The Great Fiction in Chinese

by Stephan Kinsella on December 20, 2024

Here is a first draft of a Chinese translation of The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline (Laissez Faire Books, 2012; second revised edition, Mises Institute, 2021), translated by Li San (李三). The following is not yet proofread, according to the translator.

伟大的虚构

项目计划书修订版（B）

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原书名：

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文档制作：人的行动研究社区@Alhρα

制作时间：2018年

最后修订：2024年元月第3次修订

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ON GOVERNmenT…………………………………………………………………………………………. 542
ON FREEDOM AND COERCION…………………………………………………………………………………….. 544
THESIS TWO…………………………………………………………………………………………. 548
ON ETHICS…………………………………………………………………………………………. 549
ON SOCIAL EVOLUTION…………………………………………………………………………………………. 551
CULTURAL MUTATION…………………………………………………………………………………………. 554
CULTURAL TRANSMISSION…………………………………………………………………………………………. 555
CULTURAL SELECTION…………………………………………………………………………………………. 562
conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………. 571

24 The Western State as a Paradigm：Learning from History …………………………….. 572

LESSON one：AGAINST CENTRALIZATION………………………………………… 573

25 The Libertarian Quest for a Grand Historical Narrative …………………………………….. 612

第五辑 Autobiographical……………………………………………………………………. 644

26 Interview with The Daily bell ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 644

I INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 644

INTERVIEW……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 645
conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………. 659

27 Interview with Philosophie Magazine ………………………………………………………………………. 660

INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 660
INTERVIEW……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 661

28 This Crazy World ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 666

29 My Life on the Right ……………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 671

30 My Path to the Austrian School of Economics ……………………………………………………… 686

31 The InDepth Interview ……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 697

Afterword by Stephan Kinsella …………………………………………………………… 711

Index…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 719

518 West Magnolia Avenue……………………………………………………………….. 720

Auburn，Alabama 36832 mises.org…………………………………………………… 720

前言

Foreword

Congratulations! You hold in your hands one of the best collections of essays from one of the most vital and challenging thinkers on the planet。This book is a compendium of sorts，a cross section of Professor Hans Hermann Hoppe’s best work across several decades arranged in one acces sible volume。It originally was published by Laissez Faire Books in 2012，but languished without the audience it deserved。This volume rejuvenates that work with no less than six new chapters and more than a hundred new pages not found in the earlier version，along with some muchneeded publicity and promotion。

恭喜！你手中拿着的是这个星球上最具活力和最具挑战性的思想家之一的最佳文集之一。这本书在某种程度上是一本纲要，是汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普教授几十年来的最佳作品的选集，编排在一本便于阅读的卷册中。它最初由自由放任图书公司（Laissez Faire Books）于2012年出版，但却没有得到应有的关注。这个版本通过新增不少于六个新章节和一百多页在早期版本中没有的内容，以及一些非常必要的宣传和推广，使这部作品重焕生机。

Academics and social scientists today tend toward hyperspecialization，but Dr.Hoppe does not make this mistake。In this approach he joins a long line of important thinkers who did not conﬁne themselves to a narrow academic discipline and did not care to “stay in their lane。” We forget that many twentieth century economists，for example，capably applied knowl edge in history，philosophy，logic，anthropology，sociology，epistemology，politics，and ethics to their work including Ludwig von Mises，Hoppe’s inspiration，and Murray N.Rothbard，Hoppe’s mentor。In that very important sense Hoppe continues and builds on the work of both men。

今天的学者和社会科学家都倾向于高度专业化，但霍普博士没有犯这个错误。在这种方法中，他加入了一长串重要思想家的行列，他们不把自己局限于一个狭窄的学术领域，也不愿“墨守成规”。例如，我们忘记了许多20世纪的经济学家能够将历史、哲学、逻辑学、人类学、社会学、认识论、政治学和伦理学方面的知识应用到他们的工作中，这些杰出的经济学家包括路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）、他是霍普的精神偶像，以及霍普的导师默里·罗斯巴德（Murray N.Rothbard）。正是在这个非常重要的意义上，霍普在两人的成就之上再接再厉。

