The Great Fiction in Chinese

by Stephan Kinsella on December 20, 2024

Here is a first draft of a Chinese translation of The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline (Laissez Faire Books, 2012; second revised edition, Mises Institute, 2021), translated by Li San (李三). The following is not yet proofread, according to the translator.

伟大的虚构

项目计划书修订版（B）

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原书名：

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文档制作：人的行动研究社区@Alhρα

制作时间：2018年

最后修订：2024年元月第3次修订

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ON GOVERNmenT…………………………………………………………………………………………. 542
ON FREEDOM AND COERCION…………………………………………………………………………………….. 544
THESIS TWO…………………………………………………………………………………………. 548
ON ETHICS…………………………………………………………………………………………. 549
ON SOCIAL EVOLUTION…………………………………………………………………………………………. 551
CULTURAL MUTATION…………………………………………………………………………………………. 554
CULTURAL TRANSMISSION…………………………………………………………………………………………. 555
CULTURAL SELECTION…………………………………………………………………………………………. 562
conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………. 571

24 The Western State as a Paradigm：Learning from History …………………………….. 572

LESSON one：AGAINST CENTRALIZATION………………………………………… 573

25 The Libertarian Quest for a Grand Historical Narrative …………………………………….. 612

第五辑 Autobiographical……………………………………………………………………. 644

26 Interview with The Daily bell ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 644

I INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 644

INTERVIEW……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 645
conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………. 659

27 Interview with Philosophie Magazine ………………………………………………………………………. 660

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 660
INTERVIEW……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 661

28 This Crazy World ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 666

29 My Life on the Right ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 671

30 My Path to the Austrian School of Economics ……………………………………………………… 686

31 The InDepth Interview ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 697

Afterword by Stephan Kinsella …………………………………………………………… 711

Index…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 719

518 West Magnolia Avenue……………………………………………………………….. 720

Auburn，Alabama 36832 mises.org…………………………………………………… 720

前言

Foreword

Congratulations! You hold in your hands one of the best collections of essays from one of the most vital and challenging thinkers on the planet。This book is a compendium of sorts，a cross section of Professor Hans Hermann Hoppe’s best work across several decades arranged in one acces sible volume。It originally was published by Laissez Faire Books in 2012，but languished without the audience it deserved。This volume rejuvenates that work with no less than six new chapters and more than a hundred new pages not found in the earlier version，along with some muchneeded publicity and promotion。

恭喜！你手中拿着的是这个星球上最具活力和最具挑战性的思想家之一的最佳文集之一。这本书在某种程度上是一本纲要，是汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普教授几十年来的最佳作品的选集，编排在一本便于阅读的卷册中。它最初由自由放任图书公司（Laissez Faire Books）于2012年出版，但却没有得到应有的关注。这个版本通过新增不少于六个新章节和一百多页在早期版本中没有的内容，以及一些非常必要的宣传和推广，使这部作品重焕生机。

Academics and social scientists today tend toward hyperspecialization，but Dr.Hoppe does not make this mistake。In this approach he joins a long line of important thinkers who did not conﬁne themselves to a narrow academic discipline and did not care to “stay in their lane。” We forget that many twentieth century economists，for example，capably applied knowl edge in history，philosophy，logic，anthropology，sociology，epistemology，politics，and ethics to their work including Ludwig von Mises，Hoppe’s inspiration，and Murray N.Rothbard，Hoppe’s mentor。In that very important sense Hoppe continues and builds on the work of both men。

今天的学者和社会科学家都倾向于高度专业化，但霍普博士没有犯这个错误。在这种方法中，他加入了一长串重要思想家的行列，他们不把自己局限于一个狭窄的学术领域，也不愿“墨守成规”。例如，我们忘记了许多20世纪的经济学家能够将历史、哲学、逻辑学、人类学、社会学、认识论、政治学和伦理学方面的知识应用到他们的工作中，这些杰出的经济学家包括路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）、他是霍普的精神偶像，以及霍普的导师默里·罗斯巴德（Murray N.Rothbard）。正是在这个非常重要的意义上，霍普在两人的成就之上再接再厉。

If you are new to Hoppe’s work，this is an excellent introduction and survey to his syntheses of history，anthropology，property，ethics，and state。If you already know and enjoy Hoppe，you will ﬁnd here a “Hoppe reader”：many of his best and most representative articles across a range of topics in one accessible volume。Consider it almost a reference guide，from which readers can guide themselves back to his lengthy books and articles。But this book has something for everyone，from his rigorous yet often overlooked implications of capitalism and socialism to his broadside against democracy on property rights grounds。Even the new or casual reader will come away with an excellent understanding of Hoppe’s work and worldview。

如果你是第一次接触霍普的作品，这本书是了解他的著作的切入口，此书综合了他对历史、人类学、产权、伦理和国家的精彩的介绍和概述。如果你已经知道并喜欢霍普，你会在这里找到一个“霍普读本”：他的许多最好的和最具代表性的文章，被分类整合在一个个主题之内，组成一个可检索的卷宗。读者可以把它看作是一个参考指南，从中能够引导自己回到他的长篇书籍和文章中去。这是一本对每个人都很有意义的书，在书中霍普仔细、严谨地辨析了资本主义和社会主义的含义，同时在产权的基础上猛烈地抨击了民主制度，而这些都是以前被人忽略的。即使是新读者或普通读者也会对霍普的作品和世界观有一个很好的理解。

The title of course comes from ClaudeFrédéric Bastiat，the great nineteenthcentury French economic journalist and liberal。Bastiat gave us “The Great Fiction” to describe the government mechanisms by which people attempt to live at the expense of others。The state is always present in Hoppe’s work，whether front and center or lurking in the background。Hoppe’s subtitle，Property，Economy，Society，and the Politics of Decline gives an unsubtle clue as to what readers should expect：a damning indictment of the political world and its twentyﬁrstcentury managerial superstates。In Hoppe’s world，the state is a wholly decivilizing institution：a predator rather than protector，a threat to property and peace。Markets and entre preneurs produce goods，governments produce “bads”：taxation （theft），regulation （semiownership，thus semisocialism），devalued money （central banks），war （defense），injustice （state courts and police），and the ruinous eﬀects of high time preference （democracy）。Like Bastiat，Hoppe has no patience for obscuring or soft pedaling the realities of our political world。

书名当然来自于19世纪伟大的法国经济记者兼自由主义者克劳德弗朗茨·巴斯夏（ClaudeFrédéric Bastiat）。巴斯夏给我们写了《伟大的虚构》，该书描述了政府机制，人们试图以牺牲他人为代价来生活。当然，在霍普的作品中，国家也总是存在的，有时是论述的焦点，有时是论述的背景。霍普这本书的副标题是《财产、经济、社会和衰败的政治》，它给读者提供了一个明确的线索：对政治世界及其21世纪超级统治大国的严厉谴责。在霍普的语境里，国家是一个完全破坏文明的机构：一个掠夺者而不是保护者，是对财产与和平的威胁。市场和企业家生产财货，政府生产“劣货”：税收（盗窃）、管制（半所有权，因此是半社会主义）、货币贬值（中央银行）、战争（国防）、不公正（国家法院和警察），以及高时间偏好的毁灭性影响（民主）。和巴斯夏一样，霍普没有耐心去掩盖或粉饰我们政治世界的现实。

Part one of the book deals with the development of human society and the concomitant rise of two often opposing forces，namely property and states。Here Hoppe explains civilization rising against a backdrop of greater productivity enabled by the painfully slow shift from nomadic to agrarian living。Once suﬃcient calories could be yielded from land，concepts of family and ownership come into greater focus。The Enlightenment and Indus trial Revolution create more and more prosperity，a protomiddle class，while feudal and monarchical arrangements face pressure from subjects developing greater wealth and literacy。This pressure explodes in the nine teenth century，as groups of largely decentralized kingdoms，principalities，territories，and citystates come under the full sway of national boundaries and governments。The twentieth century ushers in the era of full democratic government in the West：the Great War washes away the last vestiges of Old Europe，while growing economic and military power places the United States squarely at the helm of an international order。

本书的第一辑，论述了人类社会的发展，以及随之而来的两种对立力量的崛起，即财产和国家。在这里，霍普解释了文明是在生产力提高的背景下兴起的，这种生产力的提高，是由游牧生活向农业生活极度缓慢的转变所带来的。一旦能够从土地中获得足够的热量，家庭和所有权的概念就变得更加重要。启蒙运动和工业革命创造了越来越多的繁荣，同时诞生了一个原始的中产阶级，而封建制度和君主制度，则面临着来自那些希求更多财富和更繁荣的文化的国民的压力。这种压力在19世纪迅速扩张，大量分散的王国、公国、领土和城邦受到国家边界和政府的全面控制。20世纪开启了西方全面民主政府的时代：第一次世界大战涤荡了旧欧洲最后的痕迹，与此同时，日益增长的经济和军事实力使美国成为国际秩序的掌舵者。

Hoppe，of course，does not accept at face value the notion of the twentieth century as “liberal，” and in fact ﬁnds much of it illiberal。A particular favorite from part one is a chapter from Democracy：The God That Failed titled “On Democracy，redistribution，and the Destruction of Property。” This essay beautifully encapsulates all of his fundamental critiques of mod ern mass democracy，namely that it produces bad，shortsighted politicians who care nothing about their nation’s capital stock； bad，shortsighted voters who care nothing about future generations； bad，expansionary economic and foreign policy； and bad，central bank money to pay for it all。Citizens，unlike subjects of yesteryear，enjoy the illusion that government is “us。” But an illusion is all it is，and Hoppe enjoys slaying this most sacred of cows。

当然，霍普并不接受二十世纪 “自由主义 ”概念的表面价值，事实上，他认为二十世纪的很多东西都是不自由的。第一辑中最受欢迎的是《民主：失败的上帝》中的一章，题为《论民主、再分配和财产破坏》。这篇文章完美地概括了他对现代大众民主的所有根本性的批判。大众民主催生了糟糕的、目光短浅的政客，他们对国家的资本存量毫不关心；催生了糟糕的、目光短浅的选民，他们对子孙后代毫不关心；催生了糟糕的扩张性的经济和外交政策；更加糟糕的是，最后由央行印钱来为这一切买单。而与过去不同的是，公民们沉浸在政府为“我”、“我”为政府的幻觉中。但这只不过是一种幻觉而已，霍普喜欢屠宰这头被崇拜的神牛。

Part two focuses on the hugely important but often overlooked relation ship between money and the state。While kings and sovereigns once enjoyed debasing money to line their pockets，modern central banks turn seignior age into something far more systemic and harmful。Fiat money enables poli ticians to fund welfare and warfare programs unimaginable in previous gen erations，increasing state power at every turn。It also distorts virtually every economic decision made across society，resulting in gross ineﬃciency and malinvestment。Society suﬀers，purchasing power erodes，but an undeserv ing and stateconnected banking class beneﬁts from all the new money。The quintessential Hoppean explanation for this sordid process，namely power，is nicely presented in chapter 9，“Why the State Demands the Control of Money。”

Part three forays into Dr.Hoppe’s economic theory，particularly in the area of method。Much of what we consider to comprise modern economics is wrong，and in particular wrong because it subverts the role of theory with empiricism，statistics，math，and modeling。Human actors apply deeply subjective values to all economic goods，values which change almost constantly。They are not atoms or vectors to be studied by testing hypotheses with data，but volitional beings to which we must apply axiomatic deduc tive reasoning。Hoppe gives readers a crash course in certainty，uncertainty，and probability，to show their uses and more importantly their limitations in economics。

Part four considers the important subject of intellectual history in the context of the broad Austrolibertarian movement，and includes a truly heartfelt speech from Hoppe on his friend and colleague Rothbard which is sure to move you。It also includes a typically Hoppean critique of Friedrich von Hayek’s political theory，which in Hoppe’s view compares very unfavorably to his work in monetary policy and the knowledge problem。This sec tion ﬁnishes with the text of Hoppe’s sweeping talk titled “The Libertarian Quest for a Grand Historical Narrative，” a marvelous narrative about where we have been and where we might be going。

Finally，part ﬁve is a collection of interviews with Dr.Hoppe and auto biographical essays，including one conducted by yours truly。These interviews give a better sense of Hoppe as a person and thinker，and greater insight into his development both personally and professionally。Readers will ﬁnd plenty of intellectual ammunition here，along with answers to many of the simplistic challenges posed to Hoppe’s idealized conception of a private law society。

最后，第五辑是对霍普博士的采访和自传体随笔的集合，其中也包括本人的一篇。这些访谈让我们更好地了解霍普其人，一位思想家，同时能更深入地了解他的个人和专业的发展。读者将在这里找到大量的知识弹药，以及对霍普理想化的私法社会概念所提出的许多过于简单化的挑战的答案。

Reading HansHermann Hoppe is always a pleasure and never a chore，because both the subjects and Dr.Hoppe’s command of them quickly win the reader’s attention and even admiration。Most academic writing is almost unbearable； and as alluded to earlier it is designed to appeal only to a tiny group of PhDs who work in a very limited area or subﬁeld。Hoppe，by contrast，produces academic treatments of much broader and foundational issues which manage to hold appeal for intelligent lay audiences。The foot notes，the diamondsharp deductive logic，the references to earlier works and thinkers—all the hallmarks of academic journals are there—without the tedium and hubris。

Hoppe is the rare intellectual who never preens or bores，and never loses the plot。He keeps things close to the bone，one might say：not quite sparse but never ornate or superﬂuous。There are no twentypage detours into some faintly related topic merely for show，a habit even the best of academicaca demics sometimes fall prey to。Not Dr.Hoppe。His work inevitably strips out the nonessential and gets to the root of the issue at hand。Sometimes that essential and unadulterated focus comports with popular sentiment and thinking； oftentimes it does not。Hence his controversial reputation in certain emotive circles。But Hoppe，like any good social scientist，has an obligation to seek truth and help us understand the world。Thus he never appeals to the reader’s existing pretensions or prejudices，but instead always demands we follow the praxeological path of understanding human actors as they really are。

In other words，truth—unadorned and uncomfortable as it may be—is the end goal of any good social scientist。Thus，Dr.Hoppe is an unﬂinching advocate for reality and logic，and one you cannot ignore。

换句话说，真理——尽管它可能不加修饰、让人不适——是任何优秀的社会科学家的最终目标。因此，霍普博士是现实和逻辑的坚定倡导者，是一位你不能忽视的学者。

Jeﬀ Deist Auburn，January 2021

序

preface

While the need for and value of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research is often emphasized as a welcome antidote to hyperspecialization，such commitment is typically little more than lip service。In general，in today’s academia inter and transdisciplinary work is frowned on and dis couraged。It hampers your professional career or even dooms it。Once you venture outside an increasingly narrowly deﬁned ﬁeld of academic special ization，your colleagues will dismiss and disparage you for no longer being a “real” economist，philosopher，or whatever； and likewise，the certiﬁed members and gatekeepers of those ﬁelds into which you venture will either ignore or dismiss you as an intellectual outsider and trespasser and not really “one of them。”

虽然交叉学科与跨学科研究有必要性和价值，经常被强调为是对过度专业化的一种可取的解毒剂，但这只不过是口头上的说辞而已。总的来说，在今天的学术界，学科的细分化和精深化已经形成了学术界的话语体系，交叉和跨学科的研究是既不受欢迎也不受鼓励。它会阻碍你的职业生涯，甚至毁掉你的职业生涯。一旦你冒险跨出这日益狭窄的学术专业领域，你的同事就会因为你不再是一个“真正的”经济学家、哲学家或其他什么人而对你不屑一顾；同样的，你冒险涉足的这些领域的资深前辈和卫道者也会忽视和贬低你，把你当作智力上的局外人和入侵者，是“非我族类”，而不是真正的“他们中的一员”。

Indeed，even within a given academic ﬁeld such as philosophy or eco nomics，for instance，you are no longer expected to cover your discipline in its entirety。Instead，you are supposed to conﬁne your work to one of your discipline’s numerous branches or subdisciplines and publish exclusively in its “oﬃcially approved ‘refereed’ scholarly journals。” You are not supposed to be a philosopher or economist，period。Rather，you are supposed to be a philosopher of science，or of mathematics，or logic，language，religion，art and aesthetics，etc。； and you are supposed to be a microeconomist，a macroeconomist，a game theorist，a labor or development economist，an econometrician，a mathematical economist，etc。Only as a historian of your discipline are you still somewhat exempt from these strictures and supposed to cover your entire ﬁeld。However，the history of philosophy and even more so the history of economics and economic thought，for example，are increasingly eliminated from the academic curricula，because they are considered merely interpretative—philological or hermeneuti cal—endeavors，rather than real “science。”

事实上，即使是在一个特定的学术领域，比如哲学或经济学，你也不再被期望完整地涵盖你的学科。相反，你应该把你的工作限制在你的学科的众多分支或子学科之一，并只在该学科”官方认可的’评审’学术期刊”上发表研究成果。你不再是哲学家或经济学家，就这么简单。相反，你应该是科学、数学、逻辑、语言、宗教、艺术和美学等方面的哲学家；你应该是一个微观经济学家，宏观经济学家，博弈论专家，劳动或发展经济学家、计量经济学家、数理经济学家，等等。在你的学科领域，只有作为你所在学科的历史学家，你才在某种程度上不受这些限制，你才有资格涉猎整个学科领域。然而，哲学史，甚至是经济史和经济思想史，越来越多地被排除在学术课程之外，因为它们被认为仅仅是解释性的——语言学或诠释学的——工作，而不是真正的“科学”。

Throughout my entire academic career I ignored these strictures。First，because I did not know any better，and then，when I knew，because I con sciously rejected and resisted them—and learned to live with the conse quences。I earned my living as an economist，but I did not conﬁne my work to economics。I frequently ventured out into philosophy，my ﬁrst intellectual love，and from there，into law，sociology，history，and politics— wherever my intellectual curiosity led me。

The present volume bears witness to this fact。It contains articles，speeches，and interviews written and presented over almost a quarter cen tury。Most of them have previously appeared in disparate places：in vari ous academic journals，magazines of opinion，or popular media outlets。Yet there are also some longer，previously unpublished pieces appearing here for the very ﬁrst time。

While this book freely and frequently cuts across disciplinary lines，there is one dominant and unifying theme throughout the following：property，or more precisely private property，deﬁned as the exclusive control of scarce resources，its origin，and its ethical and economic rationale and justi ﬁcation as the ultimate source of peace and prosperity。On the other hand：the State，deﬁned as a territorial monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking and conﬂict arbitration including all cases of conﬂict involving the State and its agents themselves，its origin，and its role as the greatest danger to private property，as a permanent source of social conﬂict and the greatest enemy to peace and prosperity。And ﬁnally：the constitution of a private law society，deﬁned as a society without a state or any monopoly or monopolist whatsoever （whether legal or otherwise） and its unique function as the only conceivable guarantor of eternal peace and prosperity。

尽管这本书自由地、频繁地跨越学科界线，但贯穿全书的是一个主导的、统一的主题：财产，或者更准确地说，私有财产，其定义就是对稀缺资源的排他性控制，它的起源，以及它作为和平与繁荣的最终源泉的伦理正当性和经济理由。另一方面：国家，被定义为最终决策和冲突仲裁的领土垄断者，包括涉及国家及其代理人本身的所有冲突案件，它的起源，以及它作为私有财产的最大威胁，作为社会冲突的永久根源以及和平与繁荣的最大敌人。最后：私法社会的构成，其定义为一个没有国家或任何垄断企业或垄断者的社会（无论是否合法），以及私法社会作为可能的永久和平与繁荣的唯一保证的独特功能。

But there is much more to be found in the following：there are reﬂec tions on social evolution and the causes of the socalled Neolithic and Industrial Revolution，on monarchy and on the decivilizing eﬀect of democracy，on war，centralization and secession，on egalitarianism，inequality and natural aristocracy，on the inevitability and virtue of discrimination，and on migration and the perils of multiculturalism—much of which is extremely “politically incorrect” and has made me a persona nongrata not only among mainstream intellectuals but in particular also among many socalled left，biggovernment，or bleedingheart libertarians。

以下内容还会有更多的发现：关于社会演化和所谓新石器时代革命和工业革命的起因的反思，关于君主制和民主的去文明化影响的反思，关于战争、中心化和脱离的反思，关于平等主义、不平等和自然贵族的反思，关于歧视的必然性和美德的反思，关于移民和多元文化主义的危害的反思——其中很多是极端“政治不正确”的，使我成为一个不受主流知识分子欢迎的人，尤其是许多所谓的左派、大政府主义者或“菩萨心肠”的自由意志主义者，他们更不欢迎我。

There are some pieces assembled here dealing with purely theoretical （valuefree）—philosophical or economic—problems，others dealing with normative issues，and still others concerned with matters of politics and political strategy。Some pieces are long and intellectually “demanding” and others short and “easy。” In any case，however，I hope the reader will ﬁnd them always lucid，rigorously argued and，above all，intellectually stimulating。

这本书汇集了一些纯理论的（价值无涉的）——哲学或经济问题，其他涉及到规范问题，还有一些涉及政治和政治策略问题。有些文章很长，在智力上“要求很高”，而另一些则很短，“很容易”。然而，无论如何，我希望读者会发现这些议题都被分析得清晰明了、论证严谨，最重要的是发人深省。

While no one except me can be held personally responsible for any of the following，I owe a profound gratitude to Lew Rockwell and to the “gang” of radical—in politically correct lingo：“extremist”—thinkers he managed to assemble around the Ludwig von Mises Institute in Auburn，Alabama：to Walter Block，Thomas DiLorenzo，David Gordon，Jeﬀrey Herbener，Guido Hülsmann，Stephan Kinsella，Peter Klein，Ralph Raico，Joseph Salerno，and Mark Thornton。

虽然除了我之外，没有人需要对以下任何事情负责，我还是要深深地感谢卢·洛克韦尔，以及他在阿拉巴马州奥本的路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院设法聚集的激进“帮派”——用政治正确的术语来说就是“极端主义”思想家：沃尔特·布洛克、托马斯·迪洛伦佐、大卫·戈登、杰弗里·赫本纳、吉多·许尔斯曼、斯蒂芬·金塞拉、彼得·克莱因、拉尔夫·赖科、约瑟夫·萨勒诺和马克·桑顿。

My deepest gratitude is to my two principal intellectual masters，how ever。To Ludwig von Mises （1881–1973），whom I unfortunately never met，but whose monumental work has been a constant source of inspiration to me，and to Mises’s greatest student，Murray Rothbard （1926–1995），who further radicalized，expanded and completed the Misesian ediﬁce，and with whom I was fortunate enough to spend the last ten years of his life in intimate cooperation，ﬁrst in new York City and then as colleagues，office neighbors and intellectual co-combatants at the University of Nevada，Las Vegas。

我要对我的两位主要的思想导师致以最深切的感激。其一是路德维希·冯·米塞斯（1881 – 1973），不幸的是我从未见过他，但其不朽的著作是我灵感的不竭来源；其二是米塞斯最伟大的学生，默里·罗斯巴德（1926 – 1995），他比米塞斯更为激进，他拓展并完善了米赛斯学说的（Misesian）大厦，我很幸运，在他生命的最后十年，我们一直都在亲密合作，首先在纽约，然后在拉斯维加斯的内华达大学，我们一直是同事、办公室邻居和知识上的盟友。

汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普

伊斯坦布尔，2012 年 6 月

HansHermann Hoppe

Istanbul，June 2012

Part one Human Development，Property，and Politics

第一辑：人类发展、财产和政治

1 知识分子和反知识分子的知识分子[1]

The Role of Intellectuals and Antiintellectual Intellectuals

The state is the great fictitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else。

—Frédéric Bastiat

国家是一个巨大的虚构实体，每个人都试图利用它，以牺牲他人为代价来生存。

——弗雷德里克·巴斯夏

let me begin with the definition of a state。What must an agent be able to do to qualify as a state？ This agent must be able to insist that all conflicts among the inhabitants of a given territory be brought to him for ultimate decision making or be subject to his final review。In particular，this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving him be adjudicated by him or his agent。And implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge，as the second defining characteristic of a state，is the agent’s power to tax：to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services。

让我们从国家的定义开始。一个主体要具备什么条件才能被称为国家呢？这一主体必须能够坚称，某一特定领土内，居民之间的所有冲突必须由他作最后裁决，或者由他进行最后审查。特别是，该主体必须能够坚持所有涉及他的冲突都由他或他的代理人裁决。作为国家的第二个定义特征，在排除所有其他人作为最终仲裁者的权力中，隐含着该主体征税的权力：寻求公正的人必须为国家单方面定价的服务支付成本。

Based on this definition of a state，it is easy to understand why a desire to control a state might exist。For whoever is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make laws。And he who can legislate can also tax。Surely，this is an enviable position。

基于国家的这种定义，很容易理解为什么人会存在控制国家的欲望。因为无论是谁，只要在一定领土内垄断了最终裁决，谁就可以制定法律。能立法也就能征税。当然，这无疑是一个令人垂涎、觊觎的位置。

More difficult to understand is how anyone can get away with control ling a state。Why would others put up with such an institution？

更难以理解的是，为什么任何人都可以控制一个国家而不受惩罚。为什么其他人会容忍这样一个机构呢？

I want to approach the answer to this question indirectly。Suppose you and your friends happen to be in control of such an extraordinary institution。What would you do to maintain your position （provided you didn’t have any moral scruples）？ You would certainly use some of your tax income to hire some thugs。First：to make peace among your subjects so that they stay productive and there is something to tax in the future。But more importantly，because you might need these thugs for your own protection should the people wake up from their dogmatic slumber and challenge you。

我尝试间接地回答这个问题。假设你和你的朋友碰巧控制着这样一个特别的机构。你会做什么来维持你的地位呢（假设你没有任何道德上的顾忌）？你肯定会用你的一些税收来雇佣一些暴徒。第一：维持国民之间的和平，这样他们就能保持生产力，作为持续的税源；第二，也是更重要的一点，假如有一天人们从教条的沉睡中醒来并挑战你，那你可能需要这些暴徒来保护自己。

This will not do，however，in particular if you and your friends are a small minority in comparison to the number of subjects。For a minority cannot lastingly rule a majority solely by brute force。It must rule by “opinion。” The majority of the population must be brought to voluntarily accept your rule。This is not to say that the majority must agree with every one of your measures。Indeed，it may well believe that many of your policies are mistaken。However，it must believe in the legitimacy of the institution of the state as such，and hence that even if a particular policy may be wrong，such a mistake is an “accident” that one must tolerate in view of some greater good provided by the state。

然而，这是行不通的，尤其是如果你和你的朋友与被统治者的数量相比属于少数。因为少数人不能单靠武力长久地统治多数人。它必须通过“观念”来统治。必须让大多数人自愿接受你的统治。这并不是说大多数人必须同意你的每一项措施。事实上，他们很可能认为你的许多政策都是错误的。不管如何，他们必须相信国家制度本身的合法性，因此，即使一项特定的政策可能是错误的，他们也会相信这种错误只是一种“意外”，鉴于国家提供的更大利益，人们必须容忍这种“意外”。

Yet how can one persuade the majority of the population to believe this？

The answer is：only with the help of intellectuals。

然而，如何才能说服大多数人相信这一点呢？

答案是：只有借助知识分子的帮助。

How do you get the intellectuals to work for you？ To this the answer is easy。The market demand for intellectual services is not exactly high and stable。Intellectuals would be at the mercy of the fleeting values of the masses，and the masses are uninterested in intellectual philosophical concerns。The state，on the other hand，can accommodate the intellectuals’ typically over inflated egos and offer them a warm，secure，and permanent berth in its apparatus。

如何做才能让知识分子为你所用？这个问题的答案很简单。市场对知识服务的需求并不高，且不稳定。知识分子将任由大众转瞬即逝的价值观摆布，而大众对知识分子的哲学问题并不感兴趣。因此，知识分子在市场中并不那么“受宠”。而另一方面，国家却能够迎合知识分子典型的过度的自我膨胀，并在其体制内为他们提供一个温暖、安全、永久的“庙堂”——被豢养。

However，it is not sufficient that you employ just some intellectuals。You must essentially employ them all—even the ones who work in areas far removed from those that you are primarily concerned with：that is，philoso phy，the social sciences and the humanities。For even intellectuals working in mathematics or the natural sciences，for instance，can obviously think for themselves and so become potentially dangerous。It is thus important that you secure also their loyalty to the state。Put differently：you must become a monopolist。And this is best achieved if all “educational” institutions，from kindergarten to universities，are brought under state control and all teaching and researching personnel is “state certified。”

但是，仅仅雇用一些知识分子是不够的。你必须雇佣他们所有人——即使是那些工作领域与你主要关心的领域相去甚远的人，包括哲学、社会科学和人文科学。例如，即使是从事数学或自然科学工作的知识分子，显然也会独立思考，因此会有潜在的危险。因此，确保他们对国家的忠诚是非常重要的。换句话说你必须成为一个垄断者。如果所有的“教育”机构，从幼儿园到大学，都在国家控制之下，所有的教学和研究人员都是“国家认证”的，这是实现这一目标的最佳途径。

But what if the people do not want to become “educated”？ For this，“education” must be made compulsory； and in order to subject the people to state controlled education for as long as possible，everyone must be declared equally “educable。” The intellectuals know such egalitarianism to be false，of course。Yet to proclaim nonsense such as “everyone is a potential Einstein if only given sufficient educational attention” pleases the masses and，in turn，provides for an almost limitless demand for intellectual services。

但是，如果人民不愿意“接受教育”呢？为此，“教育”必须成为义务性的；为了使人民尽可能长时间地接受国家控制的教育，必须宣布每个人都是平等的、都是“孺子可教”。很显然，知识分子知道这种平等主义的“有教无类”，显然是错误的，但是他们不会喧之于口。然而，政府和知识分子宣扬诸如“只要给予足够的教育关注，每个人都是潜在的爱因斯坦”之类的无稽之谈却可以营造取悦大众的社会氛围，而这种社会氛围反过来又会为知识服务提供近乎无限的需求。

None of all this guarantees “correct” statist thinking，of course。It certainly helps，however，in reaching the “correct” conclusion，if one realizes that without the state one might be out of work and may have to try one’s hands at the mechanics of gas pump operation instead of concerning oneself with such pressing problems as alienation，equity，exploitation，the deconstruction of gender and sex roles，or the culture of the Eskimos，the Hopis and the Zulus。

那么，谁来证明国家主义思想是“正确的”呢？如果知识分子发现，如果没有国家的雇佣，他可能会失业，可能成为加油站工人等等体力劳动者；而有国家的雇佣他就可以去关注那些貌似高大上的东西，诸如异化、公平、剥削、性别和性别角色的解构等话题，或爱斯基摩人、霍皮人和祖鲁人的文化等等，他们怎么会不致力去证明这种“正确性”呢？

In any case，even if the intellectuals feel underappreciated by you—that is：by one particular state administration—they know that help can only come from another state administration but not from an intellectual assault on the institution of the state as such。Hence，it is hardly surprising that，as a matter of fact，the overwhelming majority of contemporary intellectuals，including most conservative or socalled free market intellectuals，are fundamentally and philosophically statists。

在任何情况下，即使知识分子感到被你轻视了——也就是说，被一个特定的国家行政机构轻视了——他们心知肚明，帮助只能来自另一个国家的行政机构，而不是来自对国家机构本身的智力攻击。因此，毫不奇怪，事实上，绝大多数当代知识分子，包括最保守的或所谓的自由市场知识分子，骨子里和哲学上都是国家主义者。

Has the work of the intellectuals paid off for the state？ I would think so。If asked whether the institution of a state is necessary，I do not think it is exaggerated to say that 99 percent of all people would unhesitatingly say yes。And yet，this success rests on rather shaky grounds，and the entire statist edifice can be brought down—if only the work of the intellectuals is countered by the work of intellectual antiintellectuals，as I like to call them。

知识分子的工作为国家带来回报了吗？我认为答案是肯定的。如果被问及国家是否是必要的，我认为99%的人会毫不犹豫地说是的，这一点毫不夸张。然而，这种成功建立在相当不稳定的基础之上，如果知识分子的工作受到反知识分子的知识分子（我喜欢这样称呼他们）的抵制，那么整个国家主义的大厦将倾。

The overwhelming majority of state supporters are not philosophical statists，i.e.，because they have thought about the matter。Most people do not think much about anything “philosophical。” They go about their daily lives，and that is it。So most support stems from the mere fact that a state exists，and has always existed as far as one can remember （and that is typically not farther away than one’s own lifetime）。That is，the greatest achievement of the statist intellectuals is the fact that they have cultivated the masses’ natu ral intellectual laziness （or incapacity） and never allowed for “the subject” to come up for serious discussion。The state is considered as an unquestionable part of the social fabric。

绝大多数国家支持者并不是出于深思熟虑而成为哲学意义的国家主义者，也就是说，他们从未思考过这个问题。大多数人都不怎么思考“哲学”的东西。他们有着自己的岁月静好，日复一日。因此，大多数国家支持者的观念都来自于这样一个事实，就他的记忆而言，就他的有生之年而言，国家存在并一直存在。也就是说，国家主义知识分子最大的成就是他们培养了大众天生的智力惰性（或无能），并且从不允许对该“主题”进行严肃的讨论。在知识分子和他们受众的语境中，国家被认为是社会结构中不容置疑的一部分。

The first and foremost task of the intellectual antiintellectuals，then，is to counter this dogmatic slumber of the masses by offering a precise definition of the state，as I have done at the outset，and then to ask if there is not something truly remarkable，odd，strange，awkward，ridiculous，indeed ludicrous about an institution such as this。I am confident that such simple，definitional work will produce some very first，but serious，doubt regarding an institution that one previously had been taken for granted—a good start。Further，proceeding from less sophisticated （yet，not coincidentally，more popular） prostate arguments to more sophisticated ones：To the extent that intellectuals have deemed it necessary to argue in favor of the state at all，their most popular argument，encountered already at kinder garten age，runs like this：Some activities of the state are pointed out：the state builds roads，kindergartens，schools； it delivers the mail and puts the policeman on the street。Imagine there would be no state。Then we would not have these goods。Thus，the state is necessary。

At the university level，a slightly more sophisticated version of the same argument is presented。It goes like this：true，markets are best at providing many or even most things； but there are other goods markets cannot provide or cannot provide in sufficient quantity or quality。These other，socalled “public goods” are goods that bestow benefits onto people beyond those actually having produced or paid for them。Foremost among such goods ranks typically “education and research。” “Education and research，” for instance，it is argued，are extremely valuable goods。They would be underproduced，however，because of “free riders，” i.e.，“cheats，” who benefit—via socalled neighborhood effects—from “education and research” without paying for it。Thus，the state is necessary to provide otherwise unproduced or underproduced （public） goods such as education and research。

到了高等教育阶段，知识分子提出了稍微复杂一点的观点。这个观点是这样的论述：的确，市场最擅长提供许多甚至大多数东西；但是，还有一些商品市场无法提供，或者无法足质足量地提供。这些所谓的“公共财货”，指的是这样一些商品，它们给这些商品的非实际生产者或非实际支付者之外的人带来利益。在这些商品中，最重要的通常是“教育和研究”。例如，有人认为“教育和研究”是极具价值的商品。然而，由于“搭便车者”、“骗子”，由于所谓的邻里效应，他们从“教育和研究”中获益，却无需支付费用，结果就是这些商品将会供不应求。因此，国家有必要提供这些未生产或生产不足的（公共）商品，如教育和研究。

These statist arguments can be refuted by a combination of three funda mental insights：First，as for the kindergarten argument，it does not follow from the fact that the state provides roads and schools that only the state can provide such goods。People have little difficulty recognizing that this is a fallacy。From the fact that monkeys can ride bikes it does not follow that only monkeys can ride bikes。And second，immediately following，it must be recalled that the state is an institution that can legislate and tax； and hence，that state agents have little incentive to produce efficiently。State roads and schools will only be more costly and their quality lower。For there is always a tendency for state agents to use up as many resources as possible doing whatever they do but actually work as little as possible doing it。

Third，as for the more sophisticated statist argument，it involves the same fallacy encountered already at the kindergarten level。For even if one were to grant the rest of the argument，it is still a fallacy to conclude from the fact that states provide public goods that only states can do so。

第三，至于更复杂的国家主义论点，它涉及到在幼儿园阶段就已经遇到的同样的谬论。因为，即使我们同意这一论点的其余部分，从国家提供公共财货这一事实得出只有国家才能提供公共财货的结论，仍然是一个谬误。

More importantly，however，it must be pointed out that the entire argument demonstrates a total ignorance of the most fundamental fact of human life，namely，scarcity。true，markets will not provide for all desir able things。There are always unsatisfied wants as long as we do not inhabit the Garden of Eden。But to bring such unproduced goods into existence scarce resources must be expended，which consequently can no longer be used to produce other，likewise desirable things。Whether public goods exist next to private ones does not matter in this regard—the fact of scarcity remains unchanged：more “public” goods can come only at the expense of less “private” goods。Yet what needs to be demonstrated is that one good is more important and valuable than another one。This is what is meant by “economizing。”

Yet can the state help economize scarce resources？ This is the question that must be answered。In fact，however，conclusive proof exists that the state does not and cannot economize：For in order to produce anything，the state must resort to taxation （or legislation）—which demonstrates irrefut ably that its subjects do not want what the state produces but prefer instead something else as more important。Rather than economize，the state can only redistribute：it can produce more of what it wants and less of what the people want—and，to recall，whatever the state then produces will be produced inefficiently。

然而，国家能帮助节约稀缺资源吗？这是必须回答的问题。然而，事实上，有确凿的证据表明，国家没有做到也无法做到节约。为了生产任何东西，国家必须诉诸税收（或立法）——这已无可辩驳地表明，它的国民不想要国家生产的东西，而是更喜欢其他更重要的东西。国家无法节约，只能重新分配。它可以生产更多自己想要的，更少人民想要的——回想一下，无论国家生产什么，都将是低效的。

Finally，the most sophisticated argument in favor of the state must be briefly examined。From Hobbes on down this argument has been repeated endlessly。It runs like this：In the state of nature—before the establishment of a state—permanent conflict reigns。Everyone claims a right to everything，and this will result in interminable war。There is no way out of this pre dicament by means of agreements； for who would enforce these agreements？ Whenever the situation appeared advantageous，one or both parties would break the agreement。Hence，people recognize that there is but one solution to the desideratum of peace：the establishment，per agreement，of a state，i.e.，a third，independent party as ultimate judge and enforcer。Yet if this thesis is correct and agreements require an outside enforcer to make them bind ing，then a statebyagreement can never come into existence。For in order to enforce the very agreement that is to result in the formation of a state （to make this agreement binding），another outside enforcer，a prior state，would already have to exist。And in order for this state to have come into existence，yet another still earlier state must be postulated，and so on，in infinite regress。

on the other hand，if we accept that states exist （and of course they do），then this very fact contradicts the Hobbesian story。The state itself has come into existence without any outside enforcer。Presumably，at the time of the alleged agreement，no prior state existed。Moreover，once a statebyagree ment is in existence，the resulting social order still remains a selfenforcing one。To be sure，if A and B now agree on something，their agreements are made binding by an external party。However，the state itself is not so bound by any outside enforcer。There exists no external third party insofar as conflicts between state agents and state subjects are concerned； and likewise no external third party exists for conflicts between different state agents or agencies。Insofar as agreements entered into by the state visàvis its citizens or of one state agency visàvis another are concerned，that is，such agree ments can be only selfbinding on the State。The state is bound by nothing except its own selfaccepted and enforced rules，i.e.，the constraints that it imposes on itself。Visàvis itself，so to speak，the state is still in a natural state of anarchy characterized by selfrule and enforcement，because there is no higher state，which could bind it。

另一方面，如果我们接受国家的存在（当然它们确实存在），那么这个事实就与霍布斯的故事相矛盾。国家本身是在没有任何外部执行者的情况下建立的。据推测，在所谓的协议达成时，先前并不存在国家。此外，一旦通过协议创造出国家，由此产生的社会秩序仍然是一种自我强制的秩序。按照霍布斯的描述，可以肯定的是，如果A和B现在就某件事达成一致，那么他们的协议就会受到某一外部第三方的约束。然而，国家本身却又不受任何外部执行者的约束。就国家代理人和国家国民之间的冲突而言，不存在独立的外部第三方；同样，在不同国家的代理人或机构之间的冲突中，也不存在独立的外部第三方。因此，就国家与其公民之间，或一个国家机构与另一个国家机构签订协议而言，这种协议只能由国家自我约束。国家除了它自我接受和强制执行的规则外（它对自己施加的约束），不受任何其它约束。就此而言，我们可以这么说，国家仍然处于一种以自我约束和强制为特征的自然无政府状态，因为没有更高一级的国家可以约束它。

Further：If we accept the Hobbesian idea that the enforcement of mutually agreed upon rules does require some independent third party，this would actually rule out the establishment of a state。In fact，it would constitute a conclusive argument against the institution of a state，i.e.，of a monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking and arbitration。For then，there must also exist an independent third party to decide in every case of conflict between me （private citizen） and some state agent，and likewise an independent third party must exist for every case of intrastate conflict （and there must be another independent third party for the case of conflicts between various third par ties）—yet this means，of course，that such a “state” （or any independent third party） would be no state as I have defined it at the outset but simply one of many freely competing thirdparty conflict arbitrators。

进一步说，如果我们接受霍布斯的观点，即相互同意的规则的执行确实需要一些独立的第三方，这实际上就排除了建立一个国家的可能性。事实上，它将构成反对国家制度的决定性的论点——国家是最终决策和仲裁的垄断者。因此，必须存在一个独立的第三方来裁决我（私人公民）与某些国家机构之间的每一起冲突，同样，必须存在一个独立的第三方来处理每一起国家内部的冲突（必须有另一个独立的第三方来处理各种第三方之间的冲突）——当然，这意味着，这样一个“国家”（或任何独立的第三方）将不是我在一开始所定义的国家，而只是许多自由竞争的第三方冲突仲裁者之一。

let me conclude then：the intellectual case against the state seems to be easy and straightforward。But that does not mean that it is practically easy。Indeed，almost everyone is convinced that the state is a necessary institution，for the reasons that I have indicated。So it is very doubtful if the battle against statism can be won，as easy as it might seem on the purely theoreti cal，intellectual level。However，even if that should turn out to be impossible—at least let’s have some fun at the expense of our statist opponents。

归纳起来，从智力和知识上否定国家的合理性，论证是简单而直接的，但真的要将这样的理念投入实践却相当不容易。事实上，几乎每个人都相信国家是一种必要的制度，原因我已经阐明。因此，反对国家主义的斗争能否取得胜利是非常值得怀疑的，尽管在纯理论和知识层面看起来很容易。然而，即使结果被证明是不可能的——至少我们这些国家主义的反对亦可自黑，以此找点乐子。

And for that I suggest that you always and persistently confront them with the following riddle。Assume a group of people，aware of the possibil ity of conflicts between them。Someone then proposes，as a solution to this human problem，that he （or someone） be made the ultimate arbiter in any such case of conflict，including those conflicts in which he is involved。Is this is a deal that you would accept？ I am confident that he will be consid ered either a joker or mentally unstable。Yet this is precisely what all statists propose。

2 私有财产的伦理学与经济学

The Ethics and Economics of Private Property

I.社会的秩序问题

THE problem OF SOCIAL ORDER

Alone on his island，Robinson Crusoe can do whatever he pleases。For him，the question concerning rules of orderly human conduct—social coopera tion—simply does not arise。Naturally，this question can only arise once a second person，Friday，arrives on the island。Yet even then，the question remains largely irrelevant so long as no scarcity exists。Suppose the island is the Garden of Eden； all external goods are available in superabundance。They are “free goods，” just as the air that we breathe is normally a “free” good。Whatever Crusoe does with these goods，his actions have repercus sions neither with respect to his own future supply of such goods nor regarding the present or future supply of the same goods for Friday （and vice versa）。Hence，it is impossible that there could ever be a conflict between Crusoe and Friday concerning the use of such goods。A conflict is only possible if goods are scarce。only then will there arise the need to formulate rules that make orderly—conflictfree—social cooperation possible。

*originally published in The Elgar Companion to the Economics of Private Property，edited by Enrico Colombatto （London：Edward Elgar，2004）。

*最初发表于恩里科·科伦巴托编辑的《埃尔加私有财产经济学指南》（伦敦：爱德华·埃尔加出版社，2004 年）。

独自一人在岛上的鲁滨逊·鲁滨逊可以做任何他喜欢的事。对他来说，有关人类有序行为规则的问题——社会合作——根本就没有出现。当然，这个问题只有在第二个人星期五来到岛上时才会出现。然而，即便如此，只要不存在稀缺，这个问题在很大程度上仍然无关紧要。假设这个岛是伊甸园，所有的外部物质都非常充足。它们是“自由财货”，就像我们通常呼吸的空气一样，是“免费”商品。无论鲁滨逊对这些物品做什么，他的行为都不会对他自己在未来对这些物品的供应产生影响，也不会对星期五现在或未来对这些物品的供应产生影响（反之亦然）。因此，鲁滨逊和星期五之间不可能就这些物品的使用发生冲突。只有在商品稀缺的情况下才有可能发生冲突。在稀缺的世界，才有必要制定规则，使无冲突有序的社会合作成为可能。

In the Garden of Eden only two scarce goods exist：the physical body of a person and its standing room。Crusoe and Friday each have only one body and can stand only at one place at a time。Hence，even in the Garden of Eden conflicts between Crusoe and Friday can arise：Crusoe and Friday cannot occupy the same standing room simultaneously without coming thereby into physical conflict with each other。Accordingly，even in the Garden of Eden rules of orderly social conduct must exist—rules regarding the proper location and movement of human bodies。And outside the Garden of Eden，in the realm of scarcity，there must be rules that regulate not only the use of personal bodies but also of everything scarce so that all possible conflicts can be ruled out。This is the problem of social order。

即使在伊甸园，也有两件物品是稀缺的：一个人的身体和他站立的空间。鲁滨逊和星期五各自只有一个身体，一次只能站在一个地方。因此，即使在伊甸园中，鲁滨逊和星期五之间的冲突也会出现：鲁滨逊和星期五不能同时站在同一个地方，否则就会发生身体上的冲突。因此，即使在伊甸园中，有序的社会行为规则也必须存在——关于人体的适当位置和活动的规则。在伊甸园之外充满稀缺的现实世界，必须有规则，不仅规范个人身体的使用，也规范每一件稀缺物品的使用，以便消除所有可能的冲突。这是社会秩序的主题。

II.解决方案：私有财产和先占

THE SOLUTIon：PRIVAte PROPERTY AND originAL APPROPRIATIon

In the history of social and political thought，various proposals have been advanced as a solution to the problem of social order，and this variety of mutually inconsistent proposals has contributed to the fact that today’s search for a single “correct” solution is frequently deemed illusory。Yet as I will try to demonstrate，a correct solution exists； hence，there is no reason to succumb to moral relativism。The solution has been known for hundreds of years，if not for much longer。1 In modern times this old and simple solution was formulated most clearly and convincingly by Murray N.Rothbard。2

在社会和政治思想史上，人们为社会秩序问题提出了各种各样的解决方案，而这种相互矛盾的多样性建议导致了这样一个事实，即今天寻求唯一“正确”的解决方案往往被认为是虚幻的。然而，正如我将试图证明的那样，存在一个正确的解决方案；因此，没有理由屈服于道德相对主义。这个解决方案人们已经知道几百年了，甚至更早。[2] 现在，默里·罗斯巴德（Murray N . rothbard）已最清晰、最令人信服地阐述了这个古老而简单的解决方案。[3]

let me begin by formulating the solution—first for the special case represented by the Garden of Eden and subsequently for the general case represented by the “real” world of allaround scarcity—and then proceed to the explanation of why this solution，and no other，is correct。

接下来，我首先以伊甸园为例的特殊情况，来阐述这个解决方案，然后将其推广到稀缺性普遍存在的“现实”世界，最后解释为什么唯有这个答案是正确的。

In the Garden of Eden，the solution is provided by the simple rule stipulating that everyone may place or move his own body wherever he pleases，provided only that no one else is already standing there and occupying the same space。And outside of the Garden of Eden，in the realm of allaround scarcity the solution is provided by this rule：

在伊甸园中，解决方案是根据一条简单的规则提供的，每个人都可以将自己的身体放置或移动到他喜欢的任何地方，只要没有其他人已经站在那里并占据相同的空间。在伊甸园之外，是到处都存在稀缺的现实世界，提供解决方案的是这条规则：

Everyone is the proper owner of his own physical body as well as of all places and naturegiven goods that he occupies and puts to use by means of his body，provided that no one else has already occupied or used the same places and goods before him。This ownership of “originally appropriated” places and goods by a person implies his right to use and transform these places and goods in any way he sees fit，provided that he does not thereby forcibly change the physical integrity of places and goods originally appropriated by another person。In particular，once a place or good has been first appropriated，in John Locke’s words，by “mixing one’s labor” with it，ownership in such places and goods can be acquired only by means of a voluntary— contractual—transfer of its property title from a previous to a later owner。In light of widespread moral relativism，it is worth pointing out that this idea of original appropriation and private property as a solution to the problem of social order is in complete accordance with our moral “intuition。” Is it not simply absurd to claim that a person should not be the proper owner of his body and the places and goods that he originally，i.e.，prior to anyone else，appropriates，uses and/or produces by means of his body？ For who else，if not he，should be their owner？ And is it not also obvious that the over whelming majority of people—including children and primitives—in fact act according to these rules，and do so as a matter of course？

每个人都是他其身体的所有者，也是他以身体为手段占据和使用的所有地方以及自然赋予的物品的正当所有者，只要这些同样的地方和物品没有被他人在其之前占据或使用。一个人对“先占”的地方和物品拥有所有权，这意味着他有权以他认为合适的任何方式使用和改造这些地方和物品，只要他不因此强行改变另一人先占的地方和物品的物理完整性。特别是，一旦一个地方或物品，用约翰·洛克的话说，通过“混合一个人的劳动”被第一次占有，那么这些地方和物品的所有权只能通过自愿的——契约的——方式，将其财产所有权从前一个所有者转让到后一个所有者。鉴于普遍存在的道德相对主义，有必要指出的是，这种将先占和私有财产作为社会秩序问题的解决方案的观念，完全符合我们的道德“直觉”。声称一个人不应该正当拥有自己的身体，不应该拥有他先于他人占有或使用的地方和物品，不应该拥有他以自己的身体为手段生产出来的东西，这岂不是荒谬透顶？除他之外，又有谁能成为它们的所有者呢？而且，绝大多数人——包括儿童和原始人——实际上都是按照这些规则行事的，并且视为理所当然，这难道不是很明显吗？

Moral intuition，as important as it is，is not proof。However，there also exists proof of the veracity of our moral intuition。

道德直觉虽然很重要，但并不是证明。然而，也有证据证明我们的道德直觉的真实性。

The proof is twofold。on the one hand，the consequences that follow if one were to deny the validity of the institution of original appropriation and private property are spelled out：If person A were not the owner of his own body and the places and goods originally appropriated and/or produced with this body as well as of the goods voluntarily （contractually） acquired from another previous owner，then only two alternatives would exist。Either another person，B，must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated，produced or acquired by A，or both persons，A and B，must be considered equal coowners of all bodies，places and goods。

In the first case，A would be reduced to the rank of B’s slave and object of exploitation。B would be the owner of A’s body and all places and goods appropriated，produced and acquired by A，but A in turn would not be the owner of B’s body and the places and goods appropriated，produced and acquired by B。Hence，under this ruling two categorically distinct classes of persons would be constituted—Untermenschen such as A and Übermenschen such as B—to whom different “laws” apply。Accordingly，such ruling must be discarded as a human ethic equally applicable to everyone qua human being （rational animal）。From the very outset，any such ruling is recognized as not universally acceptable and thus cannot claim to represent law。For a rule to aspire to the rank of a law—a just rule—it is necessary that such a rule apply equally and universally to everyone。

在第一种选择下，A会沦为B的奴隶和剥削对象。B将是A的身体以及被A占有、生产和获得的所有场所和物品的所有者，但反过来，A将不是B的身体以及被B占有、生产和获得的和物品的所有者。于是，在这个规则之下，存在截然不同的两类人，下等人A和上等人B，各自适用不同的“法律”。这样的规则决不能被当作一个平等地适用于每个有人格的人（理性的动物）的道德规范，因此必须予以抛弃。从一开始，任何这样的规则就被认为不是普遍接受的，因此不能声称代表法律。一个规则要想成为法律——一个公正的规则——就必须平等地、普遍地适用于每一个人。

Alternatively，in the second case of universal and equal coownership，the requirement of equal law for everyone would be fulfilled。However，this alternative would suffer from an even more severe deficiency，because if it were applied，all of mankind would instantly perish。（Since every human ethic must permit the survival of mankind，this alternative must also be rejected。） Every action of a person requires the use of some scarce means （at least of the person’s body and its standing room），but if all goods were coowned by everyone，then no one，at no time and no place，would be allowed to do anything unless he had previously secured every other co owner’s consent to do so。Yet how could anyone grant such consent were he not the exclusive owner of his own body （including his vocal chords） by which means his consent must be expressed？ Indeed，he would first need another’s consent in order to be allowed to express his own，but these oth ers could not give their consent without having first his，and so it would go on。

在第二种选择下，即是全体和均等的共同所有制，法律面前人人平等的要求得到了满足。然而，这个选择存在更为严重的缺陷。这是因为，如果这个规则真的得到应用，人类就会立即毁灭。（由于任何人类道德规范都必须允许人类生存，这个选择必须被拒绝）。这是因为，人的行动需要使用某种稀缺手段，至少要使用自己的身体和立足之地。但是，如果所有物品都是人人共有的，那么，除非得到每个共同所有者同意，没有人能够在任何时间和地点做任何事情。然而，假如一个人甚至不拥有自己的身体（包括他的发音器官），他又如何表达自己的同意呢？事实上，要表达他自己的同意，他要首先征得他人的同意，但没有他的同意，这些人同样无法表达他们的同意。如此等等。

This insight into the praxeological impossibility of “universal communism，” as Rothbard referred to this proposal，brings me immediately to an alternative way of demonstrating the idea of original appropriation and private property as the only correct solution to the problem of social order。3 Whether or not persons have any rights and，if so，which ones，can only be decided in the course of argumentation （propositional exchange）。Justifica tion—proof，conjecture，refutation—is argumentative justification。Anyone who denied this proposition would become involved in a performative con tradiction because his denial would itself constitute an argument。Even an ethical relativist would have to accept this first proposition，which is referred to accordingly as the a priori of argumentation。

From the undeniable acceptance—the axiomatic status—of this a priori of argumentation，two equally necessary conclusions follow。First，it follows from the a priori of argumentation when there is no rational solution to the problem of conflict arising from the existence of scarcity。Suppose in my ear lier scenario of Crusoe and Friday that Friday were not the name of a man but of a gorilla。Obviously，just as Crusoe could face conflict regarding his body and its standing room with Friday the man，so might he with Friday the gorilla。The gorilla might want to occupy the same space that Crusoe already occupied。In this case，at least if the gorilla were the sort of entity that we know gorillas to be，there would be no rational solution to their conflict。Either the gorilla would push aside，crush，or devour Crusoe—that would be the gorilla’s solution to the problem—or Crusoe would tame，chase，beat，or kill the gorilla—that would be Crusoe’s solution。In this situation，one might indeed speak of moral relativism。However，it would be more appropriate to refer to this situation as one in which the question of justice and rationality simply would not arise； that is，it would be considered an extramoral situation。The existence of Friday the gorilla would pose a technical，not a moral，problem for Crusoe。He would have no other choice than to learn how to successfully manage and control the movements of the gorilla just as he would have to learn to manage and control other inanimate objects of his environment。

从这种不可否认的先验性——具有公理地位——出发，可以得出两个必然结论。首先，当由于稀缺的存在而产生的冲突问题没有理性的解决方案时，这是从先验论证中得出的。假设在我之前提到的鲁宾逊和星期五的场景中，“星期五”不是一个人的名字，而是一只大猩猩的名字。大猩猩可能想要占据鲁滨逊已经占据的空间。在这种情况下，至少大猩猩是我们所知的那种生物，那么它们之间的冲突就没有理性的解决方式。只有两种解决方式，要么大猩猩把鲁滨逊赶走、撕成齑粉甚至吃掉——这就是大猩猩解决问题的办法——要么鲁滨逊驯服、驱逐、打败或杀死大猩猩——这就是鲁滨逊的办法。在这种情况下，我们可以说道德相对主义。然而，更恰当的说法是，这种情况根本上与公正和理性无涉；也就是说，它将被视为一种与道德无关的情况。大猩猩星期五的存在会给鲁滨逊带来技术问题，而不是道德问题。他别无选择，只能学习如何成功地管理和控制大猩猩的动作，就像他必须学习管理和控制环境中其他无生命的物体一样。

By implication，only if both parties in a conflict are capable of engaging in argumentation with one another，can one speak of a moral problem and is the question of whether or not there exists a solution to it a meaningful question。only if Friday，regardless of his physical appearance，is capable of argumentation （even if he has shown himself to be capable only once），can he be deemed rational and does the question whether or not a correct solution to the problem of social order exists make sense。No one can be expected to give any answer to someone who has never raised a question or，more to the point，who has never stated his own relativistic viewpoint in the form of an argument。In that case，this “other” cannot but be regarded and treated as an animal or plant，i.e.，as an extramoral entity。only if this other entity can pause in his activity，whatever it might be，step back，and say yes or no to something one has said，do we owe this entity an answer and，accordingly，can we possibly claim that our answer is the correct one for both parties involved in a conflict。

言下之意是，只有冲突双方能够相互论证，人们才能谈论道德问题，是否存在解决方案的问题才是一个有意义的问题。无论星期五的外貌如何，只有当他能够进行论证（即使他只表现出一次这样的能力），他才能被认为是理性的，那么此时讨论是否存在解决社会秩序问题的正确方法才有意义。谁也不能指望对一个从来没有提出过问题的人，或者更确切地说，一个从来没有以论证的形式阐述过自己的相对的观点的人能给出任何一个答案。在这种情况下，这个“他者”不能不被当作动物或植物来看待和对待，作为一个道德之外的实体。只有当这个 “他者 ”能够暂停他的活动，不管是什么活动，后退一步，对某人所说的话表示同意或不同意时，我们才欠这个实体一个答案。换句话说，只有冲突的双方都是能够表达的，我们才可能声称我们的答案对冲突中的双方来说都是正确的。

Moreover，it follows from the a priori of argumentation that every thing that must be presupposed in the course of an argumentation as the logical and praxeological precondition of argumentation cannot in turn be argumentatively disputed as regards its validity without becoming thereby entangled in an internal （performative） contradiction。

此外，论证的先验性作为逻辑学和行动学意义上的论证前提，根据这一点，论证中必须预先假定一些命题，这些命题的有效性不能反过来成为论证的对象，不然就会陷入内在（述行性的）的矛盾之中。

Now，propositional exchanges are not made up of freefloating propositions，but rather constitute a specific human activity。argumentation between Crusoe and Friday requires that both have，and mutually recognize each other as having，exclusive control over their respective bodies （their brains，vocal cords，etc。） as well as the standing room occupied by their bodies。No one could propose anything and expect the other party to convince himself of the validity of this proposition or deny it and propose something else unless his and his opponent’s right to exclusive control over their respec tive bodies and standing rooms were presupposed。In fact，it is precisely this mutual recognition of the proponent’s as well as the opponent’s property in his own body and standing room which constitutes the characteristicum specificum of all propositional disputes：that while one may not agree regarding the validity of a specific proposition，one can agree nonetheless on the fact that one disagrees。Moreover，this right to property in one’s own body and its standing room must be considered a priori （or indisputably） justified by proponent and opponent alike。Anyone who claimed any proposition as valid visàvis an opponent would already presuppose his and his opponent’s exclusive control over their respective bodies and standing room simply in order to say，“I claim such and such to be true，and I challenge you to prove me wrong。”

组成交换命题是特定的人类行为，而不是一些不知原因和自由漂浮的命题。鲁宾逊与星期五之间的论证需要双方相互承认各自有权独自支配自己的身体（大脑和发音器官等）以及身体占据的站立空间。除非预先假设一个人和与之论证的人有权独自支配自己的身体和站立的空间，否则他们中没有人能够提出任何命题，更不能期望另一方使自己相信命题的有效性，或者否认这个命题并给出新的命题。事实上，论证各方相互承认对方对自己的身体和站立空间的所有权，这一点构成论证的根本特征：一个人也许不同意某个提议的有效性，但他能够同意如下事实：有一个人不同意。此外，一个人对自己的身体和站立空间的财产权必须被论证双方看作是先验（无可争议地）正当的。任何声称自己的命题对对手有效的人，都已经预设了他和他的对手对各自的身体和站立空间的排他性控制权，这只不过是说，“我声称某个命题是正确的，提请你证明我的错误。”

Furthermore，it would be equally impossible to engage in argumenta tion and rely on the propositional force of one’s arguments if one were not allowed to own （exclusively control） other scarce means （besides one’s body and its standing room）。If one did not have such a right，then we would all immediately perish and the problem of justifying rules—as well as any other human problem—would simply not exist。Hence，by virtue of the fact of being alive，property rights to other things must be presupposed as valid，too。No one who is alive can possibly argue otherwise。

此外，如果一个人不被允许拥有（排他性控制）其他稀缺的手段（除了自己的身体和站立的空间之外），那么同样不可能进行论证，并论证自己命题的有效性。如果一个人没有这样的权利，那么我们都会立即灭亡，为规则辩护的问题——以及任何其他人类问题——就根本不存在了。因此，由于生命存续这个事实，对其他事物的财产权也必须被预设为是有效的。任何一个活着的人都不可能不这样论证。

Furthermore，if a person were not permitted to acquire property in these goods and spaces by means of an act of original appropriation，i.e.，by establishing an objective （intersubjectively ascertainable） link between him self and a particular good and/or space prior to anyone else，and if instead property in such goods or spaces were granted to latecomers，then no one would ever be permitted to begin using any good unless he had previously secured such a latecomer’s consent。Yet how can a latecomer consent to the actions of an early comer？ Moreover，every latecomer would in turn need the consent of other and later latercomers，and so on。That is，neither we，our forefathers，nor our progeny would have been or would be able to survive if one followed this rule。However，in order for any person—past，present，or future—to argue anything，survival must be possible； and in order to do just this，property rights cannot be conceived of as being timeless and unspecific with respect to the number of persons concerned。Rather，property rights must necessarily be conceived of as originating by means of action at definite points in time and space by definite individuals。otherwise，it would be impossible for anyone to ever say anything at a definite point in time and space and for someone else to be able to reply。Simply saying，then，that the firstuserfirstowner rule of the ethics of private property can be ignored or is unjustified implies a performative contradiction，as one’s being able to say so must presuppose one’s existence as an independent decisionmaking unit at a given point in time and space。4

还有，如果不允许一个人通过先占行动，即先于他人建立自己与特定物品或空间之间的关系，一个客观的（不同主体间可确定的）联系，从而获得对这些物品和空间的财产权；如果对这些物品或空间的财产权要得到后到者的承认，那么，除非先征得后到者的同意，没有人能够开始使用任何物品。然而，后到者又如何同意先来者的行动呢？此外，每个后到者需要依次征得其他和更晚的后到者的同意，如此等等。也就是说，假如按照这个规则，我们的祖先、我们自身以及我们的后代都无法生存。然而，为了让任何一个人——过去、现在或未来的人——进行任何论证，生存必须是可能的；而要做到这一点，产权就不能被认为在时间上是永恒的且在涉及的人数方面是不明确的。相反，产权必须被理解为是在特定的时间和空间点由特定的个人通过行动产生的。否则，任何人都不可能在特定的时间和空间点说出任何话，也不可能有其他人能够回应。简单地说，认为私有财产伦理的“先使用者则为先拥有者”规则可以被忽视或不正当，这意味着一种“谏言冲突”，因为一个人能够这样说必然以其在特定的时间和空间点作为一个独立的决策单位的存在为前提。[5]

III.误解和澄清

MISConcePTIonS AND CLARIFICATIonS

According to this understanding of private property，property ownership means the exclusive control of a particular person over specific physical objects and spaces。Conversely，property rights invasion means the uninvited physical damage or diminution of things and territories owned by other persons。In contrast，a widely held view holds that the damage or diminution of the value （or price） of someone’s property also constitutes a punishable offense。

As far as the （in）compatibility of both positions is concerned，it is easy to recognize that nearly every action of an individual can alter the value （price） of someone else’s property。For example，when person A enters the labor or the marriage market，this may change the value of B in these markets。And when A changes his relative valuations of beer and bread，or if A himself decides to become a brewer or baker，this changes the value of the property of other brewers and bakers。According to the view that value damage constitutes a rights violation A would be committing a punishable offense visàvis brewers or bakers。If A is guilty，then B and the brewers and bakers must have the right to defend themselves against A’s actions，and their defensive actions can only consist of physical invasions of A and his property。B must be permitted to physically prohibit A from entering the labor or marriage market； the brewers and bakers must be permitted to physically prevent A from spending his money as he sees fit。However，in this case the physical damage or diminution of the property of others cannot be viewed as a punishable offense。Since physical invasion and diminution are defensive actions，they are legitimate。Conversely，if physical damage and diminution constitute a rights violation，then B or the brewers and bakers do not have the right to defend themselves against A’s actions，for his actions—his entering of the labor and marriage market，his altered evaluation of beer and bread，or his opening of a brewery or bakery—do not affect B’s bodily integrity or the physical integrity of the property of brewers or bakers。If they physically defend themselves nonetheless，then the right to defense would lie with A。In that case，however，it cannot be regarded as a punishable offense if one alters the value of other people’s property。A third possibility does not exist。

当我们关注这两种观点的相容性时，不难理解，一个人的每个行动几乎都能改变另一个人的财产的价值（价格）。例如，当A进入劳动或婚姻市场时，这一行动会改变B在这些市场中的价值。当A改变他关于啤酒和面包的相对价值判断时，或者A决定生产啤酒或面包时，这将改变其他啤酒制造商和面包师的财产的价值。依照价值破坏构成侵权的观点，A就是在对啤酒制造商或面包师实行了可以惩罚的侵犯。如果A有罪，那么，B、啤酒制造商和面包师必定有权保护自己免受A的行动的伤害，而且他们的自卫行动只能构成对A及其财产的物理入侵。因此，必须允许B物理上禁止A进入劳动市场或婚姻市场；必须允许啤酒制造商和面包师物理上阻止A按照自己喜欢的方式花钱。然而，在这种情况下，他人财产的物理损坏或减损不能被视为应受惩罚的违法行为，因为这些物理侵犯和减损是自卫行为，是合法的。相反，如果物理损坏和减损构成侵权，那么，B或啤酒制造商和面包师就没有权利保护自己免受A的行动伤害，因为A的行动——进入劳动和婚姻市场，他改变了关于啤酒和面包的评价，或者他开设一个啤酒厂或面包店——并不影响B的人身的完整性，也不影响啤酒制造商和面包师的财产的物理完整性。如果后三者在物理上采取自卫，那么，自卫权就会属于A。然而，在这种情况下，一个人改变他人财产的价值就不能被视为应受惩罚的违法行为。不存在第三种可能。

both ideas of property rights are not only incompatible，however。The alternative view—that one could be the owner of the value or price of scarce goods—is indefensible。While a person has control over whether or not his actions will change the physical properties of another’s property，he has no control over whether or not his actions affect the value （or price） of another’s property。This is determined by other individuals and their evaluations。Consequently，it would be impossible to know in advance whether or not one’s planned actions are legitimate。The entire population would have to be interrogated to assure that one’s actions would not damage the value of someone else’s property，and one could not begin to act until a univer sal consensus had been reached。mankind would die out long before this assumption could ever be fulfilled。

这两种财产权观念不仅互不相容，而且还相互冲突。另一种观点——一个人可以是稀缺物品价值或价格的所有者——是站不住脚的。虽然一个人可以控制自己的行动是否会改变他人财产的物理属性，但他无法控制自己的行动是否会影响他人财产的价值（或价格）。因此，不可能事先知道自己计划的行动是否合法。为了确保自己的行动不会损害他人财产的价值，必须对整个人口进行调查，在达成统一共识之前，人们无法开始行动。在这一假设实现之前，人类早就灭亡了。

Moreover，the assertion that one has a property right in the value of things involves a contradiction，for in order to claim this proposition to be valid—universally agreeable—it would have to be assumed that it is permissible to act before agreement is reached。otherwise，it would be impossible to ever propose anything。However，if one is permitted to assert a proposition—and no one could deny this without running into contradictions— then this is only possible because physical property borders exist，i.e.，borders which everyone can recognize and ascertain independently and in complete ignorance of others’ subjective valuations。[6]

此外，“一个人对事物的价值拥有财产权 ”的主张内含一个矛盾，因为要使这一命题有效——普遍同意——就必须假定在达成一致意见之前是可以采取行动的。否则，就不可能提出任何主张。然而，如果一个人被允许断言一个命题——没有人可以否认这一点而不陷入矛盾——那么只有存在财产的物理边界，即每个人都可以独立地、在完全不了解他人主观评值的情况下就能辨别和确定的边界，才是可能的。[7]

Another，equally common misunderstanding of the idea of private property concerns the classification of actions as permissible or impermissible based exclusively on their physical effects，i.e.，without taking into account that every property right has a history （temporal genesis）。

对私有财产概念的另一个同样常见的误解是，完全根据行动的实际效果将其分为可允许的行动和不可允许的行动，即不考虑每项财产权都有其历史（时间起源）。

If A currently physically damages the property of B （for example by air pollution or noise），the situation must be judged differently depending on whose property right was established earlier。If A’s property was founded first，and if he had performed the questionable activities before the neigh boring property of B was founded，then A may continue with his activities。A has established an easement。From the outset，B had acquired dirty or loud property，and if B wants to have his property clean and quiet he must pay A for this advantage。Conversely，if B’s property was founded first，then A must stop his activities； and if he does not want to do this，he must pay B for this advantage。Any other ruling is impossible and indefensible，because as long as a person is alive and awake he cannot not act。An early comer can not，even if he wished otherwise，wait for a latecomer and his agreement before he begins acting。He must be permitted to act immediately。And if no other property besides one’s own exists （because a latecomer has not yet arrived），then one’s range of action can be deemed limited only by laws of nature。A latecomer can only challenge the legitimacy of an early comer if he is the owner of the goods affected by the early comer’s actions。However，this implies that one can be the owner of unappropriated things； i.e.，that one can be the owner of things one has not yet discovered or appropriated through physical action。This means that no one is permitted to become the first user of a previously undiscovered and unappropriated physical entity。

如果目前A有形地损害了B的财产（例如空气污染或噪音），则根据谁的产权更早确立，必须对这种情况进行不同的裁决。如果A的产权是先确立的，并且在B相邻的产权确立之前，他已经进行了有争议的活动，那么A可以继续他的活动。A建立了地役权。从一开始，B获得的就是肮脏和吵闹的财产，如果B想要他的财产干净和安静，他必须为这个改善付钱给A。相反，如果B的财产是先确立的，那么A必须停止他的活动；如果他不想停止活动，他必须为此向B支付代价。任何其他的规则都是不可能也是站不住脚的，因为只要一个人活着、醒着，他就不可能不行动。一个先来者，即使他愿意这样做，也不能等到后到者的同意后才开始行动。必须允许他立即采取行动。如果除了自己的财产之外没有其他财产存在（因为后到者还没有到来），那么，一个人的行动范围只能被视为仅受自然法则的限制。一个后到者拥有的物品受到了先来者行动的影响，他只能向先来者的合法性提出挑战。然而，这意味着一个人可以成为未被其占有的物品的所有者；也就是说，一个人可以成为他尚未发现或通过物理行动占有的物品的所有者。这意味着，不允许任何人成为先前未发现和未占有的物理实体的第一个使用者。

IV.私有财产经济学

THE EConOMICS OF PRIVAte PROPERTY

The idea of private property not only agrees with our moral intuitions and is the sole just solution to the problem of social order； the institution of private property is also the basis of economic prosperity and of “social welfare。” As long as people act in accordance with the rules underlying the institution of private property，social welfare is optimized。

私有财产的观念不仅符合我们的道德直觉，而且是解决社会秩序问题的唯一公正的办法；私有财产制度也是经济繁荣和“社会福利”的基石。只要人们遵照私有财产制度的基本规则行事，社会福利就会最大化。

Every act of original appropriation improves the welfare of the appropriator （at least ex ante）； otherwise，it would not be performed。At the same time，no one is made worse off by this act。Any other individual could have appropriated the same goods and territories if only he had recognized them as scarce and，hence，valuable。However，since no other individual made such an appropriation，no one else can have suffered a welfare loss on account of the original appropriation。Hence，the socalled Pareto criterion （that it is scientifically legitimate to speak of an improvement of “social welfare” only if a particular change increases the individual welfare of at least one person and leaves no one else worse off） is fulfilled。An act of original appropriation meets this requirement。It enhances the welfare of one person，the appropriator，without diminishing anyone else’s physical wealth （property）。Everyone else has the same quantity of property as before and the appropriator has gained new，previously nonexistent property。Thus，an act of original appropriation always increases social welfare。

Any further action with originally appropriated goods and territories enhances social welfare，for no matter what a person does with his property，it is done to increase his welfare。This is the case when he consumes his property as well as when he produces new property out of “nature。” Every act of production is motivated by the producer’s desire to transform a less valuable entity into a more valuable one。As long as acts of consumption and production do not lead to the physical damage or diminution of property owned by others，they are regarded as enhancing social welfare。

用先占的物品和领地进行的进一步行动为也增进社会福利。这是因为，无论一个人用自己的财产做什么，其目的总是增加他自身的福利。当他消费自己的财产和借助“自然”生产出新的财产时，他的福利增加。每个生产活动背后的动机总是生产者把不那么有价值的物品变成更有价值的物品。只要消费和生产行动不给他人拥有的财产造成物理上的损坏或减损，它们就是增进社会福利的行动。

Finally，every voluntary exchange （transfer） of appropriated or produced property from one owner to another increases social welfare。An exchange of property is only possible if both owners prefer what they acquire over what they surrender and thus expect to benefit from the exchange。Two persons gain in welfare from every exchange of property，and the property under the control of everyone else is unchanged。

最后，先占或生产出来的财产从一个所有者到另一个所有者的交换（转让）增进社会福利。财产交换之所以会发生，惟一的原因是，交易双方都更偏爱从交换中得到的物品而不是他们所放弃的物品，从而都期望在交换中获利。每次财产交换都使交换双方获利，而其他人支配下的财产未被改变。

In distinct contrast，any deviation from the institution of private property must lead to social welfare losses。

与之截然不同的是，对私有财产制度的任何偏离都必然导致社会福利的损失。

In the case of universal and equal coownership—universal communism instead of private property—the price to be paid would be mankind’s instant death because universal coownership would mean that no one would be allowed to do anything or move anywhere。Each actual deviation from a private property order would represent a system of unequal domination and hegemony。That is，it would be an order in which one person or group—the rulers，exploiters，or Übermenschen—would be permitted to acquire property other than by original appropriation，production or exchange，while another person or group—the ruled，exploited，or Untermenschen—would be prohibited from doing likewise。While hegemony is possible，it would involve social welfare losses and would lead to relative impoverishment。

在普遍而平等的共同所有权——普遍的共产主义而不是私有产权——的情况下，所要付出的代价将是人类的立即死亡，因为普遍的公有制意味着任何人都不被允许做任何事情或移动到任何地方。现实中对私有财产秩序的每一种偏离都代表着一个不平等的统治和霸权制度。也就是说，它会是这样一种秩序，其中，允许某些人或某个群体——统治者、剥削者或上等人——不经先占、生产或交换行动而获得财产，同时却不允许另一些人或另一个群体——被统治者、被剥削者或下等人——做类似的事情。霸权是可能的，但社会福利将会遭受损失，并会导致相对贫困。

If A is permitted to acquire a good or territory which B has appropriated as indicated by visible signs，the welfare of A is increased at the expense of a corresponding welfare loss on the part of B。The Pareto criterion is not fulfilled，and social welfare is suboptimal。The same is true with other forms of hegemonic rule。If A prohibits B from originally appropriating a hitherto unowned piece of nature； if A may acquire goods produced by B without B’s consent； if A may proscribe what B is permitted to do with his appropriated or produced goods （apart from the requirement that one is not permitted to physically damage or diminish others’ property）—in each case there is a “winner，” A，and a “loser，” B。In every case，A increases his supply of property at the expense of B’s corresponding loss of property。In no case is the Pareto criterion fulfilled，and a suboptimal level of social welfare always results。

如果允许A获得B以明显标记指明占有的物品或领地，那么，A的福利增进是以B的福利的相应减损为代价。帕累托规则没有得到满足，社会福利没有最大化。这一结论对于其他形式的霸权统治也同样成立。如果 A 禁止 B 先占一块迄今为止尚未拥有的自然物；如果 A 可以不经 B 同意而获得 B 生产的物品；如果 A 可以规定允许 B 如何处置他占有或生产的物品（除了不允许对他人财产造成实际损害或减损的要求之外）——在每种情况下，都有一个 “赢家”A，和一个 “输家” B。在任何情况下，帕累托标准都不会得到满足，结果总是社会福利没有最大化。

Moreover，hegemony and exploitation lead to a reduced level of future production。Every ruling which grants nonappropriators，nonproducers and nontraders control，either partial or full，over appropriated，produced or traded goods，leads necessarily to a reduction of future acts of original appropriation，production and mutually beneficial trade。For the person performing them，each of these activities is associated with certain costs，and the costs of performing them increases under a hegemonic system and those of not performing them decreases。Present consumption and leisure become more attractive as compared to production （future consumption），and the level of production will fall below what it otherwise would have been。As for the rulers，the fact that they can increase their wealth by expropriat ing property appropriated，produced or contractually acquired by others will lead to a wasteful usage of the property at their disposal。because they are permitted to supplement their future wealth by means of expropria tion （taxes），present orientation and consumption （high time preference） are encouraged，and insofar as they use their goods “productively” at all，the likelihood of misallocations，miscalculation，and economic loss is systematically increased。

此外，霸权和剥削还导致未来生产水平的降低。准许一些人部分或全部霸占另一些先占、生产和交换得来的物品，必定会减少未来的先占、生产和互利的交换活动。对于从事这些活动的人来说，这些活动中的每一个都有一定的成本，而在霸权统治的制度下，从事这些活动的成本增加，不从事它们的成本减少。与生产（未来消费）相比，当前的消费和休闲变得更具吸引力，生产水平将低于应有的水平。至于统治者，由于他们能够通过剥夺他人先占、生产或契约交换得来的财产来增加他们的财富，因此他们不珍惜财产的使用。这是因为，他们可以通过剥夺（征税）来增加他们未来的财富，这将鼓励短期行为和消费（较高的时间偏好），就物品在生产中的利用来说，资源配置扭曲、错误的计算和经济损失发生的可能性就会系统性地增加。

V.古典渊源

THE CLASSIC PEDIGreE

As noted at the outset，the ethics and economics of private property presented above does not claim originality。Rather，it is a modern expression of a “classic” tradition，going back to beginnings in Aristotle，Roman law，Aquinas，the late spanish Scholastics，Hugo Grotius and John Locke。 [8]

正如一开始所指出的，上述私有财产的伦理和经济学并不新奇。相反，它是一种“古典”传统的现代表述，可以追溯到亚里士多德、罗马法、阿奎那和晚期的西班牙经院哲学家、雨果·格劳秀斯和约翰·洛克。

In contrast to the communist utopia of Plato’s republic，Aristotle provides a comprehensive list of the comparative advantages of private property in Politics。First，private property is more productive。What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care。men pay most attention to what is their own； they care less for what is common； or at any rate they care for it only to the extent to which each is individually concerned。Even when there is no other cause for inattention，men are more prone to neglect their duty when they think that another is attending to it。 [9]

与柏拉图《理想国》中的共产主义乌托邦相反，亚里士多德在《政治学》中全面列举了私有财产制度的比较优势。第一，私有财产更具生产力。“大多数人公有的东西最少得到爱护。人们最爱护自己拥有的东西，而较少爱护公有的东西，或者他们关心后者的程度仅仅限于与个人利益有关的范围。即使没有其他疏于关心共有财产的理由，想到其他人正在关心它，人们也较倾向于忽视自己的责任。”

Secondly，private property prevents conflict and promotes peace。When people have their own separate domains of interest，“there will not be the same grounds for quarrels，and the amount of interest will increase，because each man will feel that he is applying himself to what is his。” [10] “Indeed，it is a fact of observation that those who own common property，and share in its management，are far more often at variance with one another than those who have property in severalty。” [11] Further，private property has existed always and everywhere，whereas nowhere have communist utopias sprung up spontaneously。Finally，private property promotes the virtues of benevo lence and generosity。It allows one to be so with friends in need。

第二，私有财产防止冲突，促进和平。当人们有各自分离的利益范围时，“没有争吵的共同基础，利益将会增加，因为每个人都觉得他是在为自己的事情忙碌。”“一个观察到的事实是，与各自独立拥有财产的人相比，有共有财产和共同参与其管理的人们更容易相互不和。”此外，私有财产始终普遍存在，而共产主义乌托邦却没有在任何一个地方自发地产生。最后，私有财产促进善行和慷慨。它允许一个人善待需要帮助的朋友。

Roman law，from the Twelve Tables to the Theodosian Code and the Justinian Corpus，recognized the right of private property as near absolute。Property stemmed from unchallenged possession，prior usage established easements，a property owner could do with his property as he saw fit，and freedom of contract was acknowledged。As well，Roman law distinguished importantly between “national” （Roman） law—ius civile—and “interna tional” law—ius gentium。

从《十二表法》到《狄奥多西法典》和《查士丁尼文集》，罗马法都近乎绝对地承认私有财产的权利。财产源于无异议的占有，先前的使用建立了地役权，财产所有人可以按照他认为合适的方式使用他的财产，契约自由得到承认。同样，罗马法在 “国内法”（罗马法）—— 市民法（ius civile）和 “国际法”—— 万民法（ius gentium）之间做出了重要区分。

The Christian contribution to this classic tradition—embodied in St。Thomas Aquinas and the late spanish Scholastics，as well as Protestants Grotius and Locke—is twofold。both Greece and Rome were slaveholding civilizations。Aristotle characteristically considered slavery a natural institution。In contrast，Western—Christian—civilization，notwithstanding some exceptions，has been essentially a society of free men。Correspondingly，for Aquinas as for Locke，every person had a proprietary right over himself （selfownership）。Moreover，Aristotle，and classic civilization generally，were disdainful of labor，trade，and moneymaking。In contrast，in accordance with the Old testament，the Church extolled the virtues of labor and work。Correspondingly，for Aquinas as for Locke，it was by work，use，and cultiva tion of previously unused land that property first came into existence。

基督教对这一古典传统的贡献有两个方面，体现在圣托马斯·阿奎那和晚期的西班牙经院哲学家，以及新教徒格劳秀斯和洛克的著作中。希腊和罗马都是蓄奴文明。典型地，亚里士多德认为奴隶制是一种自然制度。相比之下，西方基督教文明，尽管有一些例外，基本上是一个自由人的社会。相应地，对于阿奎那和洛克来说，每个人都对自己拥有所有权（自我所有权）。此外，亚里士多德和古典文明普遍蔑视劳动、交易和财富的获取。相反，与《旧约》相一致，教会颂扬劳动和工作的美德。因此，对于阿奎那和洛克来说，正是通过工作、利用和耕种先前未被利用过的土地，财产才第一次出现。

This classic theory of private property，based on selfownership，original appropriation （homesteading），and contract （title transfer），continued to find prominent proponents，such as J。B。Say。However，from the height of its influence in the eighteenth century until quite recently，with the advance of the Rothbardian movement，the classic theory had slipped into oblivion。

这一古典的私有财产理论，建立在自我所有权、先占（拓殖）和契约（所有权转让）的基础之上，还有另一些著名的支持者，如萨伊。然而，从其在18世纪的鼎盛一直到最近的罗斯巴德运动，这一古典理论一度走向湮没。

For two centuries，economics and ethics （political philosophy） had diverged from their common origin in natural law doctrine into seem ingly unrelated intellectual endeavors。Economics was a valuefree “posi tive” science。It asked，“What means are appropriate to bring about a given （assumed） end？” Ethics was a “normative” science （if it was a science at all）。It asked，“What ends （and what use of means） is one justified to choose？” As a result of this separation，the concept of property increasingly disappeared from both disciplines。For economists，property sounded too normative； for political philosophers property smacked of mundane economics。

In contrast，Rothbard noted，such elementary economic terms as direct and indirect exchange，markets and market prices，as well as aggression，crime，tort，and fraud，cannot be defined or understood without a theory of property。Nor is it possible to establish the familiar economic theorems relating to these phenomena without the implied notion of property and property rights。A definition and theory of property must precede the definition and establishment of all other economic terms and theorems。

两个世纪以来，经济学和伦理学（政治哲学）已经从它们共同的自然法学说的起源中分离出来，变成了看起来毫不相关的两门学科。经济学是一门价值无涉的“实证”科学。它研究的问题是，“什么手段适合达到一个给定的（假设的）目的？”伦理学是一门“规范的”科学（如果它是一门科学的话）。它的问题是，“选择什么样的目的（和手段的用途）是合理正当的？”这种分离的结果是，财产的概念在这两门学科中日益消失。对经济学家来说，财产听起来过于具有规范性；对于政治哲学家来说，财产带有世俗经济学的味道。相反，罗斯巴德指出，如果没有财产理论，直接和间接交换、市场和市场价格，以及侵犯、犯罪、侵权和欺诈等基本的经济学术语，就无法定义或理解。如果没有隐含的财产和财产权的概念，也不可能建立人们熟知的与这些现象有关的经济学定理。财产的定义和理论必须先于所有其他经济术语和定理的定义和确立。

Rothbard’s unique contribution，from the early 1960s until his death in 1995，was the rediscovery of property and property rights as the common foundation of both economics and political philosophy，and the systematic reconstruction and conceptual integration of modern，marginalist economics and natural law political philosophy into a unified moral science：libertarianism。

从20世纪60年代初到1995年去世，罗斯巴德的独特贡献是重新发现了财产和财产权是经济学和政治哲学的共同基础，并系统重建了现代边际主义经济学和自然法政治哲学，从概念上将其整合为统一的道德科学：自由意志主义。

VI.芝加哥转向

CHICAGO DIveRSIonS

At the time when Rothbard was restoring the concept of private property to its central position in economics and reintegrating economics with ethics，other economists and legal theorists associated with the University of Chicago，such as Ronald Coase，Harold Demsetz，and richard Posner，were also beginning to redirect professional attention to the subject of property and property rights。 [12]

当罗斯巴德重建私有财产的概念在经济学中的核心地位，并将经济学与伦理学重新整合时，其他与芝加哥大学有关的经济学家和法学家，如罗纳德·科斯、哈罗德·德姆塞茨和理查德·波斯纳，也开始将专业的注意力转向财产和财产权这一主题。

However，whereas for Rothbard private property and ethics logically precede economics，for the latter private property and ethics are subordinate to economics and economic considerations。According to Posner，whatever increases social wealth is just。 [13]

然而，对于罗斯巴德来说，私有财产和伦理在逻辑上先于经济学；而对于后者（波斯纳等人）来说，私有财产和伦理从属于经济学及经济考量。根据波斯纳的观点，任何增加社会财富的行为都是公正的。

The difference between the two approaches can be illustrated considering one of Coase’s problem cases：A railroad runs beside a farm。The engine emits sparks，damaging the farmer’s crop.What is to be done？

这两种方法之间的区别可以通过科斯的一个案例来说明：一条铁路在农场边通过，火车蹦出火花，损坏了农民的庄稼。该怎么办呢？

From the classic viewpoint，what needs to be established is Who was there first，the farmer or the railroad？ If the farmer was there first，he could force the railroad to cease and desist or demand compensation。If the rail road was there first，then it might continue emitting sparks and the farmer would have to pay the railroad to be sparkfree。

按照古典观点来看，需要确定的是谁先占那里，是农场主还是铁路？如果农民先占，他可以强迫铁路停运或要求赔偿。如果铁路先占那里，那么它可以继续蹦释火花，要让铁路消除火花，农场主就要付钱给铁路公司。

From the Coasean point of view，the answer is twofold。First and “positively，” Coase claims that it does not matter how property rights and liability are allocated as long as they are allocated，and provided （unrealistically） that transaction costs are zero。

从科斯的观点来看，答案有两个。首先，科斯“实证地”声称，只要产权和责任得到清楚的界定，并且（不切实际地）交易成本为零，那么如何界定并不重要。

Coase claims it is wrong to think of the farmer and the railroad as either “right” or “wrong” （liable），as “aggressor” or “victim。”The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is，How should we restrain A？ But this is wrong。We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature。To avoid the harm to B would be to inflict harm on A。The real question that has to be decided is，Should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A？ The problem is to avoid the more serious harm。[14]

科斯声称，考虑农场主和铁路是“对的”或“错的”（负有责任的），是“侵害人”或“受害者”是错误的思路。这个问题通常被认为是A对B造成了伤害，需要确定的是，我们应该如何约束A？但这是错误的。我们处理的是一个相互作用的问题。要避免伤害B，就会伤害A。真正需要决定的问题是，应该允许A伤害B还是应该允许B伤害A？问题是如何避免更严重的伤害。

Further，given the “equal” moral standing of A and B，for the allocation of economic resources it allegedly does not matter to whom property rights are initially assigned。Suppose the crop loss to the farmer，A，is $1，000，and the cost of a spark apprehension device （SAD） to the railroad，B，is $750。If B is found liable for the crop damage，B will install an SAD or cease opera tions。If B is found not liable，then A will pay a sum between $750 and $1，000 for B to install an SAD。both possibilities result in the installation of an SAD。Now assume the numbers are reversed：the crop loss is $750，and the cost of an SAD is $1，000。If B is found liable，he will pay A $750，but he will not install an SAD。And if B is found not liable，A is unable to pay B enough to install an SAD。Again，both scenarios end with the same result：there will be no SAD。Therefore，regardless of how property rights are initially assigned，according to Coase，Demsetz and Posner the allocation of production factors will be the same。

此外，鉴于A和B之间“平等的”道德地位，就经济资源的配置而言，按照科斯的说法，最初将产权界定给谁并不重要。假设农场主A的作物损失是1000美元，一个消除火花的装置（SAD）给铁路公司B带来的成本是750美元。如果认定B对作物损坏负有责任，那么，B将安装一个SAD或停止运行。如果认定B不负责任，那么，A将支付750美元至1000美元之间的一笔钱给B，使其安装一个SAD。两种情况的结果都是安装一个SAD。现在，把数字颠倒一下：作物损失是750美元，一个SAD的成本是1000美元。如果认定B有责任，他将付给A 750美元，但不会安装一个SAD。如果认定B没有责任，那么，A将不能向B支付足够的钱安装一个SAD。两种情况的结果相同：不会有SAD。因此，依照科斯、德姆塞茨和波斯纳，无论财产权最初如何界定，生产要素的配置是相同的。

Second and “normatively”—and for the only realistic case of positive transaction costs—Coase，Demsetz and Posner demand that courts assign property rights to contesting parties in such a way that “wealth” or the “value of production” is maximized。For the case just considered this means that if the cost of the SAD is less than the crop loss，then the court should side with the farmer and hold the railroad liable。otherwise，if the cost of the SAD is higher than the loss in crops，then the court should side with the railroad and hold the farmer liable。Posner offers another example。A fac tory emits smoke and thereby lowers residential property values。If property values are lowered by $3 million and the plant relocation cost is $2 million，the plant should be held liable and forced to relocate。Yet if the numbers are reversed—property values fall by $2 million and relocation costs are $3 million—the factory may stay and continue to emit smoke。

第二，由于交易成本为正这一符合现实的情况，科斯、德姆塞茨和波斯纳“规范地”要求法院按照“财富”或“产品价值”最大化的方式在争夺者中分配财产权。这意味着，在上面的例子中，如果SAD的成本小于作物损失，那么，法院应该站在农场主一边，并坚持铁路负有责任。否则，如果SAD的成本高于作物损失，那么，法院就应该站在铁路一边，并坚持农场主负有责任。波斯纳还给出了另一个例子。一个工厂排放烟雾，从而降低住宅财产价值。如果财产价值降低三百万美元，且工厂搬迁成本是二百万美元，那么，工厂应该负有责任，并被强制搬迁。然而，如果数字颠倒一下，财产价值降低二百万美元，而搬迁成本是三百万美元，那么，工厂就可以留下来，继续排放烟雾。

both the positive and the normative claim of Chicago law and economics must be rejected。[15] As for the claim that it does not matter to whom property rights are initially assigned，three responses are in order。First，as Coase cannot help but admit，it certainly matters to the farmer and the railroad，to whom which rights are assigned。It matters not just how resources are allocated but also who owns them。

芝加哥法学和经济学的实证的和规范的主张都必须被拒绝。至于财产权最初界定给哪一方无关紧要的说法，有如下三个回答。第一，正如科斯也不得不承认，对农场主和铁路公司来说，产权的分配都是重要的。产权的分配不仅影响资源的配置，还决定谁拥有它们。

Second and more importantly，for the value of social production it matters fundamentally how property rights are assigned。The resources allocated to productive ventures are not simply given。They themselves are the outcome of previous acts of original appropriation and production，and how much original appropriation and production there is depends on the incentive for appropriators and producers。If appropriators and producers are the absolute owners of what they have appropriated or produced，i.e.，if no liability visàvis second or thirdcomers arises out of acts of appropriation and production，then the level of wealth will be maximized。on the other hand，if original appropriators and producers can be found liable visàvis latecomers，as is implied in Coase’s “reciprocity of harm” doctrine，then the value of production will be lower than otherwise。That is，the “it doesn’t matter” doctrine is counterproductive to the stated goal of wealth maximization。

第二点，也是更重要的一点，对于社会生产的价值而言，产权如何分配至关重要。分配给生产性企业的资源并非简单地给定。它们本身是之前先占和生产行动的结果，而先占和生产的数量取决于占有者和生产者的激励。如果占有者和生产者是他们所占有或生产之物的绝对所有者，也就是说，如果占有和生产行为不会导致对后来者的责任，那么财富水平将实现最大化。另一方面，如果像科斯的“伤害的相互性”学说所暗示的那样，先占者和生产者可能被认定对后来者负有责任，那么生产的价值将低于其应有的水平。也就是说，“无关紧要”学说对所宣称的财富最大化目标起反作用。

Third，Coase’s claim that the use of resources will be unaffected by the initial allocation of property rights is not generally true。Indeed，it is easy to produce counterexamples。Suppose the farmer does not lose $1，000 in crops because of the railroad’s sparks，but he loses a flower garden worth $1，000 to him but worthless to anyone else。If the court assigns liability to the railroad，the $750 SAD will be installed。If the court does not assign liability to the railroad，the SAD will not be installed because the farmer simply does not possess the funds to bribe the railroad to install an SAD。The allocation of resources is different depending on the initial assignment of property rights。

第三，科斯关于资源的使用将不受产权的初始界定的影响这一说法一般来说也不正确。事实上，很容易举出反例。假设农场主没有因为铁路的火花而损失1000美元的庄稼，但他失去了一座花园，这座花园对他来说价值1000美元，但对其他人来说毫无价值。如果法院判决铁路公司承担责任，750美元的SAD将被安装。如果法院不将责任判定给铁路公司，则由于农场主根本没有足够的资金来贿赂铁路公司安装SAD，因此将不会安装SAD。资源的配置会因初始产权界定的不同而不同。

Similarly，contra the normative claim of Chicago law and economics that courts should assign property rights so as to maximize social wealth，three responses are in order。First，any interpersonal comparison of utility is scientifically impossible，yet courts must engage in such comparisons willynilly whenever they engage in costbenefit analyses。Such costbenefit analyses are as arbitrary as the assumptions on which they rest。For example，they assume that psychic costs can be ignored and that the marginal utility of money is constant and the same for everyone。

类似的，芝加哥法学和经济学的规范主张，即法院应该以社会财富最大化的方式界定产权，同样也有三个现成的回应。第一，进行个人之间的效用比较在科学上是不可能的，然而，每当法院进行成本-收益分析时，必须进行此类不容分辩的比较。这样的成本-收益分析就像其所依据的假设那样武断。例如，他们假设可以忽略（当事人的）心理成本，假设货币的边际效用是常量，且对于每个人来说都相同。

Second，as the numerical examples given above show，courts assign property rights differently depending on changing market data。If the SAD is less expensive than the crop damage，the farmer is found in the right，while if the SAD is more expensive than the damage，the railroad is found in the right。That is，different circumstances will lead to a redistribution of property titles。No one can ever be sure of his property。[16]legal uncertainty is made permanent。This seems neither just nor economical； moreover，who in his right mind would ever turn to a court that announced that it may reallocate existing property titles in the course of time depending on chang ing market conditions？

第二，正如上面给出的数值例子所示，法院根据不断变化的市场数据采用不同的方式界定产权。如果SAD比农作物损失少，则农场主占理，而如果SAD比损失多，则铁路公司占理。也就是说，情况的变化将导致财产所有权的重新分配。如此，没有人能确信自己的财产权，法律上的不确定性变成永久性的了，这显得既不公正也不经济；此外，如果一个法院宣布它可以根据随时间不断变化的市场情况重新界定现有财产权，那么，心智健全的人还会求助于这样的法院吗？

Finally，an ethic must not only have permanency and stability with changing circumstances； an ethic must allow one to make a decision about “just or unjust” prior to one’s actions，and it must concern something under an actor’s control。Such is the case for the classic private property ethic with its firstusefirstown principle。According to this ethic，to act justly means that a person employs only justly acquired means—means originally appropriated，produced，or contractually acquired from a previous owner—and that he employs them so that no physical damage to others’ property results。Every person can determine ex ante whether or not this condition is met，and he has control over whether or not his actions physically damage the property of others。In distinct contrast，the wealth maximization ethic fails in both regards。No one can determine ex ante whether or not his actions will lead to social wealth maximization。If this can be determined at all，it can only be determined ex post。Nor does any one have control over whether or not his actions maximize social wealth。Whether or not they do depends on others’ actions and evaluations。Again， who in his right mind would subject himself to the judgment of a court that did not let him know in advance how to act justly and how to avoid acting unjustly，but that would judge ex post，after the facts？

3 私有财产和家庭的起源*

The origin of Private Property and the Family

I.背景：历史

THE SETTING：HISTORY

It is reasonable to begin human history 5 million years ago，when the human line of evolutionary descent separated from that of our closest nonhuman relative，the chimpanzeE.It is also reasonable to begin it 2。5 million years ago，with the first appearance of Homo habilis； or 200，000 years ago，when the first representative of “anatomically modern man” madehits appearance； or 100，000 years ago，when the anatomically modern man had become the standard human form.Instead，I want to begin only 50，000 years ago，when “anatomically modern man” had evolved into “behaviorally modern man.”

