants and animals by the date of earliest domestication and by region. This begins at about 8,000 BC. The only animal that had been domesticated before then was the dog, which you ﬁnd on the opposite page. Dogs, of course, had been already of some use for hunters and gatherers. All the other animals are typical animals that are useful only in agricultural societies and not so much useful if you lead a hunter and gatherer lifestyle.

图 4 展示了按最早驯化时间和地区划分的驯化动植物示例。这始于公元前 8000 年左右。在此之前，唯一被驯化的动物是狗，在另一页可以看到相关内容。当然，狗对狩猎采集者已经有一定用处。其他所有动物都是典型的仅在农业社会有用的动物，对于过着狩猎采集生活方式的人来说用处不大。

The thing that I would like to make you aware of here is, the remarkable observation that there existed, basically, no large-scale domesticated animals on the American continent, except for the llama, which is not exactly comparable in its versatility to horses and cows. There exists some explanations that Jared Diamond in Guns, Germs, and Steel, proposes, which don’t sound too plausible to me. He is some sort of environmentalist. He explains, for instance, the fact that there are no large-scale domesticated animals on the American continent, by claiming that initially, there existed all the animals on the American continent that existed in Asia and Europe also, but on the American continent, overhunting took place. And then you ask, of course, “Why did overhunting take place, why did they wipe out all of these animals and did not recognize in time the value of some of them, the potential to be domesticated, as compared to what people did in Eurasia?” And his explanation is that people arrived in America at a later date than in Asia and in Europe and at that date, the weapons technology wasalready further developed, so the killing potential was greater for those people active on the American continent, such that the extinction of animals resulted there and did not result in Eurasia. There exist, of course, also other explanations for this, to which I will come back in some future lecture. It might have also something to do, of course, with the lack of foresight, that there was more foresight among some people in Eurasia and less foresight in America, to prevent this sort of environmental catastrophe, as we might call it, from occurring.

图4每个地区本地驯化物种的样本

区域	驯化的动植物		经证实的最早驯化时间
区域	植物	动物
本土化的独立起源
1.西南亚	小麦、豌豆、橄榄	绵羊、山羊	公元前8500年
2.中国	大米、小米	猪、蚕	公元前7500年
3.中美洲	玉米、豆类	火鸡	公元前3500年
4.安第斯山脉和亚马逊	土豆、木薯	拉马、几内亚猪	公元前3500年
5.东部联合州	向日葵、藜	无	公元前2500年
6.萨赫勒	高料，非洲水稻	几内亚鸡	公元前5000年
7.热带西部非洲	非洲山药、油棕榈	无	公元前3000年
8.埃塞俄比亚	咖啡，苔麸（又称埃塞俄比亚画眉草）	无	？
9.新几内亚	甘蔗、香蕉	无	公元前7000年？
源自其他地区的原始作物到达后的本地驯化
10.西欧	罂粟、燕麦	无	公元前6000至3500年
11.印度河流域	甜椒、茄子	瘤牛	公元前7000年
12.埃及	埃及榕（无花果）、荸荠	驴子、猫	公元前6000年

摘自贾雷德·戴蒙德《枪炮、病菌与钢铁：人类社会的命运》（纽约W.W.Nortn，1998），第100页

我想让你们注意的是一个显著的现象：美洲大陆基本上没有大规模被驯化的动物，除了羊驼，但就用途的多样性而言，羊驼无法与马和牛相提并论。贾雷德·戴蒙德（Jared Diamond）在《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》一书中提出了一些解释，但我觉得不太可信。他算是个环保主义者。例如，对于美洲大陆没有大规模驯化动物这一事实，他的解释是，最初美洲大陆拥有与亚洲和欧洲相同的动物，但在美洲大陆发生了过度捕猎。然后你自然会问：“为什么会发生过度捕猎？为什么他们把这些动物都捕杀殆尽，却没有及时认识到其中一些动物的价值，以及它们被驯化的潜力，而欧亚大陆的人却认识到了呢？” 他的解释是，人类到达美洲的时间比到达亚洲和欧洲的时间晚，而那时武器技术已经有了进一步发展，所以在美洲大陆活动的人捕杀能力更强，导致了动物灭绝，而欧亚大陆没有出现这种情况。当然，对此也有其他解释，我会在以后的讲座中再提及。这当然也可能与缺乏远见有关，也许欧亚大陆的一些人更有远见，而美洲的人远见不足，未能阻止我们所谓的这种环境灾难发生。

Now, agricultural life allows a far greater density of population than a hunter-gatherer existence. As a matter of fact, it is estimated that 10 to 100 times as many people can live on the same piece of land if they engage in agriculture rather than in hunting and gathering activities. And we also recognize that as soon as you have settled down and built agricultural communities, then for the ﬁrst time it becomes possible for capital to be accumulated. Imagine hunters and gatherers who just schlep around from place to place, there is only so many things that you can take with you. After all, you have to carry everything and most of the stuﬀ becomes excess baggage. Now that you settle, of course, you can establish storage and you can accumulate things for bad seasons, and you can feed not only larger numbers, you can also turn your activity from one type of farming to other types of farming, from growing one type of cereal to growing other types of cereal and so forth.

如今，农业生活所能承载的人口密度，远远高于狩猎采集的生活方式。事实上，据估计，在同一块土地上，从事农业生产所能养活的人口数量是狩猎采集的10到100倍。我们也认识到，一旦人们定居下来并建立起农业社区，资本积累便首次成为可能。想象一下，狩猎采集者四处奔波，他们能随身携带的物品非常有限。毕竟，所有东西都得自己扛着，大多数物品都会变成累赘。而现在人们定居下来，自然就可以建立储存设施，为艰难时节储备物资。不仅能养活更多人口，还能将耕作活动从一种类型转向另一种类型，比如从种植一种谷物转向种植其他谷物等等。

Anthropologists compare the way of life of the hunters and gatherers to the way of life of the settlers; the agricultural people settled and, they point out, the life of hunters and gatherers was, in a way, easier, nicer. They spent only a few hours a day just hunting away and then they were lazing around, whereas the agricultural people worked for long periods of time, especially since this whole thing started in the Middle East, with comparatively nice weather all year around, and you could work also all year around, whereas hunters and gatherers had entire seasons oﬀ. So, anthropologists report, for instance, that the hunters and gatherers frequently laughed at the stupid agricultural settlers there, that they worked so hard and they themselves had such a nice and lazy life. What is not true, however, which you ﬁnd reported in some books, is that these hunter-gatherer societies turned out to be militarily superior over agricultural societies and regularly raided them. And if you think about it, while this is, of course, possible, there are compelling reasons why that should not be the case. That is why agricultural societies should have been, even in this area, that is, defending themselves, superior over hunter-gatherer societies, simply because they engage in capital accumulation, they have denser populations, they have far more men and more conﬂicts. Typically, it was not the hunter-gatherer societies that beat the agricultural societies, but vice versa.

人类学家将狩猎采集者的生活方式与定居者（从事农业的定居人群）的生活方式进行对比。他们指出，从某种程度上来说，狩猎采集者的生活更轻松、更惬意。他们每天只需花几个小时打猎，然后就无所事事地闲散而处；而从事农业的人则要长时间劳作，尤其是因为这一切始于中东，那里全年气候相对宜人，可以全年劳作，而狩猎采集者则有一整个季节的空闲时间、无需劳作。因此，人类学家报告称，狩猎采集者常常嘲笑那些愚蠢的农业定居者，说他们如此辛苦地劳作，而自己却过着轻松悠闲的生活。然而，有些书中提到狩猎采集社会在军事上比农业社会更优越，还经常袭扰农业社会，这并不属实。仔细想想，虽然这种情况当然有可能发生，但也有充分的理由表明情况并非如此。这就是为什么农业社会在这个领域，即自卫方面，比起狩猎采集社会更具优势，仅仅因为他们进行资本积累，人口密度更大，拥有更多的男性和更多的冲突。通常情况下，并非狩猎采集社会打败农业社会，而是恰恰相反。

Because of this,then, let me just say something about the population size again. With the Neolithic Revolution, so, from 10,000 to 12,000 years ago, the population doubles every 1,300 years, roughly, as compared with every 13,000 years prior to that. Again, these are all ballpark ﬁgures. In a later lecture, I will give you a table with some sort of population estimates. So, the estimation is that maybe 10,000 years ago, we had 5 million people at the beginning of the Neolithic Revolution, and in the year 1 AD, the numbers that are given, go from 170 million to 400 million. So, if you take the average of those estimates, then you come up with this rough idea of 1,300 years per doubling of the population. Now, this superiority of agricultural societies over hunter-gatherer societies is then responsible for the gradual spreading of these societies. This did not start at every place; it started at a few places, as I said, for the Fertile Crescent and some places in China, and gradually, the farmers take over more and more land.

基于此，那我再讲讲人口规模的情况。随着新石器时代革命的发生，也就是从1万到1.2万年前开始，人口大约每1300年就会翻一番，而在此之前是每1.3万年翻一番。再次强调，这些都只是大致数据。在后续讲座中，我会给你们展示一张包含人口估算数据的表格。据估计，大约在1万年前新石器时代革命伊始，全球人口约为500万，而到公元1年，人口数量的估算范围在1.7亿到4亿之间。所以，取这些估算值的平均数，就能大致得出人口每1300年翻一番的结论。如今，农业社会相对于狩猎采集社会的这种优势，促使农业社会逐渐扩张。这并非在所有地方同时起步，正如我所说，它始于一些特定地区，比如新月沃土和中国的部分地区，随后，农民逐渐占据越来越多的土地。

The hunter-gatherers are ﬁrst transformed into herders, because they don’t roam around anymore; they have to deal with tamed animals, but the tamed animals, of course, are on the outskirts and even the herders gradually lose more and more land to the ever-expanding farming population. Again, if you just look at the current world, hunters and gatherers practically exist no more at all, except at the very fringes of the globe. And even herders exist only in very small places, again, far removed, in Siberia and Lapland and places of that kind. The superior civilization, if we want to use this term, the agricultural civilization, gradually expands outward. The time, for instance, when various plants and so forth appear in various regions, it takes about 5,000 years for agriculture to spread from the Fertile Crescent and to reach a place like England. So, that would be an expansion of something like slightly more than one kilometer per year, which is added to agriculturally used territory and taken away from hunter-gatherer territories.

最初，狩猎采集者转变为了牧民，因为他们不再四处游荡，而是开始饲养驯化的动物。不过，这些驯化的动物当然生活在偏远地区。而且，随着农耕人口的不断扩张，牧民也逐渐失去了越来越多的土地。再看看当今世界，狩猎采集者几乎已经不复存在，只在全球最边缘的地带才能见到他们的身影。同样，牧民也只在极少数偏远的地方才有，比如西伯利亚、拉普兰及其类似地区。如果我们想用这个词的话，可以说更高级的文明，即农业文明，在逐渐向外扩张。举个例子，从各种作物开始在各个地区出现算起，农业从肥沃新月地带传播到英国等地用了大约5000年时间。所以，这相当于农业用地每年增加略多于一公里，而这些土地都是从狩猎采集者的领地中夺来的。

The division of labor now intensiﬁes, of course, quite a bit. There are not just three or four diﬀerent types of occupations that you can do; with small villages coming into existence, craftsmen who are specialized in these tasks evolve far more specialization. There is also acertain amount of interregional trade now developing, whereas between the hunter-gatherer societies, as I said, there was practically no trading going on whatsoever, and of course innovations now spread in some sort of regular and permanent way. Again, hunter-gatherer societies are living side by side. It happens, but it happens more or less by accident that one group picks up a new technique that has been developed by another one. Now, in agricultural societies, people live next door to each other, being integrated, to a certain extent. And, through the division of labor, the diﬀusion of knowledge also takes place. That is, something that is developed in one place, will arrive eventually at some other place and will be imitated there, if it happens to be useful at those places. And of course the direction is always from the centers of civilization, i.e. the Fertile Crescent and the river valleys in China, to the periphery, where the wild people still live. And no longer does it take place that the division of labor breaks down as easily, that something is simply forgotten. As long as there is contact and the population size increases, the specialization progresses and innovations are transported from place to place.

当然，劳动分工在农业社会变得更加细化。人们可从事的职业不再只有三四种。随着小村庄的出现，专门从事特定工作的工匠变得更加专业化。区域间的贸易也开始有了一定发展，而正如我之前所说，在狩猎采集社群之间，几乎没有任何贸易往来。当然，如今创新也以某种规律且持续的方式传播开来。再说，狩猎采集社会是毗邻而居的。一个群体偶然间学到另一个群体发明的新技术，这种情况时有发生，但或多或少都带有偶然性。而在农业社会，人们在一定程度上相互融合，彼此相邻而居。并且，通过劳动分工，知识也得以传播。也就是说，在一个地方发展出的事物，如果在其他地方有用，最终会传播到那里并被模仿。当然，传播方向始终是从文明中心，即新月沃土和中国的河谷地区，向仍有 “野蛮人” 居住的周边地区扩散。劳动分工不再那么容易瓦解，也不会轻易遗忘某些东西。只要保持接触，且人口规模不断扩大，专业化就会不断发展，创新也会在各地传播。

And what I pointed out before: now, with agriculture, we see also that this previous tendency of languages to break up into larger and larger numbers of diﬀerent languages does come to a certain halt. There is now more communication between them; there is a greater advantage to speaking languages that are spoken by many people and also, for the ﬁrst time, a tendency to learn the languages of neighboring regions, because you trade and associate with them, to a certain extent, which you did not do during the previous phase of mankind.

正如我之前所指出的：如今，随着农业的发展，我们可以看到，此前语言不断分化为越来越多种类的趋势在一定程度上有所停滞。现在不同群体之间的交流增多了；使用多数人都说的语言变得更加有利，而且人们首次有了学习邻近地区语言的趋势，因为在一定程度上，你要与他们进行贸易往来和交往，而在人类之前的发展阶段，你无需如此行事。

Let me end this lecture by providing you with two quotes from Mises, the ﬁrst one a quote the full implication of which will only become clear in the next lecture. Mises tries to explain why there is an inherent tendency in human development of extending the division of labor, of having more and more people participate in the division of labor and to intensify the division of labor, that is, to specialize more and more and dedicate your entire time to speciﬁc tasks, rather than to one hour this and another hour that, etc. And the second quote, which, again, leads over to the next lecture, is a quote where he describes the inherent limitations that purely agricultural societies have, which lets us expect that a new invention has to be made; again, just as we invented agriculture to solve the problem of increasing scarcity of land, mankind has to solve another challenge that is inherent in purely agricultural societies—that is, to develop industrial societies with cities in order to deal with the fact that, even in agricultural societies, we will again eventually reach the point when the land cannot support a steadily growing population—and a new institution allowing us to live on far denser, far smaller territories comes into being.

在本次讲座结束之际，我给大家分享米塞斯的两段话。第一段话的完整含义要到下一讲才会明晰。米塞斯试图解释，为何在人类发展的过程中，存在一种内在趋势，就是不断扩大的劳动分工，使得越来越多的人参与到劳动分工中来，并且深化劳动分工，即越来越专业化，把全部时间投入到某一特定任务之中，而非忽而执卷品墨香，忽而弄弦奏清商。第二段话同样与下一讲相关，在这段话中，他描述了纯农业社会所固有的局限性，这让我们不得不期待新的发明。就像我们发明农业以解决土地日益稀缺的问题一样，人类必须应对纯农业社会所固有的另一挑战——即发展城市化的工业社会，以应对这样一个事实：即便在农业社会，我们最终仍会再次面临土地无法养活持续不断地增长的人口局面。于是，一种新机制应运而生，让我们能够在人口更密度、面积更小的区域生存。

The ﬁrst quote, as I said, deals with the cause of social evolution. Mises says,

The simplest way to depict the evolution of society, is to show the distinction between two evolutionary tendencies, which are related to each other in the same way as intention and extension. Society develops subjectively and objectively. Subjectively, by enlarging its membership.2

正如我所说，第一段引文探讨的是社会进化的成因。米塞斯说：

描绘社会进化最简单的方式，是展现两种进化趋势之间的区别，这两种趋势的相互关系如同内涵与外延。社会在主观和客观层面发展。从主观上来看，社会通过扩大其成员数量来发展。[9]

We have seen how that takes place, reaching several million people at the beginning of the Neolithic Revolution and then shooting up from there at a more rapid rate.

[S]ubjectively, by enlarging its membership and objectively, by enlarging the aims of its activities. Far more activities become possible in an agricultural society. We build huts; we build tools for which there was no need before; we build storage facilities, and so forth, enlarging the aims of human activities. Originally conﬁned to the narrowest circles of people, to immediate neighbors, the division of labor gradually becomes more general until eventually, it includes all mankind. This process, still far from complete and never, at any point in history, completed, is ﬁnite. We can, of course,imagine a point when this process has reached an end, when all men on Earth form a unitary system of division of labor, it will have reached its goal. Side-by-side with this extension of the social bonds, goes a process of intensiﬁcation. Social action embraces more and more aims and the area in which the individual provides for his own consumption becomes constantly narrower. We need not pause at this stage to ask, whether this process will eventually result in the specialization of all productive activity, but again, the tendency is clearly in this direction.3

我们已经看到这种情况是如何发生的，在新石器时代革命伊始，人口达到数百万，之后便以更快的速度增长。

从主观方面来说，是通过增加成员数量；从客观方面来讲，则是通过拓展活动目标。在农业社会，更多的活动成为可能。我们建造小屋，制造以前无需用到的工具，修建储存设施等等，从而拓展了人类活动的目标。劳动分工最初局限于极小的人群圈子，仅限于紧邻的邻里之间，后来逐渐变得更为普遍，直至最终涵盖全人类。这个过程远未完成，而且在历史上的任何阶段都未曾彻底完成，不过它是有极限的。当然，我们可以设想这样一个节点：当这个过程终结，地球上所有人类形成一个统一的劳动分工体系，它便达成了目标。在社会联系不断扩展的同时，还存在一个强化的过程。社会行动涵盖的目标越来越多，个人为满足自身消费而进行活动的领域则不断缩小。在现阶段，我们无需停下来探讨这个过程最终是否会导致所有生产活动都实现专业化，但很明显，趋势是朝着这个方向发展的。[10]

And now, an interesting quote on what I might call, the limitations of purely agricultural societies. Mises says,

We may depict conditions of a society of agriculturalists, in which every member tills a piece of land large enough to provide himself and his family with the indispensable necessities of life. We may include, in such a picture, the existence of a few specialists, artisans like smiths and professional men like doctors. We might even go further and assume that some men do not own a farm, but work as laborers on other people’s farms. The employer remunerates them for their help and takes care of them when sickness or old age disables him.

This scheme of an ideal society, was at the bottom of many utopian plans. It was by and large, realized for some time in some communities. The nearest approach to its realization was probably the commonwealth which the Jesuit padres established in the country which is today Paraguay. There is, however, no need to examine the merits of such a system of social organization. Historical evolution burst it asunder. Its frame was too narrow for the number of people who are living today on the Earth’ssurface.

The inherent weakness of such a society is, that the increase in population must result in progressive poverty. If the estate of a deceased farmer is divided among its children, the holdings ﬁnally become so small that they can no longer provide sufficient sustenance for a family. Everybody is a land owner, but everybody is extremely poor. Conditions, as they prevailed in large areas of China, provide a sad illustration of the misery of the tillers of small parcels. The alternative to this outcome is the emergence of the huge mass of landless proletariats. Then, a wide gap separates the disinherited paupers from the fortunate farmers. They area class of pariahs whose very existence presents society with an insoluble problem. They searched in vain for a livelihood; society has no use for them. They are destitute 4.

接下来是一段有趣的引文，内容是关于我所说的纯粹农业社会的局限性。米塞斯说：

我们可以描绘这样一个农业社会的景象：其中每个成员都耕种一块土地，面积足以供他自己和家人获取生活必需物资。在这样的图景中，我们可以设想存在一些专业人员，比如铁匠这样的工匠，以及医生这样的专业人士。我们甚至可以进一步假设，有些男子没有自己的农场，而是在别人的农场里当雇工。雇主对他们的劳作给予报酬，当他们生病或因年老丧失劳动能力时给予照顾。

这种理想社会的构想，是许多乌托邦计划的核心。大体上，它在某些社群中曾一度得以实现。最接近这一构想实现形态的，可能是耶稣会修士们在今天称为巴拉圭的国家所建立的共和国。然而，我们无需去审视这种社会组织体系的优点。历史的演进将其彻底打破。对于如今生活在地球表面的庞大人口数量而言，它的框架过于狭隘。

这样一个社会的内在缺陷在于，人口增长必然导致贫困加剧。如果一位去世农民的地产分给子女，最终这些土地会变得如此狭小，以至于无法为一个家庭提供足够的生计。每个人都是土地所有者，但每个人都极度贫困。中国大片地区曾普遍存在的状况（译者注：土地继承诸子均分导致的土地分割），便是小面积土地耕种者悲惨境遇的可悲例证。若未出现这种结果，就会产生大量无地的无产阶级。如此一来，无土地可继承的穷困潦倒的赤贫者与幸运的农民之间便会出现巨大差距。前者沦为贱民阶层，仅仅其存在本身，就会给社会带来一个难以解决的问题。他们徒劳地寻找生计，社会却无他们的立锥之地，一贫如洗。[11]

And here, then,a solution to another problem has to be developed, and that is the solution of industrial capitalism—the development of towns and money—which allows another push in the growth of mankind and in the specialization of tasks, and I will talk about that in the next lecture.

于是，必须找到这一问题的解决之道，这就是工业资本主义——城镇与货币的发展——推动了人类社会的发展以及专业化程度的提升，我将在下一讲中探讨这个问题。

第三讲货币与货币一体化：城市的发展与贸易全球化

I want to continue the story from yesterday about the division of labor. So far, I have presented more or less a historical tale, and now I want to add a few theoretical considerations about why there is division of labor, and then from there continue on to the development of money, which intensiﬁes the division of labor still further. We will also discuss the role of cities and city growth, and that will be continued in the lecture this afternoon on capital and capital accumulation.

我想接着昨天关于劳动分工的内容继续讲。到目前为止，我或多或少讲的是一个历史故事，现在我想补充一些关于劳动分工成因的理论思考，然后在此基础上继续探讨货币的发展，货币进一步强化了劳动分工。我们还会讨论城市的作用以及城市发展，今天下午关于资本与资本积累的讲座会接着这个话题展开。

I mentioned already yesterday that the fact of humans speaking to each other, arguing with each other, using language, indicates their social nature. Something else should be mentioned in this connection, and that is that at the beginning of mankind, it is difficult to imagine only two grown-up people being faced with the question, “Should we cooperate or not cooperate?,” when keeping in mind also that there are diﬀerent generations of people alive, which automatically makes it easier to understand why there is cooperation. Obviously, the older generation pressures the younger one to adopt certain standards and ﬁnds some advantages in the division of labor, but be that as it may, I want now to develop the case of the division of labor as Ludwig von Mises presents it, that is, assuming that there are grown-up adults, and that there is no language in existence initially.

我昨天已经提到，人类之间相互交谈、彼此争论以及使用语言，这些事实表明了人类的社会性。在这方面，还有一点值得提及，那就是在人类社会初期，很难想象只有两个成年人面临 “我们是否应该合作？” 这样的问题，要知道当时不同代际的人共同生活，这自然而然地让人更容易理解为什么会存在合作。显然，老一辈人会向年轻一代施压，让他们采纳某些标准，并从劳动分工中发现一些好处。但即便如此，现在我想根据路德维希·冯·米塞斯的理论来做进一步的阐述，也就是推想在假设成年人之间还不存在语言的时候如何达成分工合作。

Can we still, somehow, explain why people do not remain in selfsufficient isolation, but begin dividing their labor up and engage in exchanges based on the division of labor? In order to understand this, let’s ﬁrst assume that all individuals are perfectly identical to each other, perfect clones of each other, and that also land, that is, those things that we ﬁnd in front of us as nature-given resources, are perfectly identical for every individual. What would then occur? That is a relatively easy prediction that we can make. If we assume that all people have the same desires, the same knowledge, and the same external equipment, then the result would be that every person will produce the same sort of things in the same quantities and in the same qualities—and in such a situation, it is obvious that there’s simply no room for any type of exchange. What should I exchange if everybody has exactly the same things and uses up these things in exactly the same pattern as everybody else does, which simply follows from the assumptions that we have made, of perfect identity of labor and land. The ﬁrst recognition, then, is that if it were not for the fact of diﬀerences with regard to land and/or labor, not even the idea of division of labor (and, based on the division of labor, exchange) would ever enter any person’s mind.

‌我们究竟该如何解释，为何人们并未一直保持自给自足的孤立状态，反而开始分工合作，并基于这种分工进行交换呢？为了理解这一点，我们先做个有趣的假设，我们假设所有个体都是彼此的完美复制品，就像完美的克隆人，而且土地，也就是我们面前的那些自然赋予的资源，对每个个体来说也完全一样。那么，接下来会发生什么呢？这个预测结果，我们比较容易得出。如果我们假设所有人都有相同的欲望、相同的知识，以及相同的外部条件，那么结果必然是，每个人都会生产出相同种类、相同数量和相同质量的东西。在这种情况下，显然根本没有任何交换的空间。如果每个人拥有的东西完全一样，而且使用这些东西的方式也和其他人完全相同，这完全是基于我们之前所做的关于劳动和土地完美同一性的假设所得出的结论，那我还有什么好交换呢？由此，我们首先认识到，如果不是因为土地和 / 或劳动存在差异，甚至连劳动分工（以及基于劳动分工的交换）这个概念，都不会出现在人和人的脑海之中。

Even if there are diﬀerences between labor, ourselves and man, it is not necessary that people divide their labor and exchange based on division of labor. They could still decide that “I will produce everything on my own and remain selfsufficient while in isolation.” Mises makes the point that psychologists and sociologists frequently explain the rise of the division of labor by assuming some sort of instinct to truck and barter. You’ll ﬁnd this, for instance, in Adam Smith. He explains it by an instinct: humans are instinctively drawn to each other and to truck and barter with each other. Mises, however, points out something very interesting, that is to say, we don’t need to make this assumption. We can make the assumption that actually every person hates everybody else and still explain how a division of labor can emerge. And obviously, explanations that require less in terms of assumptions are better than explanations that require us to make all sorts of assumptions in order to come up with our conclusion.

即便人与人之间的劳动存在差异，人们也未必就会进行劳动分工，并基于分工展开交换。他们依然可能决定 “我要独自生产所需的一切，保持自给自足，与世无争。”米塞斯指出，心理学家和社会学家常常通过假定存在某种交易和易货的本能，来解释劳动分工的产生。例如，你可以在亚当·斯密的理论中看到这种观点。他用一种本能来解释：人类本能地相互吸引，并相互进行交易和易货。然而，米塞斯指出了一些非常有趣的观点，也就是说，我们无需做这样的假设。我们可以假设实际上每个人都厌恶其他人，但依然能够解释劳动分工是如何产生的。显然，假设条件较少的解释，要优于那些为了得出结论而需要我们做出诸多假设的解释。

Let’s assume everybody hates each other. Why would people nonetheless engage in the division of labor? Mises simply points out that the division of labor will arise as long as every person prefers more goods over fewer goods, as long as every person is perfectly selﬁsh and wants to have more rather than less. This is entirely sufficient in order to explain why they do not remain in selfsufficient isolation. There are, as you might have heard in your microeconomics classes, two reasons for this.

我们假设每个人都相互厌恶。那为什么人们还是会诉诸劳动分工呢？米塞斯简单明了地指出，只要每个人都希望拥有更多而非更少的财货，只要每个人都完全自利，一心想要更多而非更少，劳动分工就会出现。这就足以解释为什么人们不会一直保持自给自足的孤立状态。你们可能在微观经济学课上学过，其因有二。

The ﬁrst one is called the absolute advantage of division of labor, which refers to a situation where one person is particularly good at doing one thing and another person is particularly good at doing something else. The reason for this can be internal, that he personally has talents that somebody else does not have and somebody else has talents that the other person does not have, or it can be due to the fact that one person lives on the mountainside and has certain opportunities that somebody who lives on the seaside does not have, or it can be a combination of these two factors, that is, diﬀerences of land and in labor. And given the fact that time is scarce, it is immediately clear that an advantage would result if each person specializes in those things in which he is particularly good, because then the total amount of goods that will be produced will be larger than it would be if both individuals were to decide to produce all goods, both goods, on our own and to not engage in the division of labor.

第一个理由，被称为劳动分工的绝对优势，它指的是这样一种情况：一个人特别擅长此，而另一个人特别擅长彼。造成这种情况的原因可能是内在的，即这个人拥有他人没有的天赋，反之亦然；也可能是因为一个人住在半山腰，拥有住在海边的人所没有的某些机会；或者是这两个因素的结合，即土地和劳动力的差异。鉴于时间是稀缺的，很明显，如果每个人都专门从事自己特别擅长的事情，就会产生优势，因为这样生产出来的财货总量，会比两个人都决定独自生产所有财货（这里指两种财货）而不采用劳动分工时要多。

The second reason was ﬁrst discussed by David Ricardo. Ricardo, however, applied this argument to diﬀerent nations, and the advantage of Mises’s presentation of this argument is to show that it applies, strictly speaking, also, to the individual level. That is the so-called comparative advantage of the division of labor, which refers to the conceivably worst-case scenario where one person is all-around superior. At every production process, he is more efficient than the other person, and the other person is all-around inferior as far as his productive capabilities are concerned. And the question is then, “Does it make sense for those types of individuals, one all-around superior, one all-around inferior, to engage in a division of labor?” And without going into great detail and trying to prove this sort of thing, it is entirely sufficient to make an intuitive case for the answer: yes, even under those circumstances, division of labor is beneﬁcial, provided that these two individuals divide their labor up in the following way. The person who is all-around superior chooses to specialize in those things in which he has a particularly great advantage, and the person who is all-around inferior specializes in that area in which his disadvantage is comparatively small. Let’s take an example: a surgeon and a gardener. Among the two, the surgeon is the superior surgeon and he is also a superior gardener—and because his time is scarce, it is advantageous for him to specialize in that activity where his advantage is particularly great, namely in the area of surgery, leaving the activity of gardening to the other person, despite the fact that the surgeon would also be a better gardener than the gardener is. But given the fact that his advantage is greater in one area than in the other and that time spent on one activity can no longer be spent on another activity, dividing their labor in this way and then, based on this division of labor, engaging in exchanges, the standard of living of both individuals will be higher.

第二个理由，最早由大卫·李嘉图提出。不过，李嘉图是将这一观点应用于不同国家之间，而米塞斯的贡献在于，他严格地证明了这一观点同样适用于个体层面。这就是所谓的分工比较优势，它涉及一个可以设想的最糟糕的情形：一个人在各方面都更胜一筹。在每一个生产过程中，他都比另一个人效率更高，而另一个人就生产能力而言则全面处于劣势。那么问题来了：“对于这样两种类型的个体，一个全面占优、而另一个全面逊色，他们进行劳动分工还有意义吗？” 无需深入细节去论证这类问题，仅凭直观理解就足以给出答案：有意义，即便在这种情况下，劳动分工也是有益的，前提是这两个人按以下方式进行劳动分工。全面占优的人选择专门从事自己具有特别大优势的工作，而全面逊色的人则专门从事自己劣势相对较小的领域。让我们以一位外科医生和一位园丁为例进行说明。在这两人中，这位外科医生不仅是更出色的外科医生，也是更出色的园丁。由于他的时间有限，专门从事自己最具优势活动——即外科手术，对他而言是有利的，而把园艺工作留给另一人，尽管这位外科医生在做园丁方面，也会比那位园丁更加出色。但鉴于他在一个领域的优势大于另一个领域，且花在一项活动上的时间无法再用于另一项活动，以这种方式分工，然后基于这种分工进行交换，两人的生活水平都会提高。

Let me quote Mises to this eﬀect, that is, explaining why it is that we don’t ﬁnd people who remain in selfsufficient isolation. There might be a few people who try it, but even they do not completely do it. In the old days of the hippie movement, there were, of course, some people who tried to live oﬀ the earth, as you might remember, but even they did not live directly oﬀ the earth. They drove their campers up the mountain and led the primitive life there, but as soon as they ran out of gas, they didn’t drill for oil on the top of the mountain, but went on down to the next Shell station and got are ﬁll. If they would not have done that, we never would have heard anything from these people again. So, Mises says,

让我引用米塞斯的话来解释这一点，为什么我们找不到人们一直处于自给自足的孤立状态。可能会有一些人尝试这样做，但即便是他们也无法完全做到。你们或许还记得，在嬉皮士运动早期，当然有一些人试图与世隔绝，但即便如他们也并非完全遗世孑立。他们开着露营车到山上，在那里过着原始的生活，但一旦汽油用光，他们并不会在山顶上钻探石油，而是下山到最近的壳牌加油站加油。如果他们是自己钻井而非下山加油，那么我们就将再也不会听闻这些人的消息了。所以，米塞斯说：

If and as far as labor under the division of labor is more productive than isolated labor, and if and as far as man is able to realize this fact, human action itself tends toward cooperation and association; man becomes a social being, not in sacriﬁcing his own concerns for the sake of a mythical Moloch, society, but in aiming at an improvement in his own welfare. Experience teaches that this condition—higher productivity achieved under division of labor—is present because its cause—the inborn inequality of men and the inequality in the geographical distribution of the natural forces of production—is real. Thus we are in a position to comprehend the course of social evolution.1

如果且只要劳动分工下的劳动比孤立劳动更具生产力，只要人类能够认识到这一事实，人的行动本身就会趋向于合作与联合；人成为社会的一员，并非为了某个虚构的 “摩洛神”（Moloch，即社会）而牺牲自身利益，而是为了改善自身的福祉。经验表明，这种情况——劳动分工带来更高的生产力——是存在的，因为其成因——人类天生的不平等以及自然生产要素在地理分布上的不均衡——是真实的。因此，我们能够理解社会演变的进程。[12]

And now to a very important insight that Mises derives from this—again, recall, I pointed out that contrary to people like Adam Smith, for instance, who stipulated some inborn sympathy among mankind as the ultimate cause of division of labor, Mises reverses this argument and says, “It is precisely the higher productivity of the division of labor which makes us dependent on each other, based on our recognition that we all beneﬁt from this dependency on others that we then develop sympathetic feelings toward others.” So, it is not the sympathy that explains division of labor; it is the selﬁsh motivation to begin the division of labor, that then, as a result of the division of labor, lets feelings of sympathy among mankind develop. So, sympathy results from, but is not the cause of, the division of labor. And again, a very interesting quote to this eﬀect. Mises says,

接下来是米塞斯从中得出的一个非常重要的见解。再次提醒，比如，与亚当·斯密等人不同，斯密认为人类天生的某种同情心是劳动分工的根本原因，而米塞斯则反驳了这一观点，他说：“恰恰是劳动分工带来的更高生产力，使得我们彼此相互依赖。基于我们认识到这种对他人的依赖能使我们都从中受益，随后我们才对他人产生同情心。” 所以，并非同情心解释了劳动分工，而是自利动机开启了劳动分工，然后，作为劳动分工的结果，人类之间才产生了同情心。因此，同情心是劳动分工的结果，而非劳动分工的原因。再次引用米塞斯一句非常有意思的话来说明这一点，他说……

[T]here can emerge between members of society feelings of sympathy and friendship and a sense of belonging together. These feelings are the source of man’s most delightful and most sublime experiences. They are the most precious adornment of life; they lift the animal species man to the heights of a really human existence. However, they are not, as some have asserted, the agents that have brought about social relationships. They are the fruits of social cooperation, they thrive only within its frame; they did not precede the establishment of social relations and are not the seed from which they spring.2

“在社会成员之间会产生同情、友谊以及归属感。这些情感是人类最愉悦、最崇高体验的源泉，是生命最珍贵的点缀，它们将人类这一动物物种提升到了真正具有人性的生存高度。然而，正如一些人所断言的那样，这些情感并非造就社会关系的动因，而是社会合作的成果。在社会合作的框架内，这些情感才能茁壮成长。它们在时间上并非先于社会关系的建立，在逻辑上也不是社会关系产生的根源。” [13]

And then he elaborates a little bit more on this. He says,

The mutual sexual attraction of male and female is inherent in man’s animal nature and independent of any thinking and theorizing. It is permissible to call it original, vegetative, instinctive, or mysterious….However, neither cohabitation, nor what precedes it and what follows, generates social cooperation and societal modes of life. The animals too join together in mating, but they have not developed social relations. Family life is not merely a product of sexual intercourse. It is by no means natural and necessary that parents and children live together in the way in which they do in the family. The mating relation need not result in family organization. The human family is an outcome of thinking, planning, and acting. It is this very fact which distinguishes it radically from those animal groups which we call per analogiam animal families.3

接着，他对此进行了更深入的阐述。他说：

男女之间的相互性吸引，源自人类的动物本能，不依赖于任何思考与理论推导。称其为原始的、自然的、本能的或神秘的…… 都无可厚非。然而，无论是同居，还是之前及之后发生的事，都不会产生社会合作与社会生活方式。动物也会交配而聚在一起，但它们并未发展出社会关系。家庭生活不仅仅是性关系的产物。父母、子女以家庭形式共同生活，绝非自然且必然之事。交配关系未必会形成家庭组织。人类家庭是思考、计划与行动的产物。正是这一事实，使得人类家庭与我们类比称作“动物家庭”的动物群体有着本质区别。[14]

So again, it is the recognition of the advantages of division of labor that makes stable family relationships, rather than people breaking up and going their own way.

所以，再次强调，正是对劳动分工所具带来的优势的认知，促成了稳定的家庭关系，而非让人们“事了”拂衣去。

Now, the division of labor then, because it is more productive, allows also, as I already indicated yesterday in my lecture, for population growth that otherwise would not be possible. The easiest way to convince ourselves of this is to engage in a thought experiment, what would happen to the world population if we were to decide from now on to withdraw from all social interaction and become selfsufficient producers. As I already intimated with that hippie example, it can be easily seen that if we were to do something like this, most of mankind would be wiped out within a few days because we would not be able to provide ourselves with all the amenities that we have gotten used to. As soon as our truck wears out, we wouldn’t be able to ﬁx it; as soon as our milk runs out, well, in my case, more importantly, as soon as my beer runs out, I would be in deep trouble.

如今，正如我昨天在讲座中所提到的，劳动分工由于提高了生产效率，也使得人口增长成为可能，否则这是无法实现的。要让自己信服这一点，最简单的方法就是进行一个思想实验：如果我们从现在起决定退出所有社会互动，成为自给自足的生产者，世界人口会发生什么变化呢？就像我之前用嬉皮士的例子所暗示的那样，很容易看出，如果我们如此行事，那么大大多数人类将会在几天内灭绝，因为我们无法为自己提供已经习以为常的所有生活便利。一旦我们的卡车抛锚，我们无法修理；一旦牛奶喝完，嗯，就我个人而言，更重要的是，一旦啤酒喝完，我的麻烦就大了。

Note that the division of labor also allows the so-called unﬁt to survive. But it is precisely these people, who under very primitive conditions,due to some deﬁciencies of their bodily functions or sensory functions, would be condemned to starve and die, who can survive and lead productive lives and even become rich and wealthy individuals as a result of the division of labor. As a result of all this, as I explained, we ﬁrst have agricultural societies developing. These agricultural societies have a minimal amount of division of labor; they are still, to a large extent, selfsufficient. But then,as Mises described in the quote that I gave you yesterday, problems arise if the population increases: the plots become smaller and smaller; land becomes more and more valuable, and we have to ﬁnd a solution to this growing mass of population. And the solution is adeepening and intensifying of the division of labor, which leads to the formation, out of small villages, of cities, where we have specialized professions developing that provide the countryside with specialized tools and receive from the countryside the foodstuﬀ necessary to lead their city life.

请注意，劳动分工也使所谓的弱势群体得以生存。正是这些人，在非常原始的条件下，由于身体机能或感官功能存在某些缺陷，本会注定饥馁而死，但却因劳动分工而得以存活，过上富有成效的生活，甚至跃升为富有阶层。正如我所解释的，这一切首先促成了农业社会的发展。这些农业社会的劳动分工程度极低，在很大程度上仍处于自给自足状态。但正如我昨天引用米塞斯的话所描述的那样，一旦人口增长，问题就会出现：土地越分越小，土地愈发珍贵，人类必须为不断增长的人口群体找到解决之道。而这个解决办法，就是深化和强化劳动分工，这促使小村庄逐渐发展成为城市，而城市中则出现了专门的职业，为农村提供专业工具，并从农村获取城市生活所需的食物。

With city life also comes for the ﬁrst time (due to the fact that city life already indicates a larger amount of capital accumulation, and leads to a situation where people reach a certain level of wealth, have a certain amount of leisure time) the development of science or the ﬁrst attempts toward science, which requires leisure time to reﬂect about natural laws, and so forth, and also very importantly, the development of a written language, which again constitutes a great advance in human development above and beyond the development of a language itself— because in this way, we are no longer dependent on oral tradition, one generation telling the following generation what to do, what they have learned and so forth, but we now have the ability to just freeze and make permanent experiences that were collected by previous generations. It also becomes far easier to transport this information to far and distant places,far more easy than would be possible if we had to rely on oral traditions. Written languages developed ﬁrst around 5,000 years ago, and we do know that some regions on the globe never reached this stage of development of having a written language. Some places only received written languages once they were rediscovered by Europeans. There existed no written language on the African continent, and only very small attempts in some small regions on the American continent, of written languages.

随着城市生活的出现，还首次迎来了（因为城市生活已然意味着更大规模的资本积累，同时使人们达到一定的财富水平，且拥有一定的闲暇时间）科学的发展或对科学的初步探索，这需要闲暇时间来思考自然规律等。同样非常重要的是，书面语言的发展，这相较于语言本身的发展，无疑是人类发展中的一大进步——如此一来，我们不再依赖口头传承，一代人口口相传告诉下一代该做什么、他们学到了什么等等，而是能够固化并永久留存前代人积累的经验。将这些信息传播到陌生的远方也变得相对更加容易，远比依赖口头传承要容易得多。书面语言大约在5000年前首次出现，我们也知道，地球上有些地区从未发展到拥有书面语言的阶段。有些地方直到被欧洲人重新发现之后，才有了书面语言。非洲大陆原本不存在书面语言，而在美洲大陆，也只有一些小区域有过极为初级的书面语言尝试。

I mentioned Carroll Quigley yesterday in connection with his claim that one of the marks of civilizations is that, civilizations no longer live the parasitic life, but are societies that add something to the existing resources. Quigley gives, apart from this,a few other characteristics that he considers to be constitutive of civilization, and those are societies that have cities that have progressed beyond the village level and that possess a written language. The ﬁrst civilization or ﬁrst society that fulﬁlls this requirement of a civilization, in Quigley’s sense, would be those societies that developed in the Fertile Crescent, today’s Iraq and Syria.

我昨天提到了卡罗尔·奎格利（Carroll Quigley），他声称文明的标志之一是，文明社会不再过寄生式的生活，而是能够为现有资源增添价值。除此之外，奎格利还提出了他认为构成文明的一些其他特征，即这些社会拥有超越村落层级的城市，并且拥有书面语言。按照奎格利的定义，符合文明这一要求的首个文明或首个社会，应该是那些在新月沃土（即如今的伊拉克和叙利亚地区）发展起来的社会。

Let me just give you some ballpark ﬁgures about the size of the cities that came into being during this period 4,000–6,000 years ago. The biggest city for many centuries was Uruk, the remnants of which are in Iraq. Around 3700 BC, Uruk as the ﬁrst city had a population of about 14,000 people. So, by our standards, it was merely a large village but at that time, obviously, a major breakthrough as compared to village sizes. And this city, Uruk, in the next 1,000 years or so, by 2800 BC, grew to a population size of 80,000 people. This is already a signiﬁcant size, in which one can imagine that such a size city must display quite a signiﬁcant amount of division of labor within the nonagricultural ﬁeld. So, that was 80,000 people in 2800 BC. After that, the city of Uruk declines. Other cities take its place as the dominant city.

让我给你一些大致的数字，来描述4000到6000年前这一时期出现的城市规模。在长达数个世纪的时间里，最大的城市是乌鲁克，其遗址位于伊拉克。大约公元前3700年，作为第一座城市的乌鲁克，人口约为1.4万。所以，以我们今天的标准来看，它仅仅只是一个大村庄而已，但在当时，与一般的村庄规模相比，显然是一个重大的突破。在接下来约1000年的时间里，到公元前2800年，乌鲁克这座城市的人口增长到了8万。这个规模已经相当可观，可以想象，这么大规模的城市，在非农业领域内，必定存在相当程度的劳动分工。这样，公元前2800年，乌鲁克的人口达致8万。而在那之后，乌鲁克城开始逐渐衰落。其他城市取代了它的主导地位。

The next one is Akkad, which is also in the same region, which reaches the size of 60,000 inhabitants. Then the biggest cities appear in Egypt: Memphis and Thebes and Avaris. The biggest size of towns during this period of the Babylonian and Egyptian civilizations, was about 100,000. If we go to more recent periods, there is a time, let’s say, during the Roman Empire, when we ﬁnd cities already of a signiﬁcantly larger size. Rome itself, at its peak, had a population of about a million people, and we will see later on that there is also economic disintegration: a city that had a million inhabitants at one time shrinks,a few hundred years later, to a size of 20,000.

接下来是同样位于该地区的阿卡德，其人口达到了 6 万。随后，规模最大的城市出现在埃及，即孟菲斯、底比斯和阿瓦里斯。在巴比伦和埃及文明时期，城镇的最大规模约为 10 万人口。如果我们把时间拉近，比如在罗马帝国时期，我们发现城市的规模已经显著扩大。罗马城在鼎盛时期，人口约有 100 万。我们稍后会看到，也会出现经济解体的情况：一座曾经拥有 100 万居民的城市，在几百年后，人口规模缩小至仅有 2 万。

There are periods—and I’ll come back to that in more detail—in which you can see there is faster population growth, more intensive division of labor, greater population growth, wider specialization and so forth, but there are also periods in which this sort of thing gets destroyed and populations shrink, the division of labor shrinks, population size in cities goes down and so forth. Athens, at the peak of its development, had about 250,000 inhabitants, and one of the premier harbors and trading centers during this time, Alexandria, had a population of about 400,000 people.

有些时期——我稍后会更详细地讲到——你会看到人口增长加快、劳动分工更密集、人口增长幅度更大、专业化程度更高等等；但也有些时期，这类发展会遭到破坏，人口减少、劳动分工萎缩、城市人口规模缩小等等。雅典在其发展的鼎盛时期，约有25万居民；而当时首屈一指的港口和贸易中心之一亚历山大港，人口约有40万。

Now, with cities also come merchants and money. I would like to add that to Quigley’s deﬁnition of developed civilizations, as places that have cities and written language, as an additional criterion of developed civilizations, to point out that they must have a specialized merchant class, people who are engaged in small-distance and in particular, also long-distance trade and, of course, with long-distance trade, the development of money.

如今，随着城市的发展，商人和货币也随之而来。奎格利对发达文明的定义是拥有城市和书面语言，我想在此基础上，补充一点作为发达文明的额外标准，即它们必须有一个专门的商人阶层。这些商人不仅从事短途贸易，尤其是从事长途贸易，当然，随着长途贸易的发展，货币也就随之应运而生。

I will interrupt my historical considerations and give a brief explanation for the development of money. Just as we can rationally reconstruct why it is that people engage in the division of labor and why there is a tendency for the division of labor to become more extensive and more intensive, so we can also provide a rational reconstruction of the development of money as a solution to a problem that arises out of trade in a premonetary economy. If we have a barter economy, in which people trade consumer goods for other consumer goods or consumer goods for producer goods, and production takes place for exchange purposes, or at least partially for exchange purposes, rather than for selfsufficient supplies, then the problem automatically arises that sometimes I might have produced something for the purpose of exchanging it for something else, but the person who has what I want is not interested in my products, but wants something else.

我将暂时中断对历史问题的探讨，简要解释一下货币的发展。正如我们可以合理地重构人们为何从事劳动分工，以及劳动分工为何趋向于更加广泛、更加密集一样，我们也能够合理地重构货币的发展历程，它是为解决前货币经济贸易中出现的问题而产生的。如果我们处于物物交换的经济模式，人们用消费品交换其他消费品，或者用消费品交换生产资料，而且生产是出于交换目的，或者至少部分是出于交换目的，而非为了自给自足，那么自然而然就会出现如下问题：有时我生产出某种东西，想用来交换其他东西，但拥有我想要之物的人却对我的产品不感兴趣，而是想要其他东西。

Trade, in this situation, is only possible if we have what is called a double coincidence of wants, that is to say, I must have what you want and you must have what I want. If only one of these accidents occurs, I have what you want, but you don’t have what I want, then, clearly, trading comes to a standstill, and in such a situation, people are obviously looking for some sort of solution to this halting of trade, given the fact that they produced for exchange purposes, and not for the purpose of using things themselves. And again, Mises, drawing on the writings of Carl Menger, has a very beautiful explanation for what the solution looks like to this problem. If you cannot trade directly, what will happen is—and we don’t have to assume that this happens instantaneously or that every group of people makes the same discovery at the same time—we only have to assume that there are some brighter people in society who make the simple discovery that not all goods that are traded in barter are equally marketable. That is to say, not all goods traded in barter are equally frequently used by people. Some goods are used by more people on more occasions and other goods are used by fewer people on fewer occasions.

在这种情况下，只有当出现所谓的 “需求的双重巧合” 时，交易才有可能实现。也就是说，我必须拥有你所需之物，而你也必须拥有我所需之物。如果只出现其中一种情况，比如我有你想要之物，但你没有我想要之物，那么显然，交易就会陷入停滞。鉴于人们生产是为了交换，而非为了自己使用这些物品，在这种情况下，人们显然会寻找解决交易停滞的办法。同样，米塞斯借鉴卡尔·门格尔的著作，对这个问题的解决方案给出了非常精彩的解释。如果你无法直接进行交易，那么会发生的情况是——我们不必假设这种情况会瞬间发生，也不必假设每一群人会同时有相同的发现——我们只需假设社会中有一些更聪明之人有了一个简单的发现：在物物交换中，并非所有用于交易的财货都具有同等的适销性。也就是说，并非所有在物物交换中交易的财货都同样频繁地被人们使用。有些财货在更多场合被更多人使用，而另一些财货则在较少场合被较少人使用。

And in such a situation, where I cannot receive for my goods what I directly want, I can still gain an advantage, make myself better oﬀ, following only selﬁsh instincts, if I succeed in surrendering my goods for something that is more marketable than my own goods are. If I receive something that is more marketable, even if I have no interest in using that as aconsumer good or a producer good, the advantage that I gain is the advantage that a more marketable good can, of course, more easily be resold for those things that I really want. That is, I have a more marketable good in my hands which is of no direct use to me as a consumer or as a producer, but I have demanded it as what is called a medium of exchange, as a facilitator of exchange. It facilitates exchange because there are more people on more occasions who are willing to accept these goods than the goods I had initially oﬀered for sale.

在这种情况下，我无法用自己的财货直接换到想要的东西，但如果我能成功地用自己的财货，去换取比它们更具适销性的东西，那么仅仅出于利己的本能，我依然能获得好处，使得自身处境变得更好。即便我对换取之物用作消费品或生产资料毫无兴趣，但只要它更具适销性，我就能从中受益，因为更具适销性的财货，当然也更易转卖，以此换取我真正想要之物。也就是说，我手中有了一种对我来说，作为消费者或生产者而言，并无直接用处、却更具适销性的财货，我将其作为所谓的交换媒介来获取，作为一种促进交换的工具。它之所以能促进交换，原因在于，相比我最初出售的财货，有更多的人在更多的场合愿意接受它。

Then, the degree of marketability of this particular good increases even more so because now there are people who demand this good because they want to have it as a consumer good and a producer good as before and, in addition, there’s one person who demands this good for a diﬀerent motive, the motive being, I will use it as a medium of exchange, as a facilitator of exchange. And then it becomes easier for the next bright person in society to make the same discovery: whenever he gets into difficulties trading his good directly against those things that he wants, he makes the same move. All I have to do is ﬁnd a good that is more marketable than my own and the likelihood that he picks the same has already increased, due to the fact that there was already one brighter guy before him.

然后，这种特定商品的适销程度会进一步提高，因为现在除了像以前那样将其作为消费品或生产资料而需求该商品的人之外，还有人出于不同的动机需求它，这个动机就是，会将它当作交换媒介，一种促进交换的手段。紧接着，社会上的下一个聪明人更容易发现同样的道理：每当他直接用自己的商品去交换想要的东西遇到困难时，他就会采取同样的行动。他所要做的就是找到一种比自己的商品更具适销性的商品，而且由于有一位更聪明之士的珠玉在前，他选择同一种商品的可能性已然增加。

And then we have, very quickly, a convergence toward one medium of exchange that is used in society all over the place, and we call this a common medium of exchange or money. Two advantages that arise as soon as we have a common medium of exchange in existence is that now, with a common medium of exchange in existence, we can sell and buy instantly without having to wait for double coincidences of wants to come into existence.

随后，很快就会趋向于出现一种在全社会广泛使用的交换媒介，我们将其称为通用交换媒介或货币。一旦有了通用交换媒介，就会带来两个好处：第一个好处是，有了通用交换媒介，我们可以随时进行买卖，而无需等待双重巧合的出现。

The second advantage that arises with the existence of a common medium of exchange is that now we can engage in cost accounting. After all, recall that we produce for sale on the market; we do not produce for our own use. If we produce for the market, then we want to make sure that those things that go into the production of certain products are less valuable than those things that we produce with our inputs. Or to put it diﬀerently, we want to make sure that our output is more valuable than our input. But in a barter economy the outputs and the inputs are in diﬀerent units—they are incommensurable. However, as soon as all our inputs and our output sell against one common medium of exchange, we have a common denominator; we can now compare, or add up, all the inputs in terms of money and we can express our output in terms of money, and we can now determine whether we made proﬁts or losses—proﬁts indicating that we did indeed turn less valuable resources into more valuable resources, which is, after all, the purpose of production—or, if we made losses, this tells us that we wasted valuable resources in order to turn them into something that was less valuable than those things that were used in order to produce our product, which would give usa signal that we should discontinue this type of production process.

通用交换媒介的存在所带来的第二个好处是，我们现在可以进行成本核算。毕竟，记住我们生产是为了在市场上销售，并非为了供自己使用。如果我们是为市场生产，那么我们希望确保投入到某些产品生产中的要素，其价值低于我们利用这些投入所生产出来的产品价值。或者换种说法，我们希望确保产出价值高于投入价值。但在物物交换的经济中，产出和投入是以不同单位计量的——它们不可通约。然而，一旦我们所有的投入和产出都以一种通用交换媒介来进行交易，那么我们就有了一个共同的衡量标准；我们现在可以用货币来比较或加总所有投入，也能用货币来表示我们的产出，进而能够确定我们是盈利还是亏损——盈利表明我们确实将价值较低的资源转化为了价值较高的资源，而这毕竟是生产的目的；反之，如果我们亏损了，这就告诉我们，我们浪费了宝贵的资源，将它们转化成了比生产过程中所投入要素价值更低的东西，这就向我们传达了一个信号，即我们应该停止这种类型的生产过程。

Now, as we imagine that the division of labor expands and ultimately reaches and encompasses the entire globe, as diﬀerent regions begin to trade with each other, we can see that there will be in the market also atendency for one type of regional money to outcompete other regional types of money, with the ultimate result to be expected being that there will be only one or, at the most, two types of money left over, which are used universally. That is to say, such a money, a money that is more widely used, more widely accepted, is obviously advantageous over a money that is only used in certain small regions. If we have diﬀerent monies being used in certain small regions, then we are, strictly speaking, still in a system of partial barter. If I want to trade with a diﬀerent region, I ﬁrst have to ﬁnd somebody who wants my money and is willing to give me his money, and only then can I proceed to make my purchases. If you have, however, only one money used on a worldwide scale, then it is obviously possible that without any necessity for double coincidences of wants, immediate trading can take place. These two tendencies, division of labor expanding and the tendency of money to become one universally used money, obviously reinforce each other and deepen and intensify the division of labor.

现在，当我们设想劳动分工不断扩展，最终覆盖全球，不同地区开始相互贸易时，我们可以看到，市场上也会出现一种趋势，即某一种地区性货币会在竞争中胜过其他地区性货币，预料的最终结果会是，只会剩下一种，或者最多两种被普遍使用的货币。也就是说，一种使用范围更广、接受度更高的货币，显然比仅在某些小区域使用的货币更具优势。如果不同的货币仅在某些小区域使用，那么严格来说，我们仍处在部分物物交换的体系之中。如果我想和另一个地区进行贸易，我首先需找到一个想要我手中货币并愿意和我交换他手中货币之人，只有这样我才能继续进行购买。然而，如果全球只使用一种货币，那么显然无需需求的双重巧合，就能立即进行交易。劳动分工不断扩大，以及货币趋向于成为一种全球通用货币这两种趋势，显然会相互促进，进而深化和强化劳动分工。

At this point, to emphasize this tendency for the globalization of trade facilitated by the universality of one money having outcompeted the initial diﬀerent sorts of money—let me give an important quote from Mises, to which I will return at a later point again. Mises says,

此时，为强调因一种货币的普适性淘汰了最初的各种不同货币，从而推动贸易全球化的这一趋势，请让我引用米塞斯的一段重要论述，之后我还会再次提及。米塞斯说：

A social theory that was founded on Darwinism would either come to the point of declaring that war of all against all was the natural and necessary form of human intercourse, thus denying that any social bonds were possible; or, it would have, on the other hand, to show why peace does and must reign within certain groups and yet, on the other, to prove that the principle of peaceful union which leads to the formation of these associations is ineﬀective beyond the circle of the group, so that the groups among themselves must struggle.4

“建基于达尔文主义的社会理论，要么会得出这样的结论，即所有人对所有人的战争状态是人类交往的自然且必然形式，从而否认任何社会关系的可能性；要么，另一方面，它必须说明为何和平确实且必然在某些群体内部占主导，同时又要证明，促成这些团体形成和平的联合原则，在群体之外却不起作用，以至于群体之间必然相互争斗。”[15]

You notice that the argument here is that most people have very little difficulty accepting the thesis that yes, there are peaceful relationships between the inhabitants of village A and village B, or tribe A and tribe B, because everybody sees that that is, of course, taking place. If you accept the Darwinian explanation, this is already difficult to explain, but the next struggle, the next problem, the more decisive one, is that people who accept these Darwinian interpretations have to explain why there should be division of labor and peaceful relationships within a group but not between diﬀerent groups. After all, the same principles seem to be at work. Mises then says this: “peaceful union, which leads to the formation of these associations, is ineﬀective beyond the circle of the group, so that the groups among themselves must struggle.” And Mises then says,

你会注意到，这里的论点是，大多数人很容易接受这样一种观点，即A村与B村的居民之间，或者A部落与B部落之间存在和平关系，因为每个人都看到这种情况确实存在。如果你接受达尔文主义的解释，这就已经很难解释了，但接下来更关键的难题是，接受这些达尔文主义解释的人必须说明，为什么在一个群体内部会有劳动分工与和平关系，而不同群体之间却没有。毕竟，似乎是同样的原则在起作用。然后米塞斯说：“导致这些团体形成的和平联合原则，在群体之外便却失效了，以至于群体之间必然相互争斗。” 接着米塞斯又说道……

This is precisely the rock on which all non-liberal social theories founder. If one recognizes a principle which results in the union of all Germans, of all Doli-chocephalians or all Proletarians and forms a special nation, race, or class out of these individuals, then this principle cannot be proved to be eﬀective only within the collective groups. The anti-liberal social theories skim over the problem by conﬁning themselves to the assumption that the solidarity of interests within the groups is so self-evident, as to be accepted without further discussion, and by taking pains only to prove the existence of the conﬂict of interests between groups and the necessity of conﬂict as the sole dynamic force of historical development. But if war is to be the father of all things, the fruitful source of historical progress, it is difficult to see why its fruitful activity should be restricted within states, nations, races and classes. If Nature needs war, why not the war of all against all, why merely the war of all groups against all groups?5

这正是所有非自由主义社会理论失败的症结所在。如果有人认可一种能让所有德国人、所有多利-乔菲利亚人（Doli-chocephalians）或所有无产者联合起来，并将这些个体组成一个特殊民族、种族或阶级的原则，那么就无法证明这个原则只在集体群体内部有效。非自由主义社会理论回避了这个问题，他们只是假定群体内部的利益一致性是不言而喻的，无需进一步讨论便可接受，而只致力于证明群体之间利益冲突的存在，以及冲突作为历史发展唯一动力的必然性。但如果战争是万物之父，是历史进步的丰富源泉，那就很难理解为什么它的积极作用只局限于国家、民族、种族和阶级内部。如果自然需要战争，为什么不是所有人对所有人的战争，而只是群体之间的战争呢？[16]

This is a very powerful description of, or explanation for, why the same principles that lead groups to cooperate peacefully are also operative at work when it comes to cooperation between diﬀerent groups. The same reasons apply there as they apply within each group. The division of labor is beneﬁcial, because it beneﬁts all groups participating in it, just as it beneﬁts all individuals within a group. And a development of money toward a universal medium of exchange is beneﬁcial in the same way as the development of regional money is beneﬁcial for the inhabitants of just a small region.