If you are new to Hoppe’s work，this is an excellent introduction and survey to his syntheses of history，anthropology，property，ethics，and state。If you already know and enjoy Hoppe，you will ﬁnd here a “Hoppe reader”：many of his best and most representative articles across a range of topics in one accessible volume。Consider it almost a reference guide，from which readers can guide themselves back to his lengthy books and articles。But this book has something for everyone，from his rigorous yet often overlooked implications of capitalism and socialism to his broadside against democracy on property rights grounds。Even the new or casual reader will come away with an excellent understanding of Hoppe’s work and worldview。

如果你是第一次接触霍普的作品，这本书是了解他的著作的切入口，此书综合了他对历史、人类学、产权、伦理和国家的精彩的介绍和概述。如果你已经知道并喜欢霍普，你会在这里找到一个“霍普读本”：他的许多最好的和最具代表性的文章，被分类整合在一个个主题之内，组成一个可检索的卷宗。读者可以把它看作是一个参考指南，从中能够引导自己回到他的长篇书籍和文章中去。这是一本对每个人都很有意义的书，在书中霍普仔细、严谨地辨析了资本主义和社会主义的含义，同时在产权的基础上猛烈地抨击了民主制度，而这些都是以前被人忽略的。即使是新读者或普通读者也会对霍普的作品和世界观有一个很好的理解。

The title of course comes from ClaudeFrédéric Bastiat，the great nineteenthcentury French economic journalist and liberal。Bastiat gave us “The Great Fiction” to describe the government mechanisms by which people attempt to live at the expense of others。The state is always present in Hoppe’s work，whether front and center or lurking in the background。Hoppe’s subtitle，Property，Economy，Society，and the Politics of Decline gives an unsubtle clue as to what readers should expect：a damning indictment of the political world and its twentyﬁrstcentury managerial superstates。In Hoppe’s world，the state is a wholly decivilizing institution：a predator rather than protector，a threat to property and peace。Markets and entre preneurs produce goods，governments produce “bads”：taxation （theft），regulation （semiownership，thus semisocialism），devalued money （central banks），war （defense），injustice （state courts and police），and the ruinous eﬀects of high time preference （democracy）。Like Bastiat，Hoppe has no patience for obscuring or soft pedaling the realities of our political world。

书名当然来自于19世纪伟大的法国经济记者兼自由主义者克劳德弗朗茨·巴斯夏（ClaudeFrédéric Bastiat）。巴斯夏给我们写了《伟大的虚构》，该书描述了政府机制，人们试图以牺牲他人为代价来生活。当然，在霍普的作品中，国家也总是存在的，有时是论述的焦点，有时是论述的背景。霍普这本书的副标题是《财产、经济、社会和衰败的政治》，它给读者提供了一个明确的线索：对政治世界及其21世纪超级统治大国的严厉谴责。在霍普的语境里，国家是一个完全破坏文明的机构：一个掠夺者而不是保护者，是对财产与和平的威胁。市场和企业家生产财货，政府生产“劣货”：税收（盗窃）、管制（半所有权，因此是半社会主义）、货币贬值（中央银行）、战争（国防）、不公正（国家法院和警察），以及高时间偏好的毁灭性影响（民主）。和巴斯夏一样，霍普没有耐心去掩盖或粉饰我们政治世界的现实。

Part one of the book deals with the development of human society and the concomitant rise of two often opposing forces，namely property and states。Here Hoppe explains civilization rising against a backdrop of greater productivity enabled by the painfully slow shift from nomadic to agrarian living。Once suﬃcient calories could be yielded from land，concepts of family and ownership come into greater focus。The Enlightenment and Indus trial Revolution create more and more prosperity，a protomiddle class，while feudal and monarchical arrangements face pressure from subjects developing greater wealth and literacy。This pressure explodes in the nine teenth century，as groups of largely decentralized kingdoms，principalities，territories，and citystates come under the full sway of national boundaries and governments。The twentieth century ushers in the era of full democratic government in the West：the Great War washes away the last vestiges of Old Europe，while growing economic and military power places the United States squarely at the helm of an international order。