说人类历史从500万年前开始是合理的，就是从那时起，人类祖先与我们最近的非人类亲戚黑猩猩开始分道扬镳，走上自己的进化之路。说人类历史从250万年前开始也是合理的，那时能人第一次出现；或者从20万年前开始，“解剖学意义上的现代人类”的第一个代表出现；或者从10万年前开始，解剖学上的现代人类已经进化为标准的人类形态。但是，我只想从5万年前开始，那时“解剖学意义上的现代人”已经进化成“行动学意义上的现代人”。这也是一个非常合理的起点。[17]

This is an eminently reasonable starting point，too。

这也是一个非常合理的起点。

“behaviorally modern human” refers to the existence of huntergatherers，of which even today some small pockets have remained.Based on archeological evidence，humans living 100，000 years ago were apparently still largely inept at hunting。They were certainly unable to take down large and dangerous animals，and it appears that they did not know how to fisH.Their tools were almost exclusively made of stone and wood and made of materials of local origin，indicating the absence of any distance travel or trading。In distinct contrast，about 50，000 years later the human tool kit took on a new，greatly advanced appearance.Other materials were used besides stone and wood：bone，antlers，ivory，teeth，shells，and the materials often came from distant places.The tools，including knifes，needles，barbed points，pins，borers，and blades were more complex and skillfully crafted.The missile technology was much improved and indicated highly developed hunting skills （although bows were invented only about 20，000 years ago）。As well，man knew how to fish and was apparently able to build boats.Moreover，next to plain，functional tools，seemingly purely artistic imple ments—or naments，figurines and musical instruments，such as birdbone flutes—appeared on the scene at this time.

“行动学意义上的现代人”指的是狩猎采集者的存在，直到今天，还有零星族群过着狩猎采集生活。根据考古学证据，生活在10万年前的人类显然在很大程度上还不擅长打猎。它们当然无法拿下大型危险动物，而且它们似乎不知道如何捕鱼。他们的工具几乎完全是由石头和木材制成的，并由当地来源的材料制成，这表明没有任何长途旅行或交易。与之形成鲜明对比的是，大约5万年后，人类使用的工具呈现出全新的、非常先进的面貌。除了石头和木材外，还使用了其他材料：骨头、鹿角、象牙、牙齿、贝壳，而这些材料通常来自遥远的地方。这些工具，包括刀、缝衣针、倒钩、钉、钻孔器和刀片，制作更复杂更精妙更纯熟。投掷技术得到了很大改进，显示出了高度发展的狩猎技能（尽管弓是在大约2万年前才发明的）。此外，人类也知道如何捕鱼，而且显然能够建造小船。此外，除了简单的实用工具，像饰品、雕像以及如鸟骨笛之类的乐器等纯粹艺术品，都在此时出现。

It has been hypothesized that what made this momentous development possible was a genetic change leading to the emergence of language，which involved a radical improvement in man’s ability to learn and inno vate.The archaic humans—Homo ergaster，Homo neanderthalensis，Homo erectus—did not have command of a language.To be sure，it can be safely assumed that they employed，as do many of the higher animals，the two socalled lower functions of language：the expressive or symptomatic function and the trigger or signal function.

有人推测，这种里程碑式的跨越是基因的突变的结果，这种突变导致语言的出现，语言使人类的学习和创新能力得到根本性提高。匠人、尼安德特人、直立人这些古人类没有掌握语言。可以肯定的是，我们可以安全地假设，他们和许多高等动物一样，使用了语言的两种所谓低级的功能：表达或表征功能以及触发或信号功能。[18]

However，they were apparently incapable of performing the two higher，cognitive functions of language：the descriptive and，especially，the argumentative function.These unique human abilities—so uniquely human，indeed，that one cannot think them “away” from our existence without falling into internal contradictions—of forming simple descriptive statements （propositions） such as “this （subject） is ‘a’ （predicate），” which claim to be true，and especially of presenting arguments （chains of propositions） such as “this is a； every a is b； hence，this is b，” which claim to be valid，emerged apparently only about 50，000 years ago。

然而，他们显然无法运用语言的两种更高级的认知功能：描述功能，尤其是论证功能。这些独特的人类能力——人类确实是独一无二的，以至于人们不能认为我们的存在可以“远离”这些能力而不陷入内在的矛盾——形成简单的描述性陈述（命题）的能力，如“这（主语）是a（谓语）”，称之为真命题，特别是提出论证（命题链），如“这是a；每个a是b；因此，这是b”，称之为有效命题，这些能力显然是在大约5万年前才出现的。[19]

Without language，human coordination had to occur via instincts，of which humans possess very few，or by means of physical direction or manipulation； and learning had to be either through imitation or by means of internal （implicit） inferences.In distinct contrast，with language—that is with words：sounds associated with and logically tied to certain objects and concepts （characteristics）—coordination could be achieved by mere symbols； and learning thus became independent of sense impressions （observations） and inferences could be made externally （explicitly） and hence became inter subjectively reproducible and controllable.That is，by means of language knowledge could be transmitted to distant places and times （it was no longer tied to perception）； one could communicate about matters （knowledge acquired and accumulated） far away in time and place. And because our reasoning process，our train of thought leading us to certain inferences and conclusions became “objectified” in external，intersubjectively ascertainable arguments it could not only be easily transferred through time and space but at the same time be publicly criticized，improved，and corrected.It is no wonder，then，that hand in hand with the emergence of language revolutionary changes in technology would come about。

如果没有语言，人类的沟通协调只能通过不多的本能，而人类拥有的本能很少，或者通过操弄肢体动作来进行沟通；学习也只能要么通过模仿，要么通过内在（隐性）推导进行。与之形成鲜明对比的是，有了语言——也就是有了文字：声音与某些物体和概念（特征）相关，并与之联系在一起——沟通协调可以通过纯粹的符号来实现。因此，学习独立于感觉印象（观察），推理可以在外部（显化）进行，也因此在各主体间得以复制传播而不走样。也就是说，知识可以通过语言传播到遥远的时空（它不再与知觉联系在一起）；人们可以在遥远的时空交流事物（即获取和积累的知识）。因为使我们得出某些推断和结论的思维过程和思路，在外部的、主体间可确定的论证中被 “客观化” 了，它不仅很容易通过时间和空间传递，同时也可以被公开批评、改进和纠正。因此毫不奇怪，随着语言的出现，技术上的革命性变化随之发生也就不足为奇了。

About 100，000 years ago，the population size of “modern humans，” our immediate predecessors，is estimated to have been around 50，000，spread across the African continent and northward into the Middle East，the region of today’s Israel。 From about 80，000 to 70，000 years ago，the earth experienced a significant cooling period.As a consequence，the nean derthals，who lived in Europe and in the course of many millennia had adjusted to cold climates，moved southward，where they clashed with and apparently destroyed their African relatives in large numbers.In addition，an extended dry period beginning about 60，000 years ago robbed “mod ern man” of much of his subsistence basis，such that 50，000 years ago the number of “modern humans” may not have exceeded 5，000，confined to northeast Africa.

大约100000年前，我们的直系祖先“现代人”的人口规模估计大约有5万人，分布在非洲大陆，向北延伸到中东，即今天的以色列地区。[20]从大约80000年到70000年前，地球经历了一个显著的冰期。生活在欧洲的尼安德特人在数千年的时间里原本已适应了寒冷的气候，冰期导致他们不得已向南迁徙，结果与来自非洲的亲戚发生冲突，看起来在冲突中有大量的非洲亲戚被消灭。此外，从大约60000年前开始的一段漫长的干旱期剥夺了“现代人”的大部分生存基础，以至于50000年前的“现代人”数量可能不会超过5000人，且仅局限于非洲东北部。[21]

However，from then on the rise of modern humans has been uninterrupted，spreading all across the globe and eventually displacing all of their archaic relatives.The last neanderthals，holed up in some caves near Gibraltar，are believed to have become extinct about 25，000 years ago。The last remnants of Homo erectus，found on the Indonesian island of Flores，date back about 13，000 years.

然而，从那时起，现代人类的崛起就再没间断。他们遍布全球，并最终取代了他们所有的古老亲戚。最后的尼安德特人居住在直布罗陀附近的一些洞穴里，据信大约在25000年前就已经灭绝。在印度尼西亚的弗洛雷斯岛发现最后一批直立人的遗迹，可以追溯到大约13000年前。

The “modern humans” led a nomadic huntergatherer lifestyle.Societies were composed of small bands of people （10–30），which occasionally met and formed a common genetic pool of about 150 and maybe up to 500 people （a size which geneticists have found to be necessary in order to avoid dysgenic effects）。6 The division of labor was limited，with the main partition being that between women—acting mostly as gatherers—and men—acting mostly as hunters.While private property of tools and implements was known and recognized，the nomadic lifestyle only allowed for little possessions and hence made huntergatherer societies comparatively egalitariaN. Nonetheless，life initially appears to have been good for our forebears. only a few hours of regular work allowed for a comfortable life，with good （high protein） nourishment and plenty of leisure time.Indeed，fossil findings （skeletons and teeth） seem to indicate that our huntergatherer forebears enjoyed a life expectancy of well above 30 years，which was only reached again in the course of the 19th century。 Contra Hobbes，their life was any thing but nasty，brutish，and short。

“现代人”过着游牧的狩猎采集生活。社会由10-30人的小群组成，这些小群团偶尔相遇并形成一个约150人的共同基因库，基因库有时可能多达500人（遗传学家发现，这是避免种群退化的必要规模）。[22]劳动分工是有限的，分工主要按性别划分，女性大多负责采集，而男性负责狩猎。虽然工具和用具的私有权被个人意识到，并被他人认可，但游牧的生活方式只能获得微不足道的财产，因此使狩猎采集社会相对平等。[23]尽管如此，对我们的祖先来说，生活最初似乎是美好的。[24]他们有良好的（高蛋白质）营养和充足的休闲时间，一天只有几个小时的常规工作，这些都使他们生活舒适。事实上，化石的发现（骨骼和牙齿）似乎表明，我们的狩猎采集者祖先的预期寿命远超30岁，这一点直到19世纪才再次达到的。[25]与霍布斯的说法恰恰相反，他们的生活绝不是肮脏、残忍和短命的。[26]

However，the life of hunters and gatherers faced a fundamental and ultimately unanswerable challenge.Huntergatherer societies led essentially parasitic lives.That is，they did not add anything to the naturegiven supply of goods.They only depleted the supply of goods.They did not produce （apart from a few tools） but only consumed.They did not grow and breed but had to wait for nature to regenerate and replenisH.At best，what they accomplished was that they did not overhunt or overgather so that the natural regeneration process was not disturbed or even brought to an entire standstill。In any case，what this form of parasitism obviously involved，then，was the inescapable problem of population growtH.In order to permit the comfortable life just described，the population density had to remain extremely low.It has been estimated that one square mile of territory was needed to comfortably sustain one to two persons，and in less fertile regions even larger erritories were necessary。 So what was one to do when the population size exceeded these more or less narrow limits？

然而，狩猎采集者的生活面临着一个根本性的、最终无法解决的挑战。狩猎采集者社会本质上过的是种寄生生活。也就是说，他们对大自然的供给没有任何贡献，而只是纯然的消耗。他们没有生产（除了一些工具），只有消费。他们不事种植和繁育，只是被动等待自然的再生和补充。具体到成就，充其量说，他们也只是没有过度捕猎或过度采集罢了，因此自然再生过程不会受到干扰，不致陷入完全停滞。无论如何，这种寄生方式很显然不可避免地涉及到人口增长问题。要达致上述舒适的生活水平，人口密度必须保持在极低的水平。据估计，需要一平方英里土地才能维持一到两个人的舒适生活，而在肥沃程度较低的地区，甚至需要更广的土地。[27]那么当人口规模或多或少超过这些狭窄的限制时，人们该怎么办呢？

People could of course try to prevent such population pressure from emerging，and indeed huntergatherer societies tried their best in this regard.They induced abortions，they engaged in infanticide，especially female infanticide，and they reduced the number of pregnancies by engaging in long periods of breastfeeding （which，in combination with the low bodyfat characteristic of constantly mobile and moving women，reduces female fertility）。Yet while this alleviated the problem it did not solve it。The population kept increasing。

当然，人们可以尝试阻止这种人口压力的出现，事实上，狩猎采集者社会在这方面尽了最大努力。他们通过引产、实施杀婴，尤其是杀女婴，并通过长时间哺乳来减少怀孕次数（这与女性长期移动和运动所导致的低体脂相结合，降低了女性的生育能力）。然而，尽管这缓解了问题，但并没有解决。人口持续增长。

Given that the population size could not be maintained at a stationary level，only three alternatives existed for the steadily emerging “excess” population.one could fight over the limited food supplies，one could migrate，or one could invent and adopt a new，technologically advanced societal organization mode that allowed for a larger population size to survive on the same，given territory。

鉴于人口规模不能维持在一个固定的水平，对于不断出现的“过剩”人口，只有三种选择。人们可以为有限的食物供应而争斗，可以迁移，或者可以发明并采用一种新的、技术先进的社会组织模式，允许更大规模的人口在同一有限的土地上生存。

As for the first option，i.e.，fighting，a few remarks shall suffice.In the literature，primitive man has been frequently described as peaceful and living in harmony with nature.Most popular in this regard is Rousseau’s portrayal of the “noble savage.” Aggression and war，it has been frequently held，were the result of civilization built upon the institution of private property。In fact，matters are almost exactly the reverse. true，the savagery of modern wars has produced unparalleled carnage.both World War I and World War II，for instance，resulted in tens of millions of deaths and left entire countries in ruins.And yet，as anthropological evidence has in the mean time made abundantly clear，primitive man has been considerably more warlike than contemporary man.It has been estimated that on the average some 30 percent of all males in primitive，huntergatherer societies died from unnatural—violent—causes，far exceeding anything experienced in this regard in modern societies. According to Keeley’s estimates，a tribal society on the average lost about 0。5 percent of its population in combat each year。 Applied to the population of the twentieth century this would amount to a casualty rate of some 2 billion people instead of the actual number of “merely” a few hundred million.Of course，primitive warfare was very different from modern warfare.It was not conducted by regular troops on battlefields，but by raids，ambushes and surprise attacks.How ever，every attack was characterized by utmost brutality，carried out without mercy and always with deadly results； and while the number of people killed in each attack might have been small，the incessant nature of these aggressive encounters made violent death an everpresent danger for every man （and abduction and rape for every woman）。 Moreover，increasing evidence for the widespread practice of cannibalism has been accumulated in recent times.Indeed，it appears that cannibalism was once upon a time an almost universal practice.

至于第一种选择，即争斗，只说几句话就够了。在文学作品中，原始人经常被描述成是和平的，与自然和谐共处。在这方面最流行的是卢梭对“高贵的野蛮人”的描述。经常进行的侵略和战争是建立在私有财产制度上的文明的结果。事实上，情况几乎恰恰相反。[28]的确，现代战争的野蛮行径已经造成了前所未有的大屠杀。例如，第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战都导致数千万人死亡，使国家整体沦为废墟。然而与此同时，人类学证据已经非常清楚地表明，原始人比当代人更好战。据估计，在原始的狩猎采集者社会中，平均约有30%的男性死于非自然暴力，远远超过了现代社会在这方面所经历的任何情况。[29]根据劳伦斯·基利的估计，一个部落社会平均每年在战斗中损失约0.5%的人口。[30]如果应用于20世纪的人口，这将相当于大约20亿人的伤亡率，而不是“仅仅”几亿人的实际伤亡数字。当然，原始战争与现代战争截然不同，它不是由正规军在战场上进行的，而是通过劫掠、伏击和突袭来进行的。然而，每一次攻击都极其残暴，毫不留情，而且总是造成致命的后果，管在每次袭击中丧生的人数可能很少，但这些侵略行为的持续性使每个男人永远处在死于暴力的危险中（每个女人则一直面对绑架和强奸的危险）。[31]此外，近年来越来越多的证据表明，当时人类相食的现象广泛存在。事实上，貌似同类相食曾经是一种几乎普遍存在的做法。[32]

More importantly，these findings regarding primitive man’s warlikeness are not just anthropological curiosities，i.e.，features that one might consider incidental to the true nature of huntergatherer societies.To the contrary，there exist fundamental theoretical reasons why such societies were characterized by incessant warfare，and peaceful relations were almost impossible to attain，in particular，if the possibility of evading one another was foreclosed because all surrounding land was occupied.because then it became unavoid able that the members of different huntergatherer tribes encountered each other more or less regularly on their various expeditions in search of plants and animals.Indeed，as the population size increased，such encounters became ever more frequent。And because hunters and gatherers did not add anything to the naturegiven supply of goods but only consumed what was provided by nature，their competition for food was necessarily of an antago nistic nature：either I pick the berries or hunt a given animal or you do it。No or little trade and exchange between the members of different tribes existed，because the members of one tribe engaged in essentially the same activities as those of any other tribe and neither one accumulated any surplus of goods that could be exchanged for others’ surplus goods.There existed only ineradi cable conflict and the more conflict the more the population number in each tribe exceeded its optimum size.In this situation，where everything appropri ated by one person （or tribe） was immediately consumed and the total sup ply of goods was strictly limited by natural forces，only deadly antagonism could exist between men.In the words of Ludwig von Mises，men became

deadly foes of one another，irreconcilable rivals in their endeav ors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature.Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies； his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implaca ble conflict with all his neighbors.No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.

only the death of one’s rivals provided a solution to one’s own desire to survive.Indeed，to spare another man’s life would have left him equipped to create even more offspring and hence reduced one’s own future chance of survival still further。

更重要的是，这些关于原始人好战性的发现并不仅仅是人类学上的奇闻异事，人们可能认为这些只是狩猎采集社会本质特征之外的偶然现象。相反，存在着根本的理论原因说明为什么这样的社会以持续不断的战争为特征，而和平关系几乎无法实现，特别是在由于周围所有土地都被占据而无法相互躲避的情况下。因为在这种情况下，不同狩猎采集部落的成员在他们寻找植物和动物的各种探险中或多或少会定期相遇就变得不可避免。实际上，随着人口规模的增加，这样的相遇会变得更加频繁。因为狩猎采集者并没有给大自然的供给品增加任何东西，而只消耗自然提供的东西，他们对食物的竞争必然是敌对性质的：要么我摘这些浆果或猎杀这些动物，要么你这样做。不同的部落之间，他们从事的狩猎采集都差不多，部落之间并没有什么差异产品需要交换，也没有多少剩余产品投入交换，所以部落之间很少交易甚至没有交易。只存在无法根除的冲突，而且每个部落的人口数量越是超出其最佳规模，冲突就越多。在这种情况下，一个人（或一个部落）所获取的一切都会立即被消耗掉，而物品的总供给又严格地受到自然力量的限制，人与人之间只能存在致命的对抗。用路德维希·冯·米塞斯的话说，

人们成了彼此的死敌，在努力获取自然所提供的稀缺生活资料的过程中，他们成了不可调和的竞争对手。每个人都会被迫将所有其他人视为敌人；他对满足自己欲望的渴望会使他与所有邻居陷入不可调和的冲突之中。在这种情况下，不可能产生任何同情心。[33]

竞争对手的死亡才是解决自己生存欲望的唯一方案。事实上，放过另一个人的生命会让他有能力繁衍更多的后代，从而进一步降低自己未来生存的机会。[34]

The second available option to deal with the steadily reemerging problem of excess population was migration.While by no means costless—after all one had to leave familiar for unfamiliar territories—migration （as com pared to fighting） must have appeared frequently as the less costly option，especially as long as some open frontier existed.Hence，setting out from their homeland in EastAfrica，successively the entire globe was conquered by bands of people breaking away from their relatives to form new societies in areas hitherto unoccupied by humans.

解决反复出现的人口过剩问题的第二个可选项是迁徙。迁徙当然是有代价的，毕竟人们必须离开熟悉的地方到另一片不熟悉的土地，但是作为成本更低的选择（与战斗相比），迁徙一定经常发生，特别是只要有一些开放的边界存在。因此，一拨又一拨现代人类从他们的东非拓殖出发，脱离亲人，逐渐征服全球，在未被占领的处女地上形成新的社会。

It appears that this process began also about 50，000 years ago，shortly after the emergence of behaviorally modern man and the acquisition of the ability to build boats.From about this time on until around 12，000 to 11，000 years ago global temperatures gradually fell （since then we are in an interglacial warming period） and the sea levels accordingly fell。 People crossed over the red Sea at the Gate of Grief，which was then merely a narrow gap of water dotted with islands，to land at the southern tip of the Ara bian peninsula （which enjoyed a comparatively wet period at that time）。From there onward，preferring to stay in tropical climate zones to which one had been adjusted，the migration—of possibly not more than 150 people—continued eastward.Travel was mostly by boat，because until about certainly less reason to kill such a man than to kill a man who has added nothing but merely takes and consumes what is given （and hence inevitably reduces what remains 6，000 years ago when man learned how to tame horses，this form of trans portation was much faster and more convenient than travel by foot。Hence，migration took place along the coastline—and proceeded from there into the interior through river valleys—first all the way to India.From there，as the genetic evidence seems to indicate，the population movement split into two directions.on the one hand it proceeded around the Indian peninsula to southeast Asia and Indonesia （which was then connected to the Asian mainland） and finally to the now foundered former continent of Sahul （of Australia，new Guinea and Tasmania，which were joined until about 8，000 years ago），which was then only separated from the Asian mainland by a 60milewide channel of water dotted with islands permitting short distance island hopping，as well as northward up the coast to China and eventually JapaN.on the other hand，the migration process went from India in a northwesterly direction，through Afghanistan，Iran，and Turkey and ultimately EuropE.As well，splitting off of this stream of migration，people pressed in a northeasterly direction into southern Siberia.Later migrations，most likely in three waves，with the first about 14，000–12，000 years ago，went from Siberia across the bering Strait—then （until about 11，000 years ago） a land bridge—and onto the American continent，appar ently reaching Patagonia only about 1，000 years later （archeological find ings of human remains in southern Chile have been dated as 12，500 years old）。The last migration route set out from Taiwan，which was occupied about 5，000 years ago，sailing across the Pacific to reach the Polynesian islands and finally，only about 800 years ago，new Zealand.

这一大规模的迁徙过程似乎也开始于大约50000年前，也就是在行为上的现代人出现和获得造船能力之后不久。从这个时候开始到大约12000年到11000年前，全球气温逐渐下降（从那时起，我们就处于间冰期的变暖期），海平面也随之下降。[35]人们从“泪之门”穿过红海在阿拉伯半岛的南端登陆。（“泪之门”指阿拉伯半岛和非洲之间的曼德海峡，由于海峡内暗礁和浅滩众多，风力强大，给古代航行船只带来很大的危险和困难，使来往的旅客不禁畏惧而泪下，故阿拉伯语意为“泪之门”。当时红海只是一个点缀着岛屿的狭窄水域，而阿拉伯半岛也处于相对潮湿的时期。）从那时起，由于他们更愿意留在已经适应了的热带气候区，移民部落的人数可能不超过150人，这一小拨人继续向东迁移。由于直到大约6000年前人类学会驯服马匹前，乘船是比步行更快、更方便的交通方式，所以大部分旅行是通过船只进行的。因此，迁徙是沿着海岸线进行的，并从那里通过河谷进入内陆，然后一路迁徙到印度。从那里开始，正如遗传学证据所表明的那样，人口迁移分为两个方向。一方面，移民路线绕过印度半岛到达东南亚和印度尼西亚（当时与亚洲大陆相连），最后到达现在已经消失的前萨胡尔大陆（由澳大利亚、新几内亚和塔斯马尼亚组成，直到大约8000年前才连接在一起），该大陆当时与亚洲大陆只隔着一条60英里宽的水道，水道上点缀着许多岛屿，可以进行短距离的跳岛，并向北沿着海岸到达中国，最后到达日本。另一条路线，移民过程从印度向西北方向移动，经过阿富汗、伊朗和土耳其，最终到达欧洲。同样，从这一移民流中分裂出来的人们向东北方向进入西伯利亚南部。这一路线的迁徙，很可能分三波，第一波大约在14000-12000年前，从西伯利亚穿过白令海峡进入美洲大陆，当时（直到大约11000年前）白令海峡是一座陆桥，显然大约1000年后才到达巴塔哥尼亚（在智利南部考古发现的人类遗骸的年龄为12500年）。最后一条迁徙路线是从大约5000年前被占领的台湾出发的，横渡太平洋到达波利尼西亚群岛，最后在大约800年前，才到达新西兰。[36]

The process was essentially always the same：a group invaded some ter ritory，population pressure mounted，some people stayed put，a subgroup moved further on，generation after generation，along the coastline，follow ing rivers and game and avoiding deserts and high mountains.The migra tion from Africa all the way to Australia may have taken about 4，000 to 5，000 years，and migration to Europe 7，000 years （the oldest artifacts there ascribed to modern humans，found in Bulgaria，date about 43，000 years back） and another 7，000 years to reach western SpaiN. once broken up，practically no contact existed between the various huntergatherer Societies.Consequently，although initially closely related to one another through direct kinship relations，these societies formed separated genetic pools and， confronted with different natural environments and as the result of muta tions and genetic drift interacting with natural selection，in the course of time they took on distinctly different appearances.By and large，the genetic difference between various societies increased in correlation with the spatial distance between societies and the duration of their separation time. different ethnicities emerged and，further on，also distinctly different human races.These emerging，genetically based differences concerned matters such as skin color，physical build and strength，resistance to cold temperatures and to various diseases，and tolerance visàvis certain substances.They also concerned cognitive matters，however。Thus，genetic evidence exists for two significant further developments regarding the size and cognitive powers of the human braiN.one such development occurred about 37，000 years ago and affected most of the population in Europe as well as in East Asia （but left very few traces in Africa），and another occurred about 6，000 years ago and affected mostly people in the Middle East and Europe （but had less impact in East Asia and almost none in subSaharan Africa）。

这个过程基本上都是一样的：一群人占据了一片地方，人口压力增加，一些人留在原地，其中一个子群体继续前进，一代又一代，沿着海岸线，顺着河流，追逐野味，避开沙漠和高山。从非洲一路迁移到澳大利亚可能需要4000到5000年，从非洲迁移到欧洲则需要7000年（在保加利亚发现的现代人类最古老的文物可以追溯到43000年前），再过7000年才能到达西班牙西部。[37]部落之间一旦发生分离，各个狩猎采集社会之间几乎再没有任何联系。因此，尽管这些社会最初通过直接的亲属关系彼此密切相关，但却形成了分离的基因库，并面临不同的自然环境。由于突变和遗传漂移与自然选择相互作用，随着时间的推移，它们呈现出明显不同的面貌。总的来说，不同社会之间的遗传差异随着社会之间的空间距离和分离时间的持续而增加。[38]于是开始出现了不同的种族，后来也出现了明显不同的人种。人群之间基于基因差异而出现的表现差异，涉及到肤色、体格、体质、力量、耐受低温、疾病抵抗力、耐受某些物质等等方面。各部落人群之间的差异，也涉及到认知问题。我们的遗传学证据表明，在人类大脑的大小和认知能力方面有两次重大发展。其中一次发生在大约37000年前，影响了欧洲和东亚的大部分人口（但在非洲留下的痕迹很少），另一次发生在大约6000年前，影响了中东和欧洲的大部分人（但在东亚的影响较小，在撒哈拉以南非洲几乎没有）。[39]

Moreover，hand in hand with the geographical and correlated genetic differentiation of humans went a linguistic differentiation.very much in agreement with and supported by genetic （biological） evidence，some linguists，in particular merritt Ruhlen， following in the footsteps of the pioneering work of Joseph Greenberg，have made the plausible case for a single human protolanguage，from which all human languages can be derived as more or less distant relatives.Obviously，the original emigrants from the African homeland，some 50，000 years ago，would have spoken the same language，and so it seems hardly surprising that the above sketched population movement，and the splitting of groups of people into different genetic pools，more or less separated in time and space from one another，should be closely mirrored by a differentiation of languages，the grouping of different languages into language families，and the grouping of these into still larger superfamilies. Likewise，the process of the proliferation of languages appears to have followed a predictable pattern.First，with the spread of humans around the world as hunters and gatherers and the concomitant proliferation of distinct，separated genetic pools，a successively increasing number of different languages emerged.Thus，for instance，of the 6，000 different languages still spoken today，some 1，200 languages are spoken in new Guinea，one of the most “primitive” remaining world regions，half of which have no more than the “magic” number of 500 speakers and none more than 100，000。Then，however，with the beginning of human settlement some 11，000 years ago and the following transition to agriculture and the attendant expansion and intensification of the division of labor （more on which later on），a countervailing and even contrary tendency appears to have come into existence：just as the genetic pools appear to have widened，so the number of different languages spoken has successively diminished.

此外，随着人类地理分布的扩大和基因差异的出现，语言也发生了分化。根据基因证据，一些语言学家，尤其是梅里特·鲁伦[40]，追随约瑟夫·格林伯格的开创性工作，提出了一个可信的观点，即所有人类语言都源自一种原始语言，彼此之间存在或远或近的亲缘关系。显然，大约5万年前从非洲故乡迁出的早期人类讲的是同一种语言，因此，上述的人口迁徙和不同基因库的分化在时间和空间上分隔开来也就不奇怪了，这与语言的分化、不同语言的归类和更大语言超级家族的形成密切相关。[41]同样，语言扩散的过程似乎遵循了一个可预测的模式。首先，随着人类作为猎人和采集者在世界各地的传播，以及独立基因库的出现，逐渐涌现出越来越多的不同语言。例如，如今仍在使用的6000种不同语言中，有约1200种在新几内亚这个最“原始”的地区之一，那里的一半语言使用者不超过500人，且没有一种语言的使用者超过10万人。然而，随着大约1.1万年前人类开始定居，并逐渐过渡到农业以及随之而来的劳动分工的扩展和深化，出现了一种相反的趋势：随着基因库的扩大，语言种类的数量却在逐渐减少。

II.问题：理论

THE problem：THEORY

About 35，000 years ago，i.e.，15，000 years after the initial exodus from Africa，practically all of Europe，Asia，Australia and，of course，Africa itself had been occupied by our ancestors，the modern humans，and archaic humans，Homo neanderthalensis and Homo erectus，were on the verge of extinction.About 12，000 years ago，humans had also spread all across the Americas.Apart from the Polynesian islands，then，all land and all of the naturally given supply of earthly （economic） goods，of plants and animals，had been taken into human possession； and，given the parasitic lifestyle of huntergatherers，humans did not add anything to this land and the nature given supply of goods but merely reacted to natural changes.

大约35000年前，也就是最初离开非洲的15000年后，几乎整个欧洲、亚洲、澳大利亚，当然，还有非洲本身都已经被我们的祖先——现代人所占领。那些古人类：尼安德特人和直立人，则处于灭绝的边缘。大约12000年前，人类也已经遍布美洲。因此，除了波利尼西亚群岛之外，所有的土地和所有自然供给的世间的（经济）物品——植物和动物，都已被人类占有。然而，狩猎采集是一种寄生生活方式，人类并没有在大自然的禀赋之外增加任何东西，他们只不过对自然变化做出反应。

These changes were at times quite drastic。Changes in global climate，for instance，could and did significantly affect how much inhabitable land was available and the natural vegetation and animal population.In the time period under consideration，in the 20，000 plus years between 35，000 and 11，000 years ago，drastic changes in such natural conditions occurred.20，000 years ago，for instance，during the period known as the Last Gla cial Maximum，temperatures fell sharply and most of northern Europe and Siberia became uninhabitable.Britain and all of Scandinavia were covered by glaciers，most of Siberia turned into polar desert and steppetundra extended as far south as the mediterranean，the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.After 5，000 years，about 15，000 years ago，the glaciers began to retreat，allowing people，animals and plants to reoccupy previously deserted regions.Two and a half thousand years later，however，within merely a decade，tempera tures again plummeted back to almost the previous frigid conditions； and only another 1，000 years later，about 11，500 years ago，and again quite sud denly，did temperatures then experience a longsustained increase and the earth entered the socalled Holocene，the latest and still lasting interglacial warming period. （The Sahara began to turn into the present，extremely hot desert only less than 3，000 years ago。In preRoman times，the Sahara— and similarly the centralAsian deserts—was still a green savanna with an abundant supply of wildlifE.The power and the attraction of Carthage，for instance，was based largely on the fertility of its hinterland as a center of wheat production； this fact was an important reason for Rome’s desire to destroy Carthage and gain control of its northAfrican territories.）

然而大自然的变化有时相当剧烈。例如，全球气候的变化可以并且确实显著影响可居住土地的数量以及自然植被和动物种群。在所考虑的时期内，在35000年前至11000年前的20000多年间，这种自然条件发生了剧烈变化。例如，20000年前，在被称为末次盛冰期的时期，气温急剧下降，北欧和西伯利亚的大部分地区变得无法居住。不列颠和整个斯堪的纳维亚半岛都被冰川覆盖，西伯利亚的大部分地区变成了极地沙漠，草原苔原一直向南延伸到地中海、黑海和里海。5000年后，也就是大约15000年前，冰川开始退缩，使人类、动物和植物重新占据了以前曾经的荒芜地区。然而，2500年后，在短短十年内，气温再次骤降到，几乎回到了之前的严寒条件；又过了1000年后，大约11500年前，又是很突然的，气温长期持续上升，地球进入了所谓的全新世，这是最近且仍然持续的间冰期变暖期。[42]（撒哈拉沙漠变成现在这样极其炎热的沙漠，也才是从大约3000年前开始的。古罗马时代之前，今天的撒哈拉沙漠和中亚的沙漠那时却是一片绿色的热带大草原，有着丰富的野生动物供应。例如，那时位于北非的迦太基是一片肥沃的土地，是小麦生产中心，这是它力量和吸引力的来源，也是它招致罗马帝国摧毁并控制它的重要原因。[43]）

In any case and regardless of all complicating details and all changes that future empirical researchers will no doubt bring about concerning the foregoing historical narrative，at some point in time the landmass avail able to help satisfy human needs could no longer be enlarged.In economic jargon，the supply of the production factor “land” became fixed，and every increase in the size of the human population had to be sustained by the same，unchanged quantity of land.Of the formerly three available options in response to an increasing population pressure，to move，to fight or to invent，only the latter two remained opeN.What to do when faced with this challenge？

无论何种情况，无论未来实证研究会对上述历史叙事带来哪些复杂的细节和变化，然而毋庸置疑的是，在某个时间节点开始，可用以满足人类需求的土地将不再扩大。用经济学术语来说，生产要素“土地”的供应是固定的，人口规模的每一次增加都必须由相同的、不变的土地数量来维持。在应对日益增长的人口压力方面，以前有三种选择：迁移、争斗或发明，只有后两种选择仍然是开放的。面对这一挑战，该怎么办呢？

To bring the problem faced into even sharper relief it is useful to first take another，more detailed look at the admittedly rather limited extent of the division of labor within a huntergatherer society。

为了更加清楚地呈现所面临的问题，首先有必要更详细地审视一下狩猎采集社会中相当有限的劳动分工。

So far the antagonism between the members of different bands or clans has been explained while it has been taken for granted that within a given band or clan collaboration—peaceful cooperation—exists.But why should this be so？ intragroup cooperation is almost universally assumed as a matter of course.Nonetheless，it too requires an explanation，because a world without even this limited degree of cooperation is certainly conceivable.To be sure，there exists a biological basis for some forms of human cooperation.“The mutual sexual attraction of male and female，” writes Mises，“is inherent in man’s animal nature and independent of any thinking and theorizing。It is permissible to call it original，vegetative，instinctive，or mysterious.” The same can be said about the relationship between mother and child：if mothers did not take care of their offspring for an extended period of time，their children would instantly die and mankind would be doomed.However，this necessary，biologically determined degree of cooperation is a far cry from that actually observed in huntergatherer societies.Thus，Mises continues，

neither cohabitation，nor what precedes it or follows，generates social cooperation and societal modes of lifE.The animals too join together in mating，but they have not developed social relations.Family life is not merely a product of sexual intercourse.It is by no means natural and necessary that parents and children live together in the way they do in the family。The mating rela tion need not result in a family organization.The human family is an outcome of thinking，planning，and acting。It is this fact which distinguishes it radically from those animal groups which we call per analogiam animal families.

到目前为止，我们已经解释了不同族群或部落成员之间的对立，同时认为在一个特定的族群或部落内存在协作（和平合作）是理所当然的。但为什么会这样呢？群体内部的合作几乎被普遍认为是理所当然的事情。尽管如此，它也需要一个解释，因为一个没有这种有限程度的合作的世界是肯定可以想象的。可以肯定的是，某些形式的人类合作存在着生物学基础。米塞斯写道：“男性和女性的相互性吸引，是人的动物本性所固有的，与任何思想和理论无关，可以称其为原始的、机能的、本能的或神秘的。”[44]关于母亲和孩子之间的关系也可以这么说。如果母亲长时间不照顾她们的孩子，她们的孩子就会立即死亡，人类也将注定灭亡。然而，这种必要的、由生物学决定的合作程度与在狩猎采集社会中实际观察到的相差甚远。米塞斯继续说，

同居，无论是同居之前或之后，都不会产生社会合作和社会生活方式。动物在交配时也会结合在一起，但它们并没有发展出社会关系。家庭生活不仅仅是性交的产物。父母和孩子以他们的方式生活在一起绝不是自然和必要的。交配关系不一定会导致家庭组织。人类家庭是思考、计划和行动的结果。正是这一事实使它与那些我们称之为类动物家庭的动物群体截然不同。[45]

Why，for instance，did not each man and each woman，after they had left infancy，hunt or gather alone only to meet for occasional sex？ Why did it not occur what has been described as having occurred for groups of humans already on the level of individuals：one person，faced with a strictly limited supply of naturegiven goods，breaking away from another in order to avoid conflict until all land was taken into possession and then a war of everyone against everyone else （rather than merely a war of the members of one group against the members of all other groups） breaking out？ The answer to this is：because of the recognition that cooperation was more productive than isolated，selfsufficient action.Division of labor and cooperation based on such division of labor increased the productivity of human labor。

人与动物不同的地方，如每个雄性和雌性长大后各自单独狩猎或采集，只在偶尔的性交时才见面——人类并不这样，为什么？在资源有限时，个体为了避免冲突而各自占领自己的领地，直到所有的土地都被占领，然后爆发一个个体对所有个体的冲突——人类也不这样，又为什么？（当然人类也发生一个群体与另一个群体之间的对抗。）答案是：因为人们认识到合作比单独、自给自足的行动更有生产力。基于劳动分工的合作提高了人类劳动的生产率。

There are three reasons for this：First，there exist tasks which exceed the powers of any single man and require instead the combined efforts of several men in order to be successfully executed.certain animals，for instance，might be too large or too dangerous to be hunted by single individuals but require the cooperative engagement of many。Or there exist tasks which could，in principle，be executed by a single individual but that would take up so much time for an isolated actor that the final result does not appear worth the effort。only concerted action can accomplish these tasks in a time span sufficiently short to deem the task worthwhile.Searching for edible plants or animals，for instance，is fraught with uncer tainties.on one day one might stumble across suitable plants or animals quickly，but at another time one might search for them in vain seemingly without end.But if one pools this risk，i.e.，if a large number of gatherers or hunters begin their search separately only to call upon each other once any one of them has turned out to be lucky in his search，then gathering and hunting might be turned into routinely successful endeavors for each participant。

人类选择合作，有三个原因。首先，有一些任务超出了任何一个人的能力，而需要几个人的共同努力才能成功执行。例如，某些动物可能太大或者太危险，无法由单个人去捕猎，而需要许多人合作参与。或者有一些任务，原则上可以由一个人完成，但对于一个孤立的行动人来说，会占有大量的时间，最终的结果似乎不值得。只有协调一致的行动才能在足够短的时间内完成这些任务，从而使人们认为这项任务是值得的。例如，寻找可食用的动植物就充满了不确定性。在某一天，人们可能偶然会很快发现合适的植物或动物，但在另一个时候，人们寻找它们可能是徒劳的，而且这样的无用功似乎无休无止。但是，如果把这种风险集中起来，也就是说，如果大量的采集者或狩猎者分头开始各自的搜寻，一旦他们中的任何一个人在搜寻中碰到好运，就彼此招唤，那么狩猎和采集可能会变成每个参与者经常成功的努力。

Second：Even though the natural environment faced by each person might be more or less the same，each individual （even identical twins） is different from any other。men，for instance，are significantly different in their abilities than women.By their very nature，men are typically better hunters and women better gatherers.Adults are significantly different in their abilities than kids.Some people are physically strong and others show great dexterity。Some are tall and others are quick。Some have great vision and others a good sense of smell。Given such differences it is obviously advantageous to partition the various tasks neces sary to perform in order to secure a comfortable life in such a way that each person specializes in those activities in which he has an advantage over others.Women gather and men hunt。Tall individuals pick fruits off trees and short ones specialize in hunting mushrooms.Quick run ners relay messages.Individuals with good eyesight will spot distant events.Kids are used for the exploration of small and narrow holes.People with great dexterity produce tools.The strong will specialize in going in for the kill，etc。

第二，尽管每个人所面临的自然环境可能大致相同，但每个人（甚至是同卵双胞胎）都是不同的。例如，男性的能力与女性显著不同。就其本质而言，男性通常是更好的猎手，而女性是更好的采集者。成年人的能力与孩子有明显的不同。有些人身体强壮，而另一些人则表现得非常灵巧。有些人身材高大，有些人身手敏捷。有的人视力好，有的人嗅觉好。鉴于这种差异，为了保证舒适的生活，将必须完成的各种任务进行划分，使每个人都专门从事他比别人有优势的活动，这显然是有利的。女人采集，男人打猎。高个子从树上摘果子，矮个子专门采蘑菇。快速奔跑的人传递信息。视力好的人可以发现远处的事件。孩子们被用来探索小的和狭窄的洞。灵巧的人生产工具。强壮的人会专门从事杀人的工作，等等。

Third：Moreover，even if the members of one tribe are so distinguished from one another that one person is more efficient in every conceivable task than another，division of labor is still allaround more productive than isolated labor。An adult might be better at any task than a kid，for instance.Given the inescapable fact of the scarcity of time，however，even in this conceivably worstcase scenario it makes economic sense—that is，it leads to a greater physical output of goods produced per unit of labor—if the adult specializes in those tasks in which his greater efficiency （as compared to that of the kid） is particularly pronounced and leaves those tasks for the kid to perform in which the latter’s allaround lower efficiency is compara tively smaller。Even though the adult might be more efficient than the child in collecting small firewood，for instance，the adult’s far greater superiority in hunting large game would make it a waste of his time to gather wood.Instead，he would want the child to collect firewood and use all of his own precious time to perform that task in which his greater efficiency is espe cially marked，namely large game hunting。

第三：此外，即使一个部落的成员彼此之间如此不同，以至于一个人在每一项可以想到的任务中都比另一个人更有效率，劳动分工仍然比孤立的劳动更有效率。例如，一个成年人在任何任务上都可能比一个孩子更好。然而，考虑到时间稀缺这一不可避免的事实，即使在这种可以想象的最坏的情况下，如果成年人专门从事那些他的效率（与孩子相比）特别高的任务，并把那些他的效率相对较低的任务留给孩子去做，这也是有经济意义的，也就是说，它导致了每单位劳动产生更大的实物产出。例如，即使成人在收集小柴火方面可能比孩子更有效率，但成人在猎取大型猎物方面的更大优势会使收集柴火成为一种浪费时间的行为。相反，他会希望孩子收集小柴火，并利用自己所有的宝贵时间来完成他的效率特别高的任务，即猎杀大型猎物。

Nonetheless：While these advantages offered by the division of labor can explain intratribal cooperation （rather than fight） and，based on such，initially，maybe purely “selfishlymotivated” collaboration，for the gradual development of feelings of sympathy （good will） toward one’s fellowmen，which go above and beyond whatever biological basis there may exist for the special，morethannormallyfriendly relationship between close kin，this explanation still only goes so far。Given the peculiar，parasitic nature of huntergatherer societies and assuming land to be fixed，invariably the moment must arise when the number of people exceeds the optimal group size and average living standards will fall，threatening whatever degree of intragroup solidarity previously might have existed.

尽管如此。虽然分工带来的这些优势可以解释部落内的合作（而不是争斗），以及基于这种最初可能纯粹出自“自私动机”的合作，逐渐发展出对同胞的同情心（善意），这种同情超越了近亲之间的特殊的、超乎寻常的友好关系的可能存在的任何生物学基础，但这种解释仍然仅限于此。鉴于狩猎采集社会的特殊性和寄生性，并假设土地是固定的，不可避免地会出现这样的时刻：人数超过了最佳群体规模，平均生活水平下降，群体内以前存在的不同程度的团结受到威胁。[46]

This situation is captured and explained by the economic law of returns.

这种情形可由经济学报酬律来体现和解释。

The law of returns，popularly but somewhat misleadingly also called the law of diminishing returns，states that for any combination of two or more production factors an optimum combination exists （such that any deviation from it involves material waste，or “efficiency losses”）。 Applied to the two original factors of production，labor and land （naturegiven goods），the law implies that if one were to increase the quantity of labor （population） while the quantity of land and the available technology （hunting and gathering） remained fixed，eventually a point will be reached where the physical output per laborunit input is maximized.This point marks the optimal population size.If there is no additional land available and technology remains fixed at a “given” level，any population increase beyond the optimal size will lead to a progressive decline in per capita income.Living standards，on the average，will fall。A point of （absolute） overpopulation has been reached.This is，as Mises has termed it，the Malthusian law of population.

报酬律，通常也被称为收益递减定律，它指出，对于两个或两个以上的生产要素的任何组合，都存在一个最佳组合（因此，任何偏离该最佳组合的情况都会造成物质浪费或 “效率损失”）。[47]如果将报酬率应用于劳动力和土地（及其他自然赋予的物品）者两个原始的生产要素，则意味着如果土地数量和可用的狩猎采集技术不变，而增加劳动力的数量（人口），则会到达某个点，这个点上是单位劳动投入的实物产出的最大化。这个点就标志着最佳人口规模。如果没有额外的土地，技术仍然停留在“给定”的水平，任何超过最佳规模的人口增长都将导致人均收入的逐步下降。平均生活水平也将会下降。这时已经达到（绝对）人口过剩的程度。这就是米塞斯所说的马尔萨斯人口定律。

because of the fundamental importance of this Malthusian law of population and in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding，it is advisable to make also explicit what the law does not state.The law does not assert where exactly this optimal combination point is located—at soandso many people per square mile，for instance—but only that such a point exists.otherwise，if every quantity of output could be produced by increasing only one factor （labor） while leaving the other （land） unchanged，the latter （land） would cease to be scarce—and hence an economic good—at all； one could increase without limit the return of any piece of land by simply increasing the input of labor applied to this piece without ever having to consider expanding the size of one’s land.The law also does not state that every increase of one factor （labor） applied to a fixed quantity of another （land） must lead to a less than proportional increase of the output produced.In fact，as one approaches the optimum combination point an increase of labor applied to a given piece of land might lead to a more than proportional increase of output （increasing returns）。one additional man，for instance，might make it possible that an animal species can be hunted that cannot be hunted at all without this one extra hunter。The law of returns merely states that this cannot occur without definite limits.Nor does the law assert that the optimum combination point cannot be shifted up and outward.In fact，as will be explained in the following，owing to technological advances the optimum combination point can be so moved，allowing a larger population to enjoy a higher average living standard on the same quantity of land.What the law of returns does say is only that given a state of technological development （mode of production） and a corresponding degree of specialization，an optimum combination point exists beyond which an increase in the supply of labor must necessarily lead to a less then proportional increase of the output produced or no increase at all。

由于马尔萨斯人口定律的根本重要性，为了避免任何可能的误解，明确厘定该定律未表述的内容是明智的。该定律并没有断言这个最佳组合点到底在哪里——例如，每平方英里有多少人——而只是声称存在这样一个点。否则，如果每一个产出量都可以通过增加一个要素（劳动）而保持另一个要素（土地）不变来生产，那么后者（土地）将不再是稀缺的，因而也不再是一种经济物品；人们可以通过增加应用于这块土地的劳动投入而无限制地增加任何一块土地的收益，而不必考虑扩大自己的土地面积）。此外，该定律也从未断言必定是收入递减，也就是每次增加一个因素（劳动力）应用于固定数量的另一个因素（土地）时，产量增加都会小于之前的产出比例。实际上，当接近最佳组合点时，增加的劳动力可能会带来超过之前产出比例的产量增加（即收益递增）。例如，多一个人，就有可能猎取某个动物物种，而如果没有这个额外的猎人，该物种就根本无法被猎取。报酬律只是说，如果没有明确的限制，这种情况就不会发生。该定律也没有断言，最佳组合点不能向上和向外移动。事实上，正如下文将要解释的，由于技术的进步，最佳组合点可以这样移动，使更多的人在同样数量的土地上享受更高的平均生活水平。报酬律只是说在给定的技术发展状态（生产方式）和相应的专业化程度下，存在一个最佳的结合点，超过这个点，劳动供应的增加必然会导致产出的增长低于比例，或者根本不增加。

Indeed，for huntergatherer societies the difficulties of escaping the Malthusian trap of absolute overpopulation are even more severe than these qualifications regarding the law of returns might indicate.For while these qualifications might leave the impression that it is “only” a techno logical innovation that is needed to escape the trap，this is not the full truth.Not just any technological innovation will do。because hunter gatherer societies are，as explained，“parasitic” societies，which do not add anything to the supply of goods but merely appropriate and consume what nature provides，any productivity increase within the framework of this mode of production does not （or only insignificantly so） result in a greater output of goods produced （of plants gathered or animals hunted） but rather merely （or mostly） in a reduction of the time necessary to pro duce an essentially unchanged quantity of output。The invention of the bow and arrow that appears to have been made some 20，000 years ago，for instance，will not so much lead to a greater quantity of available animal meat to consume，thus allowing a larger number of people to reach or exceed a given level of consumption，but rather only to the same number of people enjoying more leisure with an unchanged standard of living in terms of meatconsumption （or else，if the population increases，the gain of more leisure time will have to be paid for by a reduction in meat con sumption per capita）。In fact，for huntergatherers the productivity gains achieved by technological advances such as the invention of the bow and arrow may well turn out to be no blessing at all or only a very shortterm blessing，because the greater ease of hunting that is thus brought about，for instance，may lead to overhunting，increasing the supply of meat per capita in the shortrun，but diminishing or possibly eliminating the meat supply in the longrun by reducing the natural rate of animal reproduction or hunting animals to extinction and thus magnifying the Malthu sian problem，even without any increase in population size.

事实上，对于狩猎采集社会来说，要摆脱马尔萨斯人口绝对过剩的陷阱，其难度甚至比报酬律中的这些限定所表明的还要严重。虽然这些限定可能会给人留下这样的印象：要摆脱这个陷阱，“仅仅”需要技术革新，但这并不是全部事实，并不是任何技术革新都可以。正如前面所解释的，由于狩猎采集社会是“寄生”社会，它不增加任何物品的供应，而只是占有和消耗自然界提供的东西，因此在这种生产方式的框架内，任何生产力的提高都不会（或只是微不足道地）导致产品（采集的植物或狩猎的动物）产量增加，而只是（或主要）减少了生产基本不变的产出量所需的时间。例如，大约20000年前发明的弓箭，并不会导致更多的动物肉可供食用，从而使更多的人达到或超过特定的消费水平，而只是使相同数量的人在肉类消费方面的生活标准不变的情况下享受更多的休闲（否则，如果人口增加，更多休闲时间的收益将只能以人均肉类消费的减少作为代价）。事实上，对于狩猎采集者来说，技术进步（如弓箭的发明）所带来的生产力提高很可能根本不是什么福音，或者只是非常短期的福音。例如，因为由此带来的更大的狩猎便利可能会导致过度狩猎，在短期内增加人均肉类供应，但从长远来看，通过降低动物的自然繁殖率或将动物猎杀至灭绝，从而放大马尔萨斯问题，甚至在人口规模没有任何增加的情况下，减少或可能消除肉类供应。[48]

III.解决方案：理论与历史

THE SOLUTIon：THEORY AND HISTORY

The technological invention，then，that solved （at least temporarily） the problem of a steadily emerging and reemerging “excess” of population and the attendant fall of average living standards was a revolutionary change in the entire mode of production.It involved the change from a parasitic lifestyle to a genuinely productive lifE.Instead of merely appropriating and consuming what nature had provided，consumer goods were now actively produced and nature was augmented and improved upon.

因此，技术发明解决了（至少是暂时的[49]）不断出现和再次出现的人口“过剩”问题和随之而来的平均生活水平下降的问题，这是整个生产方式的革命性变化。它涉及从寄生的生活方式到真正的生产性生活的变化。现在，人们不再仅仅占有和消耗自然界提供的东西，而是积极地生产消费品，自然界得到了扩充和改善。

This revolutionary change in the human mode of production is generally referred to as the “neolithic revolution”：the transition from food production by hunting and gathering to food production by the raising of plants and animals. It began about 11，000 years ago in the Middle East，in the region typically referred to as the “Fertile Crescent。” The same inven tion was made again，seemingly independently，less than 2，000 years later in central China，and again a few thousand years later （about 5，000 years ago） also in the Western hemisphere：in mesoamerica，in South America，and in the eastern part of today’s United States.From these centers of innovation the new technology then spread to conquer practically the entire earth.

人类生产方式的这一革命性变化一般被称为“新石器时代革命”：从靠狩猎和采集生产食物过渡到靠种植植物和饲养动物生产食物。[50]这场革命始于大约11000万年前的中东地区，该地区通常被称为“新月沃土”。同样的发明在不到2000年后在中国中部似乎独立地再次出现，几千年后（大约5000年前）在西半球的中美洲、南美洲和今天美国的东部地区又一次出现。然后，新技术从这些创新中心逐步扩散，几乎征服了整个地球。

The new technology represented a fundamental cognitive achievement and was reflected and expressed in two interrelated institutional innova tions，which from then on until today have become the dominant feature of human life：the appropriation and employment of ground land as private property，and the establishment of the family and the family household.

新技术代表了一种根本性的认知成果，并反映和体现在两项相互关联的制度创新中。从那时起到今天，这两项制度创新已成为人类生活的主要特征：将土地作为私有财产占有和使用，以及建立家庭和家户。

To understand these institutional innovations and the cognitive achievement underlying them one must first take a look at the treatment of the production factor “land” by huntergatherer societies.

为了理解这些制度创新和它们背后的认知成果，我们必须首先看看狩猎采集社会对生产要素“土地”的处理。

It can be safely assumed that private property existed within the framework of a tribal household.Private property certainly existed with regard to things such as personal clothing，tools，implements and ornaments.To the extent that such items were produced by particular，identifiable individuals or acquired by others from their original makers through either gift or exchange they were considered individual property。on the other hand，to the extent that goods were the results of some concerted or joint effort they were considered collective household goods.This applied most definitely to the means of sustenance：to the berries gathered and the game hunted as the result of some intratribal division of labor。without doubt，then，collective property played a highly prominent role in huntergatherer societies，and it is because of this that the term “primitive communism” has been often employed to describe primitive，tribal economies：each individual contributed to the house hold income “according to his abilities，” and each received from the collective income “according to his needs” （as determined by the existing hierarchies within the group）—not quite unlike the “communism” in “modern” households.

可以肯定地说，私有财产在部落家庭的框架内存在。私有财产肯定包括个人衣物、工具、器具和装饰品等物品。只要这些物品是由特定、可识别的个人制作或通过礼物或交换从原始制造者那里获得的，它们就被视为个人财产。另一方面，如果物品是通过集体或共同努力的结果，它们就被视为集体家庭财产。这一点尤其适用于生活资料：例如，通过部落内部分工采集的浆果和狩猎到的猎物。毫无疑问，集体财产在狩猎采集社会中占据重要地位。因此，”原始共产主义”一词经常被用来描述原始部落经济：每个人根据自己的能力为家庭收入做出贡献，每个人根据自己的需要从集体收入中获得分配（由群体内当时的等级制度决定）——这与“现代”家庭中的“共产主义”并没有太大不同。

Yet what about the ground land on which all group activities took place？ one may safely rule out that ground land was considered private property in huntergatherer societies.But was it collective property？ This has been typically assumed to be the case，almost as a matter of course.However，the question is in fact more complicated，because a third alterna tive exists：that ground land was neither private nor collective property but instead constituted part of the environment or more specifically the general conditions of action or what has also been called “common property” or，in short，“the commons.”

那么进行所有群体活动的土地呢？可以肯定地说，在狩猎采集社会中，土地并不被视为私有财产。但它是集体财产吗？通常人们会理所当然地认为是这样。然而，实际上这个问题更复杂，因为还存在第三种可能性：土地既不是私有财产，也不是集体财产，而是构成了环境的一部分，更具体地说，是行动的基本条件，也就是所谓的“共有财产”或简称为“共有资源”。[51]

In order to decide this question，standard anthropological research is of little or no help.Instead，some elementary as well as fundamental economic theory，including a few precise definitions，is required.The external world in which man’s actions take place can be divided into two categorically distinct parts.on the one hand，there are those things that are considered means—or economic goods； and on the other hand，there are those things that are considered environment—or also referred to sometimes，if somewhat misleadingly，as free goods.The requirements for an element of the external world to be classified as a means or an economic good have been first identified with all due precision by Carl menger。 They are threefold.First，in order for something to become an economic good （henceforth simply：a good），there must be a human need （an unachieved end or an unfulfilled human desire or want）。Second，there must be the human perception of a thing believed to be equipped or endowed with properties or characteristics causally connected （standing in a causal con nection） with，and hence capable of bringing about，the satisfaction of this need.Third，and most important in the present context，an element of the external world so perceived must be under human control such that it can be employed （actively，deliberately used） to satisfy the given need （reach the end sought）。Writes Mises：“A thing becomes a means when human reason plans to employ it for the attainment of some end and human action really employs it for this purpose.” only if a thing is thus brought into a causal connection with a human need and this thing is under human control can one say that this entity is appropriated—has become a good—and hence，is someone’s （private or collective） property。If，on the other hand，an element of the external world stands in a causal connection to a human need but no one can （or believes that he can） control and interfere with this element （but must leave it unchanged instead，left to its own natural devices and effects） then such an element must be considered part of the unappropriated environment and hence is no one’s property。Thus，for instance，sunshine or rainfall，atmospheric pressure or gravitational forces，may have a causal effect on certain wanted or unwanted ends，but insofar as man thinks himself incapable of interfering with such elements they are mere conditions of acting，not the part of any action.E.g.，rainwater may be causally connected to the sprouting of some edible mushrooms and this causal connection may well be known.However，if nothing is done about the rainwater，then this water is also not owned by anyone； it might be a factor contributing to production，but it is not strictly speaking a production factor。only if there is an actual interference with the natural rainfall，if the rainwater is collected in a bucket or in a cistern，for instance，can it be considered someone’s property and does it become a factor of production.

为了回答这个问题，标准的人类学研究帮助不大甚至没有帮助。相反，需要一些基本而重要的经济理论，包括一些精确的定义。人的行动所处的外部世界可以分为两类截然不同的部分。一方面，有些东西被视为手段或经济财货；另一方面，有些东西被视为环境，有时也被称为自由财货（尽管这个称呼有点误导性）。卡尔·门格尔首先精确地确定了将外部世界的元素分类为手段或经济财货的依据。[52]它们有三个。首先，为了使某物成为经济物品（以下简称物品），必须有一个人类需求（未实现的目标或未满足的愿望）。其次，人类必须认为某物具备与满足这种需求有因果关系的特性或特点。第三，也是本文中最重要的一点，人类必须能够控制这种外部世界的元素，以便可以用来满足特定需求（实现所追求的目标）。米塞斯写道：“当人类理性计划使用某物来实现某个目标，并且人的行动确实将其用于这个目的时，这个东西就成为了手段。”[53]只有当某物与人类需求存在因果关系并且在某人控制之下时，才能说这个东西被某人占有了，成为了财货，因此也成为了某个人（私人或集体）的财产。另一方面，如果某个外部世界的元素与人类需求存在因果关系，但没有人能（或认为自己能）控制和干预这个元素（必须任其保持自然状态），那么这种元素就必须被视为未被占有的环境的一部分，因此不属于任何人的财产。例如，阳光或降雨、大气压力或引力可能对某些想要或不想要的目的产生因果效应，但只要人认为自己没有能力干预这些元素，它们就只是行动的条件，而不是任何行动的一部分。例如，雨水可能与一些可食用菌的发芽有因果关系，这种因果关系很可能是众所周知的。但是，如果对雨水不做任何处理，那么这些水也不属于任何人；它可能是一个有助于生产的因素，但严格来说，它不是一个生产因素。只有在对自然降雨有实际干扰的情况下，例如，如果雨水被收集在水桶或蓄水池中，它才能被视为某人的财产，并成为一个生产要素。

before the backdrop of these considerations one can now proceed to address the question regarding the status of ground land in a hunter gatherer society。 certainly，the berries picked off a bush were property； but what about the bush，which was causally associated with the picked berries？ The bush was only lifted from its original status as an environ mental condition of action and a mere contributing factor to the satisfac tion of human needs to the status of property and a genuine production factor once it had been appropriated：that is，once man had purposefully interfered with the natural causal process connecting bush and berries by，for instance，watering the bush or trimming its branches in order to produce a certain outcome （an increase of the berry harvest above the level otherwise，naturally attained）。Further，once the bush had thus become property by grooming it or tending to it also future berry harvests became property，whereas previously only the berries actually harvested were someone’s property； moreover，once the bush had been lifted out of its natural，unowned state by watering it so as to increase the future berry harvest，for instance，also the ground land supporting the bush had become property。

在这些考虑的背景下，现在可以讨论狩猎采集社会中土地的地位了。[54]显然，从灌木上采摘的浆果是财产；但是，与这些浆果有因果关系的灌木是不是财产呢？只有当灌木被占有之后，它才从最初的环境条件和满足人类需求的辅助因素提升为财产和真正的生产要素。也就是说，当人类有意干预灌木与浆果的自然因果过程，例如给灌木浇水或修剪枝条以提高浆果收成时，灌木才被视为财产。进一步来说，一旦通过照料或修剪使灌木成为财产，未来的浆果收成都将成为财产，而之前只有实际采摘的浆果才是某人的财产。此外，一旦通过浇水等方式使灌木脱离自然的无主状态以增加未来的浆果收成，支撑灌木的土地也将成为财产。

Similarly，there is also no question that a hunted animal was property； but what about the herd，the pack or the flock of which this animal was a part？ Based on our previous considerations，the herd must be regarded as unowned nature as long as man had done nothing that could be interpreted （and that was in his own mind） causally connected with the satisfaction of a perceived need.The herd became property only once the requirement of interfering with the natural chain of events in order to produce some desired result had been fulfilled.This would have been the case，for instance，as soon as man engaged in the herding of animals，i.e.，as soon as he actively tried to control the movements of the herd.The herder then did not only own the herd，he thus became also the owner of all future offspring naturally generated by the herd.

同样，毫无疑问，被猎杀的动物也是财产；但是，这个动物所在的畜群或群落呢？根据我们前面的考虑，只要人类没有做任何可以被解释为（而且在他自己的头脑里）与满足感知需求有因果关系的事情，畜群就必须被视为无主的自然资源。只有当为了产生一些预期的结果而需要干预自然的事件链时，畜群才成为财产。例如，一旦人类从事放牧，也就是积极地试图控制畜群的活动，畜群就将成为财产。因此，牧民不仅拥有畜群，而且也成为畜群未来自然生育的所有后代的所有者。

What，however，about the ground land on which the controlled movement of the herd took place？ According to our definitions，the herdsmen could not be considered the owner of the ground land，at least not automatically so，without the fulfillment of a further requirement。because herders as conventionally defined merely followed the natural movements of the herd and their interference with nature was restricted to keeping the flock together so as to gain easier access to any one of its members should the need for the supply of animal meat arise.Herdsmen did not interfere with the land itself，however。They did not interfere with the land in order to control the movements of the herd； they only interfered with the movements of the members of the herd.Land only became property once herders gave up herding and turned to animal husbandry instead，i.e.，once they treated land as a （scarce） means in order to control the movement of animals by controlling land.This only occurred when land was somehow enclosed，by fencing it in or constructing some other obstacles （such as trenches），which restricted the free，natural flow of animals.Rather than being merely a contributing factor in the production of animal herds，land thus became a genuine production factor。

那么，被控制的畜群所活动的土地呢？根据我们的定义，牧民不能被视为这片土地的所有者，至少在没有满足进一步条件之前是不行的。因为传统意义上的牧民只是跟随畜群的自然移动，他们对自然的干预仅限于保持畜群的完整，以便在需要肉类供应时能更方便地获取某一只动物。然而，牧民并没有干预土地本身。他们并没有通过控制土地来控制畜群的移动，而只是干预了畜群个体的移动。那么，被控制的畜群所活动的土地呢？根据我们的定义，牧民不能被视为这片土地的所有者，至少在没有满足进一步条件之前是不行的。因为传统意义上的牧民只是跟随畜群的自然移动，他们对自然的干预仅限于保持畜群的完整，以便在需要肉类供应时能更方便地获取某一只动物。然而，牧民并没有干预土地本身。他们并没有通过控制土地来控制畜群的移动，而只是干预了畜群个体的移动。只有当牧民放弃游牧而转向畜牧业时，土地才成为财产，也就是说，一旦他们将土地作为一种（稀缺的）手段，通过控制土地来控制动物的移动。只有当土地以某种方式被围起来时，比如用栅栏围起来或建造一些其他障碍物（如壕沟），限制了牲畜的自由、自然流动，这种情况才会发生。土地因此不再仅仅是牲畜生产中的一个促成因素，而成为一个真正的生产要素。

What these considerations demonstrate is that it is erroneous to think of land as the collectively owned property of huntergatherer societies.Hunters were not herdsmen and still less were they engaged in animal husbandry； and gatherers were not gardeners or agriculturalists.They did not exercise control over the naturegiven fauna and flora by tending to it or grooming it。They merely picked pieces from nature for the taking。Land to them was no more than a condition of their activities，not their property。

这些考虑表明，认为土地是狩猎采集社会的集体所有财产是错误的。猎人不是牧民，更不是从事畜牧业的人；采集者也不是园丁或农民。他们没有通过照料或培育自然赋予的动植物来对其进行控制。他们只是从大自然中挑选可获取的东西。对他们来说，土地只不过是他们活动的一个条件，而不是他们的财产。

At best，very small sections of land had been appropriated （and were thus turned into collective property） by hunters and gatherers，to be used as permanent storage places for surplus goods for use at future points in time and as shelters，all the while the surrounding territories continued to be treated and used as unowned conditions of their existence.

充其量，狩猎采集者占用了非常小的一部分土地（从而将其变成了集体财产），用作剩余物品的永久储存地以供将来使用，以及用作庇护所，而周围的领土在整个过程中一直被当作无主的生存条件来对待和使用。

What can be said，then，to have been the decisive step toward a （tempo rary） solution of the Malthusian trap faced by growing huntergatherer soci eties was the establishment of property in land going above and beyond the establishment of mere storage places and sheltering facilities.pressured by falling standards of living as a result of absolute overpopulation，members of the tribe （separately or collectively） successively appropriated more and more of the previously unowned surrounding nature （land）。And underly ing and motivating this appropriation of surrounding ground land—and turning former places of storage and shelter into residential centers of agri culture and animal husbandry—was an eminent intellectual achievement。As Michael Hart has noted，“the idea of planting crops，protecting them，and eventually harvesting them is not obvious or trivial，and it requires a considerable degree of intelligence to conceive of that notion.No apes ever conceived of that idea，nor did Australopithecus，Homo habilis，Homo erectus， nor even archaic Homo sapiens.” Nor did any of them conceive of the even more difficult idea of the tending，taming，and breeding of animals.

因此，可以说，确立土地财产权这一决定性步骤，超越了仅仅建立储存地点和避难所，成为狩猎采集社会面临的马尔萨斯陷阱（即人口过多导致生活水平下降）的暂时解决方案。在生活水平因绝对人口过多而下降的压力下，部落成员（无论是单独还是集体）逐渐占有了越来越多原本无主的周围自然资源（即土地）。而这种对周围土地的侵占，以及将以前的储藏和庇护场所变成农业和畜牧业的居住中心，是一项杰出的智力成就。正如迈克尔·哈特所指出的，“种植作物、保护作物并最终收获作物的观念并不是显而易见或微不足道有，这需要相当程度的智慧才能构思出这个概念。猿类从来没有想到过这种观念，南方古猿、能人、直立人，甚至古代智人也没有”。[55]更不用说，他们谁也没有想到过照料、驯化和饲养动物这个更困难的观念。

formerly，all consumer goods had been appropriated in the most direct and quickest way possible：through foraging，i.e.，by “picking” such goods wherever they happened to be or go。In contrast，with agriculture and animal husbandry consumer goods were attained in an indirect and roundabout way：by producing them through the deliberate control of ground land.This was based on the discovery that consumer goods （plants and animals） were not simply “given” to be picked，but that there were natural causes affecting their supply and that these natural causes could be manipulated by taking control of ground land.The new mode of production required more time in order to reach the ultimate goal of food consumption （and insofar involved a loss of leisure），but by interposing ground land as a genuine factor of production it was more productive and led to a greater total output of consumer goods （food），thus allowing for a larger population size to be sustained on the same quantity of land.

More specifically with respect to plants：Seeds and fruits suitable for nutritional purposes were no longer just picked （and possibly stored），but the wild plants bearing them were actively cultivated.besides for their taste，seeds and fruits were selected for size，durability （storability），the ease of harvesting and of seedgermination，and they were not consumed but used as inputs for the future output of consumer goods，leading in the relatively short time span of maybe twenty to thirty years to new，domesticated plant varieties with significantly improved yields per unit of land.Among the first plants thus domesticated in the near and Middle East were the einkorn wheat，emmer wheat，barley，rye，peas and olives.In China it was rice and millet； much later，in mesoamerica it was corn，beans and squash； in South America potatoes and manioc； in northeast America sunflowers and goosefoot； and in Africa sorghum，rice，yams and oil palM.

The process of animal domestication proceeded along similar lines，and in this regard it was possible to draw on the experience gained by the first domestication and breeding of dogs，which had taken place some 16，000 years ago，i.e.，still under huntergatherer conditions，somewhere in Sibe ria.

Dogs are the descendants of wolves.Wolves are excellent hunters.How ever，they are also scavengers，and it has been plausibly argued that as such wolves regularly hung around human campsites for scraps.As scavengers，those wolves who were least afraid of humans and who displayed the friend liest behavior toward them obviously enjoyed an evolutionary advantage.It was likely from these semitame，campfollowing wolves that cubs were adopted into tribal households as pets and where it was then discovered that these could be trained for various purposes.They could be used in the hunt of other animals，they could be used to pull，they made for good bed warmers during cold nights，and they even provided a source of meat in cases of emergency。Most importantly，however，it was discovered that some of the dogs could bark （wolves rarely bark） and be selected and bred for their ability to bark and as such perform the invaluable task of warning and guarding their owners of strangers and intruders.It was this service above all，that appears to be the reason why，once the dog had been “invented，” this invention spread like wildfire from Siberia all across the world.Every one everywhere wanted to possess some offspring of this new，remarkable kind of animal，because in an era of constant intertribal warfare，the owner ship of dogs proved to be a great advantage.

once the dog had arrived in the region of the near East，which was to become the first center of human civilization，it must have added consider able momentum to the human “experiment” of productive living and its success.For while a dog used for sentry duty was an asset for mobile hunter gatherers，it was an even greater asset for stationary settlers.The reason for this is straightforward：because in sedentary societies there were simply more things to be protected.In huntergatherer societies one had to fear for one’s life，be it from external or internal aggression.However，because no member of society owned much of anything，there was little or no reason to steal。Matters were different，though，in a society of settlers.From its very incep tion，sedentary life was marked by the emergence of significant differences in the property and wealth owned by different members of society； hence，insofar as envy existed in any way，shape or form （as can be safely assumed） each member （each separate household） also faced the threat of theft or destruction of his property by others，including especially also members of his own tribe.Dogs provided invaluable help in dealing with this problem，especially because dogs，as a matter of biological fact，attach themselves to individual “masters，” rather than to people in general or，like cats，for instance，to particular places. As such，they themselves represented a prime example of something owned privately，rather than collectively。That is，they offered a “natural refutation” of whatever taboo might have existed in a primitive society against the private ownership of property。Moreover and more importantly，because dogs were unquestionably the property of par ticular individuals they proved also uniquely serviceable in guarding the private property of their natural owners from every kind of “foreign” invader。

Animals，even more so than plants，were valuable for humans for a variety of reasons：as sources of meat，milk，skin，fur and wool and also as potential means of transportation，pull and traction，for instance.How ever，as a matter of biological fact，most animals turn out to be undomesti cable. The first and foremost selection criterion，then，in the “production” of animals as livestock or pets was an animal species’ perceived degree of tamability or controllability。To test one’s hypothesis，in a first step it was checked whether or not an animal was suitable to herding。If so，it was then tried if a herd of wild animals could also be penned.If so，one would sub sequently select the tamer animals as parents of the next generation—but not all animals breed in captivity!—and so on and on.Finally，one would select among the tamed animal variety for other desirable properties such as size，strength，etc。，thus breeding eventually a new，domesticated animal species.Among the first large mammalian animals thus domesticated in the near and Middle East （around 10，000 years ago） were sheep，goats，and pigs （from wild boars），then cattle （from wild aurochs）。Cattle were also domesticated，apparently independently，in india at about the same time （about 8，000 years ago）。Roughly at about the same time as in the near and Middle East，sheep，goats and pigs were domesticated indepen dently also in China，and China was also to contribute the domesticated water buffalo （about 6，000 years ago）。Central Asia and Arabia contributed the domesticated Bactrian and Arabian camel respectively （around 4，500 years ago）。And the Americas，or more precisely the Andes region of South America，were to contribute the guinea pig （about 7，000 years ago），the llama and the alpaca （about 5，500 years ago）。Finally，an “invention” of particularly momentous consequences was the domestication of the horse，which occurred about 6，000 years ago in the region of today’s Russia and Ukraine.This achievement initiated a genuine revolution in land trans portation.Up until then，on land man had to walk from place to place，and the fastest way to cover distances was by boat。This changed dramati cally with the arrival of the domesticated horse，which from then on until the 19th century with the invention of the locomotive and the motorcar，was to provide the fastest means of overland transportation.Accordingly，not quite unlike the “invention” of the dog some 16，000 years ago，the “invention” of the horse was to spread like wildfire.However，coming some 10，000 years later，the latter invention could no longer diffuse as widely as the former。While the dog had reached practically all corners of the world，the climactic changes—the global warming—that had taken place in the meantime made it impossible for the same success to be repeated in the case of the horse.In the meantime，the Eurasian land mass was separated from the Americas and from indonesia，new Guinea and Australia by bod ies of water too wide to be bridged.Thus，it was only thousands of years later，after the European rediscovery of the Americas，for instance，that the horse was finally introduced there.（Wild horses had apparently existed on the American continent，but they had been hunted to extinction there so as to make any independent domestication impossible.）

动物甚至比植物对人类更有价值，原因有很多：例如，作为肉、奶、皮、毛的来源，以及作为潜在的运输、拉力和牵引力的手段。然而，就生物学事实而言，大多数动物最终都是无法驯养的。[63]因此，在“生产”动物作为家畜或宠物时，首要的选择标准是动物物种的可驯服性或可控制程度。为了验证自己的假设，首先要检查一种动物是否适合放牧。如果可以，那么就可以尝试是否可以将牧群里的野生动物圈养起来。这样也可以了，人们就会选择比较驯服的动物作为下一代的父母——但不是所有的动物都能在圈养环境中繁殖！——以此类推，循环往复。最后，人们将在被驯服的动物品种中进行选择，以获得其他令人满意的特性，如大小、力量等，从而最终培育出一个新的、被驯化的动物品种。在近东和中东，最早被驯化的大型哺乳动物（大约10000年前）是绵羊、山羊和猪（来自野猪），然后是牛（来自野牛）。大约在同一时期（大约8000年前），印度人显然也独立驯化了牛。几乎是与近东和中东同一时期，绵羊、山羊和猪也在中国被独立驯化，中国还贡献了驯化的水牛（大约6000年前）。中亚和阿拉伯分别贡献了驯化的双峰驼和阿拉伯驼（大约4500年前）。而美洲，或者更确切地说，南美洲的安第斯山脉地区，则贡献了豚鼠（大约7000年前）、美洲驼和羊驼（大约5500年前）。最后，一个具有特别重大影响的“发明”是马的驯化，它发生在大约6000年前的今天的俄罗斯和乌克兰地区。这一成就开启了一场真正的陆地运输革命。在此之前，在陆地上，人必须从一个地方走到另一个地方，覆盖距离最快的方法是乘船。随着驯化马的到来，这种情况发生了巨大的变化，从那时起直到19世纪火车和汽车的发明之前，马都提供了最快的陆路运输手段。因此，与大约16000年前狗的“发明”没有什么不同，马的“发明”像野火一样传播开来。然而，大约10000年后，马的“发明”不如狗的“发明”那样传播广泛了。虽然狗几乎到达了世界的各个角落，但在此期间发生的气候变化——全球变暖——使得同样的成功不可能在马身上重演。与此同时，欧亚大陆与美洲、印度尼西亚、新几内亚和澳大利亚被宽得无法跨越的水域分隔开来。只是在几千年后，例如，在欧洲人重新发现美洲之后，马才最终被引入到那里。（野马显然曾存在于美洲大陆，但它们已被猎杀殆尽，因此不可能有任何独立的驯化）。

The appropriation of land as property and basis of agriculture and animal husbandry was only half of the solution to the problem posed by an increasing population pressure，however。Through the appropriation of land a more effective use was made of land，allowing for a larger population size to be sustained.But the institution of land ownership in and of itself did not affect the other side of the problem：the continued proliferation of new and more offspring。This aspect of the problem required some solution as well。A social institution had to be invented that brought this prolifera tion under control。The institution designed to accomplish this task is the institution of the family，which developed not coincidentally hand in hand with that of land ownership.Indeed，as Thomas Malthus pointed out，in order to solve the problem of overpopulation，along with the institution of private property “the commerce between the sexes” had to undergo some fundamental change as well。

What was the commerce between the sexes before and what was the institutional innovation brought about in this regard by the family？ A pre cise answer to the first question is notoriously difficult，but it is possible to identify the principal structural change.In terms of economic theory，the change can be described as one from a situation where both the benefits of creating offspring—by creating an additional potential producer—and especially the costs of creating offspring—by creating an additional consumer （eater）—were socialized，i.e.，reaped and paid for by society at large rather than the “producers” of this offspring，to a situation where both benefits as well as costs involved in procreation were internalized by and economically imputed back to those individuals causally responsible for producing them.

Whatever the details may have been，it appears that the institution of a stable monogamous and also of a polygamous relationship between men and women that is nowadays associated with the term “family” is fairly new in the history of mankind and was preceded for a long time by an institution that may be broadly defined as “unrestricted” or “unregulated” sexual intercourse or as “group marriage.” The commerce between the sexes during this stage of human history did not rule out the existence of temporary pair relationships between one man and one woman.However，in principle every woman was considered a potential sexual partner of every man，and vice versa.“Männer （lebten） in Vielweiberei und ihre Weiber gleichzeitig in Vielmännerei，” noted Friedrich Engels，following in the footsteps of lewis H.Morgan’s researches in Ancient Society （1871），“und die gemeinsamen Kinder （galten） daher auch als ihnen allen gemeinsam （gehörig）。。。jede Frau （gehörte） jedem mann und jeder mann jeder Frau gleichmässig。”

无论细节如何，如今与家庭一词相关的男女之间稳定的一夫一妻制和一夫多妻关系在人类历史上是相当晚近新的，并且在这之前很长一段时间内，男女之间存在的是一种可以被广泛定义为 “不受限制”或“不受管制”的性交或“群婚”制。[65]不排除一男一女之间存在临时配偶关系。然而，原则上每个女人都被认为是每个男人的潜在性伴侣，反之亦然。“男人（生活）在一夫多妻制中，他们的妻子也同时处于一夫多妻制中，”弗里德里希·恩格斯追随刘易斯·H·摩根《古代社会研究》（1871）后指出，“因此，共同的孩子（被）认为也属于他们所有人。….，每个女人（属于）每个男人，每个男人也平等地属于每个女人”。[66]

What Engels and countless later socialists failed to notice in their glo rifying description of the past—and supposedly again future—institution of “free love，” however，is the plain fact that this institution has a direct and clear effect on the production of offspring。As Ludwig von Mises has commented：“it is certain that even if a socialist community may bring ‘free love，’ it can in no way bring free birth.” What Mises implied with this remark，and what socialists such as Engels and bebel apparently ignored，is that，certainly in the age before the availability of effective means of contraception，free love has consequences，namely pregnancies and births，and that births involve benefits as well as costs.This does not matter as long as the benefits exceed the costs，i.e.，as long as an additional member of society adds more to it as a producer of goods than it takes from it as a consumer—and this may well be the case for some time.But it follows from the law of returns that this situation cannot last forever，without limits.Inevitably，the point must arrive when the costs of additional offspring will exceed its benefits.Then，any further procreation must be stopped—moral restraint must be exercised—unless one wants to experience a progressive fall in average living standards.However，if children are considered every one’s or no one’s children，because everyone entertains sexual relations with everyone else，then the incentive to refrain from procreation disappears or is at least significantly diminished.Instinctively，by virtue of man’s biological nature，each woman and each man is driven to spread and proliferate her or his genes into the next generation of the species.The more offspring one creates the better，because the more of one’s genes will survive.No doubt，this natural human instinct can be controlled by rational delibera tion.But if no or little economic sacrifice must be made for simply follow ing one’s animal instincts，because all children are maintained by society at large，then no or little incentive exists to employ reason in sexual matters，i.e.，to exercise any moral restraint。

恩格斯和无数后来的社会主义者在他们美化过去（和未来可能）的“自由爱情”制度时，忽略了一个简单而明确的事实：这种制度直接影响了生育。正如路德维希·冯·米塞斯所评论的：“即使一个社会主义社会可能带来‘自由爱情’，但它绝不能带来自由生育。”[67]米塞斯的这句话的含义，以及恩格斯和贝贝尔等社会主义者显然忽略的，是在有效避孕手段出现之前，自由爱情会导致怀孕和出生，而出生既有好处也有成本。只要收益超过成本，也就是说，只要一个额外多出的社会成员作为商品生产者对社会的贡献大于作为消费者对社会的索取，这就没有关系——这种情况可能会持续一段时间。但根据报酬律，这种情况不可能永远持续下去，没有限制。不可避免地，当增加后代的成本将超过其收益时，这一点必然会到来。因此，任何进一步的生育都必须停止——必须进行道德约束——除非一个人想经历平均生活水平的逐步下降。然而，如果孩子被视为每个人的孩子或没有人专属的孩子，因为每个人都与其他人有性关系，那么避免生育的动机就会消失或大大减弱。根据人类的生物本性，每个女人和男人都有将自己的基因传播到下一代的本能。生育越多，生存下来的基因就越多。毫无疑问，这种自然本能可以通过理性来控制。但如果只需遵从动物本能，而不需要或只需要少量经济牺牲，因为所有孩子都由整个社会抚养，那么在性问题上运用理性的动机就不存在或大大减少，即缺乏任何道德克制的动机。

From a purely economic point of view，then，the solution to the problem of overpopulation should be immediately apparent。The ownership of children or more correctly the trusteeship over children must be privatized.Rather than considering children as collectively owned by or entrusted to “society” or viewing childbirths as some uncontrolled and uncontrol lable natural event and accordingly considering children as owned by or entrusted to no one （as mere favorable or unfavorable “environmental changes”），children must instead be regarded as entities which are privately produced and entrusted into private care.As Thomas Malthus first percep tively noted，this，essentially，is what is accomplished with the institution of a family：

the most natural and obvious check （on population） seemed to be to make every man provide for his own children； that this would operate in some respect as a measure and guide in the increase of population，as it might be expected that no man would bring beings into the world，for whom he could not find the means of support； that where this notwithstanding was the case，it seemed necessary，for the example of others，that the disgrace and inconvenience attending such a conduct should fall upon the individual，who had thus inconsiderately plunged himself and innocent children in misery and want。—The insti tution of marriage，or at least，of some express or implied obli gation on every man to support his own children，seems to be the natural result of these reasonings in a community under the difficulties that we have supposed.

从纯粹的经济角度来看，解决人口过剩问题的方案应该是显而易见的。孩子的所有权，或者更准确地说，孩子的监护权必须私有化。与其将孩子视为由“社会”集体拥有或托管，或者将生育视为某种无法控制的自然事件，从而认为孩子不属于任何人（只是有利或不利的“环境变化”），不如将孩子视为私人物品，由私人生产并由私人照管。正如托马斯·马尔萨斯首次敏锐地指出的，这实际上就是家庭制度所实现的：

Moreover and finally：with the formation of monogamous or polyga mous families came another decisive innovation.Earlier on，the members of a tribe formed a single，unified household，and the intratribal division of labor was essentially an intrahousehold division of labor。with the for mation of families came the breakup of a unified household into several， independent households and with that also the formation of “several”—or private—ownership of land.That is，the previously described appropriation of land was not simply a transition from a situation where something that was earlier on unowned became now owned，but more precisely something previously unowned was turned into something owned by sep arate households （thus allowing also for the emergence of interhousehold division of labor）。

此外，最后一点是，随着一夫一妻制或一夫多妻家庭的形成，出现了另一项决定性的创新。早期，部落成员组成一个统一的大家庭，部落内部的分工本质上是家庭内部的分工。随着家庭的形成，统一的家庭被分解成若干独立的家庭，，同时也形成了以户为单位——或私人——的土地所有权。也就是说，之前描述的土地占有不仅仅是从无主状态转变为有主状态，而更确切地说，是从无主状态转变为由不同家庭分别拥有的状态（这也允许家庭之间的分工出现）。

Consequently，then，the higher social income made possible by the ownership of land was no longer distributed，as was formerly the case，to each member of society “according to his need.” Rather，each separate household’s share in the total social income came to depend on the product economically imputed to it，that is，to its labor and its property invested in production.In other words：the formerly pervasive “communism” might have still continued within each household，but communism vanished from the relation between the members of different households.The incomes of different households differed，depending on the quantity and quality of invested labor and property，and no one had a claim on the income produced by the members of a household other than one’s own.Thus，“free riding” on others’ efforts became largely if not entirely impossible.He who did not work could no longer expect to still eat。

因此，由于土地所有权带来的更高社会收入不再像过去那样“按需”分配给社会的每个成员。相反，每个独立的家庭在总社会收入中的份额取决于他们在经济产品产生中的共线，也就是取决于它在生产中投入的劳动和资产。换句话说，家庭内的“共产主义”代替了部落内的“共产主义”，部落内的“共产主义”消失了。不同家庭的收入因投入的劳动和资产的数量和质量而异。除了自己家庭成员所生产的收入外，没有人有权要求其非自家家庭成员的收入。在别人的努力上“搭便车”的行为，变得不那么可行甚至完全不可能。不劳动者不再能指望仍然能吃有饭吃。[69]

Thus，in response to mounting population pressure a new mode of soci etal organization had come into existence，displacing the huntergatherer lifestyle that had been characteristic of most of human history。As Ludwig von Mises summarized the matter：

Private ownership in the means of production is the regulating principle which，within society，balances the limited means of subsistence at society’s disposal with the less limited ability of consumers to increase.By making the share in the social product which falls to each member of society depend on the product economically imputed to him，that is，to his labor and his property，the elimination of surplus human beings by the struggle for existence，as it rages in the vegetable and animal kingdom，is replaced by a reduction in the birthrate as a result of social forces.‘Moral restraint，’ the limitations of offspring imposed by social positions，replaces the struggle for existence.

因此，为了应对日益增长的人口压力，一种新的社会组织模式应运而生，取代了人类历史上大部分时期的狩猎采集生活方式。正如路德维希·冯·米塞斯总结的那样：

生产资料私有制是一个调节原则，在社会内部，它使社会支配的有限的生存资料同消费者较不那么有限的增加生存资料的能力达到平衡。使每个社会成员得到的社会产品份额，取决于在经济上应该归属于他的产品，即他的劳动和财产，这样一来，像动植物王国中流行的现象那样，通过生存竞争消灭多余人口的做法，就被出生率的降低所取代，这是社会力量导致的。“道德约束”，即社会处境对后代的限制，取代了生存竞争。[70]

Having first established some permanent storage and sheltering places，then，step by step，having appropriated more and more surrounding land as the basis for agricultural production and the raising of livestock and trans forming erstwhile centers of storage and shelter into extended settlements composed of houses and villages occupied by separate family households，the new lifestyle of the people of the near and Middle East as well as the other regions of original human settlement began to spread outward，slowly but inescapably。in principle，two modes are conceivable by which this diffusion could have taken place.Either the original settlers gradually dis placed the neighboring nomadic tribes in search of new tobecultivated land （demic diffusion），or else the latter imitated and adopted the new lifestyle on their own initiative （cultural diffusion）。Until recently，it had been generally believed that the first mode of diffusion was the predominant one. How ever，based on newly discovered genetic evidence this view now appears to be questionable，at least insofar as the spread of the new，sedentary lifestyle from the near East to Europe is concerned.If present Europeans were the descendants of near Eastern people at the time of the neolithic revolution，genetic traces for this should exist。In fact，however，very few such traces can be found among presentday Europeans.Thus，it appears more likely that the spread of the new，sedentary lifestyle occurred largely，if not exclusively，via the latter，secondmentioned route，while the role in this process played by the original near Eastern settlers was only a minor one.Perhaps a few such settlers pushed in northern and western direction，where they were then absorbed by neighboring people adopting their new and successful lifestyle， with the effect that their own genetic imprint became more and more diluted with increasing distance from their near Eastern point of origin.