这有力地描述并解释了，为何促使群体内部和平合作的相同原则，在不同群体间的合作中同样发挥作用。这些原则在群体间与在群体内部的适用原因是相同的。劳动分工是有益的，因为它使所有参与其中的群体都受益，就如同它让群体内的所有个体都受益一样。货币朝着通用交换媒介发展是有益的，同理，地区性货币的发展对小区域内的居民也是有益的。

Now, back to a few historical remarks, illustrating this tendency of globalizing the division of labor and the development of a universal money integrating all regions, all classes, all societies. From very early on, after the development of cities and a merchant class and regional monies, we have the development of long-distance trade. We already have something that is called the Silk Road, connecting Asia to Europe via the Middle East, which is still sort of the center of civilization, at that time, some 4,000 years ago. That is, 4,000 years ago there already existed trading routes of thousands of kilometers connecting Europe with Asia, trading routes that are protected by either the merchants themselves or by those people who live nearby and have an interest that the trade takes place through their areas. There exists, during the Roman Empire—which at least in the ancient history provides examples for the deepest and widest economic integration—permanent contact around 200 BC between Rome and Han, China, where caravans of people move steadily and trade various goods back and forth. Very early on we also have regular sea travel; the Chinese regularly sent ships all the way to places such as India, for instance. And from the western part, there are regular sea trade routes from the Persian Gulf to India as well, especially after the discovery of the monsoon winds. That is, the monsoon winds, I forget exactly which direction, are such that for half a year they blow toward the east and for the other half of the year they blow to the west. So, once people discovered this regular pattern, relatively large-scale shipping operations could be conducted from the Persian Gulf to India and back.

现在，让我们回顾一些历史叙述，来说明劳动分工全球化以及发展出一种将所有地区、阶层和社会整合起来的通用货币的趋势。在城市、商人阶层以及地区性货币出现后不久，长途贸易就随之发展起来。我们已经有了所谓的丝绸之路，它经由中东连接亚洲和欧洲，那时（约4000年前）中东仍是文明的中心之一。也就是说，4000年前就已经存在数千公里长的贸易路线，连接着欧洲和亚洲，这些贸易路线要么由商人自己保护，要么由居住在附近且希望贸易能途经其所在地区的人保护。在罗马帝国时期（至少在古代历史中，它为最深层、最广泛的经济一体化提供了范例），大约在公元前200年，罗马和中国汉朝之间就有了长期联系，商队不断往来，交易各种商品。很早以前，我们也有了定期的海上航行；例如，中国人经常派遣船只远至印度等地。在西方，也有从波斯湾到印度的定期海上贸易路线，尤其是在人们发现季风之后。也就是说，季风的风向，我记不太清具体方向了，半年向东吹，半年向西吹。所以，一旦人们发现了这种规律，就可以从波斯湾到印度开展相对大规模的海上航运，并往返运输。

Again, those sorts of things, just simply discovering how the wind blows, took quite sometime; in some cases it was comparatively easy, as with the monsoon winds, where you have long periods blowing one way and long periods blowing the other way. It was far more difficult, for instance, to ﬁnd the appropriate sea routes across the Atlantic, going in one direction and then coming back in the other direction, since you typically cannot take the same routes. And it was even more difficult for the Paciﬁc, where the routes are very diﬀerent for going one way and for going the other. Again, hundreds of years of experience were necessary in order to develop detailed knowledge about the most appropriate routes to take, and this only became a nonproblem with the development of steamships, which is, of course, a comparatively recent development.

再者，诸如此类的事情，比如仅仅是弄清风向，都需要相当长的时间；在某些情况下相对容易，比如季风，它长时间朝一个方向吹，然后又长时间朝另一个方向吹。例如，要找到穿越大西洋往返的合适航线就困难得多，因为通常往返不能走同一条路线。而对于太平洋来说就更困难了，往返的航线大不相同。同样，要积累起关于最佳航线的详细知识需要数百年的经验积累，而这只是在蒸汽船出现后才不再是问题，当然，蒸汽船是相对晚近才出现。

This intensive long-distance trade is reﬂected in the fact that we can ﬁnd Roman coins in places like South India, but Roman coins were not the most popular coins, because Roman coins suﬀered from frequent coin-clipping operations by various rulers. So, for some 800 years or so, from about 300 AD to the twelfth century, the most popular money was produced by Constantinople and the name of it was solidus or bezant, (obviously named after Bezant, or Byzantium), and they gained a reputation of being the most reliable, most honest coins, subject to practically no coin clipping or adding of less valuable metals to it. Trading markets, of course, prefer good money over bad money.

这种频繁的长途贸易体现在这样一个事实上：我们能在南印度等地发现罗马硬币，但罗马硬币并非最受欢迎的货币，因为罗马硬币经常遭到不同统治者的剪边操作。所以，在大约公元300年到12世纪这800年左右的时间里，最受欢迎的货币是由君士坦丁堡铸造的，名为索里迪（solidus）或拜占庭金币（bezant）（显然是以拜占庭，即Byzantium命名），它们以最可靠、最诚实著称，几乎没有遭到剪边或掺入廉价金属。显然，交易市场总是青睐良币而非劣币。

You might have heard about the so-called Gresham’s law, which states that bad money drives out good money, but this law only holds if there are price controls in eﬀect, only if the exchange ratios of different monies are ﬁxed and no longer reﬂect the market forces. Is it the case that bad money drives out good money under normal circumstances without any interference? No, for money holds to exactly the same law that holds for every other good. Good goods drive out bad goods. Good money drives out bad money, so this bezant was for something like 800 years considered to be the best money available and was preferred by merchants from India to Rome to the Baltic Sea. In all of these regions, you can ﬁnd this type of coin being used, and diggings have produced evidence of the use of these coins at these far distant places.

你可能听说过所谓的格雷欣法则，该法则称劣币驱逐良币。但这条法则只有在实施价格管制的情况下才成立，即只有当不同货币的兑换比率固定，且不再受市场力量影响的情况下才会成立。在没有任何干预的正常情况下，劣币会驱逐良币吗？显然并不会，因为货币遵循的法则与其他所有商品完全相同。优质商品会淘汰劣质商品，良币会驱逐劣币。因此，在大约 800 年的时间里，拜占庭金币被认为是市面上最好的货币，从印度到罗马再到波罗的海的商人都青睐于它。在所有这些地区，你都能发现这种硬币被使用，考古挖掘也为这些硬币在遥远地区的使用提供了证据。

To continue the story, we have the discovery of America taking place. Those areas had been completely unknown to the Western Eurasian world before—it actually takes until about 1850 for the ﬁnal explorations into the interior of Africa to take place, and we can say roughly that by the mid-nineteenth century the entire world had become known to mankind. And it is not an accident, then, that around this time what emerges is, for the ﬁrst time,a clear-cut tendency for one or two commodity monies to outcompete everything else. That is, at the end of the nineteenth century, we have an international gold standard developing. For a while, there was competition between gold and silver. There were certain areas that preferred silver. For instance, before 1908, China and Persia and a few South American countries still used silver, but by 1900, the rest of the world was on a gold standard. This is precisely what one would predict based on economic theory, a tendency toward a one world commodity money coming into existence. Of course, there is always some sort of interference and messing up by governments in this process, and we have not talked about this yet. So far, the entire reconstruction that I give is areconstruction of what would happen without any government interference. This problem of government interference will occupy us only in later lectures.

我们的故事继续，美洲被发现了。在这之前，欧亚大陆西部对这些地区完全一无所知——实际上，直到大约1850年才对非洲内陆进行了最终的探索，大致可以说，到19世纪中叶，人类已经知晓了整个世界。那么，大约在这个时候，首次出现了一两种商品货币明显胜过其他所有货币的趋势，这并非偶然。也就是说，在19世纪末，国际金本位制逐步形成。有一段时间，黄金和白银存在竞争关系。有些地区更喜欢白银。例如，1908年以前，中国、波斯和一些南美国家仍在使用白银，但到1900年，世界其他地区都采用了金本位制。这正是根据经济理论可以预测到的，即有一种单一的世界商品货币开始形成的趋势。当然，在这个过程中，政府总是会进行某种干预和捣乱，我们还未谈及此点。到目前为止，我所做的整个阐述，是在假设无任何政府干预的情况下才会发生之事。政府干预这个问题，我们将在后面的讲座中讨论。

And then we can say that from 1914 on, while we have probably reached the most complete economic integration in human history, the most encompassing economic integration, most intensive division of labor, including the entire globe; from 1914 on, disintegration set in again. Most visibly, of course, documented by the fact that we currently no longer have an international commodity money; we have, instead,a large variety of national, freely ﬂuctuating paper currencies that is a regression to a situation that we might consider to be partial barter again. That is something that we had already overcome in history, and we have gone back to a situation that we had already successfully solved. And you see, of course, currently, under a paper money regime, which requires, of course, the existence of governments—I have to jump ahead here for a moment at least. Under a paper money regime, you can see, however, the same tendency at work that you saw as a natural tendency with the commodity money, that is, trying to create a paper currency used worldwide, to bring such a thing into existence. We see the attempts of monetary integration in Europe, for instance, so that we currently have only three major currency blocks: the euro on the one hand, the dollar on the other, and the yen as the third one. All the other ones don’t count for much, because very little trade is conducted in other currencies besides these. This might change one day, of course, with China opening up completely, but as you have certainly heard, there exist powerful international organizations that promote the idea of a one-world central bank, issuing a one-world paper currency. The argument that they use for this, the kernel of truth in their argument, is, of course, precisely the same one that I explained here. It is simply advantageous to have a single money, because trading becomes easier with just one money instead of a multitude of ﬂuctuating moneys. The drawback in the current situation is, of course, that this one world paper money will be a money that will be produced and managed by a monopoly institution such as a world bank, and can be inﬂated at will. And we would likely see a larger amount of inﬂation with such an institution in place than we ever saw in world history before.

然后我们可以说，自1914年起，尽管人类可能已达到历史上最全面、最广泛的经济一体化，劳动分工也最为密集，涵盖了整个地球，但自1914年起，一体化的经济体系再次瓦解。最明显的例证当然是，如今我们不再拥有国际商品货币；取而代之的是大量各种各样的、自由波动的国家纸币，这实际上是一种倒退，又回到了我们可能认为是部分物物交换的状态。这是我们在历史上早已克服的难题，如今却又重蹈覆辙。当然，你也能看到，在当前的纸币体系下——这当然需要政府的存在，这里我至少得先提前点明一下。在纸币体系下，你会看到与商品货币自然发展趋势相同的倾向，即试图创造一种全球通用的纸币，并将其变为现实。例如，我们看到欧洲在进行货币一体化的尝试，因此，目前我们有三大主要货币区：一方是欧元，另一方是美元，以及日元作为第三大货币。其他货币的影响力不大，因为除了这几种货币外，用其他货币进行的贸易很少。当然，随着中国的完全开放，这种情况有一天可能会改变，但你肯定听说过，存在一些有影响力的国际组织，它们倡导建立一个世界央行，发行一种全球通用的纸币。他们为此所提出的论据，其核心观点当然与我在此解释的完全相同。拥有单一货币确实有优势，因为使用单一货币而非众多波动的货币，贸易会变得更加容易。当然，当前情况的弊端在于，这种全球通用的纸币将由世界银行这样的垄断机构发行和管理，且可随意增发。有这样一个机构存在，我们将有可能会看到比以往世界历史上任何时候都更加严重的通货膨胀。

Allow me this little side remark. If you have paper money, then it is actually an advantage to have competing paper monies, because the inﬂationary desires of each individual central bank are curtailed by the noncooperation of other governments. If country A inﬂates their paper money more than country B, its currency will fall in the currency market and people will tend to drop this type of money and adopt monies that are more stable. If you have paper money, which is, in eﬀect, as I said, sort of dysfunctional to the very purpose of money in the ﬁrst place, and represents a regression in human development—if you have paper money in existence, then competing paper monies ﬂuctuating against each other is an advantage over a worldwide produced paper money. But you can have a worldwide money also, one that is provided completely independent of governments, and that was precisely what we had at the end of the nineteenth century, namely an international gold standard, which could just as well be have been a silver standard. (Economic theory does not predict whether it will be gold or silver; economic theory only predicts that there will be a tendency toward one type of money being used on a worldwide scale because it is a function of money to be a facilitator of exchange, and, of course, we can recognize that a money that is used all over the place facilitates exchange more so than any other possible money that only exists in various smaller regions.)

请允许我稍作题外发挥。如果不得不使用纸币，那么有相互竞争的纸币实际上是一种优势，因为每个中央银行的通胀意愿会因其他政府的不配合而受到限制。如果A国增发纸币的幅度超过B国，A国货币在货币市场上就会贬值，人们往往会弃用这种货币，转而采用更稳健的货币。正如我所说，纸币实际上从一开始就在某种程度上背离了货币的初衷，代表着人类发展的一种倒退。如果存在纸币，那么相互竞争且汇率波动的多种纸币，相较于全球统一发行的纸币是有优势的。不过，也可以有一种完全独立于政府发行的全球通用的货币，这正是19世纪末我们所拥有的，即国际金本位制，当然也完全可以是银本位制。（经济理论无法预测最终会是黄金亦或是白银成为本位货币；经济理论只能预测，存在一种趋势，即全球范围内倾向于使用某一种货币，因为货币的功能之一就是促进交换，当然，我们能够认识到，一种被广泛使用的货币，相较仅存于各个较小区域的其他任何一种货币，能更有效地促进交换。）

第四讲时间偏好、资本、技术与经济增长

This lecture will be on time preference, on interest and capital, and on capital accumulation. I have already to a certain extent touched upon the problem of capital accumulation. We said that agricultural societies made it possible for the ﬁrst time for capital goods to be accumulated, whereas the possibilities for accumulating much in terms of capital goods in hunter-gatherer societies that move from place to place are very limited. And this subject is the third dimension that we need to cover in order to understand the wealth of nations, apart from ideological factors, which I will come to in a future lecture, besides the division of labor, the development of money, and the universalization of money. Capital accumulation is the third leg on which societies stand.

本次讲座将围绕时间偏好、利息与资本以及资本积累展开探讨。我已经在一定程度上谈到了资本积累的问题。我们曾提到过，农业社会首次使得资本财货的积累成为可能，而在四处迁徙的狩猎采集社会中，大量积累资本财货的可能性极为有限。除了思想因素（我会在后续讲座中谈及），该主题是我们理解国家财富所需探讨的第三个维度，另外两个维度则是劳动分工、货币发展与货币的普及。资本积累是社会发展的第三大支柱。

I will begin with some theoretical considerations, some theoretical explanations about the phenomenon of time preference and how it relates to capital and capital accumulation in particular. People do not just have a preference for more goods over less. I discussed how this preference explains, for instance, why there is a division of labor.

我将从一些理论思考入手，针对时间偏好现象，尤其是其与资本及资本积累的关系，展开理论阐释。人们不仅仅只是偏好更多财货而非更少。例如，我之前已经探讨过这种偏好是如何解释劳动分工的成因。

People also have a preference for goods earlier, satisfaction earlier, as compared to satisfaction later, goods later. Mankind cannot wait forever for satisfaction. Waiting for certain results involves a sacriﬁce, and without capital goods—recall, we make the distinction between consumer goods, which are directly useful, and producer goods, which are only indirectly useful. There are very few desires that we can satisfy immediately or instantaneously, well, maybe picking a berry, that immediately leads to satisfaction. And there is, of course, leisure time, just lazing around, that can also be immediately satisﬁed without doing anything else about it.

人们还有一个偏好，相较于在未来获得满足、拥有财货，人们偏好尽早获得财货、尽早得到满足。人类无法永远等待满足。等待某些结果意味着一种牺牲，而且如果没有资本财货（回想一下，我们区分了直接有用的消费品和仅仅间接有用的生产资料），能立即得到满足的欲望少之又少。也许摘颗浆果，能马上带来满足感。当然，还有闲暇时光，无所事事地闲晃，也无需借助其他事物就能即刻得到满足。

But, most of our desires require that we use intermediate products in order to satisfy them, or we need intermediate products in order to be more productive; that is, if you want to increase the amount of immediately usable consumer goods, we have to go about it in some sort of roundabout way, rather than picking berries and satisfying ourselves directly in this way. What capital goods do is they allow us a greater production of the same goods, or they allow us to produce goods that cannot be attained at all without the help of capital goods. And in order to attain capital goods, it is necessary that we save, that we consume less than we could consume, and use these saved-up funds to feed ourselves during the period of time that is necessary in order to complete the construction of capital goods, with the help of which, then, we can attain larger output of consumer goods or attain goals that we could not attain without capital goods at all.

但是，我们的大多数欲望都需要借助中间产品才能得到满足，或者说，我们需要中间产品来提高生产效率。也就是说，如果你想增加可立即使用的消费品数量，就必须采用某种迂回的方式，而不能仅仅靠采摘浆果这样直接的方式来满足自己。资本财货的作用在于，它们能让我们增加同类商品的产量，或者让我们生产出没有资本财货就根本无法生产的商品。为了获得资本财货，我们必须进行储蓄，即消费少于我们本可以消费的数量，并在完成资本财货建造所需的那段时间里，用这些积蓄来维持生活。借助资本财货，我们就能提高消费品的产量，或者实现没有资本财货就根本无法实现的目标。

This restriction on possible consumption is what we call saving, and the transfer of our saved funds, allocating—using—land and labor to construct or bring into existence capital goods, is called investment. And the question that we always face is the following. Does the utility that is achieved by the higher productivity of longer, roundabout production processes, that is,a utility that we achieve by roundabout methods of production, exceed the subjective sacriﬁce that we must make of present goods that we could conceivably consume? Or to put it diﬀerently, the decision of an actor regarding what objects to invest in will depend on the expected utility of the forthcoming consumer goods, on the durability of these forthcoming consumer goods, and on the length of time that it takes before we attain these future consumer goods. And we can then explain the entire act of deciding whether or not to perform an act of capital formation as the balancing of relative utilities—that’s the expected present utility that we attach to future goods, as compared to the utility of present goods available through consumption, discounted by the rate of time preference. That is, by the rate at which we value present goods more highly than future goods. Present goods are always valued more highly than future goods; present goods sell at a premium against future goods—or to put it the other way around, future goods sell at a discount against present goods. And this phenomenon, this discount or this premium, depending on what the angle is from which we look at the phenomenon, is called interest.

这种对可能消费的限制，我们称之为储蓄。将我们的储蓄资金进行转移，配置——利用——土地与劳动力去构建或创造资本财货，这被称为投资。我们一直面临如下问题：通过更长、更迂回的生产流程所带来的更高生产力实现的效用，也就是通过迂回生产方式达成的效用，是否超过了我们对本可消费的当前财货所必须做出的主观牺牲？换种说法，行动人对于投资何种对象的决策，将取决于即将生产出来的消费财货的预期效用、这些未来消费财货的耐用性，以及在获得这些未来消费财货之前所需的时间长度。然后，我们可以把决定是否进行资本形成的整个行为，解释为对相对效用的权衡——我们赋予未来财货的预期当前效用，既对未来财货按照时间偏好率进行折现之后，与通过消费可获得的当前财货的效用相比较。也就是说，按照我们对当前财货的估值高于未来财货的比率来折现。当前财货的估值总是高于未来财货；当前财货相对于未来财货以溢价出售——或者反过来说，未来财货相对于当前财货以折价出售。这种现象，是折价亦或溢价，取决于我们看待该现象的角度，称之为利息。

I want to illustrate these initial abstract remarks by looking for a moment at a simple Robinson Crusoe economy. Let’s assume that Robinson Crusoe is the most knowledgeable person on Earth. He knows all the technological recipes that mankind knows, but he is stranded alone on an island. On this island, there is initially nothing other than land, that is, nature-given resources, and labor from his own body, and his own knowledge incorporated in it. And let us assume that the immediately available consumer good that is available to him is ﬁsh, and thus he now has to make a decision as to how he will produce this consumer good of ﬁsh. Given, as I said, that Robinson Crusoe knows every technological recipe under the sun, we can imagine that he knows various techniques for how to attain his end, that is, ﬁsh as a consumer good. He can, for instance, use his bare hands to obtain ﬁsh,by grabbing into the water and pulling the ﬁsh out. He can build a net with which to catch ﬁsh. He can build a ﬁshing trawler, a boat with a net to catch ﬁsh, and we might easily imagine that there exist various other technologies that he is aware of as well.

我想通过审视一个简单的鲁滨逊・克鲁索式经济模型，来阐释这些初步的抽象观点。假设鲁滨逊・克鲁索是世上知识最为渊博之人。他知晓人类所掌握的所有技术方法，但却孤身一人被困一座孤岛。在这座孤岛上，最初除了土地（即大自然赋予的资源）、以及他本身的劳动力和他所掌握的知识之外，别无他物。我们再假设，他能即刻获取的消费财货是鱼，那么他现在就必须决定如何生产这种鱼这种消费财货。如我所说，鉴于鲁滨逊·克鲁索知晓世间所有技术方法，我们可以想象，他知道多种获取鱼（即作为消费财货的鱼）的技术。例如，他可以徒手抓鱼，把手伸进水里把鱼捞出来。他可以退而结网捕鱼。他还可以造一艘拖网渔船，一艘带网的船来捕鱼，而且我们很容易想象，他也知晓其他各种技术。

The question that Robinson Crusoe faces is then: “What shall I do, how shall I produce ﬁsh?” And the ﬁrst thing that is worth pointing out here is that the fact that he knows about extremely productive methods of catching ﬁsh, let’s say using a ﬁshing trawler, that this fact does not help him much in his initial situation. And the reason for this should be obvious: the reason has to do with the fact that he is constrained by time preference; that is, he cannot wait forever for the satisfaction of his most urgent desires, and if he were to start building a ﬁshing trawler then he would likely be long dead from starvation before the ﬁshing trawler is ever completed. So, he will have to start in a capital-less mode of production, without any capital goods, just using his bare hands to get ﬁsh out of the pond or the river or the ocean. When he’s done at the end of the day and he has caught ten ﬁsh, he will have to make a decision what to do with these ten ﬁsh.

那么，鲁滨逊·克鲁索面临的问题是：“我该怎么做，该如何捕鱼呢？” 在此值得指出的首要一点是，尽管他知道诸如使用拖网渔船这类极具效率的捕鱼方法，但在初始阶段，这对他并无太大帮助。原因显而易见：这与他受到时间偏好的限制有关，也就是说，他不能永远等待，无限期地延迟满足自己最迫切的需求。如果他一开始就着手建造拖网渔船，很可能在渔船完工之前，他早已饿死。所以，他不得不从无资本（capital-less）的生产模式起步，不借助任何资本财货，仅徒手从池塘、河流或海洋中抓鱼。当一天结束，在他抓到十条鱼之后，他又得决定如何处置这十条鱼。

Obviously, if he decides that he will consume all ten ﬁsh by the end of the day, then the following day he will be in the exact same position that he was on the day before. On the other hand, if he decides to put away some ﬁsh,a certain fraction of those that he could consume, then he engages in an act of saving, and he can now form some expectation as to how long it will take him to build a net, and what will be the output of ﬁsh, per hour, let’s say, that he can attain with the help of a net. And based on his evaluation of the time lag—let’s say it takes a week to build the net—and his expectation is that he will double or triple his output—he can now decide how much or how little he wants to save. If Robinson Crusoe has what we call a high degree of time preference, that is, he prefers present goods very highly over future goods, meaning saving presents a great sacriﬁce for him, then the process of saving will be relatively slow, and it will take quite a while before he has accumulated enough saved-up ﬁsh to be in a position to say that now I have saved enough ﬁsh to feed myself during the week that is necessary for me to build the net. And once the net comes into existence, then his standard of living goes up.

显然，如果他决定在当天就把十条鱼都吃光，那么第二天他就会处于和前一天完全相同的境地。换个思路，假如他决定留存一些鱼，即从他本可消费的鱼中预留出一定比例，那么他就在储蓄。此时，他可以预估自己织一张网需要多长时间，以及借助这张网每小时能捕到多少鱼。基于他对时间跨度的评估（比如说织网需要一周时间），以及他对产量的预期（比如他预计产量能翻倍或增至三倍），他现在就能决定储蓄多少。如果鲁滨逊·克鲁索的时间偏好程度较高，也就是说，相较于未来财货，他极为看重当前财货，这意味着储蓄对他来说是很大的牺牲，那么储蓄的过程就会相对缓慢，他需要很长时间才能积攒足够多的鱼，直到可以说 “我已经储存了足够多的鱼，能在织网所需的这一周维持生计”。而一旦网织好了，他的生活水平就会提高。

The same, of course, is true if he wants to move from stage two to stage three. Again, he would have to make an estimation of how long will it take him to build that ﬁshing trawler, what will be the likely increase in productivity that he can achieve if he has the ﬁshing trawler available, and then he determines how much or how little, in terms of saving, he is willing to do. Again, if his time preference is very high, preferring present satisfaction very much over future satisfaction, then the process of going from year to year will take along time. If his time preference is very low, that is, he is willing to make larger sacriﬁces, then he can delay his future gratiﬁcation more and save more, and the process of going from stage one to stage two, and from stage two to stage three, is shorter. Each step along the line, his standard of living increases. It should be clear from the outset that noone would engage in the construction of capital goods unless he expected that production with the help of a capital good will be more productive than production without a capital good. If I can produce ten ﬁsh per day by using my bare hands, and if by using a net I can also produce only ten ﬁsh per day, then obviously the net would never come into existence, because the entire time spent constructing the net would be nothing but sheer waste—that is, capital goods are always brought into existence with the expectation that production with capital goods is more productive than production without capital goods. Because of this, because of the productivity of capital goods, people are willing to pay a price for them. If the net did not yield a higher output per hour than using your bare hands, then obviously nobody would ever be willing to pay a price for the net. If the ﬁshing trawler did not promise a larger output per hour than the net, then the price of the ﬁshing trawler could not conceivably be higher than the price of the net, and so forth.

当然，如果他想从第二阶段过渡到第三阶段，情况也是如此。他同样必须估算建造那艘拖网渔船需要多长时间，拥有拖网渔船后他的生产效率可能会提高多少，然后据此决定自己愿意储蓄多少。同样，如果他的时间偏好程度很高，极度偏好当下的满足而非未来的满足，那么这个逐年推进的过程将会耗时良久。如果他的时间偏好程度很低，也就是说，他愿意做出更大的牺牲，那么他就能更多地推迟未来的满足感，增加储蓄，从第一阶段过渡到第二阶段，再从第二阶段过渡到第三阶段的过程就会更短。在此过程的每一步，他的生活水平都会提高。从一开始就应该明确，除非预期借助资本财货进行生产比不借助资本财货的生产更具效率，否则没人会去建造资本财货。如果我徒手每天能捕十条鱼，而使用网每天也只能捕十条鱼，那么显然网就永远不会出现，因为花在织网上的所有时间都无非是纯粹的浪费——也就是说，人们制造资本财货，始终是期望借助资本财货的生产比不借助时更具生产力。正因如此，由于资本财货具有生产力，人们才愿意为其付出代价。如果使用渔网，每小时的捕鱼产量并不比徒手高，那么显然没人会愿意为织网付出代价。如果拖网渔船每小时的捕鱼产量并不比渔网高，那么拖网渔船的价格想必也不会高于渔网的价格，以此类推。

What holds men back, as far as investment and capital goodsaccumulation is concerned, is always time preference. We do not automatically choose the most productive method, but it is time preference, and, related to it, savings, that allows us or does not allow us to choose certain techniques or not to choose certain techniques. Let me, in order to illustrate this concept of time preference a little bit more, use some examples, some of which you’ll ﬁnd in Mises, some of which I developed. Let’s assume we were like angels, who can live oﬀ love and air alone, that is, we have no need for consumption. We can imagine that an angel could in fact produce goods immediately and in the most productive fashion, eventhough the angel would not have any motive to produce at all; after all, he can live oﬀ love and air alone. But let’s say he had some sort of fund to produce large amounts of goods. Because the angel could wait forever, the interest rate, the degree to which he prefers present goods to future goods, is zero; it doesn’t make any diﬀerence to him whether he has a ﬁsh right now or a ﬁsh ten thousand years from now. For us, who are somewhat less than angelic, that does, of course, make a tremendous diﬀerence, whether we have ﬁsh ten thousand years from now or today or in one week. So, we are constrained by time preference; our interest rate is positive; it is higher than zero.

就投资和资本财货积累而言，限制人们的始终是时间偏好。我们并非必然会选择最具生产力的方法，而是时间偏好以及与之相关的储蓄，决定了我们能否选择某些技术。为了进一步阐释时间偏好这一概念，我会举几个例子，有些出自米塞斯，有些是我自己所想。假设我们像天使一样，仅靠爱和空气就能生存，也就是说，我们无需消费。可以想象，即便天使完全没有生产的动机，实际上他也能以最高效的方式即刻生产出财货；毕竟，他仅靠爱和空气就能生存。但假如他有某种资金可用来大量生产财货。由于天使可以永远等待，其利率为零，即他对当前财货相较于未来财货的偏好程度为零；对他来说，现在有一条鱼，亦或一万年后有一条鱼，并无丝毫差别。但对于我们这些凡人来说，吾非天使，一万年后有鱼，还是今日有鱼，亦或一周后有鱼，当然天差地别。所以，我们受时间偏好的限制；我们的利率是正数，大于零。

Take another example that helps illustrate this concept of time preference. Let’s assume, for instance—this gets us already into some sort of cultural inﬂuenceon this phenomenon of time preference and capital accumulation—let’s assume, that we know that the world will end one week from now, and we are all perfectly certain that this is going to happen. What would then happen to the willingness to exchange present goods for future goods? And the answer is, of course, that this willingness would essentially disappear. The interest rate, in this case, would skyrocket. No interest payment would be high enough to induce anybody to sacriﬁce current consumption for a higher amount of future consumption because, after all, there is no future. There are, for instance, certain religious sects who believe that the world will soon go under, and very quickly the good guys will go to heaven and the bad guys will go someplace else. And these people, of course, stop saving. They will just have one more glorious week of consumption and then the whole story will be over.

再举一个例子来帮助阐释时间偏好的概念。比如说——这就涉及到文化对时间偏好和资本积累现象的某种影响了——假设我们知道世界将在一周后终结，而且我们都完全确定此事会发生。那么，用当前财货换取未来财货的意愿会发生什么变化呢？答案显然是，这种意愿基本上会消失。在这种情况下，利率会飙升。没有任何利息支付能高到足以诱使任何人牺牲当前消费以换取更多未来消费，因为毕竟没有未来了。例如，某些宗教教派相信世界即将覆灭，很快好人会上天堂，坏人则去别的地方。这些人当然就不再储蓄了。他们只会再尽情挥霍消费享受一周，然后，就没有然后了。

As I said, all humans prefer present goods over future goods. But the degree to which people do this is diﬀerent from individual to individual, and also from one speciﬁc group to another. Let me just give you a few examples, of which we know with pretty good certainty that their degree of time preference diﬀers on average. Take little children, for instance. Little children have a very high degree of time preference. Another way to say it is that little children have tremendous difficulties delaying gratiﬁcation. Promises of high rewards in the future do not necessarily induce children to make the current sacriﬁce of not consuming, of not satisfying current desires. There have been experiments done in this regard, such as: you give a dollar to a child and tell him that if you don’t spend the dollar until tomorrow, I’ll double the amount, you get another dollar. And if you then, tomorrow, have not spent $2, I will again, double it and give you $4, and so forth. You realize how high the interest rate here is, it’s 100 percent per day. If you have a calculator, you can ﬁgure out what sort of annual interest rate that is. Nonetheless, you will ﬁnd that many children are absolutely incapable of accepting a deal such as this. They have to rush out to the 7-Eleven and get their Big Gulp right now, even though they could have two Big Gulps or four Big Gulps in a very short distance in the future. Or, another way to illustrate this would be to say that we oﬀer a child a perfectly secure certiﬁcate that promises to pay $100 one year from now, but the child has the choice of selling right now this perfectly safe and secure promise of $100 in the future. Then we will ﬁnd that the children might be willing to sell this certiﬁcate for only 10 cents, because waiting is basically intolerable for them.

正如我所说，所有人都偏好当前财货甚于未来财货。但人们的偏好程度则因人而异，不同特定群体之间也存在差异。我给你们举几个例子，我们可以相当确定，这些例子中的群体平均时间偏好程度有所不同。比如说小孩子，他们的时间偏好程度非常高。换种说法就是，小孩子极难延迟满足。对未来丰厚回报的承诺，不一定能诱使孩子做出当下不消费、不满足当前欲望的牺牲。这方面有过一些实验，比如：给一个孩子一美元，告诉他如果今天不花这一美元，明天我就把钱翻倍，给他另外再加一美元。要是明天他还没花这两美元，我就再翻倍，给他四美元，以此类推。你可以想想这里的利率有多高，每天高达100%。如果你有计算器，还能算出这相当于多高的年利率。然而，你会发现很多孩子根本无法接受这样的交易。他们非得马上冲到7-11便利店，买上一大杯饮料，尽管在不久的将来他们本可以买到两杯甚至四杯。或者，换个方式说明这个问题，我们给孩子一张绝对可靠的凭证，承诺一年后支付100美元，但孩子现在可以选择卖掉这张保证未来能得到100美元的绝对可靠凭证。那么我们会发现，孩子们可能只愿意以10美分的价格卖掉这张凭证，因为对他们来说，基本无法忍受等待。

Let me give you a few other examples and you realize, of course, depending on what sort of mentality exists among the public, capital accumulation can take forever or it can go quite quickly. If Robinson Crusoe had a childlike mentality, he might never ever reach the second stage, or if he does reach it, it might take him about one hundred years to do so.

我再给你们举几个例子，你们自然就会明白，根据大众秉持何种心态，资本积累可能旷日持久，也可能进展迅速。假如鲁滨逊·克鲁索有着孩童般的心态，他或许永远都无法进入第二阶段，即便进入了，可能也得需要大约一百年时间。

I will move on to some other examples of groups. Very old people are sometimes said to go through a “second childhood.” This is not necessarily so, because very old people can choose to provide for future generations. But assuming that they do not care for future generations, or perhaps they do not have any oﬀspring or any friends whom they want to hand over their own fortune to, and then, because their own remaining lifespan is very short, they have not much of a future left, so they go through the phase of a second childhood, by and large consuming and more or less entirely ceasing to accumulate any savings.

我接下来举一些其他群体的例子。人们有时会说，老年人会经历 “第二个童年”。不一定总是如此，因为老年人可以选择为后代着想。但假设他们不关心后代，或者也许他们没有子女，也没有想要把自己财产留给朋友，同时由于他们剩余的寿命很短，所剩时日无多，那么，大体上他们就会进入 “第二个童年” 阶段，只顾消费，几乎完全不再储蓄。

We can take the example of criminals, who are also, typically speaking—and I mean the normal run-of-the-mill-type criminal, not the white-collar-type criminal, the muggers, the murderers, the rapists and those friendly ﬁgures—characterized by high time preference. The way I explain this to my students is always using the following example. (Sometimes people hiss at it; most people like it.) Imagine a normal person who is in pursuit of a girl or vice versa, a girl in pursuit of a man. Then, what we do, of course, is take her out to dinner and bring her ﬂowers and take her out to dinner again. We listen to the conversation; wearevery impressed by all the deep thoughts that we hear. We have never heard anything interesting like that before in our lives. Of course, we entertain certain expectations, which are, of course, in the more or less distant future. This is how normal people operate. If you have a childlike mentality, but you have that in an adult body, then this sort of stuﬀ is almost an impossible sacriﬁce; you cannot wait that long and then you become a rapist or something of that nature. Normally, in order to satisfy any desire, we have to work for a day, at least for a day. Then we get paid at the end of the day and then we can buy our beer. But, what if a day of waiting is too long? The only other alternative that you have is to look for some old lady and rob her of her purse and to satisfy your desires in this way.

再以罪犯为例，通常来说——我指的是普通的街头罪犯，而非白领罪犯，比如抢劫犯、杀人犯、强奸犯这类人——他们的特点就是时间偏好程度高。我给学生解释这个问题时，总会用下面这个例子。（有时人们会对此嗤之以鼻；但大多数人还挺喜欢。）想象一个普通人追求一个女孩，或者反过来，一个女孩追求一个男孩。那么，我们通常会怎么做呢？当然是带她出去晚餐，送上鲜花，然后再次带她出去吃晚餐。我们倾听对方的笑语盈盈，为心有灵犀的那一刻怦然心动。我们感叹，此生未曾听闻如此般天籁之音。当然，我们心怀某种期待，而这种期待在或近或远的未来才能实现。正常人就是如此行事。但如果你有孩童心，却长着成人躯，那么这种等待几乎就是无法承受的牺牲；你等不了那么久，那么你很有可能就做出强奸或类似的其他事情。通常情况下，无论为了满足何种欲望，我们至少需工作一天。然后在一天结束时拿到报酬，接着才能去买啤酒。但是，如果连等一天都觉得太久呢？那你唯一的选择，就只剩下去抢劫一个老太太，抢劫她的钱包来买啤酒，通过这种方式来满足自己的欲望。

I will give you another example that already touches upon a lecture that I will give later in the week. Democratic politicians also have a very high degree of time preference. They are in power for a very short period of time and what they do not loot right now, they will not be able to loot in ﬁve or six years. So, their intention is, of course, that I have to milk the public as much as possible now, because then, with a lot of tax income, I can make myself a lot of friends in the present, and who cares about the future?

我再给你们举个例子，这已经涉及到我本周晚些时候要讲的一堂课的内容了。民主政体下的政客们时间偏好程度也非常高。他们掌权的时间很短，现在不捞的话，五六年后就没机会捞了。所以，他们的想法自然是，我现在必须尽可能多地压榨民众，因为有了大量税收收入，我当下就能结交众多朋友，至于未来如何，谁会在乎呢？

The last example is one that has gotten me in deep trouble recently at my university. I have used that example for sixteen years or so and had never any problem with it whatsoever. This time, however, some fanatic wanted to bring me down; this whole process is still underway, so I warn you not to bring harassment suits against me again. I made the point that if you compare homosexuals to regular heterosexuals with families, you can say that homosexuals have a higher time preference because life ends with them. I always thought that that was so obvious, almost beyond dispute, and then pointed out in the next sentence, that this helps us understand, for instance, the attitude of a man like Keynes, whose economic philosophy was “in the long run, we are all dead.” Now, this is true for some people, but it is not true for most people, who, of course, have their own children and so forth, future generations to come. As I said, these harmless remarks have led to three months of harassment at my university, and the whole thing is still not over yet.

最后一个例子，最近在我的大学给我带来了大麻烦。这个例子我大概已用了 16 年，之前从来没出过任何乱子。然而这次，有个狂热分子想搞垮我；整个事件还在持续发酵，诉讼尚未了解，所以我提醒你们别再对我提起骚扰诉讼了。我提出这样一个观点：如果把同性恋者和有家庭的普通异性恋者相比较，可以说同性恋者的时间偏好更高，因为他们没有后代延续。我一直觉得这一点显而易见，几乎无可争议，然后在下一句指出，这有助于我们理解，诸如像凯恩斯此类人的态度，他的经济哲学是 “长远来看，我们都会死的”。当然，这对某些人来说是成立的，但对大多数人来说并非如此，毕竟大多数人有自己的孩子等等，会有未来的世代延续。正如我所说，我这些并无恶意的言论导致我在大学遭受了三个月的骚扰，整件事至今仍未完全了结。

So, so much about the concept of time preference. Now I want to say a few words about the development of time preference and of interest overtime, in the course of history. As you can imagine, this is not difficult, but rather intuitively immediately clear. We would expect that the degree of time preference should gradually fall in the course of human history. Something like what you see in Figure 1:

关于时间偏好的概念就讲这么多。现在我想说一说在历史进程中，时间偏好和利息随时间变化的发展情况。如你所想，这并不难理解，凭直觉就能立刻明白。我们可以预期，在人类历史进程中，时间偏好程度应该会逐渐降低。就如你在图1中所见的那样：

Here in Figure 2 we have interest, or a degree of time preference, on one axis, and on the other axis we have real money income, that is, income that can be converted into immediate present satisfaction. Then we would expect that with very low real income, the sacriﬁce of exchanging a present good for a future good is very high, and people will save and invest only small amounts, but as real incomes rise, the interest rate will gradually tend to fall. That is, savings, the volume of saving and investing, will become greater; intuitively that is perfectly clear. For a rich man, it is easier to save and invest than it is for a poor man. If we look over the course of history, we would ﬁnd that capital accumulation—savings and investment—does become successively easier. It is more difficult at the beginning of mankind as it requires a bigger sacriﬁce, and it becomes successively easier as we grow wealthier. This is something that we can indeed see in history. This has been studied—long-run interest rates for the safest possible investments and so forth—and we ﬁnd, by and large, that interest rates fall.

图2的两个图横坐标都是实际货币收入，也就是能够提供当下即时满足的预期。左图的纵坐标是利率，右图的纵坐标是储蓄率。那么我们可以预测，当实际收入很低时，用当前财货换取未来财货的牺牲会非常大，人们只能进行少量储蓄和投资。但随着实际收入增加，利率会逐渐趋于下降。也就是说，储蓄以及储蓄和投资的规模将会变大，从直觉上看这再清楚不过了。对富人来说，储蓄和投资比穷人要容易。回顾历史进程，我们会发现，资本积累（储蓄和投资）确实变得越来越容易。在人类社会早期，资本积累无疑更加困难，因为需要做出更大的牺牲，而随着我们变得越来越富有，资本积累逐渐变得容易。这确实是我们在历史中能够看到的现象。这方面已有研究（比如针对最安全投资的长期利率等），我们大体上发现利率是下降的。[17]

Of course, there are exceptions to this rule. If you have wars and so forth, then you have an increase in interest rates, because the risk attached to loans becomes signiﬁcantly higher. But, we also have certain periods when the degree of time preference does seem to rise. I will come back to that again in a later lecture. This seems to be something that has happened in the twentieth century. We should have expected that interest rates, real interest rates, in the twentieth century should be lower than in the nineteenth century, given that on the average, wealth in society is greater in the twentieth century than in the nineteenth. However, we do not ﬁnd this to be true; that is, the real interest rates in the twentieth century rarely, if ever, reach the low point that they reached around 1900, which was about 2.25 percent. The conclusion would be that the entire time preference schedule must have risen in the twentieth century, which would amount to saying that the population in the twentieth century has become somewhat more childlike than the population in the nineteenth century. We are somewhat more frivolous and hedonistic in our lifestyle than our forefathers or our parents and our grandparents were, despite the fact that it was more difficult for them to engage in savings and capital accumulation than it is for us.

当然，这条规律也有例外。如果发生战争之类的情况，利率就会上升，因为贷款所附带的风险会显著提高。不过，也有些时期，时间偏好程度似乎确实在上升。我将在之后的讲座中再次谈到这一点。这种情况似乎在20世纪发生过。鉴于20世纪社会平均财富比19世纪更多，我们本应预期20世纪的实际利率会低于19世纪。然而，我们发现事实并非如此。也就是说，20世纪的实际利率极少（如果有的话）能达到1900年前后约2.25% 的低点。结论就是，整个时间偏好表在20世纪肯定上升了，这就相当于说，与19世纪的人相比，20世纪的人变得更加孩童化。尽管我们的先辈、父母和祖父母进行储蓄和资本积累比我们更困难，但在生活方式上，我们比他们更加随性轻浮和享乐主义。

Now, a word about the accumulation of capital. Obviously, in every society, it is possible to add something to the existing stock of capital, to maintain the existing stock of capital or to deplete the existing stock of capital. Even to maintain the existing stock of capital, continued savings is necessary because all capital goodswear out over time. That is what we call capital consumption. Capital consumption, however, can take quite some time before it becomes visible, because some capital goods last for along time. For instance, when the Communists took over Russia, they inherited a substantial stock of capital goods: machines, houses, etc.; and after that, they were still able to go on for a while, but if, due to the fact that no private property or factors of production existed anymore, practically no savings were forthcoming, you could expect that eventually this inherited stock of capital goods would become dilapidated and in some ten, twenty, or thirty years, you would experience some sort of catastrophe. And this is what happened: all the capital goods were suddenly worn out, and nothing was there to replace them. The same thing is true for the process of capital accumulation.

现在，谈谈资本积累。显然，在每个社会中，现有资本存量存在三种可能的趋势：增加、维持或消耗。即便只是维持现有资本存量，也需要持续储蓄，因为所有资本财货都会随着时间推移而损耗。这就是我们所说的资本消耗。然而，资本消耗可能要过相当长一段时间才会显现出来，因为有些资本财货的使用寿命很长。例如，共产党接管俄国时，继承了大量的资本财货，如机器、房屋等。在那之后，他们尚能维持一段时间，但由于私有财产或生产要素不再存在，实际上没有储蓄，所以可以预料到，最终这些继承而来的资本财货会破旧不堪，大概在十年、二十年或三十年后，就会遭遇某种灾难。而事实也正是如此：所有资本财货突然间损耗殆尽，却无新的替代。资本积累的过程同样如此。

Let me ﬁrst point out the following. Obviously, the amount of capital accumulation depends not just on the time preference that various individuals have; it depends also on the security of private property rights. Imagine Friday, a second person, coming onto the island. We can imagine Friday to be like Robinson Crusoe, and they engage in division of labor. Then, the standard of living would go up, capital accumulation would be even faster than with Robinson Crusoe being alone; standards of living go higher and so forth. But, we can also imagine that Friday is diﬀerent, perhaps a mugger from Brooklyn, and he sees that Robinson Crusoe has already built the ﬁshing net or has already saved all sorts of ﬁsh and he says, “This is very nice that you have done this already for meand I’ll take the net, or I force you to pay a tax to me: half of the ﬁsh that you produce every day you will hand over to me.” Now, in that situation, you can of course easily imagine that the process of capital accumulation will be drastically slowed down, or will even come to a complete standstill. If we look at societies that are currently rich, we cannot necessarily infer that those societies are societies in which property rights receive the best possible protection. What we can only infer is that these must be societies in which property rights must have been well protected in the past, and it might well be that we encounter societies that are quite poor right now but which do have very secure private property rights. Of those societies, we would expect that in the future they will show rapid rates of growth.

我还要进一步指出以下这点。显然，资本积累的规模不仅取决于不同个体的时间偏好，还取决于私有产权的保障程度。想象一下，另一人“星期五”来到岛上。我们可以设想“星期五”和鲁滨逊·克鲁索一样，于是他们进行劳动分工。这样一来，生活水平会提高，资本积累甚至会比鲁滨逊独处孤岛时更快，生活水平也会进一步提升等等。但是，我们也可以设想“星期五”是另一种人，也许是来自布鲁克林的抢劫犯，他看到鲁滨逊·克鲁索已经织好渔网，或者储备了各种各样的鱼，就说：“你为我准备得真周到，我要拿走这张网，或者你得向我缴税：你每天捕到的鱼，要把一半交给我。” 在这种情况下，你当然很容易想到，资本积累的进程会急剧放缓，甚至可能完全停滞。如果我们审视当下富裕的社会，不能就此推断这些富裕社会对产权的保护是最完善的。我们只能推断，这些社会在过去一定对产权有过良好的保护。而且很可能会遇到一些当下相当贫穷，但私有产权确实得到有力保障的社会。对于这些社会，我们预计未来它们将会呈现快速增长。

One might say, for instance, that to a large extent, the endowment in the United States of capital goods is due to circumstances that are long gone. That is,a lot of the capital goods have been accumulated under far more favorable circumstances than the circumstances that currently exist, and we might already be in a phase of gradual capital consumption without actually knowing it. It might take us decades before we actually ﬁnd out that this is the case. As far as the United States itself is concerned, savings rates are atrociously low. To a large extent, the United States still beneﬁts from the fact that there are savers from other countries who still consider the United States a good place to invest their funds, despite the fact that property rights are no longer nearly as safe as they were in the nineteenth century. Just keep in mind that almost 40 percent of the saved-up ﬁsh of Robinson Crusoe is nowadays handed over to the mugger from Brooklyn! In the nineteenth century, this might have been 2 percent or 3 percent of the output of Robinson Crusoe. In any case, capital needs to be preserved, and in order to preserve it, it is necessary that there exists an institutional legal framework that makes private property safe. If this framework is lacking, then one should not be surprised that very little takes place in terms of capital accumulation.

例如，有人可能会说，在很大程度上，美国资本财货的禀赋得益于早已消逝的环境条件。也就是说，大量资本财货是在比当前更为有利的环境下积累起来的，而我们或许已然处于一个资本逐渐消耗的阶段，只是尚未察觉而已。可能要过几十年，我们才会真正意识到情况确实如此。就美国自身而言，其储蓄率低得惊人。在很大程度上，美国仍受益于这样一个事实：尽管如今美国的财产权远不如19世纪那般安全，但其他国家的储蓄者依然认为美国是一个投资的好地方。要知道，如今鲁滨逊·克鲁索储存的鱼，几乎有40% 都被那个来自布鲁克林的抢劫犯拿走了！而在19世纪，这一比例可能仅为鲁滨逊·克鲁索产出的2% 或3% 。无论如何，资本需要得到保护，而要做到这一点，就必须存在一个能保障私有财产安全的制度法律框架。如果缺少这样的框架，资本积累十分有限也就不足为奇了。

Just imagine a place where there is an impending Communist revolution, where you must be fearful that maybe in the next election, the Communists will come to power and the ﬁrst thing that they will do is expropriate all owners of capital goods. Now, imagine what that does to your motivation to engage in saving and the accumulation of additional capital. Large parts of the world are like this. That is, we explain the poverty of many countries by the fact that property rights in those countries have, for many, many years, sometimes for centuries, not been secure enough for people to engage in saving and the accumulation of capital.

想象一下，假如某个地方，共产革命一触即发，你必然会担心，也许在下一次选举中，共产党人会掌权，而他们要做的第一件事就是没收所有资本财货所有者的财产。现在，想象一下这会对你进行储蓄和积累更多资本的积极性产生何种影响。世界上很多地方都是如此。也就是说，我们可以如此解释许多国家的贫困：在这些国家，多年来，有时甚至几个世纪以来，财产权都不够安全，人们因此不敢进行储蓄和资本积累。

Now I want to come to some historical illustrations, and I want to use population growth and city growth as vague approximations of what happens to capital accumulation. Recall, accumulating more capital means societies become richer; societies becoming richer implies that larger population sizes can be sustained. And recall some of the numbers that I gave you in previous lectures. Fifty thousand people lived on Earth about 100,000 years ago. Five million people lived at the beginning of the Neolithic Revolution, 10,000 to 12,000 years ago. At the year 1 AD, the population is estimated to have been somewhere between 170 million and 400 million. There was a far more rapid growth of the population after the Neolithic Revolution,a doubling of the population every 1,300 years; until the Neolithic Revolution, a doubling of the population happened every 13,000 years or so. That is,again, areﬂection of the fact that in agricultural societies, there is already a signiﬁcantly increased amount of capital accumulation that allows this larger population to be sustained.

现在我想列举一些历史事例，我会用人口增长和城市发展情况来大致说明资本积累的状况。记住，积累更多资本意味着社会变得更加富裕；社会变得富裕意味着能够养活更多人口。回想一下我在之前讲座中提到的一些数据。大约10万年前，地球上生活着5万人。在1万至1.2万年前的新石器时代革命初期，人口为500万。公元元年，据估计人口在1.7亿到4亿之间。新石器时代革命之后，人口增长速度大幅加快，每1300年人口就会翻一番；而在新石器时代革命之前，人口大约每1.3万年才会翻一番。这再次反映出，在农业社会，资本积累总量已有显著增加，从而能够维持更多人口的生存。

In Figure 3, you see estimates of world population, beginning at 400 BC and going almost to the present, until 2000. You see also the wide variety of estimates, with considerable disagreement, especially regarding the early periods of mankind. During the period beginning with the Neolithic Revolution, we see the development of various civilizations, indicating, obviously, sharp increases in the accumulation of capital goods. Table 1 gives you some sort of historical overview of these various civilizations, the beginning and the end, the name of the most dominant group, and ﬁnally the names of those groups that were responsible for the destruction of these civilizations. I already indicated in the previous lecture that in these early civilizations, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China, we experienced for the ﬁrst time major cities coming into existence, and we also have indications of speciﬁc new technologies being developed. Again, recall that it requires a certain amount of wealth and capital accumulation to allow people to develop new inventions and try out new things.

在图3中，你可以看到对世界人口的估算数据，时间跨度从公元前400年几乎一直到2000年。你还会看到各种各样的估算结果，存在相当大的分歧，尤其是在人类早期阶段。从新石器时代革命开始的这一时期，我们看到了各种文明的发展，这显然表明资本财货的积累大幅增加。表1为你提供了这些不同文明的某种历史概述，包括起止时间、占主导地位的群体名称，以及最终导致这些文明毁灭的群体名称。我在上一讲中已经提到，在美索不达米亚、埃及和中国等早期文明中，我们首次见证了大型城市的出现，同时也有迹象表明特定的新技术正在发展。再次提醒，人们要创新发明并尝试新事物，需要一定的财富和资本财货积累。

Just to give you some examples of the major technological capital goods developments that took place during the Babylonian civilization, that is in the period of 4500 BC to 2500 BC. Here we ﬁndplows used for the ﬁrst time; we ﬁnd wheeled carts for the ﬁrst time; we ﬁnd draft animals being used in agriculture; we ﬁnd bricks being used for the ﬁrst time, and magniﬁcent buildings erected. We ﬁnd what is quite unique and has not been repeated independently anywhere else in history, the invention of the arch, which allows, of course, construction of structures that otherwise would collapse under their own weight. And we know the arch concept was imported to other areas. We ﬁnd thepotter’swheel. We ﬁnd copper smelting. We ﬁnd the development of bronze, which is a combination of tin and copper in certain combinations. We ﬁnd the development of writing, which indicates that there must have been a class of intellectuals in existence, who can only be supported if there exists a certain amount of wealth in society. And a certain amount of wealth, of course, requires a certain amount of capital accumulation. We ﬁnd quite far developed mathematical techniques in Babylonia, and we ﬁnd traces of metallic money being used. And obviously in the cities, which reached sizes of 80,000 people or so, we had quite an extent of specialized professions coming forth.

仅为你列举一些巴比伦文明时期（即公元前4500年至公元前2500年）主要技术型资本财货的发展实例。在此期间，我们看到犁首次被使用；轮式手推车首次出现；役畜开始应用于农业；砖块首次被使用，并且建造了宏伟的建筑。我们还发现了拱门的发明，这一发明极为独特，在历史上其他地方未曾独立再现，它使得建造那些会因自重而坍塌的建筑结构成为可能。而且我们知道，拱门的概念传播到了其他地区。我们还发现了陶轮的使用，铜冶炼技术的出现，以及青铜的发明——这是一种由锡和铜按特定比例混合而成的合金。我们还见证了文字的发展，这表明当时肯定存在一个知识分子阶层，而只有社会拥有一定财富才能维持这个阶层的存在。当然，一定的财富需要一定程度的资本积累。我们发现巴比伦的数学技术相当发达，还发现了使用金属货币的痕迹。显然，在那些规模达到约8万人的城市中，出现了相当多专业化的职业。

But, as I said, there exist in history also periods that we can describe as economic disintegration; that is, some of these empires fall apart. There are invaders that destroy them, and the division of labor shrinks. Techniques that were once known become forgotten, and we would expect them, during those periods also, to experience a decline in population. If you look at the estimates of world population there, you ﬁnd, for instance, that only from 1000 AD on do we again see something like a trend toward an increase in the population, whereas with the fall of Rome, shortly after 200 AD or so, we see by and large a stagnation in the overall population. For almost one thousand years, there is virtually no population growth that takes place. And even in the period after 1000 AD, there are some centuries that see a more or less signiﬁcant decline. Look, for instance, at the thirteenth century: from 1200 to 1300 AD, there appears to be no increase in world population, indicating capital consumption taking place or at least no capital accumulation taking place; even more clearly, look at the ﬁfteenth century, that is the 1400s: there is a clear decline during this century in terms of population, as compared to the previous century, and it takes almost two hundred years or so before the population size is reached again that had already been reached in the fourteenth century. And once again, look at the seventeenth century, which is the century of the Thirty Years’ War. Compare the numbers from 1600 to 1650, and you ﬁnd that again there is a signiﬁcant decline in population, which indicates, in this case, major wars and major destruction. And only from 1650 on do we see an uninterrupted rise in the population numbers. From 1650 to 1850, the doubling of the population required about two hundred years. Then, from 1850 to 1950, the doubling of the population is about every hundred years and after 1950, the doubling requires less than ﬁfty years.

但是，正如我所说，历史上也存在一些我们可以称之为经济解体的时期，也就是说，一些帝国分崩离析。侵略者将其摧毁，劳动分工萎缩。曾经知晓的技术被遗忘，我们可以料到，在那样一些时期，人口也会减少。例如，看看对世界人口的估算数据，你会发现，大约从公元1000年起，我们才再次看到人口有增长的趋势，而在公元200年左右，罗马帝国衰落之后，总体人口大致处于停滞状态。近一千年间，实际上人口几乎没有增长。甚至在公元1000年之后的几个世纪里，也出现了或多或少明显的人口下降。比如，看看13世纪：从公元1200年到1300年，世界人口似乎没有增长，这表明正在发生资本消耗，或者至少没有资本积累；再清楚不过的是，看看15世纪，也就是1400年代：与前一个世纪相比，这个世纪的人口明显减少，直到近两百年后，人口规模才再次达到14世纪的水平。再看看17世纪，也就是三十年战争的那个世纪。比较1600年到1650年的数据，你会发现人口再次大幅下降，这表明在这个时期发生了大规模战争和巨大破坏。直到1650年之后，我们才看到人口持续增长。从1650年到1850年，人口翻番大约需要两百年。然后，从1850年到1950年，人口大约一百年翻了一番，而1950年之后，人口翻番所需时间则不到五十年。

Another interesting topic in all this is to look at the growth of cities. Again, city growth being a rough indicator of what happens to capital accumulation. Before the year 1600, the ten or eleven largest cities were outside of Europe, they were: Beijing, which had more than 700,000; Istanbul, which had about 700,000; Agra in India, 500,000; Cairo, 400,000; Osaka, 400,000; Canton, 350,000; Edo, which is, I think, Tokyo, 350,000; Kyoto, also 350,000; Hangchow, 350,000, Lahore, 350,000, and Nanking, somewhat above 300,000. That corresponds, roughly, with what we know about the world. Until 1500 or so, there is absolutely no doubt that China was far more developed as a civilization than Western Europe. I will explain in later lectures what might be the causes of why this changed. Interestingly, the rapid growth of European cities, which were at this time small compared to Asian cities, sprang up in large numbers from about 1500 on, this rapid growth was unsurpassed by Asian cities.

这其中另一个有趣的话题是研究城市的发展。同样，城市发展是资本积累状况的一个大致指标。1600年以前，规模最大的十到十一座城市都不在欧洲，它们分别是：北京，人口超过70万；伊斯坦布尔，人口约70万；印度的阿格拉，50万；开罗，40万；大阪，40万；广州，35万；江户（我想就是现在的东京），35万；京都，同样35万；杭州，35万；拉合尔，35万；还有南京，人口略超30万。这大致与我们对世界的认知相符。直到1500年左右，毫无疑问，中国作为一个文明体，其发展程度远远超过西欧。我会在后续讲座中解释这种情况发生改变的原因。有趣的是，当时与亚洲城市相比规模较小的欧洲城市，从1500年左右开始大量涌现并快速发展，这种快速发展是亚洲城市无法比拟的。

Table 2 lists the thirty largest cities in Europe in the period from 1050 to 1800 AD. First, take a look at the total numbers at the very bottom and you see, of course, that the total numbers always go up, but they go up in a particularly drastic way only from about 1650 AD on, and before then the growth was comparatively moderate. But, if we take a look at speciﬁc cities, we can see in which way the centers of economic development changed: which places lost in signiﬁcance, where obviously political events must have taken place that were unfavorable to capital accumulation, and how other places show a rapid increase in their ranks among the top thirty places. Let me just pick out a few cities here. Córdoba was the biggest city in 1050 AD. (The populations of Córdoba and Palermo are 450,000 and 350,000, respectively, and are somewhat in dispute as is noted in the table footnote, so I included the more realistic numbers of 150,000 and 120,000, respectively, for these two cities. Otherwise, that seems to be somewhat disproportionate.)