本书的第一辑，论述了人类社会的发展，以及随之而来的两种对立力量的崛起，即财产和国家。在这里，霍普解释了文明是在生产力提高的背景下兴起的，这种生产力的提高，是由游牧生活向农业生活极度缓慢的转变所带来的。一旦能够从土地中获得足够的热量，家庭和所有权的概念就变得更加重要。启蒙运动和工业革命创造了越来越多的繁荣，同时诞生了一个原始的中产阶级，而封建制度和君主制度，则面临着来自那些希求更多财富和更繁荣的文化的国民的压力。这种压力在19世纪迅速扩张，大量分散的王国、公国、领土和城邦受到国家边界和政府的全面控制。20世纪开启了西方全面民主政府的时代：第一次世界大战涤荡了旧欧洲最后的痕迹，与此同时，日益增长的经济和军事实力使美国成为国际秩序的掌舵者。

Hoppe，of course，does not accept at face value the notion of the twentieth century as “liberal，” and in fact ﬁnds much of it illiberal。A particular favorite from part one is a chapter from Democracy：The God That Failed titled “On Democracy，redistribution，and the Destruction of Property。” This essay beautifully encapsulates all of his fundamental critiques of mod ern mass democracy，namely that it produces bad，shortsighted politicians who care nothing about their nation’s capital stock； bad，shortsighted voters who care nothing about future generations； bad，expansionary economic and foreign policy； and bad，central bank money to pay for it all。Citizens，unlike subjects of yesteryear，enjoy the illusion that government is “us。” But an illusion is all it is，and Hoppe enjoys slaying this most sacred of cows。

当然，霍普并不接受二十世纪 “自由主义 ”概念的表面价值，事实上，他认为二十世纪的很多东西都是不自由的。第一辑中最受欢迎的是《民主：失败的上帝》中的一章，题为《论民主、再分配和财产破坏》。这篇文章完美地概括了他对现代大众民主的所有根本性的批判。大众民主催生了糟糕的、目光短浅的政客，他们对国家的资本存量毫不关心；催生了糟糕的、目光短浅的选民，他们对子孙后代毫不关心；催生了糟糕的扩张性的经济和外交政策；更加糟糕的是，最后由央行印钱来为这一切买单。而与过去不同的是，公民们沉浸在政府为“我”、“我”为政府的幻觉中。但这只不过是一种幻觉而已，霍普喜欢屠宰这头被崇拜的神牛。

Part two focuses on the hugely important but often overlooked relation ship between money and the state。While kings and sovereigns once enjoyed debasing money to line their pockets，modern central banks turn seignior age into something far more systemic and harmful。Fiat money enables poli ticians to fund welfare and warfare programs unimaginable in previous gen erations，increasing state power at every turn。It also distorts virtually every economic decision made across society，resulting in gross ineﬃciency and malinvestment。Society suﬀers，purchasing power erodes，but an undeserv ing and stateconnected banking class beneﬁts from all the new money。The quintessential Hoppean explanation for this sordid process，namely power，is nicely presented in chapter 9，“Why the State Demands the Control of Money。”

Part three forays into Dr.Hoppe’s economic theory，particularly in the area of method。Much of what we consider to comprise modern economics is wrong，and in particular wrong because it subverts the role of theory with empiricism，statistics，math，and modeling。Human actors apply deeply subjective values to all economic goods，values which change almost constantly。They are not atoms or vectors to be studied by testing hypotheses with data，but volitional beings to which we must apply axiomatic deduc tive reasoning。Hoppe gives readers a crash course in certainty，uncertainty，and probability，to show their uses and more importantly their limitations in economics。

Part four considers the important subject of intellectual history in the context of the broad Austrolibertarian movement，and includes a truly heartfelt speech from Hoppe on his friend and colleague Rothbard which is sure to move you。It also includes a typically Hoppean critique of Friedrich von Hayek’s political theory，which in Hoppe’s view compares very unfavorably to his work in monetary policy and the knowledge problem。This sec tion ﬁnishes with the text of Hoppe’s sweeping talk titled “The Libertarian Quest for a Grand Historical Narrative，” a marvelous narrative about where we have been and where we might be going。