在建立了一些永久的储存和庇护场所后，人们逐步占用了更多周围的土地作为农业生产和畜牧业的基础，将原来的储存和庇护中心变成由独立分散的家庭组成的房屋和村庄，形成了扩展的定居点。这种新的生活方式从近东和中东地区开始，逐渐向外扩展，尽管缓慢但不可避免。[71]原则上，有两种可能的扩散方式。要么原始定居者逐渐取代了附近的游牧部落，寻找新的土地进行耕种（人口扩散，耕种者取代牧民）；要么这些游牧部落主动模仿并采用了新的生活方式（文化扩散，牧民学会了耕种）。直到最近，人们普遍认为第一种扩散方式是主要的。[72]直到最近，人们普遍认为第一种扩散方式是主要的。然而，基于新发现的基因证据，这一观点现在看起来值得怀疑，至少就新石器时代生活方式从近东传播到欧洲而言。如果当今的欧洲人是新石器时代近东人的后裔，那么应该能找到相应的基因痕迹。。但实际上，当今欧洲人中很少有这样的近东人基因痕迹。因此，更可能的情况是，这种新的定居生活方式主要通过第二种方式传播开来，而近东原始定居者在这一过程中所扮演的角色很小。也许有少数定居者向北部和西部推进，然后被吸收进邻近部落，这些部落采纳了新的成功生活方式，导致近东人的基因印记随着与近东起源地的距离增加而越来越淡化。。

In any case，with the neolithic revolution the formerly universal hunter gatherer lifestyle essentially died out or was relegated to the outer fringes of human habitation.without doubt，the newly developing farming commu nities were attractive targets for nomadic raiders，and owing to their greater mobility neighboring nomadic tribes for a long time posed a serious threat to agricultural settlers.But ultimately，nomads were no match for them，because of their greater numbers.More specifically，it was the organization of larger numbers of people in communities of households—the location of separate households in close physical proximity to each other—that made for military superiority。Community life did not merely lower the transaction costs as far as intratribal exchange was concerned.Community life also offered the advantage of easily and quickly coordinated joint defense in the case of exter nal aggression.Moreover，besides the strength of greater numbers，settled agricultural communities allowed also for an intensified and expanded division of labor and for greater savings and thus facilitated the development of a weaponry superior to anything available to bands of nomads.

无论如何，随着新石器革命的到来，曾经普遍存在的狩猎采集生活方式基本上消失了，或者被迫退居到人类居住地的边缘地带。毫无疑问，新兴的农业社区对游牧掠夺者具有吸引力。游牧部落的机动性当然更强，邻近的游牧部落长时间对农业定居者构成了严重威胁。但最终，游牧部落无法与农业定居者相匹敌，主要原因在于定居者人数更多。更具体地说，以家庭为居住单位，家庭紧密相邻组织成定居点的大型社区，这形成了对于游牧掠夺者的军事优势。社区生活不仅降低了部落内部交换的交易成本，还提供了在外部侵略时快速协调共同防御的便利。除此之外，农业定居社区不仅拥有更多的人数优势，还允许更为密集和广泛的劳动分工以及更大的储蓄，从而有助于开发出远超游牧部落武器的装备。[73]

Fifty thousand years ago the human population size has been estimated to have been as low as 5，000 or possibly 50，000 people.At the beginning of the neolithic revolution，some 11，000 years ago，when essentially the entire globe had been conquered by tribes of hunters and gatherers having spread out in the course of thousands of years from their original home land somewhere in East Africa，the world population size has been esti mated to have reached about 4 million. Since then，slowly but steadily，the new mode of production：of agriculture and animal husbandry based on private （or collective） ownership of land and organized around separate family households，successively displaced the original huntergatherer order。

5万年前，全人类人口估计只有5000到50000人左右。约1.1万年前新石器革命开始时，那些来自东非某地的现代人祖先已经扩散到世界各地，形成一个个狩猎采集部落，此时世界人口估计达到了约400万。[74]此后，以私人或集体土地所有权为基础的，以家庭为组织方式的农业和畜牧业逐步取代了狩猎采集生活方式，人口数量也随之慢慢但稳步增长。

Consequently，at the beginning of the Christian era，the world population had increased to 170 million，and in 1800，which marks the onset of the socalled industrial revolution （the topic of the following chapter） and the close of the agrarian age，or as it has also been termed，the “old biological order，” it had reached 720 million.（Today’s world population exceeds 7 billion!） During this agrarian age，the size of cities occasionally reached or even surpassed one million inhabitants，but until the very end less than 2 percent of the population lived in big cities and even in the economically most advanced countries 80–90 percent of the population was occupied in agricultural production （while this number has fallen to less than 5 percent today）。

因此，在基督教时代之初，世界人口增加到1.7亿，到1800年，也就是所谓的工业革命（下一章的主题）开始和农业时代或被称为 “旧生物秩序时代”结束时，世界人口已达到7.2亿。（今天的世界人口超过70亿！）而在整个农业时代，城市规模偶尔能达到甚至超过一百万居民，但直到农业时代的最后，只有不到2%的人口生活在大城市，即使在经济最发达的国家，也有80%到90%的人口从事农业生产（而在发达国家今天这个数字已经下降到不足5%）。

4 从马尔萨斯陷阱到工业革命：对社会进化的一种解释*

4 From the Malthusian Trap to the industrial revolution：An Explanation of Social Evolution

I. 经济理论

EConOMIC THEORY

For economic theory the question of how to increase wealth and get rich has a straightforward answer。

对于经济理论来说，如何增加财富和致富的问题有一个简单明了的答案。

It has three components：you get richer （a） through capital accumulation，i.e.，the construction of intermediate “producer” or “capital” goods that can produce more consumer goods per unit time than can be produced without them or goods that cannot be produced at all with just land and labor （and capital accumulation in turn has something to do with （low） time preference）；（b） through participation and integration in the division of labor； and （c） through population control，i.e.，by maintaining the optimal population size.

致富有三个关键要素：（a）通过资本积累（b）通过参与和融入分工；（c）通过人口控制，即维持最佳人口规模。其中，资本积累可以制造中间产品和资本品，这些东西能提高生产效率，使单位时间内生产出更多的消费品；或者生产出仅靠土地和劳动力无法生产出的产品。资本积累与低时间偏好有关。

Robinson Crusoe，alone on his island，has originally only his own “labor” and “land” （nature） at his disposal。He is as rich （or poor） as nature happens to make him.Some of his most urgently felt needs he may be able to satisfy directly，equipped only with his bare hands.At the very least，he can always satisfy his desire of leisure in this way：immediately。However，the satisfaction of most of his wants requires more than bare nature and hands，i.e.，some indirect or roundabout—and timeconsuming—production method.Most，indeed almost all goods and associated sorts of satisfaction require the help of some only indirectly useful tools：of producer or capital goods.with the help of producer goods it becomes possible to produce more per unit time of the very goods that can be produced also with bare hands （such as leisure） or to produce goods that cannot be produced at all with just land and labor。In order to catch more fish than with his bare hands Crusoe builds a net； or in order to build a shelter that he cannot build with his bare hands at all，he must construct an axe.

However，to build a net or an axe requires a sacrifice （saving）。To be sure，production with the help of producer goods is expected to be more productive than without it； Crusoe would not spend any time building a net if he did not expect that he could catch more fish per unit time with the net than without it。Nonetheless，the production of a producer good involves a sacrifice； for it takes time to build a producer good and the same time cannot be used for the enjoyment or consumption of leisure or other immediately available consumer goods.In deciding whether or not to build the productivity enhancing net，Crusoe must compare and rank two expected states of satisfaction：the satisfaction which he can attain now，without any further waiting，and the satisfaction that he can attain only later，after a longer waiting time.In deciding to build the net，Crusoe has determined that he ranks the sacrifice，the value forgone of greater consumption now，in the present，below the reward：the value of greater consumption later，in the future.otherwise，if he had ranked these magnitudes differently，he would have abstained from building the net。

然而，制造一张网或一把斧头需要作出牺牲（储蓄）。可以肯定的是，在生产品的帮助下进行的生产预计会比没有生产品的情况下更有效率；如果鲁滨逊不指望在单位时间内用网捕到更多的鱼，他就不会花任何时间来造网。尽管如此，生产品的生产涉及到一种牺牲；因为建造生产品需要时间，而这些时间不能用来享受或消费休闲或其他即时可用的消费品。在决定是否制作提高生产力的鱼网时，鲁滨逊必须对两种预期的满足状态进行比较和排序：一种是他现在就能达到的满足，不需要进一步等待，另一种是他在等待更长时间以后才能达到的满足。在决定造网时，鲁滨逊已经决定将牺牲——现在放弃的更多消费的价值排在回报——未来更多消费的价值之下。否则，如果他对这些价值与以上的排序不同，他就会放弃造网。

This weighing and the possible exchange of present against future goods and associated satisfactions are governed by time preference.Present goods are invariably more valuable than future ones，and we exchange the former against the latter only at a premium.The degree，however，to which present goods are preferred to future ones，or the willingness to forgo some possible present consumption for a greater future consumption，i.e.，the willingness to save，is different from person to person and one point in time to another。Depending on the height of his personal time preferences Crusoe will save and invest more or less and his standard of living will be higher or lower。The lower his time preference，i.e.，the easier it is for Crusoe to delay current gratification in exchange for some anticipated greater satisfaction in the future，the more capital goods Crusoe will accumulate and the higher will be his standard of living。

这种权衡以及现在与未来商品之间的可能交换和相关的满足都受时间偏好的制约。现在的商品总是比未来的商品更有价值，我们只有在溢价的情况下才能用前者交换后者。然而，现在的商品比未来的商品更有价值的程度，或者为了更大的未来消费而放弃一些可能的现在消费的意愿，即储蓄的意愿，是因人而异的，也因时间而异。根据个人时间偏好的高低，鲁滨逊的储蓄和投资会更多或更少，相应的，他的生活水平会更高或更低。他对时间的偏好越低，也就是说，鲁滨逊越容易推迟当前的满足，以换取未来预期的更大满足，鲁滨逊就会积累更多的资本品，他的生活水平就越高。

Second，people can increase their wealth through participation in the division of labor。We assume that Crusoe is joined by Friday。because of their natural，physical，or mental differences or the differences of the “land” （nature） they face，almost automatically absolute and comparative advantages in the production of various goods emerge.Crusoe is better equipped to produce one good and Friday another。If they specialize in what each is particularly good at producing，the total output of goods will be larger than if they had not specialized and remained in a position of an isolated and selfsufficient producer。Alternatively，if either Crusoe or Friday is the superior producer of every good，the allaround superior producer is to specialize in those activities in which his advantage is especially great and the allaround inferior producer must specialize in those activities in which his disadvantage is comparatively smaller。Thereby，too，the overall output of goods produced will be greater than if each had remained in selfsufficient isolation.

人们可以通过参与劳动分工来增加自己的财富。我们假设星期五加入了鲁滨逊。由于他们在自然、身体或精神上的差异，或者他们所面对的“土地”（自然）的差异，在各种商品的生产中几乎自动地出现了绝对优势和相对优势。鲁滨逊更有能力生产一种商品，而星期五则更有能力生产另一种商品。如果他们专门生产各自特别擅长的东西，那么商品的总产量就会比他们不从事专门生产而仍处于孤立和自给自足的生产者处境时为大。另外，如果鲁滨逊或星期五其中一个是每种商品的优势生产者，那么，全面的优势生产者将专门从事其优势特别大的活动，而全面的劣势生产者则必须专门从事其劣势相对较小的活动。这样一来，所生产的商品的总产量也会比各自保持自给自足的孤立状态要更大。

Third，the wealth in society depends on the population size，i.e.，on whether or not the population is kept at its optimum size.That wealth depends on the population size follows from the “law of returns” and the “Malthusian law of population，” which Ludwig von Mises has hailed as

one of the great achievements of thought。Together with the principle of the division of labor it provided the foundations of modern biology and for the theory of evolution； the impor tance of these two fundamental theorems for the sciences of human action is second only to the discovery of the regularity in the intertwinement and sequence of market phenomena and their inevitable determination by the market data.The objec tions raised against the Malthusian law as well as against the law of returns are vain and trivial。both laws are indisputable.

第三，社会财富取决于人口规模，也就是说，取决于人口是否保持在最佳规模。财富取决于人口规模，这种说法来自于 “报酬律”和 “马尔萨斯人口定律”。路德维希·冯·米塞斯将“马尔萨斯人口定律”誉为

是一项伟大的思想成就。人口律和分工原理构成现代生物学和演化理论的基础；对于人的行动科学，这两个基本定律的重要性，仅次于发现各种市场现象的交错链接和发生顺序当中的规律性，以及这些现象取决于市场外生条件的必然性。那些反对马尔萨斯人口定律的意见，和反对报酬律的意见一样，是徒劳的、亦是不值一驳的。这两个定律是不容置疑的。[75]

In its most general and abstract form，the law of returns states that for any combination of two or more production factors there exists an optimum combination （such that any deviation from it involves material waste，or “efficiency losses”）。Applied to the two original factors of production，labor and land （naturegiven goods），the law implies that if one were to continuously increase the quantity of labor （population） while the quantity of land （and the available technology） remained fixed and unchanged，eventually a point will be reached where the physical output per laborunit input is maximized.This point marks the optimal population size.If the population were to grow beyond this size，income per head would fall； and likewise，income per head would be less if the population were to fall below this point （as the division of labor would shrink，with an accompanying efficiency loss）。To maintain the optimal level of income per person，then， the population must no longer grow but remain stationary。only one way exists for such a stationary society to further increase real income per head or to grow in size without a loss in per capita income：through technological innovation，i.e.，by the employment of better，more efficient tools made possible through savings brought about by the abstention from leisure or other immediate consumption.If there is no technological innovation （technology is fixed），the only possible way for the population to grow in size without a concomitant fall in per capita income is through taking more （and possibly better） land into use.If there is no additional land available and technology is fixed at a ‘given’ level，however，then any population increase beyond the optimal size must lead to a progressive decline in per capita income.

在其最一般和抽象的形式中，报酬律表明，对于任何两个或多个生产要素的组合，存在一个最佳组合（因此，任何偏离该组合的行为都会造成物质浪费或“效率损失”）。这条定律适用于劳动和土地（自然赋予的物品）这两种原始的生产要素，它意味着，如果人们不断地增加劳动力（人口）的数量，而土地的数量（和可用的技术）保持固定不变，最终会达到一个点，在这个点上，每单位劳动投入的物质产出最大化。这一点标志着最佳人口规模。如果人口增长超过这个规模，人均收入就会下降；同样，如果人口下降到这一点以下，人均收入也会减少（因为劳动分工会萎缩，并伴随着效率的下降）。因此，要维持最佳的人均收入水平，人口必须不再增长，而是保持稳定。对于这样一个静止的社会来说，只有一种方法可以进一步提高人均实际收入，或者在不损失人均收入的情况下扩大规模，那就是通过技术创新，也就是说，即通过使用更好、更有效的工具，通过放弃休闲或其他即时消费而带来的储蓄来实现。如果没有技术创新（技术是固定的），人口规模增长而人均收入不随之下降的唯一可能方式是通过使用更多（可能是更好）的土地。然而，如果没有额外的可用土地，而且技术被固定在一个“给定的”水平上，那么任何超过最佳规模的人口增长必然会导致人均收入的逐步下降。

This latter situation has been referred to also as the “Malthusian trap.” Ludwig von Mises has characterized it thus：

The purposive adjustment of the birthrate to the supply of the material potentialities of wellbeing is an indispensable con dition of human life and action，of civilization，and of any improvement in wealth and welfare. Where the average standard of living is impaired by the excessive increase in popula tion figures，irreconcilable conflicts of interest arise.Each indi vidual is again a rival of all other individuals in the struggle for survival。The annihilation of rivals is the only means to increase one’s wellbeing。 As natural conditions are，man has only the choice between the pitiless war of each against each or social cooperation.But social cooperation is impossible if people give rein to the natural impulses of proliferation.

后一种情况也被称为“马尔萨斯陷阱”，路德维希·冯·米塞斯是这样描述它的：

生育率的刻意调整，以适应幸福生活所依赖的物质供给潜力，是人的生命与行为不可或缺的一个条件，也是人类文明、财富与繁荣不可或缺的一个条件。…凡是在平均生活水准因人口过度增加而受损的地方，便会发生不可调和的利益冲突；每个人又会再度成为所有其他人在生存竞争中的对手；消灭竞争对手，仍是增进自己物质幸福的唯一手段。…自然的情况既是如此，人类只得在人人彼此残忍地争战或社会合作之间做选择。但是，社会合作是不可能的，如果人们放纵自然的繁衍冲动。[76]

It has been already described and explained （in the previous chapter） how all this worked out in huntergatherer societies.It is conceivable that mankind had never left the seemingly comfortable huntergatherer lifestyle.This would have been possible，if only mankind had been able to restrict all population growth beyond the optimal size of a huntergatherer band （of a few dozen members）。In that case，we might still live today very much like all of our direct forebears had lived for tens of thousands of years，until some 11，000 or 12，000 years ago。As a matter of fact，however，mankind did not manage to do so。The population did grow，and accordingly increasingly larger territories had to be taken into possession until one ran out of addi tional land.Moreover，technological advances made within the framework of huntergatherer societies （such as the invention of the bow and arrow some 20，000 years ago，for instance） increased （rather than decreased） the speed of this expansionisM.because hunters and gatherers （like all nonhu man animals） only depleted （consumed） the supply of naturegiven goods，but did not produce and thus add to this supply，better tools in their hands hastened （rather than delayed） the process of territorial expansion.

（在上一章中）我们已经描述和解释了这一切是如何在狩猎采集社会中进行的。可以想象的是，人类从未离开过看似舒适的狩猎采集生活方式。如果人类能够将所有的人口增长限制在狩猎采集群体（几十个成员）的最佳规模之内，这将是可能的。在这种情况下，我们今天的生活可能仍然很像我们所有的直系祖先直到大约11000或12000年前数万年以来所过的生活。然而，事实上，人类没有设法做到这一点。人口确实在增长，因此不得不占有越来越大的领土，直到耗尽额外的土地。此外，在狩猎采集社会框架内取得的技术进步（比如大约20000年前弓箭的发明）加快了（而不是减缓了）这种扩张主义的速度。因为猎人和采集者（像所有非人类的动物一样）只消耗（消费）自然赋予的物品的供应，但没有生产并因而增加这种供应，他们手中更好的工具加速了（而不是延缓了）领土扩张的过程。

The neolithic revolution，which began about 11，000 years ago，brought some temporary relief。The invention of agriculture and animal husbandry allowed for a larger number of people to survive on the same，unchanged quantity of land，and the institution of the family，in privatizing （internaliz ing） the benefits as well as the costs of the production of offspring，provided a new，hitherto unknown check on the growth of population.But neither innovation brought a permanent solution to the problem of excess popula tion.men still could not keep their pants up，and the greater productivity brought about by the new，nonparasitic mode of production represented by agriculture and animal husbandry was quickly exhausted again by a growing population size.A significantly larger number of people could be sustained on the globe than before，but mankind did not yet escape from the Mal thusian trap—until some 200 years ago with the beginning of the socalled industrial revolution.

大约11000年前开始的新石器革命带来了一些暂时的缓解。农业和畜牧业的发明使得更多的人能够在同样的、数量不变的土地上生存，而家庭制度通过私有化（内部化）生育后代的收益和成本，为人口增长提供了一种迄今未知的新的制约手段。但这两项创新都没有带来人口过剩问题的永久解决方案。男人们依然无法控制他们的拉链，而农业和畜牧业这样的非寄生生产方式的更高生产力所能带来的改善，很快又被不断增长的人口耗尽了。与以前相比，地球上可以养活更多的人，但人类尚未摆脱马尔萨斯陷阱——直到大约200年前，所谓的工业革命开始。

II. 经济史：问题

EConOMIC HISTORY：THE problem

The problem to be explained in the following has been captured by two charts depicting world population growth on the one hand and the development of per capita income （average living standards） on the other。

下面要解释的问题是通过两张图表反映出来，一方面描绘了世界人口增长，另一方面描绘了人均收入（平均生活水平）的发展。

The first chart，taken from Colin McEvedy and richard Jones， shows human population growth from 400 BC until the present （2，000 AD）。The population size was about four million at the beginning of the neolithic revolution.But up until about 7，000 years ago （5，000 BC） the area under crops （first merely in the region of the Fertile Crescent and then also in northern China） was too small to have much of an effect on the global pop ulation size.By then the population had grown to about five million.But since then，population growth increased rapidly：2，000 years later （3，000 BC） it had almost tripled to fourteen million，3，000 years ago （1，000 BC） it had reached fifty million， and only some 500 years later，when the chart sets in，the world population size stood at about 100 million.Since then，as the chart indicates，the population size has continued to increase slowly but more or less steadily up until about 1800 （to about 720 million），when a significant break occurred and the population growth sharply increased to presently，only some 200 years later to reach seven billion.

Figure I：Total World Population （millions）

图1 世界总人口（百万）

Figure 2：World Economic History in one Picture.Incomes Rose Sharply in many Countries after 1800 but Declined in Others.

The second chart，taken from Gregory Clark， shows the development of per capita income from the beginning of recorded human history to the present。It too shows a significant break occurring at around 1800。Until that time，i.e.，for most of recorded human history，real income per capita （in terms of food，housing，clothing，heating，and lighting） did not rise.That is，average living standards in eighteenth century England were not significantly higher than those in ancient Babylon，where the oldest records of wage rates and various consumer goods prices could be found.Naturally，with seden tary life and private landownership distinct differences in wealth and income came into existence.There existed large landowners （lords） who lived in enormous luxury，even by today’s standards，almost from the beginnings of settled lifE.Nor were average living standards always and everywhere equally low.There existed pronounced regional differences between，for instance，English，Indian，and West African real incomes in 1800。And of course，as far as crosstime comparisons are concerned，many technologies existed in 1800 England，which were unknown in ancient Rome，Greece，China，or Baby lon.Yet in any case，everywhere and at all times the overwhelming majority of the population，the mass of small landowners and most laborers，lived near or only a little bit above subsistence level。There were ups and downs in real incomes，due to various external events，but nowhere was there a continuous upward trend in real income per person discernible until about 1800。

第二张图表来自格雷戈里·克拉克（Gregory Clark），[79]显示了从有记录的人类历史开始到现在的人均收入的发展情况。它也显示了在1800年左右发生的一个重大突破。在那之前，即在有记录的人类历史的大部分时间里，人均实际收入（在食物、住房、衣服、取暖和照明方面）没有增加。也就是说，18世纪英国的平均生活水平并不比古巴比伦的生活水平高多少，在那里可以找到最古老的工资率和各种消费品价格记录。自然，随着定居生活和私人土地所有权的出现，财富和收入也出现了明显的差异。几乎从定居生活的一开始，就有大地主（领主）过着极其奢侈的生活，即使按照今天的标准也是如此。平均生活水平也并不总是到处都一样低。例如，在1800年，英国、印度和西非的实际收入之间存在着明显的地区差异。当然，就跨时间的比较而言，许多技术出现于1800年的英国，而这些技术在古罗马、希腊、中国或巴比伦都是不为人知的。然而，无论在何时何地，大多数人口，特别是小土地所有者和大多数劳动者，都生活在接近或略高于生存水平的状态。尽管由于各种外部因素，实际收入有时会有所起伏，但直到1800年左右，没有任何地方出现实际人均收入的持续上升趋势。

In combination，both charts capture the worldhistoric significance of the socalled industrial revolution，which occurred some 200 years ago，as well as the significance—and in particular the length—of the previous，Malthusian stage of human development。Until sometime around 1800，little difference in the economies of humans and nonhuman animals existed.For animals （and plants） it is always and invariably true that an increase in their number will encroach upon the available means of subsistence and eventually lead to overpopulation，to “supernumerary specimens，” as Mises has called them，which must be “weeded out” due to a lack of sustenance.Today，we know that as far as humans are concerned，this must not be so：no supernumerary specimens who are thus weeded out exist in modern，West ern societies.But for most of human life this was indeed the case.

两张图表结合在一起，反映了约 200 年前发生的称为工业革命的世界历史意义，以及人类发展的前一个阶段，即马尔萨斯阶段的意义，尤其是时间长度。人类和非人类动物的经济几乎没有差别，直到1800年左右。直到1800年左右的某个时候，人类经济与非人类动物的经济几乎没有差别。对于动物（和植物）来说，它们数量的增加总是会侵占可用的生存资源，并最终导致人口过剩，即米塞斯所称的“冗余个体”，由于缺乏生存资料，这些个体必须被“淘汰”。如今，我们知道就人类而言，情况并非必然如此：在现代西方社会中不存在这样被淘汰的冗余个体。但在人类大部分的历史中，情况确实如此。

To be sure，the population size could grow，mostly because more land was taken into possession for agricultural use，and partly because of better technology incorporated in producer goods and an extended and intensi fied division of labor。But all such economic “gains” were always eaten up quickly by a growing population that again encroached upon the available means of subsistence and led to overpopulation and the emergence of the “supernumerary specimen” for whom there was no space in the division of labor and who consequently had to die out silently or become a menace （an economic “bad”） in the form of beggars，vagrants，plunderers，bandits，or warriors.Throughout most of human history，then，the iron law of wages held sway。Income and wages were held down near subsistence level owing to the existence of a substantial class of supernumerary specimens.

当然，人口规模可能会增长，主要是因为更多的土地被用于农业用途，部分是因为更好的技术融入了生产品以及劳动分工的扩大和强化。但是，所有这些经济“收益”总是很快被不断增长的人口所吞噬，人口的增长又一次侵占了可用的生存手段，导致人口过剩和“冗余个体”出现，这些“冗余个体”在劳动分工中毫无容身之地，他们要么无声无息地死掉，要么成为社会的威胁——变成乞丐、流民、强盗、土匪或战士，成为经济中的一种“坏”。因此，在人类历史的大部分时间里，工资铁律一直在起作用。由于大量冗余个体、编外人员的存在，收入和工资被压低到接近维持生计的水平。

III. 历史的解释

HISTORY EXPLAIneD

Why did it take so long to get out of the Malthusian trap； and what hap pened that we finally succeeded？ Why did it take so long until we gave up a huntergatherer existence in favor of an existence as agricultural settlers？

人类为什么花了这么长的时间，才逐渐放弃了狩猎采集的游荡，选择农业定居的生活？人类又为什么花了那么长的时间，才摆脱马尔萨斯陷阱？成功摆脱的最终原因是什么？

And why，even after the invention of agriculture and animal husbandry，did it take more than another 10，000 years until mankind’s seemingly final escape from the Malthusian trap？ Economic theory，or what I have said about it，does not and cannot answer these questions.

在农业和畜牧业发明之后，人类似乎又花了一万多年的时间才最终摆脱马尔萨斯陷阱。为什么？经济理论，也就是我所指的这个范畴，并没有也不能回答这个问题。

The standard answer among economists，in particular also among libertarian economists，is：there must have been institutional impediments，in particular an insufficient protection of private property rights，that pre vented a quicker development and these impediments were removed only recently （about 1800）。This，essentially，is also Ludwig von Mises’s explana tion. Likewise，Murray N.Rothbard has advanced similar ideas. I want to argue that this explanation is mistaken or at least insufficient and present the outline of an alternative （hypothetical） explanation.

经济学家，特别是自由意志主义经济学家的标准答案是：一定有制度上的障碍，特别是对私有产权的保护不足，阻碍了经济的快速发展，这些障碍直到最近（大约1800年）才被消除。这基本上也是路德维希·冯·米塞斯的解释。[80]同样，默里·N·罗斯巴德也提出了类似的观点。[81] 然而，这种解释是错误的，至少是不充分的。我想重新论证一下这个问题，并提出另一种替代解释的大纲。

For one，hunters and gatherers，from all we know，had plenty of free time on their hands to invent agriculture and animal husbandry。again and again and at countless places，they suffered from excess population and con sequently falling incomes； and yet，although the opportunity cost of for gone leisure must have been low，no one anywhere，for tens of thousands of years，thought of agriculture and animal husbandry as an （at least temporary） escape from Malthusian conditions.Instead，until about 11，000 years ago huntergatherer tribes answered the recurring challenge of overpopulation always either by migration，i.e.，by taking additional land into use （until they finally ran out of land） or by fighting each other to the death until the population size was sufficiently reduced to prevent real incomes from falling。

首先，人类并不会主动选择农业和畜牧业。据我们所知，狩猎者和采集者有大量的空闲时间来发明农业和畜牧业。在无数地方，他们一次又一次地遭受人口过剩和收入持续下降之苦；然而，尽管闲暇的机会成本一定很低，但几万年来，没有人把农业和畜牧业作为（至少是暂时的）摆脱马尔萨斯状况的办法。相反，在大约 1.1 万年前，狩猎采集部落总是通过迁徙，即通过使用更多的土地（直到他们最终用完土地），或者通过互相厮杀，直到人口数量减少到足以防止实际收入下降，来应对人口过剩这一反复出现的挑战。

As well，property rights in settled societies were well protected at many places and times.The idea of private property and the successful protection of private property are not inventions and institutions of the recent past but have been known for a long time and practiced almost from the beginnings of settled lifE.From all we know，for instance，property rights in 1200 Eng land and in much of feudal Europe were better protected than they are today in contemporary England and Europe.That is，every institutional incentive favorable to capital accumulation and division of labor was in place—and yet nowhere，until about 1800，did mankind succeed in extricating itself from the Malthusian trap of excess population and stagnating per capita incomes.Thus，the institution of propertyprotection can and should be regarded as only a necessary，but not also as a sufficient condition of economic growth （rising per capita incomes）。

其次，私有产权不是经济增长的充要条件。在定居社会中，财产权在许多地方和时期都得到了很好的保护。私有财产的观念和对私有财产的成功保护并不是最近才有的发明和制度，而是长期以来一直为人所知，并且几乎从定居生活开始时就被实践了。例如，据我们所知，在1200年的英格兰和大部分封建欧洲，财产权比现在的英格兰和欧洲受到更好的保护。也就是说，每一个有利于资本积累和劳动分工的制度激励都已出现——然而，直到1800年左右，人类都没有成功地摆脱人口过剩和人均收入停滞的马尔萨斯陷阱。因此，财产保护制度可以而且应该被视为经济增长（人均收入增加）的必要条件，但不是充分条件。

There must be something else—some other factor，not appearing in economic theory—which will have to explain all this.

必须有其他的东西——一些经济理论中没有出现的其他因素——来解释这一切。

Part of the answer is obvious：mankind did not get out of the Malthu sian trap because，as noted before，men could not keep their pants up.If they had done so，there would have been no excess population.This can be only part of the answer，however。because population control can prevent the fall of real incomes，but it cannot make incomes rise. Some other，“empirical” factor not figuring in pure （aprioristic） economic theory must explain the length of the Malthusian age and how we finally got out of it。This missing factor is the historical variable of human intelligence，and the simple answer to the above questions，then，（to be elaborated in the following） is：because for most of history mankind was simply not intelligent enough—and it takes time to breed intelligence.

部分答案是显而易见的：人类没有走出马尔萨斯陷阱，正如前所述，男人们管不好他们的拉链（控制性欲）。倘若他们管好了，也许就不会出现人口过剩。然而，这可能只是答案的一部分。因为人口控制可以防止实际收入的下降，但它不能使收入增加。[82]要解释马尔萨斯时代的长度以及我们如何最终走出这个时代，必须加入一些其它的纯粹（先验的）经济理论中没有的“经验 ”因素。这个缺失的因素是人类智力这一历史变量，那么，对上述问题的简单回答（将在下文详述）是：因为在历史上的大部分时间里，人类只是不够聪明——而培养智力需要时间。[83]

Until some 11，000 or so years ago，mankind was not intelligent enough，such that not even its brightest members were capable of conceiving the idea of indirect or roundabout consumer goods production that underlies agricul ture and animal husbandry。The idea of first planting crops，then tending and protecting and finally harvesting them is not obvious or trivial。Nor is the idea of taming，husbanding，and breeding animals obvious or trivial。It requires a considerable degree of intelligence to conceive of such notions.It took tens of thousands of years of natural selection under huntergatherer conditions to finally breed enough intelligence to make such cognitive achievements possible.

直到大约11000年前，人类都还不够聪明，甚至连人类最聪明的成员也无法想象农业和畜牧业的基础是间接或迂回的消费品生产。首先种植庄稼，然后照料、保护并最终收获庄稼的观念并不明显或微不足道。驯服、饲养和繁殖动物的观念也是微不足道或者不是显而易见的。要构思出这样的观念需要相当高的智力，在狩猎采集者的状态下，经过数万年的自然选择，才最终培育出了足够的智力，使这种认知成就成为可能。

Similarly，it took several thousand years more of natural selection under agricultural conditions，then，to reach a threshold in the development of human intelligence （or more precisely：of low time preference correlated with high intelligence） such that productivity growth could continuously outstrip any population growtH.From the beginning of the neolithic revo lution until about 1800 enough inventions （technological improvements） were made by bright people （and imitated by others of lesser intelligence） to account （in addition to more agriculturally used land） for a significant increase in world population：from about four million to 720 million （now，seven billion）。But during the entire era，the rate of technological progress was never sufficient to allow for population growth combined with increas ing per capita incomes.

同样，在农业条件下，自然选择又经历了几千年的时间，才达到人类智力发展的一个阈值（或者更准确地说，与高智力相关的低时间偏好），使得生产力增长能够持续超过人口增长的速度。从新石器时代革命开始到大约1800年，聪明人做出了足够多的发明（技术改进）（并被其他智力较低的人模仿），从而导致了（除了更多的农业用地）世界人口的显著增长：从大约400万增加到7.2亿（现在是70亿）。但是，在整个时期内，技术进步的速度从未足够快，无法在人口增长的同时实现人均收入的增加。

Today，we take it for granted that it is solely the unwillingness to con sume less and to save more that imposes limits on economic growtH.We have a seemingly endless supply of natural resources and recipes how to produce more，better，and different goods，and it is only our limited savings that pre vent us from employing these resources and implementing such recipes.Yet this phenomenon is actually quite new.For most of human history savings were held back by a lack of ideas of how to productively invest them，i.e.，of how to convert plain savings （storing） into productive savings （producer goods production）。For Crusoe，for instance，it was not sufficient to have a low time preference and to save.Rather，Crusoe also had to conceive the idea of a net and must have known how to build it from scratcH.Most people are not intelligent enough to invent and implement anything new but can at best only imitate，more or less perfectly，what other，brighter people have invented before them.Yet if no one is capable to do this or to imitate what others have invented before，then even the safest of property rights will make no difference.Every incentive needs a receptor to work，and if a receptor is lacking or insufficiently sensitive，different incentive structures do not matter。Hence，the institution of propertyprotection must be regarded as only a necessary （but not sufficient） condition of economic growth （rising per capita incomes）。Likewise，it requires intelligence to recognize the higher physical productivity of the division of labor，and it requires intelligence to recognize the laws of human reproduction and thus allow for any form of deliberate population control，let alone an efficient—lowcost—control。

今天，我们理所当然地认为，仅仅是不愿意减少消费和增加储蓄限制了经济增长。我们似乎有无穷无尽的自然资源和如何生产更多、更好和不同产品的方法，只是我们有限的积蓄阻止了我们利用这些资源和实施这些方法。然而，这种现象实际上是相当新的。在人类历史的大部分时间里，由于缺乏如何进行有效投资的观念，即如何将普通储蓄（储存）转化为生产性储蓄（生产品生产），所以储蓄受到了抑制。例如，对鲁滨逊来说，仅有低时间偏好和储蓄是不够的。更进一步说，鲁滨逊还必须构思一个网的概念，并且必须知道如何从头开始制造它。大多数人都没有足够的智慧去发明和实施任何新的东西，而最多只能或多或少地模仿其他更聪明的人在他们之前所发明的东西。然而，如果没有人能够创造发明，或者模仿别人之前的发明，那么即使有最安全的产权也不会有任何改变。每个激励都需要接受者来发挥作用，如果接收者缺少或不够敏感，不同的激励结构也无济于事。因此，财产权的保护制度只能被视为经济增长（人均收入增加）的必要条件，但不是充分条件。同样，认识到劳动分工的更高生产力需要智力，理解人类生殖规律并进行任何形式的有计划的人口控制，乃至高效、低成本的控制，都需要智力。

The mechanism through which higher human intelligence （combined with low time preference） was bred over time is straightforward.Given that man is physically weak and illequipped to deal with brute nature，it was advantageous for him to develop his intelligence. higher intelligence translated into economic success，and economic success in turn translated into reproductive success （producing a larger number of surviving descen dants）。For the existence of both relationships massive amounts of empirical evidence are available.

随着时间的推移，培养出更高的人类智力（结合低时间偏好）的机制十分简单明了。鉴于人类身体较弱，没有能力对付野蛮的自然界，发展智力对他来说是有利的。[84]更高的智力转化为经济上的成功，而经济上的成功反过来又转化为生殖上的成功（产生大量幸存的后代）。对于这两种关系的存在，有大量的经验证据。[85]

There can be no doubt that a huntergatherer existence requires intel ligence：the ability to classify various external objects as good or bad，the ability to recognize a multiplicity of causes and effects，to estimate distances，time，and speed，to survey and recognize landscapes，to locate various （good or bad） things and to remember their position in relation to each other，etc。； most importantly，the ability to communicate with others by means of language and thus facilitate coordination.Not every member of a band was equally capable of such skills.Some were more intelligent than others.These differences in intellectual talents would lead to some visible status differen tiation within the tribe—of “excellent” hunters，gatherers，and communica tors and “lousy” ones—and this status differentiation would in turn result in differences in the reproductive success of various tribe members，especially given the “loose” sexual mores prevailing among huntergatherers.That is，by and large “excellent” tribe members would produce a larger number of surviving offspring and thus transmit their genes more successfully into the next generation than “lousy” ones.Consequently，if and insofar as human intelligence has some genetic basis （which seems undeniable in light of the evolution of the entire species），huntergatherer conditions would over time produce （select for） a population of increasing average intelligence and at the same time an increasingly higher level of “exceptional” intelligence.

毫无疑问，狩猎采集的生活方式需要智力：比如区分各种外部事物的好坏、识别多种因果关系、估算距离、时间和速度、观察和识别地形、定位各种事物（好或坏）并记住它们相互之间的位置等；最重要的是，通过语言与他人交流并促进协调的能力。部落中的每个成员在这些技能方面的能力并不相同，有些人比其他人更聪明。这些智力才能的差异会导致部落内出现明显的地位差异——有“优秀”的猎人、采集者和沟通者，也有“差劲”的人。这种地位差异反过来又会导致部落成员在繁殖成功率上的差异，特别是在狩猎采集者中普遍存在的“松散”性道德观下。也就是说，总的来说，“优秀”的部落成员会产生更多存活的后代，从而比“差劲”的成员更成功地将他们的基因传递给下一代。因此，如果人类智力在某种程度上有遗传基础（从整个物种的进化来看，这似乎是无可否认的），那么狩猎采集的环境条件会随着时间的推移，逐渐产生出平均智力水平提高的群体，同时“超常”智力水平的个体也会越来越多。

The competition within and between tribes，and the selection for and breeding of higher intelligence via differential rates of reproductive suc cess，did not come to a halt once the huntergatherer life had been given up in favor of agriculture and animal husbandry。However，the intellectual requirements of economic success became somewhat different under seden tary conditions.

部落之内和部落之间的竞争，以及通过不同的繁殖成功率进行的高智力选择和繁殖，并没有在人群放弃狩猎采集，采用农业和畜牧业后停止。只是，在定居条件下，经济成功所需的智力要求有所不同。

The invention of agriculture and animal husbandry was in and of itself an outstanding cognitive achievement。It required a lengthened planning horizon.It required longer provisions and deeper and fartherreaching insights into the chains of natural causes and effects.And it required more work，patience，and endurance than under huntergatherer conditions.In addition，it was instrumental for success as a farmer that one possessed some degree of numeracy so as to count，measure，and proportion.It required intelligence to recognize the advantages of interhousehold division of labor and to abandon selfsufficiency。It required some literacy to design contracts and establish contractual relations.And it required some skill of monetary calculation and of accountancy to economically succeed.Not every farmer was equally apt in these skills and had an equally low degree of time preference.To the contrary，under agricultural conditions，where each household was responsible for its own production of consumer goods and offspring and there was no longer any “free riding” as under huntergatherer conditions，the natural inequality of man，and the corresponding social differentiation of and between more or less successful members of a tribe became increasingly and strikingly visible （in particular through the size of one’s land hold ings）。Consequently，the translation of economic （productive） success and status into reproductive success，i.e.，the breeding of a comparatively larger number of surviving offspring by the economically successful，became even more direct and pronounced.

农业和畜牧业的发明本身就是一种卓越的认知成就。它需要更长远的计划，需要更长时间的准备和对自然因果链的更深入理解。此外，相较于狩猎采集条件，它还需要更多的工作、耐心和毅力。此外，成为一个成功的农民需要一定的计算能力，以便计数、测量和分配。需要具备一些智力来认识到家庭间分工的优势，并放弃自给自足。设计契约和建立契约关系也需要一定的读写能力。为了经济上的成功，还需要具备一些货币计算和会计技能。并不是每个农民在这些技能上都同样擅长，也不是每个人的时间偏好都同样低。相反，在农业条件下，每个家庭都负责自己生产消费品和抚养子女，不再像狩猎采集条件下那样有“搭便车”的现象，人类的自然不平等和部落成员之间的社会分化变得越来越明显（尤其是通过土地占有量的差异）。因此，经济（生产）成功和社会地位转化为繁殖成功，即经济成功者繁衍更多存活后代的现象，这种差异变得更加直接和显著。

Further，this tendency of selecting for higher intelligence would be particularly pronounced under “harsh” external conditions.If the human environment is unchangingly constant and “mild”—as in the seasonless tropics，where one day is like another year in and out—high or exceptional intelligence offers a lesser advantage than in an inhospitable environment with widely fluctuating seasonal variations.The more challenging the environment，the higher the premium placed on intelligence as a requirement of economic，and consequently reproductive，success.Hence，the growth of human intelligence would be most pronounced in harsher （historically，generally northern） regions of human habitation.

此外，这种选择高智力的趋势在“严酷”的外部条件下会特别明显。如果人类的环境是不变的和“温和的”——比如在很少季节变化的热带地区，日复一日、年复一年，并无什么不同——那么高智力或超常智力提供的优势就不如在一个季节变化很大的恶劣环境中所提供的优势。环境越具有挑战性，作为经济和繁殖成功的要求，智力的价值就越高。因此，人类智力的增长在人类居住环境更恶劣的地区（历史上通常是北方地区）最为明显。

Humans live on—consume—animals and plants，and animals live on other animals or plants.Plants，thus，stand at the beginning of the human food chaiN.The growth of plants in turn depends on the presence （or absence） of four factors：carbon dioxide （which is evenly distributed across the globe and hence of no interest here），solar energy，water，and，very importantly，minerals （such as potassium，phosphates，etc.）。

人类依靠——消费——动物和植物为生，而动物依靠其他动物或植物为生。因此，植物处于人类食物链的起点。植物的生长又取决于四个因素的存在（或缺失）：二氧化碳（在全球范围内均匀分布，因此在此勿需讨论）、太阳能、水，以及非常重要的矿物质（如钾、磷酸盐等）。[86]

At the equator，where （nearby） the first modern humans lived，two of the three conditions of biological growth were met perfectly。There existed an abundance of sunlight and of raiN.Rain fell predictably almost daily。Days and nights were equally long and temperatures yearround comfort ably warm，with little to no difference between day vs.night and summer vs.winter temperatures.In the tropical rainforest，temperatures rarely exceed 30 degrees Celsius （86 degrees Fahrenheit） and rarely fall below 20 degrees Celsius （68 degrees Fahrenheit）。Winds were generally calm，interrupted only by sudden brief storms.The conditions for human habitation，then，would appear quite appealing； and yet，the population density in tropical regions is and has always been extremely low as compared to that in regions further north （and south），sometimes，as in the rainforests of the Amazon，nearly as low as the population density typical of deserts or arctic regions.The reason for this is the extreme shortage of soil minerals in the tropics.

在赤道附近，现代人类最早的居住地，生物生长的三个条件中的有两个条件非常理想。这里阳光充足，降雨丰沛，几乎每天都有雨。昼夜长短相等，全年气温舒适温暖，昼夜和夏冬之间的温差很小。在热带雨林中，气温很少超过30摄氏度（86华氏度），也很少低于20摄氏度（68华氏度）。风一般都很平静，只是偶尔有短暂的暴风雨打断。看起来，这里的居住条件非常宜人。然而，与更北（或更南）的地区相比，热带地区的人口密度一直非常低，亚马逊雨林的部分地区人口密度低得像沙漠或北极地区的人口密度。植物生长三个条件中的另一个条件，土壤中的矿物质，在这里极度匮乏。

The soil of the tropics is，geologically speaking，old （as compared in par ticular to those regions affected by the earthhistorical sequence of glacial and interglacial periods） and almost completely drained of minerals （except for equatorial regions with volcanic—mineral producing—activity as on some indonesian islands such as Java，for instance，where the human population density has in fact always been significantly higher）。As a result，the enor mous biomass characteristic of the tropics produces no new，surplus or excess growtH.Growth is yearround，but it is slow，and it does not lead to an increase in the total biomass.once grown up，the rainforest only recycles itself。Moreover，the overwhelming proportion of this biomass is in the form of slow growing hardwood trees，i.e.，of dead matter； and the leaves of most tropical plants，due to their peculiar need for protection （cooling） against the intense equator sun，are not only hard and tough but often poisonous or at least distasteful to humans and other planteaters such as cattle and deer。This absence of surplus growth and the special chemistry of tropical plants explains the fact that，contrary to what is frequently imagined，the tropics support only amazingly few and smallish animals.Indeed，the only animals existing in abundance are ants and termites.A tropical biomass （mostly of wood） of more than 1，000 tons per hectare produces no more than 200 kilograms of meat （animal mass），i.e.，onefivethousandth of the plant mass.（In contrast，in the East African grassland savannah a mere fifty tons of plant mass per square kilometer （100 hectares） produces some twenty tons of animal mass：of elephants，buffaloes，zebras，gnus，antelopes，and gazelles.） Yet where there are so few and nonsizeable animals，only few humans can be sustained.（In fact，most people who lived in the tropics lived near rivers and sustained their lives essentially from fishing rather than hunting and gathering。）

At their place of origin，then，humans very quickly arrived at the point where they had to leave the paradisiacal，warm，stable，and predictable environment of the tropics and enter other regions in search of food.The regions northward （and southward） of the equator were seasonal regions，however。That is，they had less，and less constant rainfall than the trop ics，and the temperatures increasingly fell and varied more widely as one moved northward （or southward）。In northern regions of human habi tation，temperatures could easily vary by more than 40 degrees per day and seasonal temperatures by more than 80 degrees.The total biomass produced under such conditions was significantly less than in the tropics.However，further away from the equator the soil had （often） sufficient or even ample minerals to compensate for these climatic disadvantages and offered optimal conditions for the growth of vegetation suited for animal and human consumption：of plants that grew fast and，in spurts，produced large seasonal surpluses of fresh biomass—in particular of grasses （includ ing grains）—that could support a large number of sizable animals.

就这样，人类从他们天堂般的起源地出发，离开了温暖、稳定、可预测的热带环境，进入其他地区寻找食物。从赤道出发，向南、向北都进入季节性地区。这些地区比热带地区降雨少，降雨量不稳定，气温下降，气温变幅也变大。在人类居住的北方地区，气温每天的变化可能超过40℉，季节性温度变化可能超过80℉。在这种条件下产生的总生物量明显少于热带地区。然而，远离赤道的地方，土壤通常含有足够甚至丰富的矿物质，弥补了气候的不利条件，并为适合动物和人类食用的植被生长提供了适宜条件。这些植物生长迅速，并在短时间内产生大量的季节性的新鲜有机物，特别是草类（包括谷物），能够养活大量体型较大的动物。

During the last ice age，which ended some 10，000 years ago，the regions which offered this less than paradisiacal climatic conditions but a superior food supply included （concentrating here on the northern hemi sphere，where most of the considered development took place） all of supra equatorial Africa—including the Sahara—and most of the Eurasian land mass （except for stillarctic northern Europe and Siberia）。Since then，and essentially continuing until today，a northern belt of deserts，which widens toward the east，has come to separate the entire zone of seasonal regions into a southern one of subequatorial regions and a northern one that includes now also most of northern Europe and Siberia.From the huntergatherer stage of human development essentially until today，then，the highest population density could be found in these “moderate” seasonal regions （a pic ture further modified only by altitudes）。

今天的北半球的很多地区，包括赤道以北的整个非洲（撒哈拉沙漠所在地区），欧亚大陆的大部分地区（除了寒冷的北欧和西伯利亚），在一万年前上一个冰期结束的时候，为人类和其他动物提供了更好的食物供应。从那时起一直到今天，赤道附近一条宽阔的沙漠带在向东扩展的过程中，分隔了两个区域。南方是非洲南部的南亚热带和南温带地区，北方是北方温带和寒温带地区（包括北欧和西伯利亚）。自从人类发展的狩猎采集阶段开始，一直到今天，这些“温和”的季节性区域一直是人口密度最高的地方（这一点还受到海拔高度的影响）。

It is important to realize in this context，however，that what we have come to regard as “moderate” regions of human habitation were actually quite harsh living conditions，and in far northern latitudes even extremely harsh conditions as compared to those in the constantly warm tropics，to which humans first had been adapted.In contrast to the stable and unchang ing environment of the tropics，moderate regions presented increased change and fluctuation and thus posed （increasingly） difficult intellectual challenges to hunters and gatherers.Not only did they have to learn how to deal with large animals，which did not exist in the tropics （except for the volcanic parts of indonesia），and their movements.More importantly，outside equatorial regions seasonal changes and fluctuations in the human environment played an increasingly greater role，and it became increasingly important to predict such changes and fluctuations and to anticipate their effects on the future food supply （of plants and animals）。Those who could do so successfully and make appropriate preparations and adjust ments，had a better chance of survival and proliferation than those who could not。

人类最先适应的是持续温暖的热带地区，而前文提到的“温和”地区其实生活条件相当恶劣，而高纬度北方的生活条件甚至十分恶劣。热带地区稳定少变化，而温带地区的气候变化频繁且幅度大，因此狩猎采集者在这里生存不易，需要面临越来越困难的智力挑战。人们不仅要学习如何对付大型动物（这是他们先前在热带地区未曾遇到的），还要了解这些动物的活动规律和轨迹。离赤道地区越远，季节变化越明显，而食物（植物和动物）的波动性也越大。人类在这样的环境中生活，能否预测这些变化和波动影响着他们是否可以获得食物供应。

Outside the equatorial rainforest，to the north （and south），pronounced raining seasons existed and had to be taken into account。It rained during the summer and was dry in the winter。As well，the growth and distribution of plants and animals was affected by northeasterly （or，in the southern hemi sphere，southeasterly） trade winds.In regions still further to the north （or south），increasingly separated since the end of the last ice age from the sub equatorial regions by a belt of （northern and southern） deserts，the rain sea sons shifted，with rain in the winter and drought in the summer。The winds affecting the distribution of rain were prevailingly westerlies. Summers were hot and dry，while winter temperatures，even in low altitudes，could easily reach “deadly” freezing levels，even if only for short periods.Growing seasons were accordingly limited.Lastly，in the northernmost regions of human hab itation，i.e.，north of mediterranean latitudes，rain fell irregularly through out the year and，with prevailing westerly winds，more in the west （north ern Europe） than in the east （northern Asia）。otherwise，however，seasonal changes and fluctuations in this zone of human habitation were extreme.The lengths of days （light） and nights （dark） varied remarkably throughout the year。In extreme northern regions，a light summer day and a dark winter night both could last for more than a montH.More importantly，the entire region （and especially pronounced as one moved in a northeasterly direction） experienced extended periods of often extreme freezing conditions during the winter。During these periods，lasting from many months to most of the year，all plant growth came essentially to a standstill。Plants died or went dormant。nature stopped supplying food，and humans （and animals） were threatened with starvation and the danger of freezing to death.The growing seasons，during which a surplus of food and shelter could possibly be built up for this contingency，were accordingly short。Moreover，the extreme dif ferences between long，harsh，and freezing winters and the short，mild to warm growing seasons，affected the migration of animals.Unless they had fully adapted to arctic conditions and could go into some form of hiberna tion during “dead” seasons，animals had to migrate from season to season， often over long distances to and from far apart locations.And since animals constituted a major part of the human food supply，huntergatherers，too，had to migrate regularly over large distances.

能成功预测这些变化并做好准备和调整的个体，比那些做不到的个体，有更好的生存机会与繁衍机会。热带雨林之外的北方和南方温带地区，都有明显的雨季。夏天下雨冬天干燥，这些都是人们生产必须考虑的。北半球的东北信风地带或南半球的东南信风地带，植物和动物的生长都受到信风的影响。而在更北或更南的地区，自上一个冰期以来，被一条东西走向的沙漠地带隔开，表现为冬季下雨而夏季干旱（即所谓地中海气候——译者注）。在这个地带，影响降水量分布的季风主要是西风，此处夏季炎热干燥，而冬季温度，即使在低海拔地区，也很容易达到“致命”的冰点水平，即使只是短期的，植物的生长季节也因此受到限制。再向北看，在人类居住的最北段，即地中海维度以北，全年降雨不规律，而且在西风的影响下，处于西部的北欧的降雨量多于东部的西北亚。气候的变化很复杂，还不止前面所说的降雨问题。人类居住区，南北之间，日照长度变化也非常明显。在人类居住区的最北端，夏季可能出现一个多月的永昼（没有夜晚），冬季可能出现一个多月的永夜（没有阳光）。而且，更严重的是，越往北，气温越低，冬季甚至会出现极端的冰冻状态。所以越往北，冬季日照越短，气温越低，植物会生长停滞、死亡或休眠。在大自然的恶劣环境下，食物来源缺乏，人类和动物都面临着冻饿而死的风险。温暖的季节短，植物的生长季节也短，人们必须在这个阶段储存食物，建造居所，以度过糟糕的冬季。温暖、温和且万物生长的季节短，寒冷、严酷且万物肃杀的季节长，大多数动物难以在寒冷的季节迁徙。在北方寒温带和寒带的环境下，动物要么休眠，要么死掉（它们留下抗逆性强的卵），还有一部分动物可以长距离地迁徙，（在夏季的觅食场所与冬季的越冬场所之间）。以这些迁徙动物为食物的狩猎采集者，不得不也跟随着猎物长途迁徙。

before the background of this rough picture of human ecology and geography，further modified and complicated of course by the existence of mountain ranges，rivers，and bodies of water，it becomes apparent why the natural selection in favor of higher intelligence among huntergatherers would be more pronounced as one moved in a northern （or southern） direc tion toward the coldest regions of human habitation.No doubt，significant intelligence was required of humans to live successfully in the tropics.However，the equilibriumlike constancy of the tropics acted as a natural constraint on the further development of human intelligence.because one day was much like any other day in the tropics，little or no need existed for anyone to take anything into account in his actions except his immediate surroundings or to plan beyond anything but the immediately impending future.In distinct contrast，the increasing seasonality of regions outside the tropics made for an intellectually increasingly challenging environment。

The existence of seasonal changes and fluctuations—of rain and drought，summer and winter，scorching heat and freezing cold，winds and calms—required that more，and more remote factors including the sun，the moon，and the stars，and longer stretches of time had to be taken into account if one wanted to act successfully and survive and procreate.More and longer chains of causes and effects had to be recognized and more and longer chains of argument thought througH.The planning horizon had to be extended in time.one had to act now，in order to be successful much later。both the period of production—the time lapse between the onset of a productive effort and its completion—and the period of provision—the time span into the future for which present provisions （savings） had to be made—needed to be lengthened.In the northernmost regions，with long and deadly winters，provisions of food，clothing，shelter，and heating had to be made that would last through most of a year or beyond.Planning had to be in terms of years，instead of days or months.As well，in pursuit of seasonally and widely migrating animals，extensive territories had to be traversed，requiring exceptional skills of orientation and navigation.only groups intelligent enough on average to generate exceptional leaders who possessed such superior intellectual skills and abilities were rewarded with success—survival and procreation.Those groups and leaders，on the other hand，who were not capable of these achievements，were punished with failure，i.e.，extinction.

活下来，并繁衍后代，需要成功的行动。而成功的行动需要考虑季节的变化和波动，考虑降雨和干旱，夏季与冬季，酷暑与严寒，刮风与平静；更深远的，还要考虑考虑太阳、月亮和星星所代表的更长的时间。人们要活下来，需要认识到越来越长的因果链，思考越来越长的逻辑链条，考虑到未来某个时刻要获得成功，当下应该做什么。生产期——从开始生产到完成生产之间的时间间隔——和供应期——目前的供应（储蓄）必须持续到未来的时间跨度——都需要延长。在最北端的地区，冬季漫长而致命，食物、衣服、住所和取暖材料的供应必须能够维持一年或更长时间。计划必须以年为单位，而不是以天或月为单位。此外，为了追逐季节性大范围迁徙的动物，必须穿越广阔的地域，这需要特殊的定向和导航技能。有些群体的智力水平总体较高，也更能产生聪明卓越的领导者，他们才能活下来，并繁衍下去。另一些群体就没有那么幸运，他们可能不够聪明，或没有产生卓越的领导者，这些群体就没活下来，当然也就没能繁衍下去。

The greatest progress on the way toward the invention of agriculture and animal husbandry some 11，000 years ago，then，should have occurred in the northernmost regions of human habitation.Here，the competi tion within and between huntergatherer groups should have produced over time the most intelligent—provisionary and farsighted—population.And indeed，during the tens of thousands of years until about 11，000 years ago，every significant technological advance originated in northern regions：mostly in Europe or，in the case of ceramics，in JapaN.In contrast，during the same period the toolkit used in the tropics remained almost unchanged.

大约11000年前，农业和畜牧业的发明取得了最大的进步，而这些进步应该发生在人类居住的较北部地区。在这里，狩猎采集群体内部和之间的竞争，应该随着时间的推移产生了或者当时最聪明，或者最有远见的群体。事实上，在大约11000年之前的数万年里，每一次重大的技术进步都起源于北方地区：主要发生在欧洲，或者就陶瓷而言，起源于日本。相比之下，在同一时期，热带地区使用的工具组合几乎没有变化。

But the explanatory power of the above sketch of social evolution goes much further。The admittedly hypothetical theory presented here can explain why it took so long to get out of the Malthusian trap，and how such a feat was possible at all and we did not remain under Malthu sian conditions forever：mankind was simply not intelligent enough to achieve productivity increases that could continuously outstrip population growtH.A certain threshold of average and exceptional intelligence had to be reached first for this to become possible，and it took time （until about 1800） to “breed” such a level of intelligence.The theory can explain the wellestablished and corroborated （and yet for “political correctness” reasons persistently ignored） fact of intelligence research：that the aver age IQ of nations gradually declines as one moves from north to south （from about 100 or more points in northern countries to about seventy in subSaharan Africa）。 More specifically，the theory can thus explain why the industrial revolution originated and then took hold immediately in some—generally northern—regions but not in others，why there had always existed persistent regional income differences，and why these dif ferences could have increased （rather than decreased） since the time of the industrial revolution.

前面，我们概括了以地理为背景的人类社会进化的基本框架，它的解释力还不仅如此（涉及智力进化和筛选）。这里提出的公认的假设理论可以解释：为什么我们花了这么多时间才走出马尔萨斯陷阱？为什么我们可以走出马尔萨斯陷阱？为什么我们能将马尔萨斯陷阱抛诸在人类进化史的过往？这解释就是，过去的人类没有足够的智慧来支持生产率的增长超过人口增长。一直到1800年前后，人类的平均智力水平，和聪慧者的智力水平，其成长才超过了某个阈值。秉持着“政治正确”的观点，我们过去忽略了，但是现在不得不去承认的一个事实：一个国家人们的平均智商，如果以北方国家为100分，那么到撒哈拉以南非洲则只有70分左右。[87]更具体地说，这一理论可以解释为什么工业革命起源并且随即扎根于某些地区（通常是北方地区），而不是其他地区。为什么一直存在持续的地区收入差异，以及为什么这些差异自工业革命以来一直在增加（而不是减少）。

As well，the theory can explain what may at first appear as an anomaly：that it was not in the northernmost regions of human habitation where the neolithic revolution began some 11，000 years ago and whence it gradu ally and successively conquered the rest of the world，but in regions signifi cantly further south—yet still far north of the tropics：in the Middle East， in central China （the Yangtze Valley），and in mesoamerica.The reason for this seeming anomaly is easy to detect，however。In order to invent agriculture and animal husbandry two factors were necessary：sufficient intelligence and favorable natural circumstances to apply such intelligence.It was the second factor that was lacking in extreme northern regions and thus prevented its inhabitants from making the revolutionary invention.The extreme freezing conditions and the extreme brevity of the growing season there made agriculture and animal husbandry practically impossible，even if the idea might have been conceived.What was necessary to actually implement the idea were natural circumstances favorable to sed entary life：of a long and warm growing season （besides suitable crops，and domesticable animals）。（The greater scarcity of such crops and animals on the American continent is the likely reason for the somewhat belated third independent invention of agriculture and animal husbandry in meso america.） such climatic conditions existed in the mentioned “temperate” regions.Here，the competitive development of human intelligence among huntergatherers had made sufficient progress （even if it lagged behind that in the north） so that，combined with favorable natural circumstances，the idea of agriculture and animal husbandry could be implemented.Since the end of the last ice age about 10，000 years ago，then，the zone of tem perate climates expanded northward into higher latitudes，rendering agri culture and animal husbandry increasingly feasible there as well。meeting there an even more intelligent people，the new revolutionary production techniques were not merely quickly imitated and adopted，but most sub sequent improvements in these techniques had their origins here.South of the centers of the original invention，too，the new technique would be gradually adopted （with the exception of the tropics）—after all，it is easier to imitate something than to invent it。meeting a less intelligent people there，however，little or no contribution to the further development of more efficient practices of agriculture or animal husbandry would come from there.All further efficiency gains in these regions would stem from the imitation of techniques invented elsewhere，in regions further north.

在北半球靠北的地方，更能因自然环境的严酷和不可预料筛选出智力水平更高的人群。人类文明进化的起点看起来有点违反前面这个理论——大约11000年前，新石器时代并不起源于最北的地区，而是在更靠南边一点的地区。不过即使是靠南的地区，也在热带以北。这一现象看似反常，却也容易理解。农业和畜牧业的发明，需要两个条件：足够的智力，和应用这些智力的有利的自然环境。极北地区缺乏第二个因素，因而阻碍了居民做出革命性的发明。极北地区的极端冰冻条件和极其短暂的生长季节使得农业和畜牧业实际上是不可能的，即使这个观念可能已经被构想出来。真正要将农业和畜牧业从构想变成现实，需要的除了可以被驯化的植物和动物，还要又温暖且足够长的生长季节。这样的气候条件存在于上述“温带”地区。在这里，人类智力在狩猎采集者中的竞争性发展已经取得了足够的进步（即使它落后于北方），因此，结合有利的自然条件，农业和畜牧业的观念可以实现。自从大约10000年前最后一次冰期结束以来，温带气候区向北扩展到高纬度地区，使农业和畜牧业在那里也越来越可行。新的革命性的生产技术是可以被模仿和采用的，因此它们在北方被更聪明的人采用，也在北方被进行了大量的改进。在原始发明中心的南部，新技术也会逐渐被采用（热带地区除外）——毕竟，模仿比发明更容易。然而，如果在那里遇到的人不太聪明，那里对进一步发展更有效的农业或畜牧业的贡献就会很少或根本没有贡献。这些地区所有效率的进一步提升都将源自对更北方的其他地区所发明技术的模仿。

IV. 结论与展望

IMPLICATIonS AND OUTLOOK

Several implications and suggestions follow from this.First，the theory of social evolution sketched here entails a fundamental criticism of the egalitarianism rampant within the social sciences generally but also among many libertarians.true，economists allow for human “differences” in the form of different labor productivities.But these differences are generally interpreted as the result of different external conditions，i.e.，of different endowments or training。only rarely are internal，biologically anchored characteristics admitted as possible sources of human differences.Yet even when economists admit the obvious：that human differences have internal，biological sources as well，as Mises and Rothbard certainly do，they still typically ignore that these differences are themselves in turn the outcome of a lengthy process of natural selection in favor of human characteristics and dispositions （physical and mental） determinant of economic success and，more or less highly positively correlated with economic success，of reproductive success.That is，it is still largely overlooked that we，modern man，are a very different breed from our predecessors hundreds or even thousands of years ago。

由此得出几个结论和建议。首先，这里概述的社会进化理论对社会科学中普遍存在的平等主义进行了根本性的批评，这种平等主义也存在于许多自由主义者中。确实，经济学家承认人类在劳动生产率上的“差异”。但这些差异通常被解释为不同外部条件的结果，即不同的禀赋或训练。很少有人承认内部的、生物学上的特征也可能是人类差异的来源。即使经济学家承认显而易见的事实：人类差异也有内部的生物学来源，比如米塞斯和罗斯巴德就肯定承认这一点，他们仍然通常忽略了这些差异本身也是一个漫长自然选择过程的结果，这个过程有利于那些决定经济成功的（身体和精神上的）人类特征和倾向，并且这些特征与经济成功往往高度正相关，从而影响繁殖成功率。换句话说，我们现代人，与几百年甚至几千年前的先祖，已经是非常不同的种群，而这一点常常被忽视。

Second，once it is realized that the industrial revolution was first and foremost the outcome of the evolutionary growth of human intelligence （rather than the mere removal of institutional barriers to growth），the role of the State can be recognized as fundamentally different under Malthusian vs.postMalthusian conditions.Under Malthusian conditions the State doesn’t matter much，at least as far as macroeffects are concerned.A more exploitative State will simply lead to a lower population number （much like a pest would），but it does not affect per capita income.In fact，in lowering the population density，income per capita may even rise，as it did after the great pestilence in the midfourteenth century。And in reverse：a “good，” lessexploitative State will allow for a growing number of people，but per capita incomes will not rise or may even fall，because land per capita is reduced.All this changes with the industrial revolution.For if productivity gains continuously outstrip population increases and allow for a steady increase in per capita incomes，then an exploitative institution such as the State can continuously grow without lowering per capita income and reducing the population number。The State then becomes a permanent drag on the economy and per capita incomes.

其次，一旦认识到工业革命主要是人类智力进化的结果（而不仅仅是制度障碍的消除），就能明白国家在马尔萨斯条件和后马尔萨斯条件下的作用有根本区别。在马尔萨斯条件下，国家的作用不大，至少在宏观效果上影响不大。一个更具剥削性的国家只会导致人口减少（就像瘟疫一样），但不会影响人均收入。事实上，降低人口密度后，人均收入可能反而会上升，就像14世纪中叶大瘟疫之后的情况那样。反过来，一个“好”的、剥削较少的国家会允许人口增长，但人均收入不会增加，甚至可能下降，因为人均土地减少了。工业革命改变了这一切。如果生产力增长速度持续超过人口增长，并且允许人均收入稳步提高，那么剥削性制度（如国家）可以在不降低人均收入和人口数量的情况下不断扩张。这样一来，国家就成为经济和人均收入的长期拖累。

Third，whereas under Malthusian conditions positive eugenic effects reign：the economically successful produce more surviving offspring and the population stock is thus gradually bettered （cognitively improved）。Under postMalthusian conditions the existence and the growth of the State produces a twofold dysgenic effect，especially under democratic welfarestate conditions. For one，the “economically challenged，” as the principal “clients” of the welfare State，produce more surviving offspring，and the economically successful less.Second，the steady growth of a para sitic State，made possible by a growing underlying economy，Systematically affects the requirements of economic success.Economic success becomes increasingly dependent on politics and political talent，i.e.，the talent of using the State to enrich oneself at others’ expense.In any case，the popula tion stock becomes increasingly worse （as far as the cognitive requirements of prosperity and economic growth are concerned），rather than better。

第三，在马尔萨斯条件下，积极的优生效应占主导地位：经济上成功的人会有更多的后代存活，从而逐渐改善人口质量（认知能力提升）。在后马尔萨斯条件下，尤其是在民主福利国家的条件下，国家的存在和增长产生了双重的负面优生效应。[88]首先，作为福利国家主要受益者的“经济困难”群体生育更多存活的后代，而经济上成功的人则生育较少。其次，由于经济增长使寄生性国家的稳步扩张成为可能，国家又系统性地影响着社会。个人成功的才能也逐渐从经济才能转向了政治才能，而这是一种利用国家手段来剥削他人以自肥的才能。因此，就繁荣和经济增长所需的认知要求而言，人口质量会逐渐变差，而不是变好。

Finally，it is important to note in conclusion，then，that just as the industrial revolution and the attendant escape from the Malthusian trap was by no means a necessary development in human history so its success and achievements are also not irreversible.

最后，需要重点指出的是，工业革命和随之而来的逃离马尔萨斯陷阱的进程，并非人类历史发展的必然，而这些成功和成就也并非不可逆转。

5 论共有、公有和私有财产以及全面私有化的基本原理*

5 Of Common，Public，and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization

I have three goals.First，I want to clarify the nature and function of private property。Second，I want to clarify the distinction between “common” goods and property and “public” goods and property，and explain the construction error inherent in the institution of public goods and property。Third，I want to explain the rationale and principle of privatization.

本章有三个目标。第一，阐明私有财产的性质和功能。第二，阐明“共有”财货及财产，与“公共”财货及财产之间的区别，并解释“公共”财货及财产制度的内在结构性错误。第三，解释私有化的原理及原则。

I. 理论初步

ThroreTICAL PreLIMINARIES

I will begin with some abstract but fundamental theoretical considerations concerning the sources of conflicts and the purpose of social norms.If there were no interpersonal conflicts，there would be no need for norms.It is the purpose of norms to help avoid otherwise unavoidable conflicts.A norm that generates conflict，rather than helps avoid it，is contrary to the purpose of norms，i.e.，it is a dysfunctional norm or a perversion.

本文从一些虽然抽象但基础的理论思考起步，这些思考关系到冲突的起源及社会规范的目的。无人际冲突则无社会规范之必要。规范旨在协助避免本不可避免的冲突。一种规范，若非避免却反而滋生冲突，是与规范之本身目的相矛盾的，亦即一种失效规范或倒错（perversion）。

It is sometimes thought that conflicts result from the mere fact of different people having different interests or ideas.But this is false，or at least very incomplete.From the diversity of individual interests and ideas alone it does not follow that conflicts must arise.I want it to rain，and my neighbor wants the sun to shine.Our interests are contrary。However，because neither I，nor my neighbor controls the sun or the clouds，our conflicting interests have no practical consequences.There is nothing that we can do about the weather。Likewise，I may believe that A causes B，and you believe that B is caused by C； or I believe in and pray to God，and you don’t。But if this is all the difference there is between us nothing of any practical consequence follows.Different interests and beliefs can lead to conflict only when they are put into action—when our interests and ideas are attached to or implemented in physically controlled objects，i.e.，in economic goods or means of action.

人们有时认为，冲突不过是源于不同人拥有不同利益和观念的事实。但这种看法是错误的，或至少是不完整的。仅从个人利益分歧及观念多样出发，冲突并不必然发生。我愿下雨，而邻居盼天晴。我们的利益相反。然而，无论我还是邻居都不能控制阴晴，所以我们的冲突利益不会有实际后果。对天气我们无计可施。同样，我相信甲为乙因，你相信乙缘于丙；或我信神并向祂祷告而你不信。但如果以上是我们的全部差异，就不会有任何实际后果发生。不同的利益和信念，只有在付诸行动之时才会导致冲突——当我们的利益和观念被附着或施加于物理控制的客体，即经济财货或行为手段。

Yet even if our interests and ideas are attached to and implemented in economic goods，no conflict results so long as our interests and ideas are concerned exclusively with different—physically separate—goods.Conflict only results if our different interests and beliefs are attached to and invested in one and the same good.In the Schlaraffenland，[89] with a superabundance of goods，no conflict can arise （except for conflicts regarding the use of our physical bodies that embody our very own interests and ideas）。There is enough around of everything to satisfy everyone’s desires.In order for different interests and ideas to result in conflict，goods must be scarcE.only scarcity makes it possible that different interests and ideas can be attached to and invested in one and the same stock of goods.Conflicts，then，are physical clashes regarding the control of one and the same given stock of goods.People clash because they want to use the same goods in different，incompatible ways.

即便我们的利益和观念被附着或施加于经济财货，只要我们的利益和观念仅仅只是与不同的——物理分离的——财货有关，仍然不会有冲突发生。唯有当我们不同的利益和信念被附在或赋予同一财货，冲突才会发生。在天堂乐土，财货极大丰富，冲突不会发生（除了体现我们自身利益和观念的物理身体，在其使用上发生冲突）。周围一切足够满足每个人的欲望。要让不同的利益和观念起冲突，财货就必须是稀缺的。唯有稀缺性，才会使不同的利益和观念被附在及赋予同一财货。那么，冲突就是对同一特定财货控制的物理磨擦。人与人起冲突就是因为他们想以不同且不相容的方式使用同一财货。

Even under conditions of scarcity，when conflicts are possible，however，they are not necessary or unavoidable.All conflicts regarding the use of any good can be avoided if only every good is privately owned，i.e.，exclusively controlled by some specified individual（s） and it is always clear which thing is owned，and by whom，and which is not。The interests and ideas of different individuals may then be as different as can be，and yet no conflict arises so long as their interests and ideas are concerned always and exclusively with their own，separate property。

即使在资源稀缺、可能发生冲突的条件下，冲突也不是必然或不可避免的。只要每件财货皆为私有，涉及任何财货使用的一切冲突皆可避免，即每件财货都为某些特定个人（或多个人）排他性控制，哪件财货为谁所有，哪件则非，都是清楚明了的。无论不同人的利益和观念如何不一致，只要其利益和观念始终且仅仅只涉及其各自财产，则依然不会有任何冲突发生。

What is needed to avoid all conflict，then，is only a norm regarding the privatization of scarce things （goods）。More specifically，in order to avoid all conflict from the very beginning of mankind on，the required norm must con cern the original privatization of goods （the first transformation of nature given “things” into “economic goods” and private property）。Further，the original privatization of goods cannot occur by verbal declaration，i.e.，by the mere utterance of words，because this could work and not lead to per manent and irresolvable conflict only if，contrary to our initial assumption of different interests and ideas，a prestabilized harmony of the interests and ideas of all people existed.（Yet in that case no norms were needed in the first place!）

那么，唯有稀缺物（财货）私有化的规范，才是避免一切冲突所必要的规范。更具体而言，要从人类诞生之初就避免一切冲突，所需要的规范就必须涉及财货的最初私有化（自然赋予的“财货”初次转化为“经济财货”及私有财产）。其次，财货的最初私有化不可能通过口头声明，即仅仅通过语言表达来实现，因为只有当与我们最初假设的不同利益和观念相反，所有人的利益和观念存在一种预先稳定的和谐时，这种私有化才会起作用，才不会导致永久性的、无法解决的冲突（然而，在这种情况下，本来就不需要规范！）。

Rather，to avoid all otherwise unavoidable conflict，the original privati zation of goods must occur through actions：through acts of original appropriation of what were previously “things.” only through actions，taking place in time and space，can an objective—intersubjectively ascertainable—link be established between a particular person and a particular good.And only the first appropriator of a previously unappropriated thing can acquire this thing without conflict。For，by definition，as the first appropriator he cannot have run into any conflict with anyone in appropriating the good in ques tion，as everyone else appeared on the scene only later。All property must go back，then，directly or indirectly，through a chain of mutually beneficial and hence likewise conflictfree propertytitle transfers，to original appropriators and acts of original appropriation.

相反，为了避免一切本不可避免的冲突，对财货的最初私有化就必须借助于行动：通过对先前“东西”的先占。只有通过时空中发生的行动，在特定人和特定物之间的客观（主体间可确定的）联系才能建立。并且，只有是对先前无主物的初次占有，才能无冲突地取得该物。因为，根据定义，作为先占者，他不可能与任何人对占有该物发生冲突，这是由于其他人要待后来才出现。于是，一切财产，经由互利互惠从而摒绝冲突的财产名义所有权转让链条，都一定能直接或间接地回溯到先占者以及先占行动。

As a matter of fact，this answer is apodictically，i.e.，nonhypothetically，true.In the absence of a prestabilized harmony of all individual interests，only private property can help avoid otherwise—under conditions of scar city—unavoidable conflict。And only the principle of property acquisition by means of original appropriation or mutually beneficial transfer from an earlier to a later proprietor makes it possible that conflict can be avoided throughout—from the very beginning of mankind until the end.No other solution exists.Every other ruling is contrary to the nature of man as a rational actor。

事实上，这个答案是符合逻辑的，即是非假定性的，是真实的。在所有个人利益缺乏预先稳定的和谐的情况下，只有私有财产才能帮助避免在稀缺条件下不可避免的冲突。而且，只有通过先占或互利转让的方式从先前的所有者到后来的所有者获取财产的原则，才有可能避免冲突，从人类诞生之初直到终结。没有其他的解决办法。其他任何规则都有悖于人作为理性行动人的本性。

In conclusion，even under conditions of allaround scarcity it is possible that people with divergent interests and ideas can peacefully—without conflict—coexist，provided they recognize the institution of private （i.e.，exclusive） property and its ultimate foundation in and through acts of original appropriation.

总之，即使在遍布稀缺性的条件下，拥有不同利益和观念的人们依然可以和平地——避免冲突地—共处，只要他们认可私有（排他性的）财产制度及其通过先占行动体现出来的终极基础。

II. 私有财产、共有财货和公有财产

PRIVAte PROPERTY，COMMon GOODS AND PUBLIC PROPERTY

let me now move from theory to practice and application.let us assume a small village with privately owned houses，gardens，and fields.In principle，all conflicts regarding the use of these goods can be avoided，because it is clear who owns and has exclusive control of what house，garden，and field，and who doesn’t。

现在让我们从理论转到实践和应用。假定有一个小村庄，里面有私人房屋、花园及田地。原则上，对使用这些财货的一切冲突皆可避免，因为是谁（而非别人）拥有和排他性控制这些房屋、花园以及田地都是一目了然的。

But then there runs a “public” street in front of the private houses，and a “public” path leads through the woods at the edge of the village to some lake.What is the status of this street and this path？ They are not private property。Indeed，we assume that no one claims that he is the street’s or the path’s private owner。Rather，street and path are part of the natural environment in which everyone acts.Everyone uses the street，but no one owns it or exercises exclusive control regarding its utilization.

然而，在私有房屋的前面，有一条“公共”街道，以及一条穿过村边林荫通往某个湖泊的“公共”小径。这条街道以及小路的状态如何？它们不是私有财产。假定实际无人主张他是街道或是小径的私人所有者。相反，道路是每个人行动的自然环境的一部分。每个人都使用这条街道，却没有人拥有街道，或对街道的利用进行排他性的控制。

It is conceivable that this state of affairs with ownerless public streets can go on forever without leading to any conflict。It is not very realistic，however，because this requires the assumption of a stationary economy。Yet with economic change and growth，and in particular with a growing population，conflicts concerning the use of the public street are bound to increase.While “street conflicts” initially might have been so infrequent and so easy to avoid as not to cause anyone to worry，now they are ubiquitous and intolerable.The street is constantly congested and in permanent disrepair。A solution is required.The street must be taken out of the realm of the environment—of external “things” or common property—and brought into the realm of “economic goods.” This，the increasing economization of things previously considered and treated as “free goods，” is the way of civi lization and progress.

可以想象，无主公共街道的事态有可能永远持续而不引发任何冲突。然而，这个想象不太现实，因为这需要静态经济假设。随着经济改观及发展，尤其随着人口增长，对公共街道的使用冲突注定会增加。“街头冲突”开始时也许不太频繁，且很容易避免，不会引起任何担忧，可如今它们却到处发生，因而难以容忍。街道持续拥堵，永久失修，解决成为当务之急。这条街道必须被排除出（外部“事物”或共有财产的）环境范畴——归入“经济财货”的范畴。先前人们所认为的“免费财货”逐渐经济化，此正是文明、进步之途径。

Two solutions to the problem of managing increasingly intolerable conflicts concerning the use of “common property” have been proposed and tried.The first—and correct—solution is to privatize the street。The second—incorrect—solution is to turn streets into what is nowadays called “public property” （which is very different from the former，unowned “common” goods and property）。Why the second solution is incorrect or dys functional can best be grasped in contradistinction to the alternative privatization option.

“共有财产”使用上的冲突愈来愈难以容忍，必须设法解决这个问题，有两个解决方案获得提议及尝试。第一个——正确的——方案是私有化街道。第二个——错误的——方案是把街道变成今天所谓“公有财产”（这和先前无主的“共有”财货及财产截然不同）。为什么第二种解决方案是不正确的或功能失调的？将之与私有化的替代选择相比较，能极好地把握其原因。

How is it possible that formerly unowned common streets can be priva tized without thereby generating conflict with others？ The short answer is that this can be done provided only that the appropriation of the street does not infringe on the previously established rights—the easements—of privateproperty owners to use such streets “for free.” Everyone must remain free to walk the street from house to house，through the woods，and onto the lake，just as before.Everyone retains a rightofway，and hence no one can claim to be made worse off by the privatization of the street。Positively，in order to objectify—and validate—his claim that the formerly common street is now a private one and that he （and no one else） is its owner，the appropriator （whoever it may be） must perform some visible maintenance and repair work on and along the street。Then，as its owner，he—and no one else—can further develop and improve the streets as he sees fit。He sets the rules and regulations concerning the use of his street so as to avoid all street conflicts.He can build a hot dog or a bratwurst stand on his road， for instance，and exclude others from doing the same； or he can prohibit loitering on his street and collect a fee for the removal of garbage.Visàvis foreigners or strangers，the street owner can determine the rules of entry regarding uninvited strangers.Last but not least，as its private owner he can sell the street to someone else （with all previously established rightsofway remaining intact）。

私有化先前无主的共有街道而不致冲突，这如何才有可能？答案很简单，只要对街道的占有不触犯既有权利——地役权——即私人财产所有者对这些街道的免费使用权，私有化就是可行的。每个人理应保留在街上行走的自由，像以前一样走家串户、穿过林荫、抵达湖畔。每个人都保留通行权，因此街道私有化之后，不会有任何人宣称处境变坏。占有者（无论是谁），主张先前的共有街道现在成为私人街道，并且是他（而非别人）成为街道所有者，为使这个主张客观化——合法化，就必须积极主动地沿街或对路面实施某些明显的维护和修缮。然后，他（而非别人）作为街道所有者，只要认为合适就可以进一步开发和改良街道。他可以对街道的使用制定规则和制度，以避免一切街头冲突。例如，他可在路上修建一座热狗摊或腊肠店，但不许别人这么做；或者他可以禁止别人在街上随意游荡，并对清理垃圾收费。当碰到外国人或陌生人，街道的私人所有者可制定与不速之客有关的进入规则。最后同样重要的是，作为街道所有者，他可以将街道出售给其他任何人（全部既有通行权仍完好无损地保留）。

In all of this，it is more important that a privatization takes place than what specific form it assumes.on one end of the spectrum of possible privatizations we can imagine a single owner。A wealthy villager，for example，takes it upon himself to maintain and repair the street and thus becomes its owner。on the other end of the spectrum，we can imagine that the initial maintenance or repair of the street is the result of a genuine community effort。In that case，there is not just one owner of the street，but every community member is （initially） its equal coowner。In the absence of a prestabilized harmony of all interest and ideas，such coownership requires a decisionmaking mechanism regarding the further development of the street。let us assume that，as in a jointstock company，it is the majority of the street owners that determines what to do or not to do with it。This，i.e.，majority rule，smacks of conflict，but it isn’t so in this case.Every owner who is dissatisfied with the decisions made by the majority of owners，who believes that the burdens imposed on him by the majority are greater than the benefits he can derive from his （partial） street ownership，can always and at all times drop out or “exit。” He can sell his ownership share to someone else，thus opening the possibility for the concentration of ownership titles，conceivably in a single hand，all the while retaining his original rightofway。

这一切当中，私有化发生，而不是其呈现的具体形式，前者则更加重要。在各种可能的私有化中，一个极端是，可以想象只有单个所有者，例如某位富有村民，包揽了对街道的维护及修缮，从而成为街道的所有者。另一个极端则是，可以想象对街道的初始维护及修缮是整个社区成员努力的结果。在这种情况下，就不仅有一个街道所有者人，每个社团成员最初都是平等的街道共有所有者。在一切利益和观念的先定和谐不存在的情况下，对街道的进一步开发来说，这样的共有产权就需要一种决策机制。假定，正如一家股份制公司中的情形，是由大多数街道所有者决定该做还是不该做什么。这就是多数决规则，虽看似有冲突之虞，但在这种情况下却非如此。任何一位所有者，只要对大多数所有者的决策不满，只要他认为多数加于自身的负担，高于持有（部分）所有权的收益，总能够并随时可以退出或“脱离”。他可以将自己的所有权出售给别人，从而为所有权集中，也即设想中的掌控于一人之手提供了可能，而其最初通行权则始终保留。

In contrast，a very different sort of street property is created if the exit option does not exist，i.e.，if a person is not permitted to sell his share of street property or he is stripped of his former rightofpassage.This is，how ever，precisely what defines and characterizes the second，“public”property option.The public street in this modern sense of the word “public” is not unowned as it once was.There is a street owner—whether it is a particular individual，the king of the road，or a democratically elected street government—who has an exclusive say in setting the traffic rules and determining the future development of the street。But the street government does not permit its electors，i.e.，the people，who supposedly are the street’s equal coowners，to sell their ownership share （and so renders them compulsory owners of something of which they might rather want to divest themselves）。

相反，假如没有退出选项，个人既不被允许出售街道财产的份额，先前的通行权亦被剥夺，如此则产生了一种截然不同的街道财产。而这正是第二项“公共”财产的定义及特征。在“公共”一词的现代含义中，公共街道就不像先前那样是无主的。某个街道所有者——无论是特定个人、道路的君王，还是民选的街道政府——对于街道交通规则的制定，对街道未来发展的决策，都将是说一不二的。但是街道政府不允许其选民，即人民（他们被认为是街道的平等共同所有者）出售他们的所有权份额（从而使他们成为某种他们可能更想摆脱的东西的强制所有者）。

And neither government nor king allow the villageresidents unrestricted access and passage on the formerly free street but make its further use conditional on the payment of some user fee or contribution （thus rendering the village residents compulsory street owners again if only they want to continue using it as before）。

且无论是政府还是君主，都不允许村民不受限制地进入和通过先前的免费街道，除非以付费或纳贡为条件，才能继续使用街道（从而让村民成为被迫的街道所有者，而仅仅为了像从前那样继续使用街道。）

The results of this arrangement are predictable.In denying the “exit” option，the owner of the “public” street has gained a stranglehold on the village population.Accordingly，the fees and other conditions imposed on the village residents for the continued use of the formerly “free” street will tend to become increasingly more burdensome.Conflicts will not be avoided； quite to the contrary，conflicts are institutionalized.because the exit option is closed，i.e.，because the publicstreet users must now pay for what they formerly had for free，and no resident can sell and divest himself of his sup posed street ownership but remains continuously bound by the decisions made by the street government or king，not only are conflicts regarding the further use，maintenance and development of the street itself rendered permanent and ubiquitous.More importantly，with “public” streets conflict is also introduced into areas where it formerly did not exist。For if the private owners of the houses，gardens，and fields along the street must pay contributions to the street owner in order to continue doing what they had done before，i.e.，if they must pay taxes to the street owner，then，by the same token，the street owner has thereby gained control over their private properties.A private owner’s control concerning the use of his own house is then no longer an exclusive one.Rather，the owner of the adjacent street can interfere with a house owner’s decisions regarding his own house.He can tell the house owner what to do or not to do with his house if he wants to leave or enter it as before.That is，the publicstreet owner is in a position where he can limit，and ultimately even eliminate，i.e.，expropriate，all private property and property rights and thus render conflict unavoidable and allaround.

这种安排的结果是可想而知的。由于否认“脱离”选项，“公共”街道所有者就勒住了村民的脖子。为继续使用先前“免费”的街道，相应强加给村民的费用及其他条件，就变得越来越繁重。冲突不但无法避免，反而被制度化。不允许选择脱离，也就是说，公共街道使用者现在必须为先前免费之物付费，且居民不可出售和摆脱他的所谓街道所有权，故而不仅被街道政府或君主的决策继续束缚，继续使用、维护和开发街道本身的冲突，也将变得无休无止且无处不在。更要命的是，通过“公共”街道，冲突被引入进了先前没有冲突的领域。假如沿街的房屋、花园及土地私人所有者，要继续像先前一样使用街道，就必须向街道所有者纳贡（即缴税）；那么以同样理由，街道所有者就因此获得了对其私有财产的控制。一个私人所有者对自己房屋的使用，就不再是排他性的使用。相反，毗邻的街道所有者可以干扰屋主对自己房屋的决策。假如屋主像先前那样进出房屋，他可以对屋主发号施令。也就是说，公共街道所有者就处在一种可限制、甚至最终消灭即剥夺一切私有财产及财产权利的地位，冲突从而不可避免且四处蔓延。

III. 私有化原理

THE RATIonAle FOR PRIVATIZATIon

It should be clear now why the institution of public property is dys functional。Institutions and the norms underlying them are supposed to help avoid conflict。But the institution of “public” property—of “public” streets—creates and increases conflict。For the purpose of conflict avoidance （of peaceful human cooperation），then，public property must go。All public property must become private property。

现在应该清楚，为什么公有财产制度是功能失调的制度。制度及作为制度基础的规范理应协助避免冲突。但“公共”财产制度——“公共”街道——制造和增加了冲突。为了避免冲突（以实现人类的和平合作），就必须废除公有财产。一切公有财产必须成为私有财产。

But how to privatize in the “real world，” which has developed far beyond the simple village model that I have so far considered？ in this “real world” we have not just public streets，but also public parks，land，rivers，lakes，coastlines，housing，schools，universities，hospitals，barracks，air ports，harbors，libraries，museums，monuments，and on and on.Further，on top of local governments we have a hierarchy of “superior” provincial and ultimately “supreme” national or central governments as the owners of such goods.Predictably，moreover，parallel to the territorial extension and expansion of the domain of public goods，in which privateproperty owners have become implicated without any “way out，” the range of choices left to people regarding their private property has been increasingly limited and narrowed.only a small and increasingly smaller realm is left wherein privateproperty owners can still make free decisions，i.e.，free from possible intrusion or interference by some public authority。Not even within the four walls of one’s own house is one left free and can one exercise exclusive control over one’s property。Today，in the name of the public and as the owner of all “public goods，” governments can invade your house，confiscate any and all of your belongings，and even kidnap your children.

但真实世界的发展已经远远超出目前考虑的简单村落模型，在这样的世界里如何私有化？在真实世界中，不光有公共街道，还有公共花园、土地、河流、湖泊、海岸线、屋宇、学校、大学、医院、军营、机场、码头、图书馆、博物馆、纪念馆，等等。其次，在地方政府之上，还有“高级”省政府和“至高”的全国或联邦政府，它们是这些财产的所有者。再者，可以预料，与领土的扩展、延伸以及公有财货领域的扩张并行，私有财产者必然也受牵连拖累，最终“无路可逃”；留给人们对自己私产的选择范围，已经越发狭隘、逼仄。私有财产者的自主决策空间（即免于某些公共当局的侵扰或干预可能）所剩无几。甚至在居所四壁之内，个人不再享有自由，也不能对财产实施排他性控制。今天，作为“公有财货”的所有者，政府在公共名义下可以侵入你的住宅，任意没收你的财物，甚至绑架你的孩子。

Obviously，in the “real world，” the question of how to privatize is more difficult than in the simple village model。But the village model and elementary social theory can help us recognize the principle （if not all the complicating details） involved and to be applied in this task。The privatization of “public” goods must occur in such a way that does not infringe on the preestablished rights of privateproperty owners （in the same way as the first appropriator of a formerly unowned common street did not infringe on anyone’s rights if and insofar as he recognized every resident’s unrestricted rightofway）。

显而易见，在“真实世界”中，如何私有化的问题，比起简单村落模型要困难得多。但是，村落模型和基础社会理论可以帮助我们认识到涉及和应用于这项任务的原则（虽然不能涵盖所有复杂的细节）。“公共”财货私有化必须以不侵犯私有财产者既有权利的方式进行（就像先前无主的共有街道的首位占有者没有侵犯任何人的权利，只要他承认每位居民不受限制的通行权）。

because “public” streets were the springboards from which all other “public goods” sprang，the privatization process should begin with streets.with the transformation of formerly common streets into “public” streets the expansion of the domain of public goods and the powers of government started，and here one should begin with the solution.