表2列出了公元1050年至1800年间欧洲规模最大的30座城市。首先，看看最下方的总数，你当然会发现，总数一直在上升，但从大约公元1650年起才开始急剧上升，在此之前增长相对平缓。但是，如果我们观察特定城市，就能看出经济发展中心是如何变化的：哪些地方重要性下降，显然是在这些地方发生了不利于资本积累的政治事件；而其他地方在这30强中的排名又是如何迅速上升的。我在这里挑几个城市来说说。公元1050年，科尔多瓦是最大的城市。（科尔多瓦和巴勒莫的人口分别为45万和35万，不过正如表格脚注所指出的，这两个数据存在一定争议，所以我分别采用了更现实的15万和12万这两个数字。否则，这数据看起来有点不太合理。）

But, in any case, Córdoba, the biggest city in 1050 AD, has completely dropped out of the top thirty by 1500 AD. That’s a general tendency that we can say, that Spanish cities, or even more general, Southern European cities, lost increasingly in signiﬁcance, and the center of economic development and capital accumulation shifted to the north. Take some other spectacular cities here—Palermo, for instance, which you realize is the second-biggest city around 1000 AD, has no more inhabitants in 1800 AD than it had in the year 1000. Obviously, Palermo was not exactly the center of economic development during this time, but rather was a dying city. The same is also true for Seville. Again, Seville ranks number three in 1000 AD and hundreds of years later has apopulation that is not in any signiﬁcant way larger. Then look at the spectacular rise of Florence until 1330 AD. So, Florence is the lowest one in the ﬁrst column, with 15,000 in the year 1000, and then moves rapidly up the rank order until about 1330 AD, where the population has increased from 15,000 to 95,000, and then a decline of Florence takes place. Look at the spectacular growth of London, which, in the last column, of course, is by far the biggest European city. In the previous column, it is the second biggest. In the year 1500 column, it has just 50,000 inhabitants and in 1330 AD, only 35,000 inhabitants. So, in this period from 1330 to 1800 AD, we see a spectacular rise of London, again, indicating, obviously, a very favorable climate for capital accumulation that existed there.

但无论如何，公元1050年最大的城市科尔多瓦，到公元1500年已彻底跌出前三十。我们可以说，这是一种普遍趋势，西班牙城市，甚至更宽泛地说，南欧城市的重要性日益降低，经济发展和资本积累的中心向北转移。再看其他一些引人注目的城市，比如巴勒莫，你会发现它在公元1000年左右是第二大城市，但到公元1800年，其人口数量与公元1000年时并无增长。显然，在此期间巴勒莫并非经济发展的中心，而是一座逐渐衰落的城市。塞维利亚也是如此。公元1000年塞维利亚排名第三，然而数百年后，其人口规模并没有显著增长。再看看佛罗伦萨在公元1330年前的惊人崛起。在第一列中，佛罗伦萨是排名最靠后的，公元1000年人口为1.5万，随后排名迅速上升，到公元1330年左右，人口从1.5万增长到9.5万，之后便开始衰落。看看伦敦的惊人发展，在最后一列中，它显然是欧洲最大的城市。在前一列中，它是第二大城市。在公元1500年这一列，它仅有5万居民，而在公元1330年，只有3.5万居民。所以，在公元1330年到1800年这段时间，我们看到伦敦的惊人崛起，这显然再次表明，那里存在非常有利于资本积累的环境。Just to give you some examples of the major technological capital goods developments that took place during the Babylonian civilization, that is in the period of 4500 BC to 2500 BC. Here we ﬁndplows used for the ﬁrst time; we ﬁnd wheeled carts for the ﬁrst time; we ﬁnd draft animals being used in agriculture; we ﬁnd bricks being used for the ﬁrst time, and magniﬁcent buildings erected. We ﬁnd what is quite unique and has not been repeated independently anywhere else in history, the invention of the arch, which allows, of course, construction of structures that otherwise would collapse under their own weight. And we know the arch concept was imported to other areas. We ﬁnd thepotter’swheel. We ﬁnd copper smelting. We ﬁnd the development of bronze, which is a combination of tin and copper in certain combinations. We ﬁnd the development of writing, which indicates that there must have been a class of intellectuals in existence, who can only be supported if there exists a certain amount of wealth in society. And a certain amount of wealth, of course, requires a certain amount of capital accumulation. We ﬁnd quite far developed mathematical techniques in Babylonia, and we ﬁnd traces of metallic money being used. And obviously in the cities, which reached sizes of 80,000 people or so, we had quite an extent of specialized professions coming forth.

And interesting are also some cases of decline. For instance, there is a very quick rise and a very quick fall of Bruges (or Brügge), in what would be Belgium today. And then, the city of Bruges, after it falls, obviously the economic environment becomes very unfriendly. We see then, as a substitute,a very quick rise in the city size of Ghent,a neighboring city, which indicates to what extent neighboring cities competed against each other for capital accumulation and for merchants settling in those cities. And again, Ghent falls very quickly, to be overtaken by another city very close by, namely Antwerp. And then, Antwerp also falls very quickly and then we see the spectacular rise of Amsterdam, again,a city very close to Antwerp, again illustrating in this case the mobility of capital, people leaving one place because it oﬀers less favorable conditions for capital accumulation and moving to other places not far away and exhibiting there a spectacular growth. A similar spectacular growth you ﬁnd, for instance, in the city of Hamburg.

还有一些城市衰落的案例也很有意思。例如，在如今比利时境内的布鲁日，它经历了快速崛起又迅速衰落。布鲁日衰落之后，其经济环境显然变得极为不利。接着我们看到，作为替代，邻近城市根特的规模迅速扩大，这表明了相邻城市在多大程度上为了资本积累和吸引商人定居而相互竞争。同样，根特也很快衰落，被另一座紧邻的城市安特卫普超越。随后，安特卫普也迅速衰落，接着我们看到阿姆斯特丹惊人地崛起，阿姆斯特丹同样是一座与安特卫普距离很近的城市，这再次表明在这种情况下资本的流动性——人们因为某个地方资本积累条件变差而离开，迁移到不远处的其他地方，并在那里实现惊人的发展。比如，你会发现汉堡这座城市也有类似的惊人发展。

第五讲国家财富：意识形态、宗教、生物与环境

Besides purely economic factors, such as the division of labor, money and capital accumulation, ideological factors also play a very important role in economic development and in the formation of societies. Ideological factors, in a way, even inﬂuenced such fundamental things as the attitude toward the division of labor in a given society, and in particular also the attitude toward capital accumulation, the desire to become wealthier or to be satisﬁed with low standards of living. I want to spend this lecture discussing certain ideological factors, mostly religious factors, inﬂuencing economic development.

除了劳动分工、货币和资本积累等纯粹的经济因素外，意识形态因素在经济发展和社会形成过程中也起着非常重要的作用。在某种程度上，意识形态因素甚至影响了一些根本性的问题，比如特定社会中人们对劳动分工的态度，尤其是对资本积累的态度、追求更富裕生活的欲望，或者安于低生活水平的心态。我想在这一讲中探讨一些影响经济发展的意识形态因素，主要是宗教因素。

I will start by reminding you that capital accumulation and—based on capital accumulation—the desire to make inventions, technological improvements and so forth, can be encouraged or can be discouraged by certain prevalent ideologies existing in society. Before I start talking about major religions, let me just give you some examples that make this intuitively clear. Imagine, for instance, if people believed in a deity that leaves the world with the instruction that things should be left the way they are. If such a religion were a powerful religion among people, you can easily imagine that such a society would not have much of a potential to develop and become prosperous. We would likely guess that societies such as this would tend to die out, or will betaken over by other societies. Or, imagine a society that has a very deep and profound ancestor worship. Of such a society, we would expect that it will display, to a large extent, very ritualistic behavior, and that it also will be reluctant to introduce any innovations.

我首先要提醒大家，资本积累以及基于资本积累而产生的发明创造、技术改进等愿望，会受到社会中某些主流意识形态的鼓励或抑制。在开始探讨几个主要宗教之前，我先举几个例子，让大家直观地理解这一点。例如，想象一下，如果人们信奉某个神灵，该神灵给世人的训诫是一切应维持现状。如果这样一种宗教在人群中影响力很大，你很容易想到，这样的社会不太可能有很大的发展潜力，也难以走向繁荣。我们很可能会猜测，这样的社会往往会走向消亡，或者会被其他社会所取代。再比如，想象一个极度尊崇祖先崇拜的社会。我们可以预期，这种社会将表现出强烈的仪式化行为，对任何创新都会产生天然的抵触。人们会严格遵循祖制，任何改变传统的行为都可能被视为对祖先的亵渎。

The same is also true for slave societies. Of course in many parts of the world, for large parts of human history, we did have slave societies. The most prominent examples would be classical civilization, Greek and Roman civilizations, and also the more recent example of the United States. In slave societies, it is frequently the case that the slaves do the work and the masters laze around, don’t do much, are not involved in the day-to-day activities, and because they are not involved in the day-to-day activities, they also contribute little to improvements in the technology that can be employed in these day-to-day activities. Let megive you a brief quote from Carroll Quigley to this eﬀect. He writes,

奴隶社会也是如此。当然，在世界上许多地方，在人类历史的很长一段时期内，确实存在奴隶社会。最典型的例子是古典文明，即希腊和罗马文明，较近的例子则是美国。在奴隶社会中，常见的情况是奴隶劳作，而奴隶主无所事事、游手好闲，不参与日常活动。正因他们不参与日常活动，所以对于可应用于这些日常活动的技术改进，他们也贡献甚少。让我引用一段卡罗尔·奎格利（Carroll Quigley）表达类似观点的话。他写道：

Suppose that the primitive tribe believes that its socialorganization was established by a deity who went away leaving strict instruction that nothing be changed. Such a society would invent very little. Egyptian civilization was something like that. Or any society that had ancestor worship would probably have weak incentives to invent. Or a society whose productive system was based on slavery, would probably be uninventive. Slave societies, such as classical civilization or the Southern states of the United States in the period before 1860, have been notoriously uninventive. No major inventions in the ﬁeld of production came from either of these civilizations.1

“假设某个原始部落认为其社会组织是由一位神灵创立的，这位神灵离去时留下严格指令，要求一切不得改变。这样的社会几乎不会有什么发明创造。埃及文明就有点类似这种情况。或者，任何奉行祖先崇拜的社会，其发明创造的动力可能都很弱。又或者，生产体系基于奴隶制的社会，可能也缺乏创造力。像古典文明或1860年以前美国南方各州这样的奴隶社会，在发明创造方面一直乏善可陈。这两种文明在生产领域都没有产生重大发明。” [18]

This is not to say that these civilizations did not develop other achievements. Obviously, the Greek civilization allowed a class of philosophers to emerge, and they passed on another form of inheritance to us, namely that of rigorous logic or thinking, which has had a tremendous impact on human development. But when it comes to improving existing tools that one uses in production, they were indeed very unproductive.

这并不是说这些文明没有取得其他成就。显然，希腊文明催生了一批哲学家，他们给我们留下了另一种传承，即严谨的逻辑或思维方式，这对人类发展产生了巨大影响。但在改进生产中使用的现有工具方面，他们确实成果寥寥。

Let me give a few other examples that will show how certain ideologies might prevent wealth from being accumulated in societies. There exist religions, for instance, that prescribe that whenever the master of a household dies, that he should be buried with all of his possessions. That seems to be, from the outset, a very stupid attitude, at least as far as ever making any progress is concerned; every generation would destroy whatever they have accumulated during that generation.

我再举几个典型案例，来更直观地说明某些意识形态是如何阻碍社会财富积累的。例如，有些宗教规定，一家之主去世时，其所有财产都必须随葬。至少从追求发展进步的角度来看，这种观念从一开始就显得极为愚蠢；每一代人都会毁掉他们在这一代积累的一切财富。

Or imagine societies that are ridden by feelings of envy. There exist numerous examples of this which you can ﬁnd, for instance, in the famous book Envy by the German sociologist Helmut Schoeck. And you also ﬁnd many examples, some of them taken from the Schoeck book, in Rothbard’s little book on Egalitarianism as a Revolt against Nature. Again, I just want to quote one example of a society such as this, from Herbert Spencer. Spencer writes,

再想象一下充满嫉妒情绪的社会。有大量这样的例子，比如你可以在德国社会学家赫尔穆特・舍克（Helmut Schoeck）的名著《嫉妒》（Envy）中找到。在罗斯巴德所著的《论平等主义是对自然的反叛》这本小册子里，也有很多例子，其中一些就取自舍克之书。我再引用赫伯特・斯宾塞所描述的一个这样的社会例子。斯宾塞写道：

[There exist reports about the chiefs among the Abipones, of the Dakotas:] The cacique has nothing either in his arms or his clothes to distinguish him from a common man, except the peculiar oldness and shabbiness of them. For, if he appears in the streets with new and handsome apparel, the ﬁrst person he meets will boldly cry, “Give me that dress” and unless he immediately parts with it, he becomes the scoﬀ and scorn of all and hears himself called covetous.2

“（有关于达科他州阿比波内斯人酋长的记载：）酋长在穿着打扮上与普通人并无二致，只是他的衣物格外破旧。因为，如果他穿着崭新漂亮的衣服出现在街上，第一个遇到他的人会大胆地喊：‘把那件衣服给我。’ 除非他立刻交出衣服，否则就会成为众人嘲笑与讥诮的对象，被骂贪婪。”[19]

Obviously, a society like this is not likely to accumulate much in terms of wealth. Or, there exist societies whereas soon as the big chief has accumulated a certain amount of food stuﬀs or other goods, he is obliged to throw a big party for the entire tribe and at this big party, all of the resources that have been accumulated will be wasted away. That is,a continuous process of capital accumulation simply does not take place in societies such as this. Now, it can be safely assumed that these types of examples that I give, are obviously not examples of societies that we would expect to stand the test of time, to last very long, but instead,being displaced by other societies that have diﬀerent attitudes, and either defeat them in the form of warfare or simply displace them. That is, just make them leave or push them out of the territories that they inhabit to more unhabitable territories, and then they ultimately die out.

显然，一个这样的社会不太可能积累大量财富。又或者，有些社会中，一旦大酋长积累了一定数量的食物或其他物资，就必须为整个部落举办一场盛大宴会，而在这场宴会中，所有积累的资源都会被挥霍殆尽。换句话说，在这样的社会，根本不会出现持续的资本积累过程。现在，可以合理推断，我所举的这些例子，显然不是那种我们预期能够经受住时间考验、长久存续的社会，相反，它们会被其它秉持不同意识形态的社会所取代，要么被武力征服，要么干脆被取而代之。也就是说，迫使他们离开，或者将他们从所居领地驱赶至更不适宜居住的贫瘠之地，最终他们就会灭绝。

What I now want to do is undertake a survey of the major religions and their attitudes toward work and invention and capital accumulation. I’m not interested in the pure theological part of these religions, just in those parts of the religions that have repercussions for the dayto-day conduct that people are expected to engage in.

我现在想做的是梳理一下几大主要宗教，以及它们对工作、发明创造和资本积累的态度。我对这些宗教的纯神学部分不感兴趣，仅仅只关注宗教中那些会影响人们日常行为规范的内容。

I will begin with one of the religions that is comparatively bad, when it comes to capital accumulation, inventiveness and so forth, and that is Hinduism. Hinduism is characterized, as far as its economic doctrines are concerned, ﬁrst by explicit taboos against using certain resources. As you all know, for instance, cows cannot be used, and there exist other taboos that simply make it impossible for resources that could have been put to some useful employment to be used this way. In addition, Hinduism is a religion that is characterized by strict association taboos. That is to say, certain groups of people are not allowed to associate with certain other types of people, and you immediately recognize that this is, of course, quite an obstacle when it comes to the development of the division of labor. What you would expect of such a society, a society of castes that are prevented from having any systematic contact with each other, is that there will be some sort of petriﬁcation of production modes. Each caste sticks to its own techniques and tasks that are assigned to it, and there is no interchange of ideas; there is no social mobility of any kind and this, obviously, has negative repercussions as far as the economic growth potential is concerned. In addition, Hinduism requires strict obedience to the rules of the caste and has in place severe obstacles in the way of any economic progress. There is the promise of reincarnation into higher classes, which leads the lower classes to not rebel against the existing caste system, because rebelling against the existing caste system will prevent you from being reincarnated into a higher caste in a future life.

我先从印度教说起，这是一种在资本积累、创新能力等方面表现相对不佳的宗教体系。就其经济教义而言，印度教的特点首先是对使用某些资源有明确禁忌。例如，众所周知，牛不可被役用，同时还存在其他一些禁忌，这使得一些本可投入有益用途的资源无法如此利用。此外，印度教的特点还在于严格的交往禁忌。也就是说，某些群体的人不允许与其他特定类型的人交往，你马上就能意识到，这当然对劳动分工的发展构成了重大障碍。对于这样一个各阶层被阻止进行任何系统性接触的种姓社会，你可以预见到，其生产方式会陷入某种程度的僵化状态。每个种姓都固守着自己被直盯的技艺与任务，种姓之间没有思想交流；不存在任何形式的社会流动，显然，这对经济增长潜力产生了负面影响。此外，印度教要求严格遵守种姓制度，并对任何经济进步都设置了重重障碍。其教义承诺信徒可以转世为更高种姓，这导致低种姓阶层不会反抗现有的种姓制度，因为反抗现有的种姓制度会阻碍你在来世投胎转生为更高种姓。

There is also—this has to do with taboos with respect to certain objects—the problem that there is no clear-cut distinction in the rank of creatures on Earth. Recall, for instance, in Christianity, in Genesis, we learn that man is the highest of all creatures and that he is given dominion over the rest of the world. On the other hand, if you have a religion that does not necessarily see mankind as the highest development having dominion over the animals, but that there are gradual differences between the animal kingdom and the human kingdom, then again, this is something that hampers the economic growth potential. It leads also to widespread vegetarianism, and widespread vegetarianism, despite the fact that there are some people who propagate it even in our societies, is certainly not a lifestyle that energizes you and makes you an entrepreneurial person, if you only just eat grain.

某些宗教关于特定物种的禁忌还衍生出一个深层问题：即地球上的生物缺乏明确的等级划分。例如，回想一下基督教《创世纪》，我们知道人类是万物之灵，被赋予统治世界其他万物的权力。另一方面，如果一种宗教并不一定将人类视为统治动物的最高阶存在，而是认为动物王国和人类王国之间只有渐进式的差异，那么这同样会阻碍经济增长潜力。这也导致了普遍泛滥的素食主义，现如今，尽管我们的社会也有人宣扬素食主义，但如果你只吃谷物，这种生活方式肯定无法让你精力充沛，也难以让你成为具有冒险精神的创业者。

Hinduism also permits human sacriﬁce, which further indicates that the status of humans is not above everybody else. And it encourages orgies, that is, activities that display a high degree of time preference, having fun right now, just overdoing it completely, not disciplining yourself during these orgiastic experiences. On the other hand, they also emphasize pomp, that is the display of riches, and do not do what we will see later on, especially in puritanical religions, that is, you don’t live a pompous life; you are humble and invest, but don’t display for everyone how well oﬀ you are. And, in general, it is a religion that encourages submission—submission of certain groups vis-à-vis other groups. So, if we rank various religions, we can say from the outset that Hinduism, as long as people really adhere to it, is not exactly a religion that has great economic promises in store. And in a way, looking at India, we can see that that is borne out by the facts. In addition, India has also adopted another system, namely mass democracy, which contributes to their lack of economic promise, but this is a modern development. Traditional India, of course, was not democratic, by any means.

印度教还允许人祭，这进一步证明人类的地位并不高于其他万物。该宗教还鼓励纵欲狂欢，即那些高时间偏好的活动，追求当下快感、彻底放纵欲望，在这些狂欢体验中毫无节制。另一方面，印度教还崇尚排场、炫耀财富，并不像我们稍后会在一些宗教（尤其是清教徒式的宗教）中看到的那样——过简朴生活，为人谦逊且注重投资，避免向他人炫耀自身财富。总体而言，这是一种强调服从的宗教体系——宣扬某些群体对其他群体的绝对顺从。所以，若对各种宗教进行排序，我们一开始就能断言，只要人们真正笃信印度教，它显然并非是那种能带来巨大经济发展前景的宗教。从某种程度上看，观察印度的情况就可以佐证此点。此外，印度还采用了另一种制度，即大众民主制，这对其经济发展无疑是雪上加霜、前景黯淡，但这是现代才出现的情况。当然，传统的印度无论如何都称不上民主。

Let us then take another Eastern religion, Buddhism. And to a lesser extent, what applies to Buddhism also applies to Daoism. Buddhism started in away as are form movement of Hinduism, but essentially disappeared from India itself, and instead gained inﬂuence in Southeast Asia, outside of the Indian subcontinent. The Buddhist view of life is that ultimate wisdom consists in detachment from life, from the earthly, worldly life. It views life as painful, and it considers an ascetic lifestyle as a means to eliminate or to reduce the pain that comes from regular life. So, it advocates a life of ascetic meditation. Again, it should be perfectly clear that for people to withdraw from the world is not encouraging the type of attitude that we consider to be normal. The goal of the Buddhist religion is Nirvana, and Nirvana is a state of aﬀairs that brings about the elimination of all desires. Now of course, if you try to eliminate all your human desires, then there will be little need to engage in productive activities, which are those activities that we consider to be necessary in order to reduce our pains. The essence and purpose of life for the Buddhist and also for the Daoist, to acertain extent, is not individual fulﬁllment and especially not individual fulﬁllment in this life. The life that anyone is living right now is just one of thousands of lives. So, there is very little emphasis on personal happiness, or on individual achievement. Daoism teaches the serene acceptance and humility and gentleness and passivity and understanding acceptance of whatever happens to occur, rather than individual accomplishment and individual advancement. Again, the empirical evidence bears that clearly out, that devoted Buddhist societies are not exactly highly developed societies.

那么，我们来看看另一种东方宗教——佛教。在一定程度上，适用于佛教的观点也同样适用于道教。佛教最初在某种意义上是印度教的一场改革运动，但在印度本土基本上消失了，反而在印度次大陆以外的东南亚地区扩大了影响力。佛教的人生观认为，终极智慧在于超脱尘世生活，摆脱世俗的人间生活。它将人生视为苦痛，把苦行的生活方式当作消除或减轻日常生活痛苦的一种手段。因此，它倡导苦行冥想的生活方式。很显然，人们选择遁世，这种态度并不鼓励我们所认为的正常观念。佛教的目标是涅槃，涅槃是一种消除所有欲望的状态。当然，如果你试图消除所有人类欲望，那么就几乎没有必要从事生产活动，而我们认为生产活动是减轻痛苦所必需的。对佛教徒、以及在一定程度上对道教徒而言，生命的本质和目的并非个人成就，尤其不是今生的个人成就。任何人当下的生活只是千万次生命中的一次。所以，他们不太强调个人幸福或个人成就。道教教导人们坦然受之，常怀谦逊、温和、无为之心，以理解的心态接受发生的任何之事，而非追求个人成就与个人进步。同样，实证证据清楚地表明，笃信佛教的社会并非高度发达的社会。

Let me come to the next major religion, Islam. Islam also does not in any way encourage individual autonomy. As a matter of fact, the translation of the word “Islam” is “submission.” And what we frequently hear from proponents of Islam, is that they point out this golden age of Islam during the time that they occupied Spain, during which they rescued some of the achievements that were generated by the classical Greek culture and they then transmitted them to Christianity. But this so-called golden age is more of an exception, a ﬂuke in Islam, than typical of the Islamic religion. The main proponents during this era, the main Islamic intellectuals of this era, were by and large intellectuals that had broken with orthodox Islam and were regarded with the utmost suspicion by the Islamic community at their time. So, it was only by breaking away from orthodox Islamic beliefs that these sorts of achievements became possible. The Islamic religion is very familistic, that is family-oriented, and rigidly hierarchically structured (not unlike the Chinese societies, to which I will come in a little bit.) Again, the hierarchical structure can be seen in particular in the relationships between males and females; females are clearly members of society with signiﬁcantly fewer rights than males have.

接下来谈谈下一个主要宗教 —— 伊斯兰教。伊斯兰教也丝毫不鼓励个人自主。事实上，“伊斯兰”（“Islam”）一词的释义就是 “顺从”。我们经常从伊斯兰教支持者那里听到，他们会提到伊斯兰教在占领西班牙时期的黄金时代，在此期间，他们挽救了一些古希腊文化的成就，然后将其传播给基督教。但这个所谓的黄金时代在伊斯兰教中更像是一个例外、一种偶然，并非伊斯兰教的典型特征。这个时代的主要支持者，即当时主要的伊斯兰知识分子，大多是脱离了正统伊斯兰教的知识分子，在当时受到伊斯兰社群的极度怀疑。所以，只有摆脱正统的伊斯兰信仰，才有可能取得这类成就。伊斯兰教非常注重家族观念，也就是以家庭为导向，并且有着严格的等级结构（这与我稍后会讲到的中国社会有些类似）。同样，这种等级结构在男女关系中体现得尤为明显；女性显然是社会成员，但享有的权利却比男性少很多。

In Islam, science and reason are not recognized as in Christianity, as a gift from God. They are not regarded as valuable in and of themselves, as they are, for instance, in Thomism, that is, in certain branches of Christianity. Rather, Islam views life on Earth as something that has no inherent or internal purpose, but it is mostly a preparation for the eternal life that comes afterward. In this regard, Islam is not all that different from very early Christianity, which also had a similar belief that life on Earth was of relatively minor importance and the main goal of it was just for the preparation for life after death. This is, of course, not characteristic of later Christianity, but in the early stages of Christianity, this sort of attitude did prevail. In the view of Islam, God, after the creation of the world, does not really retreat. The Christian view is that God creates a world and then he lets things happen, then mankind is on their own. Now, they have to prove themselves. From the point of view of Islam, God remains continuously involved in worldly aﬀairs. But if God remains continuously involved in earthly aﬀairs, this then makes the search for universal and eternal laws some sort of sinful behavior, almost blasphemous. If you think that God retreats and then lets the world run the way he has organized it, then, of course, it makes sense to try to ﬁgure out what the laws of the world are, but if God remains involved in earthly aﬀairs, then, in away, it doesn’t make any sense to even look out for universal regularities. As a matter of fact, to stipulate that there are universal regularities, is some sort of insult against the belief that God remains continuously involved in earthly aﬀairs. So, this is considered to be somewhat a vain activity and to almost denying God’s almightiness.

在伊斯兰教中，科学与理性并不像在基督教中那样，被视为上帝的恩赐。科学与理性本身并不被认为具有内在价值，不像在托马斯主义（即基督教某些分支）中那样。相反，伊斯兰教认为尘世生活并无内在目的，而主要是为后世的永生做准备。在这方面，伊斯兰教与早期基督教并无太大差异，早期基督教也认为尘世生活相对次要，其主要目的只是为死后的生活做准备。当然，这并非是后来基督教的特点，但在基督教早期，这种态度确实普遍存在。在伊斯兰教看来，真主创造世界后并未真正隐退。基督教的观点则是，上帝创造世界后，任由万物自行发展，人类只能依靠自身，必须自我证明。而从伊斯兰教的角度看，真主始终在持续干预世间事务。但如果真主始终参与尘世事务，那么探寻普遍永恒的法则就成了某种罪行，近乎亵渎神明。如果你认为上帝隐退，让世界按他设定的方式运行，那么，试图弄清楚世界的法则当然是有意义的；但如果上帝一直干预尘世事务，那么，从某种程度上说，探寻普遍规律就毫无意义。事实上，认定存在普遍规律，在某种程度上是对上帝始终参与尘世事务这一信仰的冒犯。所以，这被视为一种徒劳的行为，几乎是在否定全能的上帝。

What should be perfectly clear from the outset is that if, and to the extent that, these beliefs are the beliefs of the overwhelming majority of the people, then you should expect little in terms of scientiﬁcandscholarly achievement coming from such societies. The achievements coming from these societies, as I mentioned, are mostly produced by individuals who have somehow broken with the basic tenets of the religion. On this subject let me quote a German anthropologist who writes on this feature of Islam. His name is von Grünebaum, and he says that Islam was never able to accept that scientiﬁc research is a means of glorifying God.

从一开始就应该十分清楚明了的是，如果这些信仰在很大程度上是绝大多数人的信仰，那么你就别指望这样的社会能在科学和学术方面取得多少成就。正如我所提到的，这些社会取得的成就大多是由那些在某种程度上背离了该宗教基本教义的个人所创造的。关于这个现象，让我引用一位研究伊斯兰教这一特点的德国人类学家的话。此人名为冯·格林鲍姆（von Grünebaum），他明确指出，伊斯兰教始终未能接受科学研究是一种荣耀上帝的方式。

Those accomplishments of Islamic mathematical and medical sciences which continue to compel our admiration were developed in areas and in periods where the elites were willing to go beyond and possibly against the basic strains of orthodox thought and feeling. For the sciences never shed the suspicion of bordering on the impious.…This is why the pursuit of the natural sciences, as that of philosophy, tended to become located in relatively small and esoteric circles and why but few of their representatives would escape an occasional uneasiness…which not infrequently did result in some kind of apology for their own work.3

伊斯兰数学和医学领域那些至今仍令我们赞叹不已的成就，是在这样的地区和时期取得的：当地精英愿意超越，甚至可能违背正统思想和情感的基本倾向。因为科学始终摆脱不了近乎亵渎神明的嫌疑……这就是为什么对自然科学以及哲学的追求往往局限于相对较小的神秘圈子，也是为什么这些领域的代表人物很少有人能摆脱时不时出现的不安情绪……这种情绪常常导致他们为自己的工作进行某种辩解。[20]

Now, after Islam, also not exactly favorable to economic development and again, something that is borne out by the facts, we come now to Confucianism. And Confucianism, we have to admit from the outset, is far more suitable for economic growth; it has a far more positive attitude toward science and investigation and is, in a way, a very interesting case. Keep in mind that until 1500 or so, China was clearly the most developed region on the globe. Confucianism is entirely realistic in its outlook and entirely this-worldly. It has no anthropomorphic concept of a god. It does speak of heavens, but the heavens are some sort of impersonal thing. It has nothing to do with what we imagine God to be, which has, of course, some sort of manly image. They actually do not have a concept of adeity. They also have no promise of an afterlife. That can be an advantage, or it can be a disadvantage: that depends in a way on how other religions depict the afterlife. But, in any case, no promise of an afterlife is given. The entirely realistic and rationalistic attitude of Confucianism is also reﬂected in the fact that there exist no miracles for them, in contrast to Christianity, where we admit the existence of miraculous events. Miraculous events do not exist for Confucians. That is, everything can be rationally explained. And accordingly, there also exists no such thing as a saint. Confucius himself is neither a god, nor is he a prophet. onfucius is just a leader, a teacher. Because of this, some people have even doubted whether it is appropriate to refer to Confucianism asa religion. That is, without a god, without a prophet, can we legitimately refer to it as a religion? Let me, at this moment, give you a quote from Stanislav Andreski on Confucianism. Stanislav Andreski is a Polish sociologist who taught most of his life in England, and he is one of those very few sociologists who is not a leftist. There area few others like Robert Nisbet and Helmut Schoeck. As I said, Stanislav Andreski is very interesting.4 He writes on Confucianism,

在谈完同样对经济发展不太有利且事实也证明如此的伊斯兰教之后，我们现在将视线转向儒家思想。我们必须坦然承认，儒家思想显然更有利于经济发展；它对科学研究和探索秉持更为积极的态度，从某种程度上来说，这是个非常有趣的例子。要知道，大约在1500年之前，中国显然是全球最发达的地区。儒家思想的世界观完全是入世的，且完全着眼于现世。它没有拟人化的神的概念。它确实提到“天”，但“天”是某种非人格化的事物。这与我们所想象的具有某种男性形象的上帝毫无关系。实际上，他们没有神灵的概念。他们也不承诺有来世。这可能是优势，也可能是劣势：在某种程度上，这取决于其他宗教如何描绘来世。但无论如何，儒家思想不承诺来世。儒家思想完全现实主义和理性主义的态度还体现在，对他们来说不存在“神迹”，这与基督教形成对比，我们知道，基督教承认存在“神迹”。对儒家信徒而言，“神迹”并不存在。也就是说，一切都能够合理解释。相应地，也不存在圣人这样的概念。孔子本人既非神，也非先知。孔子只是一位领袖、一位老师。正因如此，有些人甚至怀疑将儒家思想称为一种宗教是否合适。也就是说，没有神，没有先知，我们能合理地将其称为宗教吗？此刻，让我给你们引用斯坦尼斯拉夫·安德烈斯基（Stanislav Andreski）关于儒家思想的一段话。斯坦尼斯拉夫·安德烈斯基是一位波兰社会学家，他一生大部分时间在英国任教，他是极少数非左派的社会学家之一。还有其他几位像罗伯特·尼斯比特（Robert Nisbet）和赫尔穆特·舍克（Helmut Schoeck）亦是如此。如我所说，斯坦尼斯拉夫·安德烈斯基非常有趣。[21] 他是这样论述儒家思想的：

If we want to rank the religions in accordance with their compatibility with the ﬁndings of science, we must place Confucianism far ahead in ﬁrst place. Indeed, its rationalistic and this-worldly outlook has led some scholars to deny that it is a religion. None the less, it certainly is a religion in the etymological sense (which is derived from the Latin word “to bind”) because it undoubtedly did constitute a bond which united many millions during two millennia. However, if we include an anthropomorphic concept of deity and a promise of life after death as essential characteristics of a religion, then we have to conclude that Confucianism was not a religion because to the Confucians, the supreme entity is the Heavens—an invisible and impersonal force rather than a personalized god modeled on the image of a terrestrial despot as in the religions born in the Near East.

如果我们想依据与科学发现的契合程度来给各宗教排序，那必须把儒家思想远远排在首位。事实上，其理性主义和现世的世界观，导致一些学者否认它是一种宗教。尽管如此，从词源学意义上讲（“宗教”一词源于拉丁语“to bind”，意为“约束”），它无疑就是一种宗教，因为在两千年的时间里，它无疑构成了一种纽带，将数以亿计的人联结在一起。然而，如果我们把拟人化的神灵概念和对来世的承诺视为宗教的基本特征，那么我们就不得不得出结论：儒家思想不是一种宗教，因为对儒家信徒而言，至高无上的实体是“天”——一种无形且非人格化的力量，而非像在近东诞生的那些宗教中那样，是一个以尘世暴君形象塑造的人格化的神。

When asked about what happens after death, Confucius replied, “When you don’t know enough about the living, how can you know about the dead?” He never claimed, nor was attributed posthumously by his followers, any powers which could be called supernatural or magical. The Confucians expect no miracles, have no saints and revere their founder not as a deity but as a great teacher.5

当被问及人死后会怎样时，孔子回答：“未知生，焉知死？” 孔子从未宣称自己拥有任何可被称为超自然或神奇的力量，其追随者在他身后也没有赋予他这类能力。儒家信徒不期待“神迹”，也无圣人概念，他们尊崇其创始人，不是将其当作神灵，而是视为一位伟大的老师。[22]

So, we can say that Confucianism is certainly a world outlook that is clearly compatible with capitalism. It has a very strong emphasis on ﬁlial piety, on family solidarity, and that might have some sort of negative eﬀect when it comes to individual inventiveness with respect to breaking out of existing traditions, but in principle, of course, ﬁlial piety and familialism is nothing that is incompatible with capitalism. Again, let me, as regards to this lack of innovative spirit that you can ﬁnd among the Confucians, give you a quote from Charles Murray, out of his book Human Accomplishment: The Pursuit of Excellence, which I think captures this idea quite well. He says,

所以，我们可以说儒家思想无疑是一种与资本主义天然兼容的世界观。它非常强调孝道与家庭团结，这在个人突破现有传统进行创新方面，可能会产生某种负面影响，但从原则上讲，孝道和家族观念与资本主义并无冲突。关于在儒家思想中可能存在的创新精神缺失这一点，我再给大家引用查尔斯·默里（Charles Murray）《人类成就：对卓越的追求》一书中的一段话，我认为这段话很好地诠释了这一观点。他说：

At the core of the Confucian ethic was the quality called ren, the supreme virtue in man—a quality that combines elements of goodness, benevolence and love. This ethic was most essential for those with the most power. “He who is magnanimous wins the multitude,” Confucius taught. “He who is diligent attains his objective, and he who is kind can get service from the people.” Indeed, to be a gentleman—another key concept in Confucian thought—required one above all to embody ren. And lestone think that a gentleman could get by with mouthing the proper platitudes, Confucius added, “The gentleman ﬁrst practices what he preaches and then preaches what he practices.”6

儒家伦理的核心是“仁”，这是人类的最高美德，一种集善、仁、爱于一身的品质。这种伦理对于那些手握重权之人最为重要。孔子教导说：“宽则得众，敏则有功，惠则足以使人。” 的确，要成为 “君子”（儒家思想的另一关键概念），首要的是践行 “仁”。而且，别以为君子只需嘴上重复恰当的陈词滥调就行，孔子补充道：“君子先行其言，而后从之”。[23]

Now, Chinese and Japanese children also, to a certain extent, are then, because of this strong family orientation, supposed to make their life decisions always mindful of ﬁrst, the wishes and the welfare of their parents, then of their extended family, and ﬁnally of their community.

由于这种浓厚的家庭观念，在一定程度上，中国和日本的孩子在做人生决策时，也理应首先考虑父母的意愿和福祉，其次是大家庭，最后是所在社区。

There is a lack of encouragement for achieving one’sown fulﬁllment no matter what, something that you do ﬁnd to a far larger extent, of course, in the Western tradition. In addition, there is great emphasis on learning among the Chinese; China is a meritocratic system, where people from all walks of life, from all ranks, can, through some sort of examination system, reach the highest levels of society. That is, it is a society that, in a way, selects for high IQs, and thereby also tends to bind the population to the earthly powers. It is because everyone can rise and there is a meritocratic system that makes it appear fair who rises and who doesn’t rise, even the lower strata of society are somehow consoled to live with this system.

相较于西方传统，中国和日本不太鼓励人们不顾一切地追求自我实现，而在西方，这种追求更为普遍。此外，中国人极为重视学习；中国实行的是任人唯贤的制度，社会各界、各阶层的人都可以通过某种考试制度，跻身社会顶层。也就是说，从某种程度而言，这是一个选拔高智商人才的社会，因此也倾向于将民众与世俗权力联系在一起。由于每个人都有晋升机会，且任人唯贤的制度让谁能晋升、谁不能晋升显得较为公平，所以即便是社会底层民众，也在一定程度上能够接受并安于这种制度。

What must be said as one of the explanations for why China nonetheless was not able to compete ultimately with the West, was the connection that existed between Confucianism and the state bureaucracies from very early on. That is, you did have, as you will see that we don’t have in the West, an immediate or a more or less direct identity between the earthly rulers (the Chinese emperor) and the top hierarchies of the Confucian doctrine, of the Confucian theology, for lack of a better word. So, Confucianism had tied its forces very early on to the state, and because of that, the inherent reluctance to invent and to innovate was further strengthened.

必须指出，中国最终无法与西方竞争的原因之一，在于儒家思想从很早开始就与国家官僚体制紧密相连。也就是说，与西方不同，在中国，世俗统治者（中国皇帝）与儒家学说、儒家神学（暂且这么表述）的高层之间，存在着一种直接或近乎直接的一致性。因此，儒家思想很早就与国家权力捆绑在一起，正因如此，其内在的对发明创新的抵触情绪进一步加剧。

Again, I point this out. This combination of Confucianism with the state led to a certain amount of uncritical thinking, that is, what we know in the West and what we have learned in the West in particular, from the Greeks, to present an argument and then a counterargument and then another counterargument and try to hammer out what is right and what is wrong, try to refute each other in an endless game of back and forth, this is something that you rarely ﬁnd among the Chinese. I must say, based on my personal experience (because we have lots of Oriental students in Nevada), I can even detect this among my students whenever it comes to writing critical essays. They are always extremely good when they do mathematical equations and multiple choice, they remember everything, they always rank on top of the class. But when it comes to writing pieces like we learned it in school, you have the thesis and then you have to present the counterarguments and then you have to ﬁlter out what arguments are stronger and which ones are weaker and possibly synthesize this sort of stuﬀ in some way, they do show a signiﬁcant weakness in this department. Another indicator for this—again, this is a little bit speculative—is while you do ﬁnd a massive overrepresentation of Orientals in ﬁelds like mathematics, physics, engineering and so forth, they are signiﬁcantly underrepresented in law schools. And in law schools is precisely where this sort of Greek-style arguing is, that we all in the West have learned from elementary school on. But, where this Greek style of arguing is in particularly high demand they are underrepresented, as compared with other ﬁelds where they are clearly overrepresented. Again,a brief quote from Charles Murray on this observation. He says about East Asia,

我再次指出这一点。儒家思想与国家的这种结合导致了一定程度的批判性思维的缺失。也就是说，在西方，尤其是从希腊人那里，我们学到要先提出一个论点，然后给出一个反驳论点，接着再给出另一个反驳论点，并努力弄清何为对、何为错，在这种一来一回的无尽过程中相互辩驳，而这种情况在中国极为罕见。基于我个人的经验（因为在内华达州我们有很多东方学生），我甚至能在我的学生写批判性文章时察觉到这一点。他们在做数学方程式和选择题时总是非常出色，他们什么都记得住，成绩总是名列前茅。但当要写像我们在学校里学的那种文章时，也就是先提出论点，然后要给出反驳论点，接着必须筛选出哪些论点更强、哪些更弱，并可能以某种方式综合这些内容，他们在这方面就明显表现不足。另一个体现这一点的迹象——这有点属于推测——是，虽然在数学、物理、工程等领域，东方人的占比极高，但在法学院里，他们的人数却明显偏少。而在法学院，恰恰非常需要这种希腊式的辩论方式，这是我们西方人从小学就开始学习的。与他们明显占比过高的其他领域相比，在对这种希腊式辩论有特别高需求的地方，他们的占比却偏低。再次引用查尔斯·默里对此观察的一段话。他谈到东亚时说：

In the sciences, the disapproval of open dispute took a toll on the ability of East Asian science to build an ediﬁce of cumulative knowledge….[T]he history of Chinese science is episodic, with the occasional brilliant scholarly discovery but no follow up. Progress in science in the West has been fostered by enthusiastic, nonstop, competitive argument in which the goal is to come out on top. East Asia did not have the cultural wherewithal to support enthusiastic, nonstop, competitive arguments. Even in today’s Japan, a century and a half after the nation began Westernizing, it is commonly observed that Japan’s technological feats far outweigh its slender body of original discoveries. One ready explanation for this discrepancy is the diﬀerence between progress that can be made consensually and hierarchically versus progress that requires individuals who insist that they alone are right.7

在科学领域，不认可公开争论，这损害了东亚科学构建累积性知识体系的能力……中国科学史是断断续续的，偶尔会有杰出的学术发现，但却没有后续跟进。西方科学的进步得益于热烈、持续、竞争性的争论，其目标就是脱颖而出。东亚没有相应的文化资源来支持这种热烈、持续、竞争性的争论。即使在如今的日本，自这个国家开始西化一个半世纪后，人们普遍注意到，日本的技术成就远远超过其为数不多的原创性发现。对于这种差异，一个现成的解释是，通过达成共识和层级式推进取得的进步，与需要坚持自己绝对正确的个人来推动的进步之间存在差异。[24]

And of course you can tell that in the West there are plenty of people who think that they are right, that nobody else is right.

当然，你能察觉到在西方，有许多人认为自己正确，而他人皆错。

Now, from Confucianism, we will go to Judaism. From the outset, we will have to say that Judaism was always a very small and dispersed group of people, and as such they had in a way very little inﬂuence on the modern world. In addition, because they are a nonproselytizing religion, that is, they do not try to go on missions and convince other people to convert to their religion, they always remained a small group, dispersed over many places, with relatively limited inﬂuence. There are some people, such as German socialist Werner Sombart, one of the opponents of Ludwig von Mises, one of the so-called Katheder socialists, who advanced the thesis that the Jews were the inventors of modern capitalism, but this thesis is clearly false, for the following reason. Yes, it is true, for instance, that Holland, Venice, and a city like Frankfurt ﬂourished after the inﬂux of Jews into these places, and it is also true that after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, Spain declined, but this does not necessarily show any causal relationship. There are also contrary examples. For instance, in Britain, industrial capitalism arose precisely during the period after the Jews were expelled from England and before they were readmitted to England, which shows that their presence was by no means necessary in order to develop capitalist institutions.

说完儒家思想，接下来我们谈谈犹太教。首先得说，犹太教群体一直规模较小且分散，从某种程度上来说，他们对现代世界的影响微乎其微。此外，由于犹太教不热衷于传教，即他们不会主动去四处游说他人皈依其宗教，所以始终保持着小规模，散居各地，影响力相对有限。有些学者，比如德国社会主义者维尔纳·桑巴特（Werner Sombart），他是路德维希·冯·米塞斯的反对者之一，属于所谓的“讲坛社会主义者”，提出了犹太人是现代资本主义发明者的观点，但这个观点显然是错误的，原因如下。的确，例如犹太人涌入荷兰、威尼斯以及法兰克福这样的城市后，这些地方开始繁荣起来；而且犹太人被逐出西班牙后，西班牙走向衰落，这也是事实。但这并不一定表明存在因果关系。也有相反的例子。比如在英国，工业资本主义恰恰兴起于犹太人被逐出英国到重新被允许进入英国这段空挡时期，这表明，资本主义制度的发展绝非一定需要犹太人的存在。

And there are other indicators that go in a diﬀerent direction. For instance, wherever you had large numbers of Jews in the population, that is, wherever Jews were not a teeny-tiny minority surrounded by a diﬀerent culture, as was the case, for instance, in Eastern Europe, there, the economic development was always negative. That is, there the Jewish presence went hand-in-hand with abject poverty. The Jews were more numerous in the backward countries like Poland and Russia, than they were in the advanced countries, Germany, France, and England.

还有其他一些指向不同结论的迹象。例如，在任何一个犹太人人口占比很高的地方，也就是说，在犹太人并非像在东欧那样，作为极小的少数群体被截然不同的文化所包围的地方，经济发展往往都不尽如人意。也就是说，在那些地方，犹太人的存在总是与赤贫相伴。在波兰和俄国这样的落后国家，犹太人的数量比在德国、法国和英国这些先进国家的还要多。

When they begin to make major contributions to science, of course, nobody doubts this. This takes place only when they are small minorities in contact with dominant cultures surrounding them. For instance, in the Middle East, in Spain, during the so-called golden age of Arab rule and in particular, after the emancipation of the Jews by the Christians from the late eighteenth century on. I should emphasize that the emancipation of the Jews is a Christian achievement. The Jews were emancipated from their own rule and not by themselves, but by external forces, by Christians, no longer being willing, so to speak, to oppress them and treat them in the way that they were treated by their own. So, before the year 1800, you see comparatively little in terms of achievements coming from Jews, and the achievements that you do see are typically by people who had broken with their religion.

当犹太人开始为科学做出重大贡献时，当然，没人会对此表示怀疑。而这种情况只有在他们作为少数群体，与周围占主导地位的文化有所接触时才会发生。例如，在中东、西班牙，在所谓阿拉伯统治的黄金时代，尤其是从18世纪后期基督徒解放犹太人之后。我要强调，犹太人的解放是基督教的成果。犹太人从自身原有的受束缚状态中获得解放，并非靠他们自身，而是借助了外部力量，即基督徒。可以说，基督徒不再愿意以犹太人过去遭受的那种方式去压迫和对待他们。所以在1800年之前，犹太人取得的成就相对较少，而你所见青史留名者，通常是那些与自己宗教决裂之个体先驱。

Traditional Orthodox Judaism requires, again,a rigid subordination to your family and to your community, not quite unlike what you ﬁnd in Islamic societies. In the so-called ghettos there existed selfadministration of the Jews, and this self-administration was frequently typically given to them by the outside ruler in exchange for paying the outside ruler a part of the ﬁnes that the rabbis imposed internally on their own community. The Jews living in ghettos had something to do with the fact that some of their taboos involved that they had to live very close to the synagogue and could not work during certain periods of the day, so they had to be in close proximity to certain places. They could not live widely dispersed from each other, at least if you were an Orthodox Jew.

传统的东正教犹太教同样要求严格服从家庭和社区，这与在伊斯兰社会所见的情况颇为相似。在所谓的犹太“隔都”（Ghetto），犹太人实行自我管理，这种自治权通常由外部统治者赋予，作为交换，犹太拉比在内部对本社区成员处以罚款后，会将其中一部分上缴给外部统治者。犹太人居住在“隔都”，部分原因与他们的一些禁忌有关，比如他们必须居住在距离犹太教堂很近的地方，且在一天中的特定时段不能工作，所以他们必须靠近某些特定场所。如果你是一名东正教犹太人，至少就不能彼此居住得过于分散。

In Spain, for instance, that was precisely the arrangement. You get self-administration in your ghetto; you can impose any type of ﬁne, any type of punishment that Rabbinical Law allows to be imposed on other Jews, but a certain percentage of the money collected you have to give to the Spanish king. So, a mutually beneﬁcial arrangement was found, established between the Spanish ruler, on the one hand, and the rabbis being in charge of the Jewish ghettos. Now, the life in the ghettos was almost completely under rabbinical control, not unlike the control that Islamic ayatollahs exercise over their population. To make money was permitted. To make money outside of the ghettos was permitted, but only in order to support Talmudic studies. And in order to do so, the Jews became the tools of the rulers, frequently in the suppression of the indigenous population. That was, in particular, the case in places like Poland and Russia. Jews working outside of the ghetto were used by the rulers as tax collectors vis-à-vis the Polish and Russian populations. The Jews were permitted to do this because … Max Weber refers to them as having a double ethic. That is, they had rules that applied to them internally that were diﬀerent from the rules that applied to them externally. To give you just one example: while the Christians, for along time, outlawed the charging of interest, the Jews also outlawed taking interest except from Christians. It was not permitted to take interest from other Jews, but it was permitted to take interest from Christians, which of course, made them particularly suitable for certain types of professions, like moneylenders.

例如在西班牙，情况正是如此。在犹太“隔都”，你们拥有自治权；可以依据犹太教律法，对其他犹太人施加任何形式的罚款或惩罚，但收取的罚款需按一定比例上交给西班牙国王。于是，西班牙统治者与负责管理犹太“隔都”的拉比之间达成了一种互利安排。当时，“隔都”内的生活几乎完全处于拉比的掌控之下，这与伊斯兰阿亚图拉对民众的控制并无二致。赚钱是被允许的，在“隔都”外赚钱也没问题，但目的只能是支持对《塔木德》的研习。为了实现这一点，犹太人常常成为统治者压迫当地居民的工具，在波兰和俄罗斯等地尤其如此。“隔都”外工作的犹太人被统治者当作针对波兰人和俄罗斯人的征税员。犹太人被允许如此行事，是因为……马克斯·韦伯称他们奉行双重伦理准则。也就是说，他们对内适用一套规则，对外则适用另一套规则。举个例子：长期以来，基督徒禁止收取利息，犹太人也禁止收取利息，但对基督徒除外。禁止向其他犹太人收取利息，却可以向基督徒收取，这当然使他们特别适合从事某些职业，比如放贷。

In the ghettos—I’ll give you some quotes on that in a second—the reading of books in modern languages was completely outlawed. There was no writing allowed, even in Hebrew, unless it was explicitly permitted by the rabbis. We are nowadays used to the fact that Jews are particularly humorous people. Just think of Woody Allen or Murray Rothbard. But humor was something that was considered to be taboo in the ghettos. There was rigorous enforcement of eating and sexual taboos. Education was concerned exclusively with the Talmud and mystic writings. No math was taught, no science, no history, no geography. All violations were severely punished, up to and including ﬂogging to death. And, as I said regarding the liberation of the Jews, from that point on we see that the dramatic achievements that they were capable of was essentially a Christian achievement, due to the attachment of the puritanical values of the Old Testament, which was also part of the tradition of Judaism. As soon as they were emancipated, combine that with the puritanical attitude that they had, they then became indeed enormously successful businessmen, as successful as any other group. I want to read you a little quote on this atmosphere in the Jewish ghettos.

在犹太“隔都”——我马上给你们引用一些相关内容——阅读用现代语言写成的书籍是被完全禁止的。除拉比明确许可之外，即使用希伯来语写作也不被允许。如今我们都知道犹太人特别幽默，想想伍迪·艾伦或默里·罗斯巴德便知一二。但在“隔都”内，幽默被视为禁忌。饮食和性方面的禁忌被严格执行。教育完全只限于涉及《塔木德》和神秘主义典籍，数学、科学、历史和地理都被排除在外。任何违规行为都会招致严厉惩罚，甚至可能被鞭笞至死。就像我刚才提到的犹太人的解放，从那时起，他们所能取得的巨大成就本质上是基督教的功绩，这得益于《旧约》中清教徒式价值观的影响，而《旧约》也是犹太教传统的一部分。而一旦获得解放，再结合他们自身清教徒式的精神，他们确实成就斐然，于商业一道尤为突出，并不逊色于其他任何一个群体。我想给你们读一段关于犹太“隔都”氛围的具体描述。

[Before emancipation] there were no Jewish comedies, just as there were no comedies in Sparta, and for similar reasons. Or take the love of learning. Except for purely religious learning, which was, itself, in a debased and degenerate state. The Jews of Europe (and to a lesser extent also of the Arab countries) were dominated by a supreme contempt and hatred for all learning (excepting the Talmud and Jewish mysticism). Large parts of the Old Testament, all non-liturgical Hebrew poetry, most books on Jewish philosophy were not read and their very names were often anathematized. Study of all languages was strictly forbidden, as was the study of mathematics and science. Geography, history, even Jewish history, were completely unknown. Nothing was so forbidden, feared and therefore persecuted, as the most modest innovation or the most innocent criticism.

正如斯巴达没有喜剧一样，解放前的犹太社区也没有喜剧传统——两者的根源都指向严苛的社会控制。再看看对学习的态度。当时的犹太人对知识的追求仅限于宗教领域，且这种宗教研究本身也处于扭曲与僵化的状态。欧洲犹太人（阿拉伯国家的犹太社区稍好）普遍蔑视甚至敌视一切世俗学问，唯有《塔木德》和犹太神秘主义被允许研读。《旧约》中大量篇章、非宗教类希伯来诗歌、犹太哲学著作均遭禁绝，连提及这些书名都可能被诅咒。语言学习、数学、科学被严格禁止，地理与历史（包括犹太民族自身历史）更是一片空白。任何微小的创新或温和的批评都会招致最残酷的迫害。

It was a world sunk in the most abject superstition, fanaticism and ignorance,a world in which the preface to the ﬁrst work on geography in Hebrew, published 1803 in Russia, could complain that very many great rabbis were denying the existence of the American continent and saying that it is “impossible.”8

这是一个深陷最极端迷信、狂热与蒙昧之中的悲惨世界。1803年，俄国出版了第一本希伯来语地理著作，其序言无奈地写道：许多大拉比甚至否认美洲大陆的存在，坚称它‘绝无可能’。” [25]

The Jewish contribution begins after the emancipation of the Jews, basically from the outside. Before that they do not play a dominant role in the development of capitalism, but can actually be regarded as in some ways hampering that development.

犹太人的贡献始于犹太人解放之后，基本上是从外部开始的。在此之前，他们并没有在资本主义的发展中发挥主导作用，实际上可以说在某些方面阻碍了资本主义的发展。

Now I come to Christianity. While Western civilization eventually came to surpass all other civilizations, one has to admit that this was nothing that was obvious from the very beginning. Early Christianity was not individualistic, but it was absorbed in the collective community, to which a person was rigidly subordinated. Again, not quite unlike in Islam, earthly life was considered to be a mere preparation for the afterlife, and during the ﬁrst millennium of inﬂuence exercised by Christianity, one must admit that Christianity presided over a regression in scientiﬁc knowledge and the division of labor. Recall, we saw this in an earlier lecture when we looked at population ﬁgures from 200 or 300 AD until about the year 1000; there is actually retrogression taking place—the population does not increase at all, and nothing in terms of scientiﬁc, scholarly, or technological achievements is accomplished during this period. So, what we have to say is that what we describe as a Western Christian outlook developed only gradually, especially through the incorporation of Greek Aristotelian ideas, culminating in Thomas Aquinas.

现在我来讲基督教。尽管西方文明最终超越了所有其他文明，但必须承认，从一开始这并非显而易见。早期基督教并不强调个人主义，而是注重集体社群，个人严格从属于集体。同样，这与伊斯兰教有相似之处，尘世生活被视为仅仅是对来世的准备。在基督教产生影响的第一个千年里，必须承认，基督教造成了科学知识和劳动分工的倒退。回想一下，我们在之前的一次讲座中，查看公元200或300年到大约公元1000年的人口数据时就看到了这一点；实际上出现了倒退——人口根本没有增长，而且在这一时期，科学、学术或技术方面毫无建树。所以，我们必须指出，我们所说的西方基督教世界观是逐渐形成的，尤其是通过融入吸收希腊亚里士多德的思想，在托马斯·阿奎那那里达到顶峰。

With Aquinas, the modern Christian view developed. Let me now describe this modern Christian view that turned out to be, obviously, quite successful in terms of the contributions that they made to science and economic development. In this modern Christian worldview, the world is viewed basically as good and the greatest good lies in the future. The material and the spiritual world are seen as a unity. Recall, in Buddhism, for instance, it is somewhere suggested that the spiritual life separate itself from the ﬂesh. In Christianity, spirit and body form a unity, and salvation also involves both, the body and the soul. There exists no soul without a body and only by the performance of bodily actions can the soul be saved. Man, as I mentioned before, in the Christian world view, is considered to be the high point of creation. Man is given dominion over the world; he is clearly separated and ranks above the animal kingdom. For Christians, there exists no such thing as a golden age that is in the past. Quite the contrary, progress is possible and the future holds promises for Christians. The world and the truth is knowable, because God has withdrawn and we can discover eternal laws. Wisdom comes as a consequence of eﬀort; it is not automatically there, but requires achievements and eﬀorts on the part of man, and it takes time to develop.

在阿奎那的推动下，现代基督教观点得以逐渐成形。现在我来阐述一下这种现代基督教观点，显然，从其对科学和经济发展所做的贡献来看，它相当成功。在这种现代基督教世界观中，世界本质上被视为善的，而至善则存在于未来。物质世界和精神世界被视为一个统一体。回想一下，例如在佛教中，某种程度上暗示精神生活应与肉体分离。而在基督教里，精神与肉体构成一个整体，救赎涉及肉体与灵魂两者。没有肉体就不存在灵魂，而且只有通过身体力行，灵魂才能得到救赎。正如我之前提到的，在基督教世界观里，人被视为造物的巅峰。人被赋予统治世界的权力；人与动物王国明显区分开来，且地位高于动物。对基督徒而言，不存在所谓过去的黄金时代。恰恰相反，进步是可能的，未来对基督徒而言充满希望。世界和真理是可知的，因为上帝已隐退，我们能够发现永恒的法则。智慧源于努力，它并非与生俱来，而是需要人类付出成就和努力，并且需要时间来培养。

The social world is hierarchical, to a certain extent. There is God, and the pope, and then the cardinals, the bishops and the priests, and in the earthly realm, there is a king, the Lord, the father, the mother and the child. There is no ridiculous “equality.” The Christian church is antidemocratic, at least the Catholic Church is antidemocratic, but it is also individualistic, in the sense that everyone is created by God and everyone is capable of salvation, which attitude or outlook, of course, is mainly responsible for the fact that it was only in Christianity that one gradually got rid of the institution of slavery. Initially, of course, in old Christianity, slavery existed too, and there’s no clear-cut prohibition against it, but based on this view that everybody is a creature of God and capable of salvation and on the attitude that Christians were a missionary religion, trying to convert people, gradually the view became the dominant view that slavery is incompatible with Christian attitudes. It was not by accident that it was a few Spanish priests who, after the occupation and conquest of South America, were responsible for, not with immediate success, obviously, but over the time, with some success, to give rise to the opinion that the Indians, after all, are also human beings and not wild creatures that should be automatic objects of enslavement.