Finally，part ﬁve is a collection of interviews with Dr.Hoppe and auto biographical essays，including one conducted by yours truly。These interviews give a better sense of Hoppe as a person and thinker，and greater insight into his development both personally and professionally。Readers will ﬁnd plenty of intellectual ammunition here，along with answers to many of the simplistic challenges posed to Hoppe’s idealized conception of a private law society。

最后，第五辑是对霍普博士的采访和自传体随笔的集合，其中也包括本人的一篇。这些访谈让我们更好地了解霍普其人，一位思想家，同时能更深入地了解他的个人和专业的发展。读者将在这里找到大量的知识弹药，以及对霍普理想化的私法社会概念所提出的许多过于简单化的挑战的答案。

Reading HansHermann Hoppe is always a pleasure and never a chore，because both the subjects and Dr.Hoppe’s command of them quickly win the reader’s attention and even admiration。Most academic writing is almost unbearable； and as alluded to earlier it is designed to appeal only to a tiny group of PhDs who work in a very limited area or subﬁeld。Hoppe，by contrast，produces academic treatments of much broader and foundational issues which manage to hold appeal for intelligent lay audiences。The foot notes，the diamondsharp deductive logic，the references to earlier works and thinkers—all the hallmarks of academic journals are there—without the tedium and hubris。

Hoppe is the rare intellectual who never preens or bores，and never loses the plot。He keeps things close to the bone，one might say：not quite sparse but never ornate or superﬂuous。There are no twentypage detours into some faintly related topic merely for show，a habit even the best of academicaca demics sometimes fall prey to。Not Dr.Hoppe。His work inevitably strips out the nonessential and gets to the root of the issue at hand。Sometimes that essential and unadulterated focus comports with popular sentiment and thinking； oftentimes it does not。Hence his controversial reputation in certain emotive circles。But Hoppe，like any good social scientist，has an obligation to seek truth and help us understand the world。Thus he never appeals to the reader’s existing pretensions or prejudices，but instead always demands we follow the praxeological path of understanding human actors as they really are。

In other words，truth—unadorned and uncomfortable as it may be—is the end goal of any good social scientist。Thus，Dr.Hoppe is an unﬂinching advocate for reality and logic，and one you cannot ignore。

换句话说，真理——尽管它可能不加修饰、让人不适——是任何优秀的社会科学家的最终目标。因此，霍普博士是现实和逻辑的坚定倡导者，是一位你不能忽视的学者。

Jeﬀ Deist Auburn，January 2021

序

preface

While the need for and value of interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research is often emphasized as a welcome antidote to hyperspecialization，such commitment is typically little more than lip service。In general，in today’s academia inter and transdisciplinary work is frowned on and dis couraged。It hampers your professional career or even dooms it。Once you venture outside an increasingly narrowly deﬁned ﬁeld of academic special ization，your colleagues will dismiss and disparage you for no longer being a “real” economist，philosopher，or whatever； and likewise，the certiﬁed members and gatekeepers of those ﬁelds into which you venture will either ignore or dismiss you as an intellectual outsider and trespasser and not really “one of them。”

虽然交叉学科与跨学科研究有必要性和价值，经常被强调为是对过度专业化的一种可取的解毒剂，但这只不过是口头上的说辞而已。总的来说，在今天的学术界，学科的细分化和精深化已经形成了学术界的话语体系，交叉和跨学科的研究是既不受欢迎也不受鼓励。它会阻碍你的职业生涯，甚至毁掉你的职业生涯。一旦你冒险跨出这日益狭窄的学术专业领域，你的同事就会因为你不再是一个“真正的”经济学家、哲学家或其他什么人而对你不屑一顾；同样的，你冒险涉足的这些领域的资深前辈和卫道者也会忽视和贬低你，把你当作智力上的局外人和入侵者，是“非我族类”，而不是真正的“他们中的一员”。