因为“公共”街道是所有其他“公有财货”的起点，所以私有化进程应从街道开始。先前的共有街道转化成“公共”街道，公有财货领域及政府权力扩张皆由此滥觞，故而解决之道也理应从此入手。

The privatization of “public” streets has a twofold result。on the one hand，no resident is henceforth forced to pay any tax for the upkeep or development of any local，provincial，or federal street。The future funding of all streets is solely the responsibility of their new private owners （whomever they may be）。on the other hand，insofar as a resident’s rightsofway are concerned，the privatization must leave no one worse off than he was originally （while it also cannot make anyone better off）。originally，every village resident could travel freely on the local street along his property，and he could proceed equally freely from there as long as things around him were unowned.However，if in his travels he came across something that was visi bly owned，whether a house，a field，or a street，his entrance was conditional on the owner’s permission or invitation.Likewise，if a nonresident stranger came across a local street，entrance to this street was subject to its （domestic） owner’s permission.The stranger had to be invited by some resident onto his property。That is，people could move around，but no one had an entirely unrestricted right of passage.No one was free to move just anywhere with out ever requiring anyone’s permission or invitation.The privatization of streets cannot change this fact and remove such original，natural restrictions on the “freedom of movement。”

“公共”街道私有化有两个后果。一方面，居民今后不再被迫为任何地方道路、省道或国道的维护或开发缴税。将来，所有街道的资金完全是新的私人所有者（无论是谁）的职责。另一方面，对居民通行权来说，私有化不会使任何人比原来处境更差（但也可能不会使任何人处境更好）。最初，每个村民都可以沿着自己的财产，在当地街道上自由行进；只要周围都是无主之物，就能一直畅行无阻。然而，只要在行进中遇到明显的有主之物，无论是房屋、土地或街道，就要以所有者同意或邀请为进入条件。同样，假如一个非居民外来人来到当地街道，进入要取决于（当地）所有者的允许。这个外来人必须受到某些居民的邀请，才能前往该居民的财产。也就是说，人们可以四处迁徙，但没有人拥有完全不受限制的通行权。如果未曾得到允许或邀请，没有人能自由迁徙到任何地方。街道的私有化既不能改变这一事实，也不能消除对“自由迁徙”这种最初的、自然的限制。

Applied to the world of local，provincial，and federal streets，this means that as the result of the privatization of streets every resident must be per mitted to travel freely on every local，provincial，and federal street or high way as before.Entrance onto the streets of different states or provinces，and especially of different localities，however，is not equally free，but conditional on the permission or invitation of the owners of such streets.Local streets always—praxeologically—precede any inter or translocal streets，and hence entry into different localities was never free but always and every where conditional on some local permission or invitation.This original datum is reinstated and reinforced with privatized streets.

将这种原则应用到有地方道路、省道及国道的世界，街道私有化结果意味着每个居民必须得到允许，才能像先前一样在每条地方道路、省道及国道上自由行进。进入不同的州或省尤其是不同地方的街道，无论如何皆并非同等自由，都要以这些街道所有者的允许或邀请为条件。地方街道总是——从行动学上——先于任何跨地方或跨区域的街道，因此进入不同地方从来不是免费的，而总是并且无处不在地依赖于某种地方许可或邀请。这种原始基据（datum）随着街道的私有化得到恢复和强化。

Today，on “public” streets，where everyone is essentially permitted to go everywhere and anywhere，without any “discriminatory” access restric tion whatsoever，conflict in the form of “forced integration，” i.e.，of having to accept uninvited strangers into one’s midst and onto one’s property，has become ubiquitous.In distinct contrast，with every street and in particular every local street privatized，neighborhoods and communities regain their original right of exclusion，which is a defining element of private property （just as much as the right of inclusion，i.e.，the right to invite someone else onto one’s property）。The owners of neighborhood and community streets，while not infringing on any resident’s rightofway or right to invite，can determine the entrance requirement for uninvited strangers （undocumented aliens） onto their streets and thus prevent the phenomenon of forced integration.

现如今，在“公共”街道上，基本允许每个人去任一处地方，毫无“歧视性”访问的限制，这种“被迫一体化”的冲突，也即不得不接受不速之客闯入我们当中、造访我们的财产，变得普遍存在。与之鲜明对比的是，随着每一条街道尤其是每一条地方街道的私有化，街坊及社区恢复了排他性的原初权利，这是私有财产的基本要素（正如接纳权，即邀请他人光临自己财产的权利）。街坊及社区街道的所有者，在不侵犯任何居民通行权及邀请权的同时，可以对不速之客（非法移民）进入街道的要求做出决定，从而阻止被迫一体化的现象。

Yet who are the streets’ owners？ Who can claim，and validate his claim，that he owns the local，provincial，or federal streets？ These streets are not the result of some sort of community effort，nor are they the result of the work of some clearly identifiable person or group of persons.true，literally speaking，the street workers built the streets.But that does not make them the streets’ owners because these workers had to be paid to do their work。without funding，there would be no street。Yet the funds paid to the workers are the result of tax payments by various taxpayers.Accordingly，streets should be regarded as these taxpayers’ property。The former taxpayers，in accordance with their amount of local，state，and federal taxes paid，should be awarded tradable property titles in local，state，and federal streets.They then can either keep these titles as an investment，or they can divest themselves of their street property and sell it，all the while retaining their unrestricted rightofway。

但谁是街道的所有者？谁可以宣称他拥有地方道路、省道或国道，并使得他的主张生效？这些街道不是某种社区努力的结果，也不是某些清楚界定的人或团体的工作成果。确切说，诚然是街道工人建设了街道。但这并不能使他们成为街道所有者，因为必须接受报酬，这些工人才会工作。没有资金，就不会有街道。然而，支付给工人的资金，来自于不同纳税人的税款。相应的，街道理应被视为这些纳税人的财产。先前的纳税人，按照他们的地方、州及联邦税收的缴税额，应该被授予对这些地方、州及联邦街道的可交易财产权。他们或者保留这些权利作为投资，或者放弃这些财产并加以出售，同时始终保留不受限制的通行权。

The same essentially applies to the privatization of all other public goods，such as schools，hospitals，etc。As a result，all tax payments for the upkeep and operation of such goods stop.The funding and development of schools and hospitals，etc。，is henceforth solely up to their new，private own ers.Likewise，the new owners of such formerly “public” goods are those residents who actually financed them.They，in accordance with their amount of taxes paid，should be awarded saleable property shares in the schools，hospitals，etc。Other than in the case of streets，however，the new owners of schools and hospitals are unrestricted by any easements or rightsofway in the future uses of their property。Schools and hospitals，unlike streets，were not first common goods before being turned into “public” goods.Schools and hospitals simply did not exist at all as goods before，i.e.，until they had been first produced； and hence no one （except the producers） can have acquired a prior easement or rightofway concerning their use.Accordingly，the new private owners of schools，hospitals，etc。，are at liberty to set the entrance requirements for their properties and determine if they want to continue operating these properties as schools and hospitals or prefer to employ them for a different purpose.

同样原则基本适用于所有其他公有财货的私有化，例如学校、医院，等等。因此，所有为维护及运作这些财产的税收应停止缴纳。学校、医院（等）的资金及发展，今后完全取决于新的私人所有者。这些先前“公有财货”的新所有者，也就是那些实际为“公有财货”提供资金的居民。他们应按缴税额被授予学校、医院（等）可出售的财产份额。然而，不同于街道的情况，学校和医院的新所有者将来使用财产时，不受任何地役权或通行权的限制。学校及医院不像街道，在被转化为“公共”财产前，不是共有财产。在落成以前，学校和医院本非既有之物。相应的，学校、医院（等）的新的私人所有者，可自由制定其财产的进入要求，并决定是否保留原有用途继续运营或改作其他用途。

IV. 附录私有化：原则与应用

ADDENDUM PRIVATIZATIon：PRINCIple AND APPLICATIonS

The only effective solution to the problem of conflict，i.e.，the only rule or norm that can assure conflict avoidance from the beginning of man kind onward and produce “eternal peace” is the institution of private property，ultimately grounded in acts of original appropriation of previously unowned or “common” resources.In contrast，the institution of public property begins with conflict，i.e.，with an act of original expropriation of some formerly private property （rather than the appropriation of previously unowned goods）； and public property does not end conflict and expropriation but institutionalizes them and makes them permanent。Hence arises the imperative of privatization—and hence the principle of restitution，i.e.，the notion that public property be returned qua private property to those from whom it had been forcibly taken.That is，public goods should become the private property of those who financed or otherwise funded these goods and who can establish an objective—intersubjectively ascertainable—claim to this effect。

根基于对先前无主或“共有”资源先占行动的私产制度，是解决冲突的唯一有效方法，也是确保人类自始往后避免冲突，并产生“永久和平”的唯一规则或规范。相比之下，公有财产制度一开始就带有冲突，也即对某些之前的私有财产开始侵占（而非对先前无主财货的占有）；并且，公有财产非但不会终止冲突及侵占，而且还会使冲突制度化及永久化。因此，私有化势在必行——并因此，赔偿原则出现，即公有财产理应以私有财产名义返还给那些被掠夺财产的人。也就是说，公有财货理应成为那些以资金或其他方式资助它并因此确立客观（主体间可确定的）要求权之人的私有财产。

Applying this principle to the existing world is often complicated and requires considerable legal effort。I shall only consider three realistic privati zation cases in order to address some central questions and decisions.

将这个原则应用于现实世界往往复杂棘手，需要下大量法律功夫。为解决一些关键问题及决策，我将仅考虑三种现实的私有化情形。

The first case，most closely approximated by the former Soviet Union，is that of a society where each and every property is public property，administered by a state government。Everyone is a state employee and works in public offices，enterprises，factories，and shops； and everyone moves and lives on public land and in public housing。There is no private property except in immediate consumer goods，in one’s underwear，toothbrush，etc。Moreover，all records concerning the legal past are lost or destroyed such that no one，based on such records，can substantiate a claim to any identifiable part of public property。

第一种情形，大概最接近于前苏联社会，一切财产都是政府管理的公有财产。每个人都是政府雇员，在公共部门、企业、工厂和商店工作；每个人都生活在公地及公屋里面。除了内衣、牙刷等直接消费品外，没有私有财产。此外，所有的关于法律沿革的记录都丢失或者损毁；这样任何人都不能根据记录证实他对公有财产任何可识别部分的要求权。

In this case，the principle that every claim to public property must be based on objective，intersubjectively ascertainable “data” would lead one to award private ownership （and saleable property titles） based on present or past occupancy：the bureaus go to the bureaucrats who occupy them，the factories to the workers，the fields to the farmers，and the houses to the residents.retired workers are awarded property titles in their former work places in accordance with the duration of their employment。As present or past occupants of the property in question，only they have an objective tie to this property。They are the ones who have maintained the property as it is while others were working elsewhere at other public workplaces.

在这种情形中，对公有财产的每个要求权都必须建基于客观的、主体间可确定“数据”的之上，这一原则会导致根据现有或过去的占有情况授予私有财产权（和可出售的财产权）：官署归占有它们的官员，工厂归工人，土地归农民，房屋归居住者。根据工龄授予退休工人先前工场的财产权。作为当前及先前的占有者，只有他们才与该财产存在客观联系。他们是事实上的财产维护者，正如其他公共工场的工人。

Everything else，i.e.，all public property that is not currently occupied and maintained by anyone （E.g。，the “wilderness”） becomes “common” property and is opened up to all members of the society for privatization by way of original appropriation.

对于其他所有目前未被任何人占有及维护的公有财产（如荒地），则成为“共有”财产对全社会成员开放，其私有化皆采用先占方式。

This solution only leaves out one important question.All legal documents are presumably lost。But people have not lost their memories.They still remember past crimes.There are victims and witnesses to acts of murder，battery，torture，and imprisonment。What to do with those who committed these crimes，who ordered or commissioned them，or who cooperated in their execution？ Should the torturers of the secret police and the Communist nomenklatura， for instance，be included in this privatization scheme and become the private owners of the police sta tions and government palaces where they administered and planned their crimes？ Justice requires instead that every alleged criminal offender be brought to trial by his supposed victims and，if sentenced and convicted，not only be excluded from obtaining any public property whatsoever，but also possibly be handed much harsher punishment （such as having his throat cut）。

The second case differs from the first one in only one respect：the legal past has not been wiped out。Documents and records exist to prove past expropriations，and based on such documents specific people can lay objective claim to specific pieces of public property。This was essentially the case in the Soviet Union’s former vassal states，such as East germany，Czecho slovakia，Poland，etc。，where the Communist takeover had taken place only some 40 years or about one generation before （rather than more than 70 years，as in the Soviet Union）。

第二种情形与第一种大同小异：法律沿革未被抹去。证明过去被侵占、剥夺的文档依然存在，根据这些档案，特定人可以对特定公有财产提出客观要求权。这基本上是苏联前附庸国的情况，如在东德、捷克斯洛伐克、波兰等国，共产党掌权大约仅有40年或仅隔一代（而非像苏联那样超过70年）。

In this case，the original，expropriated owners or their legal heirs should be restored as private owners to the public property in question.But what about capital improvements？ More specifically，what about newly erected structures （of houses and factories）—that would come to be privately owned by their current or past occupants—that were built on land restored to a different，original landowner？ How many property shares should the landowner receive and how many the owners of the structure？ Structures and land cannot be physically separated.In terms of economic theory，they are absolutely specific，complementary production factors whose relative contribution to their jointvalue product cannot be disentangled.In this case no alternative exists for the contending parties but to bargaiN.

这种情形中，被剥夺的原所有者或他们的合法继承人，理应被恢复成相关公有财产的私人所有者。但如何处理资本增量？更具体地说，那些在土地上新建的房屋和工厂怎么办？建筑物应归使用者（现在的和过去的）所有，而其下的土地所有权应恢复给原来的土地所有者。难题在于，建筑物和土地无法物理分割，土地所有者和建筑物所有者应该分别获得多少产权份额？从经济理论上讲，建筑物和土地是绝对特定的、互补的生产因素，它们对产品产出的贡献也无法分割。在这种情况下，争议双方别无选择，只能通过协商解决。

The third case is that of the socalled mixed economies.In these Societies a public sector exists side by side with a nominally private sector。There are public goods and public employees next to nominally private property and the owners and employees of private business.Typically，the public employees who administer public property do not produce goods or services that are sold on the market。（For the atypical case of valueproductive public enterprises，see below.） Their sales revenue and their market income are zero。Their salaries and all other costs involved in the operation of public goods are instead paid for by others.These others are the owners and employees of private business.Private business and employees，in contrast to their public counterparts，produce goods and services that are sold in the market and thus earn an income.Out of this income，private business does not merely pay the salaries of its own employees and provide for the maintenance of its own property； it also pays—in the form of income and property taxes—the （net） salaries of all public employees and the operating costs of all public property。

第三种情形是所谓混合经济。在这些社会中，公共部门与名义的私营部门共存。存在公有财货和公共雇员，也有名义上的私有财产及所有者、私企雇员。典型情况是，掌管公有财产的公共雇员，并不生产市场出售的产品或服务。（对于价值生产型公共企业的非典型情况见下面。）他们的销售收入及市场收入为零；工资薪酬及经营公有财货涉及的全部其他费用，都是由他人支付。这些其他人，是指私营企业的所有者及雇员。私营企业及雇员，与公共企业及雇员不同，前者生产市场销售的商品及服务，从而赚取收入。从这种收入当中，私营企业不仅支付自己雇员的薪酬，同时也维护自身的财产；也以所得税及财产税的形式，支付所有公共雇员的（净）薪酬，以及所有公有财产的运作成本。

In this case，the principle that public property should be restored qua private property to those who actually funded it would lead one to assign ownership titles exclusively to private owners，producers，and employees in accordance with their past property and income tax payments，while public managers and employees would be excluded.All government offices and palaces，for instance，would have to be vacated by their current occupants.Publicsector salaries were paid only—and public property exists only— because of the funding provided by privatebusiness owners and their employees.Hence，while public employees may keep their private property，they have no claim to the public property that they used and administered.

这种情形中，根据公有财产理应以私产名义归还给实际资金提供者的原则，基于他们过去的财产税及所得税缴纳额，将财产权排他性地分配给私人所有者、生产者及雇员，而公共部门的管理者及雇员则排除在外。例如，当前占有者必须搬出所有政府办公室及大楼。公共部门的薪酬支付及公有财产的之所以存在，完全依靠私营企业所有者及其雇员提供的资金。因此，虽然公共雇员可保留其私有财产，但对其使用及掌管的公有财产则没有要求权。

（This is different only in the atypical case where a public enterprise，such as a governmentowned car factory，produced marketable goods and services and thus earned a market income.In that case，the public employees may have a legitimate claim to ownership，depending on the circum stances.They have a claim to full ownership of the factory，if no previously expropriated owner exists who can lay claim to the factory and if the factory never received any tax subsidies.If a previous owner exists，the factory employees can claim at best partial ownership and must bargain with the owner concerning their relative share of ownership titles.And if and to the extent that the factory had been tax subsidized，the factory workers would have to further divide their proportion of ownership titles with private sector employees qua taxpayers.）

（这和公共企业如国有汽车工厂，生产可销售的市场产品及服务，从而赚取市场收入的非典型情况不同。这时公共雇员可视情况拥有对所有权的法定要求权。假如没有可对工厂提出要求权的、被剥夺的前所有者，且假如工厂没有接受任何税收补贴，公共雇员就拥有对工厂全部所有权的要求权。如果存在前所有者，工厂雇员充其量只能要求部分所有权，且必须与工厂所有者就相应所有权份额进行协商。只要工厂是由税收补贴的，，那么在一定程度上，工厂工人将不得不与纳税人身份的私营部门雇员进一步分配所有权份额。）

Simultaneously with the privatization of all public property，all nominally private property would be restored to its original state as real private property。That is，all nominally private property would be freed of all property or income taxes and of all legislative restrictions on its use （while previously concluded agreements concerning the use of property between private parties remain in effect）。without taxes，then，there are no government expenditures，and without government expenditures all public employees will be unsalaried and must look for productive work to earn a living。Likewise，every recipient of government grants，subsidies，or purchase orders will see his income reduce or disappear entirely and must look for alternatives.

在公有财产全面私有化的同时，名义私有财产将全面恢复成真正私有财产的原状。也就是说，名义私有财产全面免除财产税和所得税，以及所有关于其使用的立法限制（与此同时，先前私人间关于财产使用达成的协议依然有效）。没有税收，就没有任何政府支出；没有政府支出，所有政府雇员就无薪水可领，必须从事生产性工作以谋生。同样，每个接受政府拨款、补贴或采购订单的人都会看到自己的收入减少或完全消失，而不得不另谋生计。

This solution leaves still one important question unresolved.once all net taxpayers have been allotted their appropriate number of publicproperty shares，how do they take hold of this property and exercise their rights as privateproperty owners？ Even if an inventory of all public property exists，most people do not have the faintest idea of what it is that they now （partially） own.Most people have a fairly good idea of local public property，but about the public property at other，distant locations，they know next to nothing，except regarding a few “national monuments.” It is practically impossible for anyone to reach a realistic appraisal of the “correct” price for all of public property，and hence also of the “correct” price of an individual share in this property。Consequently，the prices asked and paid for such shares would be highly indeterminate and widely fluctuating and divergent，at least initially； and it would be rather unwieldy and highly timeconsuming until some investor or group of investors had bought up the majority of all shares in order to then begin operating or selling off parts of this property to earn a return on the investment。

这个解决方案仍有一个关键尚待解决。一旦所有净纳税人分得适当数量的公有财产份额，他们如何掌控财产，并作为私有财产者行使权利？即使所有的公有财产清单存在，绝大多数人对他们现在（部分）所有的财产连最模糊的概念都没有。大多数人对本地公有财产有相当不错的了解，但对其他遥远地区的公有财产，除了“名胜古迹”以外，就知之甚少。对任何人来说，要给出所有公有财产“准确”价格的现实估价，及该财产中个人份额的“准确”价格，实际上都不可能。因此，至少一开始，对这些份额的讨价还价都是高度不确定的，且大幅波动、充满分歧；直到某些或某批投资者收购大多数份额之后投入经营，或者出售部分财产以赚取投资回报之前，这个过程都是相当繁琐与耗时。

This difficulty can be overcome by bringing the idea of original appropriation back into play。The titles in the hands of net taxpayers are not only saleable tickets.More importantly，they entitle their owners to repossess formerly public and nowvacated property。Public property is opened to original appropriation，and the tickets are claims to vacated，momentarily unowned public property。Everyone can take his titles to specific pieces of public property and register as their owner。Since the first one to register with a particular piece of property would be its initial owner，it is assured that all pieces of public property would be almost instantly repossessed.More specifically，most public property would thus，at least initially，come to be owned by local residents，i.e.，by people living in close proximity to a given piece of property and most knowledgeable concerning its potential value productivity。Moreover，because the value per property share increasingly falls as additional ticketholders register with one and the same piece of property，any oversubscription or undersubscription of specific proper ties would be avoided or weeded out quickly。very quickly，each piece of property would be appraised realistically according to its value productivity。

这个难题可以通过重新引入先占的概念来解决。净纳税人手中的名义所有权不只是可出售的票据；更重要的是给予所有者重新占有先前公有而现在空置的财产权利。公有财产对先占开放，这些票据代表着对空置的、暂时无主的公有财产的要求权。每个人都可以对特定的公有财产行使自己的权利并注册为财产所有者。由于特定财产的首位注册者成为其最初所有者，确保了所有公有财产几乎在短期内被重新占有。更具体的说，大部分公有财产至少在一开始会因此被当地居民拥有，即被居住在该财产附近，以及最了解其潜在价值生产力的人所拥有。此外，由于每个额外的票据持有人注册同一块财产时，该财产每股的价值会下降，因此，任何特定财产的超额认购或不足认购问题都会很快被避免或消除。很快，每块财产都会根据其价值生产力被现实地评估。

6 自然秩序、国家和移民问题*

Natural Order，the State，and the immigration problem

I.

Human cooperation is the result of three factors：the differences among men and/or the geographical distribution of naturegiven factors of production； the higher productivity achieved under the division of labor based on the mutual recognition of private property （the exclusive control of every man over his own body and his physical appropriations and possessions） as compared to either selfsufficient isolation or aggression，plunder and domination； and the human ability to recognize this latter fact。Were it not for the higher productivity of labor performed under division of labor and the human ability to recognize this fact，explains Ludwig von Mises，men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another，irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature.Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies； his craving for the satisfaction of his own appe tites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neigh bors.No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.

人类合作是三个因素促成的结果：一是人与人之间的差异和/或自然生产要素地理分布上的不同；二是与自给自足的孤立或侵犯、掠夺和统治相比，在相互承认私有财产（每个人对自己的身体、物理占有物和财产的排他性控制）的基础上进行劳动分工，实现了更高的生产力；三是人类有能力认识到后一事实。正如路德维希·冯·米塞斯所解释的那样，如果不是劳动分工下劳动生产率的提高和人类认识到这一事实的能力，人类将永远是彼此的死敌，在努力获取大自然提供的稀缺的生存手段的过程中，他们是不可调和的对手。每个人都将被迫视其他所有人为敌人；他渴望满足自己的欲望，这将使他与所有的邻居发生不可调和的冲突。在这种情况下，不可能产生同情。[91]

The higher productivity achieved under the division of labor and man’s ability to recognize this fact explain the origin of the most elementary and fundamental of human institutions：the family and the family household. Second，it explains the fact of neighborhood （community） among homoge neous people （families，clans，tribes）：of neighborhood in the form of adja cent properties owned by separate and “equal” owners and in the “unequal” form of the relationship characteristic of a father and his son，a landlord and his tenant，or a community founder and his followerresidents. Third and most important for our purposes，it explains the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of heterogeneous and alien communities.Even if the members of different communities find each other physically and/or behaviorally strange，irritating，or annoying，and do not want to associate as neighbors，they may still engage in mutually beneficial trade if they reside spatially separated from each other。

在劳动分工下实现的更高生产率，以及人类认识到这一事实的能力，解释了最根本和最核心的人类制度——家庭和家户的起源。[92]其次，它解释了同族人（家庭、氏族、部落）之间的邻里关系（社区）的事实：邻里关系是由独立的、“平等的”所有者拥有的相邻财产，以及父亲和儿子、地主和佃户、社区创始人和他的追随者之间“不平等”的关系为特征所构成的。[93]第三，也是对我们的目的来说最重要的，它解释了异质和外来社区和平共处的可能性。即使不同社区的成员发现彼此的外貌和/或行为上很奇怪，令人恼火或惹人讨厌，并且不想作为邻居交往，如果他们在空间上彼此分开居住，他们仍然可能从事互利的贸易交换。[94]

let us broaden this picture and assume the existence of different races，ethnicities，languages，religions，and cultures （henceforth summarily：ethno cultures）。Based on the insight that “likes” associate with other likes and live spatially separated from “unlikes，” the following picture emerges：People of one ethnoculture tend to live in close proximity to one another and spatially separated and distant from people of another ethnoculture.Whites live among Whites and separate from Asians and Blacks.Italian speak ers live among other Italians and separate from English speakers.Chris tians live among other Christians and separate from Muslims.Catholics live among Catholics and separate from Protestants，etc。Naturally，some “overlap” and “mixing” of different ethnocultures in various “borderter ritories” exists.Moreover，as centers of interregional trade，cities naturally display a higher degree of ethnocultural heterogeneity。This notwithstand ing，however，neighborhoods and communities are internally homogeneous （unicultural）。In fact，even in border territories and cities the same spatial association and separation of likes and unlikes is found.Nothing like a society where members of different ethnocultures live as neighbors or in close physical proximity to each other （as propagated by some American multi culturalists） emerges.Rather，the emerging multiculturalism is one in which many distinctly different ethnocultures coexist in physicalspatial separa tion and distance from one another，and trade with each other from afar。

让我们扩大这幅图景，假设存在着不同的种族、民族、语言、宗教和文化（以下简称民族文化）。基于“相似的人”与其他相似的人联系在一起，与“不相似的人”在空间上分开的这一观点，下面的画面就出现了：同一种民族文化的人往往彼此生活得很近，而与另一种民族文化的人在空间上是分开的，彼此之间距离很远。白人与白人生活在一起，与亚洲人和黑人分开。说意大利语的人和其他意大利人生活在一起，与说英语的人分开。基督徒与其他基督徒生活在一起，与穆斯林分开。天主教徒与天主教徒生活在一起，与新教徒分开，等等。自然，不同民族文化在不同的“边界领土”中存在一些“重叠”和“混合”。此外，城市作为区域间交易的中心，自然表现出较高程度的民族文化异质性。然而，尽管如此，邻里和社区内部是同质的（单一文化的）。实际上，即使在边境区域和城市中，也是同一族群小聚居于不同族群大杂居的格局中。那种不同民族文化的成员像邻居一样生活在一起或在很近的物理距离内相处的社会（如一些美国多元文化主义者所宣扬的那样）并没有出现。相反，正在出现的多元文化主义是这样一种文化，在这种文化中，许多截然不同的民族文化在物理空间上彼此分离，彼此疏远，相隔千里却有贸易往来。[95]

let us take one more step and assume that all property is owned privately and the entire globe is settled.Every piece of land，every house and building，every road，river，and lake，every forest and mountain，and all of the coastline is owned by private owners or firms.No such thing as “public” property or “open frontier” exists.let us take a look at the problem of migration under this scenario of a “natural order。”

让我们再进一步，假设我们居住的地球，所有的财产都归私人所有。每一块土地，每一栋房屋和建筑，每一条道路、河流和湖泊，每一片森林和山脉，以及所有的海岸线都归私人所有者或公司所有。不存在“公共”财产或“开放的边界”这样的东西。让我们来看看这种“自然秩序”条件下的移民问题。

First and foremost，in a natural order，there is no such thing as “freedom of migration.” People cannot move about as they please.Wherever a person moves，he moves on private property； and private ownership implies the owner’s right to include as well as to exclude others from his property。Essentially，a person can move only if he is invited by a recipient property owner，and this recipientowner can revoke his invitation and expel his invitees whenever he deems their continued presence on his property undesirable （in violation of his visitation code）。

首先，在自然秩序中，不存在 “迁徙自由”。无论一个人在哪里迁移，他都是在私有财产上迁移；而私有权意味着财产所有者有权将他人接纳进自己的财产，也有权将他人排除在自己的财产之外。从根本上说，一个人只有在接受财产所有者邀请的情况下才能迁移，而接受邀请的财产所有者只要认为被邀请者在自己的财产上继续逗留是不受欢迎的（违反了他的访问守则），就可以撤销他的邀请并驱逐他。

There will be plenty of movement under this scenario because there are powerful reasons to open access to one’s property，but there are also reasons to restrict or close access.Those who are the most inclusive are the owners of roads，railway stations，harbors，and airports，for example .Interregional movement is their business.Accordingly，their admission standards can be expected to be low，typically requiring no more than the payment of a user fee.However，even they would not follow a completely nondiscriminatory admission policy。For instance，they would exclude intoxicated or unruly people and eject all trespassers，beggars，and bums from their property，and they might videotape or otherwise monitor or screen their customers while on their property。

在这种情况下会有很多的迁移活动，因为有充分的理由开放自己财产的使用权，但也有理由限制或关闭使用权。最具包容性的是道路、火车站、港口和机场的所有者，例如，区域间的流动是他们的业务。因此，它们的准入标准可能会很低，通常只需要支付使用费。然而，即使是他们也不会遵循完全无歧视的准入政策。例如，他们会排除酗酒或不守规矩的人，并将驱逐所有的擅自闯入者、乞丐和流浪汉，他们可能会对在其财产内的顾客进行录像或以其他方式进行监视或筛查。

The situation for the owners of retail establishments，hotels，and restaurants is similar。They are in the business of selling and renting and thus offer easy access to their property。They have every economic incentive not to discriminate unfairly against “strangers” or “foreigners，” because this would lead to reduced profits or losses.However，they must be significantly more circumspect and restrictive in their admission policy than the owners of roads or airports.They must take into account the localdomestic repercussions that the presence of strangers may have.If localdomestic sales suffer due to a retailer’s or hotel’s open admission policy visàvis foreigners，then discrimination is economically justified.In order to overcome this possible problem，commercial establishments can be expected to require of their “foreign” visitors at a minimum adherence to local standards of con duct and appearance.

零售场所、酒店和餐馆的老板的情况也类似。他们的业务是出售和出租，因此会允许他人便捷的进入他们的财产。他们有充分的经济动机不去不公平地歧视“陌生人”或“外国人”，因为这会导致利润减少或损失。然而，他们的准入政策必须比道路或机场的所有者更加谨慎和严格。他们必须考虑到陌生人的出现可能对当地带来的影响。假如零售商或酒店对外国人的开放政策，会导致他们对于本地人的销售额下降，那么歧视外来人员在经济上就是合理的。为了克服这个可能出现的问题，这些商业机构可以要求他们的“外国”来访者至少遵守当地的行为和着装标准。[96]

The situation is similar for local employers.They prefer lower to higher wage rates； hence，they are not predisposed against foreigners.However，they must be sensitive to the repercussions on the local labor force that may result from the employment of foreigners； that is，they must be fearful of the possibility that an ethnoculturally heterogeneous work force might lead to lower productivity。Moreover，employment requires housing，and it is in the residential housing and real estate market where discrimination against and exclusion of ethnocultural strangers will tend to be most pronounced.For it is in the area of residential as contrasted to commercial property where the human desire to be private，secluded，protected，and undisturbed from external events and intrusions is most pronounced.The value of residential property to its owner depends essentially on its almost total exclusivity。only family members and occasionally friends are included.And if resi dential property is located in a neighborhood，this desire for undisturbed possession—peace and privacy—is best accomplished by a high degree of ethnocultural homogeneity （as this lowers transaction costs while simulta neously increasing protection from external disturbances and intrusions）。By renting or selling residential property to strangers （and especially to strangers from ethnoculturally distant quarters），heterogeneity is intro duced into the neighborhood.Transaction costs tend to increase，and the peculiar peaceandprivacy security—the freedom from external，foreign intrusions—sought and expected of residential property tends to fall，result ing in lower residential property values.[97]

当地雇主的情况也类似。他们偏爱低工资甚于高工资；因此，他们并不倾向于排斥外来人口。但是，他们必须对雇佣外来人口可能对当地劳动力造成的影响保持敏感；也就是说，他们一定会担心一个不同民族文化的劳动力可能会降低生产率。此外，就业需要住房，而在住宅和房地产市场中，对不同种族文化的陌生人的歧视和排斥往往最为明显。因为与商业地产相比，在住宅领域，人们对隐私、安静、受保护和不受外部事件侵扰的渴望最为强烈。住宅物业对其所有者而言，其价值基本上取决于几乎百分百的排他性。只有家庭成员，偶尔也包括朋友才会被接纳。如果住宅物业位于一个社区，这种对不受干扰的拥有——和平和隐私——的渴望，最好是通过高度的民族文化同质性来实现的（因为这降低了交易成本，同时增加了对外部干扰和入侵的保护）。通过将住宅物业出租或出售给陌生人（特别是来自遥远地区的不同种族文化的陌生人），将异质性引入社区，交易成本趋于增加，对住宅物业特有的和平与隐私安全——不受外部、外国入侵的自由——的追求和期望趋于下降，导致住宅物业价值下降。

Under the scenario of a natural order，then，it can be expected that there will be plenty of interregional trade and travel。However，owing to the natu ral discrimination against ethnocultural strangers in the area of residential housing and real estate，there will be little actual migration，i.e.，permanent resettlement。And whatever little migration there is，it will be by individuals who are more or less completely assimilated to their newly adopted com munity and its ethnoculture.

因此，在自然秩序的情景下，可以预期将会有大量的区域间交易和旅行。然而，由于在住房和房地产领域对不同种族文化的陌生人的自然歧视，实际永居的移民很少。无论有多少移民，都是那些或多或少被这些新移民社区及其民族文化同化的人。[98]

II.

let us now introduce the institution of a State.The definition of a State assumed here is rather uncontroversial：A State is an agency which possesses the exclusive monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking and conflict arbitration within a given territory。In particular，a State can insist that all confiicts involving itself be adjudicated by itself or its agents.Implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge，as the second defining element of a State，is its power to tax：to unilaterally determine the price justice seekers must pay to the State for its services as the monopolistic provider of law and order。

现在让我们引入国家制度。这里假定对国家的定义是完全没有争议的：国家是在某一领土内垄断了最终决策和冲突仲裁的机构。特别是，一个国家可以坚称所有涉及它自身的冲突都必须由它自己或其代理人来裁决。作为国家的第二个界定因素，排除所有其他人担任最终裁判者，隐含着其征税的权力：单方面决定寻求公正的人必须为国家这个法律和秩序的垄断者提供的服务所需支付的价格。[99]

certainly，based on this definition it is easy to understand why there might be a desire to establish a State.It is not，as we are told in kindergarten，in order to attain the “common good” or because there would be no order without a State，but for a reason far more selfish and basE.For he who is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make and cre ate laws in his own favor rather than recognize and apply existing law； and he who can legislate can also tax and thus enrich himself at the expense of others.

当然，根据这一定义，很容易理解为什么人们会有建立国家的愿望。这不像我们在幼儿园里被告知的那样，是为了实现“共同利益”，也不是因为没有国家就没有秩序，而是出于一个更自私、更卑劣的原因。因为作为在一定领土内最终仲裁的垄断者，可以制定和创立有利于自己的法律，而不是承认和适用现有法律；能立法的人也就能征税，从而损人肥己。

Here it is impossible to cover the fascinating question of how such an extraordinary institution as a State with the power to legislate and tax can possibly arise，except to note that ideologies and intellectuals play a decisive role. Rather，States are assumed “given，” and the changes as regards migra tion that result from their existence will be considered.

在这里，除了指出意识形态和知识分子起着决定性作用外，不可能涵盖这样一个引人入胜的问题，即像一个拥有立法和征税权力的国家这样一个异乎寻常的机构是如何可能产生的。[100]此外，假定国家是“既定存在的”，我们将进一步考虑由于其存在而导致的移民方面的变化。

First，with the establishment of a state and territorially defined state borders，“immigration” takes on an entirely new meaning。In a natural order，immigration is a person’s migration from one neighborhoodcom munity into a different one （micromigration）。In contrast，under statist conditions immigration is immigration by “foreigners” from across state borders，and the decision whom to exclude or include，and under what conditions，rests not with a multitude of independent private property own ers or neighborhoods of owners but with a single central （and centralizing） stategovernment as the ultimate sovereign of all domestic residents and their properties （macromigration）。If a domestic residentowner invites a person and arranges for his access onto the residentowner’s property but the government excludes this person from the state territory，it is a case of forced exclusion （a phenomenon that does not exist in a natural order）。on the other hand，if the government admits a person while there is no domestic residentowner who has invited this person onto his property，it is a case of forced integration （also nonexistent in a natural order，where all movement is invited）。

首先，随着国家的建立和领土边界的界定，“移民”有了一个全新的含义。在自然秩序中，移民是一个人从一个社区迁移到另一个社区（微观移民）。相比之下，在国家主义的条件下，移民是由跨越国家边界的“外国”移民构成，根据什么条件，排除或接受什么人的决定，不取决于众多独立的私人财产所有者或私人所有者构成的社区，而是取决于一个单一的中央（和中心化的）政府，它是所有国内居民及其财产的最终的决策者（宏观移民）。

III.

In order to comprehend the significance of this change from decentralized admission by a multitude of property owners and ownerassociations （micromigration） to centralized admission by a state （macromigration），and in particular to grasp the potentialities of forced integration under statist conditions，it is necessary first to briefly consider a state’s policy of domestic migration.Based on the state’s definition as a territorial monopolist of legislation and taxation and the assumption of “selfinterest，” the basic features of its policy can be predicted.

为了理解这种从众多财产所有者和社区的去中心化接纳（微观移民）到国家的中心化接纳（宏观移民）的转变的意义，特别是为了理解国家主义条件下强制一体化的可能性，首先有必要简短考虑一个国家的国内移民政策。基于国家的定义，作为某一领土的立法和税收的垄断者，以及“自利”假设，可以预测其政策的基本特征。

Most fundamentally，it can be predicted that the state’s agents will be interested in increasing （maximizing） tax revenues and/or expanding the range of legislative interference with established private property rights，but they will have little or no interest in actually doing what a state is supposed to do：protecting private property owners and their property from domestic and foreign invasion.

最根本的是，可以预测，国家代理人将对增加（最大化）税收，和/或立法扩大对既定私有财产权的干预范围感兴趣，但他们实际上对做一个国家应该做的事情几乎没有兴趣：保护私人财产所有者及其财产免受国内外的侵犯。

More specifically，because taxes and legislative interference with private property rights are not paid voluntarily but are met with resistance，a state，to assure its own power to tax and legislate，must have an existential interest in providing its agents access to everyone and all property within the state’s territory。In order to accomplish this，a state must take control of （expropriate） all existing private roads and then use its tax revenue to construct more and additional “public” roads，places，parks and lands，until everyone’s private property borders on or is encircled by public lands and roads.

更具体地说，由于税收和对私有产权的立法干预不是民众自愿支付的，而是会遭到抵制，一个国家为了确保自己的税收和立法权力，必须让其代理人能够接触到国家领土内的每个人及其所有财产，这是一种实实在在的利益。为了实现这一目标，国家必须控制（征用）一切现有的私人道路，然后利用其税收来建造更多的“公有”道路、场所、花园以及开拓土地，直到每个人的私有财产都与公有土地和道路接壤或被公有土地和道路的汪洋大海包围。

many economists have argued that the existence of public roads indi cates an imperfection of the natural—free market—order。According to them，the free market “underproduces” the socalled “public” good of roads； and taxfunded public roads rectify this deficiency and enhance over all economic efficiency （by facilitating interregional movement and trade and lowering transaction costs）。Obviously，this is a starryeyed view of the situation.

许多经济学家认为，公有道路的存在表明了自然自由市场秩序的不完善。根据他们的说法，自由市场“生产不足”所谓的道路这种“公共”商品；由税收资助的公有道路弥补了这一不足，并提高了总体经济效率（通过促进区域间的流动和交易以及降低交易成本）。很显然，这只是对实际形势的一厢情愿的幻想。[101]

free markets do produce roads，although they may well produce fewer and different roads than under statist conditions.And viewed from the perspective of a natural order，the increased production of roads under statist conditions represents not an improvement but an “overproduction，” or better yet “malproduction，” of roads.Public roads are not simply harmless facilitators of interregional exchange.First and foremost，they are facilitators of state taxation and control，for on public roads the government’s taxmen，police，and military can proceed directly to everyone’s doorstep.

自由市场的确生产道路，尽管比国家主义制度条件下相比，生产的道路数量可能更少、且类型也不同。从自然秩序的角度来看，在国家主义制度条件下道路产量的增加并不是一种改进，而是道路的“生产过剩”，或者贴切的说法是“生产不良”。公有道路不仅仅是地区间交流的有益无害的辅助。它们首先是国家税收和控制的辅助，有了公有道路，政府的税吏、警察和军队可以长驱直入，到每家每户的门口。[102]

In addition，public roads and lands lead to a distortion and artificial breakup of the spatial association and separation characteristic of a natural order。As explained，there are reasons to be close and inclusive，but there are also reasons to be physically distant and separated from others.The overproduction of roads occurring under statist conditions means on the one hand that different communities are brought into greater proximity to one another than they would have preferred （on grounds of demonstrated preference）。on the other hand，it means that one coherent community is broken up and divided by public roads.

此外，公有道路和土地会导致自然秩序所特有的空间关联与分隔特征出现扭曲和人为的破坏。如前文所述，人们有亲近和包容他人的理由，但也有与他人保持实际距离、相互分隔的理由。在国家主义条件下出现的道路过度生产现象，一方面意味着不同社区彼此间的距离比它们原本希望的（基于展示的偏好）更近了；另一方面，这意味着一个完整统一的社区会被公有道路分割得支离破碎。[103]

Moreover，under the particular assumption of a democratic state even more specific predictions can be made.Almost by definition，a state’s terri tory extends over several ethnoculturally heterogeneous communities，and dependent on recurring popular elections，a stategovernment will predict ably engage in redistributive policies.[104] in an ethnoculturally mixed terri tory this means playing one race，tribe，linguistic or religious group against another； one class within any one of these groups against another （the rich versus the poor，the capitalists versus the workers，etc。）； and finally，mothers against fathers and children against parents.The resulting income and wealth redistribution is complex and varied.There are simple transfer pay ments from one group to another，for instance.However，redistribution also has a spatial aspect。In the realm of spatial relations it finds expression in an ever more pervasive network of nondiscriminatory “affirmative action” policies imposed on private property owners.

此外，在民主国家的特殊假设下，甚至可以做出更具体的预测。几乎可以用定义来说明，一个国家的领土延伸到几个种族文化不同的社区，并且依赖于经常性的民众选举，政府将可以有预见地参与再分配政策。在一个民族文化混杂的地区，这意味着存在不同种族、部落、语言或宗教团体之间的对抗；这些群体中的一个阶级对抗另一个阶级（富人对抗穷人，资本家对抗工人，等等）；最后，夫妻反目、父子成仇。由此产生的收入和财富再分配复杂而多样。例如，有从一个群体到另一个群体的简单转移支付。然而，再分配也有空间方面的影响。在空间关系领域，它表现为强加给私人财产所有者一个愈发普遍的、非歧视性 “平权运动 ”政策网络。

An owner’s right to exclude others from his property is the means by which he can avoid “bads” from happening：events that will lower the value of his property。By means of an unceasing flood of redistributive legislation，the democratic state has worked relentlessly not only to strip its citizens of all arms （weapons） but also to strip domestic property owners of their right of exclusion，thereby robbing them of much of their personal and physical protection.Commercial property owners such as stores，hotels，and restau rants are no longer free to exclude or restrict access as they see fit。Employers can no longer hire or fire who they wisH.In the housing market，landlords are no longer free to exclude unwanted tenants.Furthermore，restrictive covenants are compelled to accept members and actions in violation of their very own rules and regulations.In short，forced integration is ubiquitous，making all aspects of life increasingly uncivilized and unpleasant。

所有者有权将他人排除在其财产之外，这是他避免“坏事”发生的一种手段：那些会降低其财产价值的事件。通过源源不断的再分配立法洪流，民主国家不仅无情地剥夺了其公民的所有武器，而且剥夺了国内财产所有者的排斥权，从而剥夺了他们的许多人身和有形的保护。商业地产的所有者，如商店、酒店和餐馆，不再可以自由地排斥或限制他们认为不合适的访客。雇主也不再能自主决定雇佣或解雇谁。在住房市场，房东不再能自由地拒绝不受欢迎的租户。此外，限制性条款被迫接受违反其自身规章制度的成员和行为。简而言之，强制一体化无处不在，使得生活的方方面面变得越来越不文明、令人不快。[105]

IV.

with this backdrop of domestic state policies we can return to the problem of immigration under statist conditions.It is now clear what state admission implies.It does not merely imply centralized admission.By admitting someone onto its territory，the state also permits this person to proceed on public roads and lands to every domestic resident’s doorsteps，to make use of all public facilities and services （such as hospitals and schools），and to access every commercial establishment，employment，and residential housing，protected by a multitude of nondiscrimination laws.

在这种国内政策的背景下，我们回到国家主义条件下的移民问题。现在很清楚国家准入意味着什么。它并不仅仅意味着中心化的准入。国家准许某人进入其领土，也就允许此人在公有道路和土地上通行，直抵每一位国内居民的家门口，使用所有公共设施和服务（如医院和学校），并进入每一家商业机构、获得就业机会以及入住居民住房，而且这一切都受到众多反歧视法律的保护。[106]

only one more element is missing in this reconstruction.Why would immigration ever be a problem for a state？ Who would want to migrate from a natural order into a statist area？ A statist area would tend to lose its residents，especially its most productive subjects.It would be an attraction only for potential statewelfare recipients （whose admission would only further strengthen the emigration tendency）。If anything，emigration is a problem for a state.In fact，the institution of a State is a cause of emigration； indeed，it is the most important or even the sole cause of modern mass migrations （more powerful and devastating in its effects than any hurricane，earthquake or flood and comparable only to the effects on migration of the various ice ages）。

这次重构只少了一个元素。为什么移民会成为一个国家的问题？谁会想从自然秩序地区移民到国家主义地区呢？一个国家主义地区往往会失去它的居民，尤其是它最具生产力的居民。它只会吸引潜在的国家福利接受者（他们的加入只会进一步强化移民倾向）。如果有的话，移民是一个国家的问题。事实上，国家体制是移民的一个原因；事实上，它是现代大规模移民的最重要甚至是唯一的原因（其影响比任何飓风、地震或洪水都更强大和更具破坏性，能与相媲美的唯有各种冰河时期对移民的影响）。

What has been missing in this reconstruction is the assumption of a multitude of states partitioning the entire globe （the absence of natural orders anywhere）。Then，as one state causes mass emigration，another state will be confronted with the problem of mass immigration； and the general direction of mass migration movements will be from territories where states exploit （legislatively expropriate and tax） their subjects more （and wealth accordingly tends to be lower） to territories where states exploitless （and wealth is higher）。

在这种重构中一直缺失的是这样一种假设：众多国家将整个地球划分得四分五裂（任何地方都不存在自然秩序）。于是，当一个国家导致大规模移民外流时，另一个国家就会面临大规模移民涌入的问题；而大规模移民流动的总体方向将是从那些国家对其国民剥削（通过立法进行剥夺和征税）更严重（因而财富往往更少）的地区，流向那些国家剥削较轻（且财富更多）的地区。

We have finally arrived in the present，when the Western world—West ern Europe，north America，and Australia—is faced with the specter of Statecaused mass immigration from all over the rest of the world.What can be and is being done about this situation？

终我们终于来到了当下这个时代，此时西方世界——西欧、北美和澳大利亚——面临着由国家因素导致的来自世界其他各地大规模移民的幽灵般的困扰。针对这种情况，可以采取什么措施，又正在采取哪些措施呢？

Out of sheer selfinterest States will not adopt an “open border” policy。If they did，the influx of immigrants would quickly assume such propor tions that the domestic statewelfare System would collapsE.on the other hand，the Western welfare states do not prevent tens or even hundreds of thousands （and in the case of the United States well in excess of a million） of uninvited foreigners per year from entering and settling their territo ries.Moreover，as far as legal （rather than tolerated illegal） immigration is concerned，the Western welfare states have adopted a nondiscriminatory “affirmative action” admission policy。That is，they set a maximum immigration target and then allot quotas to various emigration countries or regions，irrespective of how ethnoculturally similar or dissimilar such places and regions of origin are，thus further aggravating the problem of forced integration.As well，they typically allow an “open” （unspecified） number of “politi cal asylum” seekers to enter—of government approved “victim” groups （to the exclusion of other，“politically incorrect” victims）。[107]

纯粹为自身利益计，各国不会采取“开放边境”的政策。如果他们这样做了，涌入的移民将迅速达到一定的规模，将会导致国内福利制度的崩溃。另一方面，西方福利国家并不阻止每年数万甚至数十万（在美国超过100万）未经邀请的外国人进入并定居在他们的领土上。此外，就合法（而不是可被容忍的非法）移民而言，西方福利国家采取了非歧视性的“平权运动”的准入政策。也就是说，它们设定了一个最大移民目标，然后将配额分配给各个移民国家或地区，而不管这些地方和地区的民族文化相似度如何，从而进一步加剧了强制一体化的问题。此外，它们通常允许数量“不限”（未明确规定）的“政治庇护”寻求者入境——这些人属于政府认可的“受害”群体（而将其他“政治不正确”的受害者排除在外）。

In light of the unpopularity of this policy，one might wonder about the motive for engaging in it。However，given the nature of the state it is not difficult to discover a rationale.States，as will be recalled，are also promoters of forced domestic integration.forced integration is a means of breaking up all intermediate social institutions and hierarchies （in between the state and the individual） such as family，clan，tribe，community，and church and their internal layers and ranks of authority。Through forced integration individuals are isolated （atomized） and their power of resistance visàvis the State is weakened.

鉴于强制一体化是一项不受欢迎的政策，人们可能会对这项政策的动机产生怀疑。然而，考虑到国家的本质，洞察其基本原理并不困难。大家应该记得，国家也是强制国内一体化的推动者。强制一体化是一种打破所有中间社会机构和等级制度（位于国家和个人之间）的手段，如家庭、氏族、部落、社区和教会，以及它们的内部层级和权威等级。通过强制一体化，个人被孤立（原子化），他们抵抗国家的能力被削弱。[108]

In the “logic” of the state，a hefty dose of foreign invasion，especially if it comes from strange and faraway places，is reckoned to further strengthen this tendency。And the present situation offers a particularly opportune time to do so，for in accordance with the inherently centralizing tendency of States and statism generally and promoted here and now in particular by the U.S.as the world’s only remaining superpower，the Western world—or more precisely the neoconservativesocialdemocratic elites controlling the state governments in the U.S.and Western Europe—is committed to the establishment of supranational states （such as the European Union） and ultimately one world state.National，regional or communal attachments are the main stumbling blocks on the way to this goal。A good measure of unin vited foreigners and government imposed multiculturalism is calculated to further weaken and ultimately destroy national，regional，and communal identities and thus promote the goal of a one World Order，led by the U.S.，and a new “universal man.”

按照国家的 “逻辑”，大量的外国入侵，尤其是来自陌生且遥远地方的入侵，被认为会进一步强化这种趋势。而当前的形势为此提供了一个尤为适宜的时机，因为依照国家及国家主义普遍固有的中心化倾向，特别是当下由作为世界仅存超级大国的美国所推动的这种倾向，西方世界——或者更确切地说，是掌控着美国和西欧各国政府的新保守主义社会民主派精英们——致力于建立超国家的政体（比如欧盟），并最终建立一个世界政府。民族、地区或社区的归属感是实现这一目标的主要绊脚石。大量未经邀请的外国人和政府强制推行的多元文化主义，被认为会进一步削弱并最终摧毁民族、地区和社区的认同感，从而推动由美国领导的世界秩序以及新 “世界公民” 这一目标的实现。[109]

V.

What，if anything，can be done to spoil these statist designs and regain security and protection from invasion，whether domestic or foreign？ let us begin with a proposal made by the editors of the Wall Street Journal，the Cato institute，the Foundation for Economic Education，and various leftlibertarian writers of an open or noborder policy—not because this proposal has any merit，but because it helps to elucidate what the problem is and what needs to be done to solve it。

要想破坏这些国家主义的图谋，重新获得抵御国内外入侵的安保与保护，（如果有可能的话）能做些什么呢？让我们先从《华尔街日报》的编辑们、卡托研究所、经济教育基金会以及形形色色的左翼自由意志主义作家所提出的开放边境或无边境政策的提议说起——并非因为这个提议有任何可取之处，而是因为它有助于阐明问题所在以及解决问题需要做些什么。

It is not difficult to predict the consequences of an openborder policy in the present world.If Switzerland，Austria，germany or Italy，for instance，freely admitted everyone who made it to their borders and demanded entry，these countries would quickly be overrun by millions of thirdworld immi grants from Albania，Bangladesh，India，and Nigeria，for example.As the more perceptive openborder advocates realize，the domestic statewelfare programs and provisions would collapse as a consequence. This would not be a reason for concern，for surely，in order to regain effective protection of person and property the welfare state must be abolished.But then there is the great leap—or the gaping hole—in the openborder argument：out of the ruins of the democratic welfare states，we are led to believe，a new natu ral order will somehow emerge.

在当今世界，不难预测开放边境政策的后果。例如，如果瑞士、奥地利、德国或意大利自由地接纳每一个到达他们边境并要求入境的人，这些国家将很快被来自阿尔巴尼亚、孟加拉国、印度和尼日利亚的等第三世界的数百万移民所淹没。正如更有洞察力的开放边境的倡导者所意识到的那样，国内的国家福利计划和规定将因此崩溃。[110]这不是一个令人担忧的理由，因为为了重新获得对人身和财产的有效保护，福利国家必须被废除。但是，在开放边境的论点中，有一个巨大的跳跃——或者说是巨大的漏洞：我们被诱导相信，在民主福利国家的废墟中，一种新的自然秩序将以某种方式神奇地出现。

The first error in this line of reasoning can be readily identified.once the welfare states have collapsed under their own weight，the masses of immigrants who have brought this about are still there.They have not been miraculously transformed into Swiss，Austrians，Bavarians or Lombards，but remain what they are：Zulus，Hindus，Ibos，Albanians，or Ban gladeshis.Assimilation can work when the number of immigrants is small。It is entirely impossible，however，if immigration occurs on a mass scale.In that case，immigrants will simply transport their own ethnoculture onto the new territory。Accordingly，when the welfare state has imploded there will be a multitude of “little” （or not so little） Calcuttas，Daccas，Lago ses，and Tiranas strewn all over Switzerland，Austria and Italy。It betrays a breathtaking sociological naiveté to believe that a natural order will emerge out of this admixture.Based on all historical experience with such forms of multiculturalism，it can safely be predicted that in fact the result will be civil war。There will be widespread plundering and squatterism leading to massive capital consumption，and civilization as we know it will disappear from Switzerland，Austria and Italy。Furthermore，the host population will quickly be outbred and，ultimately，physically displaced by their “guests.” There will still be Alps in Switzerland and Austria，but no Swiss or Austrians.

很容易发现这种推理的第一个错误。一旦福利国家在自身的重压下崩溃，带来这一切的大批移民却仍滞留在那里。他们并没有奇迹般地变成瑞士人、奥地利人、巴伐利亚人或伦巴第人，而是仍然保持其原有的身份：祖鲁人、印度人、伊博人、阿尔巴尼亚人或班格拉迪斯人。当移民人数较少时，同化可以起作用。然而，如果移民大规模发生，同化是完全不可能的。在这种情况下，移民只会把自己的民族文化带到新的领土之上。因此，当福利国家崩溃时，将会有大量的“大大小小”的加尔各答、达卡、拉各斯和地拉那遍布瑞士、奥地利和意大利。相信一种自然秩序会从这种混合中产生，这暴露了一种惊人的社会学的无知。基于这种形式的多元文化主义的所有历史经验，可以有把握地预测，其实际结果将是内战。将会滋生大规模的掠夺和非法占有，同时导致大量的资本消耗，我们所熟知的文明将从瑞士、奥地利和意大利消失。此外，东道主很快就会在生育上被“外来客”超过，最终从地域上被其取代。瑞士和奥地利仍会有阿尔卑斯山，但却不会再有瑞士人或奥地利人了。[111]

However，the error in the open border proposal goes further than its dire consequences.The fundamental error of the proposal is moral or ethical in nature and lies in its underlying assumption that foreigners are “entitled，” or have a “right，” to immigrate.In fact，they have no such right whatsoever。

然而，开放边境提案中的错误远不止其带来的可怕后果。该提案的根本错误在于其道德或伦理性质，也在于其潜在的假设，即外国人“有资格”或有“权利”移民。事实上，他们根本没有这样的权利。

Foreigners would have a right to enter Switzerland，Austria or Italy only if these places were uninhabited （unowned） territories.However，they are owned，and no one has a right to enter territories that others own unless invited by the owner。Nor is it permissible to argue，as some openborder proponents have done，that while foreigners may not enter private property without the owner’s permission they may do so with public property。In their eyes，public property is akin to unowned property and thus “open” to everyone，domestic citizens and foreigners alike.However，this analogy between public property and unowned resources is wrong。There is a cat egorical difference between unowned resources （open frontier） and public property。Public property is the result of stategovernment confiscations— of legislative expropriations and/or taxation—of originally privately owned property。While the state does not recognize anyone as its private owner，all of government controlled public property has in fact been brought about by the taxpaying members of the domestic public。Austrians，Swiss，and Italians，in accordance with the amount of taxes paid by each citizen，have funded the Austrian，Swiss，and Italian public property。Hence，they must be considered its legitimate owners.Foreigners have not been subject to domestic taxation and expropriation； hence，they cannot claim any rights regarding Austrian，Swiss or Italian public property。

外国人只有在瑞士、奥地利或意大利是无人居住（无主）的领土时才有权进入。然而，它们早已归他人所有，除非得到所有者的邀请，否则无人有权进入他人拥有的领土。也不允许像一些开放边境支持者所辩称的那样，尽管外国人未经所有者许可不得进入私有财产，但他们有权进入公有财产。[112] 在他们看来，公有财产类似于无主财产，因此对所有人“开放”，无论是国内公民还是外国人。然而，将公有财产与无主资源进行类比是错误的。无主资源（开放边境）与公有财产之间存在着绝对的区别。公有财产是国家政府征收——通过立法征收和/或征税——原本属于私人所有的财产的结果。虽然国家不承认任何人是其私人所有者，但所有政府控制的公有财产实际上都是由纳税的国内公众创造的。每个奥地利人、瑞士人和意大利人，按照所缴纳的税款，为奥地利、瑞士和意大利的公有财产提供资金。因此，他们必须被视为其合法所有者。外国人没有受到这些国家内部的税收和征用；因此，他们不能对奥地利、瑞士或意大利的公有财产主张任何权利。

The recognition of the moral status of public property as expropriated private property is not just sufficient grounds for rejecting the openborder proposal as a moral outrage.It is equally sufficient for combating the present semiopen “affirmative action” immigration policies of the Western welfare States.

承认公有财产作为被征用的私有财产的道德地位，这不仅是拒绝开放边境提议，将其视为道德暴行的充分理由。它同样也是对抗西方福利国家当前半开放的“平权运动”移民政策的充分理由。

Up to now，in the debate on immigration policy too much emphasis has been placed on consequentialist （utilitarian） arguments.Apologists of the status quo have argued that most immigrants work and become productive，so immigration contributes to a rising domestic standard of living。Critics have argued that the existing statewelfare institutions and provisions increasingly invite welfareimmigration，and they have warned that the only advantage of the current policies over the openborder alternative is that the former will take decades until it ultimately leads to similarly dire effects，while the latter will produce such effects within years.As important as the resolution of these issues is，it is not decisive.The opposition against current immigration policies is ultimately independent of whether immigration will make per capita GDP （or similar statistical measures） rise or fall。It is a matter of justice：of right and wrong。

到目前为止，在关于移民政策的论证中，结果主义（功利主义）的论点被过分强调了。为现状辩护的人认为，大多数移民都在工作，并且变得富有，因此移民有助于提高国内生活水平。批评者则认为，现行的国家福利制度和规定越来越多地吸引福利移民，他们警告说，与开放边境替代方案相比，当前政策的唯一优势是，前者需要几十年的时间才能最终产生类似的直接影响，而后者将在几年内产生这种影响。尽管解决这些问题很重要，但它不是决定性的。对当前移民政策的反对最终与移民是否会使人均GDP（或类似的统计指标）上升或下降无关。这是一个公正的问题：正确亦或错误。

Understandably，the democratic welfare states try to conceal the source of public property （i.e.，acts of expropriation）。However，they do acknowledge that public property is “somehow” the property of their citizens and that they are the citizens’ trustees in regard to public property。Indeed，the modern state’s legitimacy is derived from its claim to protect its citizens and their property from domestic and foreign invaders，intruders，and trespass ers.regarding foreigners，this would require that the state act like the gate keepers in private gated communities.The State would have to check every newcomer for an invitation and monitor his movement while en route to his final destination.once it is made clear that the government actually tolerates or even promotes the intrusion and invasion of masses of aliens who by no stretch of the imagination can be deemed welcome or invited by domestic residents，this is or may become a threat to a government’s legitimacy and exert enough pressure on it to adopt a more restrictive and discriminatory admission policy。

可以理解的是，民主福利国家试图隐瞒公有财产的来源（即征用行为）。然而，他们确实承认，公有财产“在某种程度上”是公民的财产，他们是公有财产的公民受托人。事实上，现代国家的合法性来源于其保护公民及其财产免受国内外侵犯者、闯入者和非法侵入者侵害的主张。面对外国人，这将要求国家像私人封闭社区的门卫一样行事。国家必须检查每个新来者是否收到邀请，并在其前往最终目的地的途中监视他的行动。国民一旦弄清楚，政府实际上容忍甚至促进了大量外国人的闯入和入侵，而这些外国人无论如何也不会被国内居民视为是受欢迎的或是受邀请的，这就会就有可能成为政府合法性的威胁，并对其施加足够的压力，使其采取更具限制性和歧视性的入境政策。[113]

But this can only be the beginning； even if public opinion induced the state to adopt an immigration stance more in accordance with popular sentiments and justice，this fact would not change that the interests of private property owners and those of the State as a territorial monopolist of legislation and taxation are incompatible and in permanent conflict with each other。A State is a contradiction in terms：it is a property protector who may expropriate the property of the protected through legislation and taxation.Predictably，a State will be interested in maximizing its tax revenues and power （its range of legislative interference with private property rights） and disinterested in protecting anything except itself。What we experience in the area of immigration is only one aspect of a general problem.States are also supposed to protect their citizens from domestic intrusion and invasion，yet as we have seen，they actually disarm them，encircle them，tax them，and strip them of their right to exclusion，thus rendering them helpless.

但这仅仅只是一个开始；即使公众舆论促使国家采取更符合民意和公正的移民立场，这一事实也不会改变私人财产所有者与国家作为立法和税收的领土垄断者这两者之间的利益是不相容的，并且彼此之间存在永久性的冲突。国家这个词本身就是自相矛盾的：它是财产的保护者，却又可以通过立法和征税来剥夺被保护者的财产。可以预见的是，国家会热衷于将其税收收入和权力（其对私有财产权进行立法干预的范围）最大化，并且除了保护它自身之外，对保护其他任何事物都不感兴趣。我们在移民领域所经历的只是一个普遍问题的一个面向而已。国家也应该保护其公民免受国内的侵犯和入侵，然而正如我们所看到的，国家实际上解除了公民的武装，对其进行包围、征税，剥夺他们的排他权，从而使他们孤立无援。

Accordingly，the solution to the immigration problem is at the same time the solution to the general problem inherent in the institution of a State and of public property。It involves the return to a natural order by means of secession.To regain security from domestic and foreign intrusion and invasion，the central nation States will have to be broken up into their constituent parts.The Austrian and the Italian central States do not own Austrian and Italian public property； they are its citizens’ trustees.Yet they do not protect them and their property。Hence，just as the Austrians and the Italians （and not foreigners） are the owners of Austria and Italy，so by extension of the same principle do the Carinthians and the Lombards （in accor dance with individual tax payments） own Carinthia and Lombardy，and the bergamese，bergamo （and not the Viennese and the Roman governments）。

因此，移民问题的解决方式同时就是国家体制和公有财产所固有的一般问题的解决方式。它包括通过脱离的方式回到自然秩序。为了从国内外的侵犯和入侵中重新获得安全，必须将中心化的民族国家分裂成多个组成部分。奥地利和意大利这些中心化的国家并不拥有奥地利和意大利的公有财产；他们只是其公民的受托人。然而，他们并未保护公民及其财产。因此，正如奥地利人和意大利人（而不是外国人）是奥地利和意大利的所有者一样，同样的原则延伸开来，卡林西亚人和伦巴第人（根据个人纳税情况）拥有卡林西亚和伦巴第，而贝加莫人拥有贝加莫（这些地方的所有者不是维也纳政府也不是罗马政府）。

In a decisive first step，individual provinces，regions，cities，towns and villages must declare their independence from Rome，Vienna，berlin，Paris，and proclaim their status as “free territories.” Extensive efforts by the central States to the contrary notwithstanding，strong provincial affiliations and attachments still exist in many regions，cities and villages all across Europe.It is vital to tap into these provincial and local sentiments in taking this first step.with every successive act of regional secession the power of the central State will be diminished.It will be stripped of more of its public property，its agents’ range of access will increasingly be restricted，and its laws will apply in smaller and smaller territories，until it ultimately withers away。

作为决定性的第一步，各省、地区、城市、城镇和村庄必须宣布从罗马、维也纳、柏林、巴黎独立出来，并宣布其为“自由领土”。尽管中央政府作出了不懈的努力，但与此相反，在欧洲各地的许多地区、城市和村庄仍然存在着强烈的地方认同感和归属感。在迈出第一步时，充分利用这些地方情感是至关重要的。随着每一次连续的地区脱离行动，中央政府的权力将被削弱。它将被剥夺更多的公有财产，其代理人管辖的范围将日益受到限制，其法律的适用范围也会越来越小，直到最终消亡。

However，it is essential to go beyond “political secession” to the privatization of property。After all，provincial and local political bodies （governments） have no more right to provincial property than the central government had to national property。The secession process must proceed further。Provincial or communal public property：roads，parks，government build ings，schools，courthouses，etc。，must be returned to their genuine private owners and owner associations.Who owns what share of provincial or com munal property？ in principle，each owns according to his （compulsory） contribution to this property! in the case in which private property was expropriated by local government for purposes of “eminent domain，” the property is simply returned to its original owner。As for the rest （and most） of public property，tradable property shares should be distributed among community members in accordance with their individual taxpayments.Every public road，park，school，etc。，was funded by taxpayers； hence，local taxpayers，in accordance with their tax payments，should be awarded local public property。This has a twofold implication.First，some residents have paid more taxes than others，so it is only natural and just that the former should be awarded more shares than the latter。Second and more specifically，some residents will be excluded altogether from receiving public property shares.For one，welfare recipients should be excluded.Presumably，they have paid no taxes but lived instead on taxes paid by others.Hence，they cannot claim any ownership share in public property。Likewise，all government officials and civil servants must be excluded from receiving ownership shares in public property，for their net （after tax） salary has been paid out of taxes paid by others.Just like welfare recipients，civil servants have not been taxpayers but taxconsumers.Hence，they too have no claim to communal property。

但是，必须超越“政治脱离”，实现财产私有化。毕竟，省级和地方政治机构（政府）对于省级财产所拥有的权利，并不比中央政府对于国家财产所拥有的权利更多。脱离进程必须进一步推进。省级或社区的公有财产，如道路、公园、政府大楼、学校、法院等，必须归还给它们真正的私人所有者及所有者协会。那么，省级或社区财产的各部分分别归谁所有呢？原则上，每个人根据其（强制性的）对该财产的贡献来拥有相应份额！如果私有财产曾被地方政府以“征收权”为由予以没收，那么该财产应直接归还给其原所有者。至于其余（也是大部分）的公有财产，应按照社区成员各自的纳税情况向他们分配可交易的财产份额。每一条公有道路、每一座公园、每一所学校等等，都是由纳税人出资建设的；因此，当地纳税人应根据其纳税情况获得当地的公有财产。[114] 这有双重含义。首先，一些居民比其他人缴纳了更多的税，因此前者应该比后者获得更多的股份，这是自然的也是公正的。其次，更具体地说，部分居民将被完全排除在公有财产份额之外。首先，福利领取者应该被排除在外。可以推测，他们没有纳税，而是靠别人交的税生活。因此，他们不能对任何公有财产的所有权份额提出要求。同样，所有政府官员和公务员都必须被排除在公有财产的所有权股份之外，因为他们的净（税后）工资是由他人缴纳的税款支付的。和福利领取者一样，公务员也不是纳税人，而是税款消费者。因此，他们也没有权利对公有财产的提出任何主张。[115]

with the central state withered away and the privatization of public property complete，the right to exclusion inherent in private property and essential for personal security and protection is returned into the hands of a multitude of independent private decisionmaking units.immigration once again becomes a microphenomenon and disappears as a social “problem.”

随着中央国家的萎缩和公有财产私有化的完成，私有财产固有的排他权，对个人安全和保护至关重要的排他权又重新回到众多独立的私人决策单位的手中。移民再次成为一个微观现象，作为社会“问题”的移民问题消失了。

7 自由贸易和限制移民的理由*

The Case for Free Trade and Restricted immigration

It is frequently maintained that “free trade” belongs to “free immigration” as “protectionism” does to “restricted immigration.” That is，the claim is made that while it is not impossible that someone might combine protectionism with free immigration，or free trade with restricted immigration，these posi tions are intellectually inconsistent，and thus erroneous.Hence，insofar as people seek to avoid errors，they should be the exception rather than the rule.The facts，to the extent that they have a bearing on the issue，appear to be consistent with this claiM.As the 1996 Republican presidential primaries indicated，for instance，most professed free traders are advocates of relatively （even if not totally） free and nondiscriminatory immigration policies，while most protectionists are proponents of highly restrictive and selective immigration policies.

人们常常认为，“自由贸易” 与 “自由移民” 相关联，就如同 “保护主义” 与 “限制移民” 相关联一样。也就是说，有人提出这样的观点：虽然有人将保护主义与自由移民相结合，或者将自由贸易与限制移民相结合并非完全不可能，但这些立场在逻辑上是不一致的，因此是错误的。因此，就人们力求避免错误而言，上述情况应该是例外而非常规。就与该问题相关的事实来看，似乎与这一说法相符。例如，1996年共和党总统初选表明，大多数自称的自由贸易者是相对（即便不是完全）自由且非歧视性移民政策的倡导者，而大多数保护主义者则是高度限制性和选择性移民政策的支持者。

Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding，I will argue that this thesis and its implicit claim are fundamentally mistaken.In particular，I will demonstrate that free trade and restricted immigration are not only perfectly consistent but even mutually reinforcing policies.That is，it is not the advocates of free trade and restricted immigration who are wrong，but rather the proponents of free trade and free immigration.In thus taking the “intellectual guilt” out of the free trade and restricted immigration position and putting it where it actually belongs，I hope to promote a change in the present state of public opinion and facilitate substantial political realignment。

尽管表面上与此相反，但我认为这一论点及其隐含的主张根本上是错误的。特别是，我将证明自由贸易和限制移民不仅是完全一致的，而且是相辅相成的政策。也就是说，错的不是主张自由贸易和限制移民的人，而是主张自由贸易和自由移民的人。将“智识歉疚”从自由贸易和限制移民的立场中移除，并将其置于其真正所属的恰当位置，我希望推动当前公众舆论态势的变化，并以此促进实质性的政治重组。

I. 自由贸易的理由

THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE

Since the days of Ricardo，the case for free trade has been logically unassailable.For the sake of argumentative completeness，it would be useful to briefly summarize it。The restatement will be in the form of a reductio ad absurdum of the protectionist thesis as proposed most recently by Pat Buchanan.

自李嘉图时代以来，自由贸易的理由在逻辑上是无懈可击的。为了论证的完整性，简要概括一下是必要的。重述的形式是对帕特-布坎南（Pat Buchanan）最近提出的保护主义论点进行归谬。

The central argument advanced in favor of protectionism is one of domestic job protection.How can American producers who pay their workers $10 per hour possibly compete with Mexican producers paying $1 or less per hour？ They cannot，and American jobs will be lost unless import tariffs are imposed to insulate the American wages from Mexican competitioN.Free trade is possible only between countries that have equal wage rates，and thus that compete “on a level playing field.” As long as this is not the case—as with the U.S.and Mexico—the playing field must be made level by means of tariffs.As for the consequences of a policy of domestic job protection，Buchanan and other protectionists claim that it will lead to domestic strength and prosperity。In support of their claim，examples are cited of freetrade countries that lost their oncepreeminent international economic position，such as 19thcentury England，as well as of protectionist countries which gained such preeminence，such as 19th century America.

支持保护主义的核心论点之一是保护国内就业。付给工人10美元时薪的美国生产商怎么可能与付给工人1美元或更少时薪的墨西哥生产商竞争？除非征收进口关税，使美国的工资与墨西哥的竞争隔绝开来，否则美国的就业机会将会流失。自由贸易只有在工资水平相同的国家之间才有可能，因此在“公平的竞争环境”上竞争。只要这种情况没有发生——就像美国和墨西哥一样——竞争环境就必须通过关税来实现公平。至于国内就业保护政策的后果，布坎南和其他保护主义者声称，将会带来国内的繁荣与富强。为了支持他们的主张，他们列举了一些例子，如自由贸易国家失去了曾经卓越的国际经济地位，如19世纪的英国，以及保护主义国家获得了这样的卓越地位，如19世纪的美国。

This or any other alleged empirical proof of the protectionist thesis must be rejected out of hand as containing a post hoc，ergo propter hoc fallacy。The inference drawn from historical data is no more convincing than if one were to conclude from the observation that rich people consume more than poor people that it must be consumption that makes a person rich.Indeed，protectionists such as Buchanan characteristically fail to understand what is actually involved in defending their thesis.Any argument in favor of international protectionism is simultaneously an argument in favor of interregional and interlocal protectionisM.Just as different wage rates exist between the U.S.and Mexico，Haiti，or China，for instance，such differences also exist between new York and Alabama，or between manhattan，the Bronx，and Harlem.Thus，if it were true that international protection ism could make an entire nation prosperous and strong，it must also be true that interregional and interlocal protectionism could make regions and localities prosperous and strong。In fact，one may even go further。If the protectionist argument were right，it would amount to an indictment of all trade，and a defense of the thesis that everyone would be the most prosper ous and strongest if he never traded with anyone else and remained in self sufficient isolatioN.Certainly，in this case，no one would ever lose his job，and unemployment due to “unfair” competition would be reduced to zero。In thus deducing the ultimate implication of the protectionist argument，its complete absurdity is revealed，for such a “fullemployment society” would not be prosperous and strong； it would be composed of people who，despite working from dawn to dusk，would be condemned to destitution，or even death from starvatioN.

International protectionism，while obviously less destructive than a policy of interpersonal or interregional protectionism，would result in precisely the same effect and constitute a sure recipe for America’s further economic declinE.To be sure，some American jobs and industries would be saved，but such savings would come at a pricE.The standard of living and the real income of the American consumers of foreign products would be forcibly reduced.The cost to all U.S.producers who employ the protected industry’s products as their own input factors would be raised，and they would be rendered internationally less competitivE.Moreover，what could foreigners do with the money they earned from their U.S.imports？ They could either buy American goods，or they could leave it here and invest it，and if their imports were stopped or reduced，they would buy fewer American goods or invest smaller amounts.Hence，as a result of saving a few inefficient Ameri can jobs，a far greater number of efficient American jobs would be destroyed or prevented from coming into existencE.

国际保护主义的破坏性显然小于人与人之间或地区与地区之间的保护主义政策，但其结果却完全相同，必将导致美国经济进一步衰退。所有使用受保护行业的产品作为投入要素的美国生产商的成本都会提高，他们的国际竞争力也会下降.。美国如果停止或减少进口，那么出口国也会减少购买美国商品或减少向美国的投资。因此，由于挽救了一些效率低下的美国工作岗位，更多的美国高效工作岗位将被摧毁或无法存在。

Thus，it is nonsense to claim that England lost its former preeminence because of its freetrade policies.It lost its position despite its freetrade policy，and because of the socialist policies，which later took hold.Likewise，it is nonsense to claim that the rise of the U.S.to economic preeminence in the course of the 19th century was due to its protectionist policies.The U.S.attained this position despite its protectionism，and because of its unrivaled internal laissezfaire policies.Indeed，America’s current economic decline，which Buchanan wishes to reverse，is the result not of her alleged freetrade policies，but of the circumstance that America，in the course of the 20th century，has gradually adopted the same socialist policies that earlier ruined England.

II. 贸易与移民

TRADE AND immigration

Given the case for free trade，we will now develop the case for immigration restrictions to be combined with freetrade policies.More specifically，we will build a successively stronger case for immigration restrictions：from the initial weak claim that free trade and immigration restrictions can be combined and do not exclude each other to the final strong claim that the principle underlying free trade actually requires such restrictions.

有了自由贸易的理由，我们现在来讨论将移民限制与自由贸易政策相结合的理由。更具体地说，我们将为移民限制提出一个更有力的理由：从最初的 “自由贸易与移民限制可以结合且互不排斥 “的微弱主张，到最后的 “自由贸易的基本原则实际上要求这种限制 “的强力主张。

From the outset，it must be emphasized that not even the most restrictive immigration policy or the most exclusive form of segregationism has anything to do with a rejection of free trade and the adoption of protectionism.From the fact that one does not want to associate with or live in the neighborhood composed of Mexicans，Haitians，Chinese，Koreans，Germans，Catholics，Moslems，Hindus，etc。，it does not follow that one does not want to trade with them from a distance.Moreover，even if it were the case that one’s real income would rise as a result of immigration，it does not follow that immigration must be considered “good，” for material wealth is not the only thing that counts.Rather，what constitutes “welfare” and “wealth” is subjective，and one might prefer lower material living standards and a greater distance from certain other people to higher material living standards and a smaller distance.It is precisely the absolute voluntariness of human association and separation—the absence of any form of forced integration—which makes peaceful relationships—free trade—between racially，ethnically，linguistically，religiously，or culturally distinct people possible.

从一开始就必须强调，即使是最严格的移民政策或最排外的种族隔离形式也与拒绝自由贸易和采取保护主义没有任何关系。一个人不想与墨西哥人、海地人、中国人、韩国人、德国人、天主教徒、穆斯林、印度教徒等组成的社区联系或生活在一起，这并不意味着人们不想与他们进行远距离贸易。此外，即使一个人的实际收入会因为移民而增加，也不能因此认为移民一定是“好的”，因为物质财富并不是唯一重要的东西。相反，什么是“福利”和“财富”是主观的，一个人可能更喜欢较低的物质生活水平和与某些人保持较大距离，而不是较高的物质生活水平和较小的距离。正是由于人与人之间的联系和分离是绝对自愿的，不存在任何形式的强制一体化，才使得不同种族、不同民族、不同语言、不同宗教或不同文化背景的人之间可以建立和平关系，进行自由贸易。

The relationship between trade and migration is one of elastic substitut ability （rather than rigid exclusivity）：the more （or less） you have of one the less （or more） you need of the other。Other things being equal，businesses move to lowwage areas，and labor moves to highwage areas，thus effecting a tendency toward the equalization of wage rates （for the same kind of labor） as well as the optimal localization of capital。With political borders separating high from low wage areas，and with national （nationwide） trade and immigration policies in effect，these normal tendencies—of immigration and capital export—are weakened with free trade and strengthened with protectionisM.As long as Mexican products—the products of a lowwage area—can freely enter a highwage area such as the U.S.，the incentive for Mexican people to move to the U.S. is reduced.In contrast，if Mexican products are prevented from entering the American market，the attraction for Mexican workers to move to the U.S.is increased.Similarly，when U.S. producers are free to buy from and sell to Mexican producers and consum ers，capital exports from the U.S. to Mexico will be reduced； however，when U.S. producers are prevented from doing so，the attraction of moving production from the U.S.to Mexico is increased.

贸易和移民之间的关系是一种弹性替代能力（而不是刚性排他性）：你拥有的其中一种越多（或越少），你对另一种的需求就越少（或更多）。在其他条件相同的情况下，企业向低工资地区转移，劳动力向高工资地区转移，从而影响（同一种劳动力）工资率均衡化趋势以及资本的最佳本地化。随着政治边界将高工资地区和低工资地区分开，以及国家（全国性）贸易和移民政策的实施，这些正常的趋势——移民和资本出口——在自由贸易中被削弱，在保护主义中被加强。只要墨西哥产品——低工资地区的产品——可以自由进入像美国这样的高工资地区，墨西哥人移居美国的动机就会降低。相反，如果墨西哥产品被禁止进入美国市场，对墨西哥工人移居美国的吸引力就会增加。同样，当美国生产商可以自由地与墨西哥生产商和消费者进行买卖时，美国对墨西哥的资本出口将会减少；然而，当美国生产商被禁止这样做时，将生产从美国转移到墨西哥的吸引力就会增加。

Similarly，as the foreign trade policy of the U.S.affects immigration，so does its domestic trade policy。Domestic free trade is what is typically referred to as laissezfaire capitalisM.In other words，the national government follows a policy of noninterference with the voluntary transactions between domestic parties （citizens） regarding their private property。The government’s policy is one of helping to protect its citizens and their private property from domestic aggression，damage，or fraud （exactly as in the case of foreign trade and aggression）。If the U.S.followed strict domestic free trade policies，immigration from lowwage regions such as Mexico would be reduced，while when it pursues “social welfare” policies，immigration from lowwage areas becomes more attractive.

同样的，美国的对外贸易政策影响移民，其国内贸易政策也会影响移民。国内自由贸易，通常被称为自由放任的资本主义。换句话说，国家政府遵循不干涉国内各方（公民）之间关于其私有财产的自愿贸易的政策。政府的政策是帮助保护其公民及其私有财产免受国内侵犯、破坏或欺诈（与对外贸易和侵犯的情况一样）。如果美国实行严格的国内自由贸易政策，来自墨西哥等低工资地区的移民就会减少，而当美国实行“社会福利”政策时，对来自低工资地区的移民来说，就会变得更有吸引力。

III.“开放边境”、入侵和强制一体化

“OPEN BORDERS，” INVASION，AND FORCED integration

Insofar as a highwage area such as the U.S.engaged in unrestricted free trade，internationally as well as domestically，the immigration pressure from lowwage countries would be kept low or reduced，and hence，the ques tion as to what to do about immigration would be less urgent。On the other hand，insofar as the U.S.engaged in protectionist policies against the products of lowwage areas and in welfare policies at home，immigration pressure would be kept high or even raised，and the immigration question would assume great importance in public debate.

只要像美国这样的高工资地区从事不受限制的自由贸易，无论是在国际上还是在国内，来自低工资国家的移民压力就会保持在低水平或减少，因此，如何处理移民的问题就不那么紧迫了。另一方面，只要美国对来自低工资地区的产品采取保护主义政策同时实行在国内实习福利政策，移民压力就会保持在很高的水平，甚至会增加，移民问题就会在公众舆论中占据重要地位。

Obviously，the world’s major highwage regions—north America and Western Europe—are presently in this latter situation，in which immigration has become an increasingly urgent public concerN.In light of steadily mounting immigration pressure from the world’s lowwage regions，three general strategies of dealing with immigration have been proposed：unconditional free immigration，conditional free immigration，and restrictive immigration.While our main concern will be with the latter two alter natives，a few observations regarding the unconditional free immigration position are appropriate，if only to illustrate the extent of its intellectual bankruptcy。

显然，世界上主要的高工资地区——北美和西欧——目前正处于后一种情况（译者注：即在对待低工资地区的产品采取贸易保护主义政策的同时，又在国内实行高福利政策），在这种情况下，移民已成为公众日益迫切关注的问题。发达国家面临来自世界低工资地区的不断增加的移民压力，有三种处理移民的一般性策略：无条件自由移民，有条件自由移民和限制性移民。虽然我们主要关注的将是后两种选择，但对无条件的自由移民立场做几点评论也是恰当的，即便只是为了说明其在理论层面破产的程度。

According to proponents of unconditional free immigration，the U.S.qua highwage area would invariably benefit from free immigration； hence，it should enact a policy of open borders，regardless of any existing conditions，i.e.，even if the U.S.were ensnared in protectionism and domestic welfarE.Yet surely，such a proposal strikes a reasonable person as fantastic。Assume that the U.S.，or better still Switzerland，declared that there would no longer be any border controls，that anyone who could pay the fare might enter the country，and，as a resident then be entitled to every “normal” domestic welfare provisioN.Can there be any doubt how disastrous such an experi ment would turn out in the present world？ The U.S.，and Switzerland even faster，would be overrun by millions of thirdworld immigrants，because life on and off American and Swiss public streets is comfortable compared to life in many areas of the third world.Welfare costs would skyrocket，and the strangled economy would disintegrate and collapse，as the subsistence fund—the stock of capital accumulated in and inherited from the past—was plundered.civilization in the U.S.and Switzerland would vanish，just as it once did from Rome and Greece.

Since unconditional free immigration must be regarded as a prescription for national suicide，the typical position among free traders is the alternative of conditional free immigration.According to this view，the U.S.and Switzerland would have to first return to unrestricted free trade and abolish all taxfunded welfare programs，and only then should they open their borders to everyone who wanted to come.In the meantime，while the welfare state is still in place，immigration would have to be made subject to the condition that immigrants are excluded from domestic welfare entitlements.

由于无条件的自由移民必须被视为国家自取灭亡之道，自由贸易者的典型立场是选择有条件的自由移民。根据这种观点，美国和瑞士一方面应恢复不受限制的自由贸易，另一方面应废除所有用税收资金支持的福利项目，然后才可以对所有想来的人开放边境。与此同时，在福利国家仍然存在的情况下，移民将不得不受制于一个条件，即移民被排除在国内的福利权之外。

While the error involved in this view is less obvious and the consequences less dramatic than those associated with the unconditional free immigration，the view is nonetheless erroneous and harmful。To be sure，the immigration pressure on Switzerland and the U.S.would be reduced if this proposal were followed，but it would not disappear。Indeed，with free trade policies，both foreign and domestic，wage rates within Switzerland and the U.S.may further increase relative to those at other locations （with less enlightened economic policies）。Hence，the attraction of both countries might even increase.In any event，some immigration pressure would remain，so some form of immigration policy would have to exist。Do the principles underlying free trade imply that this policy must be one of conditional “free immigration”？ They do not。There is no analogy between free trade and free immigration，and restricted trade and restricted immigration.The phenomena of trade and immigration are different in a fundamental respect，and the meaning of “free” and “restricted” in conjunction with both terms is categorically different。People can move and migrate； goods and services，of themselves，can not。

尽管与无条件自由移民相关的错误相比，这种观点的错误不那么明显，其后果也不那么引人注目，但这种观点仍然是错误的和有害的。可以肯定的是，如果这一提议被采纳，瑞士和美国的移民压力将会减少，但这种压力不会消失。事实上，在国内外自由贸易政策的推动下，瑞士和美国的工资率可能会比其他经济政策不那么开明的国家进一步提高。因此，两国的吸引力甚至可能会增加。无论如何，移民压力将继续存在，因此某种形式的移民政策将不得不存在。自由贸易的基本原则是否意味着这种政策必须是一种有条件的“自由移民”？并非如此。自由贸易和自由移民之间没有可比性，限制贸易和限制移民之间也没有可比性。贸易现象和移民现象在一个根本方面存在差异，而且与这两个术语相关联的“自由”和“限制”的含义也完全不同。人可以移动和迁徙；而商品和服务本身是无法自行移动的。

Put differently，while someone can migrate from one place to another without anyone else wanting him to do so，goods and services cannot be shipped from place to place unless both sender and receiver agree.Trivial as this distinction may appear，it has momentous consequences.For free in conjunction with trade then means trade by invitation of private households and firms only； and restricted trade does not mean protection of households and firms from uninvited goods or services，but invasion and abrogation of the right of private households and firms to extend or deny invitations to their own property。In contrast，free in conjunction with immigration does not mean immigration by invitation of individual households and firms，but unwanted invasion or forced integration； and restricted immigration actually means，or at least can mean，the protec tion of private households and firms from unwanted invasion and forced integration.Hence，in advocating free trade and restricted immigration，one follows the same principle：requiring an invitation for people as for goods and services.

换句话说，一个人可以从一个地方迁移到另一个地方而勿需其他人要求他如此，但除非发送方和接收方都同意，否则货物和服务不能从一个地方运到另一个地方。尽管这种区别看起来微不足道，但却有着重大的影响。因此，就贸易而言，“自由”意味着只有私人家庭和公司之间的邀请贸易；而“限制贸易”并不“保护私人家庭或企业免于受到未经邀请的商品和服务的侵扰”，而是“侵犯和废除私人家庭和企业的对自己财产的邀请权或拒绝权”。与此相反，自由移民并不意味着个体家庭和公司邀请移民，而是不受邀请的入侵或强制一体化；而限制移民实际上意味着，或至少可以意味着，保护私人家庭和公司免受不受邀请的入侵和强制一体化。因此，在倡导自由贸易和限制移民时，我们遵循的原则是一样的：货物与服务的进入需要邀请，人的进入也需要邀请。（译者注：限制贸易意味着家庭和企业想买什么自己不能做主，自由移民也意味着公民是否想和别人一体化这件事自己不能做主）。

In contrast，the advocate of free trade and free markets who adopts the （conditional） free immigration position is involved in intellectual inconsistency。Free trade and markets mean that private property owners may receive or send goods from and to other owners without government interference.The government stays inactive visàvis the process of foreign and domestic trade，because a willing （paying） recipient exists for every good or service sent，and hence all locational changes，as the outcome of agree ments between sender and receiver，must be deemed mutually beneficial。The government’s sole function is that of maintaining the trading process （by protecting citizen and domestic property）。

相反，自由贸易和自由市场的倡导者如果采取（有条件的）自由移民的立场，就会陷入思想上的不一致。自由贸易和市场意味着私人财产所有者可以在没有政府干预的情况下从其他所有者那里接收或发送货物。政府在对外贸易和国内贸易的过程中不采取任何行动，因为每一种商品或服务都有一个愿意（付费）接受的人，因此所有地点的变化，作为发送者和接受者之间协议的结果，都必须被认为是互惠互利的。政府的唯一职能是维护交易过程（保护公民和国内财产）。

However，with respect to the movement of people，the same government will have to do more in order to fulfill its protective function than merely permit events to take their own course，because people，unlike products，possess a will and can migrate.Accordingly，population movements，unlike product shipments，are not per se mutually beneficial events because they are not always—necessarily and invariably—the result of an agreement between a specific receiver and sender。There can be shipments （immigrants） without willing domestic recipients.In this case，immi grants are foreign invaders，and immigration represents an act of invasioN.Surely，a government’s basic protective function includes the prevention of foreign invasions and the expulsion of foreign invaders.Just as surely then，in order to do so and subject immigrants to the same requirement as imports （of having been invited by domestic residents），this government cannot rightfully allow the kind of free immigration advocated by most free traders.Just imagine again that the U.S.and Switzerland opened their borders to whomever wanted to come—provided only that immigrants be excluded from all welfare entitlements，which would be reserved for U.S.and Swiss citizens.Apart from the sociological problem of thus creating two distinct classes of domestic residents and thus causing severe social tensions，there is also little doubt about the outcome of this experiment in the present world.The result would be less drastic and less immediate than under the scenario of unconditional free immigration，but it too would amount to a massive foreign invasion and ultimately lead to the destruction of American and Swiss civilization.Thus，in order to fulfill its primary function as protector of its citizens and their domestic property，a highwagearea government cannot follow an immigration policy of laissezpasser，but must engage in restrictive measures.

然而，在人员流动方面，政府要想履行其保护职能，就必须采取更多措施，而不仅仅是听任事态发展，因为人不同于产品，是有自由意志，可以迁移的。因此，人口迁移与产品运输不同，本身并不是互利的事件，因为它们并不总是——必然和不变地——特定的接收者和发送者之间达成协议的结果。可能会有运送（移民）而没有愿意的国内接受者。在这种情况下，移民是外来入侵者，移民代表了一种入侵行为。当然，政府的基本保护职能包括防止外敌入侵和驱逐外国侵略者。同样可以肯定的是，为了做到这一点，并使移民与进口商品一样受到同样的要求（受到国内居民的邀请），那么政府就不能理所当然地允许大多数自由贸易者所倡导的那种自由移民。再想象一下，如果美国和瑞士向任何想来的人开放边境，条件是移民不能享受所有福利待遇，而这些福利待遇是专门为美国和瑞士公民准备的。除了在社会学上造成两类不同的国内居民，从而引发严重的社会矛盾之外，这一实验在当今世界的结果也是毋庸置疑的。与无条件自由移民的情况相比，其结果不会那么严重，也不会那么直接，但它也会导致大规模的外国入侵，并最终导致美国和瑞士文明的毁灭。因此，为了履行其作为公民及其国内财产保护者的主要职能，高工资地区的政府不能遵循自由放任的移民政策，而必须采取限制性措施。

IV. 无政府资本主义模式

THE ANARCHOCAPITALIST MODEL

From the recognition that proponents of free trade and markets cannot advocate free immigration without falling into inconsistency and contradiction，and hence，that immigration must—logically—be restricted，it is but a small step to the further recognition of how it must be restricted.As a matter of fact，all highwageare a governments presently restrict immigration in one way or another。Nowhere is immigration “free，” unconditionally or conditionally。Yet the restrictions imposed on immigration by the U.S.and by Switzerland，for instance，are quite different。What restrictions should then exist？ Or，more precisely，what immigration restrictions is a free trader and free marketeer logically compelled to uphold and promote？ The guiding principle of a high wagearea country’s immigration policy follows from the insight that immigration，to be free in the same sense as trade is free，must be invited immigration.The details follow from the further elucidation and exemplification of the concept of invitation versus invasion and forced integration.

认识到自由贸易和市场的支持者不可能在不陷入前后矛盾和自相矛盾的情况下主张自由移民，因此，从逻辑上讲，移民必须受到限制，这只是进一步认识必须如何限制移民的一小步。事实上，所有高工资地区的政府目前都以这样或那样的方式限制移民。移民在任何地方都不是“自由的”，无论是无条件还是有条件的。然而，例如美国和瑞士对移民施加的限制就大不相同。那么应该存在什么样的限制呢？或者更准确地说，一个自由贸易者和自由市场倡导者从逻辑上讲必须支持和推动什么样的移民限制呢？高工资地区国家的移民政策的指导原则源于这样一种洞见，即移民要像贸易自由一样自由，就必须邀请移民。下文将进一步阐明和举例说明邀请与入侵和强制一体化的概念。

For this purpose，it is necessary to assume first，as a conceptual bench mark，the existence of what political philosophers have described as a private property anarchy，anarchocapitalism，or ordered anarchy：all land is privately owned，including all streets，rivers，airports，harbors，etc。With respect to some pieces of land，the property title may be unrestricted，that is，the owner is permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not physically damage the property of others.With respect to other territories，the property title may be more or less restricted.As is currently the case in some developments，the owner may be bound by contractual limitations on what he can do with his property （restrictive covenants，voluntary zoning），which might include residential rather than commercial use，no buildings more than four stories high，no sale or rent to unmarried couples，smokers，or Germans，for instance.