在一定程度上，社会是有等级之分的。有上帝、教皇，然后是红衣主教、主教和神父，在世俗领域，则有国王、领主、父亲、母亲和孩子。不存在荒谬的 “平等”。基督教会是反民主的，至少天主教会是反民主的，但它也强调个人主义，因为每个人都是上帝所造，每个人都有获得救赎的可能。当然，正是这种态度或观念，使得只有在基督教中，人们才逐渐摒弃了奴隶制。当然，最初在古老的基督教中也存在奴隶制，且没有明确的禁令。但基于每个人都是上帝的造物且都能获得救赎这一观点，以及基督教作为传教宗教试图使人皈依的态度，奴隶制与基督教教义相悖这一观点逐渐占据主导。在南美洲被占领和征服后，正是几位西班牙神父，虽并未立即成功，但随着时间推移取得了一定成效，促使人们认识到印第安人同样也是人，并非可被随意奴役的野蛮生物，这一切皆非偶然。

In addition, Christianity is social and cooperative and views the progress that is possible as a result of a cooperative eﬀort. So, it is cooperation between people that brings us closer to the truth. And I’ll just make one remark about Catholicism and then I’ll come to a comparison between Protestantism and Catholicism. There is, of course, one strand of Christianity that has to be regarded with some degree of suspicion when it comes to the question of how suitable it is to allow the development of capitalism and capital accumulation. That would be the extreme Paulist view that one should love everyone like one loves oneself, instead of taking the view that one should love one’s neighbor as one loves oneself. It is possible to love your neighbor, but if your neighbors encompass, so to speak, the entire world and you are supposed to be charitable to the entire world, then this would, obviously, be a main obstacle in the way of capital accumulation. But, nonetheless, this is not the mainstream view, as far as I understand it.

此外，基督教具有社会性和合作性，认为进步是合作努力的结果。因此，正是人与人之间的合作让我们更接近真理。关于天主教我只说一点，然后再来比较新教和天主教。当然，当谈及基督教的某一分支对资本主义发展和资本积累的适宜程度时，人们会对此抱有一定程度的怀疑。这就是极端的保罗派观点，即应该像爱自己一样爱所有人，而不是秉持爱邻如爱己的观点。爱你的邻居是有可能的，但可以说，如果你的邻居涵盖整个世界，而你又要对全世界慷慨解囊，那么这显然会成为资本积累道路上的一个主要障碍。不过，据我所知，这并非主流观点。

Now, to the famous thesis of Max Weber, which you are all familiar with. Max Weber, of course, explains the rise of capitalism with the development of puritanical religions. And as we will see, there is some basic truth in this thesis, with some reservations. Now, capitalism as we know it was, of course, born in Italy and Italy is Catholic, so that clearly shows that Catholicism is deﬁnitely compatible with capitalism. In fact, the Roman church was a major banking institution, that is, it represented itself as a capitalist institution. And the ﬁrst big centers of capitalism were Florence and Venice, again, Catholic places. And in addition one can say that as a matter of theology, Catholicism is, of course, far more enthusiastic about human existence and human autonomy and human reason and human intellect than, let’s say, Lutheranism and Calvinism is. Lutheranism and Calvinism are anti-intellectual doctrines, to a certain extent. For the Thomist, faith and intellect can somehow be reconciled and combined. For Lutherans and Calvinists, there exists a strict separation between the two, and they emphasize far more the importance of faith, of blind faith, than they emphasize reason.

现在谈谈马克斯·韦伯的著名论点，想必诸位都很熟悉。当然，马克斯·韦伯用清教主义宗教的发展来解释资本主义的兴起。正如我们将会看到的，这个论点存在基本的合理性，但也需有所保留。众所周知，资本主义诞生于意大利，而意大利是天主教国家，这清楚地表明天主教与资本主义完全相容。事实上，罗马教会本身就曾是一个重要的金融机构，也就是说，它呈现出资本主义机构的特征。资本主义最早的大型中心是佛罗伦萨和威尼斯，它们同样属于天主教地区。此外可以说，从神学角度看，天主教对人类存在、人类自主性、人类理性及智识的推崇程度，显然远胜于路德宗和加尔文宗。在某种程度上，路德宗与加尔文宗属于反智主义学说。对托马斯主义者而言，信仰与智识能以某种方式调和统一。而对路德宗和加尔文宗而言，信仰与智识之间存在严格区分，他们强调信仰（尤其是盲目信仰）的重要性远甚于理性。

On the other hand, in the Catholic religion, you have, of course, a greater emphasis on the enjoyment of life and you have, relatively speaking, a certain disdain for material things, that would, relating to the previous lecture, indicate that Catholics tend to have a slightly higher degree of time preference. And again, in looking at the present world, you can somehow see that that is true. I mean, la dolce vita—the good life or the sweet life—is something that is typical of southern countries, of Italy and Spain. La dolce vita in Germany in the nineteenth century was more or less unheard of. In the meantime, of course, we all live in some sort of secular age, so the Germans also do dolce vita plenty, in the meantime. But, again, talking about the time of a few hundred years ago when capitalism developed, it’scertainly clear that there was more of, as Murray Rothbard would say, life-affirming attitude among the Catholics, than there was among the Protestants for whom life was something less than enjoyable, to put it mildly.

天主教与新教的差别还是较为复杂的。从生活享受来看，天主教显然更强调对生活的享受，更肯定生活本身；而对于新教徒而言，生活好像是不值得享受的事情。再从时间偏好来看，天主教徒有更高的时间偏好，我们可以以观察现实生活来验证这个观点。当今世界那些南方国家，比如意大利、西班牙，他们比较喜欢及时行乐，享受”la dolce vita”（美好或甜蜜的生活）。至于德国，如今的德国也好像开始大量追求及时行乐了，但在德国资本主义发展的关键时期19世纪，他们却不是及时行乐的。但若聚焦于数百年前资本主义发展的关键时期，正如默里·罗斯巴德所言，天主教徒显然比新教徒更持有”肯定生活”的态度——委婉地说，对新教徒而言，生活远非值得享受之事。

In the twentieth century, I’m not sure if it applies anymore, but it seems to be that everybody has fun all the time, but in the old days, I think Catholics deﬁnitely had more fun because your sins could be easily forgiven, whereas the sins, of course, they stick with a Protestant forever. They never get rid of them. In fact, private property, until 1891, when Pope Leo XIII declared private property to be a good, private property had, before, been seen by the Catholics, as a regrettable, though unavoidable concession to the weakness of human nature. They were not opposed to it, but they thought it had something to do with human weakness and one had, regrettably, to accept this institution. Only relatively late, with Leo XIII, as a positive affirmation, was private property seen as a good thing.

在20世纪，我不确定这种情况是否依然适用，但似乎如今每个人总是能享受生活乐趣。但在过去，我认为天主教徒确实能获得更多乐趣，因为他们的罪孽很容易得到赦免，而新教徒的罪孽，当然会永远伴随他们，无法摆脱。事实上，直到1891年教皇利奥十三世（译者注：Pope Leo XIII，任职时间为‌1878年2月20日至1903年7月20。）宣布私有财产为善之前，天主教一直将私有财产视为对人性弱点做出的一种无奈却又不可避免的让步，虽然并不反对之，但认为这与人性的弱点有关，很遗憾人们不得不接受这一制度。直到相对的晚近，在利奥十三世积极肯定的态度下，私有财产才被视为一桩善事。

Nonetheless, despite this more rationalistic attitude among Catholics, as compared to the blind faith attitude found among Protestants, Weber seems to be fundamentally right in the following way. In mixed populations, like in France or Germany, where large parts of the population are Catholic and large parts are Protestant, and Germany is almost half and half, we do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant overrepresentation of Protestants among the capitalists, and in general we can say that of course, capitalism was further developed and was more successful in northern Europe and also in the United States, than in southern Europe. And, of course, northern Europe is predominantly Protestant. This cannot be explained with the interest question. That is, Protestants had less difficulties with charging interest than Catholics, but in the Catholic doctrine, the interest prohibition had been by and large, undermined completely at the time. So, this is likely not the explanation for the greater success, as far as capitalistic development is concerned, of Protestant places.

尽管如此，与新教徒盲目信仰的态度相比，天主教徒有着更为理性主义的态度，但从以下方面来看，韦伯的核心观点似乎依然成立。在法国或德国这样的混合宗教人口国家，其中很大一部分人口是天主教徒，另一大部分是新教徒，在德国，二者的比例几乎各占一半。我们确实发现，在资本家群体中，新教徒的占比明显偏高。总体而言，我们可以说，与南欧相比，资本主义在北欧以及美国得到了更深入的发展，同时也更为成功。当然，北欧主要是新教地区。这无法用利息问题来解释。也就是说，新教徒在收取利息方面遇到的阻碍比天主教徒少，但在当时，天主教教义中对利息的禁令基本上已名存实亡。所以，有关利息的伦理态度差异，尚不能解释新教地区资本主义发展更好的原因。

Certainly, the doctrine of predestination has nothing to do with the greater success of the Protestant religions. If anything, if people had taken the doctrine of predestination seriously, they would have fallen into some kind of Oriental lethargic fatalism. After all, if all is predestined, why should I do anything? So, what we can infer from this is that the doctrine of predestination, while it existed on the books, was never really taken seriously by anybody. What is the most likely explanation for the greater amount of capital accumulation and success and so forth, of the Protestant religion, is simply their puritanical outlook, which involves the idea that you work without enjoyment. Work is the only way to riches. The riches or wealth that you accumulate are an indicator of grace. Work is, for Protestants, almost like prayer. There’s a certain amount of asceticism that Protestants accept. You don’t enjoy life; you just pain yourself, work harder and harder.

当然，预定论与新教取得更大成功并无关联。如果说有什么影响的话，要是人们真把预定论当回事，那他们就会陷入某种东方的消极宿命论。毕竟，如果一切都早已注定，那又有何所为呢？所以，我们由此可以推断，预定论虽然写在教义里，但实际上从未有人真正将其当做实践准则。对于新教在资本积累、取得成功等方面表现更为突出，最有可能的解释仅仅是他们清教徒似的观念，其中包含工作时不应享乐的思想。工作是通往财富的唯一途径。你积累的财富是蒙恩的标志。对新教徒来说，工作几乎类似祈祷。新教徒接受一定程度的苦行主义（asceticism）。他们不享受生活，只是自我磨砺、自我鞭策，越是努力工作，越是积累财富就越符合清教伦理。（译者注：预定论教义源于加尔文主义神学体系，主张上帝在创世前已“自由不变地预定一切未来事件”，包括对人类的救赎与永恒命运。具体表现为“无条件的拣选”（上帝选定特定个体得救）与“遗弃”（其余人因原罪受永恒诅咒）的双重预旨。预定论与救赎论结合，强调救恩完全依赖神的主权恩典，而非人类行为。）

There is, among the Protestants, a more pronounced rejection of ostentatious consumption and of ostentatious displays of wealth. Again,you can see that even now; the rich people in countries like Italy or Spain live in places that look like rich people live there. I know many rich people in Germany that live in places which look no diﬀerent from the place where I live. There is a rejection, of course, of gambling among the Puritans, drinking, all the rest of it. All of this that we might regard as an achievement of the puritanical religions, Lutheranism and Calvinism, however, might be regarded as some sort of mixed blessing, because what was truly unique in the Western world, and might have had a far greater impact on the ultimate superiority of Western civilization as compared to others than the Christian religion itself, is the fact that only in Europe was the power of the church and the power of the earthly rulers institutionally separated.

在新教徒群体中，对炫耀性消费和炫富的抵制更为强烈、明显。这种文化差异至今仍清晰可辨：意大利或西班牙的富人往往居住在彰显身份的豪宅中，而在德国，许多富人的居所外观与普通中产家庭无异。我认识很多德国富人，他们的住所看起来与我的并无不同。当然，清教徒传统中对赌博、酗酒等享乐行为的排斥，以及路德宗与加尔文主义所倡导的禁欲伦理，常被视为宗教改革的重要成就。然而，这些我们或许视为清教主义宗教成就的特质，也可能是一把双刃剑。西方世界真正的独特之处，相较于基督教本身，或许对西方文明最终超越其他文明产生更为深远影响的特质，是欧洲独有的政教分离制度，教会权力和世俗统治者权力在制度上相互分离。

You had the pope in Rome, the Catholic Church being an international church, counterbalancing the power of the various local lords, reducing the power of these lords because they did not control the church at the same time. But, this separation of church and state, which was unique for Europe and existed in no other part of the world, this unique separation was, of course, to a large extent, if not completely, broken up and abolished, precisely through the Protestant Revolution. That is, by breaking up the international Catholic Church and founding various national churches—Lutherans, Calvinists, and Mr. Knox in Scotland and so forth—all of a sudden, the princely rulers realized that this gives the possibility for me to combine the highest rank in the worldly hierarchy, as king or prince, with the highest rank also in the church.

罗马有教皇，天主教会是一个国际性教会，它制衡着各地领主的权力——由于教会独立于地方统治体系，客观上削弱了领主的集权能力。但是，这种政教分离的格局是欧洲所独有的，世界其他地方都不存在，而这种独特的政教分离在很大程度上（即便不是完全地）却被新教改革所打破，甚至遭到废除。也就是说，通过瓦解国际天主教会，各种国家教会如雨后春笋般崛起——路德宗、加尔文宗以及苏格兰的诺克斯先生（Mr. Knox）等等，突然间，君主们意识到，这让他们有可能将世俗等级中的最高地位——国王或君主——与教会中的最高地位相结合，实现政教合一。

And insofar as—and this is the mixed blessing—Protestantism has systematically strengthened the power of the state and Protestantism has also been responsible, to a large extent, for the promotion of democratic values. Remember, I explained that in the Catholic Church you have hierarchies. The Catholic Church is in this sense antidemocratic. The Protestant churches are far more democratic. The high churches, the high Protestant churches have gone back, to acertain extent, in the direction of the Catholic Church because they were aware of the dangers that result if you let every individual interpret the Bible on his own. If you do that and if you have a document that is not internally consistent, then you get a splitting oﬀ of all sorts of weird sects. This is, of course, precisely, what one of the side eﬀects of the Protestant Revolution was, that you had a multiplication of weird people, of weird things happening all of a sudden, which happens, of course, if every individual just interprets whatever he thinks is right, and nothing is ﬁltered through some people who have more wisdom than others. And of course, the Lutheran Church, which was initially quite democratic, has abolished this, has also built up hierarchies, though not to the same extent as the Catholic Church, and so has the Anglican Church. And if you look at the present situation, the craziest churches are, of course, the churches that are most democratic, up to this point.

从这个角度而言（这就是所谓的喜忧参半之处），新教系统地强化了国家权力，并且在很大程度上也推动了民主价值观的发展。还记得吗，我之前解释过，天主教会存在等级制度，从这个意义上说，天主教会是反民主的。而新教教会则民主得多。一些圣公会（高派教会）的新教教会在一定程度上又回归到类似天主教会的方向，因为他们意识到，如果任由每个人自行解读《圣经》会带来危险。如果允许如此行事，外加《圣经》本身内容并非完全连贯一致，那么就会衍生出各种奇怪的教派。当然，这恰恰是新教改革的副作用之一，突然间冒出了许多“奇人异事”。当然，如果每个人都只按自己认为正确的方式去解读，而没有经过更有智慧之人的筛选把关，出现这种情况毫不意外。当然，最初相当民主的路德教会（ the Lutheran Church）已经摒弃了这种做法，且已重新建立起等级制度，尽管森严程度不如天主教会，英国圣公会（the Anglican Church）亦是如此。环顾眼前现状，到目前为止，最疯狂的教会恰恰是那些最民主的教会。

I want to brieﬂy touch upon a very politically sensitive, if not to say, dangerous, subject. Again, I must say, I dared to bring it up at my university and I have not yet received any complaints. This is a table that is culled from IQ and the Wealth of Nations,a book recently published by Richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen, who did some very simple and elementary investigation and what they did was to try to show whether there exists some sort of correlation between IQ and measures of economic output such as GNP, or not.

我想简要谈及一个即便称不上危险，也是极具政治敏感性的话题。我得再次说明，我在自己所在的大学曾大胆提出这个话题，目前还未收到任何投诉。这是一张取自《智商与国家财富》的表格，这本书最近由理查德·林恩（Richard Lynn）和塔图·凡哈宁（Tatu Vanhanen）出版。他们做了一些非常简单基础的调查，试图探究智商与诸如国民生产总值（GNP）等经济产出指标之间是否存在某种关联。

I should say from the outset that they did not just use one IQ measure for countries; they typically had, from most of the countries, several types of IQ measures available. They showed ﬁrst that these measures are all highly intercorrelated, convincing us that we can put a certain amount of trust in the numbers that they use, and they also did not just use one economic output measure such as GNP, but also if it was available, two or three, and again intercorrelated them and tried to show that there was a high internal consistency among the numbers. Now, the correlation that they established—and I’ll say something about the interpretation of this table—is extremely high for social sciences. It is close to 0.7, which is,if you have ever done empirical research in sociology or psychology or so, mind-bogglingly high. I mean, people are usually impressed already if you have correlations of 0.2 or 0.3 or something like that. That is already considered to be worth showing. So here, we get very high correlations.

我首先要说的是，他们衡量各国情况时，并非仅采用一种智商测评方式。通常，对于大多数国家，他们能获取几种不同类型的智商测评数据。他们首先表明，这些测评数据相互之间高度关联，这让我们有理由在一定程度上相信他们所使用的数据。而且，他们也并非仅采用国民生产总值（GNP）这一种经济产出指标，只要有其他可用指标，他们会采用两到三个，同样对这些指标进行相关性分析，并试图证明这些数据之间具有较高的内在一致性。现在，他们所确立的相关性——关于这张表格的解读，我稍后会讲——从社会科学角度来看极其高。相关性接近0.7 ，如果你曾在社会学或心理学等领域做过实证研究，就会知道这个数值高得惊人。我的意思是，一般来说，相关性达到0.2或0.3左右就已经能给人留下深刻印象了，这样的相关性就已被认为值得公布。所以，这里我们看到的相关性非常高。

The interpretation of Table 1 follows simply from the heading. The ﬁrst number refers to the IQ; the second number is the actual GDP per capita in the year 1998, and the third number is called Fitted GDP, which would be the calculated GDP based on a regression analysis; that is, what we should expect the GDP to be, given the IQ in that country and taking the stable relationship between IQ and GDP intoconsideration. The countries are ordered here in alphabetical order, all the way to Zimbabwe.

表1的解读逻辑可直接从表头推演：首列数值指的是智商；第二列为1998年度实际人均国内生产总值，第三列（译者注：应为第四列）标注为拟合国内生产总值（Fitted GDP,），即通过回归分析计算出的国内生产总值——该数值综合考虑了该国智商水平，以及智商水平与国内生产总值之间的稳定关系，反映出特定智商条件下该国预期的国内生产总值。表格中国家名称按字母顺序排列，从首字母A开始直至津巴布韦。

I should make one remark about the more underdeveloped countries. In the more underdeveloped countries, the actual GDP tends to be underestimated, because in very highly agricultural societies, where there is a relatively high degree of self-sufficiency, GDP numbers understate the productive output because GDP measures only goods and services that were actually bought and sold in markets. So, if you grow your own tomatoes and your own potatoes, they would not be counted, whereas if you grow potatoes and tomatoes and then sell them on the market, then they would be counted. Obviously, in terms of standard of living, that would make no diﬀerence, but in terms of GDP or GNP, numbers such as this, in one case it would be counted and in the other case it would not be counted.

关于那些欠发达国家，我得说明一点。在欠发达国家，实际国内生产总值（GDP）往往被低估，因为在农业高度发达的社会，自给自足程度相对较高，GDP数据会少算生产产出，原因在于GDP只统计实际在市场上买卖的商品和服务。所以，如果你种植西红柿和土豆自用，这些不会被计入GDP；但如果你种植土豆和西红柿然后在市场上售卖，就会被计入。显然，就生活水平而言，这两种情况并无差别，但就GDP或国民生产总值（GNP）这类数据而言，前者被完全忽略，而后者则被计入。

The overall impression that you get from this list is that those countries that have high IQs also have high GDPs. And those countries that have very low IQs have, on the average, very low GDPs. There are, however, some clear-cut exceptions, obviously, which would have to be explained diﬀerently. Take the case of China, which is here listed with an IQ of 100 and a GDP per capita of $3,000 and a calculated GDP of $16,000. Now here, the explanation is that China was and still is, to a certain extent, a Communist country, leading, of course, to extremely low actual GDP and leading us, on the other hand, to the conclusion that if this type of system were abolished, the potential of China is signiﬁcant. That is, we can expect GDPs of $16,000 per person or in the neighborhood of that. There are also some countries that seem to be overperforming. The Germans produce a higher GDP than their IQ would indicate, for instance. The same is true for the US, if I remember correctly. The US has an IQ of 98, and it has a signiﬁcantly higher actual GDP than predicted GDP based on the intelligence of the population, which again, we would explain with having a relatively freer market system than some other places have. One might object to a table such as this, “Doesn’t intelligence also have something to do with picking the right economic system?” So, maybe there is something wrong with the Chinese, despite having such a great potential; after all, for aconsiderable amount of time, they lagged behind to such a great extent.

从这份列表中你得到的总体印象是，智商高的国家国内生产总值（GDP）也高。而智商很低的国家，平均而言，国内生产总值也很低。不过，显然也有一些明显的例外，需要用不同的方式来解释。以中国为例，这里列出中国的智商为100，人均GDP为3000美元，计算得出的人均GDP为16000美元。这里的解释是，中国在一定程度上过去是，现在仍然是一个社会主义国家，这当然会导致实际GDP极低，另一方面也让我们得出结论：如果这种体制被废除，中国的潜力将十分巨大。也就是说，我们可以预期人均GDP能达到16000美元左右。也有一些国家似乎表现超常。例如，德国的GDP产出高于其智商所预示的水平。如果我没记错的话，美国也是如此。美国的智商为98，其实际GDP明显高于根据人口智力测算的GDP，对此我们的解释是，美国的市场体系比其他一些地方相对更自由。有人可能会反对这样一张表格，说：“智商难道与选择正确的经济体制无关吗？” 所以，也许中国人自身存在一些问题，尽管他们潜力巨大；毕竟，在相当长的一段时间里，他们落后那么多。

We can also—again, I do not want to overinterpret this table—but, you can also see, for instance, how relatively vain the attempt is, for instance, to expect economic miracles in Africa to take place. If you look at African countries and look at the IQs there, you will have a rather dim impression as far as the growth potential of those countries are concerned.

我们也可以——我再次强调，我不想对这张表格过度解读——但比如说，你也能看出，期望非洲出现经济奇迹是多么不切实际。如果你看看非洲国家及其智商数据，就这些国家的增长潜力而言，你会有一个相当悲观的印象。

I will end this discussion—I think the table itself is highly interesting to study—by saying that, of course, IQs are also not what we might call invariable biological constants. They are subject to variation as well, eventhough it is not as easy to vary them as many other things. Obviously, we would expect that the old Babylonians and the old Egyptians must have done somewhat better than the present-day Babylonians and the present-day Egyptians, given their relatively low performance nowadays and their glorious achievements in the past. The most straightforward way to imagine that these numbers are subject to inﬂuence is to just realize that populations can, of course, engage in eugenic breeding practices, so to speak. For instance, societies where the upper classes, the more intelligent people, have it as a habit to have larger numbers of children, and the lower classes with lower IQs have smaller numbers of children, that would lead, over a few generations, obviously, to an upward lifting of average IQs. The same thing, of course, also applies in reverse. That is, if you had the lower classes with lower IQ levels producing the overwhelming bulk of children, and the upper classes producing very few or none, then one would expect that over the timespan of several generations the average IQ would fall.

在结束本次讨论之前——我认为这张表格本身极具研究价值。当然，智商也并非我们所说的一成不变的生物常数。它们也会发生变化，尽管不像其他许多事物那样容易改变。显然，考虑到如今巴比伦人和埃及人的相对低表现以及他们过去的辉煌成就，我们可以推测古代巴比伦人和古埃及人在智商方面肯定比现在的巴比伦人和埃及人表现要好。要理解这些数据如何受到影响，最直观的理解方式就是，不妨说，人们当然可以践行优生优育。例如，在一些社会中，上层阶级、智商较高的人群习惯生育更多子女，而智商较低的下层阶级生育子女较少，那么很显然，经过几代人之后，平均智商就会有所提高。反之亦然。也就是说，如果智商较低的下层阶级占据生育主体，而上层阶级生育率断崖式下跌，那么经过若干世代，平均智商预计会整体滑坡。

Hypotheses have been advanced, for instance, for why is it that Jews tend to have a very high IQ, eventhough Israel here is not particularly outstanding, with an IQ of 94, but the Jewish population in the United States has an IQ well above. Partially, that can be explained simply by migration. That is, the more successful people are more mobile and go to places where there is more opportunity for them, and there is a larger concentration of those. For instance, they have done studies where they compare the IQ of Scots who live in London as compared with Scots who remain in Scotland and found that the IQ of Scots in London was signiﬁcantly higher than Scots who stayed behind in Scotland. Again, that has a rather obvious explanation: the smarter ones moved. The case of East Germany versus West Germany is also interesting. They do not break it up here; German is simply listed as IQ of 102, but I have seen comparisons between East Germany and West Germany, and there the diﬀerence was that West Germany had one of 104 and East Germany of 98. And again, there exists a very straightforward explanation for a phenomenon such as this. East Germany was under socialist rule and expropriated the property of most of the successful individuals, and the most successful individuals left the country. So, of course, that lifted the IQ in West Germany and lowered the IQ in East Germany. Another explanation that has been advanced, coming back to the case of the Jews, for instance—I tend to be somewhat skeptical about that one, but just for illustrative purposes, I might mention it— that the largest numbers of children were in Orthodox Jewish families, typically produced by rabbis. If one assumes that the rabbis were the smartest of the bunch, then you would expect an upward tendency in IQs simply by a diﬀerent type of breeding behavior. Clearly, explanations along this line are not sufficient when it comes to explaining the wealth of nations, but I think one would also be blind to the facts, if one simply dismisses things like this easily. The evidence that Lynn and Vanhanen present is dramatic and overwhelming. You will be shocked to see how easy the explanation for a phenomenon can be sometimes, an explanation that other people struggle around for decades and do not explain.

例如，关于犹太人为何往往智商很高，已经有一些假说被提出。尽管以色列人的智商在列表中并不特别突出，仅为94，但美国的犹太人群体智商却远高于此。部分原因可以简单地用移民来解释。也就是说，越成功的人流动性越强，会前往对他们而言机会更多的群英荟萃之地。例如，有研究对比了生活在伦敦的苏格兰人与留在苏格兰本土的苏格兰人的智商，发现前者的智商明显更高。这一现象的解释同样一目了然：更聪明的人已迁走。东德与西德的情况也很有趣。这里没有分开列出，德国整体智商只列了102，但我看过东西德的智商对比，结果是西德智商为104，东德为98。同样，对于这样的现象有一个非常浅显直观的解释。东德处于社会主义统治下，剥夺了大多数成功人士的财产，于是这些最成功的人选择离开了这个国家。其结果就是，这种人口流动自然导致西德的智商水平上升，而东德的智商水平下降。回到犹太人的例子，还有另一种解释——虽然我个人对此持怀疑态度，但它具有一定启发性，不妨稍提一下——即东正教犹太家庭，特别拉比（犹太教神职人员）家庭，往往生育较多的子女。如果假设拉比是这群人中最聪明的，那么仅通过这种不同的生育行为，就可以预期智商会有上升趋势。显然，这种解释在说明国家财富问题上并不充分，但我认为，如果轻易忽视这类情况，也是一叶障目。林恩和凡哈宁提供的证据令人耳目一新，且极具说服力。你会惊讶地发现，有时对一种现象的解释竟可以如此简单，而他人为此苦苦思索几十年却依然未找到合理的答案。

第六讲法律与秩序的生成、自然秩序、封建主义与联邦制

The topic of this lecture is the production of law and order within a natural order. That is, the production of law and order without a state. Tomorrow, I will talk about the origin of the state, but here we are still considering what would naturally evolve; just as the division of labor naturally evolves, money as a medium of exchange naturally evolves, capital accumulation will take place under decently favorable circumstances and not so much under less favorable circumstances, so it can also be expected that every society will develop mechanisms for defending itself against asocial individuals. As long as mankind is what it is, we will have people who engage in productive activities and never have any other desire but to be productive individuals. So long as that is the case, we will also have people who try to hit other people on the head and rob and rape them, and every society that wants to survive will have to do something about this.

本次讲座的主题是自然秩序下法律与秩序的生成。也就是说，在无国家状态下法律与秩序的生成。明天，我会讲述国家的起源，但在这里我们仍在探讨自然演化的社会机制。就如同劳动分工的自然演化，货币作为交易媒介的自然演化，资本积累在相对有利的环境下会发生，而在不太有利的环境下则难以实现。所以，我们同样可以预见，每个社会都会发展出防御机制，以应对反社会个体。只要人类的本质不变，就会有一部分人投身生产活动，一心只想成为生产者。但与此同时，就总会有人试图打闷棍、抢劫和强奸他人，而每个希望长期存续的社会都必须采取措施应对此类反社会行为。

I will ﬁrst return brieﬂy to the subject of property and property rights, because what it is that we want to defend in a natural order is, of course, property and the rights of people to their property. We have seen that people take it for granted, even from the very most primitive situation on, that they own themselves, due to the direct connection that we have with our physical bodies. People also never had any doubt that those tools that they themselves produced were their tools and not somebody else’s tools. When it came to the development of settled agriculture, this idea was expanded to pieces of land. People then began to put up signs in order to claim certain plots of land as theirs, and these signs typically consisted in visibly doing something to the land so that other people could see that this is not a piece of uncultivated wilderness, but rather that this is a piece of land that has been worked on. Somebody has done something to it, and I can see that. And as you will admit, of course, it is quite easy in almost all cases to distinguish between a piece of land that has been cultivated in any way by mankind and a piece of wilderness. Just drive through, say, the Rocky Mountains, and you will see that most of the places are completely untouched, nobody has done anything to them and you can see that that is the case. On the other hand, drive through similar mountain ranges in Europe, let’s say in Austria and Switzerland. You see that people have, indeed, cultivated the mountains all the way to the top of the mountain. That is visible for anyone who has eyes to see. And, of course, people will show willingness to defend themselves against invaders trying to take these cultivated pieces of land away from them.

我将先简要回顾财产与财产权这个主题，因为在自然秩序中，我们想要捍卫的就是财产以及人们对其财产所拥有的权利。我们已经看到，从最原始的社会状态开始，人们就理所当然地认为自己拥有自己的身体，其原因在于我们与自己的身体存在直接联系。人们也从未怀疑，自己制造的工具属于自己，而非他人。当人类发展到定居农业阶段，这种观念也延伸到了土地。随后，人们开始通过一些标识来宣称某些地块归自己所有，这些标识通常表现为对土地进行一些明显的改造，以便其他人能够看出这并非一片未开垦的处女地，而是已经有人劳作过的土地。有人对它做了些什么，这我能看到。当然，你肯定会承认，在几乎所有情况下，区分一块被人类以某种方式耕种过的土地和一片荒野是相当容易的。比如说，驾车穿越落基山脉，你会看到大多数地方完全未被开发，毫无人为痕迹，这种情况一目了然。另一方面，驾车穿越欧洲类似的山脉，比如在奥地利和瑞士。你会看到人们确实将山地一直开垦到了山顶。改造痕迹显而易见。当然，人们会清楚表明自身意愿，抵御、抗击那些试图夺走他们这些已开垦土地之入侵者。

Let me emphasize again why it is that we need norms of property. If goods are scarce, then conﬂicts over these goods are possible. If we want to avoid conﬂicts over the use of scarce resources, there exists only one method to do it, and that is to formulate rules of exclusive use regarding scarce resources. That is, formulating rules that say that one person can do something with it, but others are excluded from it. As long as all of us have access to the scarce resources, conﬂicts are unavoidable. As a result, we can say that property norms, in this sense, are natural and necessary institutions for avoiding conﬂicts. And the rule of the ﬁrst one to produce something, the ﬁrst one to appropriate something, is that he becomes the owner and not somebody else (such as the second one or the third one or the rest of mankind sharing in what somebody else has originally appropriated). You can recognize the naturalness of this rule by recognizing that if mankind wants to act without conﬂicts,from the beginning of mankind on, then, the rule that the ﬁrst one to use something becomes the owner of it is the only rule that makes this possible—that is, that mankind can, from the beginning of mankind on, conceivably act without any conﬂicts. In this sense, these norms are natural norms or natural laws. No other laws have this advantage of making it possible to avoid conﬂicts between humans from the very beginning of mankind on.

我要再次强调，为什么我们需要财产规范。如果物品是稀缺的，那么围绕这些物品就可能产生冲突。如果我们希望在使用稀缺资源时避免发生冲突，那么只有一种办法，制定关于稀缺资源排他性使用的规则。也就是说，制定规则明确一个人可以对其做某些事，而其他人则被排除在外。如果我们所有人都能随意获取稀缺资源，冲突就不可避免。因此，在此意义上而言，财产规范是避免冲突自然且必要的制度。最先生产出某物、最先占有某物之人，顺理成章成为所有者，而非后来的其他人（比如第二个人、第三个人，或者让其他人分享最初占有者的成果）。你可以通过这样的认识来理解这条规则的自然性：如果人类从一开始就希望在无冲突的状态下行动，那么，先使用某物之人成为其所有者，是唯一能让这种无冲突状态成为可能的规则，也就是说，人类从一开始就可以设想在无任何冲突的情况下行动。从这个意义上讲，这些规范是自然规范或自然法则。没有其他法则具备这样的优势，能从人类诞生之初就使得避免人与人之间的冲突成为可能。

There’s only one additional consideration that I want to present when it comes to conﬂicts over property rights, and that concerns the problem of easements. So, if this is my piece of land and I have no neighborso far and I spew out smoke here, there, and everywhere, and after a while, somebody settles next to me, can this person (B) complain about person A (me, the original settler) that he causes physical damage to the property of B? And the answer is no, in this case, he can’t, because person A has acquired what is called an easement. He was there ﬁrst and nobody’s property was damaged by his initial activities. If somebody else now comes along,B, then what B has appropriated is, from the outset, soiled or dirty property. And ifB wants to have unsoiled or clean property, then B must pay A to stop this. But, A, being there ﬁrst, has acquired an easement to continue with this activity if he so desires. B must pay A in order to stop it.

在讨论产权冲突问题时，我只想再提出一个额外的考量因素，那就是地役权问题。假设我拥有一块土地，目前周围没有邻居，我在这里、那里、各处随意排放烟雾。一段时间之后，有人（B）在我旁边定居，这个人（B）能否指控我（A，先定居者）对其财产造成了实际损害？答案是否定的。在此情形下，B无法提出这样的指控，因为A已经获得了所谓的地役权。A先到此处，且其最初的活动并未损害任何人的财产。那么，现如今B到来，那么从一开始，B所占用的就是已被污染的土地。如果 B 想要未被污染的干净土地，那就必须付钱给 A，要求A 停止排放。但是，A 先到此处，若 A 愿意，其便已获得继续这项活动的地役权。B 必须付钱给 A，才能让 A 停止。

If the situation is the other way around, that is, B is here ﬁrst and then A settles next to B and then spews out his smoke or whatever it is, onto B’s property, then the situation is diﬀerent. B has acquired clean property, and he has acquired an easement for his property to be left clean. In this case, he could take out an injunction against A and tell A that you must stop this or you must pay me in order for me to let you continue with this activity. These are the elementary rules that have been accepted by mankind for thousands of years. Again, there exist disputes sometimes about who was there ﬁrst and who was there second, but those rules were considered to be the basic fundamental rules of dealing with conﬂicts arising over who owns what and who is permitted to do what and who is not permitted to do what. When we are talking about the production of security in a natural order, I have in mind the defense of these principles. Who has appropriated something ﬁrst, has the right to defend it. Who was there ﬁrst, without any neighbors, acquires an easement if certain negative externalities result, or if negative externalities come later, then the initial owner has the right to stop these negative externalities.

如果情况相反，即B先占据此地，而后A才在B旁边定居，并开始把烟之类的污染物排放到B的财产范围内，那么情况就不同了。B最初获得的是干净的财产，并且他对其财产享有保持清洁的地役权。在这种情况下，B可以向A发出禁令，要求A必须停止这种行为，否则A必须向其支付一定的费用，如此B才允许A继续这种行为。这些基本规则已经被人类社会认可、践行了几千年。当然，有时会出现争议，关于究竟是谁先来谁后来，但这些规则被视为处理财产权纠纷的基本原则，诸如谁拥有、谁被允许做什么、以及谁不被允许做什么之类的冲突。当我们谈论自然秩序中的安全保障时，我指的就是对这些原则的捍卫。谁先占有某物，谁就有权利捍卫它。谁先到某地定居，且当时没有邻居，那么他就享有负外部性的地役权，或者假如后来有人造成了负外部性，那么初始所有者有权阻止这些负外部性。

Now, in a natural order, the ﬁrst thing that I want to point out, is that this does not only include self-defense. I’ve already mentioned the fact that insofar as we control something, we automatically would defend ourselves against people who try to take control away over things that we ourselves are in control of. We also, from the very beginning, select the places where we have our property, partly with consideration of how easy or difficult these things are to defend where they are. To just give you an example, the location of Venice is somehow in the marshes, but it is difficult for invaders, especially in an age when you had very limited technological abilities, to invade a place like this because you have to go through the water and the water is ﬂat and you don’t know your way around; it is easier to defend a place like this. So, the location of many places was chosen precisely with this idea in mind. Is it a place that can be easily defended? Of course, if there’s nobody around for tens of thousands of miles, you are alone, then that might not be an important consideration for you to choose certain locations, but if you are surrounded by other people, then these sorts of considerations are of importance. The same thing is true for the low countries, the Netherlands. They also oﬀer certain possibilities for defending yourself by ﬂooding certain areas and making an invasion by land very difficult. Another example would be valleys in mountain regions. Some people settled in Swiss valleys, very remote valleys in high elevations, precisely because they knew that those were places that were comparatively easy to defend and very difficult to occupy. Even in modern times, this has made a diﬀerence. The Germans could have probably, because of their signiﬁcantly larger size, invaded a country such as Switzerland, but Switzerland had, on the one hand,a militia, every man being armed and having semiautomatic machine guns at home with ammunition in the closet.1 And also, of course, because a country like Switzerland is very difficult to invade and occupy because of its mountainous terrain. You can see that, again, how our brave soldiers in Afghanistan struggle up and down the mountains to ﬁnd the people that they are looking for. Or take a place like San Marino, which sits on top of a 1,000-foot mountain with a big fortress around, and a population of 8,000 people; they were able to defend themselves for 1,500 years from any invasion.

在自然秩序中，我要指出的首要之事，并非不仅仅只涵括自卫。我已经提到，只要我们掌控着某些事物，就会自然而然地抵御那些试图夺走我们控制权之人。从一开始，我们在选择财产所在地时，这些地方所处位置防御的难易程度，亦是我们会考量的一部分。举个例子，威尼斯位于沼泽地，对于入侵者来说，尤其是在技术能力非常有限的时代，要入侵这样的地方，无疑非常困难，因为你必须穿越水域，而水面开阔，你又不熟悉周围路况；这样的地方易守难攻。所以，许多地方的选址正是出于这样的考虑。这是易于防守之地吗？当然，如果方圆数万英里都荒无人烟，只有你独自生活，那么选择特定地点时，这可能就不是重要的考量因素，但如果你周围有其他人，这类考量就很关键了。低地国家荷兰也是如此。通过淹没某些区域，使陆地入侵变得极为困难，这也为防御提供了一定的可能性。另一个例子是崇山峻岭中的山谷。有些人定居在瑞士的山谷中，那些海拔很高且非常偏远的山谷，正是因为他们知道这些地方相对容易防守，很难被占领。即便在现代，这也有重要意义。德国可能因国土面积体量更大，本可以入侵瑞士这样的小国家，但一方面，瑞士有民兵，每个男子都武装起来，家里备有半自动机关枪，壁橱里还有弹药。[26] 当然，像瑞士这样的国家，因其多山的地形，很难被入侵和长期占领。你也可以看到，我们在阿富汗的英勇士兵是如何翻山越岭寻找他们要找之人。另一个例子是圣马力诺，这座建立在海拔千英尺高的山顶之上的小国，四周围绕着坚固的堡垒，仅有约8000名居民，却能在长达1500年的时间里成功抵御外敌入侵。

The second thing I want to point out is the way justice will be done in small societies. We always hear about the necessity of having a state, in order to do justice. The world provides us with hundreds of thousands of examples of how absolutely ludicrous this idea is. In every little society encompassing a few people, there are very quickly a few people rising to the rank of some sort of authority. They are braver, smarter, more successful, more trusted than others. You can see that in every village. And whenever there is a conﬂict, that is, A steals something from B or A knocks over B and they ﬁght over who did it and who didn’t do it, while it was possible that they engaged in vigilante justice, that is, tried to beat the crap out of each other right on the spot, in most cases and for good reasons, they don’t do that because it is very difficult, then, to justify themselves afterward before the other members of the village. So, they turn to people who have more authority than others do and these people, let’s call them nobles, or aristocrats, or the elite, whatever the term is, it doesn’t matter—these people will then act as judge, typically without charging any fee, just out of the responsibility of being a leader of a small community. And based on their judgment and on their authority that they have among their fellow men, this judgment then will be enforced automatically. In most cases, there’s not even violence necessary in order to enforce it on the person who was found to be guilty. The person himself will accept it and will be willing to provide restitution, because otherwise he will be expelled from the community; he will be an outcast and nothing is, in those societies, worse than being an outcast. Again, even in modern times, this sort of ostracism works magniﬁcently in many professions.

第二点，我想讨论的是小型社会如何实现正义。我们总是听到人们说，为了实现正义，国家的存在必不可少。但现实中有成千上万个例子表明，这种想法荒谬至极。在每个只由少数人组成的小社会里，很快就会有几人脱颖而出，获得某种权威。他们比其他人更勇敢、更聪明、更成功，也更受信赖。无论在哪个村庄，都能看到这种情况。当冲突发生时，比如A偷了B的东西，或者A推倒了B，双方争执不下，虽然他们可以选择以私力救济的方式，比如当场打起来，但大多数情况下，他们不会这样做。因为如果事后无法向村里其他人证明自己的正当性，他们就会陷入困境。因此，他们往往会寻求社会中更有权威的人来裁决。这些权威人士可以称为贵族、贵胄，或精英，名称并不重要——关键是他们在社区中具有领导地位，因而承担起裁决者的角色。这些裁决通常是免费的，纯粹出于他们作为小型社会领导者的责任感。基于这些权威人士的判断，他们的裁决会自然地得到执行。大多数情况下，甚至不需要动用暴力，裁决就会被接受。被认定有罪的人通常愿意提供赔偿，因为如果拒绝执行，他可能会被逐出社区，成为社会弃民。在这些小型社会中，被驱逐是最严重的惩罚之一。同样的现象，即“社会性排斥”机制，在现代社会的许多职业领域依然运作良好。

I met a large grain dealer in Switzerland at some point. He had dealings with grain dealers all over the world, and he reported that they had a dispute regarding certain qualities of grains and delayed deliveries from a grain dealer in the Soviet Union. This was at the time when the Soviet Union was still intact. No regular court was involved, just the association of grain dealers handled this. The proceedings took place in the Soviet Union, and the unanimous verdict was that the guy in the Soviet Union had done wrong. The judgment was enforced and this person was thrown out of this association of merchant dealers, of grain dealers. Nobody dealing in grain would have anything to do with this person ever again. Mere ostracism was entirely sufficient to do it.

我曾有一次在瑞士遇到一位大型谷物经销商。他与世界各地的谷物经销商有业务往来，据他讲述，他们曾与一位苏联的谷物经销商就谷物的某些品质和延迟交货问题发生争执。当时苏联还未解体。这起纠纷并未诉诸常规法庭，而是经由谷物经销商协会来处理。仲裁过程在苏联进行，最终裁决一致认为那位苏联商人存在过错。裁决生效后，此人被逐出了这个谷物经销商同业协会。此后，再没有谷物经销商会与他有任何业务往来。仅仅是行业内排斥与抵制，就足以解决问题。

Now, of course, you sometimes have recalcitrant people, people who were by and large forced to give compensation to the victim. That was a principle of punishment, to provide compensation to the victim. You realize, of course, that criminals nowadays do not compensate their victims at all. As a matter of fact, victims typically have to shell out more money so that recalcitrant criminals can play table tennis, watch TV, engage in workouts, get their müesli and whatever it is in prison. A very diﬀerent situation than what would exist in a natural order. But, even on this relatively primitive level, we would, of course, expect that there are certain limitations to self-defense, and that people would want to rely on specialized defense providers. They want to take advantage of the division of labor also in this ﬁeld. Not everybody is equally good at protecting somebody else. That’s why bars usually have big people standing in front of the door making sure who goes in and who doesn’t go in, and not teeny old ladies. So, yes, division of labor is as important in that area as it is in others.

当然，有时也会遇到冥顽不灵之人，在自然秩序下，这类人基本上是被强制要求向受害者作出赔偿。赔偿受害者是一种惩罚原则。当然，你也明白，如今的罪犯根本不会赔偿受害者。然而，现如今的犯罪者却往往不需要对受害者进行任何赔偿。事实上，受害者反而要支付更多的钱来维持这些犯罪者的牢狱生活，使他们能在狱中打乒乓球、看电视、健身，甚至享用燕麦片等食品。这与自然秩序下的情况大相径庭。不过，即便在这种相对原始的层面，我们仍能预见到自卫存在一定的局限性，而且人们会希望依靠专业的防卫提供者。在这个领域，人们也想利用劳动分工。并非每个人都擅长保护他人。这就是为什么酒吧通常会让身材高大的保安充当门卫，负责确认人员进出，而不是让瘦小的老太太来担任这项工作。所以，没错，防卫领域和其他行业领域一样，劳动分工同样至关重要。

And what I want to do now is ﬁrst to describe how this system of defending oneself against aggressors worked during the feudal times, during the Middle Ages,a time when no state existed, just a large number of highly decentralized lords and vassals, etc. And then, in the next step, I will explain with some cues taken from the feudal order how such a system would work in modern times.

我现在想做的，首先是描述在封建时期，也就是中世纪，这样一个不存在国家，只有大量高度去中心化的领主和封臣等的时代，这种抵御侵略者的体系是如何运作的。接下来，我将借鉴封建秩序中的一些要点，解释这样一种防卫体系在现代社会中如何运作。

Now, in these feudal times, there existed landlords, owners of pieces of land, and they had tenants, tenant-farmers. Both were contractually connected. Most of the stuﬀ that we learn about feudalism tends to be half-truths at best. Feudalism has a very bad name, an undeservedly bad name. The contract between the landlords and the tenants typically provided for the landlord providing protection and the tenant working for a certain period of time for the landlord, and in cases of conﬂict, the tenant is also willing and prepared to ﬁght on the side of the landlord. Law was at that time considered something that was given. Law was not considered to be something that was made by people, but something that existed eternally and was just simply discovered. People learned what it was. New law was from the very outset considered to be suspicious, because law had to be old, it had to be something that had always existed. Anybody who came up with some sort of new law, was automatically dismissed as probably a fraud. The subjects, the tenants, had a right to resist. That is, they were not subject to their lords no matter what, because, as I said, there existed an eternally valid law, which protected the tenant as much as the landlord, and if the landlord did break this law, then the tenants had the right to resist, up to the point of killing the landlord.

在封建时代，地主是土地的所有者，他们雇佣佃户、佃户。双方通过契约联系在一起。我们对封建主义的了解大约是片面的，甚至说很多内容充其量只能算是半真半假。封建主义声名狼藉，但这名声并不公允。地主和佃户之间的契约通常规定，地主提供保护，佃户为地主劳作一定时间，一旦发生冲突，佃户也愿意并准备为地主一方作战。当时，法律被视为既定赋予（given）的东西。人们不认为法律是由人制定的，而是一种永恒存在、只需被发现的东西。人们通过学习来了解法律是什么。新法律从一开始就被视为可疑的，因为法律必须是古老的，必须是一直存在的。任何提出某种新法律之人，都会理所当然地被认为有极大可能是个骗子。臣民，也就是佃户，有反抗的权利。也就是说，他们并非无条件地服从领主，因为正如我所说，存在着一种永恒有效的法律，它对佃户和地主的保护一视同仁。如果地主违反了这条法律，那么佃户就有权利反抗，甚至可以杀掉地主。

Landlords, in turn, had been contractually tied to other landlords. The lords had, so to speak, other overlords and again, these contracts provided by and large for mutual assistance agreements. If such and such happens, you will provide so-and-so many soldiers who are peasants to do this and you do such and such and so forth. And what came about was called the feudal pyramid. That is, another contract with somebody who might be even more powerful, meaning, in this case, someone who had even larger landholdings and a larger number of tenants, all the way up to the king. Not only that, people frequently had contracts with various lords, with competing lords, so to speak, as some sort of insurance policy. That is, if this guy does something to me, I also have another protector. And, in combination with these sorts of multiple alliances that existed, they typically agreed that if it were to come to a conﬂict between the two lords to which they had pledged their allegiance, then they would remain neutral. Peasants who were not associated directly with any particular lord in some sort of protection agreement, isolated peasants, usually chose the king as their protector. That is, someone slightly more removed, but they also received some sort of legal protection by associating themselves with the king directly. There existed also so-called allodial owners, that is, people who were big landowners in their own right and who had no allegiances to anyone, and would meet the king on an even level so to speak. They might have less land than the king had, and fewer tenants and fewer soldiers working for them, but in dealings with the king they were his equals. The lords, on their territory, had complete jurisdiction over their territory, including over all those people who lived on that territory. That is, they were the judges over their own peasants, their warriors, their house personnel, etc. Intervening into the internal aﬀairs of a lord was not permitted. In this sense, they had a similar status that, let’s say, embassies have nowadays, where the United States cannot simply go into the Embassy of China and then do whatever they want. In the Chinese Embassy, the Chinese rule themselves. The lords were in charge of their dominion, and they represented their tenants or vassals in external aﬀairs. The king was typically a person who came from a particularly noble family, a family that was recognized as a family of great achievement, and was always chosen from this family, but was not hereditary in the sense that it was perfectly clear who would become the next king. It was all the other nobles, who were contractually connected with each other, who determined unanimously which of the members of the king’s family should become king.

反过来，地主也通过契约与其他地主相互关联。可以说，地主们也有上级领主，这些契约大体上规定了互助条款。如果发生某些事，某个领主需提供一定数量的农民士兵，而另一个领主则需履行自己的义务。由此便形成了所谓的“封建金字塔”。也就是说，与可能更有权势的人签订另一份契约，在这种情况下，更有权势之人是指拥有更大面积的土地和更多佃户的领主，直到国王为止。不仅如此，人们常常与不同的领主，也可以说是相互竞争的领主签订契约，以此作为某种保障。也就是说，如果这个人对我不利，我还可以依赖另一个领主作为保护者。鉴于存在这种种多重联盟关系，他们通常约定，如果他们效忠的两位领主之间发生冲突，他们将保持中立。那些没有通过某种保护协议与特定领主直接关联的农民，即孤立的农民，通常会选择国王作为他们的保护者。换句话说，虽然国王与他们的关系较远，但通过直接与国王建立联系，仍然能获得某种法律保护。此外，还存在所谓的自有土地所有者，即凭借自身实力成为大领主且不效忠于任何人的人，可以说他们与国王平起平坐。他们拥有的土地可能比国王少，为他们劳作的佃户和士兵也更少，但在与国王打交道时，他们与国王地位平等。领主在自己的领地内，对领地拥有完全管辖权，囊括生活于该领地的所有人。也就是说，他们是自己领地上农民、武士、家仆等的法官。不允许干涉领主的内部事务。从这个意义上说，他们的地位类似于如今的大使馆，比如美国不能随意进入中国大使馆并为所欲为。在中国大使馆内，由中国人自行管理。领主掌管着自己的领地，并在对外事务中代表他们的佃户或封臣。国王通常来自一个特别高贵的家族，一个被公认为成就卓著的家族，而且总是从这个家族中挑选，但并非世袭制，并非明确知道谁会成为下一任国王。实际上，决定谁能成为国王的是其他所有与国王家族有契约关系的贵族，他们会统一决定哪位王室成员最适合成为国王。

Eventually, this type of principle that combined hereditary elements with elective elements disappeared, and either the hereditary element tookover or the pure elective element tookover. But in the initial states, it was a combination of these two elements, the king coming always out of the same family, but who from this family would become the king depended on the result of an election among the lords. These assemblies of lords that selected the king became, in a way, the precursors of what we today consider to be parliaments. But, of course, only nobles, that is, landlords themselves, not tenants, were in charge of electing the king.

最终，这种将世袭元素与选举元素相结合的原则消失了，要么是世袭元素占了上风，要么是纯粹的选举元素取而代之。但在最初的国家形态中，是这两种元素的结合，国王总是出自同一个家族，但家族中谁会成为国王，则取决于领主们之间的选举结果。这些推选国王的领主大会，在某种程度上成为了我们如今所认为的议会的前身。当然，只有贵族，即领主本人，而非佃户，才有推选国王的权力。

The king’s main task consisted, with the agreement of his assembled nobles, in declaring cases of emergency, war or something like this, but only with the unanimous consent of the nobles assembled in this parliament. And, in addition, the king had the function of some sort of appeals court, that people who thought that injustice had been committed against them, including an injustice by their own lord, could appeal to the king for ﬁnal justice. The early feudal kings traveled around frequently from town to town. They were sort of the wandering judges. There existed no such thing as capital cities. In the German case, for instance, there were places where regular court sessions were held, in Nierenberg, in Augsburg, in Ladenburg, in Frankfurt, in Prague, in Vienna and several other places. All of these places had an elevated status as places where one could seek justice, but no capital existed.

在贵族议会达成一致的情况下，国王的主要职责包括宣布进入紧急状态、宣战之类的事务，但这必须得到议会中贵族们的一致同意。此外，国王还承担着类似上诉法庭的职能，那些认为自己遭受不公之人，也包括认为自己受到领主不公对待之人，可以向国王上诉，寻求最终的公正裁决。早期的封建国王经常在各个城镇间巡游穿梭。他们有点类似巡回法官。当时并不存在首都这样的概念。以德国为例，在纽伦堡、奥格斯堡、拉登堡、法兰克福、布拉格、维也纳以及其他几个地方，会定期举行法庭庭审。所有这些地方的地位都很高，是人们寻求正义的地方，但却没有首都。

Also, the king could not tax. Taxes, in the modern sense, did not exist. The king lived oﬀ his own estate, just as all lords lived oﬀ their own estates. All that he could do in cases of war was to go to his various nobles and beg them, give me a little bit, whereby every noble was perfectly entitled to say no and nothing would happen to him. The task of the king was also, in addition, with the agreement of the nobles, to decide about cases of war, to establish on the outskirts of these loose associations of lords and nobles, so-called protection villages, where people were settled, selected due to their particular abilities as ﬁghters, in order to protect, let’s say, Christendom from the Turks or something like this. They were called WereDörfer or fortiﬁed villages, especially because their task assisted in the defense against societies that were considered to be outside the society that was combined or integrated through these intricate systems of feudal contract relationships.

此外，国王无权征税。现代意义上的税收并不存在。国王依靠自己的领地维持生计，就像所有领主都依靠自己的领地生活一样。在战争时期，国王所能做的就是去找他手下的各位贵族，请求他们“给我一点（援助）”，而每位贵族都完全有权拒绝，并且拒绝后也不会有受罚之虞。另外，经贵族们同意，国王的职责还包括决定战争事宜，在这些由领主和贵族组成的松散联盟的边界上，国王还会建立所谓的“联防村”。居住在这些村庄的人通常是因其卓越的战斗能力而被选中，其主要任务是保护基督教世界免受外部威胁，例如抵御奥斯曼土耳其的入侵。这些村子被称为“防御村落”（WereDörfer），即要塞式村庄。这些村庄的之所以存在的特别原因，是为了加强对抗外部社会的防御，而这些外部社会并未融入以封建契约关系为纽带的错综复杂的内部社会体系之中。

Not only did the right to resistance exist among the tenants against their landlords, very importantly, it was also possible that these tenants, if they felt oppressed by their landlord, could run away and simply associate and get protection from a neighboring lord, which was, of course, the best protection that you can have from being oppressed in the ﬁrst place, knowing that all you have to do is run away and attach yourself to some other protector and thereby get rid of your previous lord. On this point, in particular, that is, the ability of people to run away and attach themselves to a diﬀerent protector, I want to quote Herbert Spencer, who describes the situation in ancient Rome, which was very similar in its feudal structure to Europe during the Middle Ages. Rome was also a famous place for complete dominion of the master of the household over his tenants and servants, including his children and wife. Herbert Spencer writes about early Rome,

不仅佃户对领主拥有反抗权，更重要的是，如果佃户觉得受到领主压迫，他们可以用脚投票，转而投靠依附邻近领主并寻求庇护。当然，这从一开始就是免受压迫的最佳方式，因为你只需逃走，投奔其他保护者，就能摆脱原领主的压迫。关于这一点——即个人可以逃离并依附于新的保护者——我想引用赫伯特·斯宾塞的观点。他在描述古罗马的情况时指出，古罗马在封建结构上与中世纪欧洲非常相似。在古罗马，家主对其佃户、仆人，甚至对子女和妻子都拥有绝对的统治权，这一点也曾闻名于世。斯宾塞对早期罗马的这一情况有着详细的描述：

[W]hile coercive rule within the family and the group of related families was easy, there was difficulty in extending coercion over many such groups; fortiﬁed as they were [and again, these feudal landlords, of course, all had certain amounts of fortiﬁcations] against one another. Moreover, the stringency of government within each of the communities [that is, each of the clans,] constituting the primitive city, was diminished by facility of escape from one and admission into another. As we have seen among simple tribes, desertions take place when the rule is harsh; and we may infer that, in primitive Rome there was a check onexercise of force by the more powerful families in each settlement over the less powerful, caused by the fear that migration might weaken the settlement and strengthen an adjacent one. Thus the circumstances were such that when, for defense of the city, cooperation became needful, the heads of the clans included in its several divisions came to have substantially equal powers. The original senate was the collective body of clan elders; and “this assembly of elders was the ultimate holder of the ruling power:” it was “an assembly of Kings.”2

“虽然在家庭及相关家族群体内部实施强制统治较为容易，但要将这种强制统治扩展到众多这样的群体却存在困难；因为这些群体彼此设防（当然，这些封建领主都设有一定的防御工事）。此外，构成原始城市的各个社群（即每个氏族）内部的统治严格程度，因成员易于逃离一个社群并加入另一个社群而有所降低。正如我们在一些简单的原始部落中所见那样，如果统治过于严苛，人们往往就会选择逃离；我们可以推断，在早期的罗马，每个定居点中较强大的家族对较弱小家族行使权力时会有所顾忌，因为他们担心人口迁移会削弱本定居点的实力，而增强邻近定居点的实力。因此，当时的情况是，当为了城市防御而需要合作时，城市各个分区内的氏族首领们实际上拥有了平等的权力。最初的元老院是氏族长老的集体机构；‘这个长老议会是统治权力的最终掌控者’：它是‘国王们的议会’。”[27]

Now, let me emphasize this point again. Just as important for the successful development of Western Europe was the fact that there was separation between church and state, which was diﬀerent from all other regions on the globe. So it was of utmost importance for the dynamic development of Western Europe that Western Europe was a political anarchy, that is to say, thousands of independent landlord nobles somehow connected together through contracts, but each being his own man, and the ease with which people could move from one jurisdiction to another, which tends to contribute, of course, to moderation on the part of each one of these rulers. Each one must be afraid that if I’m too draconian in my punishment of my own men, then they will attach themselves to somebody else and strengthen people who, in some situations, might become my enemy. In addition, one more element should be mentioned in order to characterize the feudal world, and that is the existence of cities. And these cities were typically founded either by bishops or by nobles, by lords or by associations of merchants and in some cases, of course, also by—as in the case of Switzerland, for instance—by Eidgenossenschaften, “oath fellowships” or confederations.