Indeed，even within a given academic ﬁeld such as philosophy or eco nomics，for instance，you are no longer expected to cover your discipline in its entirety。Instead，you are supposed to conﬁne your work to one of your discipline’s numerous branches or subdisciplines and publish exclusively in its “oﬃcially approved ‘refereed’ scholarly journals。” You are not supposed to be a philosopher or economist，period。Rather，you are supposed to be a philosopher of science，or of mathematics，or logic，language，religion，art and aesthetics，etc。； and you are supposed to be a microeconomist，a macroeconomist，a game theorist，a labor or development economist，an econometrician，a mathematical economist，etc。Only as a historian of your discipline are you still somewhat exempt from these strictures and supposed to cover your entire ﬁeld。However，the history of philosophy and even more so the history of economics and economic thought，for example，are increasingly eliminated from the academic curricula，because they are considered merely interpretative—philological or hermeneuti cal—endeavors，rather than real “science。”

事实上，即使是在一个特定的学术领域，比如哲学或经济学，你也不再被期望完整地涵盖你的学科。相反，你应该把你的工作限制在你的学科的众多分支或子学科之一，并只在该学科”官方认可的’评审’学术期刊”上发表研究成果。你不再是哲学家或经济学家，就这么简单。相反，你应该是科学、数学、逻辑、语言、宗教、艺术和美学等方面的哲学家；你应该是一个微观经济学家，宏观经济学家，博弈论专家，劳动或发展经济学家、计量经济学家、数理经济学家，等等。在你的学科领域，只有作为你所在学科的历史学家，你才在某种程度上不受这些限制，你才有资格涉猎整个学科领域。然而，哲学史，甚至是经济史和经济思想史，越来越多地被排除在学术课程之外，因为它们被认为仅仅是解释性的——语言学或诠释学的——工作，而不是真正的“科学”。

Throughout my entire academic career I ignored these strictures。First，because I did not know any better，and then，when I knew，because I con sciously rejected and resisted them—and learned to live with the conse quences。I earned my living as an economist，but I did not conﬁne my work to economics。I frequently ventured out into philosophy，my ﬁrst intellectual love，and from there，into law，sociology，history，and politics— wherever my intellectual curiosity led me。

The present volume bears witness to this fact。It contains articles，speeches，and interviews written and presented over almost a quarter cen tury。Most of them have previously appeared in disparate places：in vari ous academic journals，magazines of opinion，or popular media outlets。Yet there are also some longer，previously unpublished pieces appearing here for the very ﬁrst time。

While this book freely and frequently cuts across disciplinary lines，there is one dominant and unifying theme throughout the following：property，or more precisely private property，deﬁned as the exclusive control of scarce resources，its origin，and its ethical and economic rationale and justi ﬁcation as the ultimate source of peace and prosperity。On the other hand：the State，deﬁned as a territorial monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking and conﬂict arbitration including all cases of conﬂict involving the State and its agents themselves，its origin，and its role as the greatest danger to private property，as a permanent source of social conﬂict and the greatest enemy to peace and prosperity。And ﬁnally：the constitution of a private law society，deﬁned as a society without a state or any monopoly or monopolist whatsoever （whether legal or otherwise） and its unique function as the only conceivable guarantor of eternal peace and prosperity。

尽管这本书自由地、频繁地跨越学科界线，但贯穿全书的是一个主导的、统一的主题：财产，或者更准确地说，私有财产，其定义就是对稀缺资源的排他性控制，它的起源，以及它作为和平与繁荣的最终源泉的伦理正当性和经济理由。另一方面：国家，被定义为最终决策和冲突仲裁的领土垄断者，包括涉及国家及其代理人本身的所有冲突案件，它的起源，以及它作为私有财产的最大威胁，作为社会冲突的永久根源以及和平与繁荣的最大敌人。最后：私法社会的构成，其定义为一个没有国家或任何垄断企业或垄断者的社会（无论是否合法），以及私法社会作为可能的永久和平与繁荣的唯一保证的独特功能。