为了说明这一点，首先需要假设一个概念性基准。即政治哲学家所描述的私有财产无政府状态、无政府资本主义或有序无政府状态——所有土地都是私有的，包括所有的街道、河流、机场、港口等。在产权私有的前提下，使用权还有些不同。对于某些土地，产权可能是不受限制的，也就是说，所有者可以随心所欲地使用自己的财产，只要不对他人的财产造成物理损害。对于另一些土地，产权可能有不同程度的限制。就像目前在一些开发区中一样，所有者可能受到契约限制，规定他可以对其财产进行什么样的使用（限制性条款、自愿分区），例如只能用于住宅而不能用于商业用途，不得建造超过四层高的建筑，不得出售或出租给未婚情侣、吸烟者或德国人等。

Clearly，in this kind of society，there is no such thing as freedom of immigration，or an immigrant’s right of way。What does exist is the freedom of independent private property owners to admit or exclude others from their own property in accordance with their own restricted or unrestricted property titles.Admission to some territories might be easy，while to others it might be nearly impossible.Moreover，admission to one party’s property does not imply the “freedom to move around，” unless other property own ers have agreed to such movements.There will be as much immigration or nonimmigration，inclusivity or exclusivity，desegregation or segregation，nondiscrimination or discrimination as individual owners or owners’ asso ciations desire.

很明显，在这样的社会里，没有所谓的移民自由，或者移民通行权。真正存在的是独立的私人财产所有者根据自己有限或不受限制的财产所有权允许或排斥他人使用自己财产的自由。进入某些地区可能很容易，而另一些地区近乎不可能。此外，进入一方的财产并不意味着“行动自由”，除非其他财产所有者同意这种行动。移民或非移民、包容性或排他性、废除种族隔离或种族隔离、非歧视或歧视，将视个人所有者或所有者协会的意愿而定。

The reason for citing the model of an anarchocapitalist society is that by definition no such thing as forced integration （uninvited migration） is possible （permitted） within its framework。Under this scenario，no differrence between the physical movement of goods and the migration of people exists.As every product movement refiects an underlying agreement between sender and receiver，so all movements of immigrants into and within an anarchocapitalist society are the result of an agreement between the immigrant and one or a series of receiving domestic property owners.Hence，even if the anarchocapitalist model is ultimately rejected—and if for realism’s sake the existence of a government and of “public” （in addition to private） goods and property is assumed—it brings into clear relief what a government’s immigration policy would have to be，if and insofar as this government derived its legitimacy from the sovereignty of the “people” and was viewed as the outgrowth of an agreement or “social contract” （as is the case with all modern，postmonarchical governments，of course）。A “popular” government which assumed as its primary task the protection of its citi zen and their property （the production of domestic security） would surely want to preserve，rather than abolish，this noforcedintegration feature of anarchocapitalism!

In order to realize what this involves，it is necessary to explain how an anarchocapitalist society is altered by the introduction of a government，and how this affects the immigration problem.Since in an anarchocapitalist society there is no government，there is no clearcut distinction between inlanders （domestic citizens） and foreigners.This distinction appears only with the establishment of a government。The territory over which a government’s power extends then becomes inland，and everyone residing out side of this territory becomes a foreigner。State borders （and passports），as distinct from private property borders （and titles to property），come into existence，and immigration takes on a new meaning。immigration becomes immigration by foreigners across state borders，and the decision as to whether or not a person should be admitted no longer rests exclu sively with private property owners or associations of such owners but with the government qua domestic security producer。Now，if the government excludes a person while there exists a domestic resident who wants to admit this very person onto his property，the result is forced exclusion； and if the government admits a person while there exists no domestic resident who wants to have this person on his property，the result is forced integration.

Moreover，hand in hand with the institution of a government comes the institution of public property and goods，that is，of property and goods owned collectively by all domestic residents and controlled and adminis tered by the government。The larger or smaller the amount of publicgovernment ownership，the greater or lesser will be the potential problem of forced integration.Consider a socialist society like the former Soviet Union or East Germany，for examplE.All factors of production，including all land and natural resources，are publicly owned.Accordingly，if the government admits an uninvited immigrant，it potentially admits him to any place within the country； for without private land ownership，there exist no limi tations on his internal migrations other than those decreed by government。Under socialism，therefore，forced integration can be spread everywhere and thus immensely intensified.（In fact，in the Soviet Union and East Germany，the government could quarter a stranger in someone else’s private house or apartment。This measure—and the resulting highpowered forced integration—was justified by the “fact” that all private houses rested on public land.）

Socialist countries will not be highwage areas，of course，or at least will not remain so for long。Their problem is not immigration but emigration pressure.The Soviet Union and East Germany prohibited emigration and killed people for trying to leave the country。However，the problem of the extension and intensification of forced integration persists outside of socialism.To be sure，in nonsocialist countries such as the U.S.，Switzerland，and the Federal Republic of Germany，which are favorite immigration destina tions，a governmentadmitted immigrant could not move just anywherE.The immigrant’s freedom of movement would be severely restricted by the extent of private property，and private land ownership in particular。Yet，by proceeding on public roads，or with public means of transportation，and in staying on public land and in public parks and buildings，an immigrant can potentially cross every domestic resident’s path，even move into anyone’s immediate neighborhood and practically land on his very doorsteps.The smaller the quantity of public property，the less acute the problem will be.But as long as there exists any public property，it cannot be entirely escaped.

当然，社会主义国家不会是高工资地区，至少不会长期如此。他们的问题不是移民，而是移民压力。苏联和东德禁止移民，并杀害试图去国之人。然而，强制一体化的扩大和加剧问题在社会主义之外仍然存在。当然，在非社会主义国家，如美国、瑞士和德意志联邦共和国，这些国家都是移民的首选之地，政府承认的移民不可能随便迁移到任何地方。移民的行动自由将受到私有财产，特别是私人土地所有权的严重限制。然而，通过使用公有道路、公共交通工具，以及在公有土地、花园和公共建筑物中逗留，移民有可能会越过每个国内居民的道路，甚至搬到任何人的附近，实际上几乎就在他的家门口。公有财产的数量越少，这个问题就越不严重。但是，只要存在任何公有财产，就不可能完全避免这个问题。

V. 纠正和预防

CORRECTION AND PREVENTION

A popular government that wants to safeguard its citizens and their domes tic property from forced integration and foreign invaders has two methods of doing so，a corrective and a preventive one.The corrective method is designed to ameliorate the effects of forced integration once the event has taken place （and the invaders are there）。As indicated，to achieve this goal，the government must reduce the quantity of public property as much as possiblE.Moreover，whatever the mix of private and public property，the government must uphold—rather than criminalize—any private property owner’s right to admit and exclude others from his property。If virtually all property is owned privately and the government assists in enforcing private ownership rights，then uninvited immigrants，even if they succeeded in entering the country，would not likely get much farther。

一个人民政府想要保护其公民及其国内财产免受强制一体化和外国侵略者的侵害，有两种方法可以做到这一点，一种是纠正，另一种是预防。纠正方法的目的是在事件发生（入侵者已经存在）后，改善强制一体化的影响。如上所述，为了实现这一目标，政府必须尽可能减少公有财产的数量。此外，无论私有财产和公有财产的混合情况如何，政府都必须维护——而不是将其定为犯罪——任何私人财产所有者允许和排斥他人使用其财产的权利。如果几乎所有的财产都是私人所有，政府协助执行私人所有权，那么未经邀请的移民，即使他们成功入境，也不太可能走得更远。

The more completely this corrective measure is carried out （the higher the degree of private ownership），the less there will be a need for protec tive measures，such as border defense.The cost of protection against for eign invaders along the U.S.Mexico border，for instance，is comparatively high，because for long stretches no private property on the U.S.side exists.However，even if the cost of border protection can be lowered by means of privatization，it will not disappear as long as there are substantial income and wage differentials between high and lowwage territories.Hence，in order to fulfill its basic protective function，a highwageare a government must also be engaged in preventive measures.At all ports of entry and along its borders，the government，as trustee of its citizens，must check all newly arriving persons for an entrance ticket—a valid invitation by a domestic property owner—and everyone not in possession of such a ticket will have to be expelled at his own expense.

上述这种纠正措施执行得越彻底（私有制程度越高），对边境防御等保护措施的需求就越少。例如，美国和墨西哥边境地区抵御外来入侵者的成本相对较高，因为美国一侧很长一段边境地区都没有私有财产。然而，即使通过私有化降低了边境保护的成本，只要高工资地区和低工资地区之间存在巨大的收入和工资差异，边境保护的成本就不会消失。因此，为了履行其基本的保护职能，高薪地区的政府也必须采取预防措施。在所有入境口岸和边境沿线，政府作为公民的受托人，必须检查所有新抵达的人是否有入场券——由国内财产所有者发出的有效邀请——所有未持有入场券的人都必须被驱逐出境，且费用自理。

Valid invitations are contracts between one or more private domes tic recipients，residential or commercial，and the arriving persoN.Qua contractual admission，the inviting party can dispose only of his own private property。Hence，the admission implies negatively—similarly to the scenario of conditional free immigration—that the immigrant is excluded from all publicly funded welfarE.Positively，it implies that the receiving party assumes legal responsibility for the actions of his invitee for the duration of his stay。The invitor is held liable to the full extent of his property for any crimes the invitee commits against the person or property of any third party （as parents are held accountable for the crimes of their offspring as long as they are members of the parental household）。This obligation，which implies practically speaking that inviters will have to carry liability insurance for all of their guests，ends once the invitee has left the country，or once another domestic property owner has assumed liability for the person in question （by admitting him onto his property）。

有效的邀请函是一个或多个私人接收人（住宅或商业）与抵达者之间的契约。根据契约的许可，邀请方只能处分自己的私有财产。因此，接纳移民是消极的，与有条件自由移民的情况类似，都意味着该移民被排除在所有公共资助的福利之外。从正面来看，这意味着接受方对被邀请者在其逗留期间的行为承担法律责任。对于被邀请者对任何第三方的人身或财产所犯的罪行，邀请者须以其全部财产承担法律责任（正如父母须为其子女所犯罪行负责一样，只要他们是父母家庭的成员）。这项义务实际上意味着邀请者必须为其所有客人购买责任保险，一旦被邀请者离开这个国家，或者一旦另一个国内财产所有者（通过允许该人进入其财产）承担了对该人的责任，这项义务才会终止。

The invitation may be private （personal） or commercial，temporally limited or unlimited，concerning only housing （accommodation，residency） or housing and employment （but there cannot be a valid contract involving only employment and no housing）。In any case，however，as a contractual relationship，every invitation may be revoked or terminated by the inviter； and upon termination，the invitee—whether tourist，visiting businessman，or resident alien—will be required to leave the country （unless another resi dent citizen enters an invitationcontract with him）。

邀请可以是私人（个人）邀请，也可以是商业邀请；可以是有时间限制的邀请，也可以是无时间限制的邀请；可以只涉及住房（住宿、居留），也可以只涉及住房和就业（但不能签订只涉及就业而不涉及住房的有效契约）。但是，在任何情况下，作为一种契约关系，每一次邀请都可以由邀请人撤销或终止签证终止后，被邀请者——无论是游客、来访的商人，还是常住外国人——将被要求离开美国（除非另一位常住公民与他签订了邀请契约）。

The invitee may lose his legal status as a nonresident or resident alien，who is at all times subject to the potential risk of immediate expulsion，only upon acquiring citizenship.In accordance with the objective of making all immigration （as trade） invitedcontractual，the fundamental requirement for citizenship is the acquisition of property ownership，or more precisely the ownership of real estate and residential property。

受邀者可能会失去其作为非居民或常住外国人的合法身份，在任何时候都有可能面临被立即驱逐出境的风险，只有在获得公民身份后，才能免于这种境况。根据实现所有移民（如同贸易一样）成为受邀契约移民的目标，获得公民身份的基本要求是取得财产所有权，或者更确切地说是不动产和住宅物业的所有权。

In contrast，it would be inconsistent with the very idea of invited migration to award citizenship according to the territorial principle，as in the U.S.，whereby a child born to a nonresident or resident alien in a host country automatically acquires this country’s citizenship.In fact，such a child acquires，as most other highwagearea governments recognize，the citizenship of his parents.For the host country’s government to grant this child citizenship instead involves the nonfulfillment of its basic protec tive function，and actually amounts to an invasive act perpetrated by the government against its own citizenry。Rather，becoming a citizen means acquiring the right to stay in a country permanently，and a permanent invitation cannot be secured other than by purchasing residential property from a citizen resident。Only by selling real estate to a foreigner does a citizen indicate that he agrees to a guest’s permanent stay （and only if the immigrant has purchased and paid for real estate and residential housing in the host country will he assume a permanent interest in his new coun try’s wellbeing and prosperity）。Moreover，finding a citizen willing to sell residential property and being prepared and able to pay for it，although a necessary requirement for the acquisition of citizenship，may not also be sufficient。If and insofar as the domestic property in question is subject to restrictive covenants，the hurdles to be taken by a prospective citizen may be significantly higher。In Switzerland，for instance，citizenship requires that the sale of residential property to foreigners be ratified by a majority or even all directly affected local property owners.

VI. 结论

conclusion

Judged by the immigration policy required to protect one’s own citizens from foreign invasion and forced integration—and to render all interna tional population movements invited and contractual migrations—the Swiss government does a significantly better job than the United States.It is more difficult to enter Switzerland as an uninvited person or to stay on as an uninvited alieN.In particular，it is far more difficult for a foreigner to acquire citizenship，and the legal distinction between resident citizens and resident aliens is more clearly preserved.These differences notwithstanding，the governments of both Switzerland and the U.S.pursue immigration poli cies that must be deemed far too permissivE.

Moreover，the excessive permissiveness of their immigration policies and the resulting exposure of the Swiss and American population to forced integration with foreigners is aggravated by the fact that the extent of public property in both countries （and other highwage areas） is quite substantial； that taxfunded welfare provisions are high and growing，and foreigners are not excluded； and that contrary to official pronouncements，even the adher ence to freetrade policies is anything but perfect。Accordingly，in Switzer land，the U.S.，and most other highwage areas，popular protests against immigration policies have grown increasingly louder。

此外，瑞士和美国两国（以及其他高工资地区）的公有财产规模相当庞大，由税收资助的福利供给水平很高且还在不断增长，而且外国人并未被排除在福利享受范围之外，另外与官方声明相悖的是，就连对自由贸易政策的遵循也远非完美无缺。这些情况使得两国过度宽松的移民政策以及由此导致的瑞士和美国民众被迫与外国人一体化的状况进一步恶化。因此，在瑞士、美国以及大多数其他高工资地区，针对移民政策的民众抗议声浪日益高涨。

It has been the purpose of this essay not only to make the case for the privatization of public property，domestic laissezfaire，and international free trade，but in particular also for the adoption of a restrictive immigration policy。By demonstrating that free trade is inconsistent with （uncondition ally or conditionally） free immigration，and that free trade requires instead that migration be subject to the condition of being invited and contractual，it is our hope to contribute to more enlightened future policies in this area.

本文的目的不仅在于为公有财产私有化、国内自由放任政策以及国际自由贸易提供论据，而且尤其在于倡导采取限制性的移民政策。通过论证自由贸易与（无条件或有条件的）自由移民并不相容，且自由贸易实际上要求移民须遵循受到邀请并签订契约的条件，我们希望能为这一领域未来更为明智的政策制定贡献一份力量。

8 论人、自然、真理和公正*

On man，nature，Truth，and Justice

It is possible to describe and explain man in naturalistic terms，in the same way as we describe and explain stones，plants and animals：in the language of physics，chemistry，biology，genetics，neurology，etc。

But a purely naturalistic account of man，while entirely legitimate，and even if true，must fail to capture the essence of man：what makes man unique and distinguishes him from all other things：from stones，plants and animals.That this is the case can be easily recognized in asking oneself what it is that one is doing when debating the question at hand—the nature of man—or any other question for that matter。The answer：We speak to each other in meaningful words and sentences—we present arguments—and we do so with the purpose of argumentative success，of reaching agreement regarding the validity of an argument or the truth of some propositioN.Yet it is obviously impossible to give a naturalistic account of this undeniable part of human nature：of meaningful words，sentences and arguments，of intention and purpose，of truth and falsehood，and of success and failure.There is nothing purposeful，meaningful，true，false，successful or unsuccessful in nature.nature and the laws of nature are what they are and they work the way they do，unchangingly and unfailingly。Yet human propositions or sen tences are intentional，meaningful，and true or false，i.e.，all meaning and all truths are in a most fundamental sense meaningandtruthsforman rather than meaningandtruthsansicH.

但是，对人类的纯粹自然主义的描述，虽然完全合理，而且即使是正确的，也一定无法捕捉到人的本质：是什么使人独一无二，并将人与其他万物（石头、植物和动物）区别开来。只要扪心自问，在论证当前的问题——人的本质或任何其他问题——时，我们究竟在做什么，就不难发现这一点。答案是：我们用有意义的词语和句子相互交谈——我们提出论点——我们这样做的目的是为了论证成功，即就论证的有效性或某个命题的真实性达成一致。然而，要对人类本性中这一不可否认的部分：有意义的词语、句子和论点、意图和目的、真理与谬误、以及成功与失败等给出自然主义的解释，显然是不可能的。自然界不存在目的、意义、真假、成功或失败的概念。自然和自然法则就是这样，它们以自己的方式运作，亘古不变，永不失败。然而，人类的命题或句子是有意向的、有意义的、有真假的，也就是说，从最根本的视角看，所有的意义和真理都是因人而在的，而非自在的。

Hence，every natural scientist—whether biologist，physiologist，chemist，geneticist or neurologist—who claims that man can be reduced to nothing but nature becomes entangled in contradiction.

因此，每一位自然科学家——无论是生物学家、生理学家、化学家、遗传学家还是神经学家——如果声称人可以被简化为纯粹的自然产物而别无其他，就会陷入自相矛盾之中。

On the one hand，the ‘man’ this scientist speaks and writes about：man asnature （which he claims to be the only ‘man’ there is），has no purpose and no meaning and nothing about its inner workings is true or false，successful or failing。Everything works the way it does，in accordance with unchanging and unfailing causal laws.Even life and death have no meaning。Death and bodily decay do not falsify causal laws.Nor does life confirm these laws.The same laws of nature hold for life and death equally。Life and death are not a “success” or “failure，” as far as manasnature is concerned.They simply are：morally （valuationally） “neutral” events.And yet：On the other hand，he，the very scientist，who obviously counts himself as a member of the class of ‘man，’ follows a purpose in conducting his research on manasnature.He conducts purposeful operations and must employ meaningful sentences to describe the results of his research concerning “ansich” meaningless natural materials and processes.He claims these results to be true rather than falsE.And given his purpose，he considers his research a success or a failure.And for him，in contrast to manasnature，death and bodily malfunctions do have meaning and are indeed failures and malfunctions.Yet they have meaning and are failures or malfunctions only insofar as they are related to a human purpose：the purpose of wanting to preserve life and health （as something “good”） and to prevent illness and death （as something “bad”）。

Instead of a necessarily insufficient and incomplete “naturalistic” account，then，I want to present what one might call a cultural（istic） account of man，which captures what the naturalistic account leaves out and thus elucidates what distinguishes man from everything else.

那么，我不想给出一种必然不充分且不完整的“自然主义”描述，而是要呈现一种可以被称作关于人的“文化（主义）”描述，这种描述涵盖了自然主义描述所遗漏的内容，从而阐明了人区别于其他一切事物的特质。

And we have already gained a nonnaturalistic starting point from which we must begin this endeavor：the apriori of argumentation.

我们已经有了一个非自然主义的起点：论证的先验性。

man can undeniably argue.Not only is arguing what we do here and now，there is simply no other starting point available，for whatever we may choose as such a point，we cannot but speak and argue about it。We can not deny that argumentation must be the starting point，and the point of departure of all talk about man，without falling into some （immediately to be explained） form of contradiction.

不可否认，人是能够进行论证的。论证不仅是我们当下正在做的事情，而且根本不存在其他可用的出发点，因为无论我们选择什么作为出发点，我们都不得不对此进行言说和论证。我们不得不承认，论证必定是所有关于人的讨论的起点和出发点，否则就会陷入某种（马上要加以说明的）自相矛盾的形式。

Setting out from the apriori of argumentation as my necessary and undeniable—and hence apriori true—starting point，then，it is my plan to explain everything that is already “implied” in this apriori and hence like wise must be regarded as apriori true.

那么，以论证的先验性作为我必要且不可否认的——因而也是先验为真的——出发点，我打算解释一切在这一先验性中已然“蕴含”的内容，因此这些内容同样也必须被视作先验为真的。

That is，my following argument aims to establish and elucidate what must be presupposed by argumentation，i.e.，what an arguer must accept as more basic and elementary than argumentation，as the preargumentative foundation of argumentation，if you will，and that makes argumentation possible.

也就是说，我接下来的论证旨在确立并阐明论证所必须预设的内容，即一个论证者必须承认哪些内容比论证本身更为基础和根本，可以说，这些内容是论证的前论证基础，正是它们使得论证成为可能。

Four immediate insights spring to mind：（1） argumentation presupposes action.action comes before argumentation.All arguing is acting and every arguer knows what it is to act。But only very few actions are argumen tatioN.（2） Even most of our speech acts—acts accompanied by words—are not argumentation.The employment of language for other，nonargumen tative purposes also comes before and is presupposed by argumentation.（3） In fact，most of the time we do not speak at all when we act。We act silently，and silent action，too，comes before and is presupposed by argumentation.（4） Argumentative discourse is rare and has the unique purpose and aim of resolving disagreements regarding the truth of certain propositions or the validity of certain arguments.

脑海中立刻浮现出四点见解：（1）论证以行动为前提。行动先于论证。所有的论证都是一种行动，而且每个论证者都知道行动是怎么回事。但只有极少数的行动属于论证。（2）甚至我们大多数的言语行动——伴有话语的行为——也并非论证。将语言用于其他非论证性目的的情况同样先于论证且是论证的前提。（3）实际上，在我们行动时，大多数时候我们根本不说话。我们默默地行动，而无声的行动同样也先于论证且是论证的前提。（4）论证性的话语较为少见，其有着独特的目的和目标，即解决关于某些命题的真实性或某些论证的有效性方面的分歧。

First：Since many here are familiar with Mises’s work，I can be brief regarding the first point。Arguing is a special case of acting。Everything that can be stated about actions in general applies also to the special case of argumentation.Like all action，argumentation takes place in time and space and is constrained by scarcity and timE.argumentation，too，is a motivated，purposeful activity。

首先：由于这里很多人都熟悉米塞斯的著作，所以关于第一点我可以简要说明。论证是行动的一种特殊情况。关于一般行动所能阐述的一切内容，也同样适用于论证这种特殊情况。和所有行动一样，论证发生在时间和空间之中，并且受到稀缺性和时间的限制。论证同样也是一种有动机、有目的的活动。

But：Not all action is argumentation.argumentation is an activity sui generis.

但是：并非所有行动都是论证。论证是一种独特的活动。

Second：While arguing is also a form of communicative—language using—action （interaction） aimed at the successful coordination of the actions of a community of speakers，most communicative action is non argumentative，i.e.，is speech not concerned with the clarification of truth claims.In fact，even the request or the suggestion to enter into an argumen tation is apparently not itself a right or wrong proposition or argument，but a request or a suggestioN.Which demonstrates that nonargumentative communication comes and must have been learned temporally and logically prior to argumentation.Most fundamentally，before we can ever engage in argumentation，we must already know and have learned （at a minimum） how to use words to call upon someone and how to point out，draw attention or refer to something to be done or expected.It would be senseless to deny this，because the proponent of this argument must already presuppose these abilities as an apriori ‘given’ both for himself as well as for his opponent。The apriori of argumentation，then，implies as its logical and practical— praxeological—presupposition and foundation，an apriori of communicative action.

第二：虽然论证也是一种沟通——语言使用——行动（互动）的形式，旨在成功协调说话者群体的行动，但大多数沟通行动并非论证，即不涉及澄清真理。事实上，即使是请求论证或建议论证，本身也不涉及命题的对错或论证，而是一种请求或建议。大多数的沟通不是论证，建议论证也不是论证，这证明了非论证性的交流在时间上和逻辑上先于论证性交流，而交流是一种习得的交流方式。最根本的是，在我们能够进行论证之前，我们必须已经知道并学会（至少）如何使用语言来召集某人，学会如何表达、引起注意或指示有关某事物的做法或期望。否认这一点是毫无意义的，因为提出这一论点的人必须预先假定这些能力既是他自己的 “既定 “能力，也是他对手的 “既定 “能力。因此，论证的先验性作为其逻辑和实践——行动学——的前提和基础，意味着沟通行动的先验性。

Analytically，in any type of human speech act or communicative action we can distinguish two categorically distinct parts or constituents.On the one hand，all speech has a propositional part。Therein something is stated regarding certain facts （what it is that we are talking about）。On the other hand，every speech has an illocutionary or performative part whereby the speaker places the propositional part of his speech into a social or interactive context，commenting，so to say，to other speakers what to make of it。The same propositional content：for instance，“this banana，” can be presented in various performative modes such as “Is this a banana？” “I promise you this banana，” “this is my banana，” “take this banana，” “I am telling you a story about a banana，” “I am ordering you to get rid of this banana，” etc。Speak ing，then，is more than a mere statement of facts （facts being what proposi tions are about）。It involves always and invariably that a given propositional content is uttered and placed in some specific performative modE.

从分析的角度来看，在任何类型的人类言语行动或沟通行动中，我们都可以区分出两种截然不同的部分或成分。一方面，所有言语都有命题部分。有关于某些事实的陈述（我们正在谈论的是什么）。另一方面，每一个表达都有一个言外或述行部分，说话者通过这个部分把将其演讲的命题部分置于一个社会或互动的语境中，向其他说话者做出评论，也就是说，向其他说话者评论该怎么做。同样的命题内容：例如，“这只香蕉”可以以不同的述行模式呈现，例如“这是一只香蕉吗？”“我答应给你这根香蕉”、“这是我的香蕉”、“拿着这根香蕉”、“我给你讲一个关于香蕉的故事”、“我命令你扔掉这根香蕉”等等。因此，“说”不仅仅是对事实的陈述（事实就是命题的内容），它总是且不可避免地涉及特定命题内容的陈述，并将其置于某种特定的述行模式中。

Accordingly，the success （or failure） of a communicative action aimed at coordination depends on a twofold accomplishment。The understand ing of the speech’s propositional content and the acceptance of the modus of proposing it。

因此，以协调为目的的沟通行动的成功（或失败）取决于两方面的成就：对言语命题内容的理解和提出命题的方式的接受程度。

coordination is successful if I ask you to bring me a banana and you bring me one.It is unsuccessful if you don’t know the meaning of “banana” or “bring”—and you bring me a teddy bear instead or you respond to my request by saying，for instance，“I am 60 years old” （indicating that you haven’t understood the entire purpose of my speech）。Likewise，coordination is unsuccessful if you understand what I say，but you reject my proposal and reply，for example，“I don’t take orders from you，” or “I have no time，” or simply walk away from mE.

如果我让你给我一个香蕉，于是你给我一个，协调就是成功的。如果你不知道“香蕉”或“给”的意思，你给我一只泰迪熊，或者你对我的要求做出回应，例如，“我60岁了”（表明你没有完全理解我说话的目的），这都是不成功的。同样，如果你明白我说的话，但你拒绝我的提议并回答，例如，“我不听你的命令”，或者“我没有时间”，或者干脆从我面前走开，那么协调也是不成功的。

Moreover and importantly，unsuccessful coordination （discoordination） can take two possible forms or outcomes：“simple” disappointment or “serious” confiict。After you （disappointingly） walked away from my request （and my speech act has failed），we both go about our daily business as before （silently），I with the means under my control and you with the means under your control。A case of disappointment。

A conflict results，if，instead of you bringing me a banana （successful communication） or walking away from me （disappointing communication），you respond，for example，by taking a pocket knife against my protestations out of my hand or pulling my hair。As well，confiict results if I respond to your disappointing refusal by following you against your protestation into your house（the house previously under your undisputed control）。In both cases，we clash，because we want to employ the very same scarce means—the knife，the hair，the house—for incompatible purposes.because of the scarcity of physical means，only one purpose can be realized and fulfilled.We must clash.

如果你不是给我一根香蕉（成功的沟通），也不是从我身边走开（令人失望的沟通），你的反应却是，不顾我的抗议，从我手中夺走一把小刀，或者扯我的头发，这就产生了冲突。同样，如果我对你令人失望的拒绝做出回应，不顾你的抗议，强行进入你的房子（房子一直都无可争议的在你的控制之下），这也产生了冲突。在这两种情况下，我们发生了冲突，因为我们都想用同样的稀缺手段——刀、头发、房子——来达到不相容的目的。由于物质手段的稀缺性，只有一个目的可以实现和满足，因此我们必定有冲突。

Let me pause here for a moment for a few critically important empirical observations.The achievements of the social sciences are often belittled or even ridiculed.And in view of much if not most of contemporary academic sociology，this assessment is certainly well deserved.Yet this should not blind us toward noticing some rather obvious facts.

请允许我在此稍作停顿，谈谈一些至关重要的经验之谈。社会科学的成就常常被轻视甚至嘲笑。从当代学术社会学的大部分成果来看，这种评价无疑是实至名归。然而，我们不应因此而忽视一些显而易见的事实。

It must surely come as reassuring and refreshing to observe that much if not most of our communicative action—our speechacts—is successful，both in being understood and in being accepted for what it is.Far more communication is successful than not。And if communication is not successful and fails to reach its end of interpersonal coordination，these failures are mostly mere disappointments.Failed communication in the form of confiict is a comparatively rare occurrence （and its notoriety is derived from this rarity）。By and large，we are amazingly successful as speakers in bringing about coordination.

观察到我们的大部分（如果不是大多数的话）沟通行动——我们的言语——既能被人理解也能被人接受，这两方面都是成功的，肯定会让人感到安心和振奋。成功的交流远远多于失败的交流。如果沟通不成功，未能达到人际协调的目的，这些失败大多只是令人失望而已。以冲突形式出现的沟通失败是一种相对罕见的现象（其恶名也正是来源于这种罕见性）。总的来说，我们作为言说者在实现协调方面取得了惊人的成功。

And if speaking is and does for us in the social world （made up of other people and their actions） what engineering is and does for us in the natural world （made up of stones，plants and animals and their behavior），then we must actually come to the conclusion that we are quite successful as social engineers，as people effecting coordination by means of speech.

如果在由其他人及其行动构成的社会世界里，说话对于我们而言就如同在由石头、植物、动物及其行为构成的自然世界里工程学对于我们的意义和作用一样，那么我们实际上必须得出这样的结论：作为通过言语实现协调的人，我们作为社会工程师是相当成功的。

Moreover，even if communicative action sometimes fails to attain coor dination，we have a method of learning and improving it。

此外，即使沟通有时无法达到协调的目的，我们也有学习和改进的方法。

I will come back to the subject of argumentation.But before some first attention must be given to silent or speechless action and the categorically distinct purpose of communicative action vs.instrumental action.

我将回到论证的主题上来。但在此之前，我们必须首先关注无声或无言的行为，以及沟通行动与工具性行动截然不同的目的。

Most of what we do is silent or speechless action.In fact，just as communicative action comes before and is presupposed by argumentation，so silent action comes before and is presupposed by communicative action.On the one hand，this is revealed by the fact that，as children，we learn to act before we learn to speak and use words to identify and describe our actions as actions.And on the other hand，it is revealed by the fact that，however important communicative action may otherwise be in human life，acting man cannot live off and sustain his life from words alone.He must first transform nature to produce material goods for the ultimate purpose of consumption in order to then find the time to engage in communication or argumentation.

我们所做的大多数事情都是无声的或无言的行动。事实上，正如交流行动先于论证且是论证的前提一样，无声行动也先于交流行动且是其前提。一方面，这一点从我们儿时先学会行动，之后才学会说话并用词语来识别和描述我们的行动这一事实中便可看出。另一方面，这也体现在，无论交流行动在人类生活中原本可能有多重要，行动着的人都无法仅靠话语来维持生计。他必须首先改造自然以生产出用于最终消费目的的物质产品，然后才能抽出时间来进行交流或论证。

Getting dressed，cooking，eating，walking，working，observing，planting，harvesting，building，measuring，counting，cutting，cleaning，repairing，driving，drinking，etc。，are all examples of silent action.In all of these activities we follow methodically ordered practical recipes of how to use scarce physical means in order to reach an anticipated goal （being dressed，having cooked，eaten，etc。）。If asked，and on refiection，we could give an account of our actions in terms of meaningful words and sentences：about their purposes，about the means used，and about the recipes followed and applied in using such means.And other speakers could understand this account，because we all are united by a common language learned through common practice in language games.But we are silent，because we judge the success （or failure） of our action as independent of any communicative effort （otherwise communication would have to be part of the recipe lead ing to success）。We stay silent，because we deem the success of our action as dependent solely on us，as if we were the only person on earth，as if we stood in a purely monologic relation to the world and were the sole judge of success and failure.

穿衣、下厨、吃饭、走路、工作、观察、种植、收获、建造、测量、计数、切割、清洁、修理、驾驶、饮酒等，都是无声行动的例子。在所有这些活动中，我们都有条不紊地遵循使用方法，即如何使用稀缺的物理手段达到预期目标（穿衣、下厨、吃饭等）。如果有人问起，我们经过反思可以用有意义的词语和句子来描述我们的行动：关于行动的目的，关于使用的手段，以及在使用这些手段时遵循和应用的方法。其他说话的人也能理解这种说法，因为我们都是通过在语言游戏中的共同练习学到共同语言而联系在一起的。但我们保持沉默，是因为我们判断自身行动的成败并不取决于任何交流努力（否则交流就必须成为通向成功的要素之一了）。我们保持沉默，是因为我们认为自身行动的成败完全取决于我们自己，仿佛我们是地球上唯一的人，仿佛我们与世界处于一种纯粹的独白式关系中，并且是成败的唯一评判者。

As already noted，every instrumental or speechless activity involves the use of scarce physical means in reach and under control of a given actor，with the purpose of transforming or rearranging the physicalmaterial world around him into another more highly valued anticipated future arrangement or configuration of his material surroundings.In this，he is always guided by some ideas or knowledge in the form of actionrecipes.If he reaches his goal，his recipes are considered correct and the knowledge contained in them can be said to be true.If he fails to reach his goal，the recipes are incorrect and his knowledge is considered false or insufficient。

如前所述，每一种工具性行动或无言行动，都涉及到使用稀缺的物理手段，这些手段在特定的行动人的控制范围内，目的是改变或重新安排他周围的物质世界，使之成为他所预期的物质环境的另一种更有价值的未来安排或配置。在这种情况下，他总是以行动方法的形式受到一些观念或知识的指导。如果他达到了他的目标，他的方法被认为是正确的，其中包含的知识就可以说是正确的或真实的。如果他没有达到他的目标，那么他的方法就是不正确的，他的知识就被认为是错误的或不充分的。

Interestingly，in the wake of the writings of such prominent intellectual figures as Willard v.O.Quine，Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend，the relativism and skepticism characteristic of much of the philosophy of the social sciences has also taken increasing hold in the philosophy of the natu ral sciences.Even in the natural sciences，these authors claim in their various ways，there exists no rocksolid foundation and no systematic and methodi cal progress，and hence the possibility of any “growth of knowledge” must be put in fundamental doubt。Instead，much is made by them of the “inde terminacy of translation，” “ontological relativity，” the “incommensurability of paradigms，” and “methodological anarchism.”

有趣的是，在威拉德·范·奥曼·蒯因、托马斯·库恩和保罗·费耶阿本德等杰出知识界人物的著作问世之后，社会科学哲学中颇具代表性的相对主义和怀疑主义在自然科学哲学中也越发盛行起来。这些作者以各自不同的方式宣称，即便在自然科学领域，也不存在坚如磐石的基础，不存在系统且有条不紊的进步，因此，任何“知识增长”的可能性都必须受到根本性的质疑。相反，他们大谈 “翻译的不确定性”、”本体论的相对性”、”范式的不可通约性 “和 “方法论的无政府主义”。

In light of what has already been noted about the role of knowledge as a mental tool in the pursuit of successful instrumental action and the intentional transformation of nature into culture，these relativistic views， however popular or fashionable they may currently be，must be considered fundamentally mistaken.Indeed，as I am going to further demonstrate，they should strike one as nothing short of absurd.

鉴于上文已经提到的知识作为一种心智工具，在追求成功的工具性行动和有意图地将自然转化为文化中的作用，这些相对主义的观点，无论目前多么流行或时髦，都必须从根本上被认为是错误的。事实上，正如我将进一步证明的那样，它们应该让人觉得荒谬至极。

For one，it would seem to be obvious that most—and increasingly more—of the world around us is not “raw nature” or naturegiven “environment，” but made up instead of manufactured goods （or means）。We are surrounded by houses and streets，farms，factories，tables，chairs，toasters，telephones，pipes，wires，cars，boats，napkins，toilet paper，and on and oN.Almost never，in our daily lives，do we encounter “raw nature.” What we encounter almost exclusively instead is a world of manmade culture：of “artificial” objects，designed for a definite purpose.

首先，很明显的是，我们周围世界的大部分——而且越来越多——并非 “原始自然 “或自然赋予的 “环境”，而是由制成品（或手段）构成的。我们被房屋、街道、农场、工厂、桌子、椅子、烤面包机、电话、管道、电线、汽车、船只、餐巾纸、卫生纸等等包围着。在日常生活中，我们几乎从未遇到过 “原始自然”。相反，我们所遇到的几乎完全是一个人造文化的世界：一个为明确目的而设计的“人造”物体的世界。

Importantly （but regularly overlooked by relativistic philosophers of the natural sciences），also the natural scientist in particular does not approach nature with his bare hands，as it were，but with the help of purposefully manufactured goods.To make his natureobservations，he employs man made surfaces，planes，rulers，lines，points，angles，circles，curves，clocks，scales，calculators，microscopes，telescopes，burners，lighters，thermometers，Xray machines，etc.，etc。Without these instruments，there would be no observations，and without the proper functioning of these instruments his observations would not be “scientific” observations.As well，whenever the natural scientist conducts an experiment，he must，so as to isolate the effect of one variable on another，hold other variables constant。That is，he must artificially design and arrange nature in order to only then generate his data，and again these data are “scientific” data only if the experiment was designed and conducted properly。Indeed，even “plain” or “raw” observations，such as an eyewitness account，for instance，require that the observer is properly placed or situated visàvis the observed object，and hence，his observations，too，are “artificial，” purposefully generated data.

重要的是（但这一点经常被自然科学领域持相对主义观点的哲学家们忽视），尤其是自然科学家并非可以说是赤手空拳地去探索自然，而是借助有目的地制造出来的物品。为了进行对自然的观察，他会使用人造的平面、直尺、线条、点、角、圆、曲线、时钟、天平、计算器、显微镜、望远镜、燃烧器、打火机、温度计、X光机等等。没有这些仪器，就不会有观察结果，而且如果这些仪器不能正常运作，他的观察结果就不能算是“科学”观察结果。同样，每当自然科学家进行一项实验时，为了分离出一个变量对另一个变量的影响，他必须使其他变量保持恒定。也就是说，他必须人为地设计和安排自然，然后才能生成数据，而且只有在实验设计和实施得当的情况下，这些数据才是“科学”数据。事实上，即使是“普通的”或“原始的”观察，例如目击者的叙述，也要求观察者对所观察的对象有适当的位置或处境，因此，他的观察也是“人为的”，有目的地生成数据。

Moreover，empirically equally obvious，most of our actions involving manufactured means and most of the natural scientists’ manufactured data turn out to be working and valid.

此外，经验上同样显而易见的是，我们大多数涉及人造工具的行动以及大多数自然科学家所获取的人造数据结果都有效且有根据。

Most of the products used in our daily lives work as they are intended to do。The house gives shelter，the toaster toasts，the telephone rings and transmits distant sounds，the car drives on streets made for driving，the chair allows us to sit down，the table stands still and provides a sur face，the wire serves as a fence or transmits electricity，the pipe holds air，water，oil or gas inside，etc。，etc。The recipes leading up to these products，then，must obviously be correct recipes.What these recipes tell us must be true knowledge of nature and its way，because it leads us to instrumental success.And judged by the great and increasing number and variety of different artificially manufactured objects all around us，we must obvi ously have discovered increasingly more correct recipes and accumulated increasingly more true knowledge of nature.（So much for any skepticism regarding the possibility of a “growth of knowledge.”）

Of course it is also true that we sometimes fail in our instrumental actions.The house，the chair or the table collapse，the telephone remains silent，the wire breaks or the pipe leaks.We fail to reach our purposes.How ever，even in the comparatively rare cases when our instrumental actions fail and we do not reach our goal，we do not only immediately recognize that we failed.We also ascribe this failure to us and a faulty or incorrectly applied recipe，i.e.，to our deficient knowledge or its incorrect applicatioN.We do not blame nature.nature，as has been already repeatedly emphasized，is the way it is.What distinguishes a working house，chair，table，toaster，car，boat，or whatever，from a broken one，is not nature and the laws of nature—they hold true and apply to both functioning and broken implements equally— but the presence of a human purpose，i.e.，the fact that only a standing house，chair or table，a toasting toaster，and a swimming boat are judged by us a success （whereas a broken one is considered a failure）。both success and fail ure are due to us，and to our correct or incorrect construction recipes.

当然，我们的工具性行为有时也会失败，这也是事实。房子、椅子或桌子塌了，电话没有声音，电线断了或管道漏了。我们未达目的。然而，即使在相对罕见的情况下，我们的工具性行动失败了，我们没有达到我们的目标，我们不仅立即认识到我们失败了，我们还会把失败归咎于我们自己，归咎于错误的或不正确的应用方法，即归咎于我们的知识或其不正确的应用。我们不怪大自然。正如我们已经反复强调的那样，自然无非是其所是。把能用的房子、椅子、桌子、烤面包机、汽车、船之类的东西与坏掉的东西区分开来的，不是自然和自然法则——它们同样适用于正常运转的和坏掉的工具——而是在于人类目的之存在。我们认为，只有竖立的房子、椅子或桌子、能烤面包的面包机和会行使的游船才是成功的（而坏掉的则被认为是失败的）。成功和失败都取决于我们，取决于我们正确或不正确的建造方法。

All this applies also to the natural scientist。His instruments：his manufactured surfaces，rulers，circles，clocks，scales，calculators，thermometers，lenses，etc。，etc。，too，mostly work and function the way they are supposed to do。The ruler rules，the circle circles，the clock clocks and the calcula tor calculates.Likewise，the natural scientist’s design and construction of “controlled experiments” is routinely successful。The construction recipes for these instruments and artificial arrangements，then，must be correct and the knowledge embodied in them must be true.

所有这些情况也同样适用于自然科学家。他所使用的仪器：人造平面、直尺、圆规、时钟、天平、计算器、温度计、透镜等等，大多也都能按照预期的方式正常工作和发挥作用。直尺能用来测量长度，圆规能画出圆形，时钟能显示时间，计算器能进行计算。同样，自然科学家设计和开展“对照实验”通常也都是成功的。那么，这些仪器的制造方法以及人为设置的实验安排的构建方案肯定是正确的，其中所蕴含的知识也必定是真实的。

It is also possible of course，even if comparatively rare，that the natural scientist’s instruments fail to do what they are intended to do。The ruler，the circle，the clock，the calculator，the thermometer are broken，or an experiment has spun out of control。However，in this case the natural scientist，too，is not only to find out quickly that he failed.He also knows that the failure lies with him and his faulty or incorrectly applied construc tion recipe for his ruler，circle or calculator，and not with nature and its laws.The broken ruler，circle or calculator are just as much part of nature and behave in accordance with natural laws as are a properly functioning ruler，circle or calculator。It is only the natural scientist，depending on the purpose of his research，that makes the distinction between “broken” and “properly” functioning implements.The ruler does not “know，” as is were，how to measure，and the calculator does not “know” how to calculate，i.e.，to distinguish correct from incorrect measurements and calculations，as the existence of broken rulers and calculators conclusively demonstrates.It is the scientist，who knows how to correctly measure and calculate and thus also to distinguish between faulty and functioning rulers and calcu lators.Similarly，it is only the scientist，not the “experiment” itself，that determines whether something was a successful—replicable—experiment or not。

当然，自然科学家的仪器也有可能达不到预期的效果，尽管这种情况比较少见。直尺、圆规、时钟、计算器、温度计坏了，或者实验失控了。然而，在这种情况下，自然科学家不仅很快发现自己失败了。他还知道，失败的原因在于他自己，在于他对直尺、圆规或计算器的错误或不正确的应用，而不在于大自然及其规律。破损的尺、圆规或计算器与正常使用的尺、圆规或计算器一样，都是自然的一部分，都遵循自然规律。只有自然科学家，根据其研究目的，才能区分“坏掉的”和“正常”使用的工具。可以说，直尺并“不知道”如何进行测量，计算器也并“不知道”如何进行计算，即如何区分正确的与错误的测量和计算，破损的直尺和损坏的计算器的存在就确凿地证明了这一点。是科学家知道如何正确地进行测量和计算，从而也能够区分出有故障的和能正常使用的直尺及计算器。同样，只有科学家，而不是“实验”本身，才能判定某一实验是否是一次成功的——可重复的——实验。

Moreover，whenever the natural scientist’s instruments—his ruler，circle or calculator—fail or his experiments go awry，he in particular also knows where the failure lies and what needs to be improved or repaired in the con struction recipes of his tools or his experimental design.

此外，每当自然科学家的工具——直尺、圆规或计算器——失灵或实验出错时，他也完全知道故障所在，以及他的工具的构造方法或实验设计中需要改进或修复的地方。

Truth and truth seeking，then，are our method and means for the attain ment of our ends，i.e.，of success.We do not seek the truth-an-sich，we seek the truth，because it leads to and is a requirement of success.The more true recipes we know，the more actions we can successfully perform.

那么，真理和寻求真理就是我们达到目的（即成功）的方法和手段。我们追求真理，并不是单纯为了追求真理而追求真理，只因为真理是通向成功的途径，也是成功的必要条件。我们知道的正确方法越多，我们就越能成功地采取更多的行动。

Fourth：But—and this brings me back to my final point：to argumenta tion as an action sui generis—although the recipes we follow in our silent actions can be right or wrong，we rarely if ever argue whether they are one or the other。If they are right，they lead to success，and if they are wrong，they lead to failure.The decision is always easy。The proof is in the pudding。Lengthy public trials à la Galilei are not needed to decide in the field of manufacturing and engineering。There is no need for a public debate about what recipe to follow in constructing a plane surface，a ruler，a triangle，a circle，a clock，a brick，a wall，a house，etc。Everyone can try and see the con sequences for himself。And because of this intimate connection of truth and success，new and improved recipes，once they become known，are quickly，without much or even any discussion，frictionless if you will，adopted by other actors as in their own interest in success.

第四点：但是——这就把我带回到我要讲的最后一点了：即论证作为一种独特的行动——尽管我们在无声行动中所遵循的方法可能是对的也可能是错的，但我们极少（就算有过的话）会去争论它们到底是对是错。如果方法是对的，就会带来成功；如果是错的，就会导致失败。判断起来总是很容易的。实践出真知嘛。在制造业和工程领域，并不需要像伽利略所经历的那种漫长的公开审判来做决断。在建造一个平面、一把直尺、一个三角形、一个圆、一个时钟、一块砖、一堵墙、一所房子等等的时候，并不需要就该遵循什么样的方法进行公开辩论。每个人都可以自己去尝试并亲眼看到结果。正因为真理和成功之间存在着这种紧密的联系，新的且经过改进的方法一旦为人所知，就会很快地（可以说毫无阻碍地，即便没有经过多少甚至完全没有经过讨论）被其他行动者采纳，因为这符合他们对成功的自身利益需求。

A need for any lengthy discussion regarding the truthclaims of various recipes，i.e.，for argumentation，arises typically only in connection with conflict。That is，the first time we seriously discuss and debate matters of truth，whether or not something is “really” true，is in discussions concerning matters of justice，of right and wrong。

通常只有在出现冲突的情况下，才会产生就各种方法的真实性主张进行冗长讨论的需要，也就是进行论证的需要。也就是说，我们第一次认真地讨论和辩论真实性问题，即某件事是否“真的”为真，是在涉及公正、是非对错等问题的讨论中。

You and I want to use one and the same good for incompatible pur poses.Plain communication has failed to achieve coordination.We clash.But we can still argue.And in any case，it is impossible to argue consistently （without falling into contradictions） that we cannot do anything about our apparent discoordination except to fight。We can do something else，as this very argument，in claiming itself to be true，manifestly and conclusively demonstrates.

你和我想把同一种物品用于不相容的目的。单纯的沟通未能实现协调。我们产生了冲突。但我们仍可进行论证。而且无论如何，若始终如一地（且不陷入自相矛盾）辩称，面对我们这种明显的不协调状况，除了争斗之外我们别无他法，这是不可能的。我们可以采取其他做法，正如这一论证本身在宣称其真实性时，已明显且确凿地证明了这一点。

We can describe the actions leading to our confiict verbally，and we can identify two incompatible truthclaims as the source of our confiict：“You are the proper owner of the good in question” （the knife，the hair，the house，or whatever）—and hence your plan comes to execution—versus “I am the proper owner”—and hence my plan is implemented.By means of words，then，we can institute a “trial，” conducted in a public language，in which we present our rival truth claims with the purpose of finding a definitive answer of “yes” or “no，” “true” or “false，” “right” or “wrong”—the true recipe—that will restore coordination and prevent future confiict。

我们可以用言语描述导致我们产生冲突的那些行为，并且我们能够确定两个相互矛盾的真实性主张是我们冲突的根源：“你才是所涉物品（比如那把刀、那缕头发、那所房子或其他任何东西）的正当所有者”——因此你的计划得以执行——与之相对的是“我才是正当所有者”——因此我的计划得以实施。那么，通过言语，我们可以发起一场用公共语言进行的“审判”，在这场审判中，我们提出相互对立的真实性主张，目的是找到一个明确的答案，即“是”或“否”、“真”或“假”、“对”或“错”——也就是那个能恢复协调并防止未来冲突的正确方法。

And we have discovered such an answer—which explains why confiicts are comparatively rare in our lives and the overwhelming bulk of our actions，whether communicative or silent，runs peacefully，even if some times disappointingly。

我们已经找到了这样一个答案——它解释了为什么在我们的生活中，冲突相对较少，而我们绝大多数的行动，无论是有沟通的还是无声沉默的，都是和平进行的，即使有时令人失望。

The recipe concerns the “proper”—“right，” “true，” or “correct”—owner ship （exclusive control） of scarce physical means.It prescribes that “proper” ownership of means，or “property，” is to be established solely through first—that is，unopposed or confiictfree—appropriation and subsequent trans formation of such means，or else through a mutually agreed upon—and hence likewise unopposed—transfer of property from one actor to another。Always，in all of your actions employ only such means that you have first unopposed appropriated and produced or that you have received in a mutually agreed on exchange from others who had unopposed possession （property） of the good in question before you! If you follow this recipe，the world will still be full of surprises and disappointments，but all confiict can be avoided，from the beginning of mankind until its end.

原则涉及稀缺物质手段的“正当”——“正确”、“真实”或“正确”——所有权（排他性控制）。它规定，对手段或“财产”的“正当”所有权只能通过——即无异议或无冲突的——先占和随后对这种手段的改造，或者通过双方同意的——因此同样是无异议的——将财产从一个行动人转移到另一个行动人。总是，在你所有的行动中，你只使用这样的手段：是你无异议地先占和生产的，或者你是在彼此同意的交换中从其他人那里获得的，而这些人在你之前已经无异议地占有了该物品（财产）。如果你遵循这个原则，虽然这个世界依然会充满惊喜与失望，但所有的冲突都可以避免，从有人伊始直至灭亡。

That we indeed know the correct recipe of confiictavoidance is revealed in the fact that in our daily lives we routinely abstain from interfering with the use of means that are already under the visible or noticeable control of someone else and restrict our actions instead exclusively to means that we already have control of。

我们确实知道避免冲突的正确方法，这一点从我们日常生活中的如下事实便可看出：我们通常会避免干涉他人已经明显掌控的手段的使用，且将我们的行动完全局限于我们自己已经掌控的手段范围内。

However，this knowledge is largely habituated and subconscious.It is only upon refiection—in speaking about actions and typically motivated by some rare event of confiict—that we can not only verbalize and formulate this rule，but that we can recognize further，via a transcendental argument， that this very rule is already “implied” in or，more correctly，presupposed by argumentation.That is，that following this rule is what makes argumentation as an action sui generis at all possible； and hence，that its truth and validity as a recipe of “engineering” social coordination cannot be argumentatively denied without falling into a performative contradiction.

然而，这种知识在很大程度上是习惯性的且处于潜意识层面。只有经过反思——在谈及行动时，并且通常是受到某些罕见冲突事件的触动——我们不仅能够用言语表述并明确阐述这条规则，而且还能通过一种先验论证进一步认识到，这条规则本身已经 “蕴含” 于论证之中，或者更准确地说，是论证的预设前提。也就是说，正是由于遵循了这一规则，论证作为一种自成一类的行动才成为可能；因此，论证作为一种 “设计 ”社会协调的方法，其真实性和有效性是无法通过论证加以否定的，否则就会陷入谏言冲突。

argumentation is a purposeful activity。It is not aimless，freefioating sounds.It is speech acts aimed at coordination.More specifically，it is speech acts aimed at coordination by means of nothing but arguments.But as an action，argumentation also involves the employment of scarce physical means.First and foremost among these means is our physical body。both the proponent and the opponent of an argument must make use of their bodies to generate their arguments and engage in argumentation.I must use my body，and you yours.And my “proper” ownership of my body，and yours of yours，cannot be argumentatively disputed without falling into contradictions.For to argue back and forth and impute the arguments to you or me，as my arguments or yours，you and I must recognize each other’s “proper” ownership of our distinct and separate physical bodies.

论证是有目的的行动。它不是漫无目的的、自由流动的声音。这是一种旨在协调的言语行动。更具体地说，它是一种旨在通过论证实现协调的言语行动。但作为一种行动，论证也涉及到使用稀缺的物理手段。在这些手段中，首先同样也是最重要的是我们的身体。一个论点的支持者和反对者都必须使用他们的身体来提出他们的论点并进行论证。我得用我的身体，你也得用你的。而且，如果不陷入自相矛盾的话，就无法从论证的角度对我对自己身体的“正当”所有权以及你对你自己身体的“正当”所有权提出质疑。因为要来回进行论证，并将这些论证归之于你或我，视其为我的论证或你的论证，你我就必须承认彼此对各自不同且独立的身体有着“正当”的所有权。

Moreover，both our bodies are already “naturally” appropriated，in that only I can control my body directly，at will，and that only you can control your body directly。Mutatis mutandis，I can control your body，and you can control my body，only indirectly，by using our directly controlled bodies first。This demonstrates the practical and logical—or praxeological—prior ity of direct before and above indirect appropriatioN.To claim in an argument，then，that I am the proper owner of your body （or you of mine） involves a performative contradiction.because I must presuppose that I am the proper owner of my own body （with which to produce my arguments） and you are the proper owner of your body （with which to produce your arguments）。To impute an argument to me （or to you） the means employed to produce it must be mine （or yours），too。

此外，我们两人的身体都已经被“自然地”占有了，因为只有我能随意直接控制自己的身体，也只有你能直接控制你自己的身体。在做必要的变更后，我只能通过首先运用我自己能直接控制的身体，才能间接控制你的身体，你也只能通过首先运用你自己能直接控制的身体，才能间接控制我的身体。这表明了直接占有相对于间接占有在实践和逻辑上——或者说在行为学上——具有优先性。那么，在一场论证中声称我是你身体的正当所有者（或者你是我身体的正当所有者），就会陷入谏言冲突。因为我必须预设我是自己身体的正当所有者（我要用自己的身体来进行论证），并且你是你身体的正当所有者（你要用自己的身体来进行论证），要向我（或你）阐述一个论点，它所使用的手段也必须是我（或你）的。

And something else，besides each person’s proper ownership of his nat urally appropriated physical body，is presupposed by argumentation.You and I have already acted，silently and communicatively，long before we ever engaged in argumentation.Prior to any argumentative encounter，you and I have with the help of our respective bodies—and unopposed by either you or me—already appropriated，produced，exchanged，consumed or accu mulated countless goods.We could not be engaged in argumentation now without such prior activities and prior possessions.They make our present argumentation at all possiblE.Accordingly，we must admit （and cannot deny without “performative” contradiction） that prior and ultimately first possession is the “proper” route to the ownership of scarce physical means.In presenting our arguments back and forth，you and I affirm that we are not only the proper owners of our “naturally” owned and directly controlled physical bodies with which we produce these arguments，but also of all the things that you or I have previously，prior to our argument，and unopposed by you or me，purposefully done or produced.Indeed，to argue consistently to the contrary—that property be established and determined by disputed later and ultimately last possession—is literally impossible.We would have no feet or ground on which to stand on and make our arguments.Neither you nor I could have ever acted silently and on our own，or separately from one another，side by side，sometimes may be disappointed，but in any case without confiict。

除了每个人对其自然占有的身体的正当所有权之外，论证还预设了其他一些东西。早在我们参与论证之前，你和我就已经行动起来，沉默地交流互动。在任何争论之前，你和我已经借助各自的身体——在你我都没有反对的情况下——占有、生产、交换、消费或积累了无数商品。如果没有这些先前的活动和先前的财产，我们现在就不可能进行论证。它们使我们目前的论证完全成为可能。因此，我们必须承认（在不产生谏言冲突的情况下无法否认），先占和最初的占有是获取稀缺物质手段的所有权的“正当”途径”。在反复阐述我们的论点时，你我都确认，我们不仅是我们 “自然” 拥有且能直接控制的身体的正当所有者（我们正是用这些身体来提出这些论点的），而且也是你我在展开这场争论之前、未遭到彼此反对的情况下，有目的地完成或生产出来的所有事物的正当所有者。实际上，始终如一地提出相反的论点——即认为财产应通过有争议的后占乃至最终的占有来确立和判定 ——是完全不可能的。其结果就是，我们将无立锥之地，也无法阐述我们的论点。无论是你还是我，都不可能沉默地单独行动，也不可能彼此分开，而是并肩而行，虽然有时可能会失望，但无论如何都不会有冲突。

Philosophical analysis，then，confirms and reinforces our intuition.We have indeed a perfect and unfailing recipe of how to avoid confiict and thus systematically improve coordination，and we have a perfect recipe to resolve each and every confiict should it still occur。And with this recipe we have also a true and unfailing criterion of justice，i.e.，of deciding between just （or true） vs.unjust （or false） ownership claims and determining how to restore justice if injustice has occurred.Not everything is open to dispute in an argumentation over confiicting ownership claims.The validity of the priority principle of just acquisition itself cannot be argumentatively disputed，for without it any argumentation between you and me would be impossible.Under dispute，then，can only be the application of this principle in particular instances and with respect to specific means.There can be dispute about whether or not you or I have misapplied the principle in some instances and with regard to particular means.We can disagree as to the “true” facts of a case：who was where and when and who had possession of this or that at such and such times and places？ And it can be at times tedious and time consuming to establish and sort out these facts.

因此，哲学分析证实并强化了我们的直觉。对于如何避免冲突，从而系统地促进协调，我们确实有一个完美无缺的方法，而且，假如仍然会发生冲突，我们也有一个完美的方法来解决每一个冲突。有了这个方法，我们也就有了一个真实而持久的公正标准，即在公正（或真实）与不公正（或虚假）的所有权主张之间做出裁决，以及在发生不公正的情况下决定如何恢复公正。在关于相互冲突的所有权主张的论证过程中，并非所有事情都是可以拿来争论的。正当获取的优先权原则本身的有效性不容争辩，因为没有它，你我之间的任何论证都是不可能的。因此，有争议的只能是这一原则在特定情况下和具体手段方面的适用。至于你我是否在某些情况下和特定手段上错误地应用了这一原则，则可能存在争议。我们可能会对案件的 “真实 “性产生分歧：某人处在何时何地，谁又在何时何地拥有此或彼？有时，确立和理清这些事实既费时又费力。

However，just as the principle is beyond dispute，so is the procedure，the recipe，of sorting out the relevant facts and reaching a conclusion.The procedure is logically dictated by the principle：In every case of confiict brought to a public trial of arguments，the presumption is invariably in favor of the current owner and，mutatis mutandis，the burden of a “proof to the contrary” is always on the opponent of some current state of affairs and of current possessions.The opponent must demonstrate that he，contrary to current appearance，has a possessive claim on some specific good that is older and dated prior to the current owner’s claim，and hence，that he has been dispossessed by the current owner。If，and only if the opponent can successfully demonstrate this beyond a reasonable doubt in a public trial of arguments，must the questionable possession be restored as property to hiM.On the other hand，if the opponent fails to make his case，then not only does the possession remain as property with its current owner，but the cur rent owner in turn has acquired a possessive claim against his opponent。For the current owner’s body and time was misappropriated by the opponent during his failed and rejected argument。He could have done other preferred things with his bodytime except argumentatively defend himself against his opponent。

然而，正如原则是无可争议的一样，整理相关事实并得出结论的程序、方法也是无可争议的。这一程序在逻辑上是由以下原则决定的：在每一个公开论证的冲突案例中，推定总是有利于当前的所有者，而 “反证 “的责任总是落在某种现状和现有财产的反对者身上。反对方必须证明，与现状相反，他对某一特定物品拥有产权，他对该物品的主张，比当前所有者的主张更早，年代也更久远，因此，他是被当前所有者剥夺了产权。当且仅当反对方能够在公开论证中排除合理怀疑，且成功证明这一点时，如此才必须将有争议的财产归还予他。另一方面，如果反对者未能证明其主张，不仅财产仍归当前所有者，当前所有者还可以对反对者提出反控，因为反对者在失败的论证中占用了当前所有者的时间和精力。他本可以用自己的身体和时间去做其他更喜欢的事情，而不是在与对手的争辩中为自己进行辩护。

Let me formulate a brief conclusion now：What I have tried to do here is to refute the naturalist （or behaviorist），who wants to explain man—the nature of man—fully and exclusively in terms of the natural sciences and，more specifically and importantly，the skeptic，who claims that there is no such thing as a constant and unchanging human nature and immutable laws of man （of man’s essence）。Who claims instead，that everything there is to say about man is the story and study of history，i.e.，of past actions； that the best we can achieve is knowledge of past regularities，and based on these，of tentative conjectures concerning future events； and that the most we can thus attain are hypothetical—not yet falsified—truths，but that no such thing exists in human affairs as apodictic or apriori truths； and in any case，that there is no such thing as universal and immutable principles of justice，i.e.，of right and wrong。

现在让我做一个简短的总结：我在这里所要做的是驳斥自然主义者（或行为主义者），他们想要完全地、只用自然科学来解释人——人的本质，更具体且更重要的是，我还要驳斥怀疑论者，他们声称不存在永恒不变的人性以及关于人（人的本质）的不变法则这类事物。相反，他们声称，关于人类的一切，都是历史故事和历史研究，即过去行动的研究。我们所能达到的最好结果就是了解过去的规律，并在此基础上对未来的事件作出尝试性的推测；因此，我们最多只能获得假设性的真理，而不是被证伪的真理，而在人类事务中不存在绝对的真理或先验的真理；无论如何，也不存在普遍的、永恒不变的公正原则，即是非原则。

I have argued instead that we do know—and that we cannot without performative contradiction deny knowing—quite a few apriori truths about man.Once spelled out they appear almost selfevident and trivial，but their recognition has important philosophical consequences.We cannot deny that we can argue with each other in a common and public language.That we can communicate with each other。That we can coordinate our actions by means of words，and can become “better，” i.e.，more successful，in our attempts at communicative coordination in learning how to speak better，i.e.，how to use our words more properly and clearly。

相反，我一直主张我们确实知晓——而且若否定知晓这些内容，我们就会陷入谏言冲突——不少关于人的先验真理。一旦阐明，它们看上去几乎是不言而喻且平淡无奇的，但对它们的认知有着重要的哲学影响。我们无法否认我们能够用一种通用的公共语言相互争论。我们能够相互交流。我们能够借助话语来协调我们的行动，并且能够在尝试通过学会更好地说话，即更恰当、更清晰地运用词汇来进行交流协调的过程中变得“更好”，也就是更成功。

With that we can immediately dispose of all talk about “solipsism，” “other egos” or “ultrasubjectivism” and all Hobbesian ruminations of a war of all against all as idle mental gymnastics and pseudo problems—because whoever writes about these matters refutes himself by virtue of the fact that he writes and argues his case in a public language and thus shows himself as a cultured or socialized person （neither solipsist nor wolf ）。

有了上述认识，我们就可以立刻把所有关于“唯我论”、“他我论”或“超主观主义”的讨论，以及所有霍布斯关于“所有人反对所有人的战争”的遐想，都当作无聊的思维体操和伪问题来处理了——因为无论是谁在论述这些问题，他都是在驳斥自己，他在用一种公共语言来写作和论证自己的观点，从而表明自己是一个有教养的或社会化的人（既不是唯我论者，也不是狼一般的孤立个体）。

Further，we cannot deny that we can act in silence，alone and without any communicative purpose whatsoever （because we have acted alone before we started to talk with each other，and we can stop talking again）。That in doing so，we employ directly and indirectly appropriated goods with the purpose of producing some more highly valued future goal or good.That we follow recipes （howtodo rules） in the pursuit of this good，whatever it may be.That these recipes can lead to either success or failure，and hence，given their purpose，are objectively true or false recipes.And that we can learn from our successes or failures and methodically improve our recipes by means of successive experimentation，i.e.，by trying them out。

此外，我们不能否认，我们可以在沉默中单独行动，不带任何沟通目的（因为我们在开始彼此交谈之前就已经单独行动了，而且我们可以不再交谈）。在这样做的过程中，我们直接或间接地使用了已占有的物品，目的是为了生产一些更有价值的未来目标或物品。无论这个目标或物品是什么，我们在追求它的过程中会遵循一些方法（即操作规则）。这些方法可能会导致成功或失败，因此，鉴于其目的，它们是客观上正确或错误的方法。而且我们能够从自己的成功或失败中学习，并通过连续的试验，即通过尝试这些方法，有条不紊地改进我们的方法。

This refutes all fashionable talk about “methodological anarchism，” of the “untranslatability of languages，” of the “incommensurability of paradigms，” and of the impossibility of a systematic growth of knowledge.

这驳斥了所有时髦的“方法论无政府主义”、“语言的不可翻译性”、“范式的不可通约性”以及知识不可能系统增长的说法。

Finally，we cannot deny that we know the true recipe of how to avoid confiict，and how to resolve it should it still occur。That we can distinguish between unopposed prior possessions as argumentatively justifiable possessions （as property） versus opposed later possessions as argumentatively unjustifiable dispossessions （as theft）。And that we know how to restore justice if injustice has occurred.And this refutes all talk about cultural and ethical relativism，of legal positivism，might makes right，etc。

最后，我们无法否认我们知道如何避免冲突，以及在冲突发生时如何解决冲突的正确方法。我们能够区分无异议的先占作为论证上正当的占有（作为财产），反对后占，认为后占是论证上不正当的剥夺（作为盗窃）。如果发生了不公正，我们知道如何恢复公正。这驳斥了所有关于文化和伦理相对主义、法律实证主义、强权即公理等无稽之谈。

9 论民主、再分配和对财产的破坏*

On Democracy，redistribution，and the Destruction of Property

Imagine a world government，democratically elected according to the prin ciple of onemanonevote on a worldwide scale.What would the probable outcome of an election be？ Most likely，we would get a ChineseIndian coalition government。And what would this government most likely decide to do in order to satisfy its supporters and be reelected？ The government would probably find that the socalled Western world had far too much wealth and the rest of the world，in particular China and India，far too little，and that a systematic wealth and income redistribution would be necessary。 Or imagine that in your own country the right to vote were expanded to seven year olds.While the government would not likely be staffed of children，its policies would most definitely refiect the “legitimate concerns” of children to have “adequate and “equal” access to “free” french fries，lemon ade，and videos.

设想存在一个世界政府，它是按照一人一票的原则在全球范围内通过民主选举产生的。这样一场选举可能的结果会是什么呢？最有可能的情况是，我们会得到一个由中国和印度组成的联合政府。而这个政府为了取悦其支持者并能够获得连任，最有可能决定做什么呢？该政府很可能会发现，所谓的西方世界拥有的财富实在是太多了，而世界上的其他地区，尤其是中国和印度，拥有的财富则太少了，因此有必要进行系统性的财富和收入再分配。[116]或者设想一下，在你自己的国家，投票权被扩大到了七岁儿童。虽然政府不太可能由儿童组成，但其政策肯定会反映出儿童们的“合理关切”，即能够“充分且平等”地获取“免费”的炸薯条、柠檬水和视频。[117]

With these “thought experiments” in mind，there can be no doubt about the consequences which resulted from the process of democratization that began in Europe and the U.S.in the second half of the nineteenth cen tury and has come to fruition since the end of World War I。The successive expansion of the franchise and finally the establishment of universal adult suffrage did within each country what a world democracy would do for the entire globe：it set in motion a seemingly permanent tendency toward wealth and income redistribution.3

考虑到这些“思想实验”，对于始于19世纪下半叶的欧洲和美国、并自第一次世界大战结束以来趋于成熟的民主化进程所产生的后果，无疑是清晰可见的。选举权的不断扩大，以及成人普选权的最终确立，在每个国家内部所产生的影响，就如同世界民主制会对全球产生的影响一样：它启动了一种看似永久性的财富和收入再分配趋势。[118]

onemanonevote combined with “free entry” into government democracy implies that every person and his personal property comes within reach of and is up for grabs by everyone else.A “tragedy of the commons” is created.4 It can be expected that majorities of “havenots” will relentlessly try to enrich themselves at the expense of minorities of “haves.” This is not to say that there will be only one class of havenots and one class of haves，and that the redistribution will occur uniformly from the rich onto the poor。To the contrary。While the redistribution from rich to poor will always play a prominent role，it would be a sociological blunder to assume that it will be the sole or even the predominant form of redistribution.5 After all，the “permanently” rich and the “permanently” poor are usually rich or poor for a reason.The rich are characteristically bright and industrious，and the poor typically dull，lazy，or both.6 It is not very likely that dullards，even if they make up a majority，will sys tematically outsmart and enrich themselves at the expense of a minority of bright and energetic individuals.Rather，most redistribution will take place within the group of the “nonpoor，” and frequently it will actu ally be the betteroff who succeed in having themselves subsidized by the worseoff。Consider，for example，the almost universal practice of offering a “free” university education，whereby the working class，whose children rarely attend universities，pay through taxation for the education of middleclass children!7 Moreover，it can be expected that there will be many competing groups and coalitions trying to gain at the expense of others.There will be various changing criteria defining what it is that makes one person a “have” （deserving to be looted） and another a “havenot” （deserving to receive the loot）。At the same time，individuals will be members of a multitude of groups of “haves” and/or “havenots，” losing on account of one of their characteristics and gaining on account of another，with some individuals ending up netlosers and others netwinners of redistribution.The recognition of democracy as a machinery of popular wealth and income redistribution in conjunction with one of the most fundamental principles in all of economics that one will end up getting more of what ever it is that is being subsidized provides the key to understanding the present age.8

一人一票加上可“自由进入”政府的民主制度意味着每个人及其个人财产都处于其他人可触及并可随意争夺的范围之内。这就造成了一种“公地悲剧”。[119]可以预料，占多数的 “无产者” 将会不遗余力地试图以牺牲占少数的 “有产者” 为代价来使自己致富。这并不是说只会存在一类 “无产者” 和一类 “有产者”，也不是说再分配会整齐划一地从富人向穷人进行。恰恰相反。虽然富人对穷人的再分配将始终发挥突出作用，但如果认为这将是唯一的甚至是最主要的再分配形式，那将是社会学上的一个大错。[120]毕竟，“永久 ”的富人和 “永久 ”的穷人通常都是有原因的。富人往往聪明且勤奋，而穷人通常愚笨、懒惰，或者两者兼具。[121]即使蠢笨的人占多数，他们也不太可能系统地比聪明人更聪明，并以牺牲少数聪明和精力充沛的人的利益为代价使自己致富。相反，大多数再分配将发生在 “非贫困” 群体内部，而且往往实际上是境况较好的人成功地让境况较差的人对其进行补贴。例如，考虑一下几乎普遍存在的提供 “免费” 大学教育的做法，在这种情况下，工人阶级（其子女很少上大学）通过纳税为中产阶级子女的教育买单！[122] 此外，可以预料会有许多相互竞争的团体和联盟试图以牺牲他人为代价来获利。将会有各种各样不断变化的标准来界定是什么让一个人成为“有产者”（理应被掠夺），而另一个人成为“无产者”（理应获取掠夺所得）。与此同时，个人会成为众多“有产者”和/或“无产者”团体的成员，会因自身的某一特征而受损，又会因另一特征而获益，一些人最终会成为再分配中的净受损者，而另一些人则会成为净受益者。认识到民主是一种大众财富和收入再分配的机制，再结合经济学中最基本的原理之一，即人们最终会获得更多得到补贴的东西，这为理解当今时代提供了关键。[123]

All redistribution，regardless of the criterion on which it is based，involves “taking” from the original owners and/or producers （the “havers” of something） and “giving” to nonowners and nonproducers （the “non havers” of something）。The incentive to be an original owner or producer of the thing in question is reduced，and the incentive to be a nonowner and nonproducer is raised.Accordingly，as a result of subsidizing indi viduals because they are poor，there will be more poverty。By subsidizing people because they are unemployed，more unemployment will be cre ated.Supporting single mothers out of tax funds will lead to an increase in single motherhood，“illegitimacy，” and divorce. 9 In outlawing child labor，income is transferred from families with children to childless persons （as a result of the legal restriction on the supply of labor，wage rates will rise）。Accordingly，the birthrate will fall。On the other hand，by subsidizing the education of children，the opposite effect is created.Income is transferred from the childless and those with few children to those with many children.As a result the birthrate will increase.Yet then the value of children will again fall，and birthrates will decline as a result of the socalled social security system，for in subsidizing retirees （the old） out of taxes imposed on current income earners （the young），the institution of a family—the intergenerational bond between parents，grandparents，and children—is systematically weakened.The old need no longerrely on the assistance of their children if they have made no provision for their own old age，and the young （with typically less accumulated wealth） must support the old （with typically more accumulated wealth） rather than the other way around，as is typical within families.Parents’ wish for children，and childrens’ wish for parents will decline，family breakups and dysfunctional families will increase，and provisionary action—saving and capital formation—will fall，while consumption rises.10

所有的再分配，无论其所依据的标准是什么，都涉及从事物的原始所有者和/或生产者（“拥有者”）那里 “拿走”，并 “给予 ”非所有者和非生产者（“非拥有者”）。这就降低了成为相关物品的原所有者或生产者的积极性，而提高了成为非所有者和非生产者的积极性。因此，由于因某人贫穷就对其进行补贴，贫困现象将会增多。因某人失业就对其进行补贴，将会制造出更多的失业情况。用税收资金资助单身母亲，将会导致单身母亲数量增加、“非婚生育” 现象增多以及离婚率上升。[124] 在禁止使用童工的情况下，收入会从有孩子的家庭转移到没有孩子的人手中（由于对劳动力供给的法律限制，工资率将会上升）。相应地，出生率将会下降。另一方面，通过对儿童教育进行补贴，则会产生相反的效果。收入会从没有孩子和孩子较少的人转移到孩子较多的人手中。结果，出生率将会上升。然而，随后儿童的价值又会下降，并且由于所谓的社会保障制度，出生率将会再次下降，因为通过向当前的收入赚取者（年轻人）征税来补贴退休人员（老年人），家庭这一制度——父母、祖父母和子女之间的代际纽带——被系统性地削弱了。如果老年人没有为自己的晚年生活做准备，他们就不再需要依靠子女的帮助，而年轻人（通常积累的财富较少）必须赡养老年人（通常积累的财富较多），而不是像家庭中通常那样相反的情况。父母对子女的期望以及子女对父母的期望都会降低，家庭破裂和家庭功能失调的情况将会增加，储蓄和资本形成等预备性行动将会减少，而消费将会增加。[125]

As a result of subsidizing the malingerers，the neurotics，the careless，the alcoholics，the drug addicts，the AIDSinfected，and the physically and mentally “challenged” through insurance regulation and compulsory health insurance，there will be more illness，malingering，neuroticism，carelessness，alcoholism，drug addiction，AIDS infection，and physical and mental retardation.11 By forcing noncriminals，including the victims of crime，to pay for the imprisonment of criminals （rather than making criminals compensate theirvictims and pay the full cost of their own apprehension and incarcera tion），crime willincrease.12 By forcing businessmen，through “affirmative action” （nondiscrimination） programs，to employ more women，homo sexuals，blacks，or other “minorities” than they would like to，there will be more employed minorities，and fewer employers and fewer male，het erosexual，and white employment。13 By compelling private land owners to subsidize （“protect”） “endangered species” residing on their land through environmental legislation，there will be more and betteroff animals，and fewer and worseoff humans.14

通过保险监管和强制医疗保险来补贴精神错乱者、神经质者、粗心大意者、酗酒者、吸毒者、艾滋病感染者以及身心 “残障 ”者，将会导致更多的疾病、精神错乱、酗酒、吸毒、艾滋病感染以及身心残障。[126]通过强迫包括犯罪受害者在内的非罪犯为罪犯的监禁买单（而不是让罪犯赔偿其受害者并支付抓捕和监禁他们自己的全部费用），犯罪将会增加。[127]通过 “平权运动”（非歧视）计划强迫商人雇用超过他们原本愿意雇用的更多的女性、同性恋者、黑人或其他 “少数群体” 成员，那么将会有更多被雇用的少数群体成员，但雇主数量会减少，男性、异性恋者以及白人的就业机会也会减少。[128] 通过环境立法迫使私人土地所有者补贴（“保护”）栖息在其土地上的“濒危物种”，将会出现更多、境况更好的动物，而人类的数量会减少，境况也会变差。[129]

Most importantly，by compelling private property owners and/or market income earners （producers） to subsidize “politicians，” “political par ties，” and “civil servants” （politicians and government employees do not pay taxes but are paid out of taxes），15 there will be less wealth formation， fewer producers and less productivity，and ever morewaste，“parasites” and parasitism.

最重要的是，通过强迫私有财产所有者和/或市场收入赚取者（生产者）去补贴“政客”、“政党”以及“公务员”（政客和政府雇员不纳税，却靠税收来获取收入），[130]将会导致财富形成减少、生产者数量减少、生产率降低，并且会出现越来越多的浪费、“寄生虫”以及寄生现象。

Businessmen （capitalists） and their employees cannot earn an income unless they produce goods or services which are sold in markets.The buyers’ purchases are voluntary。By buying a good or service，the buyers （consumers） demonstrate that they prefer this good or service over the sum of money that they must surrender in order to acquire it。In contrast，politicians，parties，and civil servants produce nothing which is sold in markets.No one buys government “goods” or “services.” They are produced，and costs are incurred to produce them，but they are not sold and bought。On the one hand，this implies that it is impossible to determine their value and find out whether or not this value justifies their costs.because no one buys them，no one actu ally demonstrates that he considers government goods and services worth their costs，and indeed，whether or not anyone attaches any value to them at all。From the viewpoint of economic theory，it is thus entirely illegitimate to assume，as is always done in national income accounting，that government goods and services are worth what it costs to produce them，and then to simply add this value to that of the “normal，” privately produced （bought and sold） goods and services to arrive at gross domestic （or national） prod uct，for instancE.It might as well be assumed that government goods and services are worth nothing，or even that they are not “goods” at all but “bads，” and hence，that the cost of politicians and the entire civil service should be subtracted from the total value of privately produced goods and services.Indeed，to assume this would be far more justified.For on the other hand，as to its practical implications，the subsidizing of politicians and civil servants amounts to a subsidy to “produce” with little or no regard for the wellbeing of one’s alleged consumers，and with much or sole regard instead for the wellbeing of the “producers，” i.e.，the politicians and civil servants.Their salaries remain the same，whether their output satisfies consumers or not。Accordingly，as a result of the expansion of “public” sector employ ment，there will be in creasing laziness，carelessness，incompetence，disser vice，maltreatment，waste，and even destruction—and at the same time ever more arrogance，demagoguery，and lies （“we work for the public good”）。[131]

After less than one hundred years of democracy and redistribution，the predictable results are iN.The “reserve fund” that was inherited from the past is apparently exhausted.For several decades （since the late 1960s or the early 1970s），real standards of living have stagnated or even fallen in the West。[132] The “public” debt and the cost of the existing social security and health care system have brought on the prospect of an imminent economic meltdowN.[133] At the same time，almost every form of undesirable behav ior，unemployment，welfare dependency，negligence，recklessness，incivility，psychopathy，hedonism，and crime has increased，and social confiict and societal breakdown have risen to dangerous heights.[134] If current trends con tinue，it is safe to say that the Western welfare state （social democracy） will collapse just as Eastern （Russianstyle） socialism collapsed in the late 1980s.

However，economic collapse does not automatically lead to improve ment。Matters can become worse rather than better。What is necessary besides a crisis are ideas—correct ideas—and men capable of understanding and implementing them once the opportunity arises.Ultimately，the course of history is determined by ideas，be they true or false，and by men acting upon and being inspired by true or false ideas.The current mess is also the result of ideas.It is the result of the overwhelming acceptance，by public opinion，of the idea of democracy。As long as this acceptance prevails，a catastrophe is unavoidable，and there can be no hope for improvement even after its arrival。On the other hand，as soon as the idea of democracy is rec ognized as false and vicious—and ideas can，in principle，be changed almost instantaneously—a catastrophe can be avoided.

The central task of those wanting to turn the tide and prevent an out right breakdown is the “delegitimation” of the idea of democracy as the root cause of the present state of progressive “civilization.” To this purpose，one should first point out that it is difficult to find many proponents of democracy in the history of political theory。Almost all major thinkers had nothing but contempt for democracy。Even the Founding Fathers of the U.S.，nowadays considered the model of a democracy，were strictly opposed to it。Without a single exception，they thought of democracy as nothing but mobrule.They considered themselves to be members of a “natural aristoc racy，” and rather than a democracy they advocated an aristocratic republic。[135] Furthermore，even among the few theoretical defenders of democracy such as Rousseau，for instance，it is almost impossible to find anyone advocat ing democracy for anything but extremely small communities （villages or towns）。Indeed，in small communities where everyone knows everyone else personally，most people must acknowledge that the position of the “haves” is typically based on their superior personal achievement just as the position of the “havenots” finds its typical explanation in their personal deficiencies and inferiority。Under these circumstances，it is far more difficult to get away with trying to loot other people and their personal property to one’s advantage.In distinct contrast，in large territories encompassing millions or even hundreds of millions of people，where the potential looters do not know their victims，and vice versa，the human desire to enrich oneself at another’s expense is subject to little or no restraint。[136]

More importantly，it must be made clear again that the idea of democ racy is immoral as well as uneconomical。As for the moral status of majority rule，it must be pointed out that it allows for A and B to band together to rip off C，C and A in turn joining to rip off B，and then B and C conspiring against A，and so oN.This is not justice but a moral outrage，and rather than treating democracy and democrats with respect，they should be treated with open contempt and ridiculed as moral frauds.[137]

On the other hand，as for the economic quality of democracy，it must be stressed relentlessly that it is not democracy but private property，production，and voluntary exchange that are the ultimate sources of human civilization and prosperity。In particular，contrary to widespread myths，it needs to be emphasized that the lack of democracy had essentially noth ing to do with the bankruptcy of Russianstyle socialism.It was not the selection principle for politicians that constituted socialism’s problem.It was politics and political decisionmaking as sucH.Instead of each private producer deciding independently what to do with particular resources，as under a regime of private property and contractualism，with fully or par tially socialized factors of production each decision requires someone else’s permissioN.It is irrelevant to the producer how those giving permission are choseN.What matters to him is that permission must be sought at all。As long as this is the case，the incentive of producers to produce is reduced and impoverishment will ensuE.Private property is as incompat ible with democracy as it is with any other form of political rule.[138] Rather than democracy，justice as well as economic efficiency require a pure and unrestricted private property society，an “anarchy of production” in which no one rules anybody，and all producers’ relations are voluntary and thus mutually beneficial。[139]

Lastly，as for strategic considerations，in order to approach the goal of a nonexploitative social order，i.e.，private property anarchy，the idea of majoritarianism should be turned against democratic rule itself。Under any form of governmental rule，including a democracy，the “ruling class” （politicians and civil servants） represents only a small proportion of the total populatioN.While it is possible that one hundred parasites may lead a com fortable life on the products of one thousand hosts，one thousand parasites cannot live off one hundred hosts.Based on the recognition of this fact，it would appear possible to persuade a majority of the voters that it is adding insult to injury to let those living off other peoples’ taxes have a say in how high these taxes are，and to thus decide，democratically，to take the right to vote away from all government employees and everyone who receives government benefits，whether they are welfare recipients or government contractors.

In addition，in conjunction with this strategy it is necessary to rec ognize the overwhelming importance of secession and secessionist movements.If majority decisions are “right，” then the largest of all possible majorities，a world majority and a democratic world government，must be considered ultimately “right，”[140] with the consequences predicted at the outset of this chapter。In contrast，secession always involves the break ing away of smaller from larger populations.It is thus a vote against the principle of democracy and majoritarianism.The further the process of secession proceeds to the level of small regions，cities，city districts，towns，villages，and ultimately individual households and voluntary associa tions of private households and firms，the more difficult it will become to maintain the current level of redistributive policies.At the same time，the smaller the territorial units，the more likely it will be that a few individu als，based on the popular recognition of their economic independence，outstanding professional achievement，morally impeccable personal life，superior judgment，courage，and taste，will rise to the rank of natural，vol untarily acknowledged elites and lend legitimacy to the idea of a natural order of competing （nonmonopolistic） and freely （voluntarily） financed peacekeepers，judges，and overlapping jurisdictions as exists even now in the arena of international trade and travel。A pure private law society is the answer to democracy and any other form of political （coercive） rule.[141]

Part Two Money，State，and defense

第二辑：货币、国家和安保

10 国家为何要求控制货币*

Why the State Demands the Control of Money

Imagine you are in command of the state，defined as an institution that possesses a territorial monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking in every case of conflict，including conflicts involving the state and its agents itself，and，by implication，the right to tax，i.e.，to unilaterally determine the price that your subjects must pay you to perform the task of ultimate decisionmaking。To act under these constraints—or rather，lack of constraints—is what constitutes politics and political action，and it should be clear from the out set that politics，then，by its very nature，always means mischief。Not from your point of view，of course，but mischief from the point of view of those subject to your rule as ultimate judge.Predictably，you will use your position to enrich yourself at other people’s expense.

想象一下，你是国家的统帅，而国家的定义是，在任何冲突的情况下，包括涉及国家及其代理人本身的冲突，你都拥有领土上的终极决策垄断权，以及隐含的征税权，即单方面决定你的国民为完成终极决策任务而必须向你支付的价格。在这些约束——或者更确切地说，缺乏约束——下行动，构成政治和政治行动的要素，从我们的界定中可以清楚地看出，政治，就其本质而言，总是意味着损害。当然，不是从你的角度来看，而是从那些接受你作为最终裁决，服从你的统治的人的角度来看。可以预见的是，你会利用自己的地位损人利己。

More specifically，we can predict in particular what your attitude and policy visàvis money and banking will be.

更具体地说，我们尤其可以预测你对货币和银行业的态度和政策。

Assume that you rule over a territory that has developed beyond the stage of a primitive barter economy and where a common medium of exchange，i.e.，a money，is in usE.First off，it is easy to see why you would be particularly interested in money and monetary affairs.As state ruler，you can in principle confiscate whatever you want and provide yourself with an unearned income.But rather than confiscating various producer or consumer goods，you will naturally prefer to confiscate money。because money，as the most easily and widely saleable and acceptable good of all，allows you the greatest freedom to spend your income as you like，on the greatest vari ety of goods.First and foremost，then，the taxes you impose on society will be money taxes，whether on property or income.You will want to maximize your moneytax revenues.

假设你统治的领土已经超越了原始的物物交换的经济的阶段，使用一种共同的交换媒介，即货币。不难理解，你为什么会对金钱和货币交易特别感兴趣。作为国家统治者，你原则上可以随心所欲地征收税款，为自己提供不劳而获的收入。但是，与其向各种生产资料或消费商品课税，你自然更愿意想货币收入课税。因为货币作为最适销和最容易被广泛接受的商品，给了你最大的自由，可以随心所欲地把你的收入花在各种各样的商品上。最首要的是，你对社会征收的税将是货币税，无论是财产税还是所得税。你希望货币税收入最大化。

In this attempt，however，you will quickly encounter some rather intractable difficulties.Eventually，your attempts to further increase your tax income will encounter resistance in that higher tax rates will not lead to higher but to lower tax revenuE.Your income—your spending money— declines，because producers，burdened with increasingly higher tax rates，simply produce less.

然而，在这一尝试中，你很快就会遇到一些相当棘手的困难。最终，你进一步提高税收收入的尝试会遇到阻力，因为税率的提高不会导致税收收入的增加，反而会导致税收收入的减少。你的收入——你的支出——下降了，因为生产者在税率越来越高的情况下，只会减少生产。

In this situation，you only have one other option to further increase or at least maintain your current level of spending：by borrowing such funds.And for that you must go to banks—and hence your special interest also in banks and the banking industry。If you borrow money from banks，these banks will automatically take an active interest in your future wellbeing。They will want you to stay in business，i.e.，they want the state to go on in its exploitation business.And since banks tend to be major players in society，such support is certainly beneficial to you。On the other hand，as a negative，if you borrow money from banks you are not only expected to pay your loan back，but to pay interest on top.

在这种情况下，要想进一步增加或至少维持现有的支出水平，你只有一个选择：借贷资金。为此，你必须去银行——因此你对银行和银行业也特别感兴趣。如果你向银行借款，这些银行就会积极主动地关注你的未来福祉。他们希望你继续统治下去，也就是说，他们希望国家继续其剥削业务。而且，由于银行往往在社会中扮演重要的角色，因此这种支持对你来说无疑是有益的。另一方面，作为负面因素，如果你从银行借钱，你不仅要偿还贷款，还要支付利息。

The question，then，that arises for you as the ruler is，How can I free myself of these two constraints，i.e.，of taxresistance in the form of falling tax revenue and of the need to borrow from and pay interest to banks？It is not too difficult to see what the ultimate solution to your problem is.

那么，作为统治者，你所面临的问题是：我如何才能摆脱这两个制约因素，即税收减少带来的税收阻力，以及向银行借款并支付利息的必要性？我们不难看出问题的最终解决方法是什么。

You can reach the desired independence of taxpayers and tax payments and of banks，if only you establish yourself first as a territorial monopolist of the production of money。On your territory，only you are permitted to produce money。But that is not sufficient。because as long as money is a regular good that must be expensively produced，there is nothing in it for you except expenses.More importantly，then，you must use your monopoly position in order to lower the production cost and the quality of money as close as possible to zero。Instead of costly quality money such as gold or silver，you must see to it that worthless pieces of paper that can be produced at practically zero cost will become money。（Normally，no one would accept worthless pieces of paper as payment for anything。Pieces of paper are acceptable as payment only insofar as they are titles to something else，i.e.，property titles.In other words then，you must replace pieces of paper that were titles to money with pieces of paper that are titles to nothing。）

只要你首先确立自己在货币生产领域的垄断者地位，你就可以实现纳税人、纳税和银行所期望的独立性。在你的领土上，只有你可以生产货币。但这并不足够，因为只要货币是一种必须以昂贵代价生产的常规商品，那么对你来说，除了开支之外，它对你就毫无益处。更重要的是，你必须利用你的垄断地位，尽可能地降低货币的生产成本和货币成色，使其趋近于零。你必须确保那些几乎可以零成本生产的毫无价值的纸张变成货币，而不是像黄金或白银这样昂贵的优质货币。（通常情况下，没有人会接受毫无价值的纸片作为任何东西的支付。只有当纸片是其他物品的所有权（即财产所有权）的情况下，它们才可以作为付款方式。换句话说，你必须用没有任何所有权的纸片来代替有货币所有权的纸片。）

Under competitive conditions，i.e.，if everyone were free to produce money，a money that can be produced at almost zero cost would be produced up to a quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost，and because marginal cost is zero the marginal revenue，i.e.，the purchasing power of this money，would be zero as well。Hence，the necessity to monopolize the production of paper money，so as to restrict its supply，in order to avoid hyper infiationary conditions and the disappearance of money from the market altogether （and a fiight into “real values”）—and the more so the cheaper the money commodity。

在竞争条件下，即如果每个人都可以自由地生产货币，那么几乎可以零成本生产的货币的生产量就会达到边际收益等于边际成本的数量，而由于边际成本为零，边际收益，即这种货币的购买力，也将为零。因此，有必要垄断纸币的生产，以限制其供应，从而避免出现恶性通货膨胀的情况和货币从市场上完全消失（以及向“实际价值”的逃离）——而且货币商品越便宜，就越有必要这样做。

In a way，you have thus accomplished what all alchemists and their sponsors wanted to achieve：you have produced something valuable （money with purchasing power） out of something practically worthless.What an achievement。It costs you practically nothing and you can turn around and buy yourself something really valuable，such as a house or a Mercedes； and you can achieve these wonders not just for yourself but also for your friends and acquaintances，of which you discover that you have all of a sudden far more than you used to have （including many economists，who explain why your monopoly is really good for everyone）。

在某种程度上，你已经实现了所有炼金士和他们的赞助商想要实现的目标：你已经实际上从一些毫无价值的东西中创造出了有价值的东西（有购买力的货币）。多么了不起的成就啊。它几乎不花一分钱，就能为自己买到真正有价值的东西，如房子或奔驰车；你不仅可以为自己创造这些奇迹，也可以为你的朋友和熟人创造这些奇迹，你会突然发现你拥有的比以前多得多（包括许多经济学家，他们解释了为什么你的垄断对每个人都有好处）。

What are the effects？ First and foremost，more paper money does not in the slightest affect the quantity or quality of all other，nonmonetary goods.There exist just as many other goods around as beforE.This imme diately refutes the notion—apparently held by most if not all mainstream economists—that “more” money can somehow increase “social wealtH.” To believe this，as everyone proposing a socalled easymoney policy as an effi cient and “socially responsible” way out of economic troubles apparently does，is to believe in magic：that stones—or rather paper—can be turned into bread.