此时，我要再次强调这一点。对西欧能够成功发展同样重要的另一原因，就是教会与国家的之间分离，这一点在全球范围内独一无二。同时，西欧的蓬勃发展还得益于其政治上的“无政府状态”——即成千上万的独立封建领主，通过契约彼此联系，但每个人都享有独立的权力。此外，人们可以轻松地从一个领地迁移到另一个领地，这种流动性自然会促使各领主在统治上保持克制。每位领主都必须意识到，如果自己对属下过于严厉，就可能导致他们投奔其他领主，而这不仅会削弱自己的势力，还可能加强潜在的敌人。因此，这种权力的分散在一定程度上遏制了暴政的出现。此外，还有一个重要因素值得提及，那就是城市的存在。这些城市通常由主教、贵族、封建领主或商人协会建立，有些情况下，例如瑞士的情况，则是由“盟约共同体”（“Eidgenossenschaften”），即“誓约同盟”（“oath fellowships” ）或邦联建立。

This is the structure that the initial founding cantons in Switzerland had, where all freemen swore an oath that they would come to mutually assist each other in case of an attack against them. And these cities frequently had written law codes, that is, Magdeburg Law or Hamburg Law or Hanover Law or Lübeck Law, etc., so that people who moved to these cities knew what law code would apply to them, and when new cities were founded, the normal thing to do was to adopt one of the already existing law codes and maybe make a few amendments to it. That is, some law codes became the law codes, not just of one city, but of many, many cities, who adopted the initial example of a place that ﬁrst took the initiative to write these laws down.

这就是瑞士最初的创始州所具有的结构，在那里所有自由民都宣誓，一旦遭受攻击，他们将相互援助。这些城市经常有成文法典，如《马格德堡法》或《汉堡法》或《汉诺威法》或《吕贝克法》等，因此搬到这些城市的人都知道哪部法典适用于他们。也就是说，有些法典不仅成为一个城市的法典，而且成为众多城市之法典，因为这些城市采用了某个地方的最初范例，而这个地方率先将这些法律记录了下来。

In this connection, let me make a little side remark. In Englishspeaking countries, America and England, there is a certain amount of pride in having the so-called common law, which is, in a way, noncodiﬁed law, or case law. The Continental tradition, as you know, has been for along time diﬀerent. There, we have had codiﬁed law taken from the Romans, especially from the East Romans who had codiﬁed this law for the ﬁrst time in an extensive manner and then, of course, in modern times, the Napoleonic Code, which has been taken over by most Continental European states in one form or another with some modiﬁcations. And, as I said, Anglo-Saxons looked down on codiﬁed law and hailed their own noncodiﬁed common law. I want to just remark that, for instance, Max Weber has a very interesting observation regarding this. He sees the reason for the noncodiﬁcation of the common law in the self-interest of the lawyers to make the law difﬁcult to understand for the layman and thus make a lot of money. He emphasizes that codiﬁed law makes it possible for the layman on the street who can read to study the law book himself and go to court himself and point out, here, that this law is written down. So, maybe this excessive pride that the Anglo-Saxons have in their common law might be a little bit overdrawn.

在这个话题上，我想补充一点。在英语国家，如美国和英国，人们对所谓的普通法（common law）感到自豪。这种法律体系在某种程度上属于“非成文法”或“判例法”。相比之下，欧洲大陆的法律传统长期以来有所不同，主要采用成文法体系，其渊源可以追溯到罗马法，尤其是东罗马帝国首次系统编纂的法律。到了近代，拿破仑法典（Napoleonic Code）更是成为大多数欧洲大陆国家法律体系的基础，尽管各国在实施时有所调整。长期以来，英美法系国家的人往往对成文法体系持批评态度，认为普通法优越。但对此，马克斯·韦伯（Max Weber）曾提出一个有趣的观点。他认为，普通法之所以长期没有被系统编纂，很大程度上是因为律师的自利动机——他们希望法律保持晦涩难懂，从而增加自己的收入。相反，成文法的存在使得普通人也能自行阅读法律条文，甚至可以亲自披挂上法庭，直接援引法律条款进行诉讼。看，这条法律白纸黑字写着呢。因此，韦伯暗示，盎格鲁-撒克逊人对他们普通法的高度自豪，或许有点言过其实了。

In terms of punishment, as I said, compensation to the victim was the main principle; some system of paying ﬁnes for various types of oﬀenses was worked out relatively quickly. And by and large, they accepted the principle of proportionality. If you killed somebody, then you had to pay more than if you cut oﬀ somebody’s arm. If you cut oﬀ somebody’s arm, the ﬁne that was imposed on you was higher than if you cut oﬀ somebody’s toe, and so forth, but most of the punishments were indeed in the form of ﬁnes, either monetary ﬁnes or ﬁnes in the form of natural goods.

在惩罚方面，正如我之前所说，赔偿受害者是主要原则；社会较早便建立了一套针对各类违法行为的罚款制度，并大体上遵循相称性原则。例如，杀人需要支付的赔偿金额高于砍掉他人手臂的赔偿，而砍掉手臂的罚款又高于砍掉脚趾的罚款，依此类推。然而，大多数惩罚形式主要是罚款，既包括金钱赔偿，也包括实物赔偿。

So now I should come to the modern world. Obviously, we cannot go back to this feudal system. My purpose was only to show that we do have historical examples where societies have developed relatively eﬀective means of protecting themselves through systems of alliances. In the modern world, we would expect, of course, a slightly diﬀerent setup and this setup would be composed mostly of three institutional devices. On the one hand, commercial insurance companies. On the other hand, freely ﬁnanced police forces and freely ﬁnanced arbitration and judging agencies. We can imagine that these three institutions would operate separately from each other, but be contractually aligned with the others, or we can imagine that these three institutions would be vertically integrated. That is to say, an insurance company could also have a police division and a judge division attached to it. It doesn’t really matter whether it is vertically integrated or we have independent institutions. The decisive element here would be, again, that the relationships between all of these institutions would be contractual and voluntary, similar to the situation that existed during the feudal era. And I want to explain, in particular, that through such a setup, we would gradually create something like the uniﬁcation of law, just as the world becomes uniﬁed through one money, and the world becomes uniﬁed through a worldwide division of labor, so the world would also become integrated through a set of universal standards of law.

现在，我要谈谈现代社会。很显然，我们无法回到封建社会。我之所以讨论这个话题，只想阐明，历史上确有一些社会，通过结盟体系发展出了相对有效的自我保护机制。在现代社会，我们预期会有一个略有不同的架构，这个架构主要由三种制度性结构组成：第一，商业保险公司；第二，自由融资的警察部队；第三，自由融资的仲裁和裁决机构。我们可以设想，这三种机构彼此独立运作，却可通过契约彼此协作；或者我们也可以设想，这三种机构也可以纵向整合。也就是说，一家保险公司可能同时下设警察部门和司法部门。无论是采用纵向整合模式还是独立模式，其实并不重要。这里的关键要素依旧是，所有这些机构之间的关系都是基于契约且出于自愿，这与封建时代的状况类似。我尤其想要强调的一点是，通过这样一种架构，我们将逐步实现类似法律统一的局面，就像世界通过统一货币走向一体化，通过全球劳动分工走向一体化一样，世界也会通过一套通用的法律标准实现一体化。

Now, how would this happen? I think the main impulse in that direction would come from the insurance companies. All institutions in the modern world, all ﬁrms, all companies, everybody having an enterprise, requires insurance. To operate without insurance is almost impossible in the modern world. You can only be a very small-scale entrepreneur to do it entirely on your own, without having some sort of insurance protection. Because of this, it would not be possible, as some people have argued, that it would be the case that all institutions, all places would lay down their own peculiar rules and laws. That is, the mall has the mall laws, the school has the school laws, the steel factory has the steel factory laws. At Edward’s house, the laws would be that if somebody comes in there whom he has not invited, there might be automatic shooting devices that kill the person who comes in, and things like this. Why would that not be the case? Because insurance companies would, of course, insist that many of these practices are simply not insurable. They would insist on a certain amount ofuniformity of standards, which all of these insured companies (their clients) would have to adopt. They would eliminate arbitrary rules applying at this place or at that place and insist on rather general and generally known rules: on the one hand, in order to reduce general uncertainty, and on the other hand, because only if they lay down rather general rules will they be able to attract a large clientele, which is, of course, their desire.

那么，这将如何实现呢？我认为朝着这个方向的主要推动力将来自保险公司。现代世界中的所有机构、所有公司、所有企业主，只要经营企业，就都需要保险。在现代社会，不投保几乎无法运营。只有规模极小的创业者才有可能完全不借助任何保险保障，仅凭一己之力开展业务。正因为如此，就像有些人所主张的那样，所有机构、所有地方都制定各自独特的规则和法律，这种情况是不可能出现的。比如说，商场有商场的法律，学校有学校的法律，钢铁厂有钢铁厂的法律。在爱德华家，法律可能规定非请勿入，未经邀请的闯入者，有被自动射击装置直接击毙之虞。但为何不会出现这样的情形？原因在于，保险公司当然会坚持认为，诸如此类的许多做法根本无法投保。它们会坚持要求一定程度的标准统一，所有这些投保公司（它们的客户）都必须采用。它们会摒弃在这个地方或那个地方适用的任意、武断的规则，坚持采用社会通用且广为人知的规则：一方面，是为了减少普遍存在的不确定性；另一方面，因为只有制定极其通用的规则，保险公司才能吸引大量客户，这当然是它们所期望的。

Second, insurance companies will have inherent interest, a ﬁnancial interest, in imposing on everyone who is insured by them a defensive behavioral code. The reason for this is that you can insure yourself only against risks over whose outcomes you have no personal control. I cannot insure myself, for instance, against the risk that will I provoke another person and he then smashes me in the face and then I go to my insurance company and say that he smashed me in the face and now you must defend me against him. The insurance company would say, “Look, you have to behave in an entirely defensive way, the attack must have been entirely unprovoked, only then will we defend you, but not if you have anything to do with the attack yourself.” I cannot insure myself against the risk of my deliberately burning down my own house. I can insure myself against the risk that my house burns down, but no insurance company would insure me and allow me to burn down my own house and then make payment for it. So, insurance companies will insist that in order for them to cover you for any type of contingency, you have to commit yourself to a fundamentally defensive form of behavior and conduct.

其次，保险公司天然具有经济上的利益动机，会要求每一位投保人遵守一套防御性行为准则。其原因在于，保险只能覆盖那些投保人自身无法掌控结果的风险。举个例子，我无法为“挑衅他人导致对方殴打自己”这一风险投保。假如我先挑衅别人，结果被打伤，然后去找保险公司索赔，保险公司会拒绝赔偿，并强调：“你必须保持完全防御性的行为，只有在完全无端遭受攻击的情况下，我们才会为你提供保护。如果你在事件中有责任，我们不予受理。” 同样，我不能为“故意纵火烧毁自己房屋”投保。保险公司可以承保因意外火灾导致的损失，但不会允许我自己纵火，然后向其索赔。因此，保险公司会严格要求投保人遵守一套防御性行为准则，只有在符合这一原则的情况下，它们才会为投保人提供保障。

By their very nature, insurance companies want to minimize damage. Minimizing the risk of damage is the business they are in; otherwise, they have to pay up. What we would get is, insurance companies might oﬀer a certain variety in the types of contracts that they oﬀer. One insurance company might specialize in Catholic clients and impose certain types of punishment for committing adultery for example, something that other companies would not have in their repertoire. But, they cannot be fundamentally diﬀerent in the type of codes that they would oﬀer.

从本质上讲，保险公司希望将损失降至最低。降低损失风险是它们的业务根本之所在；否则，它们就得赔付。我们会看到，保险公司可能会在其提供的契约类型上呈现一定的多样性。例如，一家保险公司可能专门面向天主教客户，并对通奸行为规定某些特定的惩罚措施，而其他公司的契约条款中可能不会有此类内容。但是，它们所提供的行为准则在本质上不会有太大差异。

Moreover, because it is now possible that conﬂicts arise between members of diﬀerent insurance agencies, as the contracts of these different insurance companies are slightly diﬀerent, whenever there are conﬂicts between people being insured by diﬀerent insurance agencies, the only peaceful resolution that is possible is to go to an independent third-party arbitrator. These might be agencies that oﬀer such arbitration services, and they would be independent of both insurance companies. These independent arbitration agencies are competitors, and no arbitration agency can be sure that it will be chosen again. These independent arbitration agencies obviously have an interest in not losing their clients, that is, the two conﬂicting insurance companies, so they develop a set of laws that can be regarded as acceptable to everyone, regardless of which particular insurance company they deal with in most cases. That is to say, these independent arbitration agencies would create, in a process of competition, something like a universally valid international law through a process of competition, and this would lead to a situation where we have a uniﬁed law structure that is valid throughout the entire world, more or less.

此外，由于不同保险公司的契约条款略有不同，不同保险公司的客户之间有可能会发生冲突，不同保险公司的投保人之间发生冲突时，唯一可行的和平解决方式就是诉诸独立的第三方仲裁机构，它们可能是提供此类仲裁服务的专门机构，且独立于涉事的两家保险公司。这些独立仲裁机构相互竞争，没有哪家仲裁机构能确保自己会再次被选中。显然，这些独立仲裁机构不希望失去客户，也就是发生冲突的两家保险公司，因此它们制定出一套在大多数情况下无论与哪家特定保险公司打交道，都能被各方接受的法律。也就是说，这些独立仲裁机构会在竞争过程中，通过竞争逐渐形成一套普遍认可的法律体系，类似普遍有效的国际法，这将在某种程度上促成一种全球范围内通用的统一法律架构。

And this completes the process of economic and social integration: integration through the division of labor, integration through money, and integration through international law that binds all societies together, however diﬀerent their internal legal structure might be. This is what I think a natural order eﬀectively defending the property rights of individuals would look like in the modern world.

至此，经济与社会一体化进程便臻圆满之境：通过劳动分工实现一体化，通过货币实现一体化，以及通过将所有社会联结在一起的国际法实现一体化，不管这些社会的内部法律结构可能存在多大差异。此乃吾心之所向，于今世之间，可堪为守护个人财产权之自然法。

第七讲寄生现象与国家的起源

My subject today is parasitism and the origin of the state. So far, one important element has been missing in my reconstruction of the present world. We’ve seen what the nature of man is, we’ve talked about property, the division of labor based on property, the development of money, capital accumulation, production of law and order, and the natural order resulting from all of this. Now we have to come to the disturbing elements that developed in history, those events that somehow took the natural tendencies oﬀ this path and made history deviate from its natural course.

我今天的主题是寄生现象与国家的起源。到目前为止，我关于当今世界的重构，其中还欠缺一个重要元素。我们已经理解了人的本质，探讨了财产、基于财产的劳动分工、货币的发展、资本积累、法律与秩序的生成，以及由此产生的自然秩序。现在，我们必须谈谈历史上出现的干扰因素，也就是那些在某种程度上使自然发展趋势偏离正轨，让历史背离其自然进程的事件。

I will begin by reminding you why we had this tendency toward a natural order. The fundamental insight was that the division of labor and human cooperation is beneﬁcial for all people who participate in it. Division of labor implies higher productivity, and provides mankind with a reason to peacefully cooperate with each other. Otherwise, if this higher productivity associated with the division of labor did not exist, we would indeed get some sort of permanent war of each against each other. Mises writes, for instance,

If it were not for this higher productivity of labor, based on the division of labor, men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another; irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature. Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies; his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implacable conﬂict with all his neighbors. No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of aﬀairs.1

先提醒大家要注意的一点是，人类社会为何会出现趋向自然秩序的倾向。根本原因在于，劳动分工与人类合作对所有参与者都有益。劳动分工意味着更高的生产力，为人类彼此间的和平合作提供了理由。否则，若不存在因劳动分工带来的更高生产力，我们确实会陷入某种人人相互为战的持久战争状态。例如，米塞斯写道：

若不是基于劳动分工所带来的更高劳动生产力，人类将永远是彼此的死敌；在竭力获取大自然提供的有限生存资源时，会成为不可调和的竞争对手。每个人都会被迫将其他所有人视为敌人；满足自身欲望的渴求，会使他以邻为壑，与所有邻人都陷入一场无法缓和的冲突。在这种情形下，绝无可能产生任何同情之心。[28]

And again, because of this higher productivity, it is not necessary that people consider themselves as enemies, but can consider themselves as cooperative partners, if not even friends. And to hammer away on this point, let me once again brieﬂy requote something that I have already quoted before, in a slightly diﬀerent connection, where Mises says that

[i]f one recognizes a principle which results in the union of all Germans…or all proletarians and forms a special nation, race or class out of individuals, then this principle cannot be proved to be eﬀective only within the collective groups. The anti-liberal social theories [the theories that somehow emphasize that there must be conﬂict in humans] skim over the problem by conﬁning themselves to the assumption that the solidarity of interests within the group is so self-evident as to be accepted without further discussion, and by taking pains only to prove the existence of the conﬂict of interest between groups and the necessity of conﬂict as the sole dynamic force of historical development. But if war is to be the father of all things, the fruitful source of historical progress, it is difficult to see why its fruitful activity should be restricted within states, nations, races and classes. If nature needs war, why not the war of all against all, why merely the war of all groups against all groups?2

再此强调，正是由于这种更高的生产力，人们无需将彼此视为死敌，而是可将彼此视为合作伙伴，甚至是朋友。为了进一步强调这一点，让我再次简要引用米塞斯的一段话——尽管之前在稍有不同的语境下已经提到过，米塞斯说：

如果有人认可一种能让所有德国人……或所有无产者联合起来，并将个体组成一个特殊民族、种族或阶级的原则，那么就无法证明这个原则只在集体群体内部有效。反自由主义的社会理论（那些在某种程度上强调人类之间必然存在冲突的理论）回避了这个问题，它们只是假定群体内部的利益一致性是不言而喻的，无需进一步讨论便可接受，而只致力于证明群体之间利益冲突的存在，以及冲突作为历史发展唯一动力的必然性。但是，假如战争是万物之父，是历史进步的丰富源泉，那就很难理解为什么它的积极作用却只局限于国家、民族、种族和阶级内部。如果自然需要战争，为什么不是所有人对所有人的战争，而只是群体之间的战争呢？[29]

Now, at this point, before I come to my genuine subject here, let me make you aware of the fact that this principle that people can cooperate peacefully with each other to their own advantage does not necessarilymean that all groups have to live in immediate neighborhood with each other. That is, even if people dislike each other, people hate each other for various other reasons, they can still peacefully cooperate with each other from some distance. That is, to accept the principle of peaceful cooperation does not at all imply the advocacy, for instance, of multicultural societies. Multicultural societies might indeed, and likely will, be extremely dangerous institutions, because people who are ethnically or culturally diﬀerent do not necessarily like each other very much. But from a distance, from a physical distance, again, there is this overriding solidarity of mankind as a whole, that is, we can all beneﬁt from each other peacefully cooperating with each other without any need to have multicultural societies anywhere on the globe.

论述至此，在进入我真正的主题之前，我想提醒大家注意一个事实：人们出于自身利益考量，彼此能够和平合作这一原则，并不一定意味着所有群体都必须紧密相邻而居。也就是说，即便人们因各种原因相看两厌、彼此仇恨，他们依然能够在一定距离之外实现和平合作。换言之，接受和平合作原则，绝不意味着提倡多元文化社会。事实上，多元文化社会很可能是极其危险的社会形态，因为不同种族或文化背景的人并不一定喜欢彼此。但是，在保持一定的空间距离的基础之上，人类整体依然存在一种具有压倒性优势的团结关系，即我们所有人都能从彼此的和平合作中受益，而无需在全球任何一地建立多元文化社会。

In all of my talks so far I have concentrated, with brief deviations, on what we might call productive activities. And let me brieﬂy explain again what I mean by productive activities, in order to distinguish productive activities from what one might call parasitic activities. Productive activities are activities that increase the well-being of at least one person, without reducing the well-being of other individuals. You realize that by this deﬁnition, we avoid all sorts of interpersonal comparisons of utility. This formulation is similar to the formulation of the so-called Pareto criterion, which also assumes that we cannot compare my happiness with your happiness. If we cannot compare your happiness with my happiness, can we still say something about social welfare increasing or not increasing? The answer is yes, we can do this if we recognize that if through my activities my well-being increases and the well-being of others is not decreased, then we can indeed say that social welfare has increased.

到目前为止，我所有的演讲，除了偶尔稍有偏离，基本上都集中于我们所谓的生产性活动。何为生产性活动？在此，请让我再次简要说明，以便将其与所谓的寄生性活动区分开来。生产性活动是指那些在不降低其他人福祉的前提下，至少能增加一个人福祉的活动。你会意识到，根据这个定义，我们避免了各种效用的人际比较。这种表述与所谓的帕累托标准的表述类似，帕累托标准同样假定我们无法跨人际比较你我二者的幸福程度。假如无法跨人际比较幸福程度，那么我们能否断言社会福利增加与否呢？答案是肯定的。如果我们认识到，通过我的活动，我之福祉增加，而他人福祉并未稍减，那么我们无疑可断言称社会福利有所增加。

And there exist three types of activities that accomplish this, that is, making at least one person better oﬀ without making anybody else worse oﬀ: ﬁrst, an act of original appropriation, that is, I am the ﬁrst person to put some previously unowned resource to some use, is, in this sense, a Pareto-superior move. It makes me better oﬀ, otherwise I would not have appropriated what I appropriated, and it does not take away anything from anybody else because everybody else would have had the chance to appropriate the same thing, but they demonstrate through their own inactivity, that they did not attach sufficient value to it. So, nothing has been taken away from anybody else through an act of original appropriation, but one person is deﬁnitely better oﬀ; nobody else is made worse oﬀ as a result of it.

不降低任何一个人的福祉，却至少让一个人的福祉提升，这样的改进有三种行动能够达到。第一，先占行动。也就是说，我是首个将此前无主资源投入某种用途之人，在此意义上而言，这属于帕累托改进。这让我的状况得到改善，不然我不会去占有获取之物，同时这并未从其他人处夺走任何东西，原因在于，其他人原本亦有机会占有此物，但他们的不作为清楚表明，他们并未赋予该资源以足够价值。所以，先占行动并未侵占任何人的东西，结果却是肯定有一人之境况得到改善，与此同时，并未有其他人因此而受损。

The second type of Pareto-superior move is to engage in acts of production. I use my own physical body, and with the help of originally appropriated resources I now transform something that was less valuable into something that I expect to be more valuable. Obviously, I am better oﬀ because of this, otherwise I would not have engaged in this act of production. And nothing is taken away from anybody else; everybody else has exactly the same resources at their disposal that they had prior to my act of production. One person is better oﬀ; noone is made worse oﬀ.

第二种帕累托改进，则是从事生产行动。我运用自己的身体，借助先占的资源，将价值较低的事物转化为我预期价值更高的事物。显然，我因此变得更好，否则我不会进行这种生产行动。而且，没有侵占其他任何人之物；在我进行生产行动之前，其他人所能支配的资源与行动之后完全相同。一个人变得更好，而没有人变得更差。

And ﬁnally, acts of voluntary contractual exchange are also productive, in the sense that two individuals expect to beneﬁt from the exchange; otherwise, this voluntary exchange would not have taken place, and again, no resources at the disposal of any third party are aﬀected by this voluntary transaction between two individuals. So, in this case, we have two individuals gaining in utility and satisfaction and nobody losing in utility or satisfaction. Because of this, these three types of activities can be referred to as productive activities, as activities that increase social well-being.

最后，自愿的契约交换行动同样具有生产性。从某种意义上说，两个个体都期望从交换中获益，否则这种自愿交换行动就不会发生。并且，两个个体之间的这种自愿交易不会影响任何第三方所能支配的资源。所以，在这种情况下，我们看到有两个个体的效用和满足感得到提升，而没有人的效用或满足感受损。正因如此，这三类行动可被称为生产性行动，即能够增进社会福祉的行动。

In contrast, we have, of course, what we call parasitic activities and I mean parasitic, this time, in a slightly diﬀerent meaning from that which I mentioned very early on as having been used by Carroll Quigley. Remember, Quigley refers to parasitic activities as activities that somehow diminish the amount of goods in existence, like picking berries and not replacing them with anything. I would refer to this, under the current deﬁnition, as a productive activity, so he uses that term in a slightly diﬀerent way. At that time when I talked about it, the use of parasitic simply had a diﬀerent explanatory purpose than the one that I’musing now. What I mean by parasitic in this context is: activities that make some people better oﬀ, at the expense of making other people worse oﬀ. And those activities would be, obviously, activities such as taking away what some other person has originally appropriated, taking away what some other person has produced, or not waiting for the agreement of some potential exchange partner, but simply robbing him of whatever is his. In this case, in all of these cases, we obviously have a situation where one person gains and another person loses.

相比之下，当然也存在所谓的寄生性活动。这里我所说的“寄生性”，与我早前提到的卡罗尔·奎格利所使用的含义略有不同。大家是否还记得，奎格利将寄生性活动定义为以某种方式减少现有物品数量的活动，比如采摘浆果却不补种。按照我当前的定义，我会把这种行为归属为生产性活动，因此他对这个词的用法与我略有差别。之前我引用该概念时，意图与现在与现在不同。在当前语境下，我所指“寄生性”是：使一部分人受益，但却以牺牲其他人的利益为代价的活动。显然，这些活动包括夺走他人先占之物，掠夺他人的生产品，或者未经潜在交易方同意，直接抢夺其所有物。在此种情形之下，凡此种种情形之下，明显存在一人得利而另一方受损的局面。

Let me brieﬂy mention three typical parasitic activities that play a great role in history, before I then come to a special form of parasitic behavior which is associated with the institution of the state. Parasitic behavior would be, for instance, in the most drastic form, cannibalism. That is, people simply eating another person up. It was, again, insight and intelligence on the part of people that led to the abolition of cannibalism. People realized that yes, in the short run, cannibalism might be beneﬁcial, but if you have a slightly longer-term perspective, you would prefer slavery over cannibalism. This is, indeed,a stage of human development for which we have anthropological evidence. Most cannibals realized, at some point, after smartening up a little bit, that slavery was deﬁnitely superior over this, unless you are very, very hungry at this particular moment.

在探讨与国家制度相关的一种特殊的寄生行为之前，我先简要提及三种在历史上影响重大的典型寄生行为。比如，最极端形式的寄生行为就是同类相食，即人吃人。正是人类的洞察力和智慧促使这种行为遭到摒弃。人们意识到，从短期看，同类相食或许有利，但从稍长远的角度来看，奴隶制比同类相食更可取。实际上，这是人类发展的一个阶段，我们有人类学证据可以证明。大多数同类相食者，在略微聪明一些之后的某个时刻会意识到，除非当下极度饥饿，否则奴隶制绝对比同类相食更于己有利。

But eventually people even overcame this temptation, and developed slavery. And again, it was rational thought that also overcame this institution of slavery, because they realized that slavery is by and large an unproductive system of human interaction. Again, slavery, in the short run, can, of course, be beneﬁcial ifI can use you as my slave for a while, even if I were to recognize that in the long run, I would be better oﬀ if you were a freeman and I were a freeman and we cooperated with each other. In the short run, of course, slavery can have certain advantages and again, it requires a certain development of intelligence, a certain lowering of our time preference, to be willing to give up this immediate advantage that the institution of slavery might represent.

但最终人们无疑抵制了这种诱惑，发展出了奴隶制。同样，也是理性思考促使人们摒弃了奴隶制，因为他们意识到，奴隶制大体上是一种非生产性的人类互动体系。当然，从短期来看，如果我能在一段时间内把你当作奴隶使用，那么奴隶制确实可能带来好处，即便我意识到从长远来看，如果我们都成为自由人并相互合作，我会过得更好。当然，从短期看，奴隶制具有一定优势，而要放弃奴隶制可能带来的这种眼前利益，就需要智力达到一定发展水平，同时我们的时间偏好也有所降低。

Apart from slavery, of course, the most common form of parasitic behavior is plain crime: robbery and fraud and activities such as those.

除了奴隶制，最常见的寄生行为形式无疑是普通犯罪，抢劫、诈骗以及诸如此类行径。

And again, we can say that the fact that most people abstain from these types of activities is based on insight, is based on the fact that they realize that in the long run, these things simply do not pay. If robbery were to become common we would all be in terrible shape, but we abstain even from engaging in robbery and fraud, even if we know that, in the short run, we might be able to get away with it. Again, insight, a certain amount of intelligence,a certain ability to delay gratiﬁcation is necessary on the part of man in order to give up the temptations that these forms of parasitic behavior might represent.

同样，我们可以说，大多数人之所以避免这类行为，是源于他们的洞察力，源于他们意识到从长远来看，此类行为根本无利可图。如果抢劫普遍化，我们所有人都会陷入糟糕的境地。即便我们知晓短期内或许能逃脱抢劫和欺诈行为的惩罚，我们依然克制自己，不会如此行事。同样，人类要抵制这类寄生行为可能带来的诱惑，无疑需具备洞察力、一定的智慧以及延迟满足的自制力。

And because of this, because of a certain amount of intelligence, we have reached a stage where cannibalism has basically disappeared, where slavery has basically disappeared, and where fraud and robbery have become rare events, conducted by just a few asocial individuals, and most people abstain from it. So, civilization is maintained by rational insight, by having developed a certain state of intelligence and having lowered our time preference to a certain degree. And again, let me give you a quote to this eﬀect by Mises, and then I will really come to the problem of the origin of the state as I promised. Mises says here,

正因如此，由于具备了一定的智慧，我们发展到了这样一个阶段：食人现象基本消失，奴隶制几近绝迹，欺诈和抢劫也仅仅是极少数反社会个体的罕见行径，大多数人都不会涉足。所以说，文明需要理性的洞察力来维系，这就要求我们的智慧需发展到某种程度，同时能够将时间偏好降低到一定水平。我再给大家引用一段米塞斯的话来阐明此观点，然后如我承诺的那样，探讨国家起源的问题。米塞斯说：

One may admit that in primitive man, the propensity for killing and destroying and the disposition for cruelty were innate. We may also assume that under the conditions of earlier ages the inclination to aggression and murder was favorable to the preservation of life. Man was once a brutal beast But one must not forget that he was physically a weak animal; he would not have been a match for the big beasts of prey, if he had not been equipped with a peculiar weapon, reason. The fact that man is a reasonable being, that he therefore does not yield without inhibitions to every impulse, but arranges his conduct according to reasonable deliberation, must not be called unnatural, from a zoological point of view. Rational conduct means that man, in face of the fact that he cannot satisfy all his impulses, desires and appetites, forgoes the satisfaction of those which he considers less urgent. In order not to endanger the working of social cooperation man is forced to abstain from satisfying those desires whose satisfaction would hinder establishment of societal institutions. There is no doubt that such renunciation is painful. However, man has made his choice. He has renounced the satisfaction of some desires incompatible with social life and has given priority to the satisfaction of those desires which can be realized only, or in a more plentiful way, under a system of the division of labor. …

可以承认，原始人天生就有杀戮、破坏的倾向，以及天生的残忍本性。我们也可以假定，在远古时代，侵犯和杀戮的本性有利于生存。人曾经是野蛮的动物。但我们不能忘记，从体能来讲，我们是弱小的动物；如果没有理性这一独特武器，我们根本无法与大型食肉动物抗衡。从动物学的角度来看，人是理性的生物，因此不会毫无节制地屈从于每一种冲动，而是根据理性的思考来安排自己的行为，这不能被称作违背自然。理性行为意味着，人在面对无法满足自己所有冲动、欲望和渴求的现实时，会放弃那些他认为不那么迫切之欲望的满足。为了不危及社会合作的运行，人不得不克制自己，不去满足那些会阻碍社会制度建立的欲望。毫无疑问，这种克制是痛苦的。然而，人做出了自己的选择。他放弃了一些与社会生活不相容之欲望的满足，优先满足那些只有在分工体系下才能实现，或者能得到更充分满足的欲望。……

This decision is not irrevocable and ﬁnal. The choice of the fathers does not impair the sons’ freedom to choose. They can reverse the resolution. Every day they can proceed to the transvaluation of values and prefer barbarism to civilization, or as some authors say, the soul to the intellect, myth to reason, and violence to peace. But they must choose. It is impossible to have things incompatible with one another.3

这一决定并非不可逆转，也非最终章。先人的选择不会妨碍后人的选择自由。后者可以推翻前者。每一天，他们都可以重估价值观，弃文明而择归野蛮，或如某些作者所言，选择情感而非理智，迷信神话而非理性，偏爱暴力而非和平。人们必须择一而选，无法既要又要还要，同时拥有彼此互不相容之物。[30]

Now, this fact that mankind has, by and large, developed sufficient reason to engage in cooperation and build a society, has also led, on the other hand, to the temptation of creating a system of institutionalized exploitation or institutionalized parasitism or, as some people have referred to it, stationary banditry. That is, only insofar as we have a rich society before us does the temptation arise for some people to take advantage of the wealth that society has accumulated, to institute a system where they can systematically beneﬁt themselves at the expense of the great masses of productive individuals.

如今，人类大体上已发展出足够的理性来开展合作、构建社会。但另一方面，这也引发了一种诱惑，即建立一种制度化的剥削体系，或制度化的寄生体系，或者如一些人所称的“坐寇”（stationary banditry）。也就是说，只有当我们身处一个富足社会，才会对某些人产生诱惑，他们想要利用社会积累的财富，建立一种牺牲广大生产性民众从而能够系统性肥己的体制。

And this brings me to the institution of the state. Let me begin by giving you a deﬁnition of what the state is,a deﬁnition that is more or less uncontroversial, that you ﬁnd adopted by practically everyone who talks about this institution. And this deﬁnition of the state is that a state is deﬁned as an organization or an agency that exercises a territorial monopoly of ultimate jurisdiction or of ultimate judgeship or of ultimate arbitration in cases of conﬂict. In particular, it is an institution that is also the ultimate judge, in cases of conﬂicts involving itself with other people in society. And as a second element of the deﬁnition, which is, in a way, already implied in the ﬁrst one, the state is an organization that exercises a territorial monopoly of taxation. That is, it can determine unilaterally without the consent of others how much the inhabitants of the territory have to pay to the agency of the state for having the state provide this service of being the ultimate judge and arbitrator in the territory.

这就引出了国家这一制度。首先，我想给出一个较为公认的定义，这是几乎所有讨论这一制度的人都会采纳的定义。国家可被定义为：国家被界定为一个组织或机构，它在特定领土范围内对终极管辖权、终极审判权或冲突案件的终极仲裁权拥有垄断。尤其要强调一点，在涉及国家自身与社会中其他成员之间的冲突案件时，它同样也是终极仲裁者。作为该定义的第二个要素，从某种程度上说，它已隐含在第一个要素之中，即国家是一个在特定领土范围内垄断征税权的组织。也就是说，它能够不经他人同意，单方面决定该领土上的居民必须向国家机构缴纳多少费用，以换取国家在该领土上作为终极法官和仲裁者所提供的服务。

Now, you immediately recognize from this deﬁnition that it is not difficult to explain why people might be motivated to create an institution such as a state. Just imagine what that means. It means that whenever you have conﬂicts with each other, you must come to me and I settle the conﬂict and then I tell you what you owe me for the settlement, without receiving or having your consent doing this. This is, of course, a magniﬁcent position to be in. And the position is even better once you recognize that even if I caused a conﬂict, if I hit someone on the head, then he must come to meand I decide what is right and what is wrong and then,typically I will decide, of course, that what I did was right and what he is doing, complaining about the fact that I hit him on the head, is wrong—and then I tell him in addition that this is the amount of money that you have to pay me for providing you with this magniﬁcent service. It should be very clear from the outset that to explain why there have been attempts to form an institution such as a state is anything but difficult. It is easy as pie to explain why there are constant attempts to try to form institutions such as this, because what more wonderful position could one have, as somebody who has parasitic inclinations, than being in charge of an apparatus such as the state? To explain why there are attempts to found states is a very, very easy thing to do. What is the difficult thing to do is to explain why anybody can get away with this—why people do not prevent such institutions from coming into existence.

从这个定义中，我们马上就能意识到，不难解释为什么人们可能有动机去创建国家这样一种制度。想象一下，这意味着什么。这意味着，只要你们彼此之间发生冲突，就必须求助与我，由我来裁决冲突。更重要的是，我能够单方面决定你们需为此支付多少费用，并且无需征得你们同意。这无疑是一种极其有利的地位。而且，这种权力的便利性甚至更进一步——即便是我自己引发了冲突，比如我打了某人一拳，对方仍然必须找我来裁决。我自然可以判定自己是正确的，而对方投诉、抱怨被打才是错误的。随后，我甚至还能告诉对方，他需要支付一定的费用，以换取我提供的这项“公正裁决”服务。要解释为什么一直有人试图建立国家这样一种制度一点都不难，从一开始就清楚明了。要解释为什么不断有人试图建立这样的制度，简直易如反掌，因为对于有寄生倾向的人来说，还有什么位置能比掌控国家这样的机构更加妙不可言呢？解释为什么有人试图建立国家是一件非常容易之事。真正值得深思的解释难点在于，为什么这样的机构能够长久存续，为什么人们没有阻止这样的机构出现。

And I will turn now to the task, to explain why people would ever have put up with an institution such as this. This explanation becomes even more difficult once you recognize the following, which I call the fundamental law of parasitism. The fundamental law of parasitism is simply this. One parasite can live oﬀ a hundred or a thousand hosts very comfortably, but we cannot imagine that thousands of parasites can live a comfortable life oﬀ one or two or three hosts. In that case, their life would be miserable too, so what we recognize from this fundamental law of parasitism is that those people who aspire to create an institution such as a state must also always have an interest to be, themselves, just a small group that is capable of ruling, of exploiting, of taxing and exercising an arbitration monopoly over a group of people far larger than they themselves are. And if this is the case, that the state must always attempt to be a very small group as compared to the group which they exploit, then we realize another fundamental insight. Obviously, a small group, very small group, cannot subjugate a large group only by means of brutal force and weapons. Yes, for a short time it might be possible. We can imagine that there are ten people who are all heavily armed. They might control two hundred, three hundred, four hundred people and keep them in subjection, if the people have no arms and the rulers do have arms. But, in the long run, this is very difficult to maintain. That is, we must expect that these four hundred to ﬁve hundred people will also ﬁnd a way to arm themselves—and in that case, how can ten people equipped with arms rule over four hundred to ﬁve hundred or thousands of people also equipped with arms and the means to defend themselves? Then, the explanation based on violence, on sheer brute force, this explanation does not work.

现在，我要着手解释为什么民众竟然能容忍存在这样的一种制度。一旦你认识到以下我称之为“寄生基本法则”的内容，这个解释就变得愈发让人难以接受。寄生基本法则很简单：一个寄生虫可以轻松地依赖一百甚或一千个宿主生存，但我们无法想象成千上万的寄生虫能依赖一两个甚至三四个宿主过上舒适的生活。在那种情况下，它们的日子也会很悲惨。所以从这条寄生基本法则中我们认识到，那些渴望创建国家这种制度之人，必然始终希望自身规模维持在一个小团体，这个小团体有能力统治、剥削、征税，并对一个比他们自身规模大得多的群体行使仲裁垄断权。如果是这样，即与被剥削群体相比，国家必须始终试图保持为一个非常小的团体，那我们就会有另一个基本认知。显然，一个非常小的团体，仅仅依靠暴力和武器是无法长期压制一个大群体的。没错，短期内也许可行。我们可以想象，十个全副武装之人，的确能够控制几百个手无寸铁之人，并让他们臣服。但从长远来看，无疑很难维持。也就是说，我们必须预计到这几百号人也会想办法武装自己。在这种情况下，十个人单纯依靠武力又如何能统治成百上千个同样手持武装、具有自卫能力之人呢？那么，基于暴力的解释、基于纯粹蛮力的解释难以自圆其说。

What we recognize instead is that the class of parasites, the small group of parasites, must, if it wants to rule over a population for a lengthy period of time, must base its power on popular opinion. That is, it must have at least tacit support among the public. The public must have taken on a position where they put up with this, somehow see a reason for having this institution. The public must have accepted certain ideologies. And this insight, which was ﬁrst formulated by Étienne de La Boétie and David Hume—and we also ﬁnd it in Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard—is that the rule of the state over its population depends not on the exercise of sheer brute force, even though that plays some role, but rests fundamentally on nothing other than opinion and tacit agreement on the part of the public.

相反，我们应该认识到，寄生阶层，也就是这一小撮寄生虫群体，若想长期维持对大众的统治，其权力基础必须建基于普遍的民意。换言之，他们至少需要取得民众的默许——人们或出于某种理由容忍其存在，甚或在某种程度上认同其统治的合理性。这种统治得以延续的关键，在于民众必须接受某种特定的意识形态。这一观点可追溯至法国思想家艾蒂安·德·拉博埃西（Étienne de La Boétie）和英国哲学家大卫·休谟（David Hume），并在奥派经济学家路德维希·冯·米塞斯和默里·罗斯巴德的著作中得以深化。其核心洞见在于：国家机器对民众的统治，并非仅仅依靠赤裸裸的暴力（尽管暴力也起到一定作用），现代国家的统治根基，本质上来自被统治阶级“自愿戴上的思想枷锁”。

So then the task becomes to explain the transition from a natural order, as I described it yesterday, from a system of feudalism under which essentially no state organizations existed, to a state of aﬀairs where a stable state institution has come into existence. And let’s assume, for a moment, the most favorable situation for state formation without having a state already there. What I mean by this is the following scenario. Let’s assume we have a feudal king who is the natural monopolist for conﬂict resolution. By natural monopolist, I mean every person whenever they have conﬂicts with each other, do, in fact, go to the king and say, “Come on, you are the most prestigious, most wise and most experienced person. I’ll ask you to settle the dispute that I have with this other person.” People are entirely free to choose diﬀerent arbitrators, diﬀerent judges, but as a matter of fact, they all go to the king to do this. Such a scenario would still be what I call a natural order. The king, in this situation, would receive nothing but rental payments from his own tenants and from the nobles, who would receive rental payments from their own tenants. There’s no exploitation of any kind going on. The king does not tax anyone who has property that is independent of the property of the king. The king also does not pass any laws; that is, he does not legislate. Of course, he lays down the rules that his tenants have to follow, but that would be no more than if I’m the owner of a house, then, of course, I lay down certain rules that the tenants of my house have to follow, such as that they have to clean the stairs once a week and things like this. So, this king is part of a natural order and not yet a state king. He neither taxes nor legislates; he only collects rent and lays down the rules of the house of which he himself is the genuine owner.

那么，任务就变成了解释从一种自然秩序 —— 正如我昨天所描述的，在封建制度下，基本上不存在国家组织 —— 如何转变为一种国家制度已然形成的稳定状态。我们不妨先假设，在尚无国家存在的情况下，最有利于国家形成的情形是什么。我所假设的场景如下：我们设想有一位封建国王，他是自然垄断的冲突裁决者。所谓自然垄断，我的意思是，每当人们彼此发生冲突之时，实际上都会去找国王，说：“来吧，您是最有声望、最睿智且经验最丰富之人。我请您来解决我与他人的争端。” 人们完全可以自由选择不同的仲裁者或法官，但实际上，他们都会向国王寻求解决之道。这种情形依然属于我所说的自然秩序。在这个体系中，国王的收入来源仅限于他自己的领地租金，来自于他的封臣柜组与佃户，而其封臣的收入亦只来源于他们的佃户，此外再无其他收入。不存在任何形式的剥削。国王不会对任何独立于国王财产之外的人征税，也不会制定任何法律，也就是说，他不立法。当然，他会制定其佃户必须遵守的规则，但这就好比一所房子的主人，当然会制定租客必须遵守的某些规则，诸如必须每周清扫楼梯之类。因此，在这个阶段，国王仍然属于自然秩序的一部分，还未成为国家意义上的国王。他既不征税，也不立法，只是收取租金，仅仅只是为他名下的 “房子” 制定规则而已。

The decisive step that he must take in order to transform his position into the position of a state would be the following: the king, at one point, would have to say, “From now on, you must come to me whenever you have a conﬂict with somebody else. You can no longer go to anybody else for conﬂict resolution. Up to this point, you chose me voluntarily, to be the judge in all cases of conﬂict. Now, I take away this possibility from you, to turn to others, and I take the right away from others to act, if they should be chosen as judge to do so.”

为了将自己的地位从自然秩序中的国王转变为国家的统治者，国王必须迈出关键的一步：他必须在某个时刻宣称：“从现在起，无论何时，只要你们与他人发生冲突，都必须来找我解决纠纷，禁止寻求他人的裁决。过去，你们是自愿选择由我担任裁判，由我在所有冲突案件中担任仲裁者。但从今以后，我剥夺你们选择其他仲裁者的权利，同时，我也剥夺其他人被选为仲裁者的权利。”

Now, you immediately recognize that by taking this seemingly small step, the king does engage in an act of expropriation. In particular, this act of expropriation is very visible to the other leaders in society, the other nobles, to whom conﬂicting parties could have turned to receive justice. Again, recall that in the feudal order it was precisely the case that there existed a large number of independent, separate jurisdictions. Each lord was responsible for creating justice within his own territory, over his own property. Now he can no longer do this, so it is in particular the other nobles of whom we would expect to put up resistance against this attempt of the king to monopolize, to acquire the exclusive monopoly. It is no longer a natural monopoly, but it becomes in this case a compulsory monopoly on being the ultimate and ﬁnal judge in cases of conﬂict.

你会立刻意识到，国王迈出的这看似微不足道的一小步，实则是一种剥夺行为。这种剥夺行为对社会中的其他领袖而言，即在其他贵族眼中，尤为明显。过去，发生冲突的各方本可以找这些贵族主持公道。回想一下，在封建秩序下，确实存在大量独立、分散的司法管辖权。每位领主都负责在自己的领地内，为自己的财产主持公道。而如今，他们无权再如此行事。因此，我们可以预见，国王试图垄断司法权、将自己华丽变身为唯一的终审裁判者时，必然会遭到这些贵族的抵制。这显然已不再是自然垄断，在此情形之下，变成了一种强制垄断，国王成为冲突案件的终极且唯一仲裁者。

How can the king get away with this? The ﬁrst step—and again, I oﬀer you here not a precise historical description of what happened here or there, but something that you might call a logical reconstruction of what has happened more or less all over the place. The ﬁrst step is for the king to cause and bring about a crisis situation. And how does he bring about a crisis situation? In away, that is not very difficult to explain. Just as we recognize how natural, how easy it is to have the motivation to become a state, we can also recognize that among mankind, there exists always the temptation, the itching, especially among the tenants, to free themselves from their rent payments and the rules laid down for them by their own landlords. That is, tenants, wherever you go, you can imagine that it would be not all that difficult to persuade them to engage in some sort of riots against their own landlords. I free you of the rent payment that you must pay. I free you of the disciplinary rules that your landlord imposes on you and I promise to make you a freeman. I promise you that you will become the owner of those things which you previously only occupied as a tenant.

那么，国王是如何成功实现这一点的呢？首先，他必须制造并引发一场危机。这里需要强调的是，我所描述的并不是某个具体历史事件的精确再现，而是一种逻辑上的重构——这种情境在历史上各地都曾反复出现。国王要制造危机，方法其实并不复杂。正如我们已经认识到的，统治者想要建立国家的动机是显而易见的，同样，在人类社会中，总有人受到诱惑，尤其是佃户，他们往往渴望摆脱向领主缴纳地租的义务，以及领主对他们的各种规训。因此，想要煽动这些佃户反抗领主，并非什么难事。国王可以对佃户承诺：“我将免除你们向领主缴纳的租金，解除领主对你们的各种限制，让你们成为自由人。甚至，曾经仅仅只是你们租用的土地和财产，如今也将真正归你们所有。”这样的承诺无疑会激发佃户的不满情绪，促使他们掀起针对领主的暴动，而这正是国王所希望看到的局面——借助社会动荡削弱其他领主的权威，从而一步步巩固自身的统治地位。

Or, in a slightly diﬀerent scenario, you, as the king, incite a riot among the poor against the rich. You form a coalition with the poor against your own immediate competitors, that is, the well-to-do people in society that somehow are the most direct rivals to the king. So then you create a civil war, that is to say, you create a situation that is similar to the situation that Hobbes claims exists naturally among mankind. Recall, I explained that the natural condition of mankind is not war of all against all. People do recognize that the division of labor is beneﬁcial, and because of this they tend to be in favor of peaceful cooperation, at least the large majority of people do this. But you can incite,especially if you are yourself an inﬂuential person, a person who is trusted by the masses, if you are the king, you can incite a situation that brings about a situation such as a war of all against all.

或者，在另一种稍有不同的情境下，你身为国王，可以煽动穷人起来反抗富人。你与穷人结成联盟，直接对抗你的主要竞争对手，也就是社会中的富裕阶层，某种程度上来说，他们是国王最直接的权力竞争者。于是乎，你挑起一场内战，也就是说，你营造了一种类似于霍布斯所说的人类自然状态下的情形。回想一下，我解释过人类的自然状态并非是所有人对所有人的战争。人们确实认识到劳动分工是有益的，正因如此，至少绝大多数都倾向于支持和平合作。但假如你身为国王，自带魅力光环，极具影响力，普遍受到受民众信赖，那么你完全有能力挑起冲突，使社会陷入类似“所有人对所有人开战”的癫狂、混乱局面。

And then, in this situation where the war of all against all breaks out, where the tenants rise against their landlords and the poor rise against the rich, then you come to the rescue of the nobles and the middle classes and strike some sort of compromise. That is, you get a promise from the nobles and your immediate competitors. Yes, we will give up our former right to act as judge ourselves and grant you an exclusive right to be the monopoly judge, in exchange for you and us getting together and stopping this civil war.

然后，这种所有人对抗所有人的局面爆发，佃户起来反抗地主、穷人起来反抗富人之际，你出手力挽狂澜，拯救贵族和中产阶级，并与他们达成某种妥协。也就是说，你从贵族和你直接的竞争对手那里得到承诺。没错，他们愿意放弃之前自行担任法官的权利，赋予你作为唯一垄断仲裁者的独断权利，以换取你与我们携手制止这场内战。

This was, by the way, precisely the situation, for instance, during the Middle Ages, especially during the so-called Protestant Revolution,or Protestant Reformation, when ﬁrst, the Protestant Revolution resulted in big-time looting activities and so forth, and then people turned to the king saying, “This sort of stuﬀ has to be stopped and in order to stop it, we will grant you the exclusive right to be the judge.” So, you create a Hobbesian situation. The Hobbesian situation does not exist from the outset, but it can be created. Again, let me just read you a quote here from Henri Pirenne, who in a slightly diﬀerent way describes the same phenomenon, that is to say, the king allying himself with the lower classes, with the subnoble classes, so to speak, in order to break the power of the competing aristocracy, of those people who would lose the most from the fact that the king acquires a monopoly.

这种情况在中世纪，特别是所谓的新教改革（或称宗教改革）时期，曾真实上演。例如，新教改革初期引发了大规模的掠夺和骚乱，随后，人们转而向国王求助，说：“这样的混乱必须被制止。为了恢复秩序，我们授予您独占的司法裁判权。”换句话说，国王刻意制造了一种“霍布斯式的混乱局面”。霍布斯所描述的“所有人对所有人的战争”并不是人类社会的自然状态，而是可以人为制造的。在这一点上，历史学家昂利·皮雷纳（Henri Pirenne）也有类似的描述。他指出，国王往往会联合下层阶级，即与次等贵族阶层结盟，以削弱与之竞争的贵族的权力，如果国王成功垄断司法裁判权，贵族将是最大输家。

Pirenne there says,

The clear interest of the monarchy was to support the adversaries of high feudalism. [That is, the adversaries of the noble class, of the aristocracy.] Naturally, help was given whenever it was possible to do so without becoming obligated to [In this case he talks about the cities, the king in particular—he also is inciting the inhabitants of cities to rise against the nobility.] these [city] middle classes who in arising against their lords fought, to all intents and purposes, in the interests of royal prerogatives. To accept the king as arbitrator of their quarrel was, for the parties in conﬂict, to recognize his sovereignty. The entry of the burghers upon the political scene had as a consequence the weakening of the contractual principle of the Feudal State to the advantage of the principle of the authority of the Monarchical State. It was impossible that royalty should not take count of this and seize every chance to show its good-will to the communes which, without intending to do so, labored so usefully in its behalf.4

皮雷纳在书中写道：

君主的明显意图，就是支持封建贵族的反对者。[也就是说，支持贵族阶层的反对者。] 自然地，只要有可能，在不使自己承担义务的情况下就会给予帮助。[在这种情况下，他谈论的是城市居民，尤其是国王——他也在煽动城市居民起来反对贵族。] 这些城市中产阶级反抗他们的领主，实际上是为了维护王室特权。对于冲突各方而言，接受国王作为争端的仲裁者，就意味着承认他的最高统治权（sovereignty）。市民阶层崛起，开始登上政治舞台，其结果就是直接削弱了封建国家的契约原则，并使其让位于君主国家的权威原则。对于这一点，王室不可能视而不见，必然会抓住一切机会向公社团体递出橄榄枝，因为在无意之中，他们的行动最终极大地促进了王权的扩张。[31]

But this is of course only the ﬁrst step. You create the crisis. The noble class comes to you and wants to be rescued, and you rescue them in exchange for them granting you exclusive judgeship rights. You have to oﬀer something in addition, of course, to the aristocracy. What is typically oﬀered is that the aristocracy now plays some particularly important role in the slowly developing royal bureaucracy that will be established. But more than this, you now need an ideology. Again, recall, without ideological support for it, this institution is not going to last for very long. And the ideology that is created and that is still with us to this day, is the so-called Hobbesian myth. That is, the idea that the normal state of mankind is precisely this war of all against all, which the king deliberately brought about, and that in order to stop this war of all against all, it is necessary that there must be one single monopolist ruling over all people in order to create peace. Now, if you ask yourself—or if you ask all around—ask them why do we need a state? Almost everyone will give you exactly this reason. Without a single monopolist, there would be permanent war of all against all. This is the belief that up to this day has maintained the state apparatus. This is by now a ﬁrmly held belief: I have asked my own students and that was the answer that everyone gave. Without the state there would be chaos! There would be no cooperation. There must be a single monopolist. This is the ideology that keeps the state in place.

制造危机只是当权者巩固统治的过程的第一步。当权者在贵族身上制造恐慌，然后便以”救世主”姿态介入，通过提供保护换取司法裁决垄断权。当然，贵族阶层还需一些额外的好处。那么第二步，建立与贵族之间的‌利益捆绑，通常的交换条件是，‌赋予贵族阶层在‌王室官僚体系‌中的特权地位，将旧精英转化为新政权的既得利益者，形成统治同盟。但除此之外，第三步就是意识形态的塑造。再次提醒，假如没有意识形态的支持，这种统治行将不远。至今仍主导大众认知的‌霍布斯式神话——若没有一个垄断者缔造和平，社会的常态就是所有人对所有人的战争，然而，这充其量无非只是国王们蓄意炮制的谎言。我们拿一个当下的流行回复来为我们这个观点做一个注脚。若询问当代人”为何需要国家”，绝大多数人都会说：”没有国家就会天下大乱！”正是这种观念，一直支撑着国家机器运转至今。单一统治者的暴力垄断，是和平的前提条件，这如今已是一种根深蒂固的信念：我问过自己的学生，每个人的答案都如出一辙。意识形态操控的成功，让国家得以存续。

Let me only point out the following at this point. You can quickly realize the weakness of this ideology, if you do two things. On the one hand, imagine what this means if you have very small groups of people, just two individuals. So, what this theory essentially says is, no two people can ever peacefully cooperate with each other; this would always lead to war of one against the other. There must be always a master and there must be always someone who is subject to the master. You realize immediately, if you just use a very small group of people, how absurd this thesis becomes. We have ﬁve people. Is it necessary for the group of ﬁve people that there must be one person who is the monopolist in every possible conﬂict, including conﬂicts involving himself with the other four? For these small groups, most people would immediately say, “You must be crazy to believe this sort of stuﬀ. That can never be true. Because you know groups of this size who peacefully cooperate all the time.” Nonetheless, this is one of the implications.

我想在此指出一个关键问题。我们可以通过两个简单的思考方式，迅速看出这种“单一统治者的暴力垄断”意识形态的荒谬性。首先，设想一个极小规模的群体，比如仅有两个人。按照这种理论的逻辑，任何两个人都无法和平合作，必然会陷入相互对抗。在这样的假设下，每个群体中都必须有一个统治者和一个被统治者。但显然，这种说法是荒谬的。其次，将这个群体扩大到五个人。难道在一个五人的小团体中，一定要有一个人垄断所有冲突的裁决权，甚至包括自己与其他四人的冲突？面对这样的设想，大多数人都会立刻反驳：“这太荒唐了！现实中，小团体成员经常能和平合作。”然而，这种理论却隐含着这样的荒谬结论。

What you recognize here is that they never talk about the size of the territory. And on the other hand, you recognize that if this theory is true, then it must be the case that we must have a world state in order to create peace because the same argument applies, of course, to a situation where we have a multitude of states. If we have a multitude of states, then these various states are in a state of anarchy, of natural order, vis-à-vis each other and allegedly there must be permanent war among them. Now, this is also obviously not the case. There are wars among them, and I will explain why there are more wars among states than there are wars among individuals in one of my next lectures, but it is certainly not the case that states are permanently at war with each other.

在这里有一个问题值得注意，这类理论从不讨论领土的规模。另一方面，你会意识到，如果这个理论是正确的，那么为了实现和平，我们就必须建立一个世界政府，因为同样的论点显然也适用于存在众多国家的情形。如果存在众多国家，那么这些不同的国家相互之间就处于一种无政府状态，即自然秩序状态，据说它们之间必然会陷于永久战争。但显然，事实并非如此。虽然国家之间确实发生战争，但它们并不总是处于战争状态。事实上，国家之间的战争比个人之间的战争更频繁，至于原因，我会在接下来的讲座中进一步解释。但无论如何，国家之间并非一直处于战争状态，这一点已足以驳斥这种理论的绝对化结论。

What remains entirely unexplained here, and what is somehow taken intuitively for granted, is that we are talking about sizes of states where it is not perfectly clear immediately that these people would peacefully cooperate with each other, but the size of states are, in a way, arbitrary. Why should not a state have the size of a small village for example? In a small village, we have not the slightest difficulty imagining that there can be peaceful cooperation going on without a monopolist. Only when the size becomes a little bit bigger do we become increasingly blind to recognizing that at all times, the same principle is at work, just as the same principle was at work to explain why all of mankind can engage in peaceful cooperation based on the division of labor, why there is not only a reason for the division of labor among the Germans, but the Germans and the French must not ﬁght against each other, why the same principle applies to Germans and to the French. So we have to recognize that this statist principle, if it should be correct, should also apply to the level of you and me. That is to say, I am your slave or you must be my slave, but it is impossible for peaceful cooperation between the two of us to exist.

这里有一个始终未被解释清楚的问题，却被许多人直觉地视为理所当然：我们所讨论的国家规模，并非一眼就能明确其民众是否会彼此和平合作。事实上，国家规模在某种程度上是随意设定的。比如说，为什么国家不能小到一个村庄呢？在一个小村庄里，我们毫不费力就能想象，即便没有垄断者，也能实现和平合作。然而，当规模稍稍变大时，人们就逐渐变得盲目，无法意识到相同的原则依然适用。正如整个人类社会之所以能够和平合作，正是因为劳动分工的存在，而不仅仅是某个民族内部，比如德国人之间可以通过劳动分工和平合作，德国人和法国人之间也可以通过同样的原则和平相处，而不必彼此征战。同理，如果国家主义原则（statist principle）是真正正确的，那它就应该同样适用于最基本的人际关系，也就是说，要么我必须成为你的奴隶，要么你必须成为我的奴隶，而和平合作根本不可能存在。但显然，这种结论是荒谬的。

And once you recognize that the same principle applies, not just to two people, but to the entire world, you recognize immediately that what we have is just a made-up myth, created by this initial crisis that the states themselves or the would-be states created in order to blind people to something that should be perfectly obvious. So now, once a state has established this sort of mythology, they all go through a sequence of steps, essentially the same sequence of steps wherever you look. The ﬁrst one is, of course, that you have to disarm the population. There existed initially in the Middle Ages independent army leaders oﬀering their army services to whoever needed them: mercenary troops. They are now incorporated into the national army or into the king’s army or they are eliminated. Again, all states try to disarm the population.

一旦你认识到，同样的原则不仅适用于两个人，也适用于整个世界，你就会立刻清楚意识到白，这种国家主义理论只不过一个虚构的神话。这一神话最初是由国家本身或那些试图建立国家的势力，通过制造危机炮制出来的，目的是模糊人们的视线，对本应显而易见的事实视而不见。所以现在，一旦国家建立起这样的神话体系，它们都会经历一系列相似的步骤，无论在何处，本质上都是如出一辙。第一步，当然是必须解除民众武装。在中世纪早期，存在独立的军队首领，他们作为雇佣军向任何有需要的人提供军事服务。而现在，这些独立的雇佣军要么被整编进国家军队或国王的军队，要么被彻底消灭。所有国家无一例外都会采取措施解除民众武装，以巩固其权力。

In the Middle Ages, one of the immediate things that kings did, as soon as they had acquired a semi-state position, was to insist that all the nobles had to raze their own fortresses, to prevent them from coming up with the idea that maybe that whole thing was a screwy process after all and they would defend themselves against the jurisdiction or the tax impositions coming from the side of the king. So, raze your fortresses. You can build nice palaces, but no longer anything that serves defensive purposes.