But there is much more to be found in the following：there are reﬂec tions on social evolution and the causes of the socalled Neolithic and Industrial Revolution，on monarchy and on the decivilizing eﬀect of democracy，on war，centralization and secession，on egalitarianism，inequality and natural aristocracy，on the inevitability and virtue of discrimination，and on migration and the perils of multiculturalism—much of which is extremely “politically incorrect” and has made me a persona nongrata not only among mainstream intellectuals but in particular also among many socalled left，biggovernment，or bleedingheart libertarians。

以下内容还会有更多的发现：关于社会演化和所谓新石器时代革命和工业革命的起因的反思，关于君主制和民主的去文明化影响的反思，关于战争、中心化和脱离的反思，关于平等主义、不平等和自然贵族的反思，关于歧视的必然性和美德的反思，关于移民和多元文化主义的危害的反思——其中很多是极端“政治不正确”的，使我成为一个不受主流知识分子欢迎的人，尤其是许多所谓的左派、大政府主义者或“菩萨心肠”的自由意志主义者，他们更不欢迎我。

There are some pieces assembled here dealing with purely theoretical （valuefree）—philosophical or economic—problems，others dealing with normative issues，and still others concerned with matters of politics and political strategy。Some pieces are long and intellectually “demanding” and others short and “easy。” In any case，however，I hope the reader will ﬁnd them always lucid，rigorously argued and，above all，intellectually stimulating。

这本书汇集了一些纯理论的（价值无涉的）——哲学或经济问题，其他涉及到规范问题，还有一些涉及政治和政治策略问题。有些文章很长，在智力上“要求很高”，而另一些则很短，“很容易”。然而，无论如何，我希望读者会发现这些议题都被分析得清晰明了、论证严谨，最重要的是发人深省。

While no one except me can be held personally responsible for any of the following，I owe a profound gratitude to Lew Rockwell and to the “gang” of radical—in politically correct lingo：“extremist”—thinkers he managed to assemble around the Ludwig von Mises Institute in Auburn，Alabama：to Walter Block，Thomas DiLorenzo，David Gordon，Jeﬀrey Herbener，Guido Hülsmann，Stephan Kinsella，Peter Klein，Ralph Raico，Joseph Salerno，and Mark Thornton。

虽然除了我之外，没有人需要对以下任何事情负责，我还是要深深地感谢卢·洛克韦尔，以及他在阿拉巴马州奥本的路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院设法聚集的激进“帮派”——用政治正确的术语来说就是“极端主义”思想家：沃尔特·布洛克、托马斯·迪洛伦佐、大卫·戈登、杰弗里·赫本纳、吉多·许尔斯曼、斯蒂芬·金塞拉、彼得·克莱因、拉尔夫·赖科、约瑟夫·萨勒诺和马克·桑顿。

My deepest gratitude is to my two principal intellectual masters，how ever。To Ludwig von Mises （1881–1973），whom I unfortunately never met，but whose monumental work has been a constant source of inspiration to me，and to Mises’s greatest student，Murray Rothbard （1926–1995），who further radicalized，expanded and completed the Misesian ediﬁce，and with whom I was fortunate enough to spend the last ten years of his life in intimate cooperation，ﬁrst in new York City and then as colleagues，office neighbors and intellectual co-combatants at the University of Nevada，Las Vegas。

我要对我的两位主要的思想导师致以最深切的感激。其一是路德维希·冯·米塞斯（1881 – 1973），不幸的是我从未见过他，但其不朽的著作是我灵感的不竭来源；其二是米塞斯最伟大的学生，默里·罗斯巴德（1926 – 1995），他比米塞斯更为激进，他拓展并完善了米赛斯学说的（Misesian）大厦，我很幸运，在他生命的最后十年，我们一直都在亲密合作，首先在纽约，然后在拉斯维加斯的内华达大学，我们一直是同事、办公室邻居和知识上的盟友。

汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普

伊斯坦布尔，2012 年 6 月

HansHermann Hoppe

Istanbul，June 2012

Part one Human Development，Property，and Politics

第一辑：人类发展、财产和政治

1 知识分子和反知识分子的知识分子[1]

The Role of Intellectuals and Antiintellectual Intellectuals

The state is the great fictitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else。