有什么影响？首先，更多的纸币丝毫不会影响所有其他非货币商品的数量和质量。周围的其他商品与以前一样多。这直接驳斥了 “更多 “的货币能以某种方式增加 “社会财富”的观点——这种观点显然为大多数甚至所有主流经济学家所持有。显然，每个提出所谓宽松货币政策作为摆脱经济困境的有效便捷且 “对社会负责 “的方法的人都相信这一点，这就等于相信魔法：石头——或者说纸——可以变成面包。

Rather，what the additional money you printed will effect is twofold.On the one hand，money prices will be higher than they would otherwise be，and the purchasing power per unit of money will be lower。In a word，the result will be infiatioN.More importantly，however，all the while the greater amount of money does not increase （or decrease） the total amount of presently existing social wealth （the total quantity of all goods in society），it redistributes the existing wealth in favor of you and your friends and acquaintances，i.e.，those who get your money first。You and your friends are relatively enriched （own a larger part of the total social wealth） at the expense of impoverishing others （who as a result own less）。

相反，多印的钱会带来两方面的影响。一方面，货币价格会比原来高，单位货币的购买力会降低。一言以蔽之，结果将是通货膨胀。然而，更重要的是，无论如何，在货币数量增加的同时，并没有增加（或减少）现有社会财富的总量（社会中所有商品的总量），而是重新分配了现有财富，使之有利于你和你的朋友及熟人，即那些先得到你的钱的人。你和你的朋友相对更富裕了（拥有了社会财富总量的更大的一部分），而其他人却更贫穷了（他们拥有的财富更少了）。

The problem，for you and your friends，with this institutional setup is not that it doesn’t work。It works perfectly，always to your own （and your friends’） advantage and always at the expense of others.All you have to do is to avoid hyperinfiatioN.For in that case people would avoid using money and fiee into real values，thus robbing you of your magic wand.The problem with your papermoney monopoly，if there is one at all，is only that this fact will be immediately noticed also by others and recognized as the big，criminal ripoff that it indeed is.

对你和你的朋友来说，这种制度设置的问题并不在于它不起作用。它运作完美，总是对你自己（和你的朋友）有利，而且总是以牺牲他人利益为代价。你所要做的就是避免恶性通货膨胀。因为在这种情况下，人们会避免使用金钱而逃往真正的价值，从而剥夺你的魔杖。你的纸币垄断的问题，如果有的话，只是这个事实也会立即被其他人注意到，并认为这是一个巨大的犯罪的欺诈行为，当然，它确实就是。

But this problem can be overcome，too，if，in addition to monopolizing the production of money，you also set yourself up as a banker and enter the banking business with the establishment of a central bank。

但这个问题也是可以克服的，如果你除了垄断货币生产之外，还自封为银行家，并通过建立中央银行进入银行业。

because you can create paper money out of thin air，you can also create credit out of thin air。In fact，because you can create credit out of nothing （without any savings on your part），you can offer loans at cheaper rates than anyone else，even at an interest rate as low as zero （or even at a negative rate）。With this ability，not only is your former dependency on banks and the banking industry eliminated； you can，moreover，make banks dependent on you，and you can forge a permanent alliance and complicity between banks and statE.You don’t even have to become involved in the business of invest ing the credit yourself。That task，and the risk involved in it，you can safely leave to commercial banks.What you，your central bank，need to do is only this：You create credit out of thin air and then loan this money，at below market interest rates，to commercial banks.Instead of you paying interest to banks，banks now pay interest to you。And the banks in turn loan out your newly created easy credit to their business friends at somewhat higher but still submarket interest rates （to earn from the interest differential）。In addition，to make the banks especially keen on working with you，you may permit the banks to create a certain amount of their own new credit （of checkbook money） in addition and on top of the credit that you have cre ated （fractionalreserve banking）。

因为你可以凭空创造纸币，所以你也可以凭空创造信用。事实上，因为你可以凭空创造信用（你没有任何储蓄），所以你可以以比别人更低的利率，甚至低至零利率（甚至是负利率）提供贷款。有了这种能力，你不仅可以消除以前对银行和银行业的依赖，此外，你还可以使银行依赖你，你可以在银行和国家之间建立永久的联盟和共谋关系。你甚至不需要亲自参与投资信贷的业务。这个任务，以及其中的风险，你可以放心地交给商业银行。你们的中央银行需要做的只是：凭空创造信贷，然后把这些钱以低于市场利率的价格贷给商业银行。现在不是你向银行支付利息，而是银行向你支付利息。反过来，银行将你新创建的宽松信贷贷款给他们的商业朋友，利率略高，但仍低于市场（从利差中获利）。你甚至不需要亲自参与投资信贷的业务。这个任务，以及其中的风险，你可以放心地交给商业银行。你们的中央银行需要做的只是：凭空创造信贷，然后把这些钱以低于市场利率的价格贷给商业银行。现在不是你向银行支付利息，而是银行向你支付利息。反过来，银行将你新创建的宽松信贷贷款给他们的商业朋友，利率略高，但仍低于市场（从利差中获利）。此外，为了使银行特别热衷于与你合作，你可以允许银行在你已经创造的信用（部分准备金银行）的基础上创造一定数量的新信用（支票簿上的钱）。

What are the consequences of this monetary policy？ To a large extent they are the same as with an easy money policy：First，an easy credit policy is also infiationary。More money is brought into circulation and prices will be higher，and the purchasing power of money lower，than would have been the case otherwisE.Second，the credit expansion too has no effect on the quantity or quality of all goods currently in existencE.It neither increases nor decreases their amount。More money is just this：more paper。It does not and cannot increase social wealth by one iota.Third，easy credit also engen ders a systematic redistribution of social wealth in favor of you，the central bank，and the commercial banks within your cartel。You receive an interest return on money that you have created at practically zero cost out of thin air （instead of on money costly saved out of an existing income），and so do the banks，who earn additional interest on your costless money loans.both you and your banker friends thereby appropriate an “unearned income.” You and the banks are enriched at the expense of all “real” money savers （who receive a lower interest return than they otherwise would，i.e.，without the injection of your and the banks’ cheap credit into the credit market）。

这种货币政策的后果是什么？在很大程度上，它们与宽松的货币政策是一样的：首先，宽松的信贷政策也会导致通货膨胀。更多的货币进入流通，物价会比其他情况下更高，货币的购买力会比其他情况下更低。其次，信贷扩张对当前存在的所有商品的数量和质量也没有影响。它既不增加也不减少它们的数量。更多的货币就是更多的纸。它不会也不可能使社会财富增加一点。第三，宽松的信贷还造成了社会财富的系统性再分配，有利于你、中央银行以及你的卡特尔成员的商业银行。你用几乎零成本凭空创造的资金（而不是用现有收入节省下来的资金）获得利息回报，银行也是如此，他们从你的无成本资金贷款中赚取额外利息。因此，你和你的银行家朋友都有一笔“不劳而获的收入”。你和银行卡特尔联盟，以牺牲所有 “真正 “的货币储蓄者（他们获得的利息回报低于他们本应获得的回报，即在没有你们和银行的廉价信贷注入信贷市场的情况下）的利益为代价而致富。

On the other hand，there also exists a fundamental difference between an easy，printandspend money policy and an easy，printandloan credit policy。

另一方面，宽松的印钞货币政策和宽松的印贷政策之间也存在着根本的区别。

First off，an easy credit policy changes the production structure—what is produced and by whom—in a highly significant way。

首先，宽松的信贷政策在很大程度上改变了生产结构——生产什么，谁来生产。

You，the chief of the central bank，can create credit out of thin air。You do not have to first save money out of your money income，i.e.，cut your own expenses，and thus abstain from buying certain nonmoney goods （as every normal person must，if he extends credit to someone）。You only have to turn on the printing press and can thus undercut any interest rate demanded of borrowers by savers elsewhere in the market。Granting credit does not involve any sacrifice on your part （which is why this institution is so “nice”）。If things then go well，you will be paid a positiveinterest return on your paper investment，and if they don’t go well—well，as the monopoly producer of money，you can always make up losses more easily than anyone else：by covering your losses with even more printed paper。

你，央行行长，可以凭空创造信贷。你不必先从你的金钱收入中存钱，即削减自己的开支，从而不购买某些非货币商品每个正常人在向他人提供信贷时都必须这样做）。你只需开动印钞机，就可以降低市场上其他地方的储户对借款人提出的任何利率要求。发放贷款不需要你做出任何牺牲（这就是为什么这个机构如此之“好”）。如果一切顺利，你的纸质投资将获得正的利息回报，如果进展不顺，作为货币的垄断生产者，你总能比其他人更容易地弥补损失：印刷更多的纸张来掩盖你的损失。

Without costs and no genuine，personal risk of losses，then，you can grant credit essentially indiscriminately，to everyone and for any purpose，without concern for the creditworthiness of the debtor or the soundness of his business plaN.because of your “easy” credit，certain people （in particular investment bankers） who otherwise would not be deemed sufficiently cred itworthy，and certain projects （in particular of banks and their main clients） that would not be considered profitable but wasteful or too risky instead do get credit and do get funded.

没有成本，也没有真正的个人损失风险，那么，你基本上就可以不加区别地向每个人、为任何目的发放信贷，而不必担心债务人的信誉或其商业计划的可靠性。由于你的“宽松”信贷，某些人（特别是投资银行家）本来不会被认为有足够的信用，而某些项目（特别是银行及其主要客户）不会被认为有利可图，而是浪费的或风险太大的，却获得了信贷并得到了资金。

Essentially，the same applies to the commercial banks within your banking cartel。because of their special relationship to you，as the first recipients of your costless lowinterest papermoney credit，the banks，too，can offer loans to prospective lenders at interest rates below market interest rates—and if things go well for them they go well； and if they don’t，they can rely on you，as the monopolistic producer of money，to bail them out in the same way as you bail yourself out of any financial trouble：by more paper money。Accordingly，the banks too will be less discriminating in the selection of their clients and their business plans and more prone to fund ing the “wrong” people and the “wrong” projects.

从本质上讲，这同样适用于你银行卡特尔中的商业银行。由于它们与你的特殊关系，作为你无成本低息纸币信贷的第一批接受者，银行也可以以低于市场利率的利率向潜在贷款人提供贷款——如果事情进展顺利，他们就会这么干，如果情况不妙，他们就可以依靠你，作为垄断性的货币生产者，用更多的纸币来拯救他们，就像你用更多的纸币从金融危机中拯救自己一样。相应地，银行在选择客户和商业计划时也会减少辨别力，而更倾向于为“错误的”人和“错误的”项目提供资金。

And there is a second significant difference between a printandspend and a printandloan policy and this difference explains why the income and wealth redistribution in your and your banker friends’ favor that is set in motion by easy credit takes the specific form of a temporal—boom–bust— cycle，i.e.，of an initial phase of seeming general prosperity （of expected increases in future incomes and wealth） followed by a phase of widespread impoverishment （when the prosperity of the boom period is revealed as a widespread illusion）。

此外，”印钞政策 “与 “印信政策 “之间还有第二个重大区别，这一区别解释了为什么你们和你们的银行家同僚们的收入和财富再分配会因宽松的信贷而受到时间上的 “繁荣萧条周期 “的影响，即初期看似普遍繁荣（预期未来收入和财富会增加），随后却普遍陷入贫困（繁荣时期的繁荣被揭示为普遍的幻觉）。

This boom–bust feature is the logical—and physically necessary—con sequence of credit created out of thin air，of credit unbacked by savings，of fiduciary credit （or however else you may call it） and of the fact that every investment takes time and only shows later on，at some time in the future，whether it is successful or not。

这种繁荣-萧条的特征是以下所列诸因素的逻辑上和自然规律的必然结果：无中生有的信贷、没有储蓄支持的信贷、信托信贷（无论你如何称呼它），以及每一项投资都需要时间，且只有在未来的某个时候才会验证它成功与否。

The reason for the business cycle is as elementary as it is fundamental。Robinson Crusoe can give a loan of fish （which he has not consumed） to Friday。Friday can convert these savings into a fishing net （he can eat the fish while constructing the net），and with the help of the net，then，Friday，in principle，is capable of repaying his loan to Robinson，plus interest，and still earn a profit of additional fish for himself。But this is physically impossible if Robinson’s loan is only a paper note，denominated in fish，but unbacked by real fish savings，i.e.，if Robinson has no fish because he has consumed them all。

商业周期的原因既基本又必不可少。鲁滨逊·鲁滨逊可以借给星期五一条鱼（他还没有吃掉）。星期五可以把这些储蓄转化成一张渔网（他可以在织网的同时吃到鱼），在渔网的帮助下，星期五原则上有能力偿还鲁滨逊借给他的贷款，加上利息，而且还能为自己赚到更多的鱼。如果鲁滨逊的贷款只是一张以鱼计价的纸币，但没有真正的鱼储蓄作为担保。鲁滨逊并没有鱼，因为他已经吃光了所有的鱼，于是前述的过程实际上就不可能发生。

Then，and necessarily so，Friday must fail in his investment endeavor。In a simple barter economy，of course，this becomes immediately apparent。Friday will not accept Robinson’s paper credit in the first place （but only real，commodity credit），and because of this，the boom–bust cycle will not get started.But in a complex monetary economy，the fact that credit was created out of thin air is not noticeable：every credit note looks like any other，and because of this the notes are accepted by the takers of credit。

那么，星期五的投资努力必然会失败。当然，在简单的物物交换经济中，这一点立即变得显而易见。星期五首先不会接受鲁滨逊的纸币信用（而只会接受真实的商品信用），正因为如此，繁荣-萧条周期不会开始。但在一个复杂的货币经济中，凭空创造出的信用并不会引起人们的注意：每张信用纸币看起来都和其他纸币一样，正因为如此，这些纸币才会被信贷用户接受。

This does not change the fundamental fact of reality that nothing can be produced out of nothing and that investment projects undertaken with out any real funding whatsoever （by savings） must fail，but it explains why a boom—an increased level of investment accompanied by the expectation of higher future income and wealth—can get started （Friday does accept the note instead of immediately refusing it）。And it explains why it then takes a while until the physical reality reasserts itself and reveals such expectations as illusory。

这并不能改变现实的基本事实，即任何东西都不可能无中生有，没有任何实际资金（储蓄）的情况下投资的项目一定会失败，但它解释了为什么繁荣——投资水平的提高伴随着对未来收入和财富的更高预期——能够开始（星期五确实接受了这张纸币，而不是立即拒绝）。这也解释了为什么需要一段时间，物理现实才会重现自己，并揭示这种期望是虚幻的。

But what’s a little crisis to you？ Even if your path to riches is through repeated crises，brought about by your papermoney regime and central bank policies，from your point of view—from the viewpoint as the head of state and chief of the central bank—this form of printandloan wealth redistribution in your own and your banker friends’ favor，while less imme diate than that achieved with a simple printandspend policy，is still much preferable，because it is far more difficult to see through and recognize for what it is.Rather than coming across as a plain fraud and parasite，in pursu ing an easycredit policy you can even pretend that you are engaged in the selfiess task of “investing in the future” （rather than spending on present frivolities） and “healing” economic crises （rather than causing them）。

但对你们来说，一点小危机又算得了什么呢？即使你的致富之路是由纸币制度和中央银行政策带来的反复危机多铺就得，但从你的角度来看——从国家元首和中央银行行长的角度来看——这种有利于你自己和你的银行家朋友的印贷政策形式的财富再分配，虽然没有简单的印钞政策来得直接，但仍然更可取，因为它更难被看穿和认清。在推行宽松信贷政策的过程中，你甚至可以假装自己是在从事 “投资未来”（而不是花在眼前的蝇头小利上）和 “治愈 “经济危机（而不是制造危机）的无私的任务，而不是给人留下明显的骗子和寄生虫的印象。

What a world we live in!

我们生活在一个怎样的世界啊!

11利用法定财产和法定货币的企业家精神*

Entrepreneurship with Fiat Property and Fiat Money

let me begin with a brief description of what a capitalistentrepreneur does，and then explain how the job of the capitalistentrepreneur is changed under statist conditions.

What the capitalist does is this：He saves (or borrows saved funds)，hires labor，buys or rents capital goods and land，and he buys raw materials.Then he proceeds to produce his product or service，whatever it may be，and he hopes that he will make a profit。

首先，让我简要介绍一下资本企业家的工作，然后说明在国家主义条件下，资本企业家的工作是如何变化的。资本家的做法是：他储蓄（或借入储蓄资金）、雇用劳动力、购买或租用资本货物和土地，并购买原材料。然后，他开始生产他的产品或服务，不管是什么产品或服务，他希望能从中获利。

Profits are defined simply as an excess of sales revenue over the costs of production.The costs of production，however，do not determine the rev enuE.If the cost of production determined price and revenue，everyone could be a capitalist。No one would ever fail。Rather，it is anticipated prices and revenues that determine what production costs the capitalist can pos sibly afford.

利润被简单地定义为销售收入超过生产成本的部分。然而，生产成本并不能决定收入。如果生产成本决定了价格和收入，那么每个人都可以成为资本家，没有人会失败。相反，是预期的价格和收入决定了资本家可以承受的生产成本。

The capitalist does not know what the future prices will be or what quantity of his product will be bought at such prices.This depends on the consumers，and the capitalist has no control over them.The capitalist must speculate what the future demand for his products will be，and he can go wrong in his speculation，in which case he does not make profits but will incur losses instead.

资本家不知道未来的价格是多少，也不知道在这个价格上他的产品有多少会被买走。这取决于消费者，资本家无法控制他们。资本家必须推测他产品的未来需求量，而他的推测可能会出错，在这种情况下，他不仅无法获利，反而会蒙受损失。

To risk your own money in anticipation of an uncertain future demand is obviously a diffcult task。Great profits may await you，but so also may total financial ruin.Few people are willing to take this risk，and even fewer are good at it and stay in business for any length of time.In fact，there is even more to be said about the difficulty of being a capitalist。

为了不确定的未来的需求预期而拿自己的钱去冒险，这显然是一项艰巨的任务。可能会赚的盆满钵满，但也有可能血本无归。很少有人愿意去尝试这种风险，而善于冒险并能长久经营下去的人更是少之又少。事实上，资本家的艰辛一言难尽。

Every capitalist stands in permanent competition with every other one for the invariably limited amounts of money to be spent on their goods and services by consumers.Every product competes with every other product。Whenever consumers spend more (or less) on one thing，they must spend less (or more) on another。Even if a capitalist has produced a successful product and earned a profit，there is nothing that guarantees that this will go on.Other businessmen can imitate his product，produce it more cheaply，underbid his price and out compete him.To prevent this，every capitalist must thus continuously strive to lower his production costs.Yet even trying to produce whatever you produce ever more cheaply is not enough.

每个资本家都在与其他资本家进行长期竞争，以争夺消费者花在其商品和服务上的始终有限的资金。每种产品都相互竞争。每当消费者在一种产品上花费更多（或更少）时，他们就必须在另一种产品上花费更少（或更多）。即使资本家生产了一种成功的产品并赚取了利润，也不能保证这种情况会持续下去。其他商人可以模仿他的产品，以更低的价格生产，以低于他的价格与他竞争。为了防止发生这种情况，每个资本家都必须不断地努力降低他的生产成本。然而，仅仅努力以更低的成本生产你的产品是不够的。

The set of products offered by various capitalists is in constant flux，and so is the evaluation of these products by consumers.Continuously new or improved products are offered on the market and consumer tastes con stantly change.Nothing remains constant。The uncertainty of the future facing every capitalist never disappears.There is always the lure of profits but also the threat of losses.again，then，it is very difficult to be continu ously successful as a businessman and not to sink back to the rank of an employeE.

各种资本家提供的产品不断涌现，消费者对这些产品的评价也在不断变化。市场上不断出现新产品或改良产品，消费者的口味也在不断变化。没有什么是一成不变的。每个资本家所面临的未来的不确定性永远不会消失。既有利润的诱惑，也有亏损的威胁。同样，作为一名商人，要想持续取得成功而又不沦为一名打工仔，是非常困难的。

In all of this there is only one thing that the businessman can count on and take for granted，and that is his real，physical property—and even that is not safe，as we will seE.

在所有这一切中，只有一样东西是商人可以信赖并认为是理所当然的，那就是他的真实的、有形的财产——即使是这样，我们也会看到，这并不安全。

His real property comes in two forms.First，there are the physical resources，the means of production，including labor services，that the capi talist has bought or rented for some time and that he combines in order to produce whatever he produces.The value of all of these items is variable，as already explained.It depends ultimately on consumer evaluations.What is stable about them is only their physical character and capability。But with out this physical stability of his productive property the capitalist could not produce what he produces.

他的真实财货有两种形式。首先是有形资源，即生产资料，包括劳务，是资本家在一段时间内购买或租用的，他将这些资源结合起来，生产出他所生产的任何产品。如前所述，所有这些物品的价值都是可变的。它最终取决于消费者的评价。稳定的只是它们的物理特征和功能。但是，如果没有生产财产的这种物理上的稳定性，资本家就无法生产他所生产的产品。

Second，besides his productive property，the capitalist can count on his ownership of real money。Money is neither a consumer good nor a producer good.It is the common medium of exchange.As such，it is the most eas ily and widely sold good.And it is used as the unit of account。In order to calculate profit and loss，the capitalist needs recourse to money。The input factors and the output，his products to be produced，are incommensurable，like apples and oranges.They are made commensurable only insofar as they can all be expressed in terms of money。without money，economic calculation is impossible，as Ludwig von Mises above all has explained.The value of money，too，is variable，like the value of everything else.But money，too，has physical characteristics.It is commodity money，such as gold or silver，and money profits are reflected in an increase in the supply of this commod ity，gold or silver，at the disposal of the capitalist。

其次，除了生产财产，资本家还拥有真正的货币。货币既不是消费品，也不是生产品。它是通用的交换媒介。因此，它是最容易和最广泛销售的商品。它被用作记账单位。为了计算盈亏，资本家需要借助货币。投入要素和产出（即他要生产的产品），是不可比较的，就像苹果和橘子一样。只有当它们都可以用货币来表示时，它们才具有可比性。正如路德维希·冯·米塞斯首先解释的那样，没有货币，经济计算是不可能的。金钱的价值也是可变的，就像其他东西的价值一样。但金钱也有物理特征。它是商品货币（如黄金或白银），货币利润反映在资本家支配的这种商品，即黄金或白银供应的增加上。

What can be said，then，about both the capitalist’s means of production and his money，is this：their physical characteristics do not determine their value，but without their physical characteristics，they would have no value at all，and changes in the physical quality and quantity of his property do affect the value of his property，whatever other factors (such as changing consumer evaluations) may affect the value of his property also。

那么，关于资本家的生产资料和他的货币，我们可以说的是:它们的物理特性并不能决定它们的价值，但是如果没有它们的物理特性，它们就根本没有价值，他的财产的物理质量和数量的变化确实会影响其财产价值，不管其他因素(比如消费者评价的变化)是否也会影响其财产的价值。

Now let me introduce the state and see how it affects the business of the capitalist。

现在我引入国家，看它如何影响资本家的生意。

The state is conventionally defined as an institution that possesses a territorial monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking in every case of conflict，including conflicts involving the state and its agents，and，by implication，the right to tax—i.e.，to unilaterally determine the price that its subjects must pay to perform the task of ultimate decisionmaking。

传统上，国家被定义为一个机构，在所有冲突中，包括在涉及国家及其代理人的冲突中，拥有对最终决策的领土垄断权，并隐含着征税权，即单方面决定其国民为执行最终决策任务而必须支付的价格。

To act under these constraints—or rather，lack of constraints—is what constitutes politics and political action，and it should be clear from the out set that politics，then，by its very nature，always means mischief。

在这些约束下行动——或者更确切地说，缺乏约束——才是政治和政治行动的构成要素，从我们的设定中可以清楚地看到，政治，就其本质而言，总是意味着侵犯。

More specifically，we can make two interrelated predictions as to the effect of a state on the business of business.First，and most fundamentally，under statist conditions real property will become what may be called fiat property。And secondly and more specifically，real money will be turned into fiat money。

更具体地说，关于国家对商业的影响，我们可以做出两个相互关联的预测。首先，最根本的一点是，在国家主义的条件下，真实财货将成为所谓的法定财产。其次，更具体地说，真钱将变成法定货币。

First，with the state being the ultimate arbiter in every case of con flict including those in which it is involved itself，the state has essentially become the ultimate owner of all property。In principle，it can provoke a conflict with a businessman and then decide against him by expropriating him and making itself (or someone of its liking) the owner of the business man’s physical property。Or else，if it doesn’t want to go as far，it can pass legislation or regulations that involve only a partial expropriation.It can restrict the uses that the businessman can make of his physical property。certain things the businessman is no longer permitted to do with his property。

首先，由于国家是每起冲突（包括涉及国家自身的冲突）的最终仲裁者，国家实质上已成为所有财产的最终所有者。原则上，国家可以挑起与商人的冲突，通过做出不利于商人的决定，即征用商人的财产，使自己（或自己喜欢的人）成为商人有形财产的所有者。或者，如果政府不想显得吃相太难看，也可以通过只涉及部分征用的立法或法规，如此可以限制商人对其有形财产的使用，结果是，商人不得再用其财产做某些事情。

The state cannot increase the quality and quantity of real property。But it can redistribute it as it sees fit。It can reduce the real property at the disposal of businessmen or it can limit the range of control that they are allowed over their property; and it can thereby increase its own property (or that of its allies) and increase its own range of control over existing physical things.

国家不能提高真实财货的质量和数量，但可以按照自己的意愿重新分配真实财货。国家可以减少商人可以支配的真实财货，也可以限制商人对其财产的控制范围；国家还可以因此增加自己（或其盟友）的财产，扩大自己对现有实物的控制范围。

The businessmen’s property，then，is their property in name only。It is granted to them by the state，and it exists only as long as the state does not decide otherwise. Constantly，the sword of Damocles is hanging over the heads of businessmen. The execution of their business plans is based on their assumption of the existence，at their disposal，of certain physical resources and their physical capabilities，and all of their value speculations are based on this physical basis being given. But these assumptions about the physical basis can be rendered incorrect at any time—and their value calculations vitiated as well—if only the state decides to change its current legislation and regulations.

因此，商人的财产只是名义上的财产，是国家赋予他们的，只要国家不另作决定，它就存在。达摩克利斯之剑始终悬在商人的头上。他们的商业计划的执行是基于他们的假设，即某些有形资源及其有形能力的存在和支配，而他们所有的价值推测都是建立在这一有形基础之上的。但是，只要国家决定修改现行法律法规，这些关于有形基础的假设随时都可能变得不正确，其价值计算也会失效。

The existence of a state，then，heightens the uncertainty facing the busi nessman.It makes the future less certain than would be the case otherwise.realizing this，many people who might otherwise become businessmen will not become businessmen at all。And many businessmen will see their busi ness plans spoiled—not because they did not correctly anticipate future consumer demand，but because the physical basis，on which their plan was based，was altered by some unexpected and unanticipated change in state laws and regulations.

因此，国家的存在增加了商人面临的不确定性。它使得未来的不确定性增加了。意识到这一点，许多本来可能成为商人的人根本就不会成为商人。许多商人会看到他们的商业计划被打乱——不是因为他们没有正确预测未来的消费需求，而是因为他们的计划所依据的有形基础，被国家法律法规中一些意想不到的变化所改变。

Second，rather than meddling with a businessman’s productive capital through confiscation and regulation，however，the state prefers to meddle with money。because money is the most easily and widely salable good，it allows the state operators the greatest freedom to spend their income as they like.Hence the state’s preference for money taxes，i.e.，for confiscating money income and money profits.real money becomes subject to confiscation and changing rates of confiscation.This is the first sense in which money becomes fiat money under statist conditions.People own their money only insofar as the state allows them to keep it。

其次，与其通过没收和监管来干预商人的生产资本，国家更愿意干预货币。因为货币是最便利和最广泛销售的商品，它使得国家经营者有最大限度地自由支配他们的收入。因此，国家倾向于征收货币税，即对货币收入和货币利润征税。真实货币受到没收和不断变化的没收率的制约。这是货币在国家主义条件下成为法定货币的第一种意义。只有在国家允许的范围内，人们才拥有自己的货币。

But there is also a second，even more perfidious，way in which money becomes fiat money under statist conditions.

但还有另一种更不可靠的方式，在国家主义的条件下，货币变成了法定货币。

States everywhere have discovered an even smoother way of enriching themselves at the expense of productive people：by monopolizing the production of money and replacing real，commodity money and commodity credit with genuine fiat money and fiat or fiduciary credit。

世界各地的国家都发现了一种以牺牲有生产能力的人民为代价来使自己致富的更顺利的方法：垄断货币生产，用真正的法定货币和法定信用或信托信用取代真正的商品货币和商品信用。

on its territory，per legislation，only the state is permitted to produce money。But that is not sufficient。For as long as money is a real good，i.e.，a commodity that is costly to produce，there is nothing in it for the state except expenses.More importantly，then，the state must use its monopoly position in order to lower the production cost and the quality of money as close as possible to zero。Instead of costly，quality money such as gold or silver，the state must see to it that worthless pieces of paper，which can be produced at practically zero cost，will become money。

根据法律，只有国家可以在其领土上生产货币。但这还不够，因为只要货币是一种真正的商品，即一种生产成本高昂的商品，那么对国家来说，除了开支之外就没有任何东西。更重要的是，国家必须利用其垄断地位尽可能地降低货币的生产成本和质量，使之近乎为零。国家必须确保那些几乎可以零成本生产的、毫无价值的纸张将成为货币，而不是像黄金或白银这样昂贵的优质货币。

Under competitive conditions—i.e.，if everyone is free to produce money—a money that can be produced at zero cost would be produced up to a quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost。And since marginal cost is zero，the marginal revenue，i.e.，the purchasing power of this money，would be zero as well。Hence，the necessity to monopolize the production of paper money，so as to be able to restrict its supply，in order to avoid hyperinfiationary conditions and the disappearance of money from the market altogether (and a fiight into “real values”)—and the more so the cheaper the money commodity。

在竞争条件下，即如果每个人都可以自由生产货币，那么可以零成本生产的货币就会生产到边际收益等于边际成本的数量。由于边际成本为零，边际收益，即货币的购买力，也将为零。因此，有必要垄断纸币的生产，以便能够限制纸币的供应，从而避免出现恶性通货膨胀和纸币从市场上完全消失（以及向 “实际价值 “的逃离）——而且纸币越便宜，这种必要性就越大。

Having monopolized the production of money and reduced its pro duction cost and quality to virtually zero，the state has made a marvelous accomplishment。It costs almost nothing to print money and one can turn around and buy oneself something really valuable，such as a house or a mercedes.

国家垄断了货币的生产，将货币的生产成本和质量降至几乎为零，这是一项“伟大”的成就。印钞票几乎无成本，而这些人却可以转过身来就为自己买到一些真正有价值的东西，如房子或奔驰车。

What are the effects of such fiat money，and in particular what are the effects for the business of business? First and in general，more paper money does not in the slightest affect the quantity or quality of all other，nonmon etary goods.Rather，what the additional money does is twofold.on the one hand，money prices will be higher than they would otherwise be and the purchasing power per unit of money will be lower。And secondly，with the injection of additional paper money existing wealth will be redistributed in favor of those receiving and spending the new money first and at the expense of those receiving and spending it later or last。

这种法定货币会产生什么影响，特别是对商业活动会产生什么影响？首先，一般来说，更多的纸币丝毫不会影响所有其他非货币商品的数量和质量。相反，增加纸币的作用是双重的。一方面，货币价格会比不贬值时高，单位货币的购买力会降低。其次，随着更多纸币的注入，现有财富将被重新分配，有利于那些先收到和花掉新钱的人，而损害那些稍后收到和花掉新钱的人或最后收到和花掉新钱的人。

And specifically regarding the capitalist，then，paper money adds another dose of uncertainty to his business.If and as long as money is a commodity，such as gold or silver，it may not be exactly “easy” to predict the future supply and purchasing power of money。However，based on information about current production costs and industry profits，it is very well possible to come up with a realistic estimate.In any case，the task is not pure guesswork。And while it is conceivable that，with gold or silver as money，nominal money profits may not always equal “real” profits，it is at least impossible that a nominal profit should ever amount to nothing at all。There is always something left：quantities of gold or silver。

具体到资本家，纸币又给他的生意增加了不确定性。如果货币是一种商品，如黄金或白银，那么要预测未来的货币供应量和购买力可能并不 “容易”。然而，根据当前的生产成本和行业利润信息，我们完全有可能得出一个切合实际的估计。无论如何，这项任务并不是纯粹的猜测。虽然可以想象，用黄金或白银作为货币，名义货币利润可能并不总是等于 “实际 “利润，但至少不可能出现名义利润等于零的情况。总会有剩余：黄金或白银的数量。

In distinct contrast，with paper money，the production of which is unconstrained by any kind of natural (physical) limitations (scarcity) but dependent solely on subjective whim and will，the prediction of the future money supply and purchasing power does become guesswork。What will the money printers do? And it is not just conceivable but a very real inpossibility that nominal money profits will turn out to represent literally nothing but bundles of worthless paper。

与纸币形成鲜明对比的是，纸币的生产不受任何自然（物理）限制（稀缺性）的约束，而完全取决于主观的心血来潮和意志，对未来货币供应量和购买力的预测确实变成了猜测。印钞者会怎么做？名义上的货币利润将变成一捆捆毫无价值的纸张，这不仅是可以想象的，并且有一种非常现实的可能性。

Moreover，hand in hand with fiat money comes fiat or fiduciary credit，and this creates still more uncertainty。

此外，与法定货币相伴而来的是法定信贷或信托信贷，这带来了更多的不确定性。

If the state can create money out of thin air it also can create money credit out of thin air。And because it can create credit out of thin air，i.e.，without any previous savings on its part，it can offer cheaper loans than any one else，at belowmarket rates of interest，even at rates as low as zero。The interest rate is thus distorted and falsified，and the volume of investment will become divorced from the volume of savings. Systematic malinvestment is thus generated，i.e.，investment unbacked by savings.An unsustainable investment boom is set in motion，necessarily followed by a bust，revealing largescale clusters of entrepreneurial errors.

如果国家可以凭空创造货币，那么它也可以凭空创造货币信贷。因为它可以凭空创造信贷，所以，在没有任何储蓄的情况下，它可以提供比任何人都便宜的贷款，利率低于市场利率，甚至低至零利率。因此，利率被扭曲和伪造，投资量将与储蓄量脱节。这样就会产生系统性的不良投资，即没有储蓄支持的投资。不可持续的投资热潮开始了，随之而来的必然是泡沫破裂后的萧条，暴露出大规模的企业家错误群体。

Last but not least，under statist conditions，i.e.，under a regime of fiat property and fiat money，the character of businessmen and of doing busi ness is changed，and this change introduces another hazard into the world.Absent a state，it is consumers that determine what will be produced,in what quality and quantity，and who among businessmen will succeed or fail。with the state，the situation facing businessmen becomes entirely different。It is now the state and its operators，not consumers，who ultimately decide who will succeed or fail。The state can keep any businessman alive by subsidizing him or bailing him out; or else it can ruin anyone by deciding to investigate him and find him in violation of state laws and regulations.

最后但并非最不重要的是，在国家主义的条件下，即在法定财产和法定货币的制度下，商人和经商的性质发生了变化，这种变化给世界带来了另一种危险。在没有国家的情况下，由消费者来决定生产什么，以什么质量和多少数量生产，以及商人中谁会成功、谁会失败。在有国家的情况下，商人面临的情况变得完全不同。现在是国家及其经营者，而不是消费者，最终决定谁会成功或失败。国家可以通过补贴或救助任何商人，让他继续生存下去；或者，国家可以通过调查任何人，发现他违反了国家法律法规，从而毁掉他。

Moreover，the state is fiush with taxes and fiat money and can spend more money than anyone else.It can make any businessman rich (or not)。And the state and its operators have a different spending behavior than normal consumers.They do not spend their own money，but other people’s money，and in most cases not for their own，personal purposes，but for those of some anonymous third parties.Accordingly，they are frivolous and waste ful in their spending。neither the price nor the quality of what they buy is of great concern to them.

此外，国家拥有大量税收和法定货币，可以比任何人花更多的钱。它可以让任何商人致富（或不致富）。国家及其经营者的消费行为与普通消费者不同。他们花的不是自己的钱，而是别人的钱，而且在大多数情况下不是为了自己的个人目的，而是为了某些匿名第三方的目的。因此，他们的消费是轻率和浪费的。他们对所购物品的价格和质量都不太在意。

In addition，the state can go into business itself。And because it doesn’t have to make profits and avoid losses，as it can always supplement its earnings through taxes or madeup money，it can always outcompete any private producer of the same or similar goods or services.

此外，国家本身也可以参与商业活动。而且由于国家不必盈利也毋须避免亏损，因为它总是可以通过税收或补足资金来补充收入，因此国家总是可以在相同或类似商品或服务的竞争中胜过任何私人生产商。

And finally，by virtue of its ability to legislate，to make laws，the state can grant exclusive privileges to some businesses，insulating or shielding them from competition，and by the same token partially expropriate and disadvantage other businesses.

最后，凭借立法和制定法律的能力，国家可以授予某些企业排他性的特权，使它们免受竞争，并以同样的方式，部分剥夺其他企业，使其处于不利地位。

In this environment，it is imperative for every businessman to pay con stant and close attention to politics.In order to stay alive and possibly pros per，he must spend time and effort to concern himself with matters that have nothing to do with satisfying consumers，but with power politics.And based on his understanding of the nature of the state and of politics，then，he must make a choice：a moral choice.

在这种情形下，每个商人都必须持续密切地关注政治。为了生存和可能的成功，他必须花时间和精力去关注那些与满足消费者无关，而与权力政治有关的问题。基于他对国家和政治本质的理解，他必须做出选择：一种道德上的选择。

He can either join in and become a part of the vast criminal enterprise that is the state.He can bribe politicians，political parties or public officials，whether with cash or in kind (including promises of future employment in the “private” sector as “boardmembers,” “advisors,” or “consultants”)，in order to gain for himself economic advantages at the expense of other busi nesses.That is，he can pay bribes to secure state contracts or subsidies for himself and at the exclusion of others.Or he can pay bribes for the passing or maintenance of legislation that secures him and his business legal privi leges and monopoly profits (and capital gains) while partially expropriating and thus screwing his competitors.needless to say，countless businessmen have chosen this patH.In particular big banking and big industry have thus become intricately involved in the state，and many a wealthy businessman has made his fortune more on account of his political skills than his abilities as a consumerserving economic entrepreneur。

他可以加入并成为国家这个庞大的犯罪集团的一部分。他可以贿赂政客、政党或公职人员，无论是现金还是实物（包括承诺将来在 “私营 “部门担任 “董事”、”顾问 “或 “咨询人”），以牺牲其他企业的利益为自己谋取经济利益。也就是说，他可以通过行贿来为自己争取国家契约或补贴，而排斥其他人。或者，他可以通过行贿来通过或维持立法，以确保他和他的企业享有合法特权和垄断利润（以及资本收益），同时部分征用并因此坑害他的竞争对手。不用说，无数商人都选择了这条路子。特别是大银行和大工业因此与国家错综复杂地勾连在一起，许多富有的商人发家致富更多的是靠他的政治技巧，而不是靠他作为一个为消费者服务的经济企业家的能力。

Or else，a businessman can choose the honorable but at the same time also the most difficult patH.This businessman is aware of the nature of the state.He knows that the state and its operators are out to get him and bully him，to confiscate his property and money and，even worse，that they are arrogant，selfrighteous，haughty，and full of themselves.Based on such understanding，this very different breed of businessman then tries his best to anticipate and adjust to the state’s every evil move.But he does not join the gang。He does not pay bribes to secure contracts or privileges from the state.Instead，he tries as well as he can to defend whatever is still left of his property and property rights and make as large profits as possible in doing so。

或者，商人可以选择一条光荣但同时也是最艰难的道路。这种商人了解国家的性质。他知道，国家和国家的经营者都是为了对付他、欺负他，以控制他的财产和金钱，更糟糕的是，他们傲慢、自以为是、卑鄙无耻、自以为是。基于这种认识，这种与众不同的商人就会尽力预测并适应国家的每一个邪恶举动。但他没有加入这个黑帮。他不会通过行贿从国家获得契约或特权。相反，他尽其所能保护自己仅存的财产和产权，并在此过程中获得尽可能多的收益。

12 持有货币的收益*

The Yield from Money Held

Franz Čuhel occupies an honored place in the history of economic thought and of the “Viennese” or “Austrian” School of economics in particular。In his book Zur lehre von den bedürfnissen （1907），Čuhel presented for the first time a strictly ordinal interpretation of marginal utility and thus contributed to a Systematic advance of pure economic theory。Since this lecture is named in Čuhel’s honor，I felt it appropriate that I，too，should discuss here a purely theoretical problem of economics.My subject is not the general theory of value，however，but，more specifically，the theory of money。

弗朗茨-丘赫尔在经济思想史上，尤其是在 “维也纳 “或 “奥地利 “经济学派的发展史上，占有崇高的地位。在他的《边际效用论》（Zur lehre von den bedürfnissen，1907 年）一书中，丘赫尔首次提出了对边际效用的严格序数解释，从而为纯粹经济理论的系统发展做出了贡献。因为这次讲座是为了纪念丘赫尔而命名的，我觉得我也应该在这里讨论一个纯粹的经济学理论问题。不过，我的主题不是一般的价值理论，而是更具体的货币理论。

I have chosen the title of my lecture after a famous article by William H.Hutt，“The Yield from Money Held.” 1Like Hutt，I want to attack the follow ing notion：that money held in cash balances and deposit accounts is some how “unproductive，” “barren，” or “sterile，” offering a “yield of nil”； that only consumer goods and producer （investment） goods are productive of human welfare； that the only productive use of money lies in its “circulation，” i.e.，in its spending on consumer or producer goods； and that the holding，i.e.，the notspending，of money diminishes future consumption and production.

我是参照威廉·H·赫特（William H. Hutt）的一篇著名文章《持有货币的收益》来选定我此次讲座的标题的。[142]和赫特一样，我想要反驳以下这种观点：即认为以现金余额和存款账户形式持有的货币在某种程度上是“非生产性的”、“贫瘠的”或“不结果实的”，收益为“零”；认为只有消费品和生产（投资）品才对人类福祉有生产性贡献；认为货币唯一具有生产性的用途在于其“流通”，也就是说，在于将其用于购买消费品或生产资料；并且认为持有货币，也就是不花掉货币，会减少未来的消费和生产。

This view is extremely popular within the economics profession and outside.Hutt offers many examples of its proponents.I will offer only two here.The first is John Maynard Keynes.one famous quote from his general Theory will suffice for my purpose：“An act of individual saving，” by which Keynes means cash holding or “hoarding” instead of consumption or investment spending，

means—so to speak—a decision not to have dinner today。But it does not necessitate a decision to have dinner or buy a pair of boots a week hence or a year hence or to consume any speci fied thing at any specified date.Thus it depresses the business of preparing today’s dinner without stimulating the business of making ready for some future act of consumption.It is not a substitution of future consumptiondemand for present consumptiondemand—it is a net diminution of such demand.2

这种观点在经济学界内外都非常流行。赫特列举了许多支持者的例子。在此我只举两个例子。第一个是约翰-梅纳德-凯恩斯。凯恩斯的《通论》中有一句名言：”个人储蓄行为 “指的是现金持有或 “囤积”，而不是消费或投资支出。

这意味着——可以这么说——决定今天不吃晚饭。 但这并不意味着必须决定一周后或一年后吃晚饭或买一双靴子，或在任何特定日期消费任何特定物品。因此，它抑制了为今天的晚餐做准备的行为，却没有刺激为未来的消费行为做准备的行为。这并不是用未来的消费需求替代现在的消费需求，而是这种需求的净减少。[143]

Here it is：the holding of money，i.e.，the notspending of it on either consumer or investment goods，is unproductive，indeed detrimental。According to Keynes，the government or its central bank must create and then spend the money that “savers，” i.e.，the holders of cash balances，are unproductively holding back，so as to stimulate both consumption and investment。（needless to say，this is precisely what governments and central banks are presently doing to supposedly rectify the current economic crisis.）

这里的意思是：持有货币，即不把货币用于消费品或投资品，是无益的，甚至是有害的。根据凯恩斯的观点，政府或其中央银行必须创造并花掉 “储蓄者”（即现金余额的持有者）所持有的非生产性的货币，以刺激消费和投资（不用说，这正是目前各国政府和中央银行为了据称是纠正当前经济危机正在做的事情）。

The second example is from closer to home，i.e.，from the proponents of “free banking” such as Lawrence White，george Selgin，and Roger Gar rison.According to them，an （unanticipated） increase in the demand for money “pushes the economy below its potential” （Garrison），and requires a compensating moneyspending injection from the banking System.

第二个例子来自我们更为熟悉的领域，即来自劳伦斯·怀特（Lawrence White）、乔治·塞尔金（George Selgin）和罗杰·加里森（Roger Garrison）等“自由银行业”的倡导者。按照他们的观点，货币需求（意外的）增加会“使经济低于其潜在水平”（加里森语），并且需要银行系统注入一笔用于支出的补偿性货币。

Here it is again：an “excess demand for money” （Selgin and White） has no positive yield or is even detrimental； hence，help is needed.For the free bankers help is not supposed to come from the government and its central bank，but from a System of freely competing fractionalreserve banks.How ever，the idea involved is the same：the holding of （some “excess”） money is unproductive and requires a remedy。3

这里又出现了：”货币需求过剩”（塞尔金和怀特语）没有正收益，甚至是有害的；因此，需要帮助。对于自由银行制度的倡导者来说，帮助不应该来自政府及其中央银行，而应该来自自由竞争的部分准备金银行体系。无论如何，所涉及的理念是相同的：持有（一些 “过剩”）货币是没有收益的，需要采取补救措施。[144]

I do not want to engage in a textual critique of Keynes or the “free bankers” here.I only mentioned them to further elucidate the idea that I want to attack，and to indicate how widespread—and consequential— its acceptance is within the economics profession，both inside and outside Keynesian circles.Unlike Hutt，who proceeds “critically” in his article，i.e.，through a textual examination of various authors，and arrives at his own contrary view of the （positive） yield from money held in a rather indirect and circumstantial way，I want to proceed “apodictically”：by way of a positive demonstration of money’s unique productivity。4

我不想在这里对凯恩斯或 “自由银行制度的倡导者 “进行文本批判。我提到他们，只是为了进一步阐明我要反驳的观点，并说明在凯恩斯主义圈子内外，经济学界对这一观点的接受有多么普遍，以及其影响有多大。与赫特不同，赫特在其文章中是通过对不同作者的著述进行文本考证这种“批判性”的方式展开论述的，并且是以一种相当间接和迂回的方式得出了他自己关于持有货币（正向）收益的相反观点。而我想要以一种“无可置疑”的方式展开论述：通过对货币独特生产力的正面论证来进行阐述。[145]

The first natural response to the thesis that money held in or added to cash balances is unproductive is to counter，Why，then，if money held in or added to cash balances is unproductive of human welfare，do people hold them or add to them？ If cash holdings are indeed “good for nothing，” no one would hold or add to them—and yet almost everyone does so all the time! And since all money is always held or hoarded by someone—when it “circulates，” it only leaves one holding hand to be passed into another— money must be continuously “good for something” all the while it is being held （which is always）。

对于 “现金余额中持有或增加的货币是无益的 “这一论点，人们的第一个自然反应是反驳：如果现金余额中持有或增加的货币对人类福利无益，那么人们为什么还要持有或增加它们呢？如果持有现金真的 “一无是处”，那么就不会有人持有或增加现金——然而，几乎每个人都一直持有或增加现金！既然所有的货币总是被某个人持有或囤积——当它 “流通 “时，它只是从一个持有者转手到另一个持有者——那么货币在被持有的过程中（总是）就必须持续 “有益”。

To understand what this “good for something” of money is，it is best to ask，When，under what conditions，would there be no demand for cash holdings？ interestingly，wide agreement exists within the economics profes sion on the answer。It has been most lucidly stated by Ludwig von Mises.No money，and no demand for cash balances，would exist in “general equilib rium，” or as Mises calls it，within the imaginary construction of an “evenly rotating economy。” in this construction，all uncertainty is by assumption removed from human action.Everyone knows precisely the terms，times，and locations of every future action，and accordingly all exchanges can be prearranged and take the form of direct exchanges.

要理解货币的这种 “有益 “是什么，最好先问一下，在什么时候和什么情况下，对持有现金没有需求？有趣的是，经济学界对这一问题的答案达成了广泛的一致，路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）对此做出了最清晰的阐述：在 “一般均衡状态 “下，或者按照米塞斯的说法，在 “均匀轮转经济 “的假构中，不存在货币，也不存在对现金余额的需求。在这种假构中，所有的不确定性都被假定从人类行动中排除了。每个人都精确地知道每一个未来行动的条件、时间和地点，因此所有的交换都可以预先安排，并采取直接交换的形式。

Writes Mises，

In a System without change in which there is no uncertainty whatever about the future，nobody needs to hold cash.Every individual knows precisely what amount of money he will need at any future date.He is therefore in a position to lend all the funds he receives in such a way that the loans fall due on the date he will need them.5

米塞斯写道：

在一个没有变化、对未来不存在任何不确定性的系统中，没有人需要持有现金。每个人都精确地知道他在未来某一天需要多少钱。因此，他可以把他收到的所有资金以这样一种方式借出，并且使得贷款在他需要的日子到期。[146]

Based on this fundamental insight，we can state as a first provisional conclusion concerning the positive theory of money that money and cash balances would disappear with the disappearance of uncertainty （never） and，mutatis mutandis，that the investment in money balances must be conceived of as an investment in certainty or an investment in the reduction of subjectively felt uneasiness about uncertainty。

根据这一基本见解，我们可以就货币实证理论得出第一个初步结论：货币和现金余额会随着不确定性的消失而消失（但不确定性永远不会消失），并且，相应地，对货币余额的投资必须被视作是对确定性的投资，或者说是对减轻因不确定性而主观感受到的不安逸的一种投资。

In reality，outside the imaginary construction of an evenly rotating economy，uncertainty exists.The terms，times，and locations of all future actions and exchanges cannot be predicted perfectly （with certitude）。action is by nature speculative and subject to error。Presently unpredictable surprises can occur。Whenever double coincidences of wants between pairs of prospective buyers and sellers are absent，for instance，i.e.，when one does not want what the other has to sell or vice versa，any direct trade （exchange） becomes impossible.

在现实生活中，除了均匀轮转经济的假构之外，不确定性是存在的。所有未来行动和交换的条件、时间和地点都不可能完全（肯定地）预测。行动本质上是投机性的，容易出错。目前无法预测的意外可能发生。例如，每当潜在的买卖双方之间不存在需求的双重巧合时，也就是说，当一方不想要另一方要出售的东西，或者反之亦然时，任何直接的交易（交换）就变得不可能了。

Faced with this challenge of unpredictable contingencies，man can come to value goods on account of their degree of marketability （rather than their usevalue for him as consumer or producer goods） and consider trading also whenever a good to be acquired is more marketable than that to be surrendered，such that its possession would facilitate the future acquisi tion of other directly or indirectly serviceable goods and services.That is，a demand for media of exchange can arise，i.e.，a demand for goods valued on account of their marketability or resalability。

面对这种不可预知的意外情况的挑战，人们可能会根据商品的适销性（而不是作为消费品或生产资料的使用价值）对它们估价，而且当要获得的商品比要放弃的商品更适销时，也会考虑进行交易，因为拥有这种商品会有助于将来获得其他直接或间接可使用的商品和服务。也就是说，可能会产生对交换媒介的需求，即对因其适销性或可转售性而有价值的商品的需求。

And since a more easily and widely resalable good is preferable to a less easily and widely resalable good as a medium of exchange，“there would be，” as Mises writes，

an inevitable tendency for the less marketable of a series of goods used as media of exchange to be one by one rejected until at last only a single commodity remained，which was universally employed as a medium of exchange； in a word，money。6

既然一种更容易广泛转售的商品比一种不那么容易广泛转售的商品更适合作为交换媒介，“那么就会有，”米塞斯写道：

一种不可避免的趋势是，作为交换媒介的一系列商品，销路较差的商品被逐一摒弃，直至最后只剩下一种商品，这种商品存在被普遍用作交换媒介的必然趋势；换句话说，就是货币。[147]

While this brief reconstruction of the origin of money is familiar，insufficient attention has been drawn to the fact that，as the most easily and widely salable good，money is at the same time the most universally present—instantly serviceable—good （which is why the interest rate，i.e.，the discount rate of future goods against present goods，is expressed in terms of money） and，as such，the good uniquely suited to alleviate presently felt uneasiness about uncertainty。

虽然对货币起源的这种简要重构是人们所熟知的，但人们一直没有充分注意到这样一个事实：作为最容易且最广泛可售的商品，货币同时也是最为普遍存在的——即刻可用的——商品（这就是为什么利率，即未来商品相对于现在商品的贴现率，是以货币来表示的原因），并且正因如此，货币是唯一适合缓解当下因不确定性而感受到的不安逸的商品。

because money can be employed for the instant satisfaction of the widest range of possible needs，it provides its owner with the best humanly possible protection against uncertainty。In holding money，its owner gains in the satisfaction of being able to meet instantly，as they unpredictably arise，the widest range of future contingencies.The investment in cash balances is an investment contra the （subjectively felt） aversion to uncertainty。A larger cash balance brings more relief from uncertainty aversion.

因为货币可被用于即时满足各种各样可能的需求，所以它为其所有者提供了人类所能拥有的应对不确定性的最佳保障。持有货币时，其所有者能够在未来各种突发情况（因其不可预测地出现）发生时即时应对，从而在这方面获得满足感。对现金余额的投资就是对（主观感觉到的）不确定性厌恶的投资。现金余额越大，对不确定性厌恶的缓解就越大。

The term uncertainty aversion is meant here in its technical sense，as opposed to risk aversion.The categorical distinction between uncertainty on the one hand and risk on the other was introduced into economics by Frank H.Knight and further elaborated on by Ludwig von Mises with his distinction between case probability and class probability。7

Risks （instances of class probability） are contingencies against which it is possible to take out insurance，because objective longrun probability distributions concerning all possible outcomes are known and predictable.We know nothing about an individual outcome，but we know everything about the whole class of events，and we are certain about the future.

风险（类概率事件）是可以投保的意外事件，因为关于所有可能结果的客观长期概率分布是已知且可预测的的。我们对单个结果一无所知，但我们对整类事件了如指掌，并且我们对未来有确定性的把握。

Insofar as man faces a risky future，then，he does not need to hold cash.To satisfy his desire to be protected against risk，he can buy or produce insurance.The sum of money that he spends on insurance is an indication of the height of his aversion to risk。Insurance premiums are money spent，not held，and are as such invested in the physical production structure of producer and consumer goods.The payment of insurance reflects a man’s subjectively felt certainty concerning （predictable） future contingencies （risks）。

因此，假如人类只是面临一个充满风险的未来，他就不需要持有现金。为了满足他消除风险的愿望，他可以购买或生产保险。他花在保险上的钱数表明了他对风险的厌恶程度。保险费是花出去的钱，而不是持有的钱，因此是投资于生产资料和消费品的实际生产结构。保费赔付反映了一个人对（可预测的）未来偶然事件（风险）主观上感受到的确定性。

In distinct contrast，insofar as man faces uncertainty he is，quite literally，not certain concerning future contingencies，i.e.，as to what he might want or need and when.In order to be protected against unpredictable contingencies at unpredictable moments，he cannot invest in producer goods （as in the case of risk insurance）； for such investments would reflect his certainty concerning particular future needs.

与此形成鲜明对比的是，就人所面临的不确定性而言，他对未来的偶然事件，即他可能想要或需要什么以及什么时候需要，完全无法确定。为了在不可预知的时刻防范不可预知的偶然事件，他无法像应对风险投保那样对生产资料进行投资；因为此类投资反映了他对特定未来需求的确定性。

only present，instantly serviceable goods can protect against unpredictable contingencies （uncertainty）。Nor does a man want to invest in consumer goods for uncertainty protection.For an investment in consumer goods，too，is an expression of certainty concerning specific momentary or immediately impending wants.only money，on account of its instant and unspecific wideranging salability，can protect him against uncertainty。Thus，just as insurance premiums are the price paid for protection against risk aversion，so cash holdings are the price paid for protection against uncertainty aversion.

只有当下即时可用的商品才能抵御不可预知的偶然事件（不确定性）。一个人也不会为了抵御不确定性而投资消费品。因为对消费品的投资同样是对特定的即时需求或即将出现的迫切需求具有确定性的一种表现。只有货币，由于其即时和非专用的广泛适销性，才能保护他免受不确定性的影响。因此，正如保险费是防范风险厌恶所付出的代价一样，现金持有是防范不确定性厌恶所付出的代价。

To the extent that a man feels certain regarding his future needs，he will invest in consumer or producer goods.To invest in money balances is to invest neither in consumer goods nor producer goods.Unlike consumer and producer goods，which are used up in consumption or production，money is neither used up through its use as a medium of exchange nor transformed into another commodity。To invest in cash balances means，“I am uncertain about my present and future needs and believe that a balance of the most easily and widely salable good on hand will best prepare me to meet my asofyet unknown needs at asofyet unknown times.”

在一个人对自己未来的需求有一定把握的程度上，他会对消费品或生产资料进行投资。投资货币余额既不是投资于消费品，也不是投资于生产资料。消费品和生产资料在消费或生产过程中会消耗掉，而货币则不同，它既不会因为作为交换媒介而消耗掉，也不会转化为另一种商品。投资现金余额的意思是：”我不确定我现在和将来的需求，我相信手头上最容易和最广泛适销的商品余额将为我在未知的时间满足未知的需求做最好的准备”。

If a person then adds to his cash balance，he does so because he is confronted with a situation of （subjectively perceived） increased uncertainty regarding his future.The addition to his cash balance represents an investment in presently felt certainty visàvis a future perceived as less certain.In order to add to his cash balance，a person must restrict his purchases or increase his sales of nonmoney goods （producer or consumer goods）。In either case，the outcome is an immediate fall in certain nonmoney goods’ prices.As the result of restricting his purchases of x，y，or z，the money price of x，y，or z will be lowered （as compared to what it would have been otherwise），and likewise，by increasing his sales of a，b，or c，their prices will fall。

如果一个人随后增加其现金余额，他这么做是因为他面临着一种（主观感知到的）未来不确定性增加的情况。增加现金余额代表着针对被视为不太确定的未来进行的一种对当下所感受到的确定性的投资。为了增加现金余额，一个人必须限制其对非货币商品（生产资料或消费品）的购买或增加其对这些商品的销售。在这两种情况下，结果都是某些非货币商品的价格立即下跌。由于限制了对x、y或z的购买，x、y或z的货币价格将会降低（相较于原本可能的价格而言），同样，通过增加对a、b或c的销售，它们的价格也会下跌。

The actor thus accomplishes exactly and immediately what he wants.He commands a larger （nominal and real） cash balance and is better prepared for an increasingly uncertain future.The marginal utility of the added cash is higher than （ranks above） the marginal utility of the nonmoney goods sold or unbought。He is better off with more cash on hand and less nonmoney goods，otherwise he would not have reallocated his assets in this way。There is more investment in the removal of perceived uncertainty，and there is less investment in needs，present or future，considered as certain.

这样，行动人就能立即实现他的愿望。他获得了更多的（名义和实际的）现金余额，并为日益不确定的未来做好了更充分的准备。所新增的现金的边际效用高于（排序高于）已出售或未购买的非货币商品的边际效用。手头持有更多现金而非货币商品更少的情况下，他的状况更好了，否则他就不会以这种方式重新分配资产。在消除感知到的不确定性方面的投资增多了，而在被视为确定的当下或未来需求方面的投资则减少了。

The situation does not change if there is a general increase in the demand for money，i.e.，if all or most people try to increase their cash holdings，in response to heightened uncertainty。with the total quantity of money given，the average size of cash holdings cannot increase，of course.Nor is the total quantity of producer and consumer goods that make up the physical production structure affected by a general increase in the demand for money。It remains unchanged.

如果货币需求普遍增加，即如果所有人或大多数人为了应对不确定性的增加而试图增加他们的现金持有量，这种情况也不会改变。在货币总量既定的情况下，现金的平均持有量当然不会增加。构成实际生产结构的生产资料和消费品的总量也不会受到货币需求普遍增加的影响，它保持不变。

In generally striving to increase the size of their cash holdings，however，the money prices of nonmoney goods will be bid down，and the purchas ing power per unit of money will correspondingly rise.Thus，the （increased） demand for and the （given） supply of money are equilibrated again，but at a higher purchasing power per unit of money and lower prices of nonmoney goods.That is，even if nominal cash balances cannot rise as a result of a general increase in the demand for money，the real value of cash balances can； and it is this increase in the value of real cash balances that brings about precisely and immediately the effect desired：being better prepared for a future deemed as less certain.

一般来说，在人们普遍努力增加现金持有量的过程中，非货币商品的货币价格会被压低，单位货币的购买力也会相应提高。因此，（增加的）货币需求量和（给定的）货币供应量再次达到平衡，但单位货币的购买力更高，非货币商品的价格更低。也就是说，即使名义现金余额不能因货币需求的普遍增加而增加，现金余额的实际价值却可以增加；而正是现金余额实际价值的增加，恰恰立即带来了人们所期望的效果：为被认为不那么确定的未来做好了更充分的准备。

No one cares about the nominal number of money units in his posses sion.Rather，people want to keep cash with a definite amount of purchasing power on hand.If the purchasing power per unit of money increases as the result of an increased demand for cash holdings，each unit of money confronted with an array of generally lower nonmoney goods prices can do a better job in affording its owner protection against uncertainty。

没人会在意自己所拥有的货币单位的名义数量。相反，人们希望手头持有具有一定购买力的现金。如果由于对现金持有需求的增加导致单位货币的购买力提高，那么面对一系列普遍降低的非货币商品价格，每一单位货币就能更好地为其所有者提供抵御不确定性的保障。

This shall suffice as my attempt to provide a positive demonstration of the unique productivity of cash holdings as “yielders of certainty” in an uncertain world.only a brief additional comment concerning the present，unprecedentedly severe economic crisis and the consequences that our theoretical considerations imply for its solution seems to be in order。

在这个充满不确定性的世界里，我已尝试对现金持有作为“确定性的提供者”所具有的独特生产性进行了正面论证，上述内容应该已经足够了。关于当前空前严重的经济危机，以及我们的理论思考对解决方案所蕴含的影响，似乎只需要做一个简短的补充评论。

I shall say nothing here about the cause of the present crisis，except that I consider it another，spectacular vindication of the socalled Austrian—or “Mises–Hayek”—businesscycle theory。In any case，the crisis has led to heightened uncertainty。People want more certainty visàvis a future considered far less certain than before.Accordingly，their demand for cash increases.with the quantity of money given，the higher demand for money can be satisfied only by bidding down nonmoney goods’ prices.Consequently，as the overall “level” of prices falls，the purchasing power per unit of money correspondingly rises.Each unit of money is productive now of more certainty，and the desired level of uncertainty protection is restored.The crisis is ended.

在此，我不想谈论当前危机的原因，只想说，我认为这是对所谓的奥地利学派或 “米塞斯-哈耶克 “商业周期理论的又一次有力证明。无论如何，这场危机加剧了不确定性。比起一个被认为比以前更加不确定的未来，人们想要更多的确定性。因此，他们对现金的需求增加了。在货币数量既定的情况下，货币需求的增加只能通过降低非货币商品的价格来满足。因此，随着价格总 “水平 “的下降，每单位货币的购买力也相应提高。现在，每单位货币都能提供更多的确定性，从而恢复了所需的不确定性保护水平。危机结束。

The solution to the crisis suggested instead by most economists and pundits and officially adopted by governments everywhere is entirely different。It is motivated by the herecriticized，fundamentally flawed doctrine that money held in or added to cash balances is money unproductively withheld from production and consumption.The additions to their cash holdings that people want to bring about are thus interpreted，wrongly，as a diminution of human welfare.Accordingly，huge efforts are now under taken to increase the amount of spending。

（译者注：如前所述，面对不确定性的时候，人们倾向于持有更多的货币，而这导致了不确定性的降低。也就是，只要保持总货币量的稳定，系统会自动导致确定性增加。）大多数经济学家和专家建议的、并被各国政府正式采纳的危机解决方案却完全不同。它的动机是一种受到批评的、根本上有缺陷的学说，即在现金余额中持有的货币或增加到现金余额中的货币是生产和消费中被扣留的非生产性货币。因此，人们希望增加的现金持有被错误地解释为人类福利的减少。因此，目前各国政府正在作出巨大的努力来增加开支。

But this stands at crosspurpose to the general public’s needs and desires：in order to be better protected against heightened perceived uncertainty，prices must fall and the purchasing power of money must rise.Yet with an influx of additional，newly created money，prices will be higher and the purchasing power per unit of money will be lower than otherwise.Thus，as the result of the current monetary policy，the restoration of the desired level of uncertainty protection will be delayed and the crisis prolonged.

但这与普通大众的需求和愿望背道而驰：为了更好地抵御不确定性的加剧，价格必须下降，货币的购买力必须上升。然而，随着额外的、新创造的货币的流入，价格将会更高，单位货币的购买力将比原本更低。因此，由于当前货币政策的影响，恢复到理想的不确定性防护水平将被延迟，危机绵绵无绝期。

13 国家或私法社会？*

State or Private-Law Society？

I. 社会秩序问题

THE problem OF SOCIAL ORDER

Alone on his island，Robinson Crusoe can do whatever he pleases.For him，the question concerning rules of orderly human conduct—social cooperation—simply does not arise.This question can only arise once a second person，Friday，arrives on the island.Yet even then，the question remains largely irrelevant so long as no scarcity exists.Suppose the island is the Garden of EdeN.All external goods are available in superabundance.They are “free goods，” just as the air that we breathe is normally a “free” good.Whatever Crusoe does with these goods，his actions have no repercussions—neither with respect to his own future supply of such goods nor regarding the present or future supply of the same goods for Friday （and vice versa）。Hence，it is impossible that a conflict concerning the use of such goods could arise between Crusoe and Friday。A conflict is possible only if goods are scarce； and only then is there a need to formulate rules that make orderly，conflict free social cooperation possible.

独自一人在孤岛上，鲁滨逊可以做任何他喜欢的事。对他来说，有关人类有序行为规则的问题——社会合作——根本就没有出现。这个问题只有当第二个人星期五来到岛上的时候才会出现。然而，即便如此，只要不存在稀缺，这个问题在很大程度上仍然无关紧要。假设这个岛是伊甸园。所有外部商品都供应充足。它们是“自由财货”，就像我们呼吸的空气通常是一种“自由”财货一样。无论鲁滨逊如何处理这些物品，他的行为都不会产生任何影响——既不会影响他自己未来对这些物品的供应，也不会影响 “星期五 “现在或未来对这些物品的供应（反之亦然）。因此，鲁滨逊和 “星期五 “之间不可能就这些物品的使用发生冲突。只有在物品稀缺的情况下，冲突才有可能发生；也只有在这种情况下，才有必要制定规则，使有序的、无冲突的社会合作成为可能。

In the Garden of Eden only two scarce goods exist：a person’s physical body and its standing room.Crusoe and Friday each have only one body and can stand only at one place at a time.Hence，even in the Garden of Eden conflicts between Crusoe and Friday can arise：Crusoe and Friday cannot occupy the same standing room simultaneously without coming into physical conflict with each other。Accordingly，even in the Garden of Eden rules of orderly social conduct must exist—rules regarding the proper location and movement of human bodies.Outside the Garden of Eden，in the realm of allaround scarcity，there must be rules that regulate the use not only of personal bodies，but of everything scarce，such that all possible conflicts can be ruled out。This is the problem of social order。

伊甸园里只有两种稀缺物品：人的身体和站立的空间。鲁滨逊和星期五各自只有一个身体，一次只能站在一个地方。因此，即使在伊甸园里，鲁滨逊和星期五之间也会发生冲突：鲁滨逊和星期五不能同时占据同一个站立空间而不发生肢体冲突。因此，即使在伊甸园里，也必须存在有序的社会行为规则——关于人体的适当位置和活动的规则。在伊甸园之外，在普遍稀缺的领域中，必须有规则不仅规范个人身体的使用，而且规范一切稀缺物品的使用，从而避免一切可能的冲突。这就是社会秩序问题。

II. 解决方案：私有财产的观念

THE SOLUTIon：THE ideA OF PRIVAte PROPERTY

In the history of social and political thought，myriad proposals have been offered as solutions to the problem of social order，and this multitude of mutually incompatible proposals has contributed to the widespread belief that the search for a single “correct” solution is futile and illusory。Yet a correct solution does exist。There is no reason to succumb to moral relativism.Indeed，the solution to the problem of social order has been known for hundreds of years.The solution is the idea of private property。

在社会和政治思想史上，人们提出了无数方案来解决社会秩序问题，这些互不相容的方案导致人们普遍认为，寻求单一的 “正确 “解决方案是徒劳且虚幻的。然而，确实存在一个正确的解决方案。我们没有理由屈从于道德相对主义。事实上，解决社会秩序问题的方法早在几百年前就已为人所知。解决之道就是私有财产的观念。

let me formulate the solution first for the special case represented by the Garden of Eden and subsequently for the general case represented by the real world of allaround scarcity。

让我先为以伊甸园为代表的特殊情况制定解决方案，然后为普遍存在稀缺性的以现实世界所代表的一般情况制定解决方案。

在伊甸园中，解决方案是由一个简单的规则提供的，只要没有其他人站在那里占据同样的空间，每个人都可以随心所欲地放置或移动自己的身体。

Outside of the Garden of Eden，in the realm of allaround scarcity，the solution is provided by four logically interrelated rules：

在伊甸园之外，在普遍稀缺的领域，解决方案是由四条逻辑上相互关联的规则提供的：

Every person is the private （exclusive） owner of his own physical body。Indeed，who else，if not Crusoe，should be the owner of Crusoe’s body？ Friday？ Or Crusoe and Friday jointly？ Yet that would not help avoid conflict。Rather，it would create conflict and make it permanent。
每个人都是自己身体的私人（排他性的）所有者。事实上，如果不是鲁滨逊，还有谁应该是鲁滨逊身体的所有者呢？星期五吗？还是鲁滨逊和星期五共同拥有？然而，这无助于避免冲突，反而会制造冲突，并使冲突永久化。
Every person is the private owner of all naturegiven goods that he has perceived as scarce and put to use by means of his body，before any other person.again，who else，if not the first user，should be their owner？ The second user？ Or the first and the second user jointly？ Yet such rulings again would be contrary to the very purpose of norms：of helping to avoid conflict，rather than to create it。
每个人都是大自然赋予他的所有物品的私人所有者，这些物品是他认为稀缺的，并通过他的身体先于其他人使用的。同样，如果不是第一个使用者，还有谁应该是它们的所有者？第二个使用者吗？还是第一个使用者和第二个使用者共同拥有？然而，这样的规则将再次违背规范的根本目的：帮助避免冲突，而不是制造冲突。
Every person who，with the help of his body and his originally appropriated goods，produces new products thereby becomes the proper owner of these products，provided only that in the process of production he does not physically damage the goods owned by another person.
每个人，只要在生产过程中不对他人所有的物品造成物理损害，都可以利用自己的身体和先占的物品生产新产品，并且成为这些新产品的正当所有人。
once a good has been first appropriated or produced，ownership in it can be acquired only by means of a voluntary，contractual transfer of its property title from a previous to a later owner。
一旦物品被先占或生产出来，其所有权的获得方式，只能通过自愿的契约的转让，从先前的所有者手中转移到后来的所有者手中。

I can spare myself here the task of providing a detailed ethical as well as economic justification of these rules.This has been done elsewhere.How ever，a few statements in this connection are in order。

在此，我不想对这些规则进行详细的伦理和经济论证。这项工作已在其他地方完成。不过，我还是要就此发表一些看法。

Contrary to the frequently heard claim that the institution of private property is only a convention，it must be categorically stated：a convention serves a purpose，and it is something to which an alternative exists.The Latin alphabet，for instance，serves the purpose of written communication and there exists an alternative to it，the Cyrillic alphabet。That is why it is referred to as a convention.

与人们常听到的那种认为私有财产制度仅仅是一种惯例的说法相反，必须明确指出：惯例是有其目的用途的，并且存在替代选项。例如，拉丁字母表服务于书面交流的目的，并且存在它的一种替代物，即西里尔字母表。这就是为什么它被称作一种惯例。

What，however，is the purpose of action norms？ If no interpersonal conflict existed—that is：if，due to a prestabilized harmony of all interests，no situation ever arose in which two or more people wanted to use one and the same good in incompatible ways—then no norms would be needed.It is the purpose of norms to help avoid otherwise unavoidable conflict。A norm that generates conflict rather than helping to avoid it is contrary to the very purpose of norms.It is a dysfunctional norm or a perversion.

那么，行动规范的目的是什么？如果不存在人际冲突——也就是说，如果由于所有利益的预先稳定与和谐，从来没有出现过两个或两个以上的人想要以不相容的方式使用同一个物品的情况——那么就不需要规范了。规范的目的是帮助避免原本无法避免的冲突。一个规范如果不是帮助避免冲突，而是产生冲突，那么它就违背了规范的根本目的。这是一种功能失调的规范或倒错。

with regard to the purpose of conflict avoidance，however，the institution of private property is definitely not just a convention，because no alter native to it exists.only private （exclusive） property makes it possible that all otherwise unavoidable conflicts can be avoided.And only the principle of property acquisition through acts of original appropriation，performed by specific individuals at a specific time and location，makes it possible to avoid conflict from the beginning of mankind onward，because only the first appropriation of some previously unappropriated good can be conflictfree— simply，because—per definitionem—no one else had any previous dealings with the good.

然而，就避免冲突的目的而言，私有财产制度绝对不仅仅是一种惯例，因为不存在任何替代办法。只有私有（排他性）财产才有可能使原本无法避免的冲突得以避免。只有借助特定的个人在特定的时间和地点通过先占行动获得财产的原则，才有可能避免自人类自诞生以来就存在的冲突，因为只有对先前未被占有的物品的首次占有才不存在冲突——简单地说，因为——根据定义——以前没有其他人与该物品有过任何关系。

III. 社会秩序的执行和私有财产的保护：国家

THE ENforcemenT OF SOCIAL ORDER AND THE PROteCTIon OF PRIVAte PROPERTY：THE STAte

As important as this insight is—that the institution of private property，ultimately grounded in acts of original appropriation，is without alternative given the desideratum of conflict avoidance （peace）—it is not sufficient to establish social order。For even if everyone knows how conflict can be avoided，it is still possible that people simply do not want to avoid conflict，because they expect to benefit from it at the expense of others.

私有财产制度归根结底是以先占行动为基础的，鉴于要实现避免冲突（和平）这一必要条件，它不存在其他替代选择。这一见解固然重要，但仅靠它还不足以建立社会秩序。因为即便每个人都知道如何避免冲突，人们仍有可能根本就不想去避免冲突，因为他们指望能以牺牲他人为代价从冲突中获益。

In fact，as long as mankind is what it is，there will always exist murderers，robbers，thieves，thugs and con artists，i.e.，people not acting in accordance with the abovementioned rules.Hence，every social order，if it is to be successfully maintained，requires institutions and mechanisms designed to keep such rule breakers in check。How to accomplish this task，and by whom？

事实上，只要人类如是存在，就会有杀人犯、强盗、小偷、暴徒和骗子这类不按上述规则行事的人。因此，任何社会秩序要想成功维持，就需要设计一些制度和机制来约束这些破坏规则的人。那么，如何完成这项任务，以及由谁来完成呢？

The standard reply to this question is to say that this task，i.e.，the enforcement of law and order，is the first and primary duty—indeed，the raison d’être—of the state.In particular，this is the answer also given by classi cal liberals such as my own intellectual master，Ludwig von Mises.Whether or not this answer is correct depends on how “state” is defined.

对于这个问题的标准回答是，这项任务，即维护法律和秩序，是国家的首要和基本职责——实际上，这也是国家存在的理由。特别是，这也是像我的学术导师路德维希·冯·米塞斯这样的古典自由主义者给出的答案。这个答案是否正确取决于“国家”是如何被定义的。

The state，according to the standard definition，is not a regular，specialized firm.Rather，it is defined as an agency characterized by two unique，logically connected features.First，the state is an agency that exercises a territorial monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking。That is，the state is the ultimate arbiter in every case of conflict，including conflicts involving itself。It allows no appeal above and beyond itself。Second，the state is an agency that exercises a territorial monopoly of taxation.That is，it is an agency that unilaterally fixes the price that private citizens must pay for the state’s service as ultimate judge and enforcer of law and order。

根据标准定义，国家不是一个常规的、专业化的企业。相反，它被定义为这样的一个机构，具有两个独特的、逻辑上相互关联的特征。首先，国家是一个在领土范围内对最终决策权实行垄断的机构。也就是说，在每一起冲突事件中，包括涉及国家自身的冲突，国家都是最终的仲裁者。它不允许有任何超越其自身的上诉途径。其次，国家是一个在领土范围内对征税权实行垄断的机构。也就是说，它是一个单方面确定公民必须为国家作为法律和秩序的最终裁决者与执法者所提供的服务而支付价格（即纳税额）的机构。

IV.“国家主义”的根基性错误

THE funDAmenTAL ERROR OF “STATISM”

As widespread as the standard view regarding the necessity of the institution of a state as the provider of law and order is，it stands in clear contradiction to elementary economic and moral laws and principles.

尽管关于国家作为法律和秩序提供者的必要性的标准观点非常普遍，但它明显违背了基本的经济和道德的法则与原则。

First of all，among economists and philosophers two nearuniversally accepted propositions exist：

首先，在经济学家和哲学家中存在着两个几乎被普遍接受的命题：

Every “monopoly” is “bad” from the viewpoint of consumers.Monopoly is here understood in its classic meaning as an exclusive privilege granted to a single producer of a commodity or service，or as the absence of “free entry” into a particular line of production.only one agency，A，may produce a given good or service，X。such a monopoly is “bad” for consum ers，because，shielded from potential new entrants into a given area of production，the price of the product will be higher and its quality lower than otherwise，under free competition.
从消费者的角度来看，任何“垄断”都是“不好的”。垄断在这里的经典含义是指给予某种商品或服务的单一生产者的独占特权，或指没有 “自由进入 “某一特定产品生产领域的权利。只有一个机构A可以提供特定的商品或服务X。这样的垄断对消费者来说是“坏”的，因为在一个特定的生产领域，屏蔽了潜在的新进入者，产品的价格将比在自由竞争下更高，同时质量却更差。
The production of law and order，i.e.，of security，is the primary func tion of the state （as just defined）。Security is here understood in the wide sense adopted in the American Declaration of independence：as the protec tion of life，property，and the pursuit of happiness from domestic violence （crime） as well as external （foreign） aggression （war）。
法律和秩序的建立，即安保的生产，是国家的首要职能（如前所述）。这里所说的安保是按照美国《独立宣言》中的广义角度来理解的：即保护生命、财产和追求幸福的权利，使其免受国内暴力（犯罪）和外来（外国）侵略（战争）的侵害。

both propositions are apparently incompatible with each other。This has rarely caused concern among philosophers and economists，however，and in so far as it has，the typical reaction has been one of taking exception to the first proposition rather than the second.Yet there exist fundamental theoretical reasons （and mountains of empirical evidence） that it is indeed the second proposition that is in error。

这两个命题显然是互相矛盾的。然而，这种矛盾很少引起哲学家和经济学家的关注，即使有关注，典型的反应也是对第一个命题而不是第二个命题提出异议。然而，基本的理论理由（和大量的实证证据）表明，实际上第二个命题是错误的。

As a territorial monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking and law enforcement，the state is not just like any other monopoly，such as a milk or a car monopoly that produces milk and cars of comparatively lower qual ity and higher prices.In contrast to all other monopolists，the state not only produces inferior goods，but “bads” （nongoods）。In fact，it must first produce bads （such as taxes） before it can produce anything that might be considered a （inferior） good.

作为在最终决策和执法方面拥有领土垄断权的机构，国家与其他任何垄断企业都不一样，比如牛奶或汽车行业的垄断企业，它们生产的牛奶和汽车质量相对较差且价格较高。与所有其他垄断者相比，国家不仅生产劣质商品，而且还生产“劣货”（bads）（非财货nongoods）。事实上，国家必须先生产劣货（bads）（如税收），然后才能生产任何可能被视为（劣质）商品的东西。

If an agency is the ultimate judge in every case of conflict，then it is also judge in all conflicts involving itself。Consequently，instead of merely pre venting and resolving conflict，a monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking will also cause and provoke conflict in order to settle it to his own advantage.That is，if one can only appeal to the state for justice，justice will be perverted in the favor of the state，constitutions and supreme courts notwithstanding。These constitutions and courts are state constitutions and courts，and whatever limitations on state action they may set or find are invariably determined by agents of the very same institution under consideration.

如果一个机构是每个冲突案例的最终仲裁者，那么如果这个机构是冲突的一方时，它也是最终仲裁者。（译者注：在这种情形发生时，这种具有仲裁者权力的机构肯定会偏袒自己，从中牟利）。因此，拥有最终决策权的垄断者不仅不会预防和解决冲突，反而会为了自身利益制造和挑起冲突。也就是说，如果人们只能向国家寻求公正，那么尽管有宪法和最高法院，公正也会被扭曲，变成有利于国家。这些宪法和法院都是国家的宪法和法院，而且无论它们可能设定或发现的对国家行为的何种限制，无一例外地都是由正在被考量的同一机构的人员所决定的。

Predictably，the definition of property and protection will be continually altered and the range of jurisdiction expanded to the state’s advantage.The idea of some “given” eternal and immutable law that must be discovered will disappear and be replaced by the idea of law as legislation—as arbitrary，statemade law.

可以预见的是，财产和保护的定义将不断被改变，管辖权的范围也将不断扩大，从而对国家有利。某种 “给定的 “永恒不变的法律是必须被发现的观念将消失，取而代之的是作为立法的法律——任意武断的、国家制定的法律。

Moreover，as ultimate judge the state is also a monopolist of taxation，i.e.，it can unilaterally，without the consent of everyone affected，determine the price that its subjects must pay for the state’s provision of （perverted） law.However，a taxfunded lifeandproperty protection agency is a contra diction in terms：an expropriating property protector。Motivated，as every one is，by selfinterest and the disutility of labor，but equipped with the unique power to tax，state agents will invariably strive to maximize expendi tures on protection—and almost all of a nation’s wealth can conceivably be consumed by the cost of protection—and at the same time to minimize the actual production of protection.The more money one can spend and the less one must work for it，the better off one will be.

此外，作为最终的仲裁者，国家也是税收的垄断者，也就是说，它能够在未经所有受影响者同意的情况下，单方面决定其国民必须为国家提供的（扭曲的）法律支付的代价。然而，一个靠税收资助的生命和财产保护机构是一个矛盾体：它是一个剥夺财产的保护者。和所有人一样，国家代理人受自身利益和劳动负效用的驱使，但由于他们拥有独一无二的征税权力，就必然会竭力将用于保护的开支最大化——可以想象，一个国家几乎所有的财富都可能被保护成本消耗殆尽——同时将实际提供的保护最小化。一个人能花的钱越多，为此而付出的劳动越少，他的境况就会越好。

V. 错上加错：民主国家

THE ERROR COMPOUNDED：THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

Apart from the fundamental error of statism generally，additional errors are involved in the special case of a democratic state.A detailed treatment of this subject has been provided elsewhere，but a brief mention is indicated.

除了一般意义上的国家主义的根基性错误外，民主国家的特殊情况还涉及其他错误。关于这个问题的详细论述已在其他地方提供，这里只作简要介绍。

The traditional，premodern state form is that of a （absolute） monarchy。Yet monarchy was faulted，in particular also by classical liberals，for being incompatible with the basic principle of “equality before the law.” Monarchy instead rested on personal privilege.Thus，the critics of monarchy argued，the monarchical state had to be replaced by a democratic one.In opening participation and entry into state government to everyone on equal terms，not just to a hereditary class of nobles，it was thought that the principle of the equality of all before the law had been satisfied.

传统的、前现代的国家形式是（绝对的）君主制。然而，君主制却因不符合 “法律面前人人平等 “的基本原则而受到谴责，尤其是受到古典自由主义者的谴责。君主制建立在个人特权之上，因此，君主政体的批评者认为，君主政体的国家必须被民主政体所取代。人们认为，基于平等的条件，人人都可以参与和进入国家政府，而不仅仅是世袭的贵族阶层，这就满足了法律面前人人平等的原则。

However，this democratic equality before the law is something entirely different from and incompatible with the idea of one universal law，equally applicable to everyone，everywhere，and at all times.In fact，the former objectionable schism and inequality of a higher law of kings versus a subordinate law of ordinary subjects is fully preserved under democracy in the separation of “public” versus “private” law and the supremacy of the former over the latter。

然而，这种法律面前的民主平等与那种普遍适用于所有人、所有地方以及所有时间的统一法律的理念完全不同且不相容。事实上，在民主制度下，过去那种令人反感的、君主的高等法律与普通国民的从属法律之间的分裂和不平等现象，在“公”法与“私”法的区分以及前者对后者的至高无上地位中被完整地保留了下来。

Under democracy，everyone is equal insofar as entry into government is open to all on equal terms.Everyone can become king，so to say，not only a privileged circle of people.Thus，in a democracy no personal privileges or privileged persons exist。However，functional privileges and privileged functions exist。Public officials，as long as they act in an official capacity，are governed and protected by public law and occupy thereby a privileged position visàvis persons acting under the mere authority of private law.

在民主制度下，就进入政府的机会对所有人平等开放而言，每个人都是平等的。可以说，每个人都能成为君主，而不只是某一特权群体能当君主。因此，在民主制度下不存在个人特权或特权人物。然而，职能特权和享有特权的职能是存在的。只要公职人员以官方身份行事，他们就受公法管辖和保护，因此，相对于仅根据私法授权行事的人而言，公职人员享有特权地位。

In particular，public officials are permitted to finance or subsidize their own activities through taxes.That is，they do not，as every privatelaw subject must，earn their income through the production and subsequent sale of goods and services to voluntarily buying or notbuying consumers.Rather，as public officials，they are permitted to engage in，and live off，what in private dealings between privatelaw subjects is considered “theft” and “stolen loot。” Thus，privilege and legal discrimination—and the distinction between rulers and subjects—will not disappear under democracy。To the contrary。Rather than being restricted to princes and nobles，under democ racy，privileges will be available to all：everyone can engage in theft and live off stolen loot if only he becomes a public official。

特别是，公职人员可以通过税收为自己的活动提供资金或补贴。也就是说，他们不用像每一个私法主体那样，通过生产并随后向自愿购买或不愿购买的消费者出售商品和服务来赚取收入。相反，作为公职人员，他们被允许从事在私法主体之间的私人交易中被视为 “盗窃 “和 “销赃 “的行为，并以此为生。因此，特权和法律上的歧视——以及统治者和被统治者之间的区别——在民主制度下不会消失。恰恰相反，在民主制度下，特权将不再局限于王公贵族，而是向所有人开放：只要成为公职人员，每个人都可以从事盗窃，依赖偷来的赃物为生。

Predictably，then，under democratic conditions the tendency of every monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking to increase the price of justice and to lower its quality and substitute injustice for justice and is not diminished but aggravated.As hereditary monopolist，a king or prince regards the territory and people under his jurisdiction as his personal property and engages in the monopolistic exploitation of his “property。”

可以预见的是，在民主条件下，每一个对最终决策权的垄断都会提高公正的成本、降低其质量，并以不公正取代公正，而这种趋势不但没有减弱，反而加剧了。作为世袭的垄断者，君主或王子会将其管辖下的领土和人民视为自己的私人财产，并对其“财产”进行垄断性的剥削。

Under democracy，monopoly and monopolistic exploitation do not disappear。Rather，what happens with democracy is this：instead of a prince and a nobility who regard the country as their private property，a temporary and interchangeable caretaker is put in monopolistic charge of the country。The caretaker does not own the country，but as long as he is in office he is permitted to use it to his and his protégés’ advantage.He owns its current use—usufruct—but not its capital stock。This does not eliminate exploitation.To the contrary，it makes exploitation less calculating and carried out with little or no regard to the capital stock。Exploitation becomes short sighted and capital consumption will be Systematically promoted.

在民主制度下，垄断和垄断性剥削并不会消失。实际情况是，民主制度下会发生这样的情况：取代将国家视为私人财产的王子和贵族的，是一个临时性且可更替的管理者，由其对国家进行垄断性管理。这位管理者并不拥有这个国家，但只要他在位，就被允许利用国家来为自己及其亲信谋取利益。他拥有国家当下的使用权——用益权，但不拥有其资本存量。这并没有消除剥削。恰恰相反，它使得剥削变得不那么精打细算，而且在进行剥削时很少或根本不考虑资本存量。剥削变得急功近利，并且会系统性地推动对资本的涸泽而渔。

VI. 解决之道：以私法社会代替国家

THE SOLUTION：PRIVATELaw SOCIETY inSteAD OF STAte

If the state，and especially the democratic state，is demonstrably incapable of creating and maintaining social order； if，instead of helping avoid conflict，the state is the source of permanent conflict； and if，rather than assuring legal security and predictability，the state itself continuously generates insecurity and unpredictability through its legislation and replaces constant law with “flexible” and arbitrary whim，then inescapably the question as to the correct—obviously，nonstatist—solution to the problem of social order arises.

如果国家，尤其是民主国家，明显无法创建和维护社会秩序；如果国家非但无助于避免冲突，反而是持久冲突的根源；如果国家本身非但不能确保法律的安全性和可预测性，反而通过其立法不断制造不安全和不可预测性，并以 “灵活 “和任意武断的突发奇想取代恒定的法律，那么，关于社会秩序问题的正确解决方案（显然是非国家主义的解决方案）这一问题就不可避免地出现了。

The solution is a privatelaw society，i.e.，a society in which every individual and institution is subject to one and the same set of laws.No public law granting privileges to specific persons or functions （and no public property） exists in this society。There is only private law （and private property），equally applicable to each and everyone.No one is permitted to acquire property by any means other than through original appropriation，production，or voluntary exchange，and no one possesses a privilege to tax and expropriate.Moreover，in a privatelaw society no one is permitted to prohibit anyone else from using his property in order to enter any line of production he wishes and compete against whomever he pleases.

Specifically regarding the problem at hand：in a privatelaw society the production of security—of law and order—will be undertaken by freely financed individuals and agencies competing for a voluntarily paying （or notpaying） clientele，just as the production of all other goods and services.It would be presumptuous to predict the precise shape and form of the security industry emerging within the framework of a privatelaw society。However，it is not difficult to predict a few central changes that would fundamentally—and favorably—distinguish a competitive security industry from the present，alltoowellknown statist production of （in）justice and （dis）order。

具体就当前所涉及的问题而言：在一个私法社会中，安保的生产——即法律和秩序的维护——将由通过自由出资成立的个人和机构来承担，它们会为争取自愿付费（或不付费）的客户群体而展开竞争，就如同所有其他商品和服务的生产那样。要预测在私法社会框架内应运而生的安保行业的确切形态和模式，未免有些狂妄。然而，要预测出一些核心变化并不困难，这些变化将从根本上且有利地把竞争性的安保行业与当下众所周知的由国家主导的（不）公正及（混）乱的状况区分开来。

First，while in a complex society based on the division of labor self defense will play only a secondary role （for reasons yet to be explained），it should be emphasized from the outset that in a privatelaw society every one’s right to defend oneself from aggression against one’s person and property is entirely undisputed.In distinct contrast to the present，statist practice，which renders people increasingly unarmed and defenseless against aggressors，in a privatelaw society no restrictions on the private ownership of firearms and other weapons exist。Everyone’s elementary right to engage in selfdefense to protect his life and property against invaders would be sacrosanct，and as one knows from the experience of The Not So Wild，Wild West，as well as numerous recent empirical investigations into the relation ship between the frequency of gun ownership and crime rates，more guns imply less crime.

首先，虽然在一个以劳动分工为基础的复杂社会中，自卫只会发挥次要作用（原因尚待解释），但应该从一开始就强调，在私法社会中，每个人都有权保护自己免受人身和财产侵犯，这一点完全无可争议。国家主义的实践使人们越来越缺乏武装，在面对侵犯时手无寸铁，与目前这种国家主义的实践形成鲜明对比的是，在私法社会中，对私人拥有枪支和其他武器没有任何限制。每个人都有自卫的基本权利，以保护自己的生命和财产免受侵害人的侵害，这是神圣不可侵犯的。正如人们从《不那么狂野的西部》（The Not So Wild，Wild West）的经验中所了解到的，以及最近对枪支持有率与犯罪率之间关系的大量实证研究所揭示的那样，更多的枪支意味着更少的犯罪。

Just as in today’s complex economy we do not produce our own shoes，suits，and telephones，however，but partake in the advantages of the division of labor，so it is to be expected that we will also do so when it comes to production of security，especially the more property a person owns and the richer a society as a whole.Hence，most security services will without doubt be provided by specialized agencies competing for voluntarily paying clients：by various private police，insurance，and arbitration agencies.