在中世纪，国王一旦获得了某种半国家统治者的地位，他们首先会做的事情之一，就是坚持让所有贵族拆除他们自己的堡垒，以防止贵族们产生这样的想法，即认为整个（国家统治的）过程毕竟是混乱无序的，从而他们会抵制来自国王方面的司法管辖或征税举措。所以，拆除你们的堡垒吧。你们可以建造华丽的宫殿，但绝不能再修建任何具有防御功能的建筑。

Then, of course, all independent jurisdictions must be eliminated, ultimately, even going as far as to no longer allowing husbands and wives to be judges in their own homes. This process takes hundreds of years. My reconstruction compresses this into a very short period of time, but all of these powers are gradually won step by step from civil society, and we have basically only now, in the twentieth century, reached the point where the power of the state extends as far as involving itself in immediate family aﬀairs, like daring, for instance, to take children away from their parents. This is something that would not have been possible hundreds of years ago; the power of the kings was not sufficient from the outset to do something like this, but we realize that now the power of the state is large enough to tell you whether you can smoke in your own house or not.

接下来，显然所有独立的司法管辖权都必须被逐步消除，最终甚至发展到不再允许夫妻在自己家中自行裁决家务事。这一过程持续了数百年。尽管我在这里的重构将其压缩在一个很短的时间框架内，但实际上，所有这些国家权力，都是一步步从民间社会夺取而来。总体而言，直到20世纪，国家权力已经扩张到直接干涉家庭内部事务，例如竟敢擅自将孩子从父母身边带走。这在几百年前，是完全不可想象的，因为当时国王的权力远未达到如此惊世骇俗的程度。但我们发现，如今国家权力已经大到可以规定你是否能在自己家中吸烟。

The next step is very important: to control the ideology, to keep alive this belief in the Hobbesian myth and the necessity of the state for the creation of peace. And for this you have to take over, you will ﬁrst try to take over, the churches. This occurs with the Protestant Revolution,as a result of which a far closer alliance between church and state is built than existed prior to this. By the way, that’swhy the Protestant Revolution was supported by so many princes, because they realized that that was exactly oﬀering them the opportunity to establish themselves as states, besides the obvious motive that they could also grab property from the Catholic Church, which, in some countries, made up 20–30 percent of the used landmass. And, it oﬀered them a great opportunity to just enrich themselves greatly by expropriating the churches.

接下来的步骤至关重要：控制意识形态，维持人们对霍布斯神话的信仰，使其相信国家是缔造和平的必要条件。为此，国家必须逐步掌控意识形态机构，首先便是教会。这在新教改革时期尤为明显，新教运动的兴起，使教会与国家之间建立起了比以往更为紧密的联盟。顺便说一句，这也解释了为什么许多君主支持新教改革，因为他们意识到这恰好为他们提供了建立国家的契机，此外还有另一个明显的动机，即他们能够直接攫取天主教会的财产。在一些国家，天主教会拥有的土地占到已利用土地的20% – 30%。对于这些君主而言，没收教会财产，不仅是巩固政权的手段，更是一次大肆敛财的良机。

And then, of course, you introduce successively public education, by controlling the church, given that the church was a main instructional institution for along period of time, and making the priests state employees. This has, of course, happened in all European countries, to a larger or smaller extent, particularly in the Protestant countries where all priests are paid according to the official pay scale that regulates how other bureaucrats are paid. And if this does not go far enough, then, of course, you create a system of public education under direct state control. Martin Luther, for instance, played a great role in this, advising the princes not only to oppress the peasants (whom he had ﬁrst brought to rise against the princes, but then smashed them down), but also advised the princes that just as the people should be trained in order to be ready for war, so they should also be brainwashed in statecontrolled schools in order to become brave and well-trained citizens. And the last step, after the nationalization of education, is the control of money, that is, the monopolization of the issuance of money. There existed, for instance, in France, before the establishment of a central French king, a multitude of mints competing against each other, trying to acquire the reputation of producing the best, most reliable, least manipulated, type of money. All these competing mints were gradually closed down, until, in the end, only one central government mint remained in existence, which, of course, makes it far easier to engage in manipulations of the gold or silver content than it would be if there were amultitude of mints competing against each other. If you have a multitude of mints competing against each other, each mint has an incentive to point out if another one is defrauding you. You have a mint from town A or town B, they are engaging in coin clipping so people would respond by bankrupting or boycotting this type of mint. As soon as only one mint exists to serve a large territory, it becomes far easier to engage in these sorts of manipulations and thereby having a tool for enriching yourself, in addition to your power to tax.

接下来，当然，鉴于教会长期以来是主要的教育机构，国家会通过控制教会，逐步推行公立教育，并让牧师成为国家雇员。这在所有欧洲国家都或多或少地发生过，尤其是在新教国家，所有牧师的薪资都参照官僚体系的薪资标准。假如这种控制还不够彻底，那么，毫无疑问，国家便会建立一个由国家直接控制的公立教育体系。例如，马丁·路德曾在推动公立教育方面发挥了重要作用，他不仅建议君主镇压农民（他起初煽动农民起来反抗君主，但随后又镇压了他们），还建议君主，不仅要像训练士兵一样来训练民众，也应该在国家控制的学校里对他们进行洗脑，使他们成为勇敢且训练有素的“良民”。

教育被国有化之后，国家的下一个目标便是控制货币发行，即实现货币垄断。以法国为例，在建立中央王权之前，各地铸币厂相互竞争，致力于打造最可靠、最不受操控的货币，以赢得信誉。然而，随着中央集权的加强，这些竞争性的铸币厂被逐步关闭，最终只剩下一个中央政府铸币厂。这样的垄断使政府更容易操纵货币的金银含量，获取额外收益。在自由竞争环境下，如果某个铸币厂偷偷降低金币或银币的含量，其他铸币厂会揭露其欺诈行为，消费者也会选择更可靠的货币，导致劣币发行者破产或被市场淘汰。然而，当政府成为唯一的铸币机构，货币操纵变得轻而易举，国家不仅可以依靠税收，还能通过操控货币进一步掠夺财富。

Lastly, they also then monopolize the means of transportation and communication, which is of great importance once you recognize that means of communication and transportation would have to play a very important role in any attempt to revolt against the government. You have to move troops from place to place; you have to send letters and messages from place to place, so you monopolize the postal service and you monopolize at least the main throughways and make them the king’s roads and the king’s postal service, in order to control the public.

最后，他们还会垄断交通和通信手段。一旦认识到交通和通信手段在任何反抗政府的企图中都必然发挥的重要作用，就会明白这种垄断意义重大。调兵遣将需要交通，传递信件和消息需要通信。所以，他们垄断邮政服务，至少垄断主要干道，将其变为国王的专用道路和国王的邮政服务，以此来控制民众。

I will end with a few additional observations. With states coming into existence, the normal natural tendencies for markets to expand, division of labor to expand and intensify, is not brought to a halt, but it is somehow distorted and disrupted. There exist now, all of a sudden, state borders that previously did not exist, and automatically, once you have state borders, the possibility arises that you can now hamper and interfere with the free ﬂow of goods. That is, you can impose tariﬀs. Second, the normal tendency of money to become an international money is also brought to a halt because now we have borders. There will be national monies arising, even if they are initially commodity monies, but they will now be French francs and Italian lira, and this brings about monetary disintegration, or reduces the amount of integration that would otherwise naturally arise on the market. Then, with the existence of the state, of course, the tendency for law to become universal and international, that I described in my lecture yesterday, is slowed down or halted. We had these insurance agencies and reinsurance agencies and arbitration agencies and the conﬂict between various insurance agencies leading, then, to the competitive development of universally accepted standards of right and wrong, of what is legal and illegal; this comes to a halt. Law is now broken up into German law, Dutch law, Swedish law, every country having diﬀerent sorts of principles, procedures, etc. The tendency that normally exists for unifying this comes to a halt.

最后，我再补充几个观点。随着国家的出现，市场扩张、劳动分工扩大与深化的自然常态虽未完全停滞，但在某种程度上遭到了扭曲与破坏。首先，原本并不存在的国家边界被认为划定，而一旦有了国家边界，国家阻碍和干预商品自由流通的可能性就会自然而生，也就是说，国家可以设置关税，限制贸易。其次，货币原本有发展成为国际通用货币的自然趋势，但国界的出现同样打断了这一进程。于是各国货币应运而生，即便最初它们是商品货币，但现在被划分为法国法郎、意大利里拉等，这种国币的国有化导致了货币体系的分化、解体，或者说，降低了原本市场上自然形成的货币一体化程度。再者，随着国家的建立，我昨天讲座中提到的法律走向普遍化和国际化的趋势，也遭到减缓或停滞。原本存在的保险公司、再保险机构、仲裁机构之间的竞争，以及不同保险公司之间的冲突，推动了被普遍接受的是非标准的形成，关于何为合法、何为非法标准的竞争性发展，这一切现在都通通遭到夭折。法律如今被人为分割成德国法律、荷兰法律、瑞典法律等等，各国都有自行其是的一套原则和程序。法律走向统一的正常趋势被迫就此戛然而止。

And last but not least, states also have a profound eﬀect on the development of languages. On the one hand, they sometimes forcibly expand certain types of languages within their territory, eliminate certain languages and make some languages the official language of the country. On the other hand, by doing this, as the other side of the same coin, they also disrupt the natural tendency of people to learn diﬀerent languages and on the fringes of diﬀerent territories for people to speak multiple languages and, in a way, also prevent the development of some languages that are used as international languages. Just think of what happened to Latin, which used to be the language of international communication for hundreds of years all throughout Europe. Latin basically disappears from this function as soon as national states come into existence. It is then that French is spoken, German is spoken and Latin becomes, if it does not die out immediately, alanguage that is spoken less and less and in the end, it becomes just a relic that some strange people still learn in strange places without really knowing why, because nobody except the pope and his people actually speak that language.

最后，同样重要的是，国家对语言的发展也有着深远影响。一方面，国家有时会在其领土内强行推广某几种语言，同时淘汰部分语言，并将一些语言定为官方语言。另一方面，与此相伴而生的是，这也扰乱了人们学习不同语言的自然倾向，阻碍了不同地区边缘人群使用多种语言的现象，并且在一定程度上，阻碍了一些有可能国际通用语言的发展。想想拉丁语的境遇就能明白了，数百年来，拉丁语一直是整个欧洲的国际交流语言。但民族国家一出现，拉丁语基本上就丧失了这一功能。从那时起，法语、德语开始流行，拉丁语即便没有即刻消亡，使用之人也越来越少，最终沦为一种历史遗迹，只有一些非常之人在一些非常之地学习它，却并不真正明了为何要学，因为除了教皇及其相关人员，实际上无人说这种语言。

第八讲从君主制到民主制

The subject of this lecture is “From Monarchy to Democracy.” This is obviously one of the main subjects that I cover in my book Democracy: The God That Failed. I have talked about monarchs already in the previous two lectures, about the role of monarchs in feudal societies, which we can refer to as prestate societies. And then, in the last lecture, about the position of monarchs as heads of state and the transition from the feudal stage to the monarchical state. Roughly speaking, historically, and only talking about Europe, in this case the period of feudal monarchs is roughly the period from 1100 to 1500 and then from 1500 until the end of WorldWar I, that is, the period of monarchical states. The later stages are constitutional monarchical states and the earlier stages are what we refer to typically as absolute monarchies. As I said, the discussion during the last two lectures referred mostly to the development in Europe. I will comeback to the European develop ment, that is, to Christian monarchies as a transition from Christian monarchs to democracy in a moment, but I want to say a few things about the institution of kings and monarchs in general, even outside of the European scenery.

本次讲座的主题是“从君主制到民主制”。很显然，这也是我在《民主：失败的上帝》一书中重点探讨的议题之一。在之前的两讲中，我已经谈及君主，探讨了君主在封建社会（我们可将其视为前国家社会）中的角色。接着，在上一讲里，我讲到了君主作为国家元首的地位，以及封建阶段向君主制国家的转变。如果我们聚焦欧洲，沿着历史时间线，大致可以如下划分：公元1100年至1500年可以视为“封建君主”阶段，而从1500年一直到第一次世界大战结束，这一时期则属于“国家君主”阶段。至于“国家君主”阶段还可细分，早起是“专制君主”，后期则是“立宪君主”。就我们这次讲座而言，过去的两讲主要聚焦欧洲的发展过程。稍后，我还会回到欧洲的发展历程，继续讨论基督教国家的君主政体，并进一步讨论它如何过渡到民主政体。但在此之前，我想先简要谈谈君主制度这一现象本身，包括在欧洲以外地区的情况。

In a way, monarchs area more typical form of rulership, whether prestate or state rulers, than any other form. Democracies area very rare event in human history, and it is easy to explain why that is, because patriarchy is one of the most natural institutions that you can imagine. You have, of course, fathers as the heads of households, and by and large the idea of kings was modeled after the structure that you ﬁnd in households. Kings were typically regarded as the heads of extended families or the heads of clans or the heads of tribes, or later on of course, the heads of entire nations, but developing along the lines of the idea that this is a natural development, similar to what we see in each family.

从某种程度上来说，无论是在前国家时期还是国家形成之后，君主制都是一种比其他任何形式都更为典型的统治形式。民主制在人类历史上极为罕见，而原因也不难解释，因为父权制是你所能想象到的最自然的制度之一。当然，在家庭中父亲是一家之主，而国王的概念大体上是仿照家庭结构塑造出来的。国王通常被视为大家族的族长、氏族首领、部落首领，后来，理所当然地，成为整个国家的领袖。但这种发展遵循的思路是，这是一种自然发展，类似于我们在每个家庭中看到的情形。

All kings try to associate themselves with some sort of religious, or give themselves some sort of religious, dignity. In many places on the globe, kings were considered to be either gods or incarnations of gods or descendants of gods or as people who acquired godlike status after their deaths. And kings in all societies tried in a way to provide two functions. On the one hand, the function as judge and priest, that is, as the intellectual head of larger groups of people, and on the other hand, the function as warrior and protector of their clans or tribes or whatever the group was of which they were considered to be the head. And while it was sometimes the case that these two functions, the priestjudge function and the warrior-protector function were separated and occupied by diﬀerent individuals, there was always an attempt made to combine the two, to make the protector and warrior also, at the same time, the high priest, and of course, in combining these two functions, you would achieve a far greater power than if these two functions were somehow exercised by diﬀerent individuals controlling each other.

所有国王都试图将自己与某种宗教联系起来，或赋予自己某种宗教上的神圣地位。在全球许多地方，国王被视为神、神的化身或神的后裔，又或者被认为死后能获得神一般的地位。在所有社会中，国王都试图提供两种职能。一是作为法官和祭司的角色，作为更庞大群体的精神领袖；二是作为战士和保护者的角色，保护他们的氏族、部落或视他们为首领的任何群体。尽管在有些社会中，虽然这两种职能——“法官-祭司”与“战士-保护者”——可能会由不同的人分担，但历代君主无一例外都会试图将这两种职能集于一身，既是保护者和战士，同时也是大祭司。当然，相比这两种职能由不同的人分别行使且相互制衡，将两者合而为一能让国王获得更大的权力。

Outside of the West, more typically it was the case that the king was also considered to be the head of the religious organization or the head of the church. That was the case in places like Egypt and also in Japan, in the Islamic world, with the Hindus, and also in the case of China; the uniqueness of Western civilization, as I mentioned in the previous lectures, was precisely the relatively strict separation of these two functions by diﬀerent individuals and diﬀerent institutions. This is not to say that this existed all throughout the West, and it certainly was the case that religious leaders might hope and try to acquire earthly powers and that the earthly rulers try to control the churches. But certainly from about the year 1000 or so, this separation between the two roles worked for quite some time in Europe, basically until the Protestant Revolution when the combination between church, on the one hand, and state or earthly rulers, on the other hand, became increasingly closer again.

在西方世界之外，更典型的情况是，国王也被视为宗教组织的领袖或教会的首脑。比如埃及、日本、伊斯兰世界、印度教地区以及中国皆是如此。相比之下，正如我在之前讲座中提到的，西方文明的独特之处，就在于它较早地将这两种职能——政治权力与宗教权威——相对明确地分离开，由不同的人和不同的机构来行使。这并不是说整个西方历史一直都是如此，宗教领袖肯定渴望也曾试图获取世俗权力，而世俗统治者也常常试图控制教会。但可以说，大约从公元1000年开始，这种分权体制在欧洲确实维持了一段相当长的时间。直到宗教改革时期，这种分离的格局才被打破，教会与国家、宗教领袖与世俗统治者之间的关系又日渐紧密，“名”与“器”重新合一。

This separation between church leaders and the earthly worldly rulers did not, of course, prevent the various kings from claiming some sort of elevated status for themselves. I mentioned in the previous lecture that the kings of England, for instance, tried to trace their own claims to the land back to Adam and Eve, and thereby present themselves as people whose position had ultimately been founded by God, and that all of their subjects were indeed nothing else but the oﬀspring following the tenants of Adam and Eve. Nonetheless, at least for the Christian world, even if kings claim that they have this special historical dignity of having been installed by God directly or indirectly into their positions, precisely because in Christianity kings are not considered to be godlike ﬁgures and we have a transcendent God, kings were always considered to be under the law like everyone else. And because of this, in the West, the institution of regicide, killing the king, was always considered to be quite legitimate, not entirely undisputed, but for centuries, of course, considered to be something that was entirely alright, if the king would not do what he was supposed to do, according to the universal law laid down by the transcendent God.

当然，教会领袖与世俗统治者之间的这种分离，并没有阻止各国国王为自己谋求某种崇高地位。我在上一讲中提到，例如，英格兰的国王们试图将自己对土地的所有权追溯到亚当和夏娃，借此声称自己的地位是由上帝设立的，而所有臣民不过是亚当和夏娃的后代，天然地隶属于王权之下。尽管如此，至少在基督教世界，即便国王宣称自己拥有这种特殊的神圣历史地位，直接或间接地来自上帝的授予，但恰恰因为在基督教中，国王并不被视为神或神的化身，而且我们信仰的是超验的上帝，所以国王始终被认为和其他人一样要受法律约束。正因如此，在西方，弑君这一行为——杀死国王——一直被认为是非常合理，虽说并非毫无争议，但数个世纪以来，人们自然而然认为，如果国王违反了那位超越一切、制定普世法律的上帝所设下的规范，那么弑君一直被认为是完全合法正当的。

In addition, in Europe, or at least in some parts of Europe, the power of the king was always restricted by the fact that there existed other noblemen who claimed to be the sole and exclusive owners of their land, that is, not to have received their land as some sort of grant from the king, but being, maybe on a smaller scale, but nonetheless, an equally safe private property owner as a king was of whatever he claimed to be his. This is what we refer to as the allodial form of feudalism. And given, at least for the feudal king, that he was recognized as a voluntarily acknowledged judge and military leader, as I explained in the previous lecture, it took quite some time for him to secure and gain the position as a sovereign, stripping these allodial feudal owners of their full and complete property rights and establishing himself as a compulsory monopolist.

此外，在欧洲，或者至少在欧洲的部分地区，国王的权力始终受到这样一个事实的限制：存在其他贵族，他们宣称自己是其土地的唯一且排他的所有者，也就是说，他们的土地非是从国王那里获得的某种封赏，而是类似于规模较小，但同样稳固的私有财产，如同国王宣称归己所有的任何东西一样。这就是我们所说的自主地封建制形式（the allodial form of feudalism）。而且，正如我在上一讲所解释的，至少对于封建国王而言，他被视为民众自愿认可的法官和军事领袖，他花了相当长的时间才获得并巩固君主地位，剥夺这些自主地封建所有者完整的财产权，最终确立自己作为强制性垄断者的地位。

Now, with the establishment of kings as heads of states, we can almost from the very beginning discover the seeds of the destruction of dynastic monarchies in the following way. Remember what I explained about the justiﬁcation that was given for the existence of a state, the justiﬁcation that Hobbes developed. There will be war of all against all, and the only way that we can create peace is by having one monopolist on top of the social hierarchy being the ultimate judge equipped with the power to tax. Now, interestingly, in this justiﬁcation, you realize that it doesn’t really matter for the Hobbesian argument who this monopolist is. It happened to be monarchs at the time because the institution of monarchy is a relatively natural institution, just people who have more wisdom and riches accumulated and who command more authority and are looked up to.

如今，随着国王成为国家元首，王朝君主制覆灭的种子是如何被买下的呢？我们几乎从一开始就能以如下方式发现。还记得我所阐释的国家存在的正当理由吗？也就是霍布斯提出的理由。会出现所有人对所有人的战争，而我们缔造和平的唯一途径，是在社会等级顶层设立一个垄断者，由其担任终极仲裁者并拥有征税权。有趣的是，在这个正当理由中，你会意识到，从霍布斯的论点可以看出，这个垄断者是谁其实并不重要。彼时承运而立者碰巧是君主而已，因为君主制是一种相对自然的制度，而君主通常恰恰是那些更有智慧、积累了更多财富、更具权威且受人敬仰之人。

The ﬁrst governments, the ﬁrst states, happen to be monarchical states, but the argument for the state that monarchs used, in order to establish themselves as a state, makes no reference to a claim that it must be a king who is this monopolist. In principle, it can be anyone, it just must be a monopolist who does it. Because of this, for instance, the English kings were initially quite unsympathetic toward the Hobbesian argument, because they realized that it did not contain a speciﬁc justiﬁcation or legitimation for the institution of dynastic monarchs, and Hobbes was even suspected of having some sort of republican sympathies, or even as being somebody who might have secret sympathies for Cromwell. Whether that is true or not is irrelevant, but what is of importance is the fact that this justiﬁcation for the state, this rational justiﬁcation for the state, embodies the seeds of the destruction of the institution of a monarchical state.

最早的政府，也就是最早的国家，确实大多是君主制国家。但值得注意的是，君主们为了确立自身作为“国家”的地位，所采用的那套国家正当性论证——尤其是霍布斯所提出的论点——其实并没有强调必须只有“国王”才是这个垄断者。原则上，任何人都有资格，只要是由一个垄断者来行使权力就行。正因如此，例如英格兰的国王们起初就对霍布斯的主张相当反感，他们敏锐地意识到，该论点并未为王朝君主制提供明确的正当性辩护或合法性依据，甚至有人怀疑霍布斯暗中倾向共和主义，甚至可能私底下对克伦威尔抱有某种同情。这些是否属实并不重要，关键在于，霍布斯为国家所提出的“理性正当性”论证，实际上已经蕴含了瓦解君主国家制度的潜在力量。换句话说，这一理论本身不仅没有捍卫君主制，反而为其他形式的统治打开了大门。

Now, this transition from monarchical state to a diﬀerent form of state democracy took several hundred years, just as the establishment of states out of prestate orders took several hundred years, and the transition was driven not least by the very intellectuals that played an important role in securing the position of kings as states. Remember, states need legitimacy, need support, voluntary support among the public, and it was precisely intellectuals that were hired by the king who spread this idea about the necessity of a monopolist judge equipped with taxing power. But as intellectuals happen to be, they are always unsatisﬁed with their own position, eventhough the position of theirs somehow improved, being now somewhat employed or semi-employed by kings. As soon as they had reached this position, they began to spread various egalitarian views, and these egalitarian views simply raised the question whether it isn’t somehow unjust that there exist people who have privileges, that the king is guided by a diﬀerent type of law than the rest of mankind, that there are princely laws and privileges diﬀerent from the laws and rules that apply to the rest of mankind. So, the egalitarian propaganda took the form of an attack against privilege. How can privilege be squared with the Christian idea that we are all created equal by the same creator—and the alleged solution proposed to this seeming injustice was to say that there should be open entry into the position of government. Why should it be the king? After all, only a state was necessary in order to create law and order, and other people could do that just as well as some sort of hereditary king could do it. There were some people early on who recognized that the problem was rather that the state king represented amonopoly, and that what was necessary as a solution was, in away, to get rid of this monopoly power—again, to have competing jurisdictions. But the overwhelming majority took the line that in order to abolish privileges, all we have to do is open up entry into the government to everyone, and they called this equality before the law.

从君主制国家向另一种国家形式——即民主制国家的转变，历经了数百年时间，就像国家从“前国家秩序”中建立起来也花费了数百年一样。这一转变的重要推动者，很大程度上正是知识分子，他们曾在巩固国王作为国家元首地位过程中发挥重要作用。要知道，国家需要合法性，需要公众的自愿支持，而恰恰是这些食君之禄的知识分子，使得“设立一个拥有征税权的垄断仲裁者之必要性的观念”，在民众中开枝散叶。但知识分子的尿性使然，即便当下境遇已获优渥改善，食君之禄却未忠君之事，他们仍常怀不忿之心，对自身处境颇多微词。一旦心怀异心，他们便开始四处传播各种平等主义思想。这些平等主义观点引发了对特权现象的质疑：为何社会上会有人享有特权？为何国王适用的法律与普通人不同？为何存在“王室法律”与“平民法律”的差别？在基督教信仰中，人们被认为是由同一个造物主所创造的，人人平等，那么“特权”又如何自圆其说呢？于是乎，平等主义的宣传逐渐演变为对特权制度的抨击。针对这种不公现象，他们提出的所谓解决之道就是政府职位应该向所有人开放。为什么国王就是天选之子呢？毕竟，为了建立和维护法律与秩序，只需一个国家，其他人亦能如世袭国王一般胜任。早期就有一些人认识到，问题的关键在于国王所代表的国家是一种垄断，而解决办法在某种程度上就是要消除这种垄断权力——再次实现司法管辖权的竞争。但绝大多数人却认为，为了废除特权，我们只需向所有人敞开政府大门，让更多人拥有特权，他们居然大言不惭地将此称为“法律面前人人平等”。

Now, I point out from the outset that there is, of course, an error involved in this. By opening entry into the government agency to everyone instead of restricting it to just the members of some speciﬁc family, you do not abolish privileges. What you achieve instead is that you now substitute functional privileges for personal privileges. The king and his successors had a personal privilege, but if you open entry to the position of the government leader to everyone, you still have a functional privilege. Everyone can now acquire this privileged position, but there still exists privileged positions. In legal terms, you can say, instead of having a higher princely law and a lower law applying to the common man, we have now created, so to speak, public law, that is, the law that regulates the behavior of those who are in charge of the state, and private law that applies to the rest of mankind.

我必须一开始就指出，这里面当然存在一个根本性错误。将政府机构的准入资格向所有人开放，而不是仅限于某个特定家族的成员，这并没有废除特权。相反，其结果无非就是用职能特权取代个人特权。国王及其继任者拥有个人特权，但如果你向所有人开放政府领导职位，仍然存在职能特权。现在每个人都有资格争取这个特权职位，但特权职位依然存在。从法律层面来讲，我们可以说，如今已不存在适用于王公贵族的高等法律和适用于普通民众的低等法律，但是我们如今创造了公法，规范那些负责管理国家者的行为，以及适用于其他民众的私法。新瓶旧酒，特权依然。

But, public law is, again, superior over private law in the same way as princely law was superior over the law applying to common folks. Public law beats private law, and that there are privileges you can simply see by the fact that as a public official, you could do things that you were not allowed to do as a private individual. This is, of course, true up to this day. As a public official, you can take the property of others. As a private citizen, this would be considered to be a crime.

但是，公法本质上仍然高于私法，就如同之前“王室法律”高于适用普通民众的法律一样。公法凌驾于私法之上，特权的存在显而易见。这种特权，现实中随处可见，身为公职人员，你可以做一些普通个体不被允许之事。当然，直至今日仍是如此。身为公职人员，你可以征收他人财产。而作为普通公民，这将被视为犯罪。

As a public official, you can enslave people; you can draft them into the army and military. If you were just a plain private individual, then that same act would be considered to be an outrage and would be a punishable oﬀense. Privileges do not disappear when you open entry to government to everyone, and not everyone is equal before the law either, because there exist two types of law. If you area public official, a diﬀerent law applies to you and protects you than if you were a private individual; as a private individual you are only protected by a subordinate form of law, that is private law.

身为公职人员，你可以奴役民众，可以征召他们入伍。但如果你只是普通个体，同样的行为就会被视为暴行，是应受惩处的违法行为。当你向所有人敞开庙堂的大门，特权并不会消失，法律面前也并非人人平等，因为存在两种法律。如果你是公职人员，适用于你并保护你的法律，与普通个体所适用的法律不同；作为普通个体，你仅受一种较低层级的法律，即私法的保护。

If we look at the change from monarchy to democracy, described as a system where entry into the government is available to everyone, from a purely economic point of view, what happens in this case is that we substitute a person who considers the entire territory over which he exercises monopolistic control as his private property which he can pass on to his oﬀspring, for a person who is only a temporary caretaker who is in charge, for acertain limited period of time, of the same territory. But this, being the owner of a territory versus being a temporary caretaker of a territory, makes a fundamental diﬀerence from an economic point of view. Let me just illustrate that by using a very elementary example. I can give you a house and say, “You are the owner of the house. You can sell this house if you want, you can pass it on to future generations if you want. You can sell part of it. You have the right to collect rent from it.” And on the other hand, I give you a house and say, “You are not the owner of the house. You cannot sell it, you cannot determine who will be your successor. You can also not sell part of it, but you can use it to your own advantage for a certain period of time. That is, the rent that you can get out of this house, you are free to do with this rental income whatever you want.”

如果从纯粹的经济学角度来看从君主制到民主制这一转变，民主制就是一种人人都可进入政府的体制，那么实际情况是，我们将君主换成了临时看管人。君主将对其行使垄断控制权的整个区域视为其私有财产，并可传给后代，而临时看管人则只是在一定的有限时间内负责管理这同一片区域。但从经济学角度而言，成为一片区域的所有者与成为该区域的临时看管人，却有着本质区别。我可列举一个非常简单的例子来加以说明。第一种情况，假如我给你一栋房子并说：“你是这房子的主人。你若愿意，可以卖掉这房子，也可以将其传给后代。你也可以卖掉房子的一部分。你有权收取房租。” 第二种情况则是，我给你一栋房子并说：“你不是这房子的主人。你不能卖掉它，不能决定谁将成为你的继任者。你也无权卖掉房子的一部分，但在一定时间内你可以出于自身利益使用它。也就是说，你可将这房子的租金据为己有，且可随意支配这笔租金收入。”

Now, ask yourself whether or not these two people will treat the house in the same way or diﬀerently, and the answer is obvious. There will be a fundamental diﬀerence in the way that the house will be treated by these two individuals. The incentive for the owner is, yes, of course, I try to get as high a rental income as possible out of the house, but at the sametime, I always take into consideration what happens to the value of the capital stock of which I am the owner. After all, I can sell the house. Or, I can pass the house on to future generations. And it is possible, for instance, to increase your rental income from your house in such a way that the value of the capital stock drops or falls more than my increase in rental income that I get. An owner would try to prevent something like this from happening. And if he doesn’t do this, then he will be punished insofar as he will see that the value of his property will fall in the property market. A caretaker’s incentives are entirely diﬀerent. A caretaker only owns the rental income. He does not own the capital stock. What is his incentive? His incentive is to maximize his rental income regardless of what the repercussions are with respect to the value of the capital stock.

现在请你想一想，这两个人会以相同的方式对待这所房子吗？答案显而易见：此二人对待房子的方式会有根本差异。对于房子主人来说，其动机当然是尽可能从房子获取高额租金收入，但与此同时，也会考虑自身所拥有的这份资产价值会如何变化。毕竟，我可以卖掉房子，或者将它传给后代。那么，假如存在某种方式可能会提高房子的租金收入，但其资产价值的下降幅度却超过了租金收入的增长幅度。房主必定会努力避免这种情况发生。如果他不这么做，显然就会受到市场的惩罚，因为他会看到房子在贬值。而看管人的激励机制则完全不同。看管人只拥有租金收入，并不拥有房产本身。他的动机是什么呢？他的动机是将租金收入最大化，而不顾这会对房产价值产生何种负面影响。

Let’s say that instead of putting one or two families in my house and collecting rent from two families, I can instead put a thousand guest workers in my house and have one bedover the other and thereby I will deﬁnitely increase my rental income. But it is also easy to see what the price of this type of usage will be, that is, there will be a deterioration of the property taking place very quickly. The toilets will be clogged immediately, the carpets will be dirtied. There will be graffiti on the walls and all the rest of it, people come home drunk and smash the walls and who knows what. Again, if I know that I will be in charge of this house for four years and that the losses in terms of the capital value are not my losses because I don’t own the thing in the ﬁrst place, my incentive will be to maximize my current income that can be achieved by using this capital, even if it is the case that at the end of these four years, the capital stock has been run into the ground and has been completely depleted.

假设我不是在房子里安置一两户人家并收取这两户的租金，而是在房子里塞进一千名外来务工人员，采用上下铺的方式，这样我肯定能增加租金收入。但也很容易看出这种使用方式的代价，那就是房产会迅速破败。马桶立刻堵塞，地毯弄脏，墙上到处涂鸦，诸如此类，人们醉醺醺地回家，还可能砸墙撞门，天知道还会干出什么。再者，如果我知道自己只能管理这房子四年，而且房产价值的损失也不由我承担，因为我压根就不拥有这房产，那我的动机就会是通过使用这处资产来最大化我当前的收入，哪管四年之后，这处房产将会破败不堪、一文不值。

Now, on a large scale, this is the diﬀerence between democratic caretakers of countries and kings as owners of countries. A democratic caretaker’s incentive is that I have to loot the country as fast as possible, because if I don’t loot it as fast as possible, then I will no longer be in power. I can buy myself many, many friends if I just impose a tremendous amount of taxes right now, and as to what happens after I am out of power, who cares? Whereas kings, at least by and large, had an interest in preserving the value of their dynastic property and passingona valuable piece of property to future generations. No, I’m not saying that every king will automatically be equally good in terms of preserving his capital values, nor do I say that every single democratic caretaker will precisely follow the scenario that I developed, but what I’m saying is, the incentive structure is so diﬀerent that we can expect that by and large, on the average, kings will have a longer planning horizon and a greater interest in the preservation of the capital stock and democratic rulers, by and large, have a far smaller interest in the preservation of the capital stock and a far greater interest in the current consumption of resources that you can press out of the existing capital stock. The exploitation of a king is along-run exploitation, farsighted exploitation, calculated exploitation. The exploitation of a democratic caretaker is short-run exploitation, noncalculating exploitation, and so on.

从宏观层面来看，这就是民主制度下国家“看管人”与将国家视为私产的君主之间的区别。民主制度下“看管人”的动机是要尽快掠夺国家财富，因为如果不尽快下手，未来可能不再掌权。只要我现在大幅征税，就能收买众多朋友，至于下台之后会怎样，谁又在乎呢？而君主，总体而言，至少会希望维护王朝财产的价值，并将一份有价值的产业传给后代。不，我当然不是说每个君主在维护资产价值方面都会同样出色，也不是说每个民主制度下的“看管人”都会完全按照我所描述的那样行事，但我想说的是，激励机制天差地别，所以总体而言，平均来看，君主会有更长远的规划，对维护资产更感兴趣，而民主统治者总体上对维护资产的兴趣要小得多，反而对从现有资产中压榨资源以满足当前消费的兴趣要大许多。君主的剥削是长期的、有远见的、经过算计的剥削。而民主制度下“看管人”的剥削则是短期的、不经计算的剥削，凡此种种，不胜枚举。

I will illustrate this by looking just at three dimensions here. The subject of taxation—for a king, of course, he wants to tax, there’s no question. Everybody is tempted to do this; if you have the right to tax, of course you like to tax. But, what he will bring into perspective is, if I tax too much right now, the productivity of the population might go down in the long run and I expect to be in power also in the long run. So, he will more likely engage in a moderate amount of taxation, always keeping in mind the disincentive to productive people that taxation implies. Compare this with a caretaker who is just in charge for a certain period of time. Again, for him, the fact that in the long run, productivity will decline if he currently engages in massive amounts of taxation is of far lesser concern than it would be for a king because after all, in the more distant future, he will likely not be in power. He is far more present oriented in this regard, and discounts the fact that high taxation means a reduction in productivity on the part of the subject population to a greater extent than a king would do.

我将选取三个维度来阐述这个问题。第一是税收，就这个维度而言，国王希望征税，这一点毋庸置疑的。每个人都难免有此想法；如果拥有征税权，自然就会倾向于征税。但国王在征税时会考虑一个重要的长远因素：如果现在税收太重，可能会在长期内削弱民众的生产积极性，而我自己未来还将继续统治这个国家。因此，国王通常会倾向于实行较为温和的税收政策，他会意识到，过度征税会打击那些有生产力的人，而这对整个国家的财富积累不利。而与之相对，民主制度下的“临时看管人”（即民选官员）仅在短期内掌权。他不会像国王那样关心长期的国家生产力会因高税收而受损。对他而言，未来的经济损失和生产衰退无关己事，毕竟届时他极大可能已不再掌权。因此，他更现时取向，更易杀鸡取卵，会为了当前任期内的收益而大幅提高税收，而对这种行为导致的负面后果几乎不加考虑。

Look at the subject of debt, of state debt. A king is, of course, also inclined to incur debt and they all did, especially for war ﬁnance, but kings typically, in order to get credit, had to pledge certain things as security and in addition, though that was somewhat disputed, there was always the possibility that the future generations were held responsible for the debt incurred by their own father or mother. That was not in all cases carried through, but it was hanging as a Damoclean sword above the head of a king that maybe the next generation is expected to pay oﬀ my debt. And again, he knows, of course, that if his debt load is too high, this has long-run negative repercussions on savings rates, and he tries to avoid these long-run consequences, to a certain extent at least. Now consider a public caretaker and his attitude toward government debt. First of all, none of these people ever expects that any of them will be held personally responsible for the debt to be repaid. Ronald Reagan, who indebted the United States more than anybody before him and now, our beloved Bush warrior, who again, indebts this country for a tremendous amount—Reagan is not in debtor’s prison, nor will Bush have to fear that he will be jailed if he doesn’t repay the debt. They just take up as much debt as they can, and say that some future suckers will have to pay for this. In addition, of course, they will not give any security for it. That is, whereas major lenders to kings insisted that if you don’t repay, I get this castle or that castle or this little piece of land or that piece of land from you. Here there are no pledges of any security whatsoever. If a democratic government defaults on their debt, none of you are entitled to take over the Grand Canyon or someplace like this, so no security whatsoever. And again, you can, of course, imagine that the tendency of democratic governments to run up debts is far more pronounced than it would be under monarchical rule.

第二点，我们来看国家债务的问题。君主当然也倾向于举债，尤其是在战争时期，这几乎是所有国王的共同做法。不过，国王在借债时通常需要拿出某些财产作为抵押担保。此外，虽然这一点在历史上有争议，但人们普遍认为，王室所欠下的债务很可能需要由其后代来偿还。也就是说，债务如同一把达摩克里斯之剑悬在国王头上——或许下一代必须为他今天的举债埋单。因此，国王多少会考虑到，如果债务负担过重，长远来看将对储蓄率和国家财政稳定产生不利影响，所以他会有所克制。

相比之下，民选政府中的“临时看管人”在对待政府债务时的态度则截然不同。首先，这些人根本不预期自己会为国家债务承担任何个人责任。举例来说，里根是美国历史上举债最多的总统之一，而后来布什也大幅增加了国家债务。但无论是里根还是布什，都不必担心因为债务问题而坐牢。他们只是尽可能多地举债，然后把还债的责任甩给未来的“倒霉蛋”。更关键的是，他们根本不需要拿出任何实质担保来获得贷款。历史上的放贷人若借钱给国王，通常会要求对方承诺若无力偿还，就必须割让某座城堡或某块土地。而如今，如果一个民主国家政府违约，债权人不可能去接管大峡谷或其他国家资产——因为根本没有任何抵押担保可言。因此可以想见，在民主制度下，政府举债的冲动远远大于君主制下的政府。

The same applies to inﬂation. Yes, of course, kings loved inﬂation, coin clipping and so forth; it enriches you. But again, there are two concerns that you have. On the one hand, by inﬂating, you increase your own current income; on the other hand, you will get, in the future, taxes back in inﬂated money. For people who have a very short-term perspective, what counts far more is the current advantage that you have in terms of inﬂating, that you can print the money and then buy yourself a Mercedes or a BMW or whatever you want. And then you realize, of course, how many friends you have that you were not even aware of, who also just realized that man, these guys have the magic wand, they can just create wealth merely by printing up paper money. Yes, of course, you get inﬂated paper money in the form of future taxes back too, but again, in the future, you will not be there; you will not be the recipient of that inﬂated money that comes back in the form of taxes. Then, your attitude toward inﬂation is more generous, so to speak. You like inﬂation more.

第三点，我们以同样的逻辑来解释通货膨胀。没错，国王们当然钟情于通货膨胀、硬币剪边（降低铸币成色）等之类的手段，这些手段无疑都能让他们损人利己。但同样，他们也有两方面的顾虑。一方面，制造通胀确实能带来即时收益；另一方面，未来他所征收到的税入，得到的将是贬值后的货币。

而民主制度下的“临时看管人”则完全不同。他们的目光更加短浅，，通胀带来的即时利益更具诱惑力，他们可持续印钞，为自己添置香车宝马，或其他垂涎已久之物。此时他们当然会发现，忽然间凭空多出许多新知故交，而这些朋友当然也会发现，哇，这些掌权者简直犹如手握魔法棒，仅凭“印纸”就能制造财富。当然，未来收税时，的确会收到膨胀贬值后的纸币，但到那时，他们可能早已离开权位，不会是这些以税收形式回流的因当前通胀而贬值的货币的接收者。正因如此，民选官员更放纵通胀，甚至更乐于制造通胀。

Again, for all of these predictions that I make, there exists, of course, ample empirical evidence that this is indeed the case. Let me just emphasize that while kings tried several times to substitute paper monies for commodity monies such as gold or silver, all of these attempts were relatively short-lived attempts. And they had to go back to a gold or silver standard. For the democratic world, which begins after World War I—during this period, for the ﬁrst time in all of human history, it happens that commodity monies disappear entirely on a worldwide scale and wherever you go, all you have is paper money, and of course, paper money inﬂation on a scale that was unheard of in previous centuries.

同样，对于我所做的这些判断，当然有大量实证证据作为支持。我只想强调一点，尽管国王们曾多次尝试用纸币取代诸如黄金或白银之类的商品货币，但所有这些尝试都难以持久、相对短暂，最终又不得不回归金本位或银本位。相比之下，第一次世界大战之后开始的民主时代，在人类历史上首次出现了这样的情况：商品货币在全球范围内彻底消失，不论你走到哪里，所见皆是纸币，当然，接踵而来的是前所未见的大规模纸币通胀，之前几百年闻所未闻。

There’s also a diﬀerent attitude among kings, as compared to democratic caretakers, when it comes to the redistribution of income. Both can take other people’s property, but the king, if he takes property from private individuals, runs an ideological danger. That is, he himself visà-vis other kings, considers himself also to be a private property owner. He does not want to undermine the legitimacy of private property, because if he does, then, of course, his competitors, King George or King Henry or whatever, King Fritz, they might then be interested in also taking his property. So, he’s very much interested in maintaining the legitimacy of the institution of private property as such. So, his forms of redistribution are rarely redistributions from the rich to groups of poor. The redistribution activities through which he tries to achieve popularity are typically beneﬁts that he gives to particular individuals in the form of privileges, and mostly to individuals who have achieved something. Just take the Hapsburgs as an example. They sometimes ennobled people who were enemies of monarchy, but in most cases they ennobled people who had achieved something. That’s why the family of Ludwig von Mises was ennobled, despite the fact that they were Jewish. They also had relatively little racial hatreds, because all the noble houses were somehow interconnected and there was sort of far more international orientation among the kings than among democratic caretakers, who tend to be more nationalistic.

在收入再分配方面，国王与民主制下的看管人持有不同态度。两者都可以通过权力掠夺他人财产，但国王如此行事，则会面临一种意识形态上的风险。也就是说，相较于其他国王，他亦把自己当作私产所有者。他不想破坏私有财产的合法性根基，因为一旦破坏，他的竞争对手，比如乔治国王、亨利国王，或者弗里茨国王之类，可能就会觊觎他的财产。所以，他极为看重维护私有财产制度本身的合法性。因而，他的再分配形式通常不会采用“劫富济贫”的方式。他当然会尝试通过再分配活动赢得支持，但这些活动通常是以特权形式给予特定个人以奖励，而这些个人往往是因某种成就而获得赏识。例如哈布斯堡家族，有时也会册封王权的反对者以贵族爵位，但多数情况下，受封者都是有所成就之人。这就是路德维希·冯·米塞斯家族虽为犹太裔却被册封为贵族的原因。而且，他们之间种族仇恨相对较少，因为所有贵族家族在某种程度上相互关联、盘根错节，相较于更倾向于国家主义的民主制看管人，国王们的国际视野无疑更加开阔。

The redistribution under democratic conditions is diﬀerent. You have to be reelected all the time and you have to be reelected by the masses, and the masses always consist of have-nots. There are always more have-nots than haves, in every dimension of having that is worth having. That is, in terms of money, in terms of beauty, in terms of smarts, whatever it is, there always exist more dummies than smarts; there always exists more poor than rich, etc. The strategy under democratic systems is, of course, the redistribution of income. First of all,you don’t have to legitimize this anymore because after all, you are now operating no longer as somebody who defends the principle of private property; you are in favor of public property and consider public property to be superior to or more important than private property. Taking private property is no ideological problem for you, and then, of course, you distribute it not to individuals, but to the masses, and by and large, to the masses of have-nots, that is, the less capable people in all dimensions of capability.

在民主条件下的财富再分配则有所不同。你始终得争取再次当选，而且必须获得民众的支持才能连任，而民众大多是贫困者。无论从任何值得拥有的方面来看，贫困者的数量总是多于富有者。也就是说，无论是在金钱方面，还是在美貌方面，又或是在智慧方面，无论是什么方面，愚蠢之人的数量总是多于聪慧之人；穷人的数量总是多于富人，诸如此类。这就决定了民主制度下的主要策略必然是推动收入再分配。首先，与国王不同，民主政客无需以捍卫私有财产原则的形象行事，因此后者毋须为这种行为正名；想法，他们更倾向于强调公有财产的优越性，认为公共利益高于私人产权。因此，夺取私有财产的意识形态障碍，已被完全扫清。最后，政客们自然不会只把财产封赏给个别有功之人，而是广泛的分给“大多数”——也就是在各方面能力都相对较弱的“匮乏者”群体。

Then I come to the argument that is frequently brought up in favor of democracy, that is, “Shouldn’t we, as free marketeers, be in favor of free entry? After all, this is what we learned in economics: monopoly is bad, from the point of view of consumers, because there is no longer free entry into every line of production. And if there is no longer free entry into every line of production, then the incentive of a producer to produce at the lowest possible cost is no longer in existence.” Imagine this: if there exists free entry in the free market, everybody can become a car manufacturer, for instance. Then, if I produce a car at a cost that is higher than the minimum possible cost of producing this car, I basically extend an invitation to somebody else to go into competition against me, to produce the same product at a lower cost than my cost and then be able, of course, to charge a lower price for the product and thereby drive me out of the market. On the other hand, if we have restrictions on free entry, then this pressure to produce at the lowest possible cost is no longer operative. This is the case that we make, normally, for why we are in favor of competition, meaning free entry into every line of production, and why we are against monopoly, meaning entrance into certain lines of production is either prohibited or obstacles are placed in the way of free entry, etc. The argument of some advocates of democracy goes, “Yeah, isn’t the same thing true here? If we have a king, meaning restricted entry, and with democracy, all of a sudden entry is open, and isn’t this a big advantage of democracy over monarchy?”

接下来谈谈常被用来支持民主的一种观点，即 “作为自由市场经济支持者，我们难道不应该支持自由进入吗？毕竟，我们从经济学中得到的结论是：从消费者的角度来看，垄断是有害的，因为不再能自由进入各个生产领域。如果不能自由进入各个生产领域，那么生产者以尽可能低的成本进行生产的动力就不复存在。” 想象一下：如果在自由市场中存在自由进入机制，比如说，每个人都可以成为汽车制造商。那么，如果我生产一辆汽车的成本高于生产该汽车的最低可能成本，基本上就等于在邀请其他人与我竞争，以比我更低的成本生产同样的产品，然后当然就能以更低的价格出售该产品，从而把我挤出市场。另一方面，如果我们对自由进入加以限制，那么以尽可能低的成本进行生产的压力就不再起作用。这就是我们通常主张支持竞争（即自由进入各个生产领域），反对垄断（禁止进入某些生产领域，或者设置准入壁垒等）的理由。一些民主拥趸的观点是：“是啊，道理岂非一样？若行君主之制，则王庭高筑，入仕参政之路如锁金扉；而民主之治兴，众生皆可登庙堂之阶，此非民主制胜于君主制乎？”

Now, the problem with this argument is this. The argument against monopoly in favor of competition that I presented before only holds insofar as we are considering the production of goods. The argument, however, does not hold if we consider the production of bads, and this is precisely what governments do. After all, people who are taxed do not willingly pay for the privilege of being taxed. That is to say, they are not considering being taxed to be a good. Those people who are, through legislative action, stripped of their property or robbed of part of their income, do not consider that to be a good thing that happens to them; they consider that to be a bad. People who see that the purchasing power of their money goes down as a result of paper money printing, do not consider this the production of goods; they consider that as the production of something bad. Now, do we want to have competition in the areas of the production of bads? The answer should be obvious: no. In the production of bads, we want to have as little competition as there can possibly be. We do not want to have competition as to who would be the most efficient commandant of a gas chamber. We would not want to have competition as to who would be the best whipper of slaves. There, we would be perfectly happy if that slave-whipping or gas chamber-commandant occupation would be very restricted and we would be quite happy if very incompetent people exercise this power, rather than looking for people who are particularly good at this.

这种论点存在的问题在于：我之前提出的反对垄断、支持竞争的观点，仅在我们考虑财货生产时才成立。然而，当我们考虑劣货（bads）生产时，则此观点不再成立，而政府所为皆在此列。毕竟，被征税的人并非心甘情愿为纳税这项 “特权” 买单。也就是说，他们并不认为被征税是件好事。那些因立法而被剥夺财产或部分收入之人，并不觉得于他们而言这是好事，恰恰相反，这无疑是坏事。看到因印钞导致自己手中货币购买力下降之人，并不认为印钞是在生产财货，实则是在制造劣货。那么，我们希望在制造劣货的领域存在竞争吗？答案显然是否定的。在生产劣货领域，我们希望竞争越少越好。我们不希望在谁能成为最有效率的毒气室最高效指挥官的问题上存在竞争。我们也不希望在谁能成为最娴熟的奴隶鞭笞者上存在竞争。在这些情境下，我们宁愿这些岗位、职业受到严格限制，甚至由最无能之辈来担任，而非鼓励那些特别擅长生产这些“劣货”之人进入并展开竞争。

Continuing this argument, you might say, “Kings, because they get into their position by accident of birth, can, of course, be evil guys, no question about it.” But, if they are evil guys and pose a danger that, through their activity, the possession of their dynasty—after all, they are head of a family—is threatened, then what typically happens is that one of their close relatives will be designated to make short shrift of this guy and chop oﬀ his head. That is, we have a way of getting rid of these people, and we don’t even have to worry too much about the general public taking care of this problem. It is within the family of those weird kings themselves where they have the greatest incentive either to surround these weirdos with advisors who curtail their evil desires, or if this doesn’t work, then have somebody hired out of their own family to kill this guy oﬀ.

顺着这个论点继续推论下去，你可能会说：“国王毕竟是靠血统继承上位的，难免有可能是个坏人，这一点毫无疑问。” 但是，如果这些坏国王的行为对王朝的存续构成威胁——毕竟他们是一个家族的首领——那么通常会发生什么呢？常见的情况是，他的某个近亲会被推选而出，迅速处理掉这个麻烦，甚至直接砍掉他的脑袋。也就是说，我们其实有一种“清除坏王”的机制，而且并不需要依赖广大普通的人民群众来解决这个问题。往往正是国王所在家族内部的人，最有动机去限制这类“坏王”的权力，他们要么会安排可信的顾问来制衡他们的恶行；假如此路不通，就会干脆由家族内部派人除掉他。

On the other hand, if you come into the position by accident, it is also possible that these people can be nice and decent people, like nice uncles. They do not have to worry about being reelected. They have been by and large trained for along time to be the future king or queen and to take care of the country. And believe me, I have met some members of royal houses; the upbringing of those people on the average tends to be an upbringing that most people would not like to suﬀer. That is to say, there is far more demanded of them in terms of decent good behavior than of the normal run-of-the-mill-type people. I’m glad that I’m not one of the oﬀspring of a royal house. There is, in most of these places, relatively little fun in your life. In those monarchical families that have been deposed, they have frequently become playboys, because they have had no preparation for anything else. They just have aﬀairs and gamble and do this and that, but in those places where there is still the expectation that they will get into the position, I tell you, there is discipline that you have never seen in your own house before.

另一方面，如果一个人仅仅因出身偶然而继承王位，也有可能恰好是个性格温和、品行端正之人，就像一位和蔼可亲的好叔叔。而且他们无需操心连任问题。总体而言，他们从小就接受长时间的训练，为日后成为国王或女王、治理国家做好准备。我可以负责任的说，我曾见过一些王室成员；整体而言，他们从小所受的教育，是大多数人未必愿意经历的。也就是说，相较于普通大众，他们在行为规范、道德要求方面要更加严格。我很庆幸自己不是王室出身。因为在大多数王室家庭，生活其实并不轻松，也没多少乐趣可言。那些被废黜的王室家族成员，往往会成为花花公子，因为他们从小就没有为其他生活道路做准备。他们只会拈花惹草、走鸡斗犬、惹是生非，但在那些王位继承仍有希望的王室家庭中，子女从小接受的训练以及管束之严格，是你在自家可能从未见过的。

Now look at democratic rulers and how they get to power. They have to be elected. And, it should be perfectly clear, that under this condition, that is, with free entry, everyone can become president, senator, etc.—and these people are in the business of doing bad things, being capable of doing bad things; we have a competition, “Who is the smartest bad guy? Who has the most demagogic talent? Who is a magniﬁcent briber, liar, cheater and all the rest of it?” Under democratic conditions, especially on the central level, it is almost impossible that a decent person will ever be elected to a higher rank. This might not be the case in a small village. In a small village, there are still some sort of social constraints, as the biggest, smoothest liar and so forth might not win an election in a village of one hundred people where everybody knows what kind of jerk he is. But, go to higher levels, state level, federal level, etc., it is almost assured that a person who out of conviction, doesn’t lie, who says we should, of course, not rip oﬀ the rich in order to give to the poor, but we should protect private property rights under all circumstances, a person like this is as likely to be elected as that it will snow in the summer in Las Vegas.

再来看民主制度下的统治者如何上台、以及他们是如何掌权的。他们必须通过选举才能上台。这种制度下，实行“自由参政”原则，也就是说，任何人都有机会成为总统、参议员等等。而这些职位的本质，其实是“干坏事”的岗位，或者说，需要具备“干坏事”的能力。于是，我们就看到了一场特殊的竞争——竞争的不是谁最有德行，而是谁是最聪明的坏蛋，谁最有煽动民众的天赋，谁是行贿高手、撒谎专家、欺骗能手，等等。在民主制度下，尤其是中央政府层级，几乎不可能选出一个真正正直的人。在一个小村庄，情况可能会有不同。在那种地方，依然存在一些社会约束，因为在一个百人小村，一个满嘴跑火车的油滑之徒，未必能够当选，因为大家都了解他的品性。但在更高层级的选举中，比如州一级、联邦一级等，几乎可以肯定，一个秉持信念、拒绝说谎，反对主张“劫富济贫”，坚持无论身在何时身处何境都应该保护私有财产权之人，几乎不可能当选。说这样的人能够当选，正如说拉斯维加斯的夏天会下雪一样荒谬。

I will just make a few more remarks. There is also far more resistance against raising taxes if you have monarchs in place because everybody sees, this is a monarch, I cannot be the monarch. I’m just a regular guy and why should he tax me? There will be resistance against being taxed because you realize you will never beneﬁt from this sort of stuﬀ. On the other hand, as soon as everybody has a chance to become president, senator, or whatever it is, you do not like being taxed as long as you are outside of government, but there is a consolation prize. The consolation prize may be that at one point I will be at the other end of all of this, and that makes me put up with the taxation more easily than I otherwise would. That’s another important argument. Again recall, kings that overdo it, they quickly lose their heads. Democrats, even if they are far more evil than kings ever would be, because you think, “Maybe in four years we can get rid of this guy, he will rarely be killed, and imagine how nice it would be if this institution of regicide would also be expanded to democraticide or something of that nature.”

我还想再补充几点。在君主治下，民众对加税的抵触通常会更强烈，因为每个人都明白，那是国王，自己永远不可能成为国王，只是一平头百姓而已，为什么要被他征税呢？人们会觉得被征税完全是为他人做嫁衣，明白自己永远不会从这件事上受益，因此会反对征税。但是，一旦变成人人都有机会成为总统、参议员，情况就起了变化。虽然你身在政府之外，也不喜欢被征税，但好歹心里会有个安慰。你会自我安慰说：“皇帝轮流做，说不定哪天我亦能身处高位、执掌大权。”正是这种“来年到我家”的心理，使得人们更容易接受原本反感的征税行为。这也是另一个很重要的区别。再回忆一下，君主如果做得太过分，很容易就会被砍掉脑袋。而民主制度下的统治者，即使干的坏事远超国王，也很少真的会被清算。人们想的是，“没关系，再过四年就能换人了。”正因如此，哪怕民主政客的行为更加恶劣，他们也几乎不会遭遇和君主一样的下场。说实话，要是“弑君”制度能推广到“刺杀民主政客”，或许只有如此，那些政客才会稍怀敬畏之心，不会坏事做绝。

I will end on some oﬀside remarks. The ﬁrst one explains how I developed these ideas about monarchy. The person who made me interested in this subject in the ﬁrst place was Eric von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, with whom I was somewhat friends. He was, of course, far older than I am. Before that, like most people, I always thought, “Monarchy, what an idiotic thing to say. How can you even talk about this subject?” So, he convinced me that that was something worthwhile thinking about. I think he did not have nearly as convincing arguments as those I later developed. [Laughter] I’m not boasting, because he himself admitted that. He wrote a few articles before he died and in each one, he quotes me and says that I have, of course, developed this far further than he ever thought possible. So, it is not that I just boast about this.

最后，我想说几句题外话。首先，我要解释我是如何得出这些关于君主制的结论。最初让我对这一主题产生兴趣的是埃里克・冯・屈内尔特 – 莱迪恩（Eric von Kuehnelt-Leddihn），我们当时算是朋友。当然，他比我年长许多。和大多数人一样，在此之前我一直以为：“君主制，这说法多荒谬啊。这个话题还有什么讨论的价值呢？” 但正是他让我意识到，这其实是一个值得认真思考的的问题。当然，我认为他当年的论证远不如我后来阐述的那么有说服力（笑）。我这么说并非在自夸，因为他本人也承认了这一点。他生前写过几篇文章，每一篇都引用了我，并且表示我在这个话题上的推进和阐述远超他的设想。所以，非是我在自卖自夸。

The idea that I stumbled across ﬁrst, from which I then developed this was, having observed that in the former Soviet Union, in contrast to most places on Earth, in the last two decades, life expectancies fell. Having traveled extensively in the Eastern Bloc because my parents came from East Germany and were exploited by the government there, and I have relatives there and visited these places, I always noticed the bad health conditions of these people, despite the fact that they had, of course, free healthcare. There, everything was free, except nothing was ever available of these allegedly free things. And I asked myself, “What could explain this? If life expectancy falls here but everywhere else it seems to be going up.” And another striking observation was the massive number of people that the Soviet Union killed and worked to death, even during peacetime.

我最初萌生这一整套思想的契机，是偶然观察到一个现象，并在此基础上展开思考。我注意到，在前苏联地区，与世界上大多数地方相反，在过去二十年间，人们的平均寿命是下降的。由于我的父母来自东德，曾遭受当地政府的剥削，我在东欧各国也有不少亲戚，所以我常常去这些地方旅行，也算所见颇多。我曾多次亲眼目睹，尽管他们表面上享有全民免费医疗，但健康状况却极其糟糕。在那里，一切似乎都是免费的，但所谓免费的服务却总是无法真正获得。这让我不禁开始思考：“这该如何解释？为什么在别的地方人们的寿命普遍延长，而在这里却在下降？”另一个令我震惊的事实是：即使在和平时期，苏联也依然大规模地杀害民众或将人活活劳累致死。

And then it came upon me, there’s actually a very simple explanation for this and the explanation is simply this. There exist two types of slavery. There exists the old run-of-the-mill-type slavery that we are familiar with in the United States. You Americans are familiar with it and guilty; I, of course, am not. Germans have done other things, but not that. So, here you had private ownership of slaves. In the Soviet Union and in the Eastern Bloc countries, you also had a form of slavery, because slavery is characterized by two marks. On the one hand, you cannot run away. If you try to run away, and they catch you, they punish you or even kill you. And the second characteristic is that they can assign you to work. This they could do in the Soviet Union. You could not run away, they would shoot you dead if you tried to do this and of course you could not just hang around. If you were just hanging around, they would take you and put you to work someplace. But, the slaves in the Soviet Union were not privately owned slaves. That is, Lenin, Stalin, and Gorbachev and whomever, they could not sell these people in the slave market and pocket the money, or rent them out for a few hours and then ﬁnance their beers from the rental money that they got. No, they were just public owners or public caretakers of these slaves. They could exploit them to the hilt, but they did not own the capital in them. That is, they did not own the person. And once you realize this, then it is perfectly clear that a private slave owner who can sell the slave in the slave market, who can rent him out, who can pass him on to his son, will by and large treat his slave far more humanely than somebody who is a public slave owner, because the private slave owner realizes that if he mistreats a slave, the value of that slave will fall.

后来我突然意识到，此现象背后其实有一个非常简单的解释。这个解释简单如斯，那就是这个世界，存在两种不同类型的奴隶制。第一种是我们较为熟悉的传统奴隶制，比如美国历史上的奴隶制度。你们美国人对此非常熟悉，并且难辞其咎；而我当然没有这个负担——我们德国人干的是别的坏事，但不是这个。在苏联和东欧国家，也存在一种奴役制度，只是形式不同。我们可以通过两个标准来判断一个制度是否构成奴役：第一，你不能逃跑；一旦试图逃跑，被抓后就会受到惩罚，甚至被处决。第二，他们可以随意指派你去工作。苏联正符合这两个标准：你不能离开，如果尝试逃跑，则很可能被当场枪杀；你也不能什么都不干，若无所事事，他们会立刻抓你去劳作。不过，苏联的奴隶和美国旧南方的奴隶不同——他们不是“私有”的。列宁、斯大林、戈尔巴乔夫这些领导人并不能像奴隶主一样，把奴隶拿到市场上出售，换钱装进自己口袋；也不能把奴隶“租出去”几个小时，靠租金买几瓶啤酒。他们只是这些奴隶的“公有”管理者，可以极度剥削他们，但并不拥有这些奴隶的“资本价值”，也就是说，他们并不拥有这些人。一旦你意识到这一点，就很容易理解：一个私有奴隶主因为能出售奴隶、租用奴隶、甚至把奴隶传给自己的儿子，所以通常会更“人道”地对待奴隶。因为他知道，如果他虐待奴隶，这个奴隶的价值就会降低。

What private slave owner would, just for the joy of it, kill the slave? That is a very rare event. Just like a farmer doesn’t kill his horses and cows just for the fun of it. After all, they represent his capital goods! But in the Soviet Union, in those places where you had public slavery, this is precisely what happened. People did not take care of their slaves. Life expectancy fell. If these slaves dropped like ﬂies,no problem, you had a fresh supply waiting just around the corner. If you were told that you must be a slave, that you can’t be a free man, what would you choose? Would you want to be a privately owned slave or would you want to be a gulag slave? And I think the answer is perfectly clear. I’d rather be a privately owned slave than a gulag slave. And when it comes to democracy and monarchy, the thing is basically the same. If you cannot be a free man, if you cannot have a natural order that respects private property, but you have to be ripped oﬀ by somebody, would you rather want to be ripped oﬀ by some dynasty of kings or by some randomly elected caretakers? And I think the answer to this question is also relatively clear.

什么样的私人奴隶主，会仅仅为了取乐就杀掉奴隶呢？这种情况极为罕见。就好比一个农民，不会仅仅为了好玩就杀掉自己的马和牛一样——毕竟，那是他的生产资料！但在苏联，在那些存在公共奴隶制的地方，此类事件，却并不鲜见。那里的人们并不关心奴隶，任其自生自灭，结果导致寿命下降。如果这些奴隶像蝼蚁般死去，也完全无所谓，反正随时都有源源不断的新奴隶可以补充。设想一下：如果你被强制要求，必须成为一名奴隶，失去自由，你会如何选择呢？成为一名私人奴隶，还是成为一个古拉格（劳改营）奴隶？我想答案显而易见。那就是宁愿做私人奴隶，也不愿做古拉格奴隶。同样的逻辑也适用于民主制和君主制之间的比较。如果你注定无法做一个自由人，无法生活在一个尊重私有产权的自然秩序中，而是必须被某个权力集团剥削——那么你愿意被一个有世袭责任的王室剥削，还是愿意被一群随意选出来、来去匆匆的临时官僚剥削？我想，这个问题的答案也是相当清楚的。

And the last thing I want to do is, again, give you an example that I always give to my students and, based on their reaction, always ﬁnd very instructive, explaining the eﬀects of democracy. You know that during the twentieth century, the right to vote was extremely restricted. In many countries, it didn’t exist at all early in the nineteenth century, but then it was gradually expanded over time. First, of course, people only thought about male franchise. Females were considered to be just appendices of men, voting just like their husbands do. Unfortunately, they don’t do that anymore either.

最后，我想再给你们举个例子，我经常讲给我的学生听，从他们的反应来看，我总觉得这个例子很有启发性，它能说明民主的影响。你们知道，在20世纪，投票权受到极大限制。在19世纪早期，许多国家根本不存在投票权，之后随着时间推移才逐渐扩大。起初，人们当然只考虑男性选举权。女性则被视为男性的附庸，就像跟着丈夫投票一样（行使投票权）。不幸的是，现在她们也不再这样了。

And the interesting thing is, the country, for instance, that introduced the male franchise ﬁrst, almost full male franchise, happened to be the country that gave the right to vote to women last, and that was Switzerland. And since that time, Switzerland is also in a very iﬀy condition. They were already in great danger before, but the danger has dramatically increased since that time. But, as you realize, of course, I have nothing against women at all. I’ma lover of women and I’m just in favor of nobody should have the right to vote. But in any case, in the nineteenth century, gradually the franchise was expanded and parallel to the expansion of the franchise, the classical liberal movement died out and social democratic and socialist parties came to power. Even those parties who called themselves liberal are no longer liberal in the previous classical sense. They have become social liberal parties.

有趣的是，第一个几乎全面实行男性普选权的国家，恰好也是最后一个赋予女性投票权的国家，这个国家就是瑞士。从那以后，瑞士的局势也变得非常动荡。早在此前，瑞士就已面临巨大危险，但自那以后，这种危险显著加剧。当然，你们不要误会，我绝非对女性有偏见。我是一个惜花之人，是女性的崇拜者。我真正的主张是：任何人都不应该拥有投票权。总之，，从19世纪起，选举权逐渐扩大，与此同时，伴随这一趋势的，是古典自由主义运动的衰落，以及社会民主党和社会主义政党的崛起。即便是那些依然自诩为“自由主义”的政党，也早已不再是从前意义上的古典自由主义者，而是变成了社会自由主义政党。

And in order to illustrate this tendency, to make people understand this, as almost a necessary consequence of expanding the franchise, I always use two examples. The ﬁrst example is, imagine we have a world democracy, one man, one woman, one vote, on a worldwide scale. What will the result of that be? There will be an Indian-Chinese coalition government, simply by virtue of numbers. What will this Indian-Chinese coalition government do, in order to be reelected in the next round? They will, of course, initiate a massive redistribution, an income and wealth redistribution program from the United States and Western Europe to those regions. Does anybody have the slightest doubt that that would be the result? I have not found any student in my classes who ever had the slightest doubt that that is what would happen. And then, you point out, “Look,what do you think happened when they expanded the franchise in your own country?” And then they begin to realize, oh, that’s probably exactly the same thing happened there too, maybe not as drastically because the population was more homogeneous, the diﬀerence between income levels were not as pronounced as they are now between India and the United States or places like this, but of course, the same thing has happened there.

为了更直观地阐释这种趋势，让人们理解选举权扩大后几乎不可避免的某些后果，我经常会举两个例子。第一个例子是：设想我们有一个全球民主体系，实行一人一票（无论男女）的全球普选。结果会如何呢？将会出现一个中印联合政府，仅仅因为他们人口众多。为了在下一轮选举中再次当选，这个中印联合政府会如何行事呢？答案显而易见，他们会启动大规模的再分配计划，将美国和西欧的财富收入，重新分配到中印地区。这将是最终结果，对此会有人哪怕有一丝毫怀疑吗？在我的课堂上，我还没碰到过哪个学生对此结果有丝毫怀疑，都认为必然会如此。接下来我会指出：“看看，当你所在的国家逐步扩大选举权时，会发生什么呢？”此时，这些学生开始意识到——哦，原来在我们国家可能发生的情况完全类似，也许没那么剧烈，因为国内人口更加同质化，收入差距不像印度和美国这类发达国家之间的差距那么明显，但毫无疑问，过程的本质是相同的。

And the second example is, in the nineteenth century, the age when people could vote was relatively high and by and large, they also had property restrictions. But, look just at the age. There were many places like Italy, where the age was twenty-nine years, in a country with a life expectancy of forty-ﬁve. So, only old men could vote in that place. That would be nowadays like only people above seventy-ﬁve years would be allowed to vote. And then the voting age was gradually reduced to its current level of eighteen. Now, we have to admit that eighteen is, of course, a completely arbitrary age. Why not twelve? In many places of the world, people can write at age twelve. In the United States, that is not always clear, but many places, it is known of people that they are able to write. So, why not twelve? Now, what would then happen? I would not predict that a twelve-year-old would then be elected president or something like this, but what you can predict is, of course, that every political party would have something on their platform about the legitimate concerns and rights of the children. Just as we are nowadays greatly concerned about the elderly, that we treat them right because we know they have the most time on their hands and tend to go and schlep out to these elections, whereas other people sometimes have to work and can’t go. We would then be greatly concerned about their well-being and what would these platforms then likely contain? At least one visit to Toys “R” Us per month, free videos from Blockbuster, as many as you want, at least one square meal at McDonald’s, or Burger King per day and a Big Gulp for every kid at all times.

第二个例子是，19世纪时，人们拥有投票权的年龄相对较高，而且总体上还有财产限制。单看年龄标准，有很多地方，比如意大利，该国当时的平均寿命只有45岁，而法定投票年龄却是29岁。也就是说，在那里只有“老男人”才有投票权。换到今天，这就相当于只有75岁以上的人才被允许投票。后来，投票年龄逐步下调，直到今天普遍为18岁。但是，我们必须承认，18岁其实是个完全随意、武断的标准。为什么不是12岁？在世界上很多地方，12岁的孩子就懂得书写。在美国，情况可能并不总是如此，但在很多地方，人们普遍知道12岁的孩子已经会读书写字了。所以，为什么标准不是12岁呢？那么，会发生什么情况呢？我当然不是说一个12岁的孩子会当选总统之类的，但你可以预测的是，毫无疑问每个政党的竞选纲领中都会加入“儿童权益”这类内容。就像我们今天特别关爱老年人，要妥善照顾他们——因为我们知道老年人时间最充裕，也最有可能出门投票、参与选举，而其他上班族工作所累，未必有这个投票时间。假如孩子也有投票权，政党自然也会关切他们的“福祉”，那么，这样的政纲可能会包含什么内容呢？比如：至少每月一次去玩具反斗城、从百事达免费租借无限数量的影碟、每天至少一顿麦当劳或汉堡王套餐、再加一杯不限量供应的巨无霸可乐。

第九讲国家、战争与帝国主义

Today I want to talk about state, war, and imperialism. I want to begin by reminding you that ﬁghting and war, conquest, and plunder are part of human history, despite the advantages of the division of labor, about which I have talked extensively. And if we look for reasons for this deviationist behavior, we will ﬁnd three factors. One is a lack of intelligence, and closely correlated with that is a very high time preference. High time preference and low intelligence are closely correlated phenomena, being just concerned with immediate eﬀects, not being able to grasp the long-run advantages that result from the division of labor, but being tempted by the immediate advantages that you can gain by robbing and plundering and engaging in these sorts of activities. And the third factor that contributes to it is violent ideologies. There exist ideologies like ardent nationalism and things of that nature that have also mightily contributed to the fact of war. We just have to think of the current Iraq War the idea that some countries are simply superior to others, due to who knows what, obviously contributes to these types of wars.

今天我想谈谈国家、战争与帝国主义。首先我要提醒大家，尽管我已详细论述过劳动分工的种种益处，但争斗、战争、征服与掠夺仍然贯穿人类历史。若要探寻这种偏离正常行为的原因，我们会发现有三个因素。其一，智力欠缺，与之紧密相关的是第二个因素，就是极其高企的时间偏好。高时间偏好与低智力相伴而生，这类人只注重眼前收益，无法理解劳动分工会带来长远收益，反而很容易魅惑于抢劫、掠夺和参与此类活动所带来的即时收益。第三个促成因素，则是暴力性的意识形态。诸如极端狂热的民族主义之类的意识形态，在历史上也曾也极大推动了战争的发生。我们只需想想当下的伊拉克战争就能明白，那种不知基于何种缘由就认定某些国家天生优于其他国家、自认为高人一等的观念，显然助长了诸如此类的战争。

Nonetheless, I want to emphasize before I get to the subject of war in history, that there has also been a peaceful spread of civilization. Just recall what I talked about very early in my lectures, the slow and gradual outward expansion of agricultural life from the Fertile Crescent, progressing from that area by about one kilometer per year, for several thousand years, gradually displacing the less civilized societies of hunters and gatherers and herders, and instituting more peaceful social relations than existed before. Or, think of examples of colonialism, which is something very diﬀerent from imperialism. Colonialism was driven by the motive of scarcity of land, and also driven by various missionary ideologies, Christians wanting to spread the Christian belief to other areas.

不过，在进入有关历史与战争这个话题之前，我想先强调一点：文明的传播并不总是通过战争实现的，历史上也存在着和平扩展的过程。还记得我在讲座开头提到过的例子吗？农业生活从新月沃地缓慢而逐步地向外扩张，每年大约推进一公里，持续了几千年。最终农业社会逐渐取代了那些相对不那么文明的狩猎、采集和游牧为主的原始社会，并建立起了比以往更为和平的社会关系。又比如殖民主义的例子，它与帝国主义截然不同。殖民主义的驱动力一方面是土地稀缺，另一方面则是各种传教理念，比如基督徒希望将基督教信仰传播到其他地区。

Just to give you a few examples of relatively peaceful colonial adventures, such as Greek colonialism, without which we would not have had cities like Stagira, where Aristotle was born, or Pestamus, or Pergamon, or Efesus, or Agrigento, or Syracuse, all of which are Greek in origin, and places to which the Greek culture was exported. Similarly, we can say that, at least partially, primitive Rome also had a civilizing eﬀect on the rest of Italy, carrying its superior culture to less developed places in Italy and also to less developed places in parts of the later Roman Empire. Without colonialism by the Bavarians, there would be no such thing as Austria, which was, at that time, on the eastern fringes of civilization, and Bavarians settled these regions and turned them into more or less civilized places. We should mention the eﬀorts of Frederick the Great and Maria Theresia, who promoted the settlement of Germans in more eastern regions of Europe with the purpose of lifting cultural life in those regions. Or, coming to more modern times, New France, Canada: in 1754 there were 55,000 people from France who settled in Canada and created, so to speak, civilization out of nothing. After 1650, some 80,000 people settled in New England and more than 100,000 settled in Maryland and Virginia. All in all, some 2 million people left Britain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for colonial purposes, by and large peaceful ventures. Some 200,000 Germans left for America before 1800.

我们不妨举几个相对和平的殖民案例作。比如古希腊的殖民活动——如果没有希腊殖民，就不会有斯塔吉拉（亚里士多德的出生地），以及佩斯塔穆斯、帕加马、以弗所、阿格里真托、锡拉库萨这些城市，所有这些地方都是希腊文化的扩展成果，见证了希腊文明的传播。同样，我们可以说，至少在一定程度上，早期罗马也对意大利其他地区起到了文明教化作用，将其更先进的文化带到了意大利欠发达地区，以及后来罗马帝国部分欠发达地区。要是没有巴伐利亚人的殖民，就不会有奥地利，当时奥地利处于文明的东部边缘，巴伐利亚人在这些地区定居，使其在一定程度上成为了文明之地。我们还可以提及腓特烈大帝和玛丽亚·特蕾西亚的努力，他们积极推动德国人向东欧地区迁移，目的就是提升那些地区的文化生活水平。近现代以来，例如新法兰西（即法国殖民加拿大）：1754年时，有5.5万法国人定居加拿大，可以说，从无到有地创造了文明。同样在1650年之后，大约有8万人迁往新英格兰，还有超过10万人定迁往马里兰和弗吉尼亚。总体而言，整个17和18世纪，约有200万人离开大不列颠，投身于殖民事业，而这些基本上都是和平的活动。此外，1800年之前，还有约20万德国人前往美洲大陆。

Let me give you some numbers of countries where people left and countries to which people went, from the mid-nineteenth century to about 1930. All in all, 52 million Europeans left Europe during that period of time. Five million Austrians left their country, 18 million Britons, less than 5 million Germans, 10 million Italians, about 5 million Spaniards, about 2 million Russians and slightly less than 2 million Portuguese. And where did they go? Six million of them went to Argentina, more than 4 million went to Brazil, more than 5 million went to Canada, 34 million went to the United States, slightly less than 3 million went to Australia, about half a million went to New Zealand, and slightly less than half a million went to South Africa. There’s also an interesting fact that close to 4 million people went to Siberia during the nineteenth century, that is, into an area that was basically nothing before. And last, but not least, by 1930 or so, some 8 million Chinese had left their country and gone to various Southeast Asian places and lifted up their cultures. Again, I’m not saying that all of these colonial movements were entirely peaceful, but overwhelmingly so; we can say that those were peaceful expansions of culture and civilization to places that were less civilized and less cultured before.

我来举一些具体的数据，说明从19世纪中期到大约1930年期间，人们从哪些国家迁出，又去了哪些地方。在这段时间里，总共有大约5200万欧洲人离开了欧洲。其中，奥地利有500万人移民他国，英国人有1800万，德国人不到500万，意大利人有1000万，西班牙人约500万，俄罗斯人约200万，葡萄牙人略少于200万。这些人都去了哪里呢？大约600万人去了阿根廷，400多万人去了巴西，500多万人去了加拿大，最多的是美国，达到了3400万人，澳大利亚接收了不到300万人，新西兰约50万人，南非也接近50万人。还有一个很有意思的现象是：19世纪期间，约有400万人迁往了西伯利亚——当时那是一片几乎毫无开发的蛮荒之地。最后也值得一提的是，到1930年前后，大约有800万中国人离开祖国，前往东南亚的多个地区，为这些地方带去了更高水平的文化，并对当地社会产生了积极的影响。当然，我并不是说所有这些殖民和迁徙过程都是完全和平的，但可以肯定地说，大多数情况是和平的。这些移民运动，本质上是把文化和文明扩展到了原本相对落后的地区。

Now, to the topic. I will return to the West as the ultimately superior civilization and I want to begin ﬁrst with pre-state conﬂicts, that is, conﬂicts as they existed during the feudal age, essentially before 1500. In order to set the stage, remember that Europe—and that was one of the reasons for the uniqueness and for the development of Europe— was a highly decentralized place at this time, with tens of thousands of smaller or larger lords, princes, and kings. There existed at this time tens of thousands of people who owned a castle or a fortress and could say no to whomever wanted to plunder them or oppress them or tax them or whatever it was, because for along time castles were indeed a very eﬀective means of protecting yourself against any kind of enemy. And this protection that fortresses and castles constituted only gradually disappeared with the development of artillery, which appears for the very ﬁrst time in 1325, but does not become a really relevant factor of warfare until about two hundred years later, that is in the 1500s. The ﬁghting forces during this feudal age consisted, by and large, of mounted knights, which were quite expensive at this time. Horses, after all, compete with men for food and it was an expensive thing to own a horse and armor and weapons, and what all, to equip a ﬁghting knight. And in addition, there were archers used in warfare. And from 1300 on, until about 1500, an important role was also played by pikemen. That was a strategy—developed in particular by the Swiss—of assembling large groups of people (in German they were called Spießer Gewalthaufen, “piker violence clusters” would be the translation), and these groups of pikemen were the ﬁrst development that could stand up to mounted knights. Before this, mounted knights were the non plus ultra in terms of weaponry, until these massive groups of pikemen came into existence and they could take care of the mounted knights. These groups sometimes were three, four, or ﬁve thousand people in size, and they simply eliminated the horses. The ﬁghters themselves were either the vassals of the lords, or the tenants of the lords. You recall during the feudal time there existed some sort of contractual relationship between the lords who owned the fortresses and oﬀered protection, and the various tenants that they had for mutual assistance in cases of conﬂict.

现在，言归正传。我将从西方作为最终优越的文明开始讨论，首先从前国家时期的冲突，也就是中世纪封建时代的冲突谈起，大致是在1500年之前。为了引入背景，需要记住，此时的欧洲——这也是欧洲发展具有独特性的原因之一——权力高度分散，存在成千上万的大小领主、王公和国王。当时，有成千上万的人拥有城堡或要塞，他们可以拒绝任何一个想要掠夺、压迫或征税之人，因为长期以来，城堡无疑一直都是抵御任何敌人的极其有效的手段。这样的保护作用，直到火炮的出现才逐渐消失。火炮于1325年首次出现，但直到大约两百年后的16世纪，它才真正成为战争中的一个重要因素。

在封建时代，作战部队大体上由骑士组成，而骑士在当时是相当昂贵的。毕竟，马屁与人类争食，拥有一匹马、一副盔甲和武器，以及装备一名骑士所需的一切都是非常昂贵的。此外，战争中还会使用弓箭手。从1300年起，直到1500年左右，长矛兵也发挥了重要作用。这种战术是由瑞士人特别发展起来的，聚集大量人群（在德语中他们被称为“Spießer Gewalthaufen”，可以译为“长矛暴力集群”）。这些长矛兵是第一种能够与骑士抗衡的武装力量。在此之前，骑士在武器装备方面堪称无可匹敌，直到这些长矛兵成规模地出现，唯有他们才能够轻松应对骑士。这些大规模的长毛兵队伍，有时人数可达三、四千甚至五千，他们直接针对骑士的马匹。作战的士兵通常是领主的封臣或佃户。你应该记得，在封建时期，拥有堡垒并提供保护的领主与他们的各种佃户之间存在某种契约关系，约定在发生冲突时互为援助。

Somewhat later, mercenary groups appeared, that is, groups that could be hired by whomever needed them for defensive or aggressive purposes. Fights were quite frequent at that time, but they were, as you can imagine, on a comparatively small scale and typically they were some sort of inheritance disputes. Who owns this place? Who owns this piece of land? And so forth. No army at that time exceeded 20,000 people, and most armies were signiﬁcantly smaller than this. But what is important is that there existed certain rules about how to ﬁght. Despite the fact that these ﬁghts were bloody, there existed something like knightly honor, and the knightly honor prescribed certain ways of proceeding and outlawed other ways. I want to read you a quote to this eﬀect, by Stanislav Andreski, who I mentioned a few times before. He writes here that

此后不久，雇佣军团体出现了，也就是说，任何有防御或进攻需求的人都可以雇佣这些团体。当时战斗相当频繁，但如你所想，规模都相对较小，而且通常是诸如继承纠纷之类的小事。这片土地归谁？这块地方属谁？诸如此类。那时没有一支军队人数超过2万，而且大多数军队规模远小于这个数字。但重要的是，关于如何作战存在某些规则。尽管这些战斗很血腥，但存在一种类似骑士荣誉的东西，骑士荣誉规定了某些行事方式，同时禁止其他方式。我想给你们读一段能说明这一点的文字，出自斯坦尼斯瓦夫·安德烈斯基（Stanislav Andreski），我之前提过他几次。他写道：

[a]t the height of the medieval civilization the wars were almost sporting matches: bloody, to be sure, but just as restricted by conventions. Let us look at one of the many examples of such a spirit. At the beginning of the ﬁfteenth century Jagiello, the king of Poland and Lithuania, was ﬁghting the Order of the Teutonic Knights. On one occasion, he found their army when it was crossing a river, and, although many of his warriors were eager to pounce upon the enemy, he restrained them because he thought that it was unworthy of a knight to attack the enemy who was not ready. When both armies ﬁnally met upon a fair ground they ﬁrst engaged in parlays, during which the envoys of the Teutonic knights gave Jagiello two swords, thus mocking the inferior armament of his troops. Having slept overnight, each side celebrated a mass in its camp. When both sides were ready they signalled to each other by trumpeting, and then rushed into battle. As a rule, the medieval knights considered it unworthy of their honour to attack by surprise or pursue the defeated enemy. The knights who fell from their horses were usually spared and released for ransom.1

“在中世纪文明鼎盛时期，战争几乎就像体育比赛：诚然很血腥，但同样受到惯例的约束。让我们看看众多体现这种精神的例子之一。15世纪初，波兰和立陶宛国王雅盖沃与条顿骑士团作战。有一次，他发现条顿骑士团的军队正在渡河，尽管他的许多战士急于扑向敌人，但他制止了他们，因为他认为趁敌人不备发动攻击不符合骑士身份。当两支军队最终在一片开阔地上相遇时，他们首先进行了谈判，在此期间，条顿骑士团的使者给了雅盖沃两把剑，以此嘲笑他的部队装备低劣。双方过夜休整后，各自在营地举行了弥撒。当双方都准备好后，他们用号角相互示意，然后冲向战场。通常，中世纪的骑士认为，发动突袭或追击战败的敌人有损他们的荣誉。从马上摔落的骑士通常会被饶过，并被释放以换取赎金。”[32]

When mercenaries became used as soldiers, wars likewise were mostly bloodless battles. The mercenaries were a bunch of adventurers, international men. They were not united by any kind of ideology and their general attitude was that my enemy today might be my employer tomorrow, so I had better watch out to protect myself from being killed. Wait until those people who are my enemies maybe go bankrupt and have to give up, but in any case, avoid massive amounts of casualties. Again, to this eﬀect, a quote from J.F.C. Fuller, a military historian who writes on mercenary warfare in fourteenth-century Italy. He writes,

In Florence and in Milan and other ducal principalities, in their factional contests, their tyrants relied on highly trained professional mercenaries hired out by their condottieri, or contractor captains. These soldiers fought solely for proﬁt; one year they might sell their services to one prince, and to his rival the next. For them war was a business as well as an art, in which the ransom of prisoners was more proﬁtable than killing their employer’s enemies. Because war was their trade, to prolong a war rather than to end it was clearly to their advantage.2

当雇佣兵成为战场主力时，战争往往演变为伤亡较少的非致命性冲突。雇佣兵是一群冒险家，来自世界各地。他们不受任何意识形态的束缚，秉持实用主义的信条——今日之敌可能成明日之雇主，因此他们作战之时讲究保全性命，往往采取”静待敌方因财力耗尽而自行溃散”的策略，始终避免造成大规模伤亡。同样，军事历史学家J.F.C. 富勒在论述14世纪意大利雇佣兵战争时也表达了类似观点，他写道：

“在佛罗伦萨、米兰及其他公国，在派系争斗中，其暴君们依赖由雇佣兵统帅（即承包队长）招募的训练有素的职业雇佣兵。这些士兵纯粹为利益而战；今年他们可能为一位君主效力，明年就为其对手服务。对他们来说，战争既是一门生意，也是一门艺术，在战争中，索要战俘赎金比杀死雇主的敌人更有利可图。因为战争是他们的营生，延长战争而非结束战争显然对他们更为有利。” [33]

Hence, the historian Guicciardini writes:

They would spend the whole summer on the siege of a fortiﬁed place, so that wars were interminable, and campaigns ended with little or no loss of life, and by the end of the ﬁfteenth century, such noted soldiers as the condottieri Paolo Vitelli and Prospero Colonna declared that “wars are won rather by industry and cunning than by the actual clash of arms.”3

因此，历史学家圭恰迪尼（Guicciardini）写道：

他们常常耗费整个夏季围攻一处要塞，导致战事旷日持久。然而这些战役往往以极低伤亡收场——有时甚至接近零伤亡。到15世纪末期，像雇佣兵统帅保罗·维泰利（Paolo Vitelli ）和普罗斯佩罗·科隆纳（Prospero Colonna）这样的名将曾公开宣称：“兵者诡道也，其制胜之道在于运筹帷幄之中，智谋斡旋于外，而非军队的正面交锋。”[34]

And of these soldiers Sir Charles Oman writes,

The consequence of leaving the conduct of war in the hands of the great mercenary captains was that it came often to be waged as a mere tactical exercise or a game of chess, the aim being to manoeuvre the enemy into an impossible situation and then capture him, rather than to exhaust him by a series of costly battles. It was even suspected that condottieri, like dishonest pugilists, sometimes settled beforehand that they would draw the game. Battles when they did occur, were often bloodless aﬀairs….Machiavelli cites cases of general actions in which there were only two or three men-at-arms slain, though the prisoners were to be numbered by the hundreds.4

关于这些士兵，查尔斯·奥曼爵士（Sir Charles Oman）写道：

将战争指挥权交付于雇佣兵大首领之手，战事的结果往往演变为单纯的战术演练或棋局博弈。其核心策略是把敌人逼入绝境而后俘获，而不是通过一系列代价高昂的惨烈战役消耗对方。甚至有人怀疑，雇佣兵统帅如同舞弊的拳击手，有时会事先商定平局协议。当实际交火真的发生时，伤亡人数往往也是寥寥……马基雅维利曾记载多场大规模战役中仅有两三名重装骑士阵亡，被俘士兵却数以百计。[35]

From the sixteenth through the seventeenth century, essentially until the end of the Thirty Years’ War in 1648, we see a change in warfare. We might call this period the period during which we do not have states ﬁghting each other, but instead wars are conducted in order to create states. Remember, when I talked about the origin of the state, I explained how kings frequently tried to create the Hobbesian situation of war of all against all, in order to come out of this war as a state rather than as a feudal king who had to rely on voluntary contributions from his various vassals. These wars from the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries were quite brutal. And just to document the thesis that these wars were wars that were used as instruments to the formation of states,here is a quote from a German historian, who writes,

从16世纪至17世纪（确切的说，直到1648年三十年战争结束），我们可以看到战争的形式发生了根本性转变。我们或许可以将这一时期称为非国家间的相互对抗，为了缔造国家而战的特殊时期。正如先前分析国家起源时所表述的，国王们常常主动制造霍布斯所说的“所有人对所有人”的战争局面，其目的在于摆脱封建君主依靠封臣自愿进贡的旧模式，转而通过暴力冲突构建起现代国家机器‌。这两个世纪的战争异常残暴。为印证“战争成为国家建构工具”的论点，某位德国历史学家曾精辟指出：

The years between 1500 and 1700 according to a recent study of the incidence of war in Europe, were “the most warlike in terms of the proportion of years of war under way (95 per cent), the frequency of war (nearly one every three years), and the average yearly duration, extent, and magnitude of war.”5

根据一项针对欧洲战争发生率的近期研究显示，1500至1700年，这两百年是欧洲历史上战事最为频繁的时期。具体表现为：战争年份占比高达95%，战争频率接近每三年一次，且战争的年均持续时间、波及范围及破坏程度均达到顶峰。[36]

This was the most warlike Europe had been up to this point; in 95 percent of the years, there was some war; on the average, every three years a new war was started, whereby the duration and the extent increased over time. In this case, up to the Thirty Years’ War, these wars were not interstate wars, but they were state formation wars.

这一时期是欧洲此前最为好战的阶段；95%的年份里都有战争发生；平均每三年就会爆发一场新战争，而且随着时间推移，战争的持续时间和规模都在增加。在这一时期，直至三十年战争，这些战争并非国家间的战争，而是国家形成过程中的战争。

And these state formation wars fall right in the period of the Protestant Revolution. As I explained, the Protestant Revolution was precisely the event used by various princes to combine earthly and religious power and to establish themselves as state rulers rather than feudal kings. During this period, from 1500 to 1648, for the ﬁrst time the wars take on an ideological connotation. What I mentioned before was that mercenaries had no ideology to ﬁght for. The various feudal nobles ﬁghting each other typically also had no ideological purposes in mind behind their ﬁghting, but their reasons for ﬁghting were more or less inheritance disputes, which tend to be settled by occupation; once you have occupied a certain territory, then the war’s basically over. But these religious wars were ideologically motivated wars, and ideologically motivated wars (I’ll come back to that later on when I talk about democratic wars) tend to be far more brutal than professional wars because they involve the participation of the masses.

而这些国家形成过程中的战争恰好处于新教改革时期。正如我所解释的，新教改革正是被各路王公诸侯利用的契机，借此将世俗权力与宗教权力集于一身，使自己成为国家统治者，而非封建国王。在 1500 年到 1648 年这一时期，战争首次被赋予了意识形态的内涵。我之前提到，雇佣兵打仗没有意识形态方面的诉求。封建贵族之间的争斗，通常在争斗背后也没有意识形态目的，他们争斗的原因或多或少是继承纠纷，而这类纠纷往往靠占领来解决；一旦你占领了某块领地，战争基本就结束了。但这些宗教战争是出于意识形态动机的战争，而出于意识形态动机的战争（我之后讲到民主战争时会再提及这一点）往往比职业性战争残酷得多，因为它们涉及民众的参与。

Also, for the ﬁrst time during this period, muskets were used. These had a range of about 200 meters, slightly more than 200 yards, but they were only able to shoot about once per minute. And artillery was used now, to a larger extent. In addition, from the seventeenth century on, a combination of the piking strategy with the shooting musket was introduced by using bayonets. The ability to use artillery and muskets made it possible for the ﬁrst time to defeat clusters of pikemen. Before then it was basically impossible to break them up. Now, through artillery ﬁre and through the use of muskets, you could breakup and spread out these clusters of pikemen and then be able to attack them. And also, the fortiﬁcations which, for along time, had oﬀered solid protection, became less and less protective because of the development of artillery. In response to the development of artillery, new types of fortiﬁcations were developed either in the form of triangles or in the form of stars and with some sort of water moats in front of them, in order to force the artillery to be placed at greater distances and to make the artillery less eﬀective in crushing the walls of the fortiﬁcations.

同样，在这一时期，火枪首次得到使用。其射程约200米，略超200码，但每分钟只能射击一次左右。此时，火炮的使用也更为广泛。此外，从17世纪起，人们通过引入刺刀，将“梭标战术 ”与 “火枪射击 ”相结合。火炮和火枪的运用能力，首次使击败密集的长矛兵方阵成为可能。在此之前，基本无法冲破这些方阵。而现在，通过火炮射击和火枪使用，能够打散这些长矛兵方阵，进而发起攻击。而且，长期以来提供坚实防护的防御工事，由于火炮的发展，防护作用越来越小。为应对火炮的发展，新型防御工事应运而生，有的呈三角形，有的呈星形，前方还设有某种护城河，目的是迫使火炮置于更远的距离，降低火炮摧毁防御工事城墙的效能。

The religious uprisings, which were initially stimulated by people like Luther and the various Protestant reforms, and the social chaos that resulted from them, as I said, was used by the various princes as a springboard for state formation and for forcing the smaller nobility into submission and accepting the rule and the taxing power of the larger lords. In addition, these religious wars were used by the princes to grab the substantial amounts of property that the Catholic Church owned; in some countries up to 30 percent of cultivated land was owned by the churches. Kings formed new alliances with national religions, and the old-style separation between church and state increasingly broke down and became more direct alliances between these two forces. At the end of the Thirty Years’War in 1648, the German territories, for instance, which had about 20 million people at the outset, had lost 8 million people as a result of this period of permanent state-formation wars. The modern state came into existence in Europe at the end of the Thirty Years’ War.

由路德等改革者点燃的新教运动，最初虽以宗教觉醒为旗帜，却迅速演变为王公诸侯扩张权力的工具。诸侯们将这场信仰动荡转化为国家建构的跳板——他们以镇压宗教起义的名义，迫使中小贵族臣服，并确立大领主对税收与领土的绝对控制权。更具战略意义的是，诸侯借宗教战争之名，大规模没收天主教会财产：当时教会掌控着欧洲近30%的耕地，这些土地最终流入君主与新兴官僚集团手中。在此过程中，王权与国教缔结新型同盟，传统政教分离模式土崩瓦解，取而代之的是“以剑护教，以教固权”的共生关系。三十年战争便是这种国家暴力建构的终极体现。以德意志地区为例，战争爆发时2000万人口中，最终有800万人死于战火与饥荒。当1648年《威斯特伐利亚和约》签署时，欧洲大地已矗立起现代民族国家的雏形——这些国家用三十年的血火淬炼出中央集权的官僚体系、常备军与税收制度，彻底终结了中世纪的封建秩序。

Typically now, standing armies came into existence. Standing armies were, of course, far more expensive than hiring mercenaries here and there and then dismissing them again. So, the formation of standing armies requires, already, a certain amount of centralization of power and requires that taxing power exists on the part of the lords or kings. During the Thirty Years’ War, for instance, there still existed some 1,500 independent condottieri, army leaders. All of these were now consolidated into standing armies. Either the independent mercenary companies were dissolved, or they were simply taken over as a state army and then had to be paid, of course, both during peacetime and wartime, which made them quite expensive. Nonetheless, even at this time, Europe remained highly decentralized. To give you an indication of this, even after the Thirty Years’ War, Germany consisted of 234 countries, 51 free cities, and about 1,000 independent large manors owned by signiﬁcant noble people.

常备军的制度化堪称这一时期最深刻的军事变革。与传统雇佣军相比，常备军需要持续的资金投入——这不仅要求君主具备稳定的征税能力，更标志着权力向中央集中的重大突破。以三十年战争为例：当时活跃于德意志地区的1500余支雇佣军团（由被称为“雇佣军首领”的军事承包商统领），逐渐被各邦国收编整编为常备军。这个过程充满博弈：部分雇佣兵团被强制解散，更多则被整体收编为「国家军队」——但代价是无论战和，君主都必须支付高昂军饷。值得注意的是，即便经历了如此剧烈的军事改革，欧洲政治版图仍呈现高度碎片化。三十年战争后的德意志地区就是典型例证：这片饱经战火的土地仍分裂为234个邦国、51个自由城市，以及约1000个由世袭贵族掌控的独立庄园。这种“微型主权实体”林立的局面，恰与现代民族国家的集权特质形成鲜明对比。

After 1648, the next period of warfare begins, which we might call the period of monarchical warfare. And before I come to characterize this period of monarchical warfare, let me present some theoretical arguments that help us understand the development that results now, after the Thirty Years’ War. First, we should recognize that institutions such as states show a natural aggressiveness. The explanation is very simple. If you have to fund your own aggressive ventures yourself, out of your own pocket, that will somewhat curtail your natural inclination to ﬁght other people, because you have to pay for it yourself. On the other hand, if you imagine that if I want to ﬁght some of you guys and I can tax him or him or him and ask them to support me in my ﬁghting endeavors, then whatever my initial aggressive impulses might be, are certainly stimulated because I can externalize the cost of war onto other people. I don’t have to bear the cost myself. Other people have to bear the cost. This explains why institutions that have the power to tax, and also institutions that have the power to print money, in later ages, have ﬁnancial abilities that make it more likely that they go to war than you would go to war if the power to tax was lacking or the power to print money was lacking on your part.

1648年之后，战争进入一个新的阶段，我们不妨称之为君主制战争时期。不过在具体描述此阶段的战争特征之前，让我先阐述几个理论观点，以帮助理解三十年战争结束之后，历史发展为何会朝这个方向演变。

首先，我们需要认识到，诸如国家这样的制度性实体机构天生具有侵略性。为什么会这样？其实原因非常简单：如果你必须自掏腰包为侵略行动提供资金，这在一定程度上会抑制你与他人开战的自然倾向，因为战争既烧钱又危险。但换个思路设想一下：如果我想与你们中的某些人开战，同时我可以向他他、他或他征税，强制他们支持我的作战行动——那么，哪怕我最初只是一时冲动，最终肯定也会被鼓动、激发。毕竟不用自己出钱，开战的代价于是乎也就不痛不痒。

我不必自担成本，而是由其他人来承担。这就解释了为什么拥有征税权力的机构，以及在后来的时代拥有印钞权的机构，因具备更强的财政能力，有权力让别人为自己的野心买单，这使得它们比那些没有征税权或印钞权的主体更加好战。

We can also see that states, because they compete with each other for population, do not like to see people moving from one state to another state. After all, every individual that moves from one place to another means there is one taxpayer less here, and your opponent gets one taxpayer more. The high degree of decentralization that existed in Europe went hand in hand with a high degree of regional mobility, people moving from territories that were more oppressive to territories that were less oppressive, and this then causes automatic rivalries between the diﬀerent states and leads frequently to war. And we can say that this competition between states, in contrast to the competition of General Motors against Ford or Toyota against Honda or whatever, that the competition between states is an eliminative competition. It is possible that Ford and Toyota and Honda and GM can live side-byside, coexist side by side until the end of history. However, there can, in any given territory, be only one institution that is entitled to tax and pass laws. There can not be free competition in a territory in terms of taxing power and legislative power. If everybody could tax everybody, there would be nothing left to be taxed, and if everybody could make laws, chaos would break out.

我们还能看到，各国因彼此之间争夺人口，故而不愿看到民众从本国迁往他国。毕竟，多一个外迁之人，就意味着本国少一头纳税的牛马，而对手国家则多一头。欧洲曾存在高度的去中心化，与高度的区域人口流动相伴相生。人们会从压迫较重的地区迁往压迫较轻的地区，这自然导致不同国家之间的竞争，并同时导致频繁的战争。可以说，国家间的这种竞争，与通用汽车、福特、丰田、本田之间的竞争有所不同。国家间的竞争是一种淘汰性竞争。福特、丰田、本田和通用汽车有可能长期和平共存，携手到天荒地老。然而，在任何特定区域，有且只能有一个机构有权征税和立法。在征税权和立法权方面，一个地区不可能存在自由竞争。倘若人人都能征税，那就无税可征；倘若人人都能立法，岂非分分钟就会天下大乱？

The competition between states is eliminative in the sense that in any given territory, there can only exist one taxing authority and one monopolist of legislation and we should expect that wars will by and large lead to a tendency to concentration. That is, more and more of these small states are eliminated and the territories of states become gradually larger and larger.

国家之间的竞争具有淘汰性，这意味着在任何特定区域，只能存在一个征税机构以及一个立法垄断者。我们可以预见，战争总体上会导致一种集中化的趋势。也就是说，越来越多的小国会被淘汰，而大国的领土会逐渐变得越来越大。

And we can also quickly address and resolve the question as to who is about to win and who is about to lose in these types of battles. If you assume that states were initially of roughly equal size with roughly equal populations, then we recognize some sort of paradox, that is, that those states that treat their populations nicer, more liberal states, so to speak, are the states that have a more prosperous civil society than those states that mistreat their populations, because if you are liberal to your population, less oppressive to your population, they tend to be more productive. And after all, in a war, in order to conduct a war, especially a war that lasts for a while, that requires that you have a productive population. People have to continue working, have to continue making weaponry and feeding the soldiers, etc., and those territories, those state territories that oppress their population, tend to be also poor places that have fewer resources on which to draw in the conduct of war. We would expect that as a tendency, more liberal states will, at least in the long run, defeat less liberal states, wiping them out and enlarging their territory at the expense of these less liberal states.

我们也可以顺带快速回答一个问题：在这类战争中，谁可能是赢家，谁可能是输家？假设一开始各国的规模和人口都差不多，那么接下来我们就会发现一个颇具讽刺意味的现象：那些对本国民众更宽容、更“开明”的国家，反而更有可能拥有一个繁荣的公民社会，生产力也更高。而那些欺压本国民众的国家，社会往往更贫穷，经济也更脆弱。毕竟，战争，尤其是旷日持久的战争，打的就是经济实力，因此需要有富有生产力的民众。人们必须继续工作，持续制造武器、为士兵提供补给等等。而那些对自己人动辄打压的国家，往往穷得叮当响，战争打不久，资源也撑不了几轮。我们可以预见，总体趋势是，从长远来看，那些自由度较高的国家会打败自由度较低的国家，吞并它们的领土，扩大自己的版图。自由的力量，往往比压迫的力量更持久、更强大。

You can see, however, that there is a limitation to this tendency. That is, the larger the territories become, the more difficult it becomes for people to move from one territory to another. At the conceivable end point of the process of concentration we have a one world state, the possibility for people to vote with their feet entirely disappears. Wherever you go, the same tax and regulation structure applies. The implication of that is with larger and larger territories, the initial reason for state rulers to be comparatively moderate in their taxing andregulation policy to their own population, in order to be successful in wars, this initial motive disappears more and more, the larger the territories become, and the more difficult voting with your feet becomes. So, we can recognize some sort of dialectic process. Initially, you want to be relatively liberal in order to expand your territory. The more successful you become in expanding your territory, the less important becomes the motive to be liberal to our own population, because voting with your feet becomes evermore difficult.

然而，你会发现这种趋势其实存在局限性。随着领土变得越来越大，人们用脚投票（从一个地区迁往另一个地区）越来越困难。可以想象，领土中心化进程的终点，会出现一个全球大一统的国家，届时人们用脚投票的可能性将消失殆尽，最终无处可逃。无论你走到哪里，税收制度和监管政策都一模一样。这种过程会带来一个重要后果：在国家还不那么大时，统治者为了在战争中取得优势，通常会对自己国内的民众采取相对温和的税收和监管政策；但随着国家版图不断扩张，人们“用脚投票”的选项逐渐消失，这种“温和”的动机也就越来越弱。我们可以看到这里面有点辩证的味道：一开始，统治者为了扩张领土，会采取比较自由宽松的政策；但越是扩张成功，越是形成垄断地位，统治者就越没有动力继续对老百姓温柔以待。届时，普天之下皆为王土，天下众生皆困于樊笼，又有何处可遁？

Jumping ahead for a moment, this sort of paradox, that is, that liberal states tend to be more aggressive in their foreign policy, is nicely illustrated, in a way, by comparing the United States and the former Soviet Union. There’s no doubt that the former Soviet Union was an extremely oppressive state internally, with the result being that they had a basket case economy, and the United States, on the other hand, being a comparatively nice country, was a very prosperous economy. And if we now look at the foreign policy of these two countries, we ﬁnd what some people consider to be a curious result, but which I think can be easily explained. We ﬁnd that the Soviet Union engaged in comparatively few imperialist ventures. And those imperialist ventures that they engaged in were usually in second-, third-, and fourth-rate places because they knew precisely that their economy was so weak that they could not take on a highly developed country, due to lack of resources needed in the conduct of war. Keep in mind that the main territorial gains that the Soviet Union achieved were territorial gains that were granted to it by the United States as a result of various agreements during WorldWar II. All of Eastern Europe was given to the Soviet Union by the Americans; it would not have been possible for the Soviet Union to take over all of these places if they had to ﬁght the United States to the hilt. The leadership of the United States actually ordered some of the generals, like General Patton, to withdraw, and prevented him from marching further to the east, from taking over places like Prague and so forth, to prevent communism from spreading to the West. So, the main territorial gains of the Soviet Union can hardly be described as the result of their internal imperialist desires.

在某种程度上，这种悖论，即自由主义国家在外交政策上往往更具侵犯性，可以通过比较美国和前苏联来很好地说明。毫无疑问，前苏联是一个对内极度高压的国家，致其经济一团糟；相对而言，而美国是个不错的国家，经济要繁荣得多。那么，如果我们比较这两个国家的对外政策，就会发现一些令人诧异的现象，但我觉得这其实很容易解释。我们发现，苏联进行的帝国主义冒险活动相对较少。而且他们参与的那些帝国主义冒险扩张活动，通常也只是在二三流、甚至四流地区，这并非因为他们“仁慈”，而是他们深有自知之明：经济薄弱，缺乏战争资源，根本没本钱与一个高度发达的国家打一场像样的战争。再提醒一下，苏联所获得的主要领土，并不是靠它自己凭实力打下来的，而是美国在二战期间通过各种协定“让与”的——比如整个东欧，其实是美国拱手相送的。若真要苏联靠武力硬碰硬地从美国手里夺取这些地方，完全力有未逮。事实上，当时美国的高层还命令将军们（比如巴顿将军）撤退，不允许他们继续向东挺进、比如占领布拉格之类的城市——以遏制共产主义进一步向西欧渗透。所以说，苏联那些“领土扩张”的成果，不是它自己通过帝国主义的野心得来的。

But if you compare this with the foreign policy of the United States, you ﬁnd that the United States has, in fact, in every single year, been engaged in various sorts of imperialist ventures. And the explanation for this is precisely that the United States did that because they knew as a result of their internal resources, because of their internal wealth, they would likely become winners, whereas the Soviet Union full well knew that they would not be capable of waging a successful war against highly industrialized countries. That was not the result of the goodness of the hearts of Gorbachev and Brezhnev and their other leaders. Quite to the contrary, I admit that these were evil people and that the Soviet Union was, so to speak, the Evil Empire, all of this is perfectly correct. Nonetheless, there is a rational explanation for why they were reluctant in their imperialist desires and why the United States, precisely because it is more liberal internally, was more aggressive as far as its external policy is concerned.

若对比苏联与美国的外交政策，便会发现一个悖论：表面上更自由的国家，反而可能更具对外侵略性。美国之所以常年推行各类帝国主义冒险行动（从越南战争到中东干预），根源在于其国内雄厚的经济实力与制度弹性——这种“内部优势”使决策者深信能在冲突中获利。反观苏联，尽管被称作“邪恶帝国”，其领导层却清醒意识到自身工业基础薄弱，难以在对抗高度工业化国家时取胜。戈尔巴乔夫、勃列日涅夫等前苏联领导人，他们的“和平政策”并非出于道德觉醒，而是基于冰冷的实力计算。前苏联领导人不是不想扩张，只是“臣妾做不到”。美国恰恰因为国内的自由制度，能汲取更多的国内资源，所以在外交政策上更具有侵略性。以上是一个非常合理的解释。

Now, back to monarchical wars, before the backdrop of these theoretical considerations. Recall that kings, princely rulers, regard their country as their own property. Even in wars which are typically motivated by inheritance disputes, that is, which are non-ideologically motivated wars, even during these wars, kings and princes have incentive to preserve the territories that they try to take over—because after all, they regard themselves as the owner of the capital stock represented by these provinces and this then leads to a relatively civilized form of warfare during the monarchical age. And again, some quotes, to this eﬀect, referring to monarchical state wars and showing the moderation of these types of non-ideological, territorially motivated wars. First, a quote from a military historian,Arne Røksund. He says,

现在，回到君主制战争，在这些理论思考的背景下展开探讨。回想一下，国王、王公贵族们将国家视为自己的财产。即便在那些通常由继承纠纷引发的战争中，也就是非意识形态驱动的战争中，国王和王公们也有动力去保护他们试图夺取的领土——毕竟，他们将自己视为这些地方所代表的资本存量的所有者，这就使得君主制时代的战争形式相对更文明。同样，这里有一些相关引述，能体现君主制国家战争的特点，并表明这类非意识形态的、以领土为导向的战争的克制性。首先，引用军事历史学家阿内·勒克松德（Arne Røksund）的话：

On the continent, commerce, travel, cultural and learned intercourse went on in wartime almost unhindered. The wars were the King’s wars; the role of the good citizen was to pay his taxes, and sound political economy dictated that he should be left alone to make the money out of which to pay those taxes. He was required to participate neither in the decisions out of which wars arose, nor to take part in them once they broke out, unless prompted by a spirit of useful adventures. These matters were purely royal matters and the concern of the sovereign alone.6

在欧陆，战时的商业、旅行、文化及学术交流几乎不受阻碍。战争是国王的战争；良民的职责是纳税，而合理的政治经济学原则表明，应让民众安心赚钱用以纳税。民众既无需参与引发战争的决策，战争爆发后也无需参与其中，除非受到有益冒险精神的驱使。这些纯属王室事务，由君王乾纲独断。[37]

And a Swiss-Italian historian, Guglielmo Ferrero, writes of the wars during the eighteenth century:

War became limited and circumscribed by a system of precise rules. It was deﬁnitely regarded as a kind of single combat between the two armies, the civil population being merely spectators. Pillage, requisitions and acts of violence against the population were forbidden in the home country as well as in the enemy country. Each army established depots in its rear in carefully chosen towns, shifting them as it moved about…. Conscription existed only in rudimentary and sporadic form….Soldiers being scarce and hard to ﬁnd, everything was done to ensure their quality by long, patient and meticulous training, but as this was costly, it rendered them very valuable, and it was necessary to let as few be killed as possible. Having to economize their men, generals tried to avoid ﬁghting battles. The object of warfare was the execution of skillful maneuvers and not the annihilation of the adversary; acampaign without battles and without loss of life,a victory obtained by a clever combination of movements, was considered the crowning achievement of this art, the ideal pattern of perfection….It was avarice and calculation that made war more humane….War became a kind of game between sovereigns. A war was a game with its rules and its stakes—a territory, an inheritance,a throne, a treaty. The loser paid, but a just proportion was always kept between the value of the stake and the risks to be taken, and the parties were always on guard against the kind of obstinacy which makes a player lose his head.They tried to keep the game in hand and to know when to stop.7

一位瑞士裔意大利历史学家古列尔莫·费雷罗在谈到18世纪的战争时写道：

战争受到一套精确规则体系的限制与约束。人们明确将其视为两支军队之间的一种单打独斗，而平民仅仅是旁观者。无论战事发生在本国还是在敌国，抢劫、征用物资以及对平民的暴力行为均被禁止。每支军队都会在后方精心挑选的城镇设立兵站，并随着军队的调动而转移兵站……征兵仅以初步且零星的形式存在……由于士兵稀缺且难以招募，人们想尽办法通过长期、耐心且细致的训练来确保他们的素质，但耗资巨大，使得士兵极为宝贵，因此必须尽可能减少士兵的伤亡。出于对兵力的节省，将领们尽量避免进行战斗。战争的目的在于实施巧妙的军事调动，而非歼灭对手；一场没有兵刃相见、没有人员伤亡的战役，一场通过巧妙的军事行动组合取得的胜利，被视为这门艺术的最高成就、完美的理想典范……正是贪婪与算计让战争变得更加人道……战争变成了君主之间的一种游戏。一场战争就像一场有规则和赌注的游戏——赌注可能是一块领土、一份遗产、一尊王位、一项条约。输家付出代价，但赌注的价值与所冒风险之间始终保持着恰当的比例，各方也始终警惕那种会让玩家失去理智的固执与疯批。他们试图掌控这场游戏，并清楚明了何时该收手。[38]

We comeback, on a slightly larger scale, to the form of warfare that existed during the age of knights. The diﬀerence being here essentially that the armies are, of course, of far larger size than they were at this earlier age.

我们回归到一种规模稍大的战争形式，类似于骑士时代的战争形态。本质区别当然在于，如今的军队规模比早期要庞大得多。

Now comes the next transformation in the conduct of war, and that is the transformation from monarchical wars to democratic wars, to national wars. I spoke about this transition from monarchy to democracy previously. This transition begins with the French Revolution, is then interrupted, to a certain extent, after the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, until 1914 with the outbreak of WorldWar I, and it resumes in World War I and after up to the present. But, the ﬁrst new experience is indeed the French Revolution.

战争形态的第二次重大转变，即从君主制战争向民主制战争、国家战争的转变。正如前文所述，正是从君主制到民主制的这种转变。这种转变始于法国大革命，1815 年拿破仑战败后在一定程度上被迫中断，直到 1914 年第一次世界大战爆发才又重新启动，此后在一战期间及战后一直延续至今。法国大革命，正是全新的现代国家战争的首次完整预演。

The French Revolution represents, in a way, a return to these religious types of wars that I mentioned earlier. It is an ideologically motivated event. The king is killed and instead, some high-ﬂoating ideals become prominent: liberty, fraternity, and the glory of the nation and things of this nature. The right to vote is introduced, and as people could not vote before and always said, “If the king goes to war, we have nothing to do with the state, this is the king’s state, we don’t get involved in the king’s wars,” now the argument was turned around, saying, “Now all of a sudden we give you a stake in the state, you participate in the state, you elect, you have the right to elect representatives, etc., and as a consequence you also have to serve in the state’s wars.” Revolutionary France now introduces for the ﬁrst time what had existed in rudimentary form in the past, but in very rudimentary form—kings had tried to introduce a draft, but were typically unsuccessful. For the ﬁrst time was seen now, during the French Revolution, and in particular after Napoleon comes to power, the draft, a mass draft. All the people of the French population are somehow made participants in the war. There exists no clear-cut distinction anymore between combatants and noncombatants; the resources of the entire nation are put at the disposal of the warring armies.

从某种意义上说，法国大革命标志着复活了我先前提到的宗教战争的逻辑，但注入了意识形态（形态）内核。以自由、博爱与民族荣光的抽象理念为教义可以杀死国王也可以大杀四方。处死国王的诉求，以令人瞩目的崇高理想来替代之，自由、博爱、国家荣耀以及诸如此类的理念。投票权被引入，过去人们没有投票权，于是总说：“王兴战事，于黎庶而言，实乃庙堂之事。此邦国为王者之域，非吾等黔首所系，自当袖手，不涉兵戈之争。”而现如今，论调早已生180度转变，“忽而春风化雨，家国命运紧系你我，既赋予选举之权，尔等庶民亦可参与国事，推举贤良。既为这山河的主人，又享民主之利，国家有战，便应奔赴疆场，当洒热血，守护这万里河山。” 革命时期的法国，首次推行系统化的全民征兵制，而此种制度，在过去则仅以某种雏形存在——此前，国王们也曾试图全民征兵，但通常都以失败告终。在法国大革命期间，尤其是拿破仑掌权之后，人们首次看到了这种大规模的征兵。战争机器开始吞噬整个民族，法国全体民众都以某种方式被迫裹挟到战争之中，原有的”战斗人员-平民”界限彻底消融。在全民皆兵体制下，每个法兰西人都被转化为战争资源，整个国家的资源都交由参战军队调配使用。

Since it is no longer inheritance disputes that motivate wars, but ideological diﬀerences (i.e., the hatred against monarchs, the desire to spread liberty, whatever that means), it becomes extremely difficult to stop wars. If you have nonideologically motivated wars with territorial objectives, then once you have reached your territorial objective, the reason for the war is over. Once you have ideological motives, you want to make the world safe for liberty or nowadays for democracy, you are never quite sure if you actually reached your goal. Maybe these people just pretend that they have become democrats or Catholics or Protestants, and the only way that you are really sure that you succeeded in your conversion is, of course, to kill as many as possible. Then you know for sure that they don’t adhere to their old wrong beliefs anymore.