正如在当今复杂的经济体中，我们并不生产自己的鞋子、衣服和电话，而是分享劳动分工的好处，因此可以预见，我们在生产安保服务时也将如此，尤其是个人拥有的财产越多、整个社会越富裕的时候。因此，毫无疑问，大多数安保服务将由专门机构提供，如各种私人警察、保险和仲裁机构，这些机构将争夺自愿付费的客户。

If one wanted to summarize in one word the decisive difference and advantage of a competitive security industry as compared to the current statist practice，it would be this：contract。The state，as ultimate decision maker and judge，operates in a contractless legal vacuum.There exists no contract between the state and its citizens.It is not contractually fixed，what is actually owned by whom，and what，accordingly，is to be protected.It is not fixed，what service the state is to provide，what is to happen if the state fails in its duty，nor what the price is that the “customer” of such “service” must pay。

如果要用一个词来概括竞争性安保行业与当前国家主义做法的决定性区别和优势，那就是：契约。国家作为最终的决策者和仲裁者，在无契约的法律真空中运作。国家与其公民之间不存在契约。实际上谁拥有什么，以及相应地要保护什么，这些都不是通过契约确定的。国家应提供何种服务、如果国家未能履行其职责会发生什么情况，以及这种“服务”的“顾客”必须支付的价格是多少，这些也都没有确定下来。

Rather，the state unilaterally fixes the rules of the game and can change them，per legislation，during the game.Obviously，such behavior is inconceivable for freely financed security providers.Just imagine a security provider，whether police，insurer，or arbitrator，whose offer consisted in some thing like this：

相反，国家单方面制定游戏规则，并可在游戏过程中通过立法改变规则。显然，这种行为对于自由出资的安保供应商来说是不可想象的。试想一下，无论是警察、保险商，还是仲裁者，如果他们提供的安保服务是这样的，那么，他们会怎么做呢？

I will not contractually guarantee you anything。I will not tell you what specific things I will regard as your tobeprotected property，nor will I tell you what I oblige myself to do if，according to your opinion，I do not fulfill my service to you—but in any case，I reserve the right to unilaterally determine the price that you must pay me for such undefined service.

我不会在契约上向你承诺任何事情。我不会告诉你我将把哪些具体的事物视为你受保护的财产，我也不会告诉你，假如根据你的意见，我没有履行我对你的服务，以及我有义务履行什么——但无论如何，我保留单方面决定你必须为这种未定义的服务向我支付的价格的权利。

Any such security provider would immediately disappear from the market due to a complete lack of customers.Each private，freely financed security producer instead must offer its prospective clients a contract。And these contracts must，in order to appear acceptable to voluntarily paying consumers，contain clear property descriptions as well as clearly defined mutual services and obligations.Moreover，each party to a contract，for the duration or until the fulfillment of the contract，would be bound by its terms and conditions； and every change of terms or conditions would require the unanimous consent of all parties concerned.

由于完全缺乏客户，任何此类安保供应商都会立即从市场上消失。相反，每个自由出资的私人安保生产商必须向其潜在客户提供一份契约。为了让自愿付费的消费者能够接受，这些契约必须包含清晰的财产说明，以及明确界定的相互之间的服务与义务。此外，契约的每一方，在契约有效期间或履行完结之前，将受其条款和条件的约束；条款或条件的任何更改都需要有关各方的一致同意。

Specifically，in order to appear acceptable to security buyers，these con tracts must contain provisions about what will be done in the case of a conflict or dispute between the protector or insurer and his own protected or insured clients as well as in the case of a conflict between different protectors or insurers and their respective clients.And in this regard only one mutually agreeable solution exists：in these cases the conflicting parties contractually agree to arbitration by a mutually trusted but independent third party。

具体而言，为了使安保产品的购买方可以接受，这些契约必须包含在保护者或保险公司和他们所保护或投保的客户之间发生冲突或争议时的处理条款，以及在不同保护者或保险公司和他们各自的客户之间发生冲突时的处理条款。在这方面，只有一个双方都能接受的解决方案：在这些情况下，冲突各方通过契约同意由双方共同信任的独立第三方进行仲裁。

And as for this third party，it too is freely financed and stands in competition with other arbitrators or arbitration agencies.Its clients，i.e.，the insurers and the insured，expect of it that it come up with a verdict that is recognized as fair and just by all sides.only arbitrators capable of forming such judgments will succeed in the arbitration market。Arbitrators incapable of this and viewed as biased or partial will disappear from the market。

至于这个第三方，它也是自由出资，并与其他仲裁者或仲裁机构竞争。它的客户，即保险公司和被保险公司，希望它能做出一个各方都认可的公平公正的裁决。只有能够做出这种裁决的仲裁者才能在仲裁市场上取得成功。无法做到这一点并被视为有偏见或偏袒的仲裁者将从市场上消失。

From this fundamental advantage of a privatelaw society all other advantages follow.

从私法社会的这一基本优势出发，所有其他优势都会随之而来。

First，competition among police，insurers，and arbitrators for paying clients would bring about a tendency toward a continuous fall in the price of protection （per insured value），thus rendering protection increasingly more affordable，whereas under monopolistic conditions the price of protection will steadily rise and become increasingly unaffordable.

首先，警察、保险公司和仲裁者之间对付费客户的竞争将导致保护价格（按保险价值计算）持续下降的趋势，从而使保护越来越容易负担，而在垄断条件下，保护价格将节节攀升，变得越来越难以负担。

Furthermore，as already indicated，protection and security are goods and services that compete with others.If more resources are allocated to protection，fewer can be expended on cars，vacations，food，or drink，for example.Also，resources allocated to the protection of group A （people living along the Pacific，for instance） compete with resources expended on the protection of group B （people living along the Atlantic）。

此外，如前所述，安保和安全是与其他商品和服务竞争的商品和服务。例如，假如把更多的资源用于安保，那么在汽车、度假、食物或饮料等方面的花费就会减少。此外，用于保护 A 组（例如太平洋沿岸居民）的资源与用于保护 B 组（大西洋沿岸居民）的资源相互竞争。

The state，as a taxfunded protection monopolist，will necessarily allocate resources arbitrarily。There will be overproduction （or underproduction） of security as compared to other competing goods and services，and there will be overprotection of some individuals，groups，or regions and underprotection of others.

国家作为一个由税收资助的安保的垄断者，必然会任意分配资源。与其他竞争性商品和服务相比，会出现安保生产过剩（或生产不足）的情况，而且会出现对某些个人、群体或地区保护过度，而对其他个人、群体或地区保护不足的情况。

In distinct contrast，in a System of freely competing protection agen cies all arbitrariness of allocation （all over and underproduction） would disappear。Protection would be accorded the relative importance that it has in the eyes of voluntarily paying consumers，and no person，group，or region would receive protection at the expense of any other one.Each and every one would receive protection in accordance with his own payments.

与之形成鲜明对比的是，在一个由自由竞争的安保机构所组成的体系中，所有分配上的任意性（所有的生产过剩和生产不足）都会消失。安保服务将会获得其在自愿付费的消费者眼中所具有的相对重要性，并且没有任何人、任何群体或任何地区会以牺牲其他人为代价而获得安保服务。每个人都会根据自己的付费情况获得相应的安保服务。

The most important advantage of a private，contractbased production of law and order，however，is of a qualitative nature.

然而，私营的、以契约为基础的法律和秩序生产的最重要的优势在于其质量。

First，there is the fight against crime.The state is notoriously inefficient in this regard，because the state agents entrusted with this task are paid out of taxes，i.e.，independent of their productivity。Why should one work if one is also paid for doing nothing at all？

首先是打击犯罪。国家在这方面的效率是出了名的低，因为负责这项任务的国家代理人的工资来自税收，即与他们的工作效率无关。如果一个人什么都不做也能得到工资，那他为什么还要干活呢？

In fact，it can be expected that state agents will have an interest in maintaining a moderately high crime rate，because this way they can justify everincreased funding。Worse，for state agents the victims of crime and the indemnification and compensation of such victims play an at best negligible role.The state does not indemnify the victims of crime.To the contrary，the harmed victims are still further insulted in making them，qua taxpayers，pay for the incarceration and “rehabilitation” of the criminal （should he be captured）。

事实上，可以预料到的是，国家代理人会有兴趣维持一个适度偏高的犯罪率，因为这样他们就能为不断增加的经费开支找到理由。更糟糕的是，对于国家代理人来说，犯罪受害者以及对这些受害者的赔偿和补偿所起的作用往好了说也是微不足道的。国家不会对犯罪受害者进行赔偿。恰恰相反，那些受到伤害的受害者还会进一步遭到侮辱，因为他们作为纳税人，还要为罪犯（如果罪犯被抓获的话）的监禁和“改造”付费。

The situation in a privatelaw society is entirely different。Security pro viders，insurers in particular，have to indemnify their clients in the case of actual damage （otherwise they would find no clients） and hence，they must operate efficiently。They must be efficient in the prevention of crime，for unless they can prevent a crime，they would have to pay up.Further，even if a criminal act could not be prevented，they must be efficient in detecting and recovering stolen loot，because otherwise they must pay to replace these goods.In particular，they must be efficient in the detection and apprehen sion of the criminal，for only if the criminal is apprehended is it possible for them to make him pay for the compensation owed to the victim and thus reduce their costs.

私法社会的情况则完全不同。安保服务供应商，尤其是保险公司，必须在实际损害发生时赔偿其客户（否则他们就找不到客户），因此，他们必须高效运作。他们必须有效地防止犯罪，原因在于，除非他们能够防止犯罪，否则他们就必须支付赔偿。此外，即使不能阻止犯罪行为，他们也必须有效地侦查和追回被盗赃物，否则他们就必须支付重置这些物品的费用。特别是，他们必须在犯罪侦查和逮捕方面高效，因为只有抓住罪犯，他们才能让其支付应付给受害者的赔偿，从而降低他们的成本。

Moreover，a private，competitive，and contractbased security industry has a general peacepromoting effect。States are，as already explained，by nature aggressive.They can cause or provoke conflict in order to then “solve” it to their own advantage.

此外，一个私营的、竞争性的、基于契约的安保行业具有普遍的促进和平的作用。如前所述，国家具有侵犯性。它们可以制造或挑起冲突，然后以对自己有利的方式 “解决 “冲突。

Or，to put it differently，as taxfunded monopolists of ultimate decisionmaking，states can externalize the costs associated with aggressive behavior onto others，i.e.，the hapless taxpayers，and accordingly will tend to be more aggressive visàvis their own population as well as “foreigners.”

或者换句话说，作为由税收资助的最终决策垄断者，国家可以将与侵犯行为相关的成本外部化，将其转嫁予他人，那些倒霉透顶的纳税人，因此，无论是对本国民众还是对 “外国人”，国家往往都会表现得更具侵略性。

In distinct contrast，competing private insurers are by nature defenive and peaceful。on the one hand this is because every act of aggression is costly，and an insurance company engaged in aggressive conduct would require comparatively higher premiums，involving the loss of clients to cheaper nonaggressive competitors.

与之形成鲜明对比的是，相互竞争的私营保险公司本质上是防御性的、和平的。一方面，这是因为每一种侵犯行动都是代价高昂的，而从事侵犯行动的保险公司需收取相对较高的保费，这会导致客户流失，转而投向收费更低且无侵犯性的竞争对手。

On the other hand，it is not possible to insure oneself against every conceivable “risk。” Rather，it is only possible to insure oneself against “accidents，” i.e.，risks over whose outcome the insured has no control and to which he contributes nothing。Thus，it is possible to insure oneself against the risk of death and fire，for instance，but it is impossible to insure oneself against the risk of committing suicide tomorrow or setting one’s own house on fire.

另一方面，不可能针对每一种能想到的“风险”都为自己投保。相反，只有针对“意外事故”才能为自己投保，也就是说，针对那些结果不受投保人控制且投保人对其发生毫无促成作用的风险才能投保。例如，人们可以为自己投保以防死亡和火灾的风险，但不可能为自己投保以防明天自杀或放火烧自己房子的风险。

Similarly，it is impossible to insure oneself against the risk of business failure，of unemployment，or of disliking one’s neighbors，for in each case one has some control over the event in question.Most significantly，the uninsurability of individual actions and sentiments （in contradistinction to accidents） implies that it is also impossible to insure oneself against the risk of damages resulting from one’s own prior aggression or provocation.

同样，人们也不可能为商业失败、个人失业或不喜的邻里关系这样的风险的投保，因为在以上每种情况下，个人对相关事件都有一定的掌控力。最重要的是，个人行动和情感的不可保性（与意外事故不同）意味着，人们也无法为自己投保以防范因自己先前的侵犯或挑衅行为而导致损害的风险。

Instead，every insurer must restrict the actions of his clients so as to exclude all aggression and provocation on their part。That is，any insurance against social disasters such as crime must be contingent on the insured sub mitting themselves to specified norms of civilized，nonaggressive conduct。

Further，due to the same reasons and financial concerns，insurers will tend to require that their clients abstain from all forms of vigilante justice （except perhaps under quite extraordinary circumstances），for vigilante justice，even if justified，invariably causes uncertainty and provokes possible thirdparty intervention.By obliging their clients instead to submit to regular publicized procedures whenever they think they have been victimized，these disturbances and associated costs can be largely avoided.

Lastly，it is worthwhile pointing out that while states as taxfunded agencies can—and do—engage in the largescale prosecution of victimless crimes such as “illegaldrug” use，prostitution，or gambling，these “crimes” would tend to be of little or no concern within a System of freely funded protection agencies.“Protection” against such “crimes” would require higher insurance premiums，but since these “crimes”—unlike genuine crimes against persons and property—do not create victims，very few people would be willing to spend money on such “protection.”

Still more：while states，as already noted，are always and everywhere eager to disarm their populations and thus rob them of an essential means of selfdefense，privatelaw societies are characterized by an unrestricted right to selfdefense and hence by widespread private gun and weapon ownership.Just imagine a security producer who demanded of its pro spective clients that they would first have to completely disarm them selves before it would be willing to defend the clients’ life and property。Correctly，everyone would think of this as a bad joke and refuse such an offer。

此外，如前文所述，国家无论何时何地总是热衷于解除民众的武装，从而剥夺他们一项非常重要的自卫手段，而私法社会的特点则是拥有不受限制的自卫权，因此私人普遍拥有枪支和武器。想象一下，一个安保生产商要求其潜在客户首先必须完全解除自己的武装，然后才愿意保护其客户的生命和财产。没错，每个人都会认为这是一个蹩脚的笑话，同时拒绝这样的提议。

freely financed insurance companies that demanded potential clients first hand over all of their means of selfdefense as a prerequisite of pro tection would immediately arouse the utmost suspicion as to their true motives，and they would quickly go bankrupt。In their own best interest，insurance companies would reward armed clients，in particular those able to certify some level of training in the handling of arms，charging them lower premiums reflecting the lower risk that they represent。Just as insur ers charge less if homeowners have an alarm System or a safe installed，so would a trained gun owner represent a lower insurance risk。

自由出资的保险公司要求其潜在客户首先交出所有的安保手段，以此作为获得保护的先决条件，这将立即引起人们对其真实动机的极大怀疑，他们很快就会破产。为了自身的最大利益，保险公司会奖励持有武器的客户，特别是那些能够证明自己接受过某种程度的武器操作培训的客户，向他们收取较低的保费，以彰显他们所代表的较低风险。就像如果房主安装了警报系统或保险箱，保险公司就会降低保险费一样，训练有素的持枪者也会降低保险风险。

Last and most importantly，a System of competing protection agen cies would have a twofold impact on the development of law.on the one hand，it would allow for greater variability of law.Rather than imposing a uniform set of standards onto everyone （as under statist conditions），protection agencies could compete against each other not just via price but also through product differentiation.There could exist side by side，for instance，Catholic protection agencies or insurers applying canon law，Jewish agencies applying Mosaic law，Muslim agencies applying Islamic law，and agencies applying secular law of one variety or another，all of them sustained by a voluntarily paying clientele.Consumers could choose the law applied to them and their property。No one would have to live under “foreign” law.

on the other hand，the very same System of private law and order production would promote a tendency toward the unification and harmoniza tion of law.The “domestic”—Catholic，Jewish，Roman，etc。—law would apply only to the person and property of those who had chosen it。Canon law，for instance，would apply only to professed Catholics and deal solely with intraCatholic conflict and conflict resolution.

另一方面，同样的私法与秩序生产体系会推动法律趋于统一与协调。“内部的”——天主教、犹太教、罗马法等等——法律将仅适用于那些选择了该法律之人的人身和财产。例如，教会法将仅适用于公开表明信仰天主教的人，并且仅处理天主教内部的冲突以及冲突解决事宜。

Yet it is also possible，of course，that a Catholic might come into conflict with the subscriber of some other law code，E.g。，a MusliM.If both law codes reached the same or a similar conclusion，no difficulties exist。However，if competing law codes arrived at distinctly different conclusion （as they would at least in some cases），a problem arises.

当然，天主教徒也有可能与其他法典（如穆斯林法典）的使用者发生冲突。如果两部法典得出相同或相似的结论，就不存在任何难点。然而，如果相互竞争的法典得出截然不同的结论（至少在某些情况下会如此），问题就出现了。

In this case，“domestic” （intragroup） law would be useless，but natu rally every insured person would want protection against the contingency of intergroup conflicts as well。In this situation，it cannot be expected that one insurer and the subscribers of its law code simply subordinate their judgment to that of another insurer and its law.Rather，as I have already explained，in this situation there exists only one credible and acceptable way out of this predicament：from the outset，every insurer would have to be contractually obliged to submit itself and its clients to arbitration by an independent third party。This party would not only be independent but at the same time the unanimous choice of both parties.

在这种情况下，”内部的”（群体内）法律将毫无用处，但自然而然，每个投保人都希望在群体间冲突发生时得到保护。在这种情况下，我们不能指望一家保险公司及其法律规范的使用者会简单地将自己的判决服从于另一家保险公司及其法律的判决。相反，正如我已经解释过的，在这种情况下，只有一个可信的、可接受的办法来摆脱这种困境：从一开始，每家保险公司就必须在契约上表明义务，将自己及其客户交由独立的第三方仲裁。这个第三方不仅是独立的，而且是双方一致选择的。

It would be agreed upon because of its commonly perceived ability to find mutually agreeable （fair） solutions in cases of intergroup disagreement。If an arbitrator failed in this task and arrived at conclusions that were per ceived as “unfair” or “biased” by either one of the insurers or their clients，this person or agency would not likely be chosen as an arbitrator in the future.

人们之所以认同仲裁者，是因为人们普遍认为仲裁者有能力在群体间出现分歧时找到双方都能接受的（公平的）解决方案。如果仲裁者未能完成此项任务，得出的结论被其中一方保险公司或其客户视为 “不公平 “或 “有偏见”，那么此人或此机构今后不太可能会被选为仲裁者。

As a result of the constant cooperation of various insurers and arbitrators，then，a tendency toward the unification of property and contract law and the harmonization of the rules of procedure，evidence，and conflict resolution would be set in motion.Thus，in buying protection insurance，every insurer and insured becomes a participant in an integrated System of conflict avoidance and peacekeeping。Every single conflict and damage claim，regardless of where and by or against whom，would fall under the jurisdiction of one or more specific insurance agencies and would be handled either by an individual insurer’s “domestic” law or by the “international” or “universal” law provisions and procedures agreed upon by every one in advance.

由于各类保险公司和仲裁者的不断合作，一种促使财产法和契约法趋于统一以及使程序、证据和冲突解决规则趋于协调的趋势将会形成。因此，在购买安保保险时，每一家保险公司和每一位投保人都成为了一个综合性的冲突避免与维和体系的参与者。每一起冲突和损害索赔，无论发生在何处、涉及何人或针对何人，都将归属于一家或多家特定保险机构的管辖范围，并将依据某家保险公司“内部的”法律，或者依据所有人事先商定的“国际的”或“通用的”法律条款及程序来进行处理。

Hence，instead of permanent conflict，injustice，and legal insecurity— as under the present statist conditions—in a privatelaw society，peace，justice，and legal security would hold sway。

因此，在私法社会中，和平、公正和法律安全将占据主导地位，而不是像在目前的国家主义条件下那样长期存在冲突、不公正和法律不安全。

14 防卫的私人生产*

The Private Production of defense

Among the most popular and consequential beliefs of our age is the belief in collective security。Nothing less significant than the legitimacy of the modern state rests on this belief。

我们这个时代最流行、影响最大的信仰之一就是集体安保。现代国家的合法性无一不是建立在这一信仰之上。

I will demonstrate that the idea of collective security is a myth that provides no justification for the modern state，and that all security is and must be private.Yet，before coming to the conclusion let me begin with the problem.First，I will present a twostep reconstruction of the myth of collective security，and at each step raise a few theoretical concerns.

我将证明，集体安保的理念是一个神话，它没有为现代国家提供任何正当理由，所有的安保都是而且必须是私人的。不过，在得出结论之前，让我先从问题入手。首先，我将对集体安保这一神话分两步进行重构，并且在每一步中都提出一些理论关切。

The myth of collective security can also be called the Hobbesian myth.Thomas Hobbes，and countless political philosophers and economists after him，argued that in the state of nature，men would constantly be at each others’ throats.Homo homini lupus est。Put in modern jargon，in the state of nature a permanent underproduction of security would prevail。Each indi vidual，left to his own devices and provisions，would spend too little on his own defense，and hence，permanent interpersonal warfare would result。The solution to this presumably intolerable situation，according to Hobbes and his followers，is the institution of a state.In order to institute peaceful coop eration among themselves，two individuals，A and B，require a third inde pendent party，S，as ultimate judge and peacemaker。However，this third party，S，is not just another individual，and the good provided by S，that of security，is not just another “private” good.Rather，S is a sovereign and has as such two unique powers.on the one hand，S can insist that his subjects，A and B，not seek protection from anyone but him； that is，S is a compulsory territorial monopolist of protection.on the other hand，S can determine unilaterally how much A and B must spend on their own security； that is，S has the power to impose taxes in order to provide security “collectively。”

集体安保神话也可称为霍布斯神话。托马斯-霍布斯以及他之后的无数政治哲学家和经济学家都认为，在自然状态下，人们会不断地相互争斗。人之于人无异于狼（Homo homini lupus est。）用现代的行话说，在自然状态下，普遍存在着安保生产长期不足的现象。倘若任由每个人自行其是、自行筹备，每个人在自身防卫上的投入就会过少，因此，就会导致持续不断的人际战争。霍布斯和他的追随者认为，解决这种大概难以忍受的状况的办法就是建立国家。为了在彼此之间建立和平合作关系，A、B 这两个人需要有第三方独立主体 S 来充当最终裁决者与和平缔造者。然而，这个第三方 S 并非只是另一个普通个体，而且 S 所提供的安保这种 “商品” 也并非只是另一种 “私人” 商品。相反，S 是一个主权者，因而拥有两项独特的权力。一方面，S 可以要求其国民 A 和 B 除了向他寻求保护之外，不得向其他任何人寻求保护；也就是说，S 是强制性的地域性保护垄断者。另一方面，S 能够单方面决定 A 和 B 必须在自身安保方面投入多少；也就是说，S 有权征税以便 “集体性地” 提供安保服务。

In commenting on this argument，there is little use in quarreling over whether man is as bad and wolflike as Hobbes supposes，except to note that Hobbes’s thesis obviously cannot mean that man is driven only and exclu sively by aggressive instincts.If this were the case，mankind would have died out long ago。The fact that he did not demonstrates that man also possesses reason and is capable of constraining his natural impulses.The quarrel is only with the Hobbesian solution.given man’s nature as a rational animal，is the proposed solution to the problem of insecurity an improvement？ Can the institution of a state reduce aggressive behavior and promote peaceful cooperation，and thus provide for better private security and protection？ The difficulties with Hobbes’s argument are obvious.For one，regardless of how bad men are，S—whether king，dictator，or elected president—is still one of them.man’s nature is not transformed upon becoming S.Yet how can there be better protection for A and B，if S must tax them in order to provide it？ Is there not a contradiction within the very construction of S as an expropriating property protector？ in fact，is this not exactly what is also—and more appropriately—referred to as a protection racket？ To be sure，S will make peace between A and B but only so that he himself in turn can rob both of them more profitably。Surely S is better protected，but the more he is protected，the less A and B are protected from attacks by S.Collec tive security，it would seem，is not better than private security。Rather，it is the private security of the state，S，achieved through the expropriation，i.e.，the economic disarmament，of its subjects.Further，statists from Thomas Hobbes to James Buchanan have argued that a protective state S would come about as the result of some sort of “constitutional” contract。1 Yet who in his right mind would agree to a contract that allowed one’s protector to determine unilaterally—and irrevocably—the sum that the protected must pay for his protection？ And the fact is，no one ever has! 2

在评论这一论点时，争论人类是否如霍布斯所设想的那般恶劣、如狼一般，并没有多大用处，不过需要指出的是，霍布斯的论点显然不可能意味着人类仅仅且完全受攻击性本能的驱使。如果是这样的话，人类早就灭绝了。人类并未灭绝这一事实表明，人类也拥有理性，并且能够克制自己的自然冲动。争议只在于霍布斯提出的解决方案。鉴于人类作为理性动物的本性，针对不安全问题所提出的这一解决方案算得上是一种改进吗？国家制度能否减少侵犯行为，促进和平合作，从而提供更好的私人安保和保护？霍布斯这一论点的问题是显而易见的。首先，不管人类有多恶劣，S—— 无论是君主、独裁者还是民选总统——终归也是人。人的本性并不会在成为 S 之后就发生改变。然而，如果 S 必须向 A 和 B 征税才能提供保护，那又怎么能说给 A 和 B 带来了更好的保护呢？把 S 构建成一个通过剥夺财产来提供保护的角色，其本身难道不存在矛盾吗？事实上，这不正是所谓的 “保护伞”（protection racket）吗？可以肯定的是，S 确实会在 A 和 B 之间促成和平，但那只是为了方便他回头能更有利可图地劫掠他们二人罢了。当然，S（国家或主权者）自身得到了更好的保护，但它受到的保护越多，A 和 B 受到来自 S 的侵犯的保护就越少。看来，集体安保并不比私人安保更好。相反，它是国家（S）通过剥夺其国民（即对国民进行经济层面的缴械）而实现其自身的安保此外，从托马斯・霍布斯到詹姆斯・布坎南的这些国家主义者都辩称，一个保护性国家S是某种 “立宪 ”契约的结果。[149]然而，但凡头脑清醒的人，谁会同意这样一份契约呢？这份契约允许自己的保护者单方面且不可撤销地决定被保护者必须为其保护所支付的金额。而事实是，从来都没有人会同意这样的契约！ [150]

let me interrupt my discussion here，and return to the reconstruction of the Hobbesian myth.once it is assumed that in order to institute peace ful cooperation between A and B it is necessary to have a state S，a twofold conclusion follows.If more than one state exists，S1，S2，S3，then，just as there can presumably be no peace among A and B without S，so there can be no peace between the states S1 S2，and S3 as long as they remain in a state of nature （i.e.，a state of anarchy） with regard to each other。Consequently，in order to achieve universal peace，political centralization，unification，and ultimately the establishment of a single world government are necessary。

让我在此中断一下我的论述，回过头来继续重构霍布斯式神话。一旦假定为了在A和B之间建立和平合作关系就必须要有一个国家S，那么就会得出一个双重结论。如果存在不止一个国家，比如S1、S2、S3，那么，就像倘若没有S，A和B之间大概就不会有和平一样，只要这些国家S1、S2和S3彼此之间处于自然状态（即无政府状态），它们之间也就不会有和平。因此，为了实现世界普遍和平，政治上的集中化、统一化，以及最终建立一个单一的世界政府就是必要的。

Commenting on this argument，it is first useful to indicate what can be taken as noncontroversial。To begin with，the argument is correct，as far as it goes.If the premise is correct，then the consequence spelled out follows.The empirical assumptions involved in the Hobbesian account appear at first glance to be borne out by the facts，as well。It is true that states are constantly at war with each other，and a historical tendency toward political centralization and global rule does indeed appear to be occurring。Quarrels arise only with the explanation of this fact and tendency，and the classifi cation of a single unified world state as an improvement in the provision of private security and protection.First，there appears to be an empirical anomaly for which the Hobbesian argument cannot account。The reason for the warring among different states S1，S2，and S3，according to Hobbes，is that they are in a state of anarchy visàvis each other。However，before the arrival of a single world state not only are S1，S2，and S3 in a state of anarchy relative to each other but in fact every subject of one state is in a state of anarchy visàvis every subject of any other state.Accordingly，there should exist just as much war and aggression between the private citizens of various states as between different states.Empirically，however，this is not so。The private dealings between foreigners appear to be significantly less warlike than the dealings between different governments.Nor does this seem to be surprising。After all，a state agent S，in contrast to every one of its subjects，can rely on domestic taxation in the conduct of his foreign affairs.given his natural human aggressiveness，however pronounced it may initially be，is it not obvious that S will be more brazen and aggressive in his conduct toward foreigners if he can externalize the cost of such behavior onto others？ Surely，I am willing to take greater risks and engage in more provocation and aggression if I can make others pay for it。And surely there is a tendency of one state—one protection racket—to want to expand its territorial protection monopoly at the expense of other states and thus bring about，as the ultimate result of interstate competition，world government。3 But how is this an improvement in the provision of private security and protection？ The opposite seems to be the case.The world state is the winner of all wars and the last surviving protection racket。Doesn’t this make it particularly dangerous？ And will not the physical power of any single world government be overwhelming as compared to that of any one of its individual subjects？

在评论这一论点时，首先有必要指出哪些内容可被视为毫无争议的。首先，就其本身而言，这一论点是正确的。如果前提是正确的，那么所阐述的结果必定也是正确的。乍一看，霍布斯的论述中所涉及的经验性假设似乎也得到了事实的印证。确实，各个国家之间征伐不断，而且政治集中化和全球一统的历史趋势似乎也确实正在显现。争论的焦点仅在于如何解释这一事实和趋势，以及将单一的大一统的世界国家归类为提供私人安保和保护方面的改进这一点上。首先，似乎存在一个经验性的反常情况，霍布斯的论点无法对此作出解释。按照霍布斯的说法，不同国家S1、S2和S3之间相互交战的原因是它们彼此处于无政府状态。然而，在单一世界国家出现之前，不仅S1、S2和S3彼此处于无政府状态，而且事实上，一个国家的每一位国民与其他任何国家的每一位国民之间也都处于无政府状态。因此，不同国家的公民个人之间的战争和侵略应该和不同国家之间的战争和侵略一样多。然而从经验层面来看，情况并非如此。外国人之间的私人交往似乎远没有不同政府之间的交往那样充满火药味。这似乎也并不令人意外。毕竟，一个国家代理人 S，与它的每一个国民不同，在处理外交事务时可以依赖国内税收。考虑到人类天生的侵犯性，无论这种侵犯性最初是多么明显，如果 S 可以将这种行为的成本外部化到其他人身上，那么它在对外交往中会更加肆无忌惮且更具攻击性，这难道不是显而易见的吗？当然，如果能让别人买单，我愿意冒更大的风险，进行更多的挑衅和侵犯。而且，肯定存在这样一种趋势，即一个国家——一个保护伞—— 会想要以牺牲其他国家利益为代价来扩大其地域性的保护垄断范围，从而导致国家间竞争的最终结果是形成世界政府。[151]但这如何能算是在提供私人安全和保护方面的一种进步呢？实际情况似乎恰恰相反。世界国家是所有战争的赢家，也是最后幸存的保护伞。这难道不会使它变得尤其危险吗？而且，相较于其任何一个单个国民的力量而言，任何一个单一世界政府的武力难道不具有压倒性吗？

I. 经验证据

THE EMPIRICAL EVidence

let me pause here in my abstract theoretical considerations to take a brief look at the empirical evidence bearing on the issue at hand.As noted at the outset，the myth of collective security is as widespread as it is consequential。I am not aware of any survey on this matter，but I would venture to predict that the Hobbesian myth is accepted more or less unquestioningly by well over 90 percent of the adult population.However，to believe something does not make it true.Rather，if what one believes is false，one’s actions will lead to failure.What about the evidence？ Does it support Hobbes and his followers，or does it confirm the opposite anarchist fears and contentions？

请允许我暂停抽象的理论思考，简要回顾一下与当前问题有关的经验证据。正如开头所指出的，集体安保这一神话流传甚广，影响深远。我不清楚是否有这方面的调查，但我敢预言，超过 90% 的成年人或多或少都不加质疑地接受了霍布斯神话。然而，相信某事并不会使它成真。相反，如果一个人所相信的是错误的，那么其行动就会导向失败。证据情况又如何？它是支持霍布斯及其追随者，还是证实了与之相反的无政府主义者的担忧和论点呢？

The U.S.was explicitly founded as a protective state à la Hobbes.let me quote to this effect from Jefferson’s Declaration of independence：

We hold these truths to be selfevident：that all men are created equal； that they are endowed by their creator with inalienable rights； that among these are life，liberty，and the pursuit of hap piness：that to secure these rights，governments are instituted among men，deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

美国显然是按照霍布斯的理念作为一个保护性国家而建立起来的。在此，我援引杰斐逊《独立宣言》中的相关内容来说明这一点：

我们认为以下真理不证自明：人人生而平等；造物主赋予他们不可剥夺的权利；其中包括生命权、自由权和追求幸福的权利；为了保障这些权利，人类才在他们之间建立政府，政府的正当权力来自被统治者的授予。

Here we have it：The U.S.government was instituted to fulfill one and only one task：the protection of life and property。Thus，it should provide the perfect example for judging the validity of the Hobbesian claim as to the status of states as protectors.After more than two centuries of protective statism，what is the status of our protection and peaceful human cooperation？ Was the American experiment in protective statism a success？

我们得出以下结论：美国政府成立的目的只有一个，那就是保护生命和财产。因此，它应该是判断霍布斯关于国家作为保护者的地位的主张是否有效的绝佳范例。经过两个多世纪的保护性国家主义，现如今我们的安保与人类和平合作的状况如何？美国的保护性国家主义实验是否成功？

According to the pronouncements of our state rulers and their intellectual bodyguards （of whom there are more than ever before），we are better protected and more secure than ever。We are supposedly protected from global warming and cooling，from the extinction of animals and plants， from the abuses of husbands and wives，parents and employers，from poverty，disease，disaster，ignorance，prejudice，racism，sexism，homophobia，and countless other public enemies and dangers.In fact，however，matters are strikingly different。In order to provide us with all this protection，the state managers expropriate more than 40 percent of the incomes of private producers year in and year out。Government debt and liabilities have increased without interruption，thus increasing the need for future expropriations.owing to the substitution of government paper money for gold，financial insecurity has increased sharply，and we are continually robbed through currency depreciation.Every detail of private life，property，trade，and contract is regulated by ever higher mountains of laws （legislation），thereby creating permanent legal uncertainty and moral hazard.In particular，we have been gradually stripped of the right to exclusion implied in the very concept of private property。As sellers we cannot sell to，and as buyers we cannot buy from whomever we wish.And as members of associations we are not permitted to enter into whatever restrictive covenant we believe to be mutually beneficial。As Americans，we must accept immigrants we do not want as our neighbors.As teachers，we cannot get rid of lousy or ill behaved students.As employers，we are stuck with incompetent or destruc tive employees.As landlords，we are forced to cope with bad tenants.As bankers and insurers，we are not allowed to avoid bad risks.As restaurant or bar owners，we must accommodate unwelcome customers.And as members of private associations，we are compelled to accept individuals and actions in violation of our own rules and restrictions.In short，the more the state has increased its expenditures on social security and public safety，the more our private property rights have been eroded，the more our property has been expropriated，confiscated，destroyed，or depreciated，and the more we have been deprived of the very foundation of all protection：economic inde pendence，financial strength，and personal wealth.[152]4 The path of every presi dent and practically every member of Congress is littered with hundreds of thousands if not millions of nameless victims of personal economic ruin，financial bankruptcy，impoverishment，despair，hardship，and frustration.

根据我们国家的统治者及其智识卫队（他们的人数比以往任何时候都多）的声明，我们受到了比以往更好的保护，也比以往更加安全。据称，我们受到保护，免受全球变暖和变冷的影响，免受动植物灭绝的威胁，免受夫妻、父母及雇主的虐待，免受贫困、疾病、灾难、无知、偏见、种族主义、性别歧视、恐同心理以及数不清的其他公敌和危险的侵害。然而，事实却截然不同。为了给我们提供所有这些保护，国家管理者年复一年地剥夺私人生产者 40% 以上的收入。政府债务和负债不断增加，从而增加了未来剥夺的需求。由于政府用纸币代替了黄金，金融不安全性急剧增加，我们不断因货币贬值而被掠夺。私人生活、财产、贸易以及契约的每一个细节都受到堆积如山且日益增多的法律（立法）的管制，从而造成了长期的法律不确定性和道德风险。尤其是，我们逐渐被剥夺了私有财产这一概念本身所蕴含的排他权。作为卖家，我们不能把东西卖给任何我们想卖的人；作为买家，我们也不能从任何我们想交易的对象那里购买商品。作为协会的成员，我们不被允许订立任何我们认为对彼此有益的限制性契约。作为美国人，我们必须接纳那些我们不想要的移民成为我们的邻居。作为教师，我们无法摆脱那些差劲或行为不端的学生。作为雇主，我们不得不留用那些不称职或具有破坏性的员工。作为房东，我们被迫去应对那些不良租户。作为银行家和保险商，我们不被允许规避不良风险。作为餐馆或酒吧老板，我们必须接纳那些不受欢迎的顾客。而且作为私人社团的成员，我们被迫接受那些违反我们自身规则与限制的个人及行为。简而言之，国家在社会保障和公共安全方面的支出越多，我们的私有财产权就被侵蚀得越厉害，我们的财产被征收、没收、损毁或贬值的情况就越多，我们被剥夺所有保护之根基——经济独立、财务实力以及个人财富——的程度也就越高。每位总统以及几乎每一位国会议员走过的权力之路，都布满了数十万甚至数百万无名的受害者，他们遭受了个人经济损失、财务破产、贫困、绝望、艰难困苦和人生挫败。

The picture appears even bleaker when we consider foreign affairs.never during its entire history has the continental U.S.been territorially attacked by any foreign army。（Pearl Harbor was the result of a preceding U.S.provo cation.） Yet the U.S.has the distinction of having possessed a government that declared war against a large part of its own population and engaged in the wanton murder of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens.Moreover，while the relations between American citizens and foreigners do not appear to be unusually contentious，almost from its very beginnings the U.S.government pursued relentless aggressive expansionisM.beginning with the spanishAmerican War，culminating in World War I and World War II，and continuing to the present，the U.S.government has become entangled in hundreds of foreign conflicts and risen to the rank of the world’s dominant imperialist power。Thus，nearly every president since the turn of this century also has been responsible for the murder，killing，or starvation of countless innocent foreigners all over the world.In short，while we have become more helpless，impoverished，threatened，and insecure，the U.S.government has become ever more brazen and aggressive.In the name of national security，it defends us，equipped with enormous stockpiles of weapons of aggression and mass destruction，by bullying ever new “Hitlers，” big or small，and all suspected Hitlerite sympathizers anywhere and everywhere outside of the territory of the U.S. 5

当我们考虑外交事务时，情况似乎更加黯淡。在其整个历史上，美国本土从未遭受过任何外国军队的领土攻击。（珍珠港事件是美国此前挑衅行为导致的结果。）然而，美国却有着这样的“独特之处”：其政府曾对本国很大一部分民众宣战，并肆意杀害了数十万本国公民。此外，虽然美国公民与外国人之间的关系似乎并没有特别大的争议，但几乎从建国伊始，美国政府就一直在进行无情的侵略扩张。从美西战争开始，在第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战时达到顶峰，并一直持续至今，美国政府卷入了数以百计的对外冲突，已然崛起成为世界上占主导地位的帝国主义强国。因此，自本世纪初以来，几乎每一位总统都要对世界各地无数无辜外国人的遇害、被杀或饿死负有责任。简而言之，在我们变得更加无助、贫困、受威胁恐吓且缺乏安全感的同时，美国政府却变得越发无所顾忌和更具侵略性。它以国家安全之名，凭借大量的攻击性武器和大规模杀伤性武器来“保卫”我们，通过欺凌各类大小不一的新“希特勒”们以及美国领土之外任何地方、所有被怀疑同情希特勒的人来达到这一目的。[153]

The empirical evidence thus seems clear。The belief in a protective state appears to be a patent error，and the American experiment in protective statism a complete failure.The U.S.government does not protect us.To the contrary，there exists no greater danger to our life，property，and pros perity than the U.S.government，and the U.S.president in particular is the world’s single most threatening and armed danger，capable of ruining everyone who opposes him and destroying the entire globe.

因此，经验证据似乎很清晰。保护性国家的信念似乎是一个明显的错误，而美国在保护性国家主义方面的尝试是一场彻底的失败。美国政府并没有保护我们。恰恰相反，对我们的生命、财产以及繁荣而言，没有比美国政府更大的威胁了，尤其是美国总统，是世界上最具威胁性且武装到牙齿的危险人物，他有能力毁掉任何反对他的人，甚至摧毁整个地球。

II. 剖析国家主义者的反应

How TO THINK ABOUT THE STATIST reSPonSE

Statists react much like socialists when faced with the dismal economic performance of the Soviet Union and its satellites.They do not necessarily deny the disappointing facts，but they try to argue them away by claiming that these facts are the result of a Systematic discrepancy （deviancy） between “real” and “ideal” or “true” statism，respectively socialism.To this day，socialists claim that “true” socialism has not been refuted by the empirical evidence，and everything would have turned out well and unparalleled prosperity would have resulted，if only Trotsky’s，or Bucharin’s，or better still their very own brand of socialism，rather than Stalin’s，had been implemented.Similarly，statists interpret all seemingly contradictory evidence as only accidental。If only some other president had come to power at this or that turn in history，or if only this or that constitutional change or amendment had been adopted，everything would have turned out beautifully，and unparalleled security and peace would have resulted.Indeed，this may still happen in the future，if their own policies are employed.

面对苏联及其卫星国令人沮丧的经济表现，国家主义者的反应与社会主义者十分相似。他们并不一定否认这些令人失望的事实，但他们试图辩解这些事实，声称这些事实是 “现实 ”与 “理想 ”或 “真正 ”的国家主义（即社会主义）之间存在系统性差异（deviancy）的结果。时至今日，社会主义者仍宣称 “真正的” 社会主义并未被经验证据所驳倒，而且他们声称只要实施的是托洛茨基的、布哈林的，或者更好的是他们自己那一套社会主义，而非斯大林的社会主义，一切都会进展顺利，还会带来空前的繁荣。同样，国家主义者将所有看似与之矛盾的证据都仅仅视作偶然情况。他们认为，要是历史的这个或那个转折点上是别的某位总统上台执政，或者要是通过了这项或那项宪法变更或修正案，一切都会变得很美好，还会带来空前的安全与和平。事实上，如果采用他们自己的政策，一个美丽的新世界依然可期。

We have learned from Ludwig von Mises how to respond to the social ists’ evasion （immunization） strategy。6 As long as the defining characteris tic—the essence—of socialism，i.e.，the absence of the private ownership of the factors of production，remains in place，no reform will be of any help.The idea of a socialist economy is a contradictio in adjecto，and the claim that socialism represents a higher，more efficient mode of social production is absurd. In order to reach one’s own ends efficiently and without waste within the framework of an exchange economy based on division of labor，it is necessary that one engage in monetary calculation （costaccounting）。Everywhere outside the System of a primitive selfsufficient single house hold economy，monetary calculation is the sole tool of rational and efficient action.only by being able to compare inputs and outputs arithmetically in terms of a common medium of exchange （money） can a person deter mine whether his actions are successful or not。In distinct contrast，socialism means to have no economy，no economizing，at all，because under these conditions monetary calculation and costaccounting is impossible by definition.If no private property in the factors of production exists，then no prices for any production factor exist； hence，it is impossible to determine whether or not they are employed economically。Accordingly，socialism is not a higher mode of production but rather economic chaos and regression to primitivism.

我们从路德维希·冯·米塞斯那里学到了该如何应对社会主义者的回避（免疫）策略。[154]只要社会主义的决定性特征——其本质，即生产要素的私有制不存在，任何改革都无济于事。社会主义经济这一理念本身就是自相矛盾的说法，而声称社会主义代表着一种更高级、更高效的社会生产模式的观点是荒谬的。为了能在基于劳动分工的交换经济框架内高效且无浪费地达成个人目的，人们必须进行货币计算（成本核算）。在原始的自给自足的单一家庭经济体系之外的所有地方，货币计算都是合理且高效行动的唯一工具。只有能够通过一种通用的交换媒介（货币）从算术角度对投入和产出进行比较，一个人才能确定其行动是否成功。与之形成鲜明对比的是，社会主义意味着根本不存在经济，也无从进行节约，因为在社会主义条件下，货币计算和成本核算顾名思义是不可能的。如果不存在生产要素的私有财产，那么就不存在任何生产要素的价格；因此，就不可能确定它们是否被经济地使用。因此，社会主义并非一种更高级的生产模式，而是经济混乱以及向原始状态的倒退。

How to respond to the statists’ evasion strategy has been explained by Murray N.Rothbard.7 But Rothbard’s lesson，while equally simple and clear and with even more momentous implications，has remained to this day far less known and appreciated.So long as the defining characteristic—the essence—of a state remains in place，he explained，no reform，whether on the level of personnel or of the constitution，will be to any avail。given the principle of government—judicial monopoly and the power to tax—any notion of limiting its power and safeguarding individual life and property is illusory。Under monopolistic auspices the price of justice and protection must rise and its quality must fall。A taxfunded protection agency is a contradiction in terms and will lead to ever more taxes and less protection.Even if a government limited its activities exclusively to the protection of preexisting property rights （as every protective state is supposed to do），the further question of how much security to provide would arise.Motivated （like everyone else） by selfinterest and the disutility of labor，but with the unique power to tax，a government’s answer will invariably be the same：to maximize expenditures on protection—and almost all of a nation’s wealth can conceivably be consumed by the cost of protection—and at the same time to minimize the production of protection.Furthermore，a judicial monopoly must lead to a deterioration in the quality of justice and protection.If one can only appeal to government for justice and protection，justice and protection will be perverted in favor of government，constitutions，and supreme courts notwithstanding。After all，constitutions and supreme courts are state constitutions and courts，and whatever limitations to government action they might contain is determined by agents of the very institution under consideration.Accordingly，the definition of property and protection will continually be altered and the range of jurisdiction expanded to the government’s advantage.

如何应对国家主义者的“鸵鸟”策略，默里-罗斯巴德（Murray N.Rothbard）已经给出了解释。[155]但罗斯巴德所传达的道理虽然同样简单明了，且有着更为重大的影响，却直至今日都远未得到足够的了解与重视。他解释道，只要国家的决定性特征——其本质——依然存在，那么无论是人事层面还是宪法层面的改革都将无济于事。鉴于政府的原则——司法垄断以及征税的权力——任何限制其权力、保障个人生命和财产的想法都是虚幻的。在垄断的加持下，司法和保护的价格必然上升，质量必然下降。由税收资助的保护机构自相矛盾，会导致税收越来越多，保护越来越少。即使政府的活动仅限于保护已有的财产权（正如每个奉行保护主义的国家理应做的那样），也会产生应提供多少安保这一更进一步的问题。出于（与其他人一样的）自利动机以及对劳动负效用的考量，再加上拥有独一无二的征税权力，政府的答案必然总是相同的：将保护方面的支出最大化——可以想象，一个国家几乎所有的财富都可能被保护成本消耗殆尽——同时将保护的生产最小化。此外，司法垄断必然导致司法和保护的质量下降。如果人们只能向政府寻求司法和保护，那么即便有宪法和最高法院的存在，司法与保护也会朝着有利于政府的方向被扭曲。毕竟，宪法和最高法院都是国家的宪法和法院，它们可能对政府行为的任何限制都是由正被考量的这个机构的代理人所决定的。因此，财产和保护的定义将会不断被更改，管辖范围也会朝着对政府有利的方向不断扩大。

Hence，Rothbard pointed out，it follows that just as socialism cannot be reformed but must be abolished in order to achieve prosperity，so can the institution of a state not be reformed but must be abolished in order to achieve justice and protection.“defense in the free society （including such defense services to person and property as police protection and judicial findings），” Rothbard concluded，

would therefore have to be supplied by people or firms who （a） gained their revenue voluntarily rather than by coercion and （b） did not—as the State does—arrogate to themselves a com pulsory monopoly of police or judicial protection …defense firms would have to be as freely competitive and as noncoercive against noninvaders as are all other suppliers of goods and ser vices on the free market。defense services，like all other services，would be marketable and marketable only。[156]8

因此，罗斯巴德指出，正如社会主义不能改革而必须废除才能实现繁荣一样，国家制度也不能改革而必须废除才能实现正义和保护。“自由社会中的防卫（包括诸如针对人身和财产的警察保护、司法裁决等防卫服务）”，罗斯巴德总结道：

因此，（防卫服务）必须由这样的个人或企业来提供：（a）他们是自愿获取收入，而非通过强制手段；（b）他们不会——像国家那样——擅自将警察或司法保护方面的强制垄断权据为己有…… 防卫企业必须像自由市场上所有其他商品和服务的供应商一样，能够自由竞争，且不会对非侵犯者进行强制。防卫服务，如同所有其他服务一样，将是市场化的，而且只能是市场化的。

That is，every private property owner would be able to partake of the advantages of the division of labor and seek better protection of his property than that afforded through selfdefense by cooperation with other owners and their property。Anyone could buy from，sell to，or otherwise contract with anyone else concerning protective and judicial services，and one could at any time unilaterally discontinue any such cooperation with others and fall back on selfreliant defense，or change one’s protective affiliations.

也就是说，每位私有财产所有者都可以分享劳动分工带来的好处，并通过与其他所有者及其财产的合作，为自己的财产寻求比自卫更好的保护。任何人都可以就安保和司法服务与其他任何人进行买卖交易，或者签订其他形式的契约，而且人们可以在任何时候单方面终止与他人的此类合作，重新依靠自力更生式的防卫，或者变更自己所属的安保合作关系。

III. 支持私人安保的理由

THE case FOR PRIVAte SECURITY

Having reconstructed the myth of collective security—the myth of the state—and criticized it on theoretical and empirical grounds，I now must take on the task of constructing the positive case for private security and protection.In order to dispel the myth of collective security，it is not just sufficient to grasp the error involved in the idea of a protective state.It is just as important，if not more so，to gain a clear understanding of how the nonstatist security alternative would effectively work。Rothbard，building on the pathbreaking analysis of the Frenchbelgian economist Gustave de Molinari，9 has given us a sketch of the workings of a freemarket System of protection and defense.10 As well，we owe Morris and Linda Tannehill for their brilliant insights and analyses in this regard. 11 Following their lead，I will proceed deeper in my analysis and provide a more comprehensive view of the alternativenonstatistSystem of security production and its ability to handle attacks，not just by individuals or gangs but in particular also by states.

在重构了集体安全的神话——国家的神话——并从理论和经验层面对其加以批判之后，我现在必须承担起为私人安保与保护构建积极论证的任务。为了破除集体安全的神话，仅仅认识到保护性国家这一理念中所包含的错误是不够的。同样重要的是，甚至更重要的是，要清楚地了解非国家主义的安保替代方案将如何有效运作。罗斯巴德以法国贝尔格经济学家古斯塔夫-德-莫利纳里（Gustave de Molinari）的开创性分析为基础，[157]为我们勾勒出了自由市场保护与防卫体系的运作方式。[158] 同样，我们要感谢莫里斯・坦尼希尔和琳达・坦尼希尔在这方面所提出的深刻洞见与分析。[159]在他们的引领下，我将更深入地分析，对替代性的非国家主义安保生产体系及其应对攻击的能力提供一个更为全面的视角，这里所说的攻击不仅来自个人或犯罪团伙，尤其还包括来自国家的攻击。

There exists widespread agreement—among liberallibertarians such as Molinari，Rothbard，and the Tannehills as well as most other commentators on the matter—that defense is a form of insurance，and defense expenditures represent a sort of insurance premium （price）。Accordingly，as Rothbard and the Tannehills in particular would emphasize，within the frame work of a complex modern economy based on a worldwide division of labor the most likely candidates for offering protection and defense services are insurance agencies.The better the protection of insured property，the lower are the damage claims and hence an insurer’s costs.Thus，to provide efficient protection appears to be in every insurer’s own financial interest； and in fact even now，although restricted and hampered by the state，insurance agencies provide wideranging services of protection and indemnification （compensation） to injured private parties.Insurance companies fulfill a second essential requirement。Obviously，anyone offering protection ser vices must appear able to deliver on his promises in order to find clients.That is，he must possess the economic means—the manpower as well as the physical resources—necessary to accomplish the task of dealing with the dangers，actual or imagined，of the real world.on this count insurance agencies appear to be perfect candidates，too。They operate on a nation wide and even international scale，and they own large property holdings dispersed over wide territories and beyond single state boundaries.Accord ingly，they have a manifest selfinterest in effective protection，and are big and economically powerful。Furthermore，all insurance companies are con nected through a network of contractual agreements of mutual assistance and arbitration as well as a System of international reinsurance agencies，representing a combined economic power which dwarfs that of most if not all existing governments.

在诸如莫利纳里、罗斯巴德和坦尼希尔夫妇这样的自由意志主义者以及大多数其他就此问题发表评论的人士当中，存在着一种广泛的共识，即防卫是一种保险形式，防卫支出则是一种保险费（价格）。因此，正如罗斯巴德，尤其是坦尼希尔夫妇会着重强调的那样，在基于全球劳动分工的复杂现代经济框架内，最有可能提供保护和防卫服务的候选者是保险公司。被保险财产受到的保护越好，损害索赔就越低，进而保险公司的成本也就越低。这样一来，提供高效的保护似乎符合每一家保险公司自身的经济利益；而事实上，即便如今受到国家的限制和阻碍，保险公司也依然为遭受损失的私人团体提供范围广泛的保护及赔偿（补偿）服务。保险公司还满足了第二项基本要求。显然，任何提供保护服务的主体都必须看上去有能力兑现承诺，这样才能招揽到客户。也就是说，其必须具备完成应对现实世界中实际存在或想象中的种种危险这一任务所必需的经济手段——人力以及物力资源。在这一点上，保险公司似乎也是绝佳的候选者。它们在全国乃至国际范围内运营，并且在广阔的地域乃至跨越单个国家边界拥有大量资产。因此，它们在有效保护方面有着明显的自身利益考量，而且规模庞大、经济实力强劲。此外，所有的保险公司都通过互助与仲裁的契约协议网络以及国际再保险机构体系相互联结，它们所代表的联合经济力量，即便不是让所有现存政府相形见绌，也足以令大多数现存政府自叹弗如。

I want to further analyze and Systematically clarify this suggestion：that protection and defense are insurance and can be provided by insurance agencies.To reach this goal，two issues must be addressed.First，it is not possible to insure oneself against every risk of life.I cannot insure myself against committing suicide，for instance，or against burning down my own house，or becoming unemployed，or not feeling like getting out of bed in the morning，or not suffering entrepreneurial losses，because in each case I have full or partial control over the likelihood of the respective outcome.Risks such as these must be assumed individually。No one except myself can possibly deal with them.Hence，the first question will have to be what makes protection and defense an insurable rather than an unin surable risk？ After all，as we have just seen，this is not selfevident。In fact，doesn’t everyone have considerable control over the likelihood of an attack on and invasion of his person and property？ Do I not deliberately bring about an attack by assaulting or provoking someone else，for instance，and is not protection then an uninsurable risk，like suicide or unemployment，for which each person must assume sole responsibility？

我想进一步分析并系统地阐明这一观点：保护和防卫属于保险范畴，并且可以由保险公司来提供。为实现这一目标，有两个问题必须加以探讨。首先，人们不可能针对生活中的每一种风险都进行投保。例如，我无法为自己投保以防自杀，也无法投保以防自己烧毁自家房屋、失业、早上不想起床或者避免遭受创业损失，因为在上述每一种情况中，我对相应结果出现的可能性都有着全部或部分的掌控权。诸如此类的风险必须由个人自行承担。诸如此类的风险必须由个人自行承担。除了我自己，没人能够应对它们。因此，首要的问题将是，是什么使得保护和防卫成为一种可投保的风险，而非不可投保的风险呢？毕竟，正如我们刚刚所说，这一点并非不言自明。事实上，难道每个人对自身及财产遭受攻击和侵犯的可能性不是有着相当大的掌控力吗？例如，我难道不是通过攻击或挑衅他人而故意招致攻击的吗？如此一来，保护不就像自杀或失业一样，属于一种不可投保的风险，每个人必须独自为此承担责任吗？

The answer is a qualified yes and No.Yes，insofar as no one can possibly offer unconditional protection，i.e.，insurance against any invasion what soever。That is，unconditional protection can only be provided，if at all，by each individual on his own and for himself。But the answer is no，insofar as conditional protection is concerned.only attacks and invasions that are provoked by the victim cannot be insured.However，unprovoked and thus accidental attacks can be insured against。12 That is，protection becomes an insurable good only if and insofar as an insurance agent contractually restricts the actions of the insured so as to exclude every possible provocation on their part。Various insurance companies may differ with respect to the specific definition of provocation，but there can be no difference between insurers with regard to the principle that each must Systematically exclude （prohibit） all provocative and aggressive action among its own clients.

答案既是肯定的，也是否定的，需要具体情况具体分析。从肯定的方面来说，鉴于任何人都不可能提供无条件的保护，也就是针对任何形式的侵犯都能提供保险保障，这意味着，无条件的保护（如果真有可能存在的话）只能由每个人自行给自己提供。但从否定的方面来说，就有条件的保护而言，答案是否定的。只有那些由受害者自身挑起的攻击和侵犯行为是无法投保的。然而，无端的、也就是意外的攻击是可以投保的。[160] 也就是说，只有当保险公司通过契约限制被保险公司的行动，以排除他们任何可能的挑衅行为时，保护才会成为一种可投保的商品。不同的保险公司对于挑衅的具体定义可能会有所不同，但就每家保险公司都必须系统性地排除（禁止）其客户之间所有挑衅性和攻击性的行动这一原则而言，各保险公司之间并无差异。

As elementary as this first insight into the essentially defensive—non aggressive and nonprovocative—nature of protectioninsurance may seem，it is of fundamental importance.For one，it implies that any known aggres sor and provocateur would be unable to find an insurer，and hence，would be economically isolated，weak，and vulnerable.on the other hand，it implies that anyone wanting more protection than that afforded by selfreliant self defense could do so only if and insofar as he submitted himself to speci fied norms of nonaggressive，civilized conduct。Furthermore，the greater the number of insured people—and in a modern exchange economy most people want more than just selfdefense for their protection—the greater would be the economic pressure on the remaining uninsured to adopt the same or similar standards of nonaggressive social conduct。Moreover，as the result of competition between insurers for voluntarily paying clients，a tendency toward falling prices per insured property values would come about。At the same time，a tendency toward the standardization and unification of property and contract law would be set in motion.Protection contracts with standardized property and product descriptions would come into existence； and out of the steady cooperation between different insurers in mutual arbitration proceedings，a tendency toward the standardization and unification of the rules of procedure，evidence，and conflict resolution （including compensation，restitution，punishment，and retribution），and steadily increasing legal certainty would result。Everyone，by virtue of buy ing protection insurance，would be tied into a global competitive enterprise of striving to minimize aggression （and thus maximize defensive protection），and every single conflict and damage claim，regardless of where and by or against whom，would fall into the jurisdiction of exactly one or more enumerable and specific insurance agencies and their mutually defined arbitration procedures.

尽管对保护保险本质上具有防御性——非攻击性且非挑衅性——这一特性的这一初步见解可能看似浅显，但却具有根本性的重要意义。一方面，这意味着任何已知的侵犯者和挑衅者都将无法找到保险公司，因此，他们在经济上会陷入孤立，变得弱小且易受攻击。另一方面，这意味着任何人想要得到比自力更生式的自卫所提供的更多的保护，就必须遵守特定的非攻击性文明行为规范。此外，投保人数越多——在现代交换经济中，大多数人希望获得的保护不只是自卫——对其余未投保人的经济压力就越大，他们就会采取相同或类似的非攻击性社会行为标准。此外，由于保险公司之间为争取自愿付费客户而展开竞争，每单位被保险财产价值的保险价格会呈现下降趋势。与此同时，财产法和契约法的标准化和统一化趋势也将启动。带有标准化财产及产品描述的保护契约将会出现；并且，通过不同保险公司在相互仲裁程序中的持续合作，程序规则、证据规则以及冲突解决规则（包括赔偿、归还、惩处和报复等方面）标准化和统一化的趋势将会形成，法律的确定性也会稳步提高。每个人凭借购买保护保险，都将被纳入一个致力于将侵犯行为最小化（从而将防御性保护最大化）的全球性竞争体系之中，而且每一项冲突及损害索赔，无论发生在何地、涉及何人或者由何人发起针对何人，都将落入一个或多个明确可数且特定的保险公司及其相互界定的仲裁程序的管辖范围之内。

IV. 进一步讨论侵犯保险

V. 政治边界与保险

POLITICAL BORDERS AND inSURAnce

let me first contrast defenseprotection insurance with that against natu ral disasters.Frequently an analogy between the two is drawn，and it is instructive to examine if or to what extent it holds.The analogy is that just as every individual within certain geographical regions is threatened by the same risk of an earthquake，a flood，or a hurricane，so does every inhabitant within the territory of the U.S.or germany，for instance，face the same risk of being victimized by a foreign attack。Some superficial similarity—to which I shall come shortly—notwithstanding，it is easy to recognize two fundamental shortcomings in the analogy。For one，the borders of earthquake，flood，or hurricane regions are established and drawn according to objective physical criteria and hence can be referred to as natural。In distinct contrast，political boundaries are artificial boundaries.The borders of the U.S.changed throughout the entire 19th century，and germany did not exist as such until 1871，but was composed of nearly 50 separate countries.Surely，no one would want to claim that this redrawing of the U.S.or german borders was the outcome of the discovery that the security risk of every American or german within the greater U.S.or germany was，contrary to the previously held opposite belief，homogeneous （identical）。

首先，请允许我将防卫保险与自然灾害保险进行对比。人们常常会对这两者进行类比，考察一下这种类比是否成立或者在多大程度上成立是很有启发意义的。这种类比认为，正如在某些地理区域内的每个人都面临着同样的地震、洪水或飓风风险一样，例如，美国或德国境内的每一位居民也面临着遭受外国攻击的相同风险。尽管存在一些表面上的相似性（我稍后会谈到这一点），但我们很容易就能发现这种类比存在的两个根本性缺陷。一方面，地震、洪水或飓风区域的边界是依据客观的自然标准确定并划分的，因此可被称作自然边界。与之形成鲜明对比的是，政治边界属于人为划定的边界。美国的国界在整个19世纪一直在变化，而德国直到1871年才以如今的形态存在，此前是由将近50个独立的邦国组成的。当然，没人会想说美国或德国国界的这种重新划定，是因为发现了在范围更大的美国或德国境内，每个美国人或德国人的安全风险（与此前持有的相反看法不同）同质（相同）的结果。

There is a second obvious shortcoming。nature—earthquakes，floods，hurricanes—is blind in its destruction.It does not discriminate between more and less valuable locations and objects，but attacks indiscriminately。In distinct contrast，an aggressorinvader can and does discriminate.He does not attack or invade worthless locations and things，like the Sahara Desert，but targets locations and things that are valuable.Other things being equal，the more valuable a location and an object，the more likely it will be the target of an invasion.

第二个明显的缺陷是，大自然——地震、洪水、飓风——在其造成破坏时是盲目的。它不会区分价值高低不同的地点和物体，而是不加选择地进行破坏。与之形成鲜明对比的是，侵害人或入侵者能够而且确实会进行区分。他不会去攻击或入侵像撒哈拉沙漠那样毫无价值的地点和事物，而是会瞄准有价值的地点和事物。在其他条件相同的情况下，一个地点或物体的价值越高，它就越有可能成为入侵的目标。

This raises the crucial next question.If political borders are arbitrary and attacks are in any case never indiscriminate but directed specifically toward valuable places and things，are there any nonarbitrary borders separating different securityrisk （attack） zones？ The answer is yes.such nonarbitrary borders are those of private property。Private property is the result of the appropriation and/or production of particular physical objects or effects by specific individuals at specific locations.Every appropriatorproducer （owner） demonstrates with his actions that he regards the appropriated and produced things as valuable （goods），otherwise he would not have appropri ated or produced them.The borders of everyone’s property are objective and intersubjectively ascertainable.They are simply determined by the extension and dimension of the things appropriated and/or produced by any one particular individual。And the borders of all valuable places and things are coextensive with the borders of all property。At any given point in time，every valuable place and thing is owned by someone； only worthless places and things are owned by no one.

这就引出了至关重要的下一个问题。如果政治边界是任意划定的，而且攻击无论如何都绝非不加选择，而是专门针对有价值的地点和事物，那么是否存在划分不同安全风险（攻击）区域的非任意边界呢？答案是肯定的。这样的非任意边界就是私有财产的边界。私有财产是特定个体在特定地点对特定的有形物体或成果进行占有和/或生产的结果。每一个占有者兼生产者（所有者）都通过其行动表明，他认为所占有和生产出来的东西是有价值的（商品），否则他当初就不会去占有或生产它们了。每个人财产的边界都是客观的，且是主体间可确定的。它们仅仅是由任何一个特定个体所占有和/或生产的事物的范围及规模来决定的。而且，所有有价值的地点和事物的边界与所有财产的边界是一致的。在任何给定的时间点上，每一个有价值的地点和事物都归某人所有；只有毫无价值的地点和事物才不归任何人所有。

Surrounded by other men，every appropriator and producer can also become the object of an attack or invasion.Every property—in contrast to things （matter）—is necessarily valuable； thus，every property owner becomes a possible target of other men’s aggressive desires.Consequently，every owner’s choice of the location and form of his property will，among countless other considerations，also be influenced by security concerns.Other things being equal，everyone will prefer safer locations and forms of property to locations and forms that are less safE.Yet，regardless of where an owner and his property are located and whatever the property’s physical form，every owner，by virtue of not abandoning his property even in view of potential aggression，demonstrates his personal willingness to protect and defend these possessions.

在被其他人环视的情况下，每一个占有者和生产者也都可能成为攻击或入侵的对象。每一项财产——与物品（物质）不同——必然是有价值的；因此，每一位财产所有者都可能成为他人侵犯欲望的目标。结果就是，每一位所有者对其财产所处位置和形式的选择，在诸多其它考虑因素之外，也会受到安全方面的考量影响。在其他条件相同的情况下，相较于安全性较差的地点和财产形式，每个人都会更倾向于选择更安全的地点和财产形式。然而，无论所有者及其财产位于何处，也无论财产的实际形态如何，每一位所有者即便面临潜在的侵犯也不放弃自己的财产，这就表明了他个人保护和捍卫这些财产的意愿。

However，if the borders of private property are the only nonarbitrary borders standing in Systematic relation to the risk of aggression，then it follows that as many different security zones as there are separately owned property holdings exist，and that these zones are no larger than the extension of these holdings.That is，even more so than in the case of industrial accidents，the insurance of property against aggression would seem to be an example of individual rather than group （mutual） protection.

然而，如果私有财产的边界是唯一与遭受侵犯风险存在系统性关联的非任意性边界，那么就会得出这样的结论：存在着与单独所有的财产数量一样多的不同安全区域，而且这些区域不会比这些财产的范围更大。也就是说，相较于工业事故的情况，针对财产免受侵犯的保险似乎更像是个体保护的例子，而非团体（互助）保护的例子。

Whereas the accidentrisk of an individual production process is typi cally independent of its location—such that if the process were replicated by the same producer at different locations his margin of error would remain the same—the risk of aggression against private property—the production plant—is different from one location to another。By its very nature，as privately appropriated and produced goods，property is always separate and distinct。Every property is located at a different place and under the control of a different individual，and each location faces a unique security risk。It can make a difference for my security，for instance，if I reside in the coun tryside or the city，on a hill or in a valley，or near or far from a river，ocean， harbor，railroad or street。In fact，even contiguous locations do not face the same risk。It can make a difference，for instance，if I reside higher or lower on the mountain than my neighbor，upstream or downstream，closer to or more distant from the ocean，or simply north，south，west，or east of him.Moreover，every property，wherever it is located，can be shaped and transformed by its owner so as to increase its safety and reduce the likelihood of an aggression.I may acquire a gun or safedeposit box，for instance，or I may be able to shoot down an attacking plane from my backyard or own a laser gun that can kill an aggressor thousands of miles away。Thus，no location and no property are like any other。Every owner will have to be insured individually，and to do so every aggressioninsurer must hold sufficient capital reserves.

单个生产过程中的意外风险通常与其所处位置无关——也就是说，如果同一生产者在不同地点复制这一生产过程，其误差范围将保持不变——然而，私有财产（生产厂房）遭受侵犯的风险却会因地点不同而有所差异。就其本质而言，作为私人占有和生产的物品，财产总是相互独立且各不相同的。每一项财产都位于不同的地点，处于不同个体的掌控之下，并且每个地点都面临着独特的安全风险。例如，我居住在乡村还是城市、在山上还是山谷中、距离河流、海洋、港口、铁路或街道是近还是远，这些因素都会对我的安全产生影响。事实上，即使是相邻的地点面临的风险也不尽相同。比如，相较于我的邻居，我在山上居住的位置是更高还是更低、是处于河流上游还是下游、离海洋更近还是更远，又或者仅仅是在他的北边、南边、西边还是东边，这些情况都会产生影响。而且，每一项财产，无论位于何处，其所有者都可以对其进行改造塑形，以增强其安全性并降低遭受侵犯的可能性。例如，我可以购置一把枪或一个保险箱，又或者我能够从自家后院击落一架来袭的飞机，再或者拥有一把可以击毙数千英里之外侵犯者的激光枪。因此，没有哪一个地点、哪一项财产是与其他的完全一样的。每一位所有者都必须单独投保，而为此，每一家提供防范侵犯保险的保险公司都必须持有充足的资本储备金。

VI. 民主国家与全面战争

THE DEMOCRATIC STAte AND TOTAL WAR

The analogy typically drawn between insurance against natural disasters and external aggression is fundamentally flawed.As aggression is never indiscriminate but selective and targeted，so is defense.Everyone has different locations and things to defend，and no one’s security risk is the same as anyone else’s.And yet the analogy also contains a kernel of truth.However，any similarity between natural disasters and external aggression is due not to the nature of aggression and defense but to the rather specific nature of state aggression and defense （interstate warfare）。As explained above，a state is an agency that exercises a compulsory territorial monopoly of protection and the power to tax，and any such agency will be comparatively more aggressive because it can externalize the costs of such behavior onto its subjects.How ever，the existence of a state does not just increase the frequency of aggression； it changes its entire character。The existence of states，and especially of democratic states，implies that aggression and defense—war—will tend to be transformed into total，undiscriminating，war。13

通常将针对自然灾害的保险与抵御外来侵犯进行类比，这种做法从根本上就是有缺陷的。正如侵犯从来都不是无差别的，而是有选择性和针对性的，防卫也是如此。每个人所处的位置不同，需要保卫的事物也不一样，而且任何人所面临的安全风险都与其他人不尽相同。不过，这种类比也包含着一定的合理之处。然而，自然灾害与外来侵犯之间的任何相似性，并非源于侵犯和防卫的本质，而是源于国家侵犯和防卫（国家间战争）的特定性质。如上文所述，国家是一个对保护实施强制性地域垄断并拥有征税权力的机构，任何此类机构都会相对更具侵犯性，因为它可以将这种行为的成本外部化，转嫁给其国民。然而，国家的存在不仅会增加侵犯行为的频率，还会改变侵犯的整个性质。国家的存在，尤其是民主国家的存在，意味着侵犯与防卫——战争——往往将会转变成全面的、不加区分的战争。[161]

Consider for a moment a completely stateless world.Most property owners would be individually insured by large，often multinational insurance companies endowed with huge capital reserves.Most if not all aggressors，being bad risks，would be left without any insurance what soever。In this situation，every aggressor or group of aggressors would want to limit their targets，preferably to uninsured property，and avoid all “collateral damage，” as they would otherwise find themselves confronted with one or many economically powerful professional defense agencies.Likewise，all defensive violence would be highly selective and targeted.All aggressors would be specific individuals or groups，located at specific places and equipped with specific resources.In response to attacks on their clients，insurance agencies would specifically target these locations and resources for retaliation，and they would want to avoid any collateral damage，as they would otherwise become entangled with and liable to other insurers.

暂且设想一个完全不存在国家的世界。大多数财产所有者会由那些拥有巨额资本储备的大型（通常是跨国的）保险公司单独承保。大多数（即便不是全部）侵害者，由于属于高风险对象，将根本得不到任何保险。在这种情况下，每个侵害者或侵害者团伙都希望限制其攻击目标，最好是将目标锁定在未投保的财产上，并且避免一切 “附带损害”，因为否则他们就会发现自己要面对一个或多个经济实力强大的专业防卫机构。同样，所有防卫性的暴力行为也都会极具选择性和针对性。所有侵害者都将是特定的个人或团体，处于特定的地点，并配备特定的资源。针对客户受到的攻击，保险公司会专门针对这些地点和资源进行报复，并希望避免任何附带损害，因为否则它们就会与其他保险公司产生纠葛并承担责任。

All of this fundamentally changes in a statist world with interstate war fare.For one，if a state，the U.S.，attacks another，for instance Iraq，this is not just an attack by a limited number of people，equipped with limited resources and located at a clearly identifiable place.Rather，it is an attack by all Americans and with all of their resources.Every American supposedly pays taxes to the U.S.government and is thus defacto，whether he wishes to be or not，implicated in every government aggression.Hence，while it is obviously false to claim that every American faces an equal risk of being attacked by Iraq，（low or nonexistent as such a risk is，it is certainly higher in new York City than in Wichita，Kansas，for instance） every American is rendered equal with respect to his own active，if not always voluntary，participation in each of his government’s aggressions.

在存在国家间战争的国家主义世界里，这一切都发生了根本性的变化。首先，如果一个国家，比如美国，攻击另一个国家，例如伊拉克，这就不只是由数量有限、配备有限资源且位于明确可识别地点的人员所发起的攻击。相反，这是全体美国人利用他们所有资源发起的攻击。每个美国人按理都向美国政府纳税，因此，无论其是否愿意，实际上都卷入了政府的每一次侵犯当中。因此，虽说声称每个美国人面临着被伊拉克攻击的同等风险显然是错误的（这种风险即便有也是很低或者根本不存在的，例如在纽约市的风险肯定要比在堪萨斯州威奇托市的风险高），但就每个美国人主动（即便不总是自愿）参与其政府的每一次侵犯而言，他们在这方面是被同等对待的。

Second，just as the attacker is a state，so is the attacked，Iraq。As its U.S.counterpart，the Iraqi government has the power to tax its popula tion or draft it into its armed forces.As taxpayer or draftee，every Iraqi is implicated in his government’s defense just as every American is drawn into the U.S.government’s attack。Thus，the war becomes a war of all Americans against all Iraqis，i.e.，total war。The strategy of both the attacker and the defender state will be changed accordingly。While the attacker still must be selective regarding the targets of his attack，if for no other reason than that even taxing agencies （states） are ultimately constrained by scarcity，the aggressor has little or no incentive to avoid or minimize collateral damage.To the contrary，since the entire population and national wealth is involved in the defensive effort，collateral damage，whether of lives or property，is even desirable.No clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants exists.Everyone is an enemy，and all property provides support for the attacked government。Hence，everyone and everything becomes fair game.Likewise，the defender state will be little concerned about collateral damage resulting from its own retaliation against the attacker。Every citizen of the attacker state and all of their property is a foe and enemy property and thus becomes a possible target of retaliation.Moreover，every state，in accordance with this character of interstate war，will develop and employ more weapons of mass destruction，such as atomic bombs，rather than longrange precision weapons，such as my imaginary laser gun.

其次，正如攻击者是一个国家（美国）一样，被攻击者伊拉克也是一个国家。与美国政府一样，伊拉克政府有权向其民众征税或征召民众入伍。作为纳税人或应征入伍者，每个伊拉克人都卷入了本国政府的防御行动，就如同每个美国人都被卷入美国政府的攻击行动一样。于是，这场战争就变成了全体美国人对全体伊拉克人的战争，也就是总体战。攻击方和防御方国家的战略都会相应地发生改变。虽然攻击者出于资源稀缺等原因仍必须对攻击目标有所选择，但侵略者几乎没有或根本没有动力去避免或尽量减少附带损害。恰恰相反，由于全体民众和国家财富都参与到防御行动中，所以无论是生命还是财产方面的附带损害甚至都是可取的。战斗人员和非战斗人员之间不存在明确的区分。每个人都是敌人，所有财产都为被攻击的政府提供支持。因此，所有人和所有事物都成了可以攻击的目标。同样，防御国也不会太在意其针对攻击者进行报复所造成的附带损害。攻击方国家的每一位公民都是敌人，其所有财产都是敌方财产，因而都可能成为报复的目标。而且，依照国家间战争的这种特性，每个国家都会研制并使用更多的大规模杀伤性武器，比如原子弹，而不是像我设想的激光枪那样的远程精确武器。

Thus，the similarity between war and natural catastrophes—their seemingly indiscriminate destruction and devastation—is exclusively a feature of a statist world.

因此，战争与自然灾难之间的相似性——它们看似不加区分的破坏和毁灭——完全是国家主义世界的一个特征。

VII. 保险与激励

INSURAnce AND inceNTIveS

This brings on the last problem.We have seen that just as all property is private，all defense must be insured individually by capitalized insurance agencies，very much like industrial accident insurance.Yet，we have also seen that both forms of insurance differ in one fundamental respect。In the case of defense insurance，the location of the insured property matters.The premium per insured value will be different at different locations.Further more，aggressors can move around，their arsenal of weapons may change，and their entire character of aggression can alter with the presence of states.Thus，even given an initial property location，the price per insured value can alter with changes in the social environment or surroundings of this location.How would a System of competitive insurance agencies respond to this challenge？ in particular，how would it deal with the existence of states and state aggression？

至此引出了最后一个问题。我们已经看到，正如所有财产都是私有的一样，所有的防卫都必须由资本化的保险公司为个人提供保险，这很像工业意外保险。然而，我们也看到，这两种保险形式在一个基本方面有所不同。就防卫保险而言，被保险财产的位置很重要。不同位置的单位保险价值的保险费是不同的。此外，侵害者可以四处移动，他们的武器库可能会改变，而且他们整个侵害的性质可能会随着国家（的出现）而改变。因此，即使给定一个初始的财产位置，单位保险价值的价格也会随着这个位置的社会环境或周边情况的变化而改变。竞争性的保险公司体系将如何应对这一挑战呢？特别是，它将如何应对国家的存在和国家的侵犯呢？

In answering these questions it is essential to recall some elementary economic insights.Other things being equal，private property owners generally，and business owners in particular，prefer locations with low protec tion costs （insurance premiums） and rising property values to those with high protection costs and falling property values.Consequently，there is a tendency toward the migration of people and goods from highrisk and fall ing propertyvalue areas into lowrisk and increasing propertyvalue areas.Furthermore，protection costs and property values are directly related.Other things being equal，higher protection costs （greater attack risks） imply lower or falling property values，and lower protection costs imply higher or increasing property values.These laws and tendencies shape the operation of a competitive System of insuranceprotection agencies.

在回答这些问题时，有必要回顾一些基本的经济学观点。在其他条件相同的情况下，一般私有财产所有者，特别是企业所有者，更倾向于选择保护成本（保险费）低、财产价值上升的地区，而不是保护成本高、财产价值下降的地区。因此，出现了一种趋势，即人员和财货从高风险和财产价值下降的地区向低风险和财产价值上升的地区迁移。此外，保护成本与财产价值是直接相关的。在其他条件相同的情况下，更高的保护成本（更大的受攻击风险）意味着更低的财产价值或财产价值下降，而更低的保护成本则意味着更高的财产价值或财产价值上升。这些规律和趋势形塑了保险保护机构竞争体系的运作方式。

First，whereas a taxfunded monopolist will manifest a tendency to raise the cost and price of protection，private profitloss insurance agencies strive to reduce the cost of protection and thus bring about falling prices.At the same time insurance agencies are more interested than anyone else in rising property values，because this implies not only that their own property holdings appreciate but in particular that there will also be more of other people’s property for them to insure.In contrast，if the risk of aggression increases and property values fall，there is less value to be insured while the cost of protection and price of insurance rises，implying poor business conditions for an insurer。Consequently，insurance companies would be under permanent economic pressure to promote the former favorable and avert the latter unfavorable condition.

首先，靠税收供资的垄断者往往会有提高保护成本及价格的倾向，而自负盈亏的私营保险机构则会努力降低保护成本，进而促使价格下降。与此同时，保险机构比其他任何机构都更关注财产价值的上升，因为这不仅意味着它们自身持有的财产会增值，尤其还意味着可供它们承保的他人财产也会增多。相反，如果遭受侵犯的风险增加且财产价值下降，那么可承保的价值就会减少，而保护成本和保险价格却会上升，这意味着保险公司的经营环境不佳。因此，保险公司将长期面临经济压力，促使其推动前一种有利状况的出现，并避免后一种不利状况的发生。

This incentive structure has a fundamental impact on the operation of insurers.For one，as for the seemingly easier case of the protection against common crime and criminals，a System of competitive insurers would lead to a dramatic change in current crime policy。To recognize the extent of this change，it is instructive to look first at the present and thus familiar statist crime policy。While it is in the interest of state agents to combat common private crime （if only so that there is more property left for them to tax），as taxfunded agents they have little or no interest in being par ticularly effective at the task of preventing it，or else，if it has occurred，at compensating its victims and apprehending and punishing the offenders.Moreover，under democratic conditions，insult will be added to injury。For if everyone—aggressors as well as nonaggressors and residents of high crime locations as well as those of lowcrime locations—can vote and be elected to government office，a Systematic redistribution of property rights from nonaggressors to aggressors and the residents of lowcrime areas to those of high crime areas comes into effect and crime will actually be promoted.Accordingly，crime，and consequently the demand for private security services of all kinds are currently at an alltime high.Even more scandalously，instead of compensating the victims of the crimes it did not prevent （as it should have），the government forces victims to pay again as taxpayers for the cost of the apprehension，imprisonment，rehabilitation，and/or entertainment of their aggressors.And rather than requiring higher protection prices in high crime locations and lower ones in lowcrime locations，as insurers would，the government does the exact opposite.It taxes more in lowcrime and high propertyvalue areas than in highcrime and low propertyvalue ones，or it even subsidizes the residents of the latter locations—the slums—at the expense of those of the former and thus erodes the social conditions unfavorable to crime while promoting those favorable to it。14

这种激励机制对保险公司的运营有着根本性的影响。其一，就防范普通犯罪及犯罪分子这一看似较为简单的情况而言，一个竞争性的保险公司体系将会使当前的犯罪政策发生重大变化。要认识到这种变化的程度，首先审视一下目前人们所熟悉的国家主义的犯罪政策是很有启发意义的。虽然打击普通的私人犯罪符合国家代理人的利益（哪怕只是为了有更多的财产可供他们征税），但作为靠税收供养的公职人员，他们对于特别有效地预防犯罪这一任务几乎没有兴趣，或者说即便犯罪已经发生，他们对于赔偿受害者、缉拿并惩处罪犯也没什么兴趣。而且，在民主制度下，往往是雪上加霜。因为如果每个人——侵犯者与非侵犯者、高犯罪率地区居民以及低犯罪率地区居民——都能投票并当选公职，那么一种将财产权从非侵害者向侵害者、从低犯罪率地区居民向高犯罪率地区居民进行系统性再分配的情况就会发生，而犯罪实际上就会受到助长。相应地，犯罪以及由此引发的对各类私人安保服务的需求目前正处于历史最高水平。更可耻的是，政府不但没有（本应如此）对那些它未能阻止的罪行的受害人进行赔偿，反而强迫受害人作为纳税人再次为抓捕、监禁、改造甚至优待侵犯他们的人而支付费用。保险公司会根据情况在高犯罪率地区收取较高的安保费用，在低犯罪率地区收取较低的费用，然而政府的做法却恰恰相反。政府在低犯罪率、高财产价值的地区征收的税比在高犯罪率、低财产价值地区征收的更多，甚至还以牺牲前者（低犯罪率、高财产价值地区）居民的利益为代价去补贴后者（高犯罪率地区，也就是贫民窟）的居民，这样一来，就侵蚀了抑制犯罪滋生的社会条件，反而助长了有利于犯罪的环境。[162]

The operation of competitive insurers would be in striking contrast。For one，if an insurer could not prevent a crime，it would have to indemnify the victim.Thus，above all insurers would want to be effective in crime prevention.And if they still could not prevent it，they would want to be efficient in the detection，apprehension，and punishment of criminal offenders，because in finding and arresting an offender，the insurer could force the criminal— rather than the victim and its insurer—to pay for the damages and cost of indemnification.

竞争性保险公司的运作情况会与之形成鲜明对比。其一，如果一家保险公司未能阻止犯罪发生，它就必须对受害者进行赔偿。因此，最重要的是，所有保险公司都会希望能有效地预防犯罪。而且，如果它们仍然没能阻止犯罪发生，它们会希望能高效地侦查、缉拿并惩处犯罪者，因为通过找到并逮捕犯罪者，保险公司可以迫使罪犯——而非受害者及其保险公司——来支付损害赔偿费用和补偿成本。

More specifically，just as insurance companies currently maintain and continually update a detailed local inventory of property values so they would then maintain and continually update a detailed local inventory of crimes and criminals.Other things being equal，the risk of aggression against any private property location increases with the proximity and the number and resources of potential aggressors.Thus，insurers would be interested in gathering information on actual crimes and known criminals and their locations，and it would be in their mutual interest of minimizing property damage to share this information with each other （just as banks now share information on bad credit risks with each other）。Furthermore，insurers would also be particularly interested in gathering information on potential （not yet committed and known） crimes and aggressors，and this would lead to a fundamental overhaul of and improvement in current— statist—crime statistics.In order to predict the future incidence of crime and thus calculate its current price （premium），insurers would correlate the frequency，description，and character of criminals and crimes with the social surroundings in which they occur and operate，and develop and under competitive pressure continually refine an elaborate System of demographic and sociological crime indicators.15 That is，every neighbor hood would be described，and its risk assessed，in terms and in light of a multitude of crime indicators，such as the composition of sexes，age groups，races，nationalities，ethnicities，religions，languages，professions，and incomes.

更具体地说，就像保险公司目前维护并不断更新当地财产价值的详细清单一样，他们也会维护并不断更新当地犯罪和犯罪分子的详细清单。在其他条件相同的情况下，任何私有财产所在地遭受侵犯的风险会随着潜在侵害者的临近程度、数量以及资源的增加而上升。因此，保险公司会有兴趣收集有关实际犯罪、已知犯罪分子及其所在位置的信息，而且为了将财产损失降到最低，它们相互分享这些信息是符合彼此共同利益的（就像如今银行之间会相互分享不良信用风险信息一样）。此外，保险公司还会对收集有关潜在（尚未实施且尚不为人知）犯罪及侵犯者的信息特别感兴趣，而这将促使对当前的——国家主义的——犯罪统计数据进行根本性的全面修订与完善。为了预测未来犯罪发生率，进而计算出当下的犯罪保险价格（保费），保险公司会将犯罪分子及犯罪行为的频率、描述以及特征与它们发生及实施的社会环境相关联，并在竞争压力下开发且不断完善一套详尽的人口统计学及社会学犯罪指标体系。 [163]也就是说，每个社区都会基于众多犯罪指标来进行描述，并对其风险作出评估，这些指标包括性别构成、年龄群体、种族、国籍、民族、宗教、语言、职业以及收入情况等。

Consequently，and in distinct contrast to the present situation，all interlocal，regional，racial，national，ethnic，religious，and linguistic income，and wealth redistribution would disappear，and a constant source of social conflict would be removed permanently。Instead，the emerging price （premium） structure would tend to accurately reflect the risk of each location and its particular social surrounding，such that no one would be forced to pay for the insurance risk of anyone but his own and that associated with his particular neighborhood.More importantly，based on its continually updated and refined System of statistics on crime and property values and further motivated by the noted migration tendency from highrisk lowvalue （henceforth “bad”） to lowriskhighvalue （henceforth “good”） locations，a System of competitive aggression insurers would promote a tendency toward civilizational progress （rather than decivilization）。

因此，与当前状况形成鲜明对比的是，所有跨地区、跨区域、跨种族、跨国家、跨民族、跨宗教以及跨语言的收入和财富再分配现象都将消失，一个社会冲突的持久根源将被永久消除。相反，逐渐形成的价格（保险费）结构将倾向于准确反映各个地点及其特定社会环境的风险，这样一来，除了为自己以及与自己所在特定社区相关的保险风险付费外，没人会被迫为其他人的保险风险买单。更重要的是，基于其不断更新和完善的犯罪及财产价值统计体系，再加上前文提及的从高风险低价值（此后称为“孬”）地区向低风险高价值（此后称为“好”）地区迁移的趋势所带来的进一步推动作用，一个由相互竞争的防范侵犯保险公司所构成的体系将会推动文明进步（而非去文明化）的趋势。

Governments—and democratic governments in particular—erode “good” and promote “bad” neighborhoods through their tax and transfer policy。They do so also，and with possibly an even more damaging effect，through their policy of forced integration.This policy has two aspects.on the one hand，for the owners and residents in “good” locations and neigh borhoods who are faced with an immigration problem，forced integration means that they must accept，without discrimination，every domestic immi grant，as transient or tourist on public roads，as customer，client，resident，or neighbor。They are prohibited by their government from excluding any one，including anyone they consider an undesirable potential risk，from immigration.on the other hand，for those owners and residents in “bad” locations and neighborhoods，who experience emigration rather than immigration，forced integration means that they are prevented from effective selfprotection.Rather than being allowed to rid themselves of crime through the expulsion of known criminals from their neighborhood，they are forced by their government to live in permanent association with their aggressors.16

政府——尤其是民主政府——通过其税收及转移支付政策侵蚀 “好 ”社区，助长“孬 ”社区的发展。它们还通过强制一体化政策这么做，而且可能会产生更具破坏性的影响。这项政策包含两个方面。一方面，对于身处 “好” 地段及 “好” 社区且面临移民问题的所有者和居民来说，强制一体化意味着他们必须一视同仁地接纳每一位国内移民，无论是作为公共道路上的过客或游客，还是作为顾客、客户、居民或邻居。政府禁止他们将任何人（包括他们认为存在不良潜在风险的任何人）排除在移民行列之外。另一方面，对于那些身处“孬”地段及“孬”社区、面临人口外流而非人口流入情况的所有者和居民来说，强制一体化意味着他们被阻止进行有效的自我保护。他们不能通过将已知犯罪分子驱逐出自己所在社区的方式来摆脱犯罪困扰，而是被政府强迫要永远与侵犯他们的人为邻。[164]

The results of a System of private protection insurers would be in strik ing contrast to these all too familiar decivilizing effects and tendencies of statist crime protection.To be sure，insurers would be unable to eliminate the differences between “good” and “bad” neighborhoods.In fact，these differences might even become more pronounced.However，driven by their interest in rising property values and falling protection costs，insur ers would promote a tendency to improve by uplifting and cultivating both “good” and “bad” neighborhoods.Thus，in “good” neighborhoods insurers would adopt a policy of selective immigration.Unlike states，they could not and would not want to disregard the discriminating inclinations among the insured toward immigrants.To the contrary，even more so than any one of their clients，insurers would be interested in discrimination：in admitting only those immigrants whose presence adds to a lower crime risk and increased property values and in excluding those whose presence leads to a higher risk and lower property values.That is，rather than eliminating discrimination，insurers would rationalize and perfect its practice.Based on their statistics on crime and property values，and in order to reduce the cost of protection and raise property values，insurers would formulate and continually refine various restrictive （exclusionary） rules and procedures relating to immigration and immigrants and thus give quantitative precision—in the form of prices and price differentials—to the value of discrimination （and the cost of nondiscrimination） between potential immigrants （as high or lowrisk and valueproductive）。

私人安保保险公司体系所产生的结果，将与人们耳熟能详的国家主义犯罪防范措施那去文明化的种种影响及趋势形成鲜明对比。诚然，保险公司无法消除 “好 ”社区和 “孬”社区之间的差异。事实上，这些差异甚至会变得越发显著。不过，出于对财产价值上升和保护成本下降的利益考量，保险公司会推动一种通过提升和培育 “好”“孬” 社区来实现改善的趋势。因此，在 “好” 社区，保险公司会采取选择性移民政策。与国家不同，它们不能也不会无视被保险公司对移民所抱有的差别对待倾向。恰恰相反，相较于它们的任何一位客户，保险公司会对差别对待更感兴趣：它们只会接纳那些能降低犯罪风险、提升财产价值的移民，而拒绝接纳那些会导致更高风险和更低财产价值的移民。也就是说，保险公司不会消除差别对待，反而会使其做法合理化并加以完善。基于它们有关犯罪和财产价值的统计数据，并且为了降低保护成本、提高财产价值，保险公司会制定并不断完善各种与移民及移民相关的限制性（排他性）规则和程序，从而以价格及价格差异的形式，对潜在移民之间（作为高风险或低风险以及能创造价值与否）差别对待的价值（以及无差别对待的成本）给出量化的精确界定。

Similarly，in “bad” neighborhoods the interests of the insurers and the insured would coincide.Insurers would not want to suppress the expulsion ist inclinations among the insured toward known criminals.They would rationalize such tendencies by offering selective price cuts （contingent on specific cleanup operations）。Indeed，in cooperation with one another，insur ers would want to expel known criminals not just from their immediate neighborhood，but from civilization altogether，into the wilderness or open frontier of the Amazon jungle，the Sahara，or the polar regions.

同样，在“孬”社区，保险公司和投保人的利益将会是一致的。保险公司不会想要压制投保人驱逐已知犯罪分子的倾向。它们会通过提供有选择性的降价（依据具体的清理行动而定）来使这类倾向合理化。事实上，通过相互合作，保险公司会希望不仅将已知犯罪分子从它们临近的社区驱逐出去，而且是将其彻底逐出文明世界，赶到荒郊野外，或是驱至亚马逊丛林、撒哈拉沙漠或极地地区那样的偏远地带。

VIII. 防范国家侵犯

INSURING againST STAte AGGreSSIon

Yet what about defense against a state？ How would insurers protect us from state aggression？

然而，针对国家的防卫情况又如何呢？保险公司将如何保护我们免受国家的侵犯呢？

First，it is essential to remember that governments qua compulsory，tax funded monopolies are inherently wasteful and inefficient in whatever they do。This is also true for weapons technology and production，military intel ligence and strategy，especially in our age of high technology。Accordingly，states would not be able to compete within the same territory against voluntarily financed insurance agencies.Moreover，most important and general among the restrictive rules relating to immigration and designed by insur ers to lower protection cost and increase property values would be the one concerning government agents.States are inherently aggressive and pose a permanent danger to every insurer and insured.Thus，insurers in particular would want to exclude or severely restrict—as a potential security risk—the immigration （territorial entry） of all known government agents，and they would induce the insured，either as a condition of insurance or of a lower premium，to exclude or strictly limit any direct contact with any known government agent，be it as visitor，customer，client，resident，or neighbor。That is，wherever insurance companies operated—in all free territories— state agents would be treated as undesirable outcasts，potentially more dan gerous than any common criminal。Accordingly，states and their personnel would be able to operate and reside only in territorial separation from，and on the fringes of，free territories.Furthermore，owing to the comparatively lower economic productivity of statist territories，governments would be continually weakened by the emigration of their most valueproductive residents.

首先，必须牢记，政府作为依靠强制征税维持的垄断机构，无论做什么，本质上都是浪费且低效的。在武器技术与生产、军事情报及战略方面也是如此，在我们所处的高科技时代尤其如此。因此，在同一地域内，国家无法与自愿出资的保险机构相竞争。而且，在保险公司为降低保护成本、增加财产价值而制定的与移民相关的限制性规则中，最为重要且普遍的一条会是涉及政府代理人的规则。国家天生具有侵犯性，对每一家保险公司及每一位投保人都构成持久的威胁。因此，保险公司尤其会希望将所有已知的政府代理人的移民（入境）行为作为一种潜在的安全风险加以排除或严格限制，而且它们会引导投保人（将此）作为获得保险或降低保费的一个条件，去排除或严格限制与任何已知政府代理人的直接接触，无论是将其当作访客、顾客、客户、居民还是邻居。

Now，what if such a government should decide to attack or invade a free territory？ This would be easier said than done! Who and what would one attack？ There would be no state opponent。only private property own ers and their private insurance agencies would exist。No one，least of all the insurers，would have presumably engaged in aggression or even provoca tion.If there were any aggression or provocation against the state at all，this would be the action of a particular person，and in this case the interest of the state and insurance agencies would fully coincide.both would want to see the attacker punished and held accountable for all damages caused.But without any aggressorenemy，how could the state justify an attack and even more so any indiscriminate attack？ And surely it would have to justify it! For the power of every government，even the most despotic one，rests ultimately on opinion and consent，as La Boétie，Hume，Mises and Rothbard have explained.17 Kings and presidents can issue an order to attack，of course.But there must be scores of others willing to execute their order to put it into effect。There must be generals receiving and following the order，soldiers willing to march，kill，and be killed，and domestic producers will ing to continue producing to fund the war。If this consensual willingness were absent because the orders of the state rulers were considered illegiti mate，even the seemingly most powerful government would be rendered ineffectual and collapse，as the recent examples of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet Union have illustrated.Hence，from the viewpoint of the leaders of the state an attack on free territories would have to be considered extremely risky。No propaganda effort，however elaborate，would make the public believe that its attack were anything but an aggression against innocent vic tims.In this situation，the rulers of the state would be happy to maintain monopolistic control over their present territory rather than running the risk of losing legitimacy and all of their power in an attempt at territorial expansion.

那么，如果这样一个政府决定去攻击或入侵一片自由领地，情况会如何呢？说起来容易做起来难！要去攻击谁、攻击什么呢？那里不会有作为对手的国家存在，只有私有财产所有者及其私人保险公司。大概没有人，尤其是那些保险公司，会去实施侵犯甚或挑衅。即便真的存在针对这个国家的任何侵犯或挑衅，那也只会是某个特定个人的举动，在这种情况下，国家和保险公司的利益将会完全一致。双方都会希望看到攻击者受到惩罚，并为造成的所有损失承担责任。但是，如果没有任何侵犯者/敌人，国家如何正当化一次攻击行动，更别说是无差别的攻击行动？很显然，它必定需要给出正当理由！正如拉博埃西、休谟、米塞斯和罗斯巴德所阐释的那样，每个政府，哪怕是最专制的政府，其权力最终都建基于舆论和民众的认同。[165]国王和总统当然可以下达攻击的命令。但必须有许多其他人愿意执行他们的命令，才能将其付诸实施。有士兵愿意出征、杀敌以及赴死，国内的生产者愿意继续生产以资助战争。如果由于国家统治者的命令被认为是非法的，而缺乏这种基于认同的意愿，那么即便看似最强大的政府也会失效并走向垮台，近期伊朗国王和苏联的例子足以说明此点。因此，从国家领导人的角度来看，对自由领地发起攻击必须被视为极具风险之举。无论多么精心策划的宣传活动，都无法让公众相信这种攻击不是对无辜受害者的侵犯。在这种情况下，国家统治者会乐于维持对现有领土的垄断控制，而不是冒着失去合法性和所有权力的风险试图扩张领土。

However，as unlikely as this may be，what would happen if a state still attacked and/or invaded a neighboring free territory？ in this case the aggressor would not encounter an unarmed population.only in statist ter ritories is the civilian population characteristically unarmed.States every where aim to disarm their own citizenry so as to be better able to tax and expropriate it。In contrast，insurers in free territories would not want to dis arm the insured.Nor could they。For who would want to be protected by someone who required him as a first step to give up his ultimate means of selfdefense？ To the contrary，insurance agencies would encourage the ownership of weapons among their insured by means of selective price cuts.

然而，尽管这种可能性不大，但如果一个国家仍然攻击和/或入侵邻近的自由领地，会发生什么情况呢？在这种情况下，侵犯者不会遇到手无寸铁的民众。只有在实行国家主义的地区，平民百姓才通常是没有武器的。各国到处都致力于解除本国公民的武装，以便能够更好地对其征税和没收财产。与此相反，自由领地的保险公司不会想要解除投保人的武装，它们也没办法这么做。因为谁会愿意让一个首先要求自己放弃最终自卫手段的人来提供保护呢？恰恰相反，保险机构会通过有选择性的降价手段来鼓励投保人拥有武器。

Moreover，apart from the opposition of an armed private citizenry，the aggressor state would run into the resistance of not only one but in all likelihood several insurance and reinsurance agencies.In the case of a successful attack and invasion，these insurers would be faced with mas sive indemnification payments.Unlike the aggressing state，however，these insurers would be efficient and competitive firms.Other things being equal，the risk of an attack—and hence the price of defense insurance— would be higher in locations adjacent or in close proximity to state ter ritories than in places far away from any state.To justify this higher price，insurers would have to demonstrate defensive readiness visàvis any possible state aggression to their clients，in the form of intelligence services，the ownership of suitable weapons and materials，and military personnel and training。In other words，the insurers would be prepared—effectively equipped and trained—for the contingency of a state attack and ready to respond with a twofold defense strategy。on the one hand，insofar as their operations in free territories are concerned insurers would be ready to expel，capture，or kill every invader while at the same time trying to avoid or minimize all collateral damage.on the other hand，insofar as their operations on state territory are concerned insurers would be prepared to target the aggressor—the state—for retaliation.That is，insurers would be ready to counterattack and kill，whether with longrange precision weap ons or assassination commandos，state agents from the top of the government hierarchy of king，president，or prime minister on downward while at the same time seeking to avoid or minimize all collateral damage to the property of innocent civilians （nonstate agents），and they would thereby encourage internal resistance against the aggressor government，promote its delegitimization，and possibly incite the liberation and transformation of the state territory into a free country。

此外，除了民间武装的抵抗之外，侵略国遇到的将不仅仅是一家，而很可能是多家保险和再保险公司的抵制。倘若侵略和入侵得逞，这些保险公司将面临巨额赔偿支出。然而，与侵略国不同的是，这些保险公司都是高效且有竞争力的企业。在其他条件相同的情况下，靠近或紧邻国家领土的地方遭受攻击的风险会高于远离任何国家的地方，因此防卫保险的价格也会高于这些地方。为了证明这种高昂的价格是合理的，保险公司必须向其客户证明，在面对任何可能的国家侵犯时，他们已经做好了防御准备，其形式包括情报服务、拥有合适的武器及物资、配备军事人员并开展相关训练等。换句话说，保险公司会针对国家发动攻击这一突发情况做好准备——配备有效的装备并进行训练，而且时刻准备采用双重防御策略予以应对。一方面，就其在自由地区的行动而言，保险公司会随时准备驱逐、俘获或击毙每一个入侵者，同时努力避免或尽量减少一切附带损害。另一方面，就其在国家领土上的行动来说，保险公司会准备将侵略者——也就是国家——作为报复目标。也就是说，保险公司会准备进行反击并实施打击，无论是使用远程精确武器还是派遣暗杀突击队，对从君主、总统或总理等政府高层往下的国家代理人采取行动，同时力求避免或尽量减少对无辜平民（非国家代理人）财产造成的所有附带损害。通过这样的方式，它们会鼓励针对侵略政府的内部抵抗，促使其丧失合法性，并有可能煽动将该国领土解放并转变为一个自由国度。

IX. 重获自我防卫的权利

REGAINING OUR RIGHT TO SELFdefense

I have thus come full circle with my argument。First，I have shown that the idea of a protective state and state protection of private property is based on a fundamental theoretical error，and that this error has had disastrous consequences：the destruction and insecurity of all private property and per petual war。Second，I have shown that the correct answer to the question of who is to defend private property owners from aggression is the same as for the production of every other good or service：private property own ers，cooperation based on the division of labor，and market competition.Third，I have explained how a System of private profitloss insurers would effectively minimize aggression，whether by private criminals or states，and promote a tendency toward civilization and perpetual peace.The only task outstanding，then，is to implement these insights：to withdraw one’s consent and willing cooperation from the state and to promote its delegitimization in public opinion so as to persuade others to do the same.without the erroneous public perception and judgment of the state as just and necessary and without the public’s voluntary cooperation，even the seemingly most powerful government would implode and its powers evaporate.Thus liber ated，we would regain our right to selfdefense and be able to turn to freed and unregulated insurance agencies for efficient professional assistance in all matters of protection and conflict resolution.

这样一来，我的论证就已完整地呈现。首先，我已经表明，保护性国家以及国家对私有财产提供保护的理念是基于一个根本性的理论错误，而且这个错误已经造成了灾难性的后果：所有私有财产遭到破坏、缺乏安全保障以及战乱不断。其次，我已经说明，对于由谁来保护私有财产所有者免受侵犯这一问题，正确答案与其他任何商品或服务的生产问题的答案是一样的：那就是私有财产所有者、基于劳动分工的合作以及市场竞争。第三，我已经解释了一个基于盈亏考量的私人保险公司体系将如何有效减少来自私人犯罪分子或国家的侵犯行为，并推动走向文明与永久和平的趋势。那么，剩下的唯一任务就是践行这些见解：不再认同国家，不再自愿与国家合作，并且在公众舆论中促使其丧失合法性，以便说服其他人也这么做。倘若公众不再错误地认为国家是公正且必要的，倘若公众不再自愿与国家合作，那么即便看似最强大的政府也会内爆，其权力也会烟消云散。如此一来获得解放后，我们就能重获自卫的权利，并且能够向自由且不受管制的保险机构寻求高效、专业的协助，以处理所有保护及解决冲突方面的事务。

15 关于国家与战争的反思*

reflections on State and War

Conventionally，the state is defined as an agency with two unique charac teristics.First，it is a compulsory territorial monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking （jurisdiction）。That is，it is the ultimate arbiter in every case of conflict，including conflicts involving itself。Second，the state is a territorial monopolist of taxation.That is，it is an agency that unilaterally fixes the price citizens must pay for its provision of law and order。

传统上，国家被定义为具有两个独特特征的机构：第一，它是最终决策（管辖权）的强制性领土垄断者，即它是所有冲突（包括涉及其自身的冲突）的最终仲裁者；第二，国家是税收的领土垄断者。也就是说，它是单方面决定公民为其所提供的法律和秩序而必须支付的价格的机构。

Predictably，if one can only appeal to the state for justice，justice will be perverted in favor of the state.Instead of resolving conflict，a monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking will provoke conflict in order to settle it to his own advantage.Worse，while the quality of justice will fall under monopolistic auspices，its price will rise.Motivated like everyone else by selfinterest but equipped with the power to tax，the state agents’ goal is always the same：to maximize income and minimize productive effort。

可以预见的是，如果人们只能向国家寻求公正，那么公正就会向国家倾斜从而被扭曲。最终决策的垄断者不仅不会解决冲突，反而会为其自身私利从而挑起冲突。更糟糕的是，在一言堂下，公正的质量会下降，其价格会上升。国家代理人像其他人一样受到自我利益的驱动，但他们拥有征税权，他们的目标始终如一：最大化收入，同时最小化生产性努力。

I. 国家、战争和帝国主义

STATE，WAR，AND IMPERIALISM

Instead of concentrating on the internal consequences of the institution of a state，however，I will focus on its external consequences，i.e.，foreign rather than domestic policy。

然而，我不会着重探讨国家制度带来的内部影响，而是将聚焦于其外部影响，也就是外交政策而非国内政策。

For one，as an agency that perverts justice and imposes taxes，every state is threatened with “exit。” Especially its most productive citizen may leave to escape taxation and the perversions of law.No state likes this.To the contrary，instead of seeing the range of control and tax base shrink，state agents prefer that they be expanded.Yet this brings them in conflict with other states.Unlike competition between “natural” persons and institutions， however，the competition between states is eliminative.That is，there can be only one monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking and taxation in any given area.Consequently，the competition between different states promotes a tendency toward political centralization and ultimately one single world state.

首先，作为一个扭曲公正和征税的机构，每个国家都面临着“退出”的威胁。尤其是最有生产力的公民可能会为了逃避税收和扭曲的法律而选择离开。没有哪个国家喜欢这样。相反，国家不希望看到控制范围和税基缩小，而是希望它们扩大。然而，这却会导致国与国之间发生冲突。与 “自然人 “和机构之间的竞争不同，国家之间的竞争是淘汰性的，也就是说，在任何特定区域，最终的决策者和税收垄断者只能有一个。因此，不同国家之间的竞争促进了政治集中化的趋势，最终形成一个单一的世界国家。

Further，as taxfunded monopolists of ultimate decisionmaking，states are inherently aggressive institutions.Whereas “natural” persons and institutions must bear the cost of aggressive behavior themselves （which may well induce them to abstain from such conduct），states can externalize this cost onto their taxpayers.Hence，state agents are prone to become provocateurs and aggressors and the process of centralization can be expected to proceed by means of violent clashes，i.e.，interstate wars.

此外，作为由税收资助的最终决策垄断者，国家本质上是具有侵犯性的机构。”自然人 “和机构必须自己承担侵犯行为的成本（这很可能促使他们放弃这种行为），而国家却可以将这种成本外部化到纳税人身上。因此，国家代理人很容易成为挑衅者和侵犯者，可以预料到集权化的进程会通过暴力冲突，即国家间战争，来推进。

Moreover，given that states must begin small and assuming as the starting point a world composed of a multitude of independent territorial units，something rather specific about the requirement of success can be stated.Victory or defeat in interstate warfare depend on many factors，of course，but other things such as population size being the same，in the long run the decisive factor is the relative amount of economic resources at a state’s disposal。In taxing and regulating，states do not contribute to the creation of economic wealth.Instead，they parasitically draw on existing wealth.However，state governments can influence the amount of existing wealth negatively。Other things being equal，the lower the tax and regulation burden imposed on the domestic economy，the larger the population will tend to grow and the larger the amount of domestically produced wealth on which the state can draw in its conflicts with neighboring competitors.That is，states that tax and regulate their economies comparatively little—liberal states—tend to defeat and expand their territories or their range of hegemonic control at the expense of less liberal ones.

此外，鉴于国家必须从小规模开始，并假设世界最初由众多独立的领土单位组成，可以对成功的要求做出一些具体的陈述。当然，国家间战争的胜负取决于很多因素，但在人口数量等其他因素不变的情况下，从长远来看，决定性因素是一国可支配的经济资源的相对数量。在征税和监管方面，国家并没有为创造经济财富做出贡献。相反，国家以寄生的方式汲取现有财富。然而，国家政府可以对现有财富的数量产生负面影响。在其他条件相同的情况下，对国内经济施加的税收和监管负担越低，人口就越容易增长，国家在与周边竞争对手的冲突中可以汲取的国内生产财富也就越多。也就是说，对内经济征税和管制相对较少的国家——自由主义的国家——往往以牺牲自由主义程度较低的国家为代价，战胜并扩大其领土或霸权控制范围。

This explains，for instance，why Western Europe came to dominate the rest of the world rather than the other way around.More specifically，it explains why it was first the Dutch，then the British and finally，in the 20th century，the United States，that became the dominant imperial power，and why the United States，internally one of the most liberal states，has conducted the most aggressive foreign policy，while the former Soviet Union，for instance，with its entirely illiberal （repressive） domestic policies has engaged in a comparatively peaceful and cautious foreign policy。The United States knew that it could militarily beat any other state； hence，it has been aggressive.In contrast，the Soviet Union knew that it was bound to lose a military confrontation with any state of substantial size unless it could win within a few days or weeks.

例如，这就解释了为何西欧得以统治世界其他地区，而不是反过来被其他地区统治。更确切地说，这解释了为何先是荷兰，接着是英国，最后在20世纪是美国成为了占主导地位的帝国势力；也解释了为何美国——其国内是最自由的国家之一——却奉行着最具侵略性的外交政策，而像前苏联，因其国内政策完全是不自由的（具有压制性），却奉行着相对和平且谨慎的外交政策。美国知道自己在军事上能够击败任何其他国家，所以它一直表现得很有侵略性。相比之下，苏联知道，除非能在几天或几周内取胜，否则它必然会在与任何规模可观的国家的军事对抗中落败。

II. 从君主制和军队战争到民主制和全面战争

FROM MonARCHY AND WARS OF ARMIES TO DEMOCRACY AND TOTAL WARS

Historically，most states have been monarchies，headed by absolute or constitutional kings or princes.It is interesting to ask why this is so，but here I have to leave this question aside.Suffice it to say that democratic states （including socalled parliamentary monarchies），headed by presidents or prime ministers，were rare until the French revolution and have assumed worldhistoric importance only after World War I。

从历史上看，大多数国家曾是君主制国家，由专制君主或立宪君主、亲王等领导。探究为何会如此是个有趣的问题，但在此我先把这个问题搁置一旁。只需说明一点就够了，即由总统或首相领导的民主制国家（包括所谓的议会君主制国家）在法国大革命前十分罕见，并且只是在第一次世界大战后才具备了世界历史性的重要意义。

While all states must be expected to have aggressive inclinations，the incentive structure faced by traditional kings on the one hand and modern presidents on the other is different enough to account for different kinds of war。Whereas kings viewed themselves as the private owner of the territory under their control，presidents consider themselves as temporary caretakers.The owner of a resource is concerned about the current income to be derived from the resource and the capital value embodied in it （as a reflec tion of expected future income）。His interests are longrun，with a concern for the preservation and enhancement of the capital values embodied in “his” country。In contrast，the caretaker of a resource （viewed as public rather than private property） is concerned primarily about his current income and pays little or no attention to capital values.

尽管可以预料所有国家都会有侵略倾向，但传统君主与现代总统所面临的激励机制差异颇大，足以导致不同类型战争的出现。君主将自己视为所掌控领土的私人所有者，而总统则把自己看作临时的管理者。资源所有者关心的是能从该资源中获取的当前收益以及蕴含其中的资本价值（这体现了预期的未来收益）。他着眼于长远利益，关注的是“他的”国家所蕴含的资本价值的保全与增值。相比之下，资源的管理者（将资源视作公有财产而非私有财产）主要关心的是自己的当前收益，对资本价值很少关注甚至毫不在意。

The empirical upshot of this different incentive structure is that monar chical wars tended to be “moderate” and “conservative” as compared to democratic warfare.

这种不同的激励结构的经验结论是，与民主战争相比，君主战争往往是“温和的”和“保守的”。

Monarchical wars typically arose out of inheritance disputes brought on by a complex network of interdynastic marriages.They were characterized by tangible territorial objectives.They were not ideologically motivated quarrels.The public considered war the king’s private affair，to be financed and executed with his own money and military forces.Moreover，as conflicts between different ruling families，kings felt compelled to recognize a clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants and target their war efforts exclusively against each other and their family estates.Thus military historian Michael Howard noted about 18thcentury monarchical warfare：

on the [European] continent commerce，travel，cultural and learned intercourse went on in wartime almost unhindered.The wars were the king’s wars.The role of the good citizen was to pay his taxes，and sound political economy dictated that he should be left alone to make the money out of which to pay those taxes.He was required to participate neither in the decision out of which wars arose nor to take part in them once they broke out，unless prompted by a spirit of youthful adventure.These matters were arcane regni，the concern of the sovereign alone.1

君主制战争通常源于因王朝间错综复杂的联姻网络所引发的继承争端。这类战争有着明确的领土目标，并非受意识形态驱动的纷争。民众认为战争是君主的私人事务，应由君主们自己出钱和出军队来付诸实施。此外，当不同统治家族之间发生冲突时，君主们觉得必须明确区分战斗人员和非战斗人员，并将战争目标完全对准彼此及其家族产业。军事历史学家迈克尔-霍华德（Michael Howard）在谈到 18 世纪的君主制战争时如是说：

在（欧洲）大陆，商业、旅行、文化以及学术交流在战时几乎畅通无阻。战争是君主的战争。良民的职责就是缴税，而健全的政治经济学原则要求应让民众安心挣钱来缴纳这些税款。民众既无需参与引发战争的决策，战争一旦爆发也无需参战，除非受到年少冒险精神的驱使。这些事务属于王室机密，仅是君主一人乾纲独断之事。[166]

Similarly Ludwig von Mises observed about the wars of armies：

In wars of armies，the army does the fighting while the citizens who are not members of the army pursue their normal lives.The citizens pay the costs of warfare； they pay for the maintenance and equipment of the army，but otherwise they remain outside of the war events.It may happen that the war actions raze their houses，devastate their land，and destroy their other property； but this，too，is part of the war costs which they have to bear。It may also happen that they are looted and incidentally killed by the warriors—even by those of their “own” army。But these are events which are not inherent in warfare as such； they hinder rather than help the operations of the army leaders and are not tolerated if those in command have full control over their troops.The warring state which has formed，equipped，and maintained the army considers looting by the soldiers an offense； they were hired to fight，not to loot on their own.The state wants to keep civil life as usual because it wants to preserve the taxpaying ability of its citizens； conquered territories are regarded as its own domain.The System of the market economy is to be maintained during the war to serve the requirement of warfare.

同样，路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）也对军队战争发表了看法：

在军队战争中，军队进行战斗，而非军队成员的公民则继续过着正常的生活。公民支付战争费用，包括军队的维持费和装备费，但除此之外，他们置身于战争事物之外。战争可能会夷平他们的房屋，毁坏他们的土地，摧毁他们的其他财产；但这也是他们必须承担的战争代价的一部分。他们还可能遭到战士们的抢劫和意外杀害——甚至是他们 “自己 “军队的战士。但是，这些情况并非战争本身所固有的；它们阻碍而非帮助军队指挥官的作战行动，如果指挥官能够完全控制自己的部队，就不会容忍这些情况发生。组建、装备和维持军队的交战国认为士兵抢劫是一种犯罪行为；他们是被雇佣来打仗的，而不是来抢劫的。国家希望保持公民生活如常，因为它要维护公民的纳税能力；被征服的领土被视为自己的领地。战争期间，市场经济体系需要保持，以支持战争需求。[167]

In contrast to the limited warfare of the ancien régime，the era of democratic warfare—which began with the French revolution and the Napole onic Wars，continued during the 19th century with the American War of Southern independence，and reached its apex during the 20th century with World War I and World War II—has been the era of total war。

与旧制度下的有限战争不同，民主战争时代——肇始于法国大革命和拿破仑战争，在 19 世纪随着美国南方独立战争得以延续，并在 20 世纪的第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战期间达到顶峰——是全面战争时代。

In blurring the distinction between the rulers and the ruled （“we all rule ourselves”），democracy strengthened the identification of the public with a particular state.Rather than dynastic property disputes which could be resolved through conquest and occupation，democratic wars became ideological battles：clashes of civilizations，which could only be resolved through cultural，linguistic，or religious domination，subjugation and，if necessary，extermination.It became increasingly difficult for members of the public to extricate themselves from personal involvement in war。resistance against higher taxes to fund a war was considered treasonous.because the democratic state，unlike a monarchy，was “owned” by all，conscription became the rule rather than the exception.And with mass armies of cheap and hence easily disposable conscripts fighting for national goals and ideals，backed by the economic resources of the entire nation，all distinctions between combatants and noncombatants fell by the wayside.Collateral damage was no longer an unintended sideeffect but became an integral part of warfare.“once the state ceased to be regarded as ‘property’ of dynastic princes，” Michael Howard noted，and

became instead the instrument of powerful forces dedicated to such abstract concepts as Liberty，or Nationality，or revolution，which enabled large numbers of the population to see in that state the embodiment of some absolute Good for which no price was too high，no sacrifice too great to pay； then the “temperate and indecisive contests” of the rococo age appeared as absurd anachronisms.3

民主制度模糊了统治者与被统治者之间的区别（”我们都在自我统治”），从而加强了公众对特定国家的认同。民主战争不再是可以通过征服和占领来解决的王朝财产争端，而是变成了意识形态之争：文明的冲突，只能通过文化、语言或宗教的统治、征服甚至必要时的灭绝才能解决。公众越来越难以摆脱个人对战争的参与。反对提高税收以资助战争被视为是叛国行径。只因民主国家不同于君主制，归全民“所有”，所以征兵成为常态而非例外。此外，有了大批由廉价因而可轻易牺牲的应征入伍者组成的军队，他们为国家目标和理想而战，并且得到整个国家经济资源的支持，战斗人员与非战斗人员之间的所有区别都被抛到了一边。附带损害不再是意外的副作用，而是成了战争不可或缺的一部分。“一旦国家不再被视为王朝君主的‘财产’，”迈克尔·霍华德（Michael Howard）指出：

“反而成为致力于诸如自由、民族性或革命这类抽象概念的强大力量的工具，这使得大量民众认为国家体现着某种至善，为了它无论付出多高的代价、做出多大的牺牲都不为过；那么，洛可可时代那种‘温和且优柔寡断的争斗’就显得像是荒谬的不合时宜之物了。”[168]

Similar observations have been made by the military historian Major general J。F。C。Fuller：

The influence of the spirit of nationality，that is of democracy，on war was profound，。。。[it] emotionalized war and，consequently，brutalized it；。。。National armies fight nations，royal armies fight their like，the first obey a mob—always demented，the second a king，generally sane.All this developed out of the French revolution，which also gave to the world conscription—herd warfare，and the herd coupling with finance and commerce has begotten new realms of war。For when once the whole nation fights，then is the whole national credit available for the purpose of war。4

军事历史学家 J. F. C.福勒少将也提出了类似的看法：

民族精神（也就是民主精神）对战争的影响是深远的……它使战争情绪化，进而使战争变得残酷；……民族军队是为民族而战，王室军队则是与同类（其他王室军队）作战，前者听从的是群氓——群氓总是疯狂的，后者听从的是国王，而国王通常是理智的。所有这一切都源自法国大革命，法国大革命还给世界带来了征兵制——群体战争，而群体与金融、商业相结合便催生了新的战争领域。因为一旦整个民族投入战斗，那么整个国家的信用便可用于战争的目的。[169]

And William A.Orton thus summarized matters：

Nineteenthcentury wars were kept within bounds by the tradi tion，well recognized in international law，that civilian property and business were outside the sphere of combat。Civilian assets were not exposed to arbitrary distraint or permanent seizure，and apart from such territorial and financial stipulations as one state might impose on another，the economic and cultural life of the belligerents was generally allowed to continue pretty much as it had been.Twentiethcentury practice has changed all that。during both World Wars limitless lists of contraband coupled with unilateral declarations of maritime law put every sort of commerce in jeopardy，and made waste paper of all precedents.The close of the first war was marked by a determined and successful effort to impair the economic recovery of the principal losers，and to retain certain civilian properties.The second war has seen the extension of that policy to a point at which international law in war has ceased to exist。For years the Government of germany，so far as its arms could reach，had based a policy of confiscation on a racial theory that had no standing in civil law，international law，nor Christian ethics； and when the war began，that violation of the comity of nations proved contagious.AngloAmerican leadership，in both speech and action，launched a crusade that admitted of neither legal nor territorial limits to the exercise of coercion.The concept of neutrality was denounced in both theory and practice.Not only enemy assets and interests，but the assets and interests of any parties whatsoever，even in neutral countries，were exposed to every constraint the belligerent pow ers could make effective； and the assets and interests of neutral states and their civilians，lodged in belligerent territories or under belligerent control，were subjected to practically the same sort of coercion as those of enemy nationals.Thus “total war” became a sort of war that no civilian community could hope to escape； and “peace loving nations” will draw the obvious inference.5

威廉-奥顿（William A.Orton）这样总结道：

19 世纪的战争是在国际法公认的传统范围内进行的，即平民财产和商业活动不属于战争范围。平民的财产不会被任意扣押或永久扣押，除了一个国家可能对另一个国家施加的领土和财政规定外，交战国的经济和文化生活通常都被允许得以继续。二十世纪的实践改变了这一切。在两次世界大战期间，无穷无尽的违禁品清单加上单方面的海事法声明，使各种商业活动岌岌可危，并使所有先例沦为废纸。第一次世界大战后，主要战败国的经济恢复受到有意的削弱，同时保留了一些民用财产。第二次世界大战将这一政策扩展到国际法几乎失效的地步。多年来，德国政府在其武力所及范围之内，一直将没收政策建立在种族理论的基础之上，而这一理论在民法、国际法和基督教伦理中都是站不住脚的。英美领导层在言论和行动上都发起了一场“圣战”，在实施强制手段时既不受法律限制，也不受领土范围限制。中立概念无论在理论上还是实践中都遭到了抨击。不仅敌方的资产和利益，而且任何一方的资产和利益，哪怕是在中立国家的，都面临着交战国能够施加的各种有效限制；而中立国家及其平民位于交战国领土内或处于交战国控制下的资产和利益，实际上也遭受着与敌国国民资产和利益相同类型的强制手段。于是，“总体战”成了一种任何平民群体都无望逃避的战争形式；而“热爱和平的国家”将会得出显而易见的推论。[170]

III. 附录：民主和平论

EXCURSUS：THE DOCTRIne OF DEMOCRATIC peace

I have explained how the institution of a state leads to war； why，seemingly paradoxical，internally liberal states tend to be imperialist powers； and how the spirit of democracy has contributed to the decivilization in the conduct of war。More specifically，I have explained the rise of the United States to the rank of the world’s foremost imperial power； and，as a consequence of its successive transformation from the early beginnings as an aristocratic republic into an unrestricted mass democracy which began with the War of Southern independence，the role of the United States as an increasingly arrogant，selfrighteous and zealous warmonger。

What appears to be standing in the way of peace and civilization，then，is above all the state and democracy，and specifically the world’s model democracy：the United States.Ironically if not surprisingly，however，it is precisely the United States which claims that it is the solution to the quest for peace.

那么，似乎阻碍和平与文明的，首先是国家和民主，尤其是世界民主的典范：美国。然而，令人啼笑皆非的是，恰恰是美国声称自己在寻求和平的解决方案。

The reason for this claim is the doctrine of democratic peace，which goes back to the days of Woodrow Wilson and World War I，has been revived in recent years by george W.Bush and his neoconservative advisors，and by now has become intellectual folklore even in liberallibertarian circles.The theory claims：

Democracies do not go to war against each other。
Hence，in order to create lasting peace，the entire world must be made democratic。

And as a—largely unstated—corollary：

Today，many states are not democratic and resist internal— democratic—reform.
Hence，war must be waged on those states in order to convert them to democracy and thus create lasting peace.

I do not have the patience for a fullblown critique of this theory。I shall merely provide a brief critique of the theory’s initial premise and its ultimate conclusion.

民主国家不会相互开战。
因此，为了创造持久的和平，整个世界都必须民主化。
当前许多国家并不民主，并且抵制内部的民主改革。
因此，必须对这些国家发动战争，将其转变为民主国家，从而创造持久和平。

我没有耐心对这一理论进行全面的批判，我只想对这一理论的初始前提和最终结论进行简要的批判。

First：Do democracies not go to war against each other？ Since almost no democracies existed before the 20th century the answer supposedly must be found within the last hundred years or so。In fact，the bulk of the evidence offered in favor of the thesis is the observation that the countries of Western Europe have not gone to war against each other in the post–World War II era.Likewise，in the Pacific region，Japan and South Korea have not warred against each other during the same period.Does this evidence prove the case？ The democraticpeace theorists think so。As “scientists” they are interested in “statistical” proof，and as they see it there are plenty of “cases” on which to build such proof：germany did not war against France，Italy，England，etc。； France did not war against Spain，Italy，belgium，etc。Moreover，there are permutations：germany did not attack France，nor did France attack germany，etc。Thus，we have seemingly dozens of confirmations—and that for some 60 years—and not a single counterexample.But do we really have so many confirming cases？

首先，民主国家之间是否不会发生战争？由于在20世纪之前几乎没有民主国家，这个问题的答案必须在过去一百年左右的时间里寻找。事实上，支持这一论点的主要证据是，西欧国家在二战后没有相互开战。同样，在太平洋地区，日本和韩国在同一时期也没有相互开战。这个证据是否真的证明了民主和平论的正确性？民主和平论者是这样认为的。作为 “科学家”，他们对 “统计”证据感兴趣，而在他们看来，有足够的“案例”来建立这种证明：德国没有与法国、意大利、英格兰等国开战；法国没有与西班牙、意大利、比利时等国开战。此外，还有一些排列组合：德国没有进攻法国，法国也没有进攻德国，等等。因此，我们似乎有几十个确证案例——就在大约60 年的时间里——并且没有一个反例。但是，我们真的有这么多确证案例吗？

The answer is no：we have actually no more than a single case at hand.with the end of World War II，essentially all of—by now，democratic— Western Europe （and democratic Japan and South Korea in the Pacific region） has become part of the U.S.Empire，as indicated by the presence of U.S.troops in practically all of these countries.What the post–World War II period of peace then “proves” is not that democracies do not go to war against each other but that a hegemonic，imperialist power such as the United States did not let its various colonial parts go to war against each other （and，of course，that the hegemon itself did not see any need to go to war against its satellites—because they obeyed—and they did not see the need or did not dare to disobey their master）。

答案是否定的：实际上我们手头只有一个案例。第二次世界大战结束后，基本上所有的西欧——现在是民主的西欧（以及太平洋地区民主的日本和韩国）——都已成为美帝国的一部分，美军驻扎在几乎所有这些国家就表明了这一点。第二次世界大战后的和平时期所 “证明 “的，不是民主国家之间不会相互开战，而是像美国这样的霸权帝国主义强国不会让其殖民地的各个部分相互开战（当然，霸权帝国本身也认为没有必要对其卫星国开战——因为它们服从——而卫星国也认为没有必要或不敢违抗其美国主子）。

Moreover，if matters are thus perceived—based on an understanding of history rather than the naïve belief that because one entity has a different name than another their behavior must be independent from one another—it becomes clear that the evidence presented has nothing to do with democracy and everything with hegemony。For instance，no war broke out between the end of World War II and the end of the 1980s，i.e.，during the hegemonic reign of the Soviet Union，between East germany，Poland，Czechoslovakia，Romania，Bulgaria，Lithuania，Estonia，Hungary，etc。Was this because these were communist dictatorships and communist dictatorships do not go to war against each other？ That would have to be the conclusion of “scientists” of the caliber of democraticpeace theorists! But surely this conclusion is wrong。No war broke out because the Soviet Union did not permit this to happen—just as no war between Western democracies broke out because the United States did not permit this to happen in its dominion.To be sure，the Soviet Union intervened in Hun gary and Czechoslovakia，but so did the United States at various occasions in Central America，such as in Guatemala for instance.（Incidentally：How about the wars between Israel and Palestine and lebanon？ Are not all these democracies？ Or are Arab countries ruled out by definition as undemocratic？）

此外，如果这样看待问题——基于对历史的理解，而不是天真地认为一个实体与另一个实体的名称不同，它们的行为就一定是相互独立的——那么很显然，所提供的证据与民主无关，而与霸权有关。例如，从第二次世界大战结束到 20 世纪 80 年代末，即在苏联霸权统治时期，东德、波兰、捷克斯洛伐克、罗马尼亚、保加利亚、立陶宛、爱沙尼亚、匈牙利等国之间之间没有爆发战争。这是因为这些国家是共产主义独裁国家，而共产主义独裁国家不会相互开战吗？这只能是民主和平论者这样的 “科学家 “得出的结论！但这个结论肯定是错误的。没有爆发战争是因为苏联不允许这种情况发生——正如西方民主国家之间的没有爆发战争是因为美国不允许这种情况在其统治范围内发生一样。当然，苏联在匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克进行过干预，但美国也在中美洲的不同地区进行过干预，例如在危地马拉。（顺便问一句：以色列与巴勒斯坦和黎巴嫩之间的战争呢？这些国家难道都不是民主国家吗？还是阿拉伯国家被定义为非民主国家而被排除在外？）

Second：What about democracy as a solution to anything，let alone peace？ Here the case of democraticpeace theorists appears even worse.Indeed，the lack of historical understanding displayed by them is truly frightening。Here are only some fundamental shortcomings：

其次，民主是否能解决任何问题？民主是否能解决和平问题？民主和平论者在这一点上的表现更是令人失望。事实上，他们所表现出的对历史理解的缺乏着实令人震惊。以下只是一些根本性的缺陷：

First，the theory involves a conceptual conflation of democracy and liberty （freedom） that can only be called scandalous，especially coming from selfproclaimed libertarians.The foundation and cornerstone of liberty is the institution of private property； and private—exclusive—property is logically incompatible with democracy—majority rule.Democracy has nothing to do with freedom.Democracy is a soft variant of communism，and rarely in the history of ideas has it been taken for anything else.Incidentally，before the outbreak of the democratic age，i.e.，until the beginning of the 20th century，government （state） taxexpenditures （combining all lev els of government） in Western European countries constituted somewhere between 7 and 15% of national product，and in the still young United States even less.less than a hundred years of fullblown majority rule have increased this percentage to about 50% in Europe and 40% in the United States.

首先，该理论在概念上混淆了民主与自由，这种混淆简直堪称恶劣，尤其这话出自那些自称自由意志主义者之口就更是如此了。自由的基础与基石是私有财产制度；而私有——排他性的——财产在逻辑上与民主——多数决规则——是不相容的。民主与自由毫无关联。民主是共产主义的一种温和变体，而且在思想史上，它几乎从未被当作别的什么来看待。顺便提一下，在民主时代爆发之前，也就是直至20世纪初，西欧国家的政府（国家）税收支出（将各级政府加总起来）大约占国民生产总值的7%到15%，而在当时还很年轻的美国，这一比例甚至更低，还不到7%。而在全面实行多数决规则还不到一百年的时间里，这一比例在欧洲已增至约50%，在美国也达到了40%。

Second，the theory of democratic peace distinguishes essentially only between democracy and nondemocracy，summarily labeled dictatorship.Thus not only do all aristocraticrepublican regimes disappear from view but，more importantly for my current purposes，so do all traditional monarchies.They are equated with dictatorships à la lenin，Mussolini，Hitler，Stalin，Mao。In fact，however，traditional monarchies have little in common with dictatorships （while democracy and dictatorship are intimately related）。

其次，民主和平论本质上仅对民主政体和非民主政体做出区分，一概将非民主政体简单地贴上独裁的标签。这样一来，不仅所有贵族共和政体被忽视了，而且就我当下的论述目的而言更为重要的是，所有传统君主制政体也被无视了。它们被等同于列宁、墨索里尼、希特勒、斯大林、毛式的独裁政权。然而，事实上传统君主制与独裁政权几乎没有共同之处（而民主与独裁却是密切相关的）。

Monarchies are the semiorganic outgrowth of hierarchically structured natural—stateless—social orders.Kings are the heads of extended families，of clans，tribes，and nations.They command a great deal of natural，voluntarily acknowledged authority，inherited and accumulated over many generations.It is within the framework of such orders （and of aristocratic republics） that liberalism first developed and flourished.In contrast，democracies are egalitarian and redistributionist in outlook； hence，the abovementioned growth of state power in the 20th century。Characteristically，the transition from the monarchical age to the democratic one，beginning in the second half of the 19th century，has seen a continuous decline in the strength of liberal parties and a corresponding strengthening of socialists of all stripes.

君主制是等级结构的自然-无国家-社会秩序的半有机产物。君主是大家族、氏族、部落和国家的首领。他们拥有大量自然的、自愿承认的权威，这些权威是世世代代继承和积累下来的。自由主义正是在这种秩序（以及贵族共和国）的框架内发展和繁荣起来的。与此相反，民主政体具有平等主义和再分配主义的观念，因此在 20 世纪出现了上述国家权力增长的现象。从 19 世纪下半叶开始，从君主制时代向民主制时代过渡的典型特点是，自由主义政党的力量不断衰退，而各种社会主义政党的力量则相应增强。

Third，it follows from this that the view democraticpeace theorists have of conflagrations such as World War I must be considered grotesque，at least from the point of view of someone allegedly valuing freedom.For them，this war was essentially a war of democracy against dictatorship； hence，by increasing the number of democracies，it was a progressive，peaceenhancing，and ultimately justified war。

第三，由此可见，民主和平论者对第一次世界大战等战乱的看法显得十分荒谬，至少从一个所谓珍视自由的人的角度来看是如此。对民主和平论者而言，这场战争本质上是一场民主对抗独裁的战争；因此，通过增加民主国家的数量，这场战争被视为一种进步的、促进和平的终归也是一场具有正当性的战争。

In fact，matters are very different。To be sure，prewar germany and Austria may not have qualified as democratic as England，France，or the United States at the time.But germany and Austria were definitely not dictatorships.They were （increasingly emasculated） monarchies and as such arguably as liberal—if not more so—than their counterparts.For instance，in the United States，antiwar proponents were jailed，the german language was essentially outlawed，and citizens of german descent were openly harassed and often forced to change their names.Nothing comparable occurred in Austria and germany。

事实上，情况大不相同。当然，战时的德国和奥地利可能不像当时的英国、法国或美国那样民主。但德国和奥地利绝对不是独裁国家。这些国家都是（日益被阉割的）君主制国家，因此可以说与其同类国家一样自由，甚至更加自由。例如，在美国，反战支持者被关进监狱，德语基本上被取缔，德裔公民受到公开骚扰，经常被迫改名。在奥地利和德国没有发生过类似的情况。

In any case，however，the result of the crusade to make the world safe for democracy was less liberal than what had existed before （and the versailles peace dictate precipitated World War II）。Not only did state power grow faster after the war than before.In particular，the treatment of minorities deteriorated in the democratized post–World War I period.In newly founded Czecho slovakia，for instance，the germans were Systematically mistreated （until they were finally expelled by the millions and butchered by the tens of thousands after World War II） by the majority Czechs.Nothing remotely comparable had happened to the Czechs during the previous Habsburg reign.The situa tion regarding the relations between germans and southern Slavs in prewar Austria versus postwar Yugoslavia respectively was similar。

Nor was this a fluke.As under the Habsburg monarchy in Austria，for instance，minorities had also been treated fairly well under the Ottomans.However，when the multicultural Ottoman Empire disintegrated in the course of the 19th century and was replaced by semidemocratic nationstates such as Greece，Bulgaria，etc。，the existing Ottoman Muslims were expelled or exter minated.Similarly，after democracy had triumphed in the United States with the military conquest of the Southern Confederacy，the Union government quickly proceeded to exterminate the Plains indians.As Mises had recognized，democracy does not work in multiethnic societies.It does not create peace but promotes conflict and has potentially genocidal tendencies.

这并非侥幸。例如，在奥地利哈布斯堡君主制时期，少数民族在奥斯曼帝国统治下也得到了相当好的待遇。然而，当多元文化的奥斯曼帝国在 19 世纪解体，取而代之的是希腊、保加利亚等半民主民族国家时，当时的奥斯曼穆斯林被驱逐或消灭了。同样，民主在美国取得胜利，军事征服了南方邦联之后，联邦政府迅速着手消灭平原的印第安人。正如米塞斯所解释的，民主在多民族社会行不通。它不会创造和平，反而只会助长冲突，并具有潜在的种族灭绝倾向。

Fourth，and intimately related，the democraticpeace theorists claim that democracy represents a stable “equilibrium.” This has been expressed most clearly by Francis Fukuyama，who labeled the new democratic world order as the “end of history。” However，overwhelming evidence exists that this claim is patently wrong。

第四，与此密切相关的是，民主和平论者声称民主代表了一种稳定的“均衡”。这一观点由弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）最为明确地表达，他将新的民主世界秩序称为“历史的终结”。然而，已有大量证据表明，这一主张显然是错误的。

on theoretical grounds：How can democracy be a stable equilibrium if it is possible that it be transformed democratically into a dictatorship，i.e.，a System that is considered not stable？ Answer：that makes no sense!

从理论层面来看：如果民主有可能通过民主的方式转变成独裁，也就是转变成一种被认为不稳定的体制，那么民主又怎么能是一种稳定的均衡呢？答案是：这根本说不通！

Moreover，empirically democracies are anything but stable.As indicated，in multicultural societies democracy regularly leads to the discrimination，oppression，or even expulsion and extermination of minorities—hardly a peaceful equilibrium.And in ethnically homogeneous societies，democracy regularly leads to class warfare，which leads to economic crisis，which leads to dictatorship.Think，for example，of postCzarist Russia，post–World War I Italy，Weimar germany，Spain，Portugal，and in more recent times Greece，Turkey，Guatemala，Argentina，Chile，and Pakistan.

此外，从经验层面来看，民主根本谈不上稳定。如前所述，在多元文化社会中，民主往往会导致对少数群体的歧视、压迫，甚至驱逐和灭绝——这很难说是一种和平的均衡状态。而在种族同质化的社会中，民主常常引发阶级斗争，阶级斗争进而导致经济危机，经济危机又会引发独裁。例如，想想沙俄之后的俄国、一战后的意大利、魏玛德国、西班牙、葡萄牙，以及更近一些时候的希腊、土耳其、危地马拉、阿根廷、智利和巴基斯坦的情况吧。

Not only is this close correlation between democracy and dictatorship troublesome for democraticpeace theorists；worse，they must come to grips with the fact that the dictatorships emerging from crises of democracy are by no means always worse，from a classical liberal or libertarian view，than what would have resulted otherwise.cases can be easily cited where dicta torships were preferable and an improvement。Think of Italy and Mussolini or Spain and Franco。In addition，how is one to square the starryeyed advocacy of democracy with the fact that dictators，quite unlike kings who owe their rank to an accident of birth，are often favorites of the masses and in this sense highly democratic？ Just think of lenin or Stalin，who were cer tainly more democratic than Czar Nicholas II； or think of Hitler，who was definitely more democratic and a “man of the people” than Kaiser Wilhelm II or Kaiser Franz Joseph.

民主与独裁之间的这种紧密关联不仅让民主和平论者感到棘手；更糟糕的是，他们必须正视这样一个事实，即从古典自由主义或自由意志主义的观点来看，因民主危机而产生的独裁政权并不总是比原本可能出现的情况更糟。很容易就能列举出一些独裁政权更可取且有所改善的例子。想想意大利与墨索里尼或者西班牙与佛朗哥的情况吧。此外，既然独裁者与因出身偶然因素而获得地位的国王截然不同，他们往往是民众的宠儿，从这个意义上来说是高度 “民主” 的，那么人们又该如何将对民主那种充满幻想的倡导与这一事实相协调呢？只要想想列宁或斯大林，他们肯定比沙皇尼古拉二世更 “民主”；或者想想希特勒，他无疑比德皇威廉二世或奥匈帝国皇帝弗朗茨・约瑟夫更 “民主”，更算得上是 “人民的一员”。

According to democraticpeace theorists，then，it would seem that we are supposed to war against foreign dictators，whether kings or demagogues，in order to install democracies，which then turn into （modern） dictator ships，until finally，one supposes，the United States itself has turned into a dictatorship，owing to the growth of internal state power which results from the endless “emergencies” engendered by foreign wars.

根据民主和平论者的观点，那么似乎我们应该对外与独裁者（无论是君主还是蛊惑民心的政客）开战，以便建立民主政权，而这些民主政权随后又会转变为（现代）独裁政权，直至最后，人们可以设想，由于对外战争引发的没完没了的 “紧急状况” 导致国内国家权力不断膨胀，美国自身也会变成一个独裁国家。。

better，I dare say，to heed the advice of Erik von Kuehneltleddihn and，instead of aiming to make the world safe for democracy，we try making it safe from democracy—everywhere，but most importantly in the United States.

IV. 让世界远离民主而安全，或如何抵御美国

MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FROM DEMOCRACY OR：How TO DEFEND oneSELF againST THE UNIteD STAteS

After this excursion into the theory of democratic peace I am back to the proposition that there is no greater threat to lasting peace than the democratic state，and in particular the United States.Thus the question is：how to defend oneself against the U.S.

在对民主和平论进行了一番探讨之后，我又回到了这样一个命题：对持久和平的最大威胁莫过于民主国家，尤其是美国。因此，问题是：如何抵御美国？

Incidentally，this is not only a question for foreigners but Americans as well。After all，the territory constituting the U.S.too is occupied territory—conquered by the U.S.government。

顺便提一下，这不仅是外国人的问题，也是美国人的问题。毕竟，构成美国的这片领土也是被占的领土——被美国政府征服的领土。

let us assume，then，that a small territory within the borders of the current U.S.—a village，a town，a county—declares its independence and secedes from the U.S.What can and will the U.S.do in response？

让我们假设，美国境内的一小块领土——一个村、一个镇、一个县——宣布独立并脱离美国。美国政府能够并且将会采取什么应对措施？

It is possible that the U.S.will invade the territory and crush the secessionists.This is what the French republic did to the vendée during the French revolution，what the Union did to the Confederacy，and on a much smaller scale，what the U.S.government did in Waco。But history also provides examples to the contrary：the Czechs and Slovaks separated peacefully，Russia let Lithuania，Estonia and Latvia go； the Slovenes were let go； Singapore was even expelled from a previous union with Malaysia.Obviously，the relative population size matters in the decision to war or not to war。Likewise it matters what resources are at the secessionists’ disposal。Also the geographical location can weigh in favor oragainst intervention.But this cannot be all。For how is one to explain，for instance，that France has not long ago conquered Monaco，or germany Luxemburg，or Switzerland Liechtenstein，or Italy Vatican City，or theU.S.Costa Rica？ Or how is one to explain that the U.S.does not “finish the job” in Iraq by simply killing all Iraqis.Surely，in terms of population，technology and geography such are manageable tasks.

美国有可能入侵相关地区并镇压分裂势力。法国大革命期间法兰西共和国对旺代地区就是这么做的，美国联邦政府对南部邦联也是如此，而从规模小得多的情况来看，美国政府在韦科镇事件中也是这么干的。但历史上也有相反的例子：捷克和斯洛伐克和平分离，俄罗斯任由立陶宛、爱沙尼亚和拉脱维亚独立；斯洛文尼亚被准许独立；新加坡甚至是被从之前与马来西亚组成的联邦中分离了出去。显然，相对人口规模在决定是否开战的问题上起着重要作用。同样，分裂势力所掌握的资源情况也很关键。地理位置也会对是否进行干预产生影响。但这肯定不是全部因素。例如，该如何解释法国很久以前没有征服摩纳哥，德国没有征服卢森堡，瑞士没有征服列支敦士登，意大利没有征服梵蒂冈城，美国没有征服哥斯达黎加呢？又或者如何解释美国没有通过杀光所有伊拉克人来“彻底解决”伊拉克问题呢？当然，就人口、技术和地理位置而言，这些（征服行动）本应是可以做到的事。

The reason is not that French，german，Swiss，Italian or U.S.state rulers have scruples against conquest，confiscation，and the imprisonment or killing of innocents—they do these things on a daily basis to their “own” population.Bush，for instance，has no compunction ordering to kill innocent Iraqis.He does so every day。Rather，what constrains the conduct of state rulers is public opinion.

原因并不是法国、德国、瑞士、意大利或美国的国家统治者忌惮征服、没收、监禁或滥杀无辜——他们每天都在对 “自己 “的人民做这些事。例如，布什毫不犹豫地下令杀害无辜的伊拉克人。他每天都这样做。相反，制约国家统治者行为的是公众舆论。

As La Boétie，Hume，Mises and Rothbard have explained，government power ultimately rests on opinion，not brute force.Bush does not himself kill or put a gun to the head of those he orders to kill。generals and soldiers follow his orders on their own.Nor can Bush “force” anyone to continue providing him with the funds needed for his aggression.The citizenry must do so on its own.on the other hand，if the majority of generals，soldiers and citizens stop believing in the legitimacy of Bush’s commands，his commands turn into nothing more than hot air。It is this need for legitimacy that explains why state governments itching to go to war must offer a reason.The public is not typically in favor of killing innocent bystanders for fun or profit。Rather，in order to enlist the public’s assistance “evidence” must be manipulated so as to make aggression appear as defense （for what reasonable person could be against defense）。

正如拉伯蒂（La Boétie）、休谟、米塞斯和罗斯巴德所阐释的那样，政府权力归根结底依赖于民意，而非武力。布什本人并不会去杀人，也不会拿枪顶着那些他下令去杀之人的脑袋。将军们和士兵们是自愿听从他的命令的。而且布什也无法“强迫”任何人继续为他的侵略行径提供所需资金。民众必须是自愿这么做的。另一方面，如果大多数将军、士兵和民众不再相信布什命令的合法性，那么他的命令就不过是一纸空文而已。正是这种对合法性的需求解释了为什么急于发动战争的国家政府必须给出一个理由。公众通常并不赞成为了乐趣或利益而杀害无辜的旁观者。相反，为了争取公众的支持，必须操纵 “证据”，使侵犯看起来像是自卫（有哪个通情达理的人会反对自卫）。

We know the catchwords：Fort Sumter，the U.S.S.Maine，the Lusitania，Pearl Harbor，9–11。

我们知道这些标志性事件：萨姆特要塞、美国海军 “梅因”号战舰、”卢西塔尼亚 “号邮轮、珍珠港事件、9·11事件。

It thus turns out that not even an overwhelming size advantage is deci sive in determining the course of action.That David Koresh and his followers in Waco could be brutally killed by the U.S.government was due to the fact that they could be portrayed as a bunch of child molesters.Had they been “normal people” an invasion might have been considered a public relations disaster。Moreover，regardless of whatever disadvantage the secessionists have in terms of size，resources or location，this can be made up by a favorable international public opinion，especially in the internet age when the spread of news is almost instantaneous.

事实证明，即使是压倒性的规模优势也不能决定行动的方向。大卫-科雷什（David Koresh）和他在韦科的同伙之所以能被美国政府残忍杀害，是因为他们可以被描绘成一群儿童性骚扰者。如果他们是 “正常人”，入侵可能会被认为是一场公关灾难。此外，无论分离主义者在规模、资源或位置上处于何种劣势，都可以通过有利的国际舆论来弥补，尤其是在新闻传播几乎是即时的互联网时代。

These considerations bring me to the final points.The new secessionist country can be another state or it can be a free，stateless society。I will argue that the likelihood of successful defense against U.S.aggression is higher if the secessionists form a stateless society than if they opt for another state； for whether large or small，states are good at aggression and bad at defense.（Granting，maybe prematurely，that the U.S.had nothing to do with 9–11 directly，the events of that day certainly show that the U.S.was not good at defending its own citizens：first，by provoking the attacks and，secondly，in having its population disarmed and defenseless visàvis boxcutter wield ing foreign invaders.）

这些考虑引出了最后的观点。新的分离主义国家可以是另一个国家，也可以是一个无国家的自由社会。我认为，如果分离主义者组成一个无国家的社会，成功抵御美国侵略的可能性要高于他们选择另一个国家；因为国家无论大小，都擅长于侵犯，而不擅长于防御。（承认美国与 “9-11 “事件没有直接关系，这可能为时过早，但当天发生的事件无疑表明，美国并不善于保护自己的公民：首先，它挑起了袭击，其次，在面对挥舞着屠刀的外国侵略者时，美国民众被解除武装、手无寸铁）。

How would the defense of a free society differ from that of a state？

自由社会的防御与国家政府的国防有何不同？

As explained，the likelihood of an attack depends essentially on the ease of manipulating the evidence so as to camouflage aggression as defense— and to “discover” such evidence is much easier in the case of a state.Even the most liberal state has a monopoly of jurisdiction and taxation and thus cannot but create victims who，properly stylized as “victims of human rights violations，” may provide the “excuse” for an invasion.Worse，if the new state is a democracy it is unavoidable that one group—the Catholics or the Protestants，the Shiites or the sunnis，the Whites or the Blacks—will use its power to dominate another—and again there exists an “excuse” for invasion：to “free an oppressed minority。” better still：the oppressed are incited to “cry out” for help.Moreover，in reaction to domestic oppression terrorists may grow up who try to “revenge” the injustice：just think of the red Brigades，the RAF，the IRA，the ETA—and both：their continued existence as well as the attempt of eradicating them may provide “reason” to intervene （to pre vent the spread of terrorism or to come to the rescue of freedom fighters）。In contrast，in a free society only private property owners and firms，including insurers，police，and arbitrators，exist。If there are any aggressions，they are those of criminals—of murderers，rapists，burglars，and plain frauds—and it is difficult to portray the treatment of criminals as criminals as a reason for an invasion.

如前所述，攻击的可能性主要取决于操纵证据的难易程度，以便将侵略伪装成防御——而 “发现 ”这种证据对于国家来说要容易得多。即使是最自由的国家也垄断了管辖权和征税权，因此也会产生受害者，而这些受害者被恰当地称为 “人权受侵犯的受害者”，从而为入侵提供了 “借口”。更糟糕的是，如果新国家是一个民主国家，那么不可避免的是，一个群体——天主教徒或新教徒、什叶派教徒或逊尼派教徒、白人或黑人——将利用自己的权力统治另一个群体，这又为入侵提供了 “借口”：“解放受压迫的少数群体”。更妙的是：受压迫者被煽动起来 “大声呼救”。此外，在国内压迫的反作用下，可能会滋生出试图 “报复 “不公正的恐怖分子：想想红色旅、红军派、爱尔兰共和军、埃塔这些组织吧——而且无论是它们的持续存在，还是试图消灭它们的行动，都可能为我们提供干预的 “理由”（防止恐怖主义蔓延或拯救自由战士）。

What if the attack does occur？ in that case it might well be best to give up quickly，especially if the secessionist territory is very small。Thus Mogens Glistrup，founder of the Danish Progress Party，once recommended that the defense Department of tiny Denmark be replaced with an answering machine announcing （to the Russians） that “we surrender。” This way，no destruction occurs and yet the reputation of the invading government as a “defender and promoter of liberty” is soiled forever。

要是攻击真的发生了该怎么办呢？在那种情况下，或许最好迅速投降，尤其是当要求分离的地区面积非常小的时候。因此，丹麦进步党创始人摩根斯·格利斯楚普（Mogens Glistrup）曾建议，面积狭小的丹麦的国防部可以用一台答录机来取代，（向俄罗斯人）宣告“我们投降”。这样一来，就不会有破坏发生，而且入侵政府作为“自由捍卫者和推动者”的声誉将永远被玷污。

This leads to our central question regarding the effectiveness of states versus free societies in matters of defense.As a monopolist of ultimate deci sionmaking，the state decides for everyone bindingly whether to resist or not； if to resist，whether in the form of civil disobedience，armed resistance or some combination thereof； and if armed resistance，of what form.If it decides to put up no resistance，this may be a wellmeaning decision or it may be the result of bribes or threats by the invading state—but in any case，it will be contrary to the will of many who would have liked to resist and who are thus put in double jeopardy because as resisters they now disobey their own state as well as the invader。on the other hand，if the state decides to resist，this again may be a wellmeaning decision or it may be the result of pride or fear—but in any case，it too will be contrary to the preferences of many who would have liked not to resist or to resist by different means and who are now entangled as accomplices in the state’s schemes and subjected to the same collateral fallout and victor’s justice as everyone else.

这就引出了我们的核心问题，即国家与自由社会在国防安保问题上的有效性。作为终极决策权的垄断者，国家会对所有人作出有约束力的决定，决定是否抵抗；如果抵抗，是以公民不服从、武装抵抗还是两者相结合的形式；如果是武装抵抗，又该采取何种形式。如果国家决定不抵抗，这可能是一个善意的决定，也可能是受到入侵国贿赂或威胁的结果 ——但无论如何，这都将违背许多本想抵抗之人的意愿，而这些人因此陷入了双重困境，因为作为抵抗者，他们现在既要违抗本国的决定，又要面对侵略者。另一方面，如果国家决定抵抗，这也可能是一个善意的决定，也可能是骄傲或恐惧的结果–但无论如何，这也将违背许多人的意愿，他们本不想抵抗或以不同的方式抵抗，但现在却作为共犯卷入了国家的阴谋，要和其他人一样承受同样的附带损害以及战胜者的所谓 “正义”裁决。

The reaction of a free territory is distinctly different。There is no government which makes one decision.Instead，there are numerous institutions and individuals who choose their own defense strategy，each in accordance with his own risk assessment。Consequently，the aggressor has far more difficulties conquering the territory。It is no longer sufficient to “know” the government，to win one decisive battle or to gain control of government headquarters.Even if one opponent is “known，” one battle is won or one defense agency defeated，this has no bearing on others.

一个自由地区的反应截然不同。这里没有作出统一决策的政府。相反，有众多机构和个人会依据各自的风险评估来选择各自的防御策略。因此，侵略者要征服这片地区会困难得多。仅仅“了解”政府、打赢一场决定性战役或者控制政府总部已经远远不够了。即便了解了某个对手、赢得了一场战斗或者击败了一家防卫机构，这对其他机构和个人也不会产生影响。

Moreover，the multitude of command structures and strategies as well as the contractual character of a free society affect the conduct of both armed and unarmed resistance.As for the former，in stateterritories the civilian population is typically unarmed and heavy reliance exists on regular，taxanddraftfunded armies and conventional warfare.Hence，the defense forces create enemies even among its own citizenry，which the aggressor state can use to its own advantage，and in any case there is little to fear of the aggressor once the regular army is defeated.In contrast，the population of free territories is likely heavily armed and the fighting done by irregular militias led by defense professionals and in the form of gue rilla or partisan warfare.All fighters are volunteers and all of their sup port：food，shelter，logistical help，etc。，is voluntary。Hence，guerrillas must be extremely friendly to their own population.But precisely this：their entirely defensive character and nearunanimous support in public opin ion can render them nearly invincible，even by numerically far superior invading armies.History provides numerous examples：Napoleon’s defeat in Spain，France’s defeat in Algeria，the U.S.defeat in Vietnam，Israel’s defeat in South lebanon.

此外，众多的指挥结构与战略以及自由社会的契约性质，会对武装和非武装抵抗的行动产生影响。就前者（武装抵抗）而言，在国家统治的地区，平民百姓通常手无寸铁，高度依赖依靠税收和征兵来维持的正规军队以及常规战争形式。因此，国防部队甚至会在本国公民中树敌，而侵略国可以利用这一点为自己谋利，而且无论如何，一旦正规军被击败，对侵略者就没什么可惧怕的了。相比之下，自由地区的民众很可能是全副武装的，战斗是由防卫专业人员领导的非正规民兵进行的，并且采取游击战或游击式作战的形式。所有参战人员都是志愿者，他们所获得的所有支持——食物、住所、后勤援助等等——也都是自愿提供的。因此，游击队员必须对本地区民众极为友好。但恰恰是这一点——他们完全的防御性质以及在民意方面近乎一致的支持，能让他们几乎坚不可摧，即便面对在人数上远超自己的入侵军队也是如此。历史上有诸多这样的例子：拿破仑在西班牙的战败、法国在阿尔及利亚的战败、美国在越南的战败以及以色列在南黎巴嫩的战败。

This consideration leads immediately to the other form of defense：civil disobedience.Provided only that the secessionists have the will to be free，the effectiveness of this strategy can hardly be overestimated.recall that power does not rest alone on brute force but must rely on “opinion.” The conquerors cannot put one man next to each secessionist and force him to obey their orders.The secessionists must obey by their own freewill。However，if they do not，the conquerors will fail。Most importantly：civil disobedience can occur in many forms and degrees.It can range from ostentatious acts of defiance to entirely unobtrusive ways，thus allowing almost everyone to participate in the defense effort：the courageous and the timid，the young and the old，leaders and followers.one may hide armed fighters or not hinder them.one may publicly refuse to obey certain laws，or evade and ignore them.one may engage in sabotage，obstruction，negligence，or simply display a lack of diligence.one may openly scoff at orders or comply only incompletely。Tax payments may be refused or evaded.There may be demonstrations，sitins，boycotts，workstoppages or plain slackingoff。The conquerors may be maltreated，molested，ridiculed，laughed at or simply ostracized and never assisted in anything。In any case：all of this contributes to the same result：to render the conquerors powerless，make them despair and finally resign and withdraw.

这一考量会立刻引出另一种防御形式：公民不服从。只要分离主义者有追求自由的意愿，那么这种策略的有效性怎么高估都不为过。回想一下，权力并非仅仅依靠野蛮的暴力，而是必须依赖“民意”。征服者没办法在每一个分离主义者身边都安排一个人，然后强迫其服从命令。分离主义者必须是出于自愿而服从。然而，如果他们不服从，征服者就会失败。最为重要的是：公民不服从可以有多种形式和程度。它可以从公然的反抗行动到完全不引人注目的方式，这样几乎所有人都能参与到防御行动中来：勇敢者与胆小者、年轻人与老年人、领导者与追随者都能参与。有人可以藏匿武装战斗人员或者不妨碍他们；有人可以公开拒绝遵守某些法律，或者逃避、无视这些法律；有人可以进行破坏、阻挠、消极怠工，或者仅仅表现出不够勤勉；有人可以公开嘲笑命令，或者只是不完全遵照执行。可以拒绝或逃避纳税。可以举行示威、静坐、抵制、罢工或者就是消极怠工。可以虐待、骚扰、嘲弄、讥笑征服者，或者干脆孤立他们，在任何事情上都不给予协助。无论如何，所有这些都会促成同一个结果：让征服者变得无能为力，使他们绝望，最终放弃并撤军。

As is often the case，the first step in the antiimperialistantidemocratic struggle is the most difficult。Indeed，the difficulties are enormous.once the first step has been successfully taken，however，things get successively easier。once the number of secessionist territories has reached a critical mass—and every success in one location will promote imitation by other localities—the difficulties of crushing the secessionists will increase exponentially。In fact，the more time passes the greater will the comparative economic and technological advantage of free territories become，and in light of the ever increasing attractiveness and economic opportunities offered by the free territories the imperialist powers will be increasingly happy if they can hang on to their power rather than risk whatever legitimacy they still have in an attack。

通常情况下，反帝反民主斗争的第一步是最艰难的。事实上，困难重重。然而，一旦成功迈出了第一步，随后的事情就会逐渐变得容易。一旦分离主义地区的数量达到了一个临界规模——而且一个地方取得的每一次成功都会促使其他地方效仿——镇压分离主义者的难度就会呈指数级增加。事实上，随着时间推移，自由地区在经济和技术方面的相对优势会越发明显，鉴于自由地区所提供的吸引力和经济机遇与日俱增，帝国主义列强会越发乐见保有自己的权力，而非冒着丧失现有合法性的风险发动攻击。

Economic Theory

第三辑经济学理论

16 关于确定性和不确定性*

on certainty and uncertainty

The honest historicist would have to say：Nothing can be asserted about the future.

—Ludwig von Mises1

诚实的历史主义者会说：关于未来，没有什么是可以断言的。

——路德维希·冯·米塞斯[171]

The future is to all of us unknowable.

—Ludwig Lachmann 2

未来对我们所有人来说都是不可知的。

——路德维希-拉赫曼[172]

I.

It is possible to imagine a world characterized by complete certainty。All future events and changes would be known in advance and could be predicted precisely。There would be no errors and no surprises.We would know all of our future actions and their exact outcomes.In such a world，nothing could be learned，and accordingly，nothing would be worth knowing。Indeed，the possession of consciousness and knowledge would be useless.For why would anyone want to know anything if all future actions and events were completely predetermined and it would not make any difference for the future course of events whether or not one possessed this or any knowledge？ Our actions would be like those of an automaton—and an automaton has no need of any knowledge.Thus，rather than representing a state of perfect knowledge，complete certainty actually eliminates the value of all knowledge.

我们可以设想一个完全确定的世界。所有未来的事件和变化都能提前知晓并被精准预测。不会有差错，也不会有意外情况。我们会清楚自己未来的所有行动以及它们的确切结果。在这样一个世界里，人们无从学习新东西，相应地，也就没有什么值得去了解的了。事实上，拥有意识和知识将毫无用处。因为如果所有未来的行动和事件都完全是预先确定好的，而一个人是否拥有这些知识或任何知识对未来事件的进程都没有任何影响，那又有谁会想要去了解任何事物呢？我们的行动会如同自动机器一般——而自动机器不需要任何知识。因此，完全确定性非但不代表一种完美知识的状态，实际上还消除了所有知识的价值。

Obviously，we do not inhabit a world of complete certainty。We cannot predict all of our future actions and their outcome.There are in our world surprises.Our knowledge of future events and outcomes is less than perfect。

显然，我们并不生活在一个完全确定的世界里。我们无法预测我们未来的所有行为及其结果。我们的世界总有惊喜。我们对未来事件和结果的了解并不完美。

We make errors，can distinguish between failure and success，and are capable of learning。Unlike for an automaton，for us knowledge is valuable.To know something or not makes a difference.knowledge is not of predetermined events and states of affairs，but knowledge of how to interfere with and divert the natural course of events so as to improve our subjective wellbeing。knowledge does not help us predict an unalterable course of events but is a tool of purposefully changing and hopefully bettering future outcomes and events.Our actions，unlike the operations of an automaton，are not a series of predetermined events，which the knower cannot influence and with respect to whose outcome he is indifferent。Rather，our actions are sequences of decisions （choices） of altering the predetermined course of events to our advantage.We are never neutral or indifferent toward the course of future events.Instead，we always prefer one course of events to another，and we use our knowledge to bring about our preferences.For us，knowledge is practical and effective，and while it is imperfect and subject to error，it is the only means of achieving human betterment。

我们会犯错，能够区分成功与失败，并且具备学习的能力。与自动机器不同，对我们来说，知识是有价值的。是否知道某件事情，结果是不同的。知识不是关于预先确定的事件和事物的知识，而是关于如何干预和改变事件的自然进程，从而改善我们的主观幸福感。知识并不能帮助我们预测不可改变的事件进程，而是一种有目的地改变并希望改善未来结果和事件的工具。我们的行动与自动机器的运行不同，不是一系列预先确定的事件，知者无法影响这些事件，也对其结果漠不关心。相反，我们的行动是一系列的决定（选择），这些决定（选择）改变了预定的事件进程，使其对我们有利。对于未来事件的发展，我们从不保持中立或漠不关心。相反，我们总是更偏好某一种事件进程，而非另外一种，我们用我们的知识来实现我们的偏好。对我们来说，知识是真实有效的，虽然它是不完美的、也是容易出错的，但它是实现人类进步的唯一手段。

II.

From the recognition of the fact that perfect foresight eliminates the very need of knowing and knowers，and that such a need only arises if，as in our world，foresight is less than perfect，and insofar as knowledge is a means of bringing about preferences，it does not follow that everything is uncertain.Quite to the contrary。In a world where everything is certain，the idea of certainty would not even come into existence.The idea of certain knowledge requires，as its logical counterpart，the idea of uncertainty。certainty is defined in contrast to uncertainty，and not everything can be certain.Likewise，uncertainty cannot be defined without reference to certainty，and not all knowledge can be uncertain.It is this latter part of one and the same conclusion which critics of the model of perfect foresight，such as Ludwig Lachmann，have failed to recognize.From the correct insight that we do not inhabit a world of perfect knowledge it does not follow that we live in a world of perfect uncertainty； i.e.，in a world with no certainty at all，and from the fact that I cannot predict all of my and others’ future actions it does not follow that I can say nothing at all about them.In fact，even if I do not know everything about my future actions，for instance，I do know something to be true about each and every one of them：that I will，as long as I act，employ my knowledge to interfere in the natural course of events so as to—hopefully—bring about a more preferable state of affairs.

我们认识到，完美的预见消除了对知识和知者的需要，只有在我们的世界中，预见不那么完美时，才会产生这种需要，而知识是产生偏好的一种手段，这并不意味着一切都是不确定的。恰恰相反，在一个一切都确定无疑的世界里，确定性的概念甚至都不会出现。“确定性”知识的概念需要 “不确定性”的概念作为其逻辑对应物。”确定性 “是相对于 “不确定性 “而言的，而并非所有事物都是确定的。同样，不确定性也不能在不参考确定性的情况下定义，而且并非所有知识都是不确定的。路德维希·拉赫曼（Ludwig Lachmann）等完美预见模型的批评者未能认识到的正是这一结论的后一部分。从我们并不生活在一个完美知识的世界这一正确观点出发，并不能推导出我们生活在一个完全不确定的世界中；也就是说，生活在一个完全没有确定性的世界中，而且从我无法预测自己和他人的所有未来行动这一事实出发，并不能推导出我对他们一无所知。事实上，即使我不知道我未来行动的一切，例如，我确实知道关于每一个行动的一些真实情况：只要我行动，我就会运用我的知识来干预事件的自然进程，以便——希望——带来一种更可取的事态。

Later on，more will be said about the importance of this insight。But it is worth emphasizing from the outset that the idea of perfect or radical uncertainty （or ignorance） is either openly contradictory insofar as it is meant to say，“everything about the future is uncertain except that there will be uncertainty—about this we are certain，” or it entails an implicit contradiction if it is meant to say，“everything is uncertain and that there is nothing but uncertainty，is uncertain，too。” （I do know such and such to be the case，and I do not know whether such and such is the case or not。） only a middleoftheroad position between the two extremes of perfect knowledge and perfect ignorance is consistently defensible：3 There exists uncertainty but this we know for certain.Hence，also certainty exists，and the boundary between certain and uncertain knowledge is certain （based on certain knowledge）。

稍后，将会更多地谈及这一见解的重要性。但从一开始就值得强调的是，完全不确定性（或无知）这一概念要么是公然自相矛盾的，因为它意在表明“关于未来的一切都是不确定的，除了存在不确定性这一点——对此我们是确定的”；要么它隐含着矛盾，因为它的本意是说，“一切都是不确定的，除了不确定之外什么都没有，连不确定也是不确定的。”（我确实知道某事是这样的情况，而且我也确实不知道某事是否是这样的情况。）只有介于全知和全无知这两个极端之间的折衷立场，才始终是站得住脚的。[173]不确定性是存在的，但我们可以确定这一点。因此，确定性也是存在的，确定知识与不确定知识之间的界限是确定的（基于确定的知识）。

III.

Nothing about the external，physical world is or can be known with certainty—except for those rather abstract but universal and real things that are already implied in the certain knowledge of acting and action：that this must be a world of objects and objectqualities （predicates），of countable units，physical magnitudes，and quantitative determinateness （causality）。without objects and objectqualities there can be no such thing as propositions； without countable units there can be no arithmetic； and without quantitative determinateness the fact that definite quantities of causes only bring about definite （limited） effects—there can be no ends and means （goods），i.e.，no active interference in the course of external events with the purpose of bringing about a more highlyvalued end （preferred effect）。Apart from the laws of propositional logic，arithmetic，and causality，however，all other knowledge about the external world is uncertain （a posteriori）。We do not and cannot know with certainty （a priori） what kinds of objects and object qualities exist，how many units of what physical dimensions there are， and what quantitative causeandeffect relationships exist （or do not exist） between various magnitudes of various objects.All of this must be learned from experience E.Moreover，experience is invariably past experience，that of past events.It cannot reveal whether or not the facts and relationships of the past will also hold in the future.We cannot but assume that this will be the case，by and large.But it cannot be ruled out categorically that we might be mistaken，and that the future will be so different from the past that all of our past knowledge will be entirely useless.It is possible that none of our instruments or machines will work anymore tomorrow，that our houses will collapse on top of us，that the earth will open up，and that all of us will perish.It is in this sense that our knowledge of the external physical world must be ultimately regarded as uncertain.

关于外部的物质世界，没有任何事物能够被确定地知晓——除了那些相当抽象但具有普遍性且真实存在的事物，它们已然隐含在对行为及行动的确定认知之中：这必定是一个由物体及物体属性（谓词）、可数单位、物理量以及定量确定性（因果关系）所构成的世界。没有物体及物体属性，就不会有命题这一事物；没有可数单位，就不会有算术；没有定量确定性，即一定量的原因只会产生特定（有限）的结果这一事实，就不会有目的和手段（物品），也就是说，不会为了实现一个更具价值的目的（更合意的结果）而对外在事件的进程进行积极干预。然而，除了命题逻辑、算术和因果关系的规律之外，所有关于外部世界的其他知识都是不确定的（后验的）。我们没有也不可能（先验地）确定地知道存在着什么样的物体和物体的性质，有多少物理维度的单位，以及各种物体的不同量之间存在（或不存在）什么样的定量的因果关系。所有这些都必须从经验中学习。而且，经验总是过去的经验，是过去事件的经验。它不能揭示过去的事实和关系在未来是否仍然成立。我们不得不假定情况大致如此。但是，我们也不能断然排除这样的可能性，即我们可能搞错了，未来会与过去大相径庭，以至于我们过去的所有知识都将毫无用处。有可能明天我们所有的仪器或机器都不再运转，我们的房屋会在我们头顶坍塌，大地会裂开，而我们所有人都会丧生。正是在这个意义上，我们对外部物质世界的知识最终必须被视作是不确定的。

Notwithstanding this ultimate uncertainty of our knowledge concern ing the external world，however，as a result of contingent circumstances，the relative stability and regularity in the concatenation of external objects and events，it has been possible for mankind to accumulate a vast and expanding body of practically certain knowledge.This knowledge does not render the future predictable，but it helps us predict the effects to be produced by definite actions.Even though we do not know why things work the way they do，and whether or not they must always work in this way，we do know with complete practical certitude that and how certain things will operate now and tomorrow.one would never know it from the writings of the apostles of radical uncertainty but an innumerable and growing number of events （outcomes） can be produced literally at will and predicted with almost perfect exactitude.My toaster will toast，my key will open the door，my com puter，telephone，and fax will work as they are supposed to，my house will protect me from the weather，cars will drive，airplanes will fly，cups will still hold water，hammers will still hammer，and nails will still nail。much of our future is，practically speaking，perfectly certain.Every product，tool，instru ment or machine represents a piece of practical certainty。To claim，instead，that we are faced with radical uncertainty and that the future is to all of us unknowable is not only selfcontradictory but also appears to be a position devoid of common sense.

IV.

Our practical certainty concerning future outcomes and events extends even further。There are many future events about whose outcome we are practically certain because we literally know how to produce them （the outcome is under our complete practical control）。We can also predict with practical certainty a great and growing number of outcomes outside and beyond anyone’s control。Sometimes my tools，machines，and products are defective.My toaster does not toast，my telephone is silent，a hurricane or an earthquake has destroyed my house，my airplane crashes，or my cup is broken.I had no knowledge that this would happen to me here and now，and hence I could not have acted differently from the way I did.I am thus taken by surprise.But my surprise and my uncertainty must not be complete.For while I may know absolutely nothing about the single event—this cup will now break，this airplane will now crash，my house will be destroyed in an earthquake two years from now—and thus cannot possibly predict and alter any such event，I may know practically everything with respect to the whole class of events （broken cups，crashing airplanes，earthquakes） of which this single event is a member。I may know，based on the observation of longrun frequency distributions，that airplanes of a certain type crash every so often，that 1 in 10，000 cups produced is defective，that machines of such and such a type function on the average for 10 years，and that an earthquake strikes a certain region on the average twice a year and destroys，in the long run，1 percent of the existing housing stock per year。Then，although the single event still comes as a surprise，I do know with practical certainty that surprises such as these exist and how frequent they are.I am surprised neither by the type of surprise nor its longrun frequency。My surprise is only relative.I am surprised that such and such happens here and now rather than elsewhere or later。But I am not surprised that it happens at all，here，there，now，or later。In thus delineating the range and frequency of possible surprises，my uncertainty concerning the future，while not eliminated，is Systematically reduced.

我们对未来结果和事件的实际确定性甚至更进一步。

cases of limited surprises or reduced uncertainty are，of course，what Frank Knight first classified as “risk” （as opposed to “uncertainty”），and what Ludwig von Mises，building on Knight and the work on the foundations of probability theory of his mathematician brother，richard von Mises，would later define as “class probability” （as opposed to “case probability”）[174]：“Class probability means：We know or assume to know，with regard to the problem concerned，everything about the behavior of a whole class of events or phenomena； but about the actual singular events or phenomena we know nothing but that they are elements of this class.”[175] I know nothing about whether this or that cup will be broken，and I know nothing about whether my house or your house will be destroyed by a tornado within the next year，but I do know from the observation of longrun frequency distributions regarding cups and tornadoes，for instance，that no more than 1 in 10，000 cups is defective and that of a thousand houses in a given territory，no more than one per year on the average will be destroyed.If，based on this knowledge，I adopted a strategy of always predicting that the next cup will not be broken，and that my house will not be destroyed next year，I would commit errors.But in the long run，the strategy would assure more successes than errors：my errors would be ‘correct’ errors.on the other hand，if I adopted the strategy of predicting always that the next cup will be broken and my house destroyed，I might well be correct。But in the long run this strategy would assuredly fail：I would be erroneously correct。Whenever the conditions of class probability are met and we do not know enough to avoid mistakes altogether but enough to make only correct mistakes，it is possible to take out insurance.As a producer of cups，for instance，I know that on the average I will have to produce 10，001 cups in order to have 10，000。I cannot avoid broken cups，but I can insure myself against the risk of broken cups by including it，as a regularly occurring loss，in my costaccounting，and by thus associating a correspondingly higher cost with my production of cups.Similarly，I cannot avoid tornadoes，but I can insure myself against them.because tornado losses are large and infrequent in relation to the size and operations of my household，it would be difficult （although not impossible） to provide insurance internally （within my household）。But it is possible to pool my tornado risk with yours and that of other households or firms in a given region.Not one of us knows who will be affected by the risk in question，but based on the knowledge of the objective longrun frequency of tornadoes and tornado damage for the entire region，it is possible to calculate a premium against payment of which each one of us can be insured for this hazard.

当然，弗兰克

It is not only the knowledge incorporated in our tools，instruments，and machines，then，which provides practical certain information about our future：in this case，knowledge of how we will generate various singular events.Also，the knowledge incorporated in any form of insurance，whether internally practiced or by method of pooling，represents practical certain knowledge：in this case，knowledge of how to be prepared for various classes of events whose individual occurrence is beyond anyone’s control。To be sure，while the conditions of class probability and insurability can be stated exactly，with certainty，the question of whether or not there exist insurable events，which ones，and the various expenses of insuring against them，cannot be answered with certainty。on the one hand，the knowledge of objective probability distributions must be acquired through observational experience，and as is the case for all knowledge based on such experience，we can never know whether or not past regularities will also hold in the future.We may have to make revisions.on the other hand，even in order to collect such information，it is necessary that various singular events be classified from the outset as falling into one and the same class （of events）。This cup or tornado and that cup or that tornado，are both members of the same class of cup or tornado。Yet any such classification is tainted with uncertainty。The joint classification of a series of singular events is only correct （for the purpose of insurance） if it holds that I do not know more about any of the single class members than that each one of them is a member of the same class.If I learned，however，that one cup was made of clay A and another from clay B，for instance，and that this fact makes a difference for the longrun frequency of defects，my initial classification would become faulty。Similarly，I might learn from experience that tornado damage on the east side of a given valley is Systematically higher than on its western side.In this case，too，my original classification would have to be changed，new and revised classes and subclasses of insurable events would have to be formed，and new and different insurance premiums would have to be calculated.These uncertainties notwithstanding，however，it deserves to be pointed out that as a contingent fact of human life，the actual range of insurance，and hence of relatively certain information about future events and outcomes，is vast and growing：We know how many ships will likely sink，how many airplanes crash，how often it will rain or shine，how many people of a given age will die，how many hotwater boilers will explode，how many people will be struck by cancer，that more women than men will be affected by breast cancer，that smokers will die earlier than nonsmokers，that Jews suffer more frequently from TaySachs disease than gentiles，and Blacks more from sickle cell anemia than Whites，that tornadoes，earthquakes，and floods occur here but not there，etc。Our future is most definitely not unknowable.

V.

Little of this ever attracts the attention of theoreticians of radical uncertainty。The existence of a practical working technology and of a vast and flourishing insurance industry constitutes an embarrassment for any theory of radical uncertainty。If pressed sufficiently hard，of course，Lachmann and his followers would probably admit the undeniable and，as if all of this did not matter，quickly move on to another problem.So far，it might be pointed out with some justification，attention has been directed almost exclusively either to the technological rather than the economic aspect of action—to accidents rather than to actions.The phenomenon of radical uncertainty，however，arises in a different arena.While it may be possible to predict the physical outcomes if such and such an action is taken，and while it may be possible also to predict the pattern of various physical events entirely out side of human control，matters are completely different when it comes to predicting our own future actions.I can predict that my toaster will toast if I employ it in a certain way，and I can predict that toasters generally do not work longer than 10 years，but presumably I cannot predict whether or not I will actually employ my toaster in the future，nor could I have predicted before it actually happened that I ever wanted—and constructed or bought—a toaster in the first place.It is here，in the arena of human choices and preferences，where supposedly radical uncertainty reigns.

这些都没有引起极端的不确定性理论家的注意。一种实用可行的技术和一个庞大而繁荣的保险业的存在，使任何具有极端的不确定性的理论都感到尴尬。当然，如果逼得太紧，拉赫曼和他的追随者们很可能会承认这一点，然后，好像这一切都无关紧要似的，迅速转向另一个问题。到目前为止，我们有理由指出，人们的注意力几乎完全集中在行动的技术层面而非经济层面，集中在意外事故层面而非行动层面。然而，极端的不确定性现象出现在另一个领域。我们有可能预测采取这样或那样行动的物理结果，也有可能预测完全不受人类控制的各种物理事件的模式，但预测我们自己未来的行为时，情况就完全不同了。我可以预测我的烤面包机如果以某种方式使用就会烤焦，我也可以预测烤面包机的使用寿命一般不会超过

Lachmann and his followers are correct in emphasizing that the problem of predicting my and others’ future actions is categorically different from that of predicting the physical outcomes of given actions or of natural events.In fact，the destructive part of Lachmann’s argument is largely correct even though it is hardly new （and entirely insufficient to establish his constructive thesis of radical uncertainty）。[176] This is the roof that not only the idea of perfect foresight，underlying general equilibrium theory，is mistaken，but likewise the idea，advanced by rational expectations theorists，that all human uncertainty can be subsumed under the heading of insurable risks：that the uncertainty concerning our future actions in particular is no different from that regarding the future of natural events，such that we can，based on our observation of longrun frequency distributions，predict their general pattern in the same way as we can predict the pattern of earthquakes，torna does，cancer，or car accidents，for example.

拉赫曼和他的追随者们强调，预测自己和他人未来行动的问题与预测既定行动或自然事件的物理结果的问题截然不同，这一点是正确的。事实上，拉赫曼论证的破坏性部分大体上是正确的，尽管它并不新颖（而且完全不足以确立他关于极端的不确定性的建设性论点）。这不仅证明了一般均衡理论的基础——完美预见的观点是错误的，而且证明了理性预期理论家提出的人类所有不确定性都可以归入可保风险的观点也是错误的：关于我们未来行为的不确定性与关于自然事件的未来的不确定性没有什么不同，因此，我们可以根据对长期频率分布的观察，预测它们的一般模式，就像我们可以预测地震、龙卷风、癌症或车祸的模式一样。

As Lachmann points out，and as Frank Knight and Ludwig von Mises explained long before，the new theory of rational expectations suffers from essentially the same deficiency as the old general equilibrium model of perfect foresight：it cannot account for the phenomenon of learning and，hence，of knowledge and consciousness.Rational expectation theorists only replace the model of man as a neverfailing automaton with that of a machine subject to random errors and breakdowns of known types and characteristics.Rather than possessing perfect knowledge of all singular （individual） actions，man is assumed to possess merely perfect knowledge of the probability distribution of all future classes of actions.He is assumed to commit forecasting errors，but his errors are always correct errors.False predictions never require a revision of a person’s given stock of knowledge.There is no learning from success or failure and，hence，there is no change，or only predictable change，in the future pattern of human actions.such a model of man，Knight，Mises，and Lachmann agree，is no less faulty than the one it is supposed to replace.It not only stands in manifest contradiction to the facts，but any proponent of this model is also inevitably caught up in logical contradictions.

正如拉赫曼所指出的，以及弗兰克

First off，if our expectations （predictions） concerning our future actions were indeed as rational as rational expectation theorists believe them to be，this would imply that it would be possible to give an exhaustive classification of all possible actions （just as one could list all possible outcomes of a game of roulette or all possible locations of a physical body in space）。For without a complete enumeration of all possible types of actions there can be no knowledge of their relative frequencies.Obviously，no such list of all possible human actions exists，however。We know of a great number of types of action performed then or now，but this list is always open and incomplete.Indeed，actions are designed to alter the natural course of events in order to bring about something as yet nonexistent。They are the result of creative imagination.new and different actions are constantly added to the list，and old ones dropped.For instance，new or different products and services are constantly added to the preexisting list of products and services，while others disappear from the list。However，something as yet nonexistent—a new product—cannot appear on any list until after it has been imagined and produced by someone.Even the producer of a new product X does not know—and could not have predicted—anything regarding the relative frequency of actions such as the supply of or the demand for X before he had actually had the new idea of X—yet any new product idea and any new product must necessarily upset （alter） the entire preexisting pattern of the relative frequency of various forms of action （and of relative prices）。

首先，如果我们对未来行为的预期（预测）确实像理性预期理论家所认为的那样理性，这就意味着我们有可能对所有可能的行为进行详尽的分类（就像我们可以列出轮盘赌的所有可能结果或物体在空间中的所有可能位置一样）。因为没有完整列举所有可能的行动类型，就不可能知道它们的相对频率。然而，很明显，不存在这样一个包含所有可能的人类行为的清单。

Moreover，if we could indeed predict our future actions，either perfectly or subject only to random errors，then it would have to be implicitly assumed as well that every actor must possess the same （identical） knowledge as everyone else.I must know what you know，and you must know what I know.otherwise，if our knowledge were somehow different，it would be impossible that both our predictions could be equally correct or else equally correctly wrong。Instead，either my predictions would have to be correct and yours would have to be wrong，or vice versa，and either my predictions or yours then would have to be wrongly wrong。The error （mine or yours） would not be random but Systematic，for it could have been avoided had I （or you） known what you （or I） knew.This precisely is the case，however：our knowledge is not identical。You and I may know some things in common，but I also know things （about myself，for instance） that you do not know，and vice versa.Our knowledge，and hence our predictions and expec tations concerning future actions，are in fact different。Yet if different actors possess different knowledge，the likelihood （frequency） of their predicting correctly or incorrectly will be different as well。Hence，neither the success nor the failure of our predictions can be considered purely random but will have to be ascrib

The Great Fiction in Chinese

目录

前言

序

第一辑：人类发展、财产和政治

1 知识分子和反知识分子的知识分子[1]

2 私有财产的伦理学与经济学

I.社会的秩序问题

II.解决方案：私有财产和先占

III.误解和澄清

IV.私有财产经济学

V.古典渊源

VI.芝加哥转向

3 私有财产和家庭的起源*

I.背景：历史

II.问题：理论

III.解决方案：理论与历史

4 从马尔萨斯陷阱到工业革命：对社会进化的一种解释*

I. 经济理论

II. 经济史：问题

III. 历史的解释

IV. 结论与展望

5 论共有、公有和私有财产以及全面私有化的基本原理*

I. 理论初步

II. 私有财产、共有财货和公有财产

III. 私有化原理

IV. 附录 私有化：原则与应用

6 自然秩序、国家和移民问题*

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

7 自由贸易和限制移民的理由*

I. 自由贸易的理由

II. 贸易与移民

III.“开放边境”、入侵和强制一体化

IV. 无政府资本主义模式

V. 纠正和预防

VI. 结论

8 论人、自然、真理和公正*

9 论民主、再分配和对财产的破坏*

第二辑： 货币、国家和安保

10 国家为何要求控制货币*

11利用法定财产和法定货币的企业家精神*

12 持有货币的收益*

13 国家或私法社会？*

I. 社会秩序问题

II. 解决方案：私有财产的观念

III. 社会秩序的执行和私有财产的保护：国家

IV.“国家主义”的根基性错误

V. 错上加错：民主国家

VI. 解决之道：以私法社会代替国家

14 防卫的私人生产*

I. 经验证据

II. 剖析国家主义者的反应

III. 支持私人安保的理由

IV. 进一步讨论侵犯保险

V. 政治边界与保险

VI. 民主国家与全面战争

VII. 保险与激励

VIII. 防范国家侵犯

IX. 重获自我防卫的权利

15 关于国家与战争的反思*

I. 国家、战争和帝国主义

II. 从君主制和军队战争到民主制和全面战争

III. 附录：民主和平论

IV. 让世界远离民主而安全，或如何抵御美国

第三辑 经济学理论

16 关于确定性和不确定性*

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

IV. 附录私有化：原则与应用

第二辑：货币、国家和安保

第三辑经济学理论