如今，战争的动因已不再是王室之间的继承纷争，而更多是出于意识形态上的对立（比如对君主制的憎恨，或者要“传播自由”——虽然没人能说清这到底意味着什么）。正因为如此，战争也变得越来越难以结束。如果战争的动机是非意识形态性的，比如争夺领土，那么一旦目标达成，战争也就没有继续的理由。但如果战争出自意识形态的动因，比如要让世界因自由（如今则是因民主）而安全，那么你永远无法确定是否已真正实现目标。也许对方只是佯装接受了“民主”、变成了“天主教徒”或“新教徒”，你没法确定他们内心是否真的已改变。而唯一能让你“确信”他们不再坚持原来的“错误信仰”的方式，似乎唯有——尽可能多地杀掉他们。如此一来，你才能确定他们不会再继续相信原先那一套了。

And, of course, there are no borders. How far should you extend your war? If you liberate Germany and turn to make that a free country, what about Poland? They have not been freed yet and if you win Poland, then what about Russia? Russia needs to be freed as well. Then you turn to the South, Egypt needs to be freed and Spain needs to be freed. The world is a wide place and all of them are yearning for freedom, of course, so it becomes impossible to ever end a war. So, war becomes total war. And then there is the size of the armies: the biggest armies before Napoleon were about 400,000 under Louis XIV, which was considered a huge army. The armies under Napoleon were well above a million. Now I quote, from Fuller and from Howard, to illustrate this change in warfare that began with the French Revolution. First, Howard. He says,

当然，战争也不再有明确的边界。该止戈于何时呢？如果你解放了德国，使其成为一个自由的国家，那波兰又该如何？他们还未获解放；如果赢下了波兰，那么俄国呢？显然，俄国也需要被解放。再把目光投往南部，埃及也需要被解放，西班牙也被需要解放。世界如此之大，当然所有地方都渴望自由，所以战争就永无止境。于是，战争演变为全面战争。再来看军队规模：在拿破仑之前，路易十四麾下规模最大的军队约有40万人，这在当时已被视为一支庞大的军队。但到了拿破仑时代，他所指挥的的军队规模，其人数早已远超100万。接下来我会引用富勒（Fuller）和霍华德（Howard）的著作，进一步说明自法国大革命以来，战争形态所发生的这种巨变。先看霍华德的话：

Once the state ceased to be regarded as the “property” of dynastic princes…and became instead the instrument of powerful forces dedicated to such abstract concepts as Liberty, or Nationality, or Revolution, which enabled large numbers of the population to see in that state the embodiment of some absolute Good, for which no price was too high, no sacriﬁce too great to pay; then the temperate and indecisive contests of the rococo age appeared as absurd anachronisms.8

一旦国家不再被视为王朝君主的“私有财产”……转而成为某种强大力量的工具——这些力量已自由、国家、革命等抽象等抽象理念为名，使得大众将国家视为某种绝对“善”的化身——那么，为了这种“善”，无论付出多高代价、多大牺牲，人们都认为理所应当。置身于如此宏大且充满变革张力的历史语境之中，昔日洛可可时代那种含蓄委婉、优柔寡断的权力之争，恰似陈年老调，既透着不合时宜的滑稽荒诞，又显露着被时光淘洗后的陈旧沧桑。[39]

And another quote,

Truly enough,a newera had begun, the era of national wars, of wars which were to assume a maddening pace; for those wars were destined to throw into the ﬁght all the resources of the nation; they were to set themselves the goal, not a dynastic interest, not of the conquest or possession of a province, but the defense or the propagation of philosophical ideas in the ﬁrst place, next of the principles of independence, of unity, of immaterial advantages of various kinds. Lastly they staked upon the issue the interests and fortune of every individual private. Hence, the rising of passions, that is the elements of force, hitherto in the main unused.9

再看另一段引述：

确实，一个新的时代已然开启——这是国家战争的时代。战争将以疯狂的节奏展开；因为这些战争注定要投入国家的所有资源；它们的目标不再是王朝的利益，也不是征服或占领某个地区，而首先是为了捍卫或传播哲学理念，其次是为了维护独立、追求统一，以及争取各种无形的精神价值。最终，它们裹挟每一个个体，将他们的利益与命运都押注在这场豪赌之上。从今往后，以往大多未曾真正被动员的激情与力量，如今被全面唤醒并投入战场。[40]

And another set of quotes, very revealing, from J.F.C. Fuller.

The inﬂuence of the spirit of nationality, that is, of democracy, on war, was profound.…[It] emotionalized war and, consequently, brutalized it.…In the eighteenth century, wars were largely the occupation of kings, courtiers and gentlemen. Armies lived on their depots, they interfered as little as possible with the people, and as soldiers were paid out of the king’s privy purse they were too costly to be thrown away lightly on mass attacks. The change came about with the French Revolution, sanscoulottism replaced courtiership, and as armies became more and more the instruments of the people, not only did they grow in size but in ferocity. National armies ﬁght nations, royal armies ﬁght their like, the ﬁrst obey a mob—always demented, the second a king—generally sane.…All this developed out of the French Revolution, which also gave to the world conscription—herd warfare, and the herd coupling with ﬁnance and commerce has begotten new realms of war. For when once the whole nation ﬁghts, then is the whole national credit become available for the purposes of war.10

下面是J.F.C. 富勒的另一组很能说明问题的引语。

国家精神，也就是民主精神，对战争的影响是深远的……它让战争情绪化，因而也让战争变得更加残酷无情。……在18世纪，战争在很大程度上是国王、朝臣和贵族之间的事务。军队依靠兵站补给，尽量避免干扰平民百姓，而且军饷来自国王的私人金库，所以士兵尤为金贵，不能轻易在大规模战役中牺牲。变革之风随法国大革命而来，无套裤汉主义（sanscoulottism）取代了宫廷贵族作风，随着军队越来越成为人民的工具，其不仅规模不断壮大，作战方式也愈发激烈残忍。国家军队与他国开战，皇家军队则与同类对手作战，前者听命于群众——往往歇斯底里，后者听从国王——通常理智冷静。……这一切都源自法国大革命，它不仅把全民参战的征兵制带给了世界，还催生了“群体战争”。当战争不再是少数人的事，而是全民参战，此时整个国家的信用与财政也都被调动起来为战争服务。战争不再是有限的冲突，而成为国家机器全面动员的产物，甚至和金融、商业结合，催生了新的战争模式。[41]

And further on the same topic:

Conscription changed the basis of warfare. Hitherto, soldiers had been costly, now they were cheap; battles had been avoided, now they were sought, and however heavy were the losses, they could rapidly be made good by the muster-roll….From August (of 1793, when the Parliament of the French Republic decreed universal compulsory military service) onward, not only was war to become more and more unlimited, but ﬁnally, total. In the fourth decade of the twentieth century, life was held so cheaply that the massacre of civilian populations on wholesale lines became as accepted a strategic aim as battles were in previous wars. In 150 years conscription had led the world back to tribal barbarism.11

关于同一主题，还有：

征兵制改变了战争的基本面貌。在此之前，士兵是昂贵的资源，而如今则变得“廉价”；过去交战双方都尽量避免战斗，而现在却主动求战。不论伤亡多么惨重，都可以很快通过征召新兵迅速补充……自1793年8月（法兰西共和国议会颁布普遍义务兵役制之时）起，战争便开始朝着无限战方向演变，最终发展成了全面战争。到了20世纪四十年代，生命已如草芥，以至于大规模屠杀平民成为战略目标，这种行为的接受程度就如同以往战争中进行正规战斗一样自然。在短短150年间，征兵制度让整个世界重回部落时代的野蛮。[42]

Now, there was, as I said,a small pause after the defeat of Napoleon. The wars that were fought in Europe during the nineteenth century after Napoleon’s defeat, such as the war, for instance, of Germany against France in 1870–71, was again,a traditional monarchical war, almost harmless. The German officers resided in French hotels and paid their bills whereas the French military asked the hotel to wait for payment until later dates. There was practically no involvement of the civilian population whatsoever. The only major exception in the nineteenth century from this return to civilized warfare, if we can call warfare civilized at all, was the American War of Southern Independence. And this, again, was atypical democratic war; so much for the thesis that democracies do not ﬁght each other and democracies are somehow better suited to creating peace. The only democratic war in the nineteenth century was, again, the only ideologically motivated war and the American Civil War was, up until this point, unsurpassed in terms of brutality. It was at least as brutal as the religious wars had been many centuries before and as you all know, more Americans were killed in that war than all the Americans who died in WorldWar I and in WorldWar II as well.

正如我所说，拿破仑战败后，这种转变曾有过一段短暂的间歇。拿破仑战败后的19世纪，欧洲也曾再次爆发战争，比如1870 – 1871年的德法战争，仍然是传统的君主制战争，几乎没有造成太大破坏，可以说是“无害”的。例如，德国军官住在法国的酒店里，并且还会付清账单，而法国军方则常常“打白条”。实际上，这些战争几乎没有牵涉到平民。在19世纪这种回归文明战争（如果我们还能称战争为文明的话）的大趋势中，唯一的主要例外是美国南北战争。这又是一场典型的民主制战争，这足以反驳那种认为民主国家之间不会相互开战、民主国家更适合缔造和平的迂腐之见。在整个19世纪，美国内战是唯一一场民主制战争，同样也是唯一一场受意识形态驱动的战争，其残酷程度，在当时可说是前所未有。它他血腥与惨烈程度，可与几个世纪前的宗教战争相媲美。世人皆知，在那场战争中丧生的美国人，超过了美国在第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战中的伤亡总和。

This war, for the ﬁrst time, brings to bear all modern weaponry: machine guns and telegraphs and railroads and steamships and riﬂes of great accuracy over some 1,000 meters. And then, this type of warfare, of which the American war was atypical example, and the French one, the Napoleonic wars before, this type of warfare then continues with World War I, particularly after the entry of the United States, which was much earlier than the official entry.

美国内战首次全面动用了现代武器：机枪、电报、铁路、汽船以及射程可达1000米以上的高精度步枪。这种战争方式，在当时的美国内战中已有所体现，而在这之前的拿破仑战争也可视为其早期雏形。随后，这种战争形态延续至第一次世界大战，尤其是在美国介入之后更加明显——而美国的实际介入，则比其正式宣布参战的时间要早出许多。

The United States was, from the very beginning, due to British propaganda, on the side of the Western forces. The entry of the United States into the war was much facilitated by two of our most beloved institutions, one of which was the introduction of the income tax in 1913 and the other one is the founding of the Federal Reserve System in the same year, both of which, of course, facilitated greatly the possibility of a country like the United States carrying on a war far away from its own shores. Just to give you some ballpark idea, for instance, the reserve requirements for the central bank during the war were lowered from 20 percent before the war to 10 percent during the war, which basically implies a doubling of the money supply, which, of course, enables greatly the ﬁnancing of adventures such as this. And again, with the entry of the United States early on, what began as some sort of traditional European monarchical war and could have ended easily by 1916—there were various peace initiatives underway, one by the pope and another by the Austrian emperor Karl—this war then became an ideological war, as you know, the war to “make the world safe for democracy.” As my friend Kuehnelt-Leddihn noted, it would be more appropriate to say, “We should not make the world safe for democracy. We should make the world safe from democracy.”

美国自诞生之初就因英国的宣传攻势而倾向于西方阵营。美国最终参加一战得益于美国两大备受推崇的制度创新：其一是1913年引入的所得税制度，其二是同年建立的联邦储备体系。这两项制度创新显然极大增强了美国这种远离欧洲大陆的国家实施海外军事行动的能力。仅以中央银行为例，战争期间其准备金率从战前的20%降至10%，这实质上意味着货币供应量翻倍，自然为战争融资提供了极大便利。更关键的是，随着美国早期介入，这场原本属于传统欧洲君主制国家间的常规战争——本可能在1916年便告终结，当时教宗和奥地利皇帝卡尔都曾提出和平倡议——最终却演变为意识形态战争。如诸位所知，这场战争被包装成一场 “让世界为了民主而安全” 的战争。正如我的朋友库内尔特-莱迪恩（Kuehnelt-Leddihn）所言，更切中肯綮的说法应该是：“我们不应让世界为了民主而安全，而应让世界远离民主而安全。”

And as a result of this ideologically motivated war, the war ended, of course, not with a mutually face-saving compromise peace, but ended with a completely ridiculous demand for total and complete and unconditional surrender, and forcing the Germans and the Austrians to accept sole exclusive guilt for the war, despite the fact that even nowadays, there are very few historians who would maintain that the war was exclusively caused by Austria or Germany. If anything, the most guilty parties, in my judgment, were the Russians, by encouraging the Serbs not to give in to the relatively moderate demands of the Austrians—and the Russians would not have done that, if they had not had some sort of alliance with the British encouraging the Russians to behave the way they did. So, not being an historian, just being an amateur historian, I would blame Russia and England more so than Austria and Germany for the war. But in any case, this war ended with a disastrous peace treaty, which then implied already the seeds for World War II. In many ways, World War II can be considered to be just the continuation of the ﬁrst one, with abrief interlude. As a matter of fact, one of the better-known German historians, Hans Nolte, has written a book with the title that this was another Thirty Years’ War, that is, describing history as if World War I almost automatically led up to World War II.

这场由意识形态驱动的战争，其终局并非以双方皆可维护体面的妥协性和平作结，而是演变为近乎荒诞的诉求：战胜方要求德国与奥地利必须进行全面、彻底且毫无附加条件的投降，并强行将战争的全部罪责归咎于两国。然而，即便在当下，学界主流观点也鲜少认为奥、德是这场战争的唯一肇因，战争爆发实为多重复杂因素交织作用的结果。在我看来，如果非要论责任，最该受指责的是俄国，它怂恿塞尔维亚人拒绝接受奥地利相对温和的要求。而如果俄国没有与英国结成某种联盟，得到英国的鼓励，它也不会这么做。所以，虽说我并非专业历史学家，只是个业余历史爱好者，但我认为，相比奥地利和德国，俄国和英国更应为这场战争负责。但无论如何，这场战争以一份灾难性的和平条约终结，这已然埋下了第二次世界大战的种子。从很多方面看，第二次世界大战可被视为第一次世界大战的延续，中间只不过有一段短暂的和平插曲。事实上，德国一位著名历史学家汉斯·诺尔特（Hans Nolte）写过一本书，观其书名就已清楚表明，这其实是又一场 “三十年战争”，他在书中描述这段历史是称，仿佛第一次世界大战几乎不可避免地催生了第二次世界大战。

And of World War II, we know that the exact same thing happened. It was an ideologically motivated war, with America siding with Stalin. Stalin, who was a bigger killer than Hitler by far, and not only no longer respected in any way the distinction between combatants and noncombatants, wiping out huge masses of the civilian population at points when the outcome of the war was long decided, just for the mere purpose of instilling terror in the population, and then handing over all of middle and Eastern Europe to Communist rule.

而对于第二次世界大战，我们知道这是历史的再一次重演。这是一场受意识形态驱动的战争，美国选择了斯大林。斯大林的杀戮行径远远超过希特勒，他不仅完全无视战斗人员与非战斗人员的区别，而且在战争胜负早已注定之时，依然大肆屠杀平民，仅仅只是为了在民众中制造恐惧，战后将中东欧全部置于共产的铁幕统治之下。

I want to end with along quote from Mises, which does not deal directly with the question whether societies’ natural orders can defend themselves against enemy states, but it can be read as an indirect statement on this question. Can free societies defend themselves against hordes of barbarians trying to occupy them? And the upshot of this longer quotation is, yes, it is precisely the internal coherence, the integration economically and monetarily of highly civilized societies that can withstand the onslaught of even the most barbarian invasions. Mises says here this:

最后，我想以米塞斯的一段长篇引文作结。这段论述虽非直接探讨社会的自然秩序能否抵御敌国侵略之问，却可视为对该问题的间接回应：自由社会能否抵御蛮族入侵的浪潮？这段引述略长，其核心结论是肯定的——正是高度文明社会所具有的内部凝聚力、经济和货币的内部连贯性与一体化，使其能够抵挡最野蛮的入侵冲击。米塞斯如此阐述：

We must reject a priori any assumption that historical evolution is provided with a goal by any “intention” or “hidden plan” of Nature, such as Kant imagined and Hegel and Marx had in mind; but we cannot avoid the inquiry whether a principle might not be found to demonstrate that continuous social growth is inevitable. The ﬁrst principle that oﬀers itself to our attention is the principle of natural selection. More highly developed societies attain greater material wealth than the less highly developed; therefore, they have more prospect of preserving their members from misery and poverty. They are also better equipped to defend themselves from the enemy. One must not be misled by the observation that richer and more civilized nations were often crushed in war by nations less wealthy and civilized. Nations in an advanced stage of social evolution have always been able at least to resist a superior force of less developed nations. It is only decaying nations, civilizations in wardly disintegrated, which have fallen prey to nations on the upgrade. Where a more highly organized society has succumbed to the attack of a less developed people the victors have in the end become culturally submerged, accepting the economic and social order and even the language and faith of the conquered race.

我们必须先验地否定以后任何关于“自然意图”或“隐秘计划”驱动历史演进的目的论预设——无论是康德式的构想，还是黑格尔和马克思的学说皆属此类。但我们不可避免的追问是：是否能找到一条原则来证明社会的持续发展具有必然性。首先跃入视野的，正是自然选择原则。进化程度更高的社会能创造更丰厚的物质财富，因此，它们更有希望使其成员拜托贫困苦难。这些社会在抵御外敌方面无疑更具优势。切不可因观察到富裕且文明程度更高的国家常被欠发达国家击溃而被误导。处于社会进化高级阶段的国家，向来至少能够抵御来自欠发达国家的优势力量。唯有那些衰落的国家，其内部文明已然瓦解，才会成为崛起国家的猎物。当一个组织程度更高的社会屈服于一个发展程度较低的国家的攻击时，征服者在文化上终将会被同化，接受被征服民族的经济社会秩序，乃至语言和信仰。

The superiority of the more highly developed societies lies not only in their material welfare, but also quantitatively in the number of their members and qualitatively in the greater solidity of their internal structure. For this, precisely, is the key to higher social development: the widening of the social range, the inclusion in the division of labor of more human beings and its stronger grip on each individual. The more highly developed society diﬀers from the less developed in the closer union of its members; this precludes the violent solution of internal conﬂict and forms externally a close defensive front against any enemy. In less developed societies, where the social bond is still weak, and between the separate parts of which there exists a confederation for the purposes of war rather than true solidarity based on joint work and economic cooperation—disagreement breaks out more easily and more quickly than in highly developed societies. For the military confederation has no ﬁrm and lasting hold upon its members. By its very nature it is merely a temporary bond which is upheld by the prospect of momentary advantage, but dissolvesassoon as the enemy has been defeated and the scramble for the booty sets in. In ﬁghting against the less developed societies the more developed ones have always found that their greatest advantage lay in the lack of unity in the enemy’s ranks. Only temporarily do the nations in a lower state of organization manage to cooperate for great military enterprises. Internal disunity has always dispersed their armies quickly. Take for example the Mongol raids on the Central European civilization of the thirteenth century or the eﬀorts of the Turks to penetrate into the West. The superiority of the industrial over the military type of society, to use Herbert Spencer’s expression, consists largely in the fact that associations which are merely military always fall to pieces through internal disunity.12

高度发展的社会之所以优越，不仅体现在物质财富上，还体现在两个方面：其一是人口数量更多；其二是社会结构更加稳定。这正是社会高度发展的关键所在：社会关系的拓展，使更多人被纳入分工体系，并且这种分工对每个人的影响也更为深入。相比之下，发达社会与落后社会之间的根本区别，在于其成员之间的联系更为紧密。这种紧密的联系不仅减少了内部冲突借助暴力手段解决的可能性，也在对外时形成了一个稳固的防御阵线。而在落后社会，社会纽带仍然较为薄弱，各个部分之间多是为战争目的而暂时结盟，而非基于劳动分工与经济合作所形成的真正团结。这种松散的关系使得它们更容易、更迅速地发生内讧。军事同盟本身就不是一种稳固长久的结合，它往往只是出于短期利益而维系的临时安排，一旦外敌被击退、胜利果实需要分配时，这种同盟便会迅速瓦解。因此，在与落后社会交战时，发达社会最显著的优势往往就在于敌方内部缺乏统一。组织程度较低的国家，只能在短时间内为了大型军事行动而勉强合作，但内部的不团结很快就会瓦解他们的军队。举个例子，13世纪蒙古人对中欧文明的侵袭，或者奥斯曼土耳其人试图向西欧渗透的尝试，都表现出这一特征。正如赫伯特·斯宾塞所言：“工业型社会优于军事型社会”，主要原因就在于：那些纯粹以军事为基础的社会结构，最终都会因为内部不和而走向瓦解。[43]

第十讲策略、分离、私有化与自由的前景

The upshot of all my lectures is that the institution of the state represents somehow an error and a deviation from the normal and natural cause of civilization. And all errors are costly and have to be paid for. This is most obvious with errors concerning the laws of nature. If a person errs regarding the laws of nature, this person will not be able to reach his own goals. However, because a failure to do so must be borne by each individual, there prevails in the area of the natural sciences a universal desire to learn and to eliminate and correct one’s errors. On the other hand, moral errors are costly also, but unlike in the case of the natural sciences, the cost of moral errors may not be paid for by each and every person that commits this error.

我所有讲座的核心观点可归结为一点：国家这种制度，在某种程度上代表着一种错误，偏离了文明发展正常且自然的进程。一切错误皆有代价，必须为之付出成本。在涉及自然规律的错误时，体现尤为明显。如果一个人在自然规律方面犯错，就必然无法实现自身目标。然而，由于未能遵循自然规律的所导致的苦果，必须由每个人自己承担，因此在自然科学领域，人们普遍存在强烈的动机去学习如何消除和纠正自身错误。相比之下，道德上的错误同样代价高昂，但与自然科学不同的是，道德错误所带来的代价并不总是由犯错之人来承担。

For instance, take the error that we have talked about here in detail, take the error of believing that one agency, and only one agency, the state, has the right to tax and to ultimate decision-making. That is, that there must be diﬀerent and unequal laws applying to masters and serfs, to the taxers and the taxed, to the legislators and the legislated. A society that believes in this error can, of course, exist and last, as we all know, but this error must be paid for too. But, the interesting thing is that not everyone holding this error must pay for it equally. Rather, some people will have to pay for the error, while others, maybe the agents of the state, actually beneﬁt from the same error. Because of this, in this case, it would be mistaken to assume that there exists a universal desire to learn and to correct one’s error. Quite to the contrary, in this case, it will have to be assumed that some people instead of learning and promoting the truth, actually have a constant motive to lie, that is, to maintain and promote falsehoods, even if they themselves recognize them as such.

例如，以我们之前详细讨论过的一个错误为例，就是人们认为只能有一个机构，也就是国家，拥有权征税和最终决策权。换句话说，人们认为必须存在一套不平等的法律，分别适用于“主人”和“农奴”、征税者与被征税者、立法者与被立法者。我们都清楚，即使一个社会秉持这种错误观，当然也可以存在并延续下去，但这种错误同样要付出代价。不过，有趣的是，并非每一个秉持这种错误观念之人，都必须为此付出同样的代价。更确切地说，一部分人将不得不为这种错误买单，而另一部分人，比如国家代理人，实际上却从同样的错误中获益。正因如此，在这种情况下，我们不能简单地假设所有人都渴望学习真理，怀有纠正自身错误的强烈愿望。恰恰相反，在这种情况下，我们必须假定，有些人非但不会学习并宣扬真理，反而会出于私利持续传播谎言，甚至在他们已认清自身错误观念的情况下，依然有动机去维护和宣扬这些错误虚假的观念。

Let me explain this in a little bit more detail and repeat some of the basic insights that I tried to convey during these lectures. Once you accept the principle of government, namely that there must be a judicial monopoly and the power to tax, once you accept this principle incorrectly as a just principle, then any idea or any notion of restrainingor limiting government power and safeguarding individual liberty and property becomes illusory. Rather, under monopolistic auspices, the price of justice and protection will continually rise, and the quality of justice and protection will continually fall. A tax-funded protection agency is a contradiction in terms. That is, it is an expropriating property protector. And such an institution will inevitably lead to more taxes and ever less protection, even if, as some classical liberals demand, a government were to limit its activities exclusively to the protection of preexisting private property rights. Then immediately the further question would arise, “How much security to produce and how many resources to spend on this particular good of protection?” And motivated, like everyone else, by self-interest, but equipped with the unique power to tax, a government agent’s answer will invariably be the same. That is, to maximize expenditures on protection (and, as you can imagine, almost the entire wealth of a nation can, in principle, be expended on protection. We just have to equip everyone with a personal bodyguard and tank with a ﬂamethrower on top), and at the same time to minimize what they are supposed to do, that is, the production of protection. The more money you can spend and the less you must work for this money, the better oﬀ you are.

让我稍加详解，并重复一些我在这些讲座中试图传达的基本观点。一旦你接受了政府存在的原则，即必须存在司法垄断和征税权，同时你错误地将这一原则当作正义原则来接受，那么，任何限制政府权力、保障个人自由和财产的想法或观念都将成为水中幻影。相反，在垄断的庇护下，正义与安全的“价格”会不断攀升，而其质量则会不断持续下降。一个靠税收供养的保护机构，其本身就是自相矛盾的存在——它一边声称自己是 “财产保护者”，一边却在掠夺财产。这样一种机构必然会导致税负越来越重，而提供的保护却会越来越少。即便按照一些古典自由主义者的设想，政府将自身职能严格限制在保护既有私有财产权这一范围之内，问题依然存在。比如，紧接着你就会面临另一个问题：“我们到底该生产多少‘安全’，该投入多少资源在这个‘保护’上？”而一旦你明白，政府官员与其他人一样，受自身利益驱使，同时又拥有独一无二的征税权——那么答案永远如出一辙：他们会最大化保护支出（可以想象，原则上，一个国家的几乎全部财富都可以用在保护上——只需给每一人都配备一名私人保镖，再加一辆顶上装有喷火器的坦克），与此同时，他们却会极力最小化自身真正的“保护”职责。毕竟，花得越多、干得越少，对他们来说才越有利。

Now, in addition, a judicial monopoly will inevitably lead to a steady deterioration in the quality of justice and protection. If no one can appeal to justice except to the government, justice will invariably be perverted in favor of government, constitutions, and supreme courts notwithstanding. After all, constitutions and supreme courts are state constitutions and state agencies, and whatever limitations to state activities these institutions might ﬁnd or contain, is invariably decided by agents of the very institution that is under consideration. It is easily predictable that the deﬁnition of property and the deﬁnition of protection will continually be altered and the range of jurisdiction expanded to the government’s advantage, until ultimately the notion of universal and immutable human rights, and in particular property rights, will disappear and will be replaced by that of law as government-made legislation and rights as government-given grants to people.

此外，司法垄断必然会导致司法和安全保障的质量持续恶化。一个社会，假如政府之外，再也无处可寻求公平正义，那么即便存在宪法和最高法院，公正也总会被扭曲，向政府一方偏袒。毕竟，宪法和最高法院本身就是国家的产物，是国家机构的一部分。无论这些机构可能会发现或包含哪些对国家行为的限制，也最终都由正被审视的这个机构的代理人来决定。完全可以合理预见，财产的定义、安全的定义，将会不断被重新解释、不断更改，其管辖权的范围，也会朝着有利于政府的方向扩大，直至最终，普遍且永恒的人权概念，尤其是财产权概念，将统统消失不见，将被法律和政府许可取而代之。至于法律，无非就是政府制定的法规，而许可，也仅仅只不过是政府对民众的“恩赐”罢了。

Now, the results are all before our own eyes and everyone can see them. The tax load that is imposed on property owners and producers has continually increased, making even the economic burden of slaves and serfs seem moderate in comparison. Government debt, and hence future tax obligations, has risen to breathtaking heights. Every detail of private life, of property, of trade, and of contract is regulated by ever higher mountains of paper laws. Yet, the only task that the government was ever supposed to assume, that of protecting life and property, it does not perform too well. To the contrary, the higher the expenditures on social welfare and national security have risen, the more our private property rights have been eroded, the more our property has been expropriated, conﬁscated, destroyed, and depreciated. The more paper laws have been produced, the more legal uncertainty and moral hazard has been created, and the more lawlessness has displaced law and order. Instead of protecting us from domestic crime and from foreign aggression, our government, which is equipped with enormous stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, aggresses against ever new Hitlers and suspected Hitlerite sympathizers, anywhere and everywhere outside of its own territory. In short, while we have become evermore helpless, impoverished, threatened, and insecure, our state rulers have become increasingly more corrupt, arrogant, and dangerously armed.

如今，一切结果摆在我们眼前，大家有目共睹。加诸于财产所有者和生产者身上的税负不断加重，相比之下，奴隶和农奴的经济负担都是小巫见大巫，显得温和许多。政府债务，也就是未来的纳税义务，已攀升至令人瞠目结舌的高度。私人生活、财产、贸易和契约的每一个细节，都被堆积如山的成文法所规制。然而，政府本应承担的唯一任务——保护生命和财产——却执行的极其糟糕。事实上，随着社会福利和国家安全支出的越发地不断高企，我们的私有财产权就被侵蚀得越厉害，我们的财产被征用、没收、破坏和贬值的情况也越来越普遍。法律越写越多，结果反而是法律的不确定性和道德风险不断上升，真正的法治被无法无天所取代。不仅如此，政府并未有效保护我们免受国内犯罪和外国侵略的威胁，反而手握大规模杀伤性武器，不断对外挑衅，四处寻找新的“希特勒”以及各种被怀疑是“希特勒同情者”的对象，发动攻击。简而言之，我们变得越来越无助、贫穷、受威胁且缺乏安全感，而我们的国家统治者却变得日益腐败、傲慢，甚至武装到牙齿，愈发危险。

Now, what can we do about all this? Let me begin by ﬁrst pointing out something that I have mentioned already before, that is, we have to recognize that states, as powerful and as invincible as they might seem, ultimately owe their existence to ideas, and since ideas can in principle change instantaneously, states can be brought down and crumble practically overnight too. The representatives of the state are always and everywhere only just a small minority of the population over which they rule. The reason for this, as I explained, is as simple as it is fundamental. One hundred parasites can live comfortable lives if they suck out the lifeblood of thousands of productive hosts, but thousands of parasites cannot live comfortably oﬀ a host population of just a few hundred. Yet, if government agents are merely a small minority of the population,how can they enforce their will on this population and get away with it? The answer given by Rothbard, de La Boétie, Hume, and Mises is only by virtue of the voluntary cooperation of the majority of the subject population with the state.

那么，我们究竟能对此做些什么呢？我想先重申一点，这也是我之前提到过的：我们必须认识到，国家虽然看起来强大而不可动摇，但归根结底，其存续依赖于观念。而观念，原则上可以一瞬间改变。因此，国家也就可能在一夜之间土崩瓦解。国家的统治者，无论在哪个时代哪个地方，始终只占小部分人口。这个道理，正如我所解释的，既简单又根本：一百个寄生虫如果吸附在成千上万的健康宿主身上，是可以安逸生活的；但如果是成千上万的寄生虫要靠几百个宿主生存，那就不可能了。然而，既然政府人员只是极少数，他们又是如何成功地让广大民众服从自己，并安然无恙地维持统治的呢？对此，罗斯巴德、拉博埃西、休谟和米塞斯等人都给出了同一个答案：那就是，正是因为被统治的大多数人愿意配合、主动服从国家，这一统治才得以维持。

Yet, how can the state secure such cooperation? And the answer is, only because and insofar as the majority of the population believes in the legitimacy of state rule, in the necessity of the institution of the state. This is not to say that the majority of the population must agree with every single state measure. In fact, it may well believe that many state policies are mistakes or even despicable. However, the majority of the population must believe in the justice of the institution of the state as such, and hence that even if a particular government goes wrong or makes particular mistakes, that these mistakes are merely accidents, which must be accepted and tolerated in view of some greater good provided by the institution of government. That is, people believe in the accident theory of government error instead of seeing that there is a systematic reason behind all of this. Yet, how can the majority of the population be brought to believe this accident theory? And the answer is, with the help of the intellectuals. In the old days, that meant trying to mold an alliance between the state and the church. In modern times, far more eﬀectively, this means through the nationalization or the socialization of education, through state-run and state-subsidized schools and universities. The market demand for intellectual services, in particular in the area of the humanities and the social sciences, is not exactly high and also not exactly stable and secure. Intellectuals would be at the mercy of the values and choices of the masses and the masses are generally uninterested in intellectual and philosophical concerns. The state, on the other hand, as Rothbard has noted, accommodates their typically overinﬂated egos and is willing to oﬀer the intellectuals a warm, secure, and permanent berth in its apparatus, a secure income and the panoply of prestige. And indeed, the modern democratic state in particular has created a massive oversupply of intellectuals.

那么，国家究竟是如何获得民众的配合的呢？答案是：只有当且仅当大多数人相信国家统治是正当的，相信国家这个制度本身是必要的，国家才能获得这种配合。这并不意味着人们必须同意国家的每一项具体政策。事实上，很多人可能认为某些政策是错误的，甚至是可耻的。但关键在于，大多数人必须相信国家制度本身是正义的。也就是说，即便某一届政府做错了事，人们也倾向于认为这只是个别失误，是偶然事件，可以容忍——因为他们相信，国家制度总体上带来了更大的好处。换句话说，人们普遍相信“政府错误是偶然的”这一说法，而不是意识到这些错误背后其实存在一种系统性的原因。

那么问题来了：人们是如何被引导去相信这种“偶然论”的呢？答案是借助知识分子的力量。在过去，这意味着尝试在国家与教会之间结成联盟。在现代，更有效的方式是通过教育国有化或社会主义化，通过公立及国家资助的中小学和大学来实现。在现实中，市场对“知识分子服务”（尤其是人文学科和社会科学）的需求并不高，而且也缺乏稳定性。知识分子的处境将取决于大众的价值观和兴趣，而大众普遍对哲学或抽象思辨并不感兴趣。但国家却愿意迎合知识分子过度膨胀的自尊心，如罗斯巴德所指出的，国家为他们提供了一个温暖、安全、长期的“岗位”，不但有稳定的收入，还有社会地位和威望。事实上，尤其是在现代民主国家，国家培育豢养了数量庞大的过剩知识分子。

Now, this accommodation does not guarantee correct statist thinking of course. Also, as generally overpaid as intellectuals are, they will continue to complain how little their “oh so important” work is appreciated by the powers that be. But it certainly helps in reaching the correct statist conclusions if one realizes that without the state, that is, without the institutions of taxation and legislation, one might be out of work entirely, and might have to try his hand at the mechanics of gas pump operation instead of concerning himself with such pressing problems as alienation and equity and exploitation and the deconstruction of gender and sex roles or the culture of the Eskimos, the Hopis and the Zulus. And even if one feels underappreciated by this or that incumbent government, intellectuals still realize that help can only come from another government, and certainly not from an intellectual assault on the legitimacy of the very institution of government as such. Thus, it is hardly surprising that, as a matter of empirical fact, the overwhelming majority of contemporary intellectuals are farout lefties,and that even most conservative or free market intellectuals, such as, for instance, Milton Friedman or Friedrich von Hayek, are fundamentally and philosophically also statists.

当然，这种“豢养机制”，并不能确保知识分子就一定会得出正确的国家主义结论。但不可否认的是，这种机制的确有助于他们得出对国家有利的观点。尽管知识分子普遍报酬不菲，他们仍然习惯抱怨自己“如此重要”的工作没有得到当权者的足够重视。然而，如果他们意识到：一旦没有了国家——也就是没有了征税和立法这样的制度——他们可能会彻底失业，那就会促使他们更倾向于维护国家体制。毕竟，没有国家，他们可能就得去当加油站工人，而无法再沉浸在“异化、公平、剥削、性别角色的解构”这些议题中，或者研究爱斯基摩人、霍皮人和祖鲁人的文化问题。即便某些知识分子对当前政府感到不满，他们也清楚，真正的希望只能来自“另一个政府”，而绝不可能来自对“政府这一制度本身正当性”的根本质疑。因此，从现实情况来看，大多数当代知识分子都是极左倾向的，也就不令人意外了。甚至那些看似保守或自由市场派的知识分子，比如米尔顿·弗里德曼或弗里德里希·哈耶克，从根本的哲学立场上来说，也仍然是国家主义者，这一点也就不足为奇了。

Now, from this insight to the importance of ideas and the role of intellectuals as bodyguards of the state and of statism, it follows that the most decisive role in the process of liberation, that is, the restoration of justice and morality, must fall on the shoulders of what one might call anti-intellectual intellectuals. Yet, how can such anti-intellectual intellectuals possibly succeed in delegitimizing the state in public opinion, especially if the overwhelming majority of their colleagues are statists and will do everything in their power to isolate and discredit them as extremists and crackpots? The ﬁrst thing is this. Because one must reckon with the vicious opposition from one’s colleagues, and in order to withstand this criticism and to shrug it oﬀ, it is of utmost importance to ground one’s own case, not just in economics and in utilitarian arguments, but in ethics and moral arguments, because only moral convictions provide one with the courage and the strength needed in ideological battle. Few people are inspired and willing to acceptsacriﬁces if what they are opposed to is mere error and waste. More inspiration and more courage can be drawn from knowing that one is engaged in ﬁghting evil and lies.

正是基于这种对“观念重要性”以及“知识分子作为国家和国家主义卫道士”的认识，我们可以得出一个结论：在实现自由、恢复正义与道德的解放进程中，最具决定性的作用的角色，必须由称为“反知识分子的知识分子”来承担。然而，这就引出了一个难题：如果绝大多数知识分子本身都是国家主义者，并竭尽所能地将这些“反知识分子分知识分子”边缘化、抹黑成极端分子或疯子，那么这些反对者又如何可能在公众舆论中成功地质疑和否定国家的合法性，并把这种质疑传播开去？关键的第一步在于，这些反对者们不仅要夯实经济学与功利主义的理论基础，更要从伦理和道德层面为自己的观点提供依据，唯有道德信念，才能给予人面对意识形态斗争时所需的勇气和力量。毕竟，仅仅反对错误，抵制浪费，这样的行动，对很多人来讲，不仅缺乏激励，匡论为之做出牺牲。只有当他清醒的意识到，自己是在对抗邪恶与谎言，才能汲取更多的灵感和勇气。

The second point I want to emphasize is this. It is equally important to recognize that one does not need to convert one’scolleagues, that is, that one does not need to persuade mainstream intellectuals. As Thomas Kuhn has shown, in particular, converting one’scolleagues is a rare enough event, even in the natural sciences. In the social sciences, conversions among established intellectuals from previously held views are almost unheard of. Now, instead, one should concentrate one’s eﬀorts on the not yet intellectually committed young, whose idealism makes them particularly receptive to moral arguments and to moral rigorism. And likewise one should circumvent, as far as this is possible, pure academic institutions and reach out to the general public, which has some generally healthy anti-intellectual prejudices into which one can easily tap.

我想强调的第二点是：无需说服自己的同行，也就是说，无需说服主流知识分子。这一点同样非常重要。正如托马斯·库恩所指出的，即便在自然科学领域，说服同行转变观念都是极为罕见之事。而在社会科学领域，改变知名知识分子原有的观点，就更加少见，几乎闻所未闻。因此，我们应将精力集中在那些尚未形成固定知识立场的年轻人身上。由于年轻人理想主义的特质，他们往往更容易接受道德层面的论证和严格的道德主张。同时，我们也应该尽量绕开那些纯粹的学术机构，直接面向公众。大众往往对学院派知识分子持有一种天然的戒备和反感，而这种“反智”情绪本身其实可以成为我们传播思想时可以借力利用的资源。

The third point is—and this makes me return to the importance of a moral attack on the state—it is essential to recognize that there can be no compromise on the level of theory. To be sure, one should not refuse to cooperate with people whose views are ultimately mistaken and confused, provided that their objectives can be classiﬁed clearly and unambiguously as a step in the right direction of a destatization of society. For instance, one would not want to refuse cooperation with people who seek to introduce a ﬂat income tax of 10 percent. However, we would not want to cooperate with those who want to combine this measure with an increased sales tax in order to achieve revenue neutrality, for instance. Under no circumstances should such cooperation lead to compromising one’s principles. Either taxation is just or it isn’t, and once it is admitted that it is just, how is one then to oppose any increase in it? And the answer is, of course, that then one has no argument left over. Put diﬀerently, compromise, on the level of theory, as we ﬁnd it, for instance, among moderate free marketeers, such as Hayek or Friedman, or even among some so-called minarchists, is not only philosophically ﬂawed, but it is also practically ineﬀective and even counterproductive. Their ideas can be, and in fact are, easily coopted and incorporated by the state rulers and by the statist ideology. In fact, how often do we hear nowadays from statists, in defense of a statist agenda, cries such as “even Hayek or Friedman says such and such” or “not even Hayek or Friedman would propose anything like this”?

第三个要点，我们不能妥协。让我再回到这个问题，在理论层面上我们需要坚定不移地对国家进行道德批判。当然，在实际行动中，我们也要鼓励边际上的改善，对那些有助于推动社会去国家化的行为我们也不应拒绝合作，即使他们的理论错乱。但是，我们也要对这些混乱的观念保持警惕。例如，如果有人主张推行10%的统一所得税，这种主张可以看作是朝着减轻国家干预的一步，我们当然可以支持。但如果他们同时又提出，为了财政平衡，要配套提高销售税，那我们就不应与之合作。特别强调，合作不应以牺牲原则为代价。税收要么是正义的，要么就是不正义的——一旦你承认它是正义的，那你就无法再有力地反对它的任何提高。换句话说，在理论上妥协，就如我们在一些温和的自由市场倡导者那里看到的那样，比如哈耶克、弗里德曼，甚至一些所谓的“最小政府主义者”（minarchists），不仅在哲学上先天不足，在实践中也往往无效，甚至适得其反。这些中间立场的思想很容易被国家统治者和国家主义意识形态所吸收和利用。事实上，如今我们常常听到国家主义者在为他们的政策辩护时如此宣称：“连哈耶克或弗里德曼都认为……”，或者说：“就连哈耶克或弗里德曼也不会提出你们这样的主张。”诸如此类的说法已清楚表明说明他们的思想早已被国家主义的理念侵蚀。

Now, personally, Friedman and Hayek might not be happy about this, but there is no denying that their work lends itself to this very purpose, and hence, that they willy-nilly actually contributed to the continued and unabating power of the state. In other words, theoretical compromise and gradualism will only lead to the perpetuation of the falsehood, the evils, and the lies of statism, and only theoretical purism, radicalism, and intransigence can and will lead ﬁrst to gradual practical reform and improvement and possibly also to ﬁnal victory. Accordingly, as an anti-intellectual intellectual, in the Rothbardian sense, one can never be satisﬁed with criticizing various government follies. Although one might have to begin with criticizing such follies, one must always proceed from there onto a fundamental attack on the institution of the state as such,as a moral outrage, and on its representatives as moral as well as economic frauds, liars, and imposters, or as emperors without clothes. In particular, one must never hesitate to strike at the very heart of the legitimacy of the state and its alleged indispensable role as producer of private protection and security. I have already shown how ridiculous this claim is on theoretical grounds. How can an agency that may expropriate private property possibly claim to be a protector of private property?

就个人立场而言，弗里德曼和哈耶克也许对此并不乐见，但不可否认的是，他们的著作确实被用于支持国家主义的扩张。因此，无论他们承认不承认，愿意还是不愿意，他们的理论实际上都对国家权力的持续不衰的扩张起到了推波助澜的作用。换句话说，理论上的妥协和渐进主义只会让国家主义的谬误、恶行与谎言延续，只有坚持理论上的纯粹主义、激进主义和毫不妥协的立场，才有可能首先带来逐步的实践性改革与改善，甚至有可能最终实现根本性的胜利。因此，作为一名罗斯巴德意义上的反知识分子的知识分子，我们绝不能仅仅满足于对政府各种愚蠢行径的批评。尽管我们可能不得不从批评这些荒唐的政策入手，但必须从这里更进一步，对国家这一制度本身发起根本性抨击——将其视为一种道德上的耻辱，并且要揭露其代理人，无论在道德上还是经济上，他们都是骗子、说谎者和伪善之辈，是那种穿着皇帝新装，到处张招摇撞骗之徒。尤其重要的是，我们绝不能对国家所谓“合法性”这一核心主张让步，绝不能接受它在提供私人保护和安全方面所谓“不可或缺”的角色。我此前已经从理论上说明，这一主张本身就是荒谬可笑的——一个可以随意剥夺私人财产的机构，怎么居然还有脸自称是“私人财产的保护者”呢？

But, hardly less important is it to attack the legitimacy of the state on empirical grounds, that is, to point out and hammer away on the subject that after all, states, which are supposed to protect us, are the very institution responsible for some estimated 170 million deaths in peacetime in the twentieth century alone; that is probably more than the victims of private crime in all of human history. And this number of victims of private crimes from which government did not protect us would have been even much lower if governments everywhere and at all times had not undertaken constant eﬀorts to disarm its own citizens so that the governments, in turn, could become evermore eﬀective killing machines. Instead of treating politicians with respect, then, one’s criticism of them should be signiﬁcantly stepped up. Almost to a man—there might be a few exceptions—almost to a man, politicians are not only thieves, but in fact, mass murderers or at least assistants of mass murderers. And how do they dare to demand our respect and loyalty?

不过，从经验事实层面对国家的合法性发起质疑，也同样至关重要。我们必须反复强调这一点：那些被赋予“保护我们”职责的国家，实际上恰恰是导致大规模死亡的主要元凶——仅在二十世纪的和平时期，各国政府就被认为直接或间接造成了大约一亿七千万人的死亡。这一数字，可能已经超过了整个人类历史上所有私人犯罪的受害者总数。更重要的是，如果各国政府没有在各个时代、各个地区不断致力于解除公民的武装，使自己变成一个更高效的杀戮机器，那么这些私人犯罪的受害人数原本还可以大幅减少。因此，我们不该对政治人物抱以尊敬，而应大幅提升我们对他们的批评力度。几乎可以说，除了极少数例外，绝大多数政治人物不仅是窃贼，实际上更是大屠杀的祸首，或至少是大屠杀的帮凶。这样一群人，竟然还厚颜无耻地要求我们给予他们尊重与忠诚，这本身就是莫大的讽刺。

But, will a sharp and distinct logical radicalization bring about the results that we want to achieve? In this, I have very little doubt. Indeed, only radical and in fact, radically simple ideas can possibly stir the emotions of the dour and indolent masses and delegitimize government in their eyes. Let me quote Hayek to this eﬀect and from this, you realize that even a guy who is fundamentally muddled and mistaken can have very important insights, and that we can learn very much also from those people who do not agree totally with us.

坚持逻辑彻底、观点鲜明，能否达到我们所期望的结果？答案毋庸置疑——因为宣传需要激进且简明的思想。大众的情绪往往沉闷而懒散，若想促使他们从内心质疑政府的正当性，就需要以激进简明的思想为火种，点燃思考的火焰。在此，我想引用哈耶克的洞见：即便一个人在根本上思想混乱、观点有误，也可能偶尔迸发吉光片羽般的深刻见解。更重要的是，我们完全能够从那些未必完全认同我们立场的人身上，汲取许多值得深思的养分。

We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure, a deed of courage. What we lack is a liberal Utopia,a program which seems neither a mere defense of things as they are nora diluted kind of socialism, but a truly liberal radicalism which does not spare the susceptibilities of the mighty (including the trade unions), which is not too severely practical and which does not conﬁne itself to what appears today as politically possible. We need intellectual leaders who are prepared to resist the blandishments of power and inﬂuence and who are willing to work for an ideal, however small may be the prospects of its early realization. They must be men who are willing to stick to principles and to ﬁght for their full realization, however remote. Free trade or the freedom of opportunity are ideas which still may arouse the imaginations of large numbers, but a mere “reasonable freedom of trade” or a mere “relaxation of controls” are neither intellectually respectable nor likely to inspire any enthusiasm.

Unless we can make the philosophical foundations of a free society once more a living intellectual issue and its implementation a task which challenges the ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest minds, the prospects of freedom are indeed dark. But if we can regain that belief in the power of ideas which was a mark of liberalism at its greatest, the battle is not lost.1

我们必须重建自由社会，这无疑是一场知识上的冒险，是勇敢之举。我们所缺乏的是一个自由主义的乌托邦，一个既非仅仅维护现状，也非某种改良版的社会主义方案，而是一种真正的自由主义激进主张，它敢于直面权贵阶层（包括工会）的利益核心，不会过于实用主义，也不会局限于当下政治上看似可行的妥协方案。我们需要这样的思想领袖：他们愿意抵制权力与影响力的诱惑，愿意为一个理想而奋斗，即便这个理想在短期内实现希望渺茫。他们必须是那些愿意坚守原则，并为原则的彻底实现而不懈奋斗之人——无论看起来多么遥不可及。这些坚定的观点——自由贸易、机会平等等理念依然能够激发大众的想象和热情。那些模棱两可的说辞——“适度的贸易自由” “适当放松管制”，既缺乏思想说服力，也难以唤起人们真正的热情。

除非我们能让自由社会的哲学基础重新成为一个充满生命力的思想议题，并将其实践过程作为一个激发最富才智与想象力之头脑的挑战，否则，自由的前景的确是黯淡的。但如果我们能够重新找回对思想力量的信念——正是这种信念曾标志着自由主义最辉煌的时期——那么，这场战斗就尤未言败。[44]

Now, Hayek, of course, did not heed his own advice to provide us with a consistent and inspiring theory. His utopia as developed, for instance, in his Constitution of Liberty, is instead the uninspiring vision of the Swedish welfare state. But, it is Rothbard, above all, who has done what Hayek recognized as necessary for the renewal of classical liberalism, that is, he had given us an inspiring utopia, something that is based on morals and is capable of invigorating, especially the young and intellectually uncommitted.

当然，哈耶克本人并未践行自己的主张——为世人构建一套逻辑自洽且充满感召力的理论体系。以《自由秩序原理》为例，他所描绘的乌托邦图景，本质上不过是瑞典福利国家模式的翻版，难掩其缺乏理想光芒的现实底色。然而，罗斯巴德尤为出色地完成了哈耶克眼中复兴古典自由主义的必要之举——他为世人勾勒出一个以道德为基石、极具感召力的乌托邦图景。这一构想恰似精神火炬，不仅能点燃人们的理想热忱，对充满憧憬的年轻人与尚未固化思维的群体而言，更具直指人心的激励力量。

Now, let me end by also trying to oﬀer some sort of inspiring utopia for intermediate goals, goals before wereach a fully destatized society. You realize that if we follow the logic of the state to its ultimate conclusion, then what we must demand is a world state, because as long as there is no world state, then according to the statist ideology itself, there will be perpetual war among states because they are, vis-à-vis each other, in a state of anarchy. The only ultimate solution would be that of a world state. This is precisely the vision that our leaders try to propagate. Of course, a world state under control of the United States, to be more precise, but in any case, it requires a world state. Instead, the utopia, the intermediate utopia that I would suggest takes its cues from what we have learned from the Middle Ages and from the peculiar organization of Europe which was responsible for the unique success of the Western world, that is, the quasi-anarchistic structure, the highly decentralized structure of Europe. What we can propose as an intermediate goal, which I think is more inspiring than the world state, is the view of a world composed of tens of thousands of Monacos and Liechtensteins and Swiss Cantons and Singapores and Hong Kongs and San Marinos and whatever small entities nowadays still exist. Recall, if we have a large number of small political entities, each of these entities will have to be relatively moderate and nice to its population, otherwise, people will simply run away from it.

最后，我亦尝试提出某种富有感召力的过渡性乌托邦构想，聚焦于实现完全去国家化社会之前的阶段性目标。需知，若将国家主义逻辑推演至极致，必然导向对世界政府的诉求——因国家主义意识形态宣称，只要不存在世界政府，各国便会因彼此间的“无政府状态”陷入永无休止的战争，故唯一终极解决方案是建立世界政府。这恰是某些领导人试图宣扬的理念，更确切地说，是由美国主导的世界政府设想。与之相对，我所建议的过渡性乌托邦构想，灵感源于中世纪欧洲独特的组织模式——那种近乎“无政府状态”的高度去中心化结构，正是此模式孕育了西方世界的独特成功。我们可提出一个比世界政府更具吸引力的过渡目标：构建一个由数万小型政治实体组成的世界。这些实体可如摩纳哥、列支敦士登、瑞士各州、新加坡、中国香港、圣马力诺及现存所有微型政体这般——当大量小型政治实体并存时，每个实体都不得不对其民众保持相对温和与友善，否则，民众将用脚投票，直接选择逃离。

Second, each one of these small units will have to engage almost necessarily in an open free trade policy. The United States, as a large country, can engage in protectionist measures because it has a large internal market. Even if it were to stop trading with the rest of the world, the United States population would experience a signiﬁcant decline in standards of living, but people would not die. On the other hand, imagine Liechtenstein or Monaco or San Marino declaring no more trade, no more free trade with the outside world, or Hong Kong, places such as this. Then, of course, it would take a week or two and the entire population in these places would be wiped out. So, small units must, in order to avoid starving to death or losing, in particular, their most productive individuals in no time, must engage in classical liberal policies.

其次，此类小型政治实体几乎必然会推行开放的自由贸易政策。以美国这样的大国为例，因其拥有庞大的国内市场，尚可采取保护主义措施——即便停止与世界其他国家贸易，民众生活水平虽会大幅下降，却不致危及生存。但试想，若列支敦士登、摩纳哥、圣马力诺或中国香港等微型经济体宣布终止自由贸易，不出一两周，全体居民便会陷入生存绝境。因此，为避免饿殍遍野，更避免迅速流失最具生产力的人口，这些小型政治实体不得不奉行古典自由主义政策。

In addition,alarge number of very small units would have to give up, of necessity, the institution of paper money because there cannot be tens of thousands of diﬀerent paper monies issued by tens of thousands of diﬀerent political units. We would basically be back to a system of barter if we were to do this. The smaller the units are, the greater is the pressure, in fact, that we will return also to a commodity money standard, which is entirely independent of government control.

此外，大量微型政治实体必然需要摒弃纸币体系——试想，若由数以万计不同政体发行万余种纸币，本质上无异于退回以物易物的原始交易形态。事实上，实体规模越小，向商品货币本位制回归的驱动力便越强，而这一货币体系可完全脱离政府控制，以市场共识为根基自主运行。

What I would recommend, in particular, for the United States and so forth, is to realize that democracy will not abolish itself. The masses like to loot other people’s property. They will not give up the right to continue doing this. However, there are still, in the United States and in many other places, small islands of reasonable people, and it is possible that on small local levels, some people, some natural authorities can gain enough inﬂuence in order to induce them to secede from their central state. And if they do so, and if that accelerates, if it happens at many places simultaneously, it will be almost impossible for the central state to crush a movement such as this. Because in order to crush a movement such as this, again, public opinion has to be in favor of this and it would be difficult to persuade the public to attack to kill, to destroy small places that have done nothing other than to declare that they wish to be independent of the United States.

我特别想向美国等国家建言：需清醒认知——民主制度不会自行消解。人性中固有对他人财富的觊觎倾向，民众往往难以主动舍弃通过制度攫取利益的“权利”。所幸，在美国及诸多地区，仍存在由理性个体组成的“小众群体”。在地方微观层面，或有某些自然形成的权威力量，凭借足够的社会影响力，推动区域从中央政府治下脱离。若此类行动形成趋势、多地联动，中央政府将难以有效镇压——毕竟，任何镇压行动均需舆论背书，而说服民众去攻击、屠戮乃至摧毁那些仅宣称希望从美国独立出去的地方社群，实为难事。

索引

略。

[1] 汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe），《我与思想警察的斗争》，米塞斯日报，2005年4月12日，https://mises.org/library/my-battle-thought-police

[2] Brand Blanshard, Reason and Analysis (1962; Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), chap. 2, p. 51.

布兰德·布兰沙德，《理性与分析》（1962年；英国阿宾登：劳特利奇出版社，2013年重印），第2章，第51页。

[3] Ibid.同上。

[4] 同上。

[5] 赫伯特·斯宾塞，《社会学原理》（第2版）（纽约：D. 阿普尔顿公司，1916年），第2卷，第538页。

[6] 引自阿诺德·盖伦《人类学研究》（汉堡：罗沃尔特出版社，1965年），第94-95页。

[7] Ibid.同上。

[8] [本次讲座开头，霍普分享了两则个人事项。尽管与讲座内容无直接关联，但颇具历史价值与趣味。——编者注]

首先，我来说几句个人的事。其一，鉴于你们有些人看过默里·罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）的录像带，我得提一下，在他生命的最后十年，我是他最亲密的同事。从某种程度上讲，我算是他学术上的保镖。1985年我来到美国，与默里在纽约共事了一年，他不在城里的时候，我就代他授课。1986年，他收到内华达大学拉斯维加斯分校授予的终身教席邀请，这是他首次获得重要职位。当时，学校还有另一个职位空缺，他便邀我一同前往。很凑巧，我也得到了那份工作。我想，在那所大学，也就只有那一年，我们俩有可能同时被录用。从那之后，系里的人员构成发生了变化，我们再也不可能同时获得聘用了。后来我一直留在那里，直到1995年他去世，而如今我是仅存的坚守者，成了他们再也甩不掉的人。

另一件事与这些讲座有关。讲座的结构本应是我下一个书籍项目的架构。因此，从某种程度上说，我在这上面投入的精力比平时更多。除此之外，正是卢·罗克韦尔（Lew Rockwell）的邀请，总是迫使我克服天生的惰性，集中全部精力，为这些讲座做好准备。

[9] 路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《社会主义：经济与社会学分析》（1951年；阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，2009年），第314页。

[10] Ibid.

同上。

[11] 路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《人的行动：经济学专论》（学者版）（1949年；阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，1998年），第831页。

[12] Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, scholar’s ed. (1949; Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998), p. 160.

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《人的行动：经济学专论》（学者版）（1949年；阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，1998年），第160页。

[13] 同上，第144页。

[14] 同上，第167页。

[15] 路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《社会主义：经济与社会学分析》，J. 卡哈内译（1951年版；阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，2009年重印），第318页。

[16] 同上。

[17] 译者注：（长期利率的变化见图1，它整体描述了近七百年西欧和美国利率的下降趋势。

[18] 卡罗尔·奎格利，《文明的演进》第2版（印第安纳波利斯，印第安纳州：自由基金，1979年），第134页。

[19] 赫伯特·斯宾塞，《社会学原理》第2版（纽约：D. 阿普尔顿公司，1916年），第557页。

[20] G. E. 冯·格林鲍姆，《伊斯兰教：一种文化传统的本质与发展论文集》（1955年；蒙大拿州怀特菲什：凯辛格出版社，2010年）

[21] 我推荐社会学家斯坦尼斯拉夫·安德烈斯基。除了他的一些综合性著作，我特别想提及一本，一本非常有趣的书。书名叫《社会科学如巫术》。它总体上是在调侃社会学这一专业。如果你没读过这本书，我强烈推荐你读一读。你可以在深夜睡前读，读完会笑着入睡。这是一本很棒的书，你想了解社会学的话，读它就够了。

[22] 斯坦尼斯拉夫·安德烈斯基，《马克斯·韦伯：洞察力与谬误》（1984年；伦敦：劳特利奇出版社，2006年），第5章，第3节。

[23] 查尔斯·默里，《人类成就：公元前800年至1950年艺术与科学领域对卓越的追求》（纽约：哈珀柯林斯出版社，2003年），第41-42页。

[24] 查尔斯·默里，《人类成就：公元前800年至1950年艺术与科学领域对卓越的追求》（纽约：哈珀柯林斯出版社，2003年），第41-42页。

[25] 伊萨尔·沙哈克，《犹太历史、犹太宗教：三千年的重负》（伦敦：冥王星出版社，1994年），第18页。

[26] 我还记得，当我带孩子们去一位瑞士朋友家，他打开壁橱，里面有一把大枪和足够杀死半数德国人的弹药时，孩子们被惊得目瞪口呆。

[27] 赫伯特·斯宾塞，《社会学原理》，第2版（纽约：D. 阿普尔顿公司，1916年），第2卷，第378-379页。

[28] Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, scholar’s ed. (1998; Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2008), p. 144.

[29] Ludwig von Mises, Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis (1951; Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2009), p. 318.

[30] Mises, Human Action, pp. 171–72.

[31] 亨利·皮雷纳，《中世纪的城市：起源与贸易复兴》（1925年；新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1974年），第179 – 180页。

[32] 斯坦尼斯瓦夫·安德烈斯基，《比较社会学的用途》（伯克利与洛杉矶：加利福尼亚大学出版社，1964年），第111页。

[33] Stanislaw Andreski, The Uses of Comparative Sociology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 111.

[34] 引自同上，第2页。

[35] 引自同上，第2-3页。

[36] 杰弗里·帕克，《军事革命：1500—1800年的军事创新与西方的崛起》（第2版）（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1996年），第1页。

[37] 阿尔内·勒克松德，《青年学派》，载于罗尔夫·霍布森、汤姆·克里斯蒂安森编《北方水域的海军》（伦敦：劳特利奇出版社，2004年），第139页。

[38] 古列尔莫·费雷罗，《和平与战争》（新泽西州弗里波特：图书馆书籍出版社，1969年），第5 – 7页。

[39] 迈克尔·霍华德，《欧洲历史上的战争》（1976年；剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2009年），第5章。

[40] 斐迪南·福煦，《战争原则》（1903年），转引自J.F.C. 富勒所著《战争行为，1789 – 1961》，第34页。

[41] J.F.C.富勒，《战争与西方文明，1832-1932》（伦敦：达克沃思出版社，1932年），第26页。

[42] J.F.C. 富勒，《战争行为，1789-1961 年》，第 33 和 35 页。

[43] 路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《社会主义：经济与社会学分析》（阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，2009年），第306 – 307页。

[44] 弗里德里希·A·哈耶克，《自由秩序原理》（1978年；芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，2005年），第384页。

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Chinese Translation of Economy, Society, and History

传递逻辑的力量

目 录

序言

自序

第一讲 人的本质与人类生存状况：语言、财产与生产

第二讲 人类在全球的扩散：劳动分工的扩展与深化

第三讲 货币与货币一体化：城市的发展与贸易全球化

第四讲 时间偏好、资本、技术与经济增长

第五讲 国家财富：意识形态、宗教、生物与环境

第六讲 法律与秩序的生成、自然秩序、封建主义与联邦制

第七讲 寄生现象与国家的起源

第八讲 从君主制到民主制

第九讲 国家、战争与帝国主义

第十讲 策略、分离、私有化与自由的前景

索引

目录