—Frédéric Bastiat

国家是一个巨大的虚构实体，每个人都试图利用它，以牺牲他人为代价来生存。

——弗雷德里克·巴斯夏

let me begin with the definition of a state。What must an agent be able to do to qualify as a state？ This agent must be able to insist that all conflicts among the inhabitants of a given territory be brought to him for ultimate decision making or be subject to his final review。In particular，this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving him be adjudicated by him or his agent。And implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge，as the second defining characteristic of a state，is the agent’s power to tax：to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services。

让我们从国家的定义开始。一个主体要具备什么条件才能被称为国家呢？这一主体必须能够坚称，某一特定领土内，居民之间的所有冲突必须由他作最后裁决，或者由他进行最后审查。特别是，该主体必须能够坚持所有涉及他的冲突都由他或他的代理人裁决。作为国家的第二个定义特征，在排除所有其他人作为最终仲裁者的权力中，隐含着该主体征税的权力：寻求公正的人必须为国家单方面定价的服务支付成本。

Based on this definition of a state，it is easy to understand why a desire to control a state might exist。For whoever is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make laws。And he who can legislate can also tax。Surely，this is an enviable position。

基于国家的这种定义，很容易理解为什么人会存在控制国家的欲望。因为无论是谁，只要在一定领土内垄断了最终裁决，谁就可以制定法律。能立法也就能征税。当然，这无疑是一个令人垂涎、觊觎的位置。

More difficult to understand is how anyone can get away with control ling a state。Why would others put up with such an institution？

更难以理解的是，为什么任何人都可以控制一个国家而不受惩罚。为什么其他人会容忍这样一个机构呢？

I want to approach the answer to this question indirectly。Suppose you and your friends happen to be in control of such an extraordinary institution。What would you do to maintain your position （provided you didn’t have any moral scruples）？ You would certainly use some of your tax income to hire some thugs。First：to make peace among your subjects so that they stay productive and there is something to tax in the future。But more importantly，because you might need these thugs for your own protection should the people wake up from their dogmatic slumber and challenge you。

我尝试间接地回答这个问题。假设你和你的朋友碰巧控制着这样一个特别的机构。你会做什么来维持你的地位呢（假设你没有任何道德上的顾忌）？你肯定会用你的一些税收来雇佣一些暴徒。第一：维持国民之间的和平，这样他们就能保持生产力，作为持续的税源；第二，也是更重要的一点，假如有一天人们从教条的沉睡中醒来并挑战你，那你可能需要这些暴徒来保护自己。

This will not do，however，in particular if you and your friends are a small minority in comparison to the number of subjects。For a minority cannot lastingly rule a majority solely by brute force。It must rule by “opinion。” The majority of the population must be brought to voluntarily accept your rule。This is not to say that the majority must agree with every one of your measures。Indeed，it may well believe that many of your policies are mistaken。However，it must believe in the legitimacy of the institution of the state as such，and hence that even if a particular policy may be wrong，such a mistake is an “accident” that one must tolerate in view of some greater good provided by the state。

然而，这是行不通的，尤其是如果你和你的朋友与被统治者的数量相比属于少数。因为少数人不能单靠武力长久地统治多数人。它必须通过“观念”来统治。必须让大多数人自愿接受你的统治。这并不是说大多数人必须同意你的每一项措施。事实上，他们很可能认为你的许多政策都是错误的。不管如何，他们必须相信国家制度本身的合法性，因此，即使一项特定的政策可能是错误的，他们也会相信这种错误只是一种“意外”，鉴于国家提供的更大利益，人们必须容忍这种“意外”。

Yet how can one persuade the majority of the population to believe this？

The answer is：only with the help of intellectuals。

然而，如何才能说服大多数人相信这一点呢？

答案是：只有借助知识分子的帮助。

How do you get the intellectuals to work for you？ To this the answer is easy。The market demand for intellectual services is not exactly high and stable。Intellectuals would be at the mercy of the fleeting values of the masses，and the masses are uninterested in intellectual philosophical concerns。The state，on the other hand，can accommodate the intellectuals’ typically over inflated egos and offer them a warm，secure，and permanent berth in its apparatus。

如何做才能让知识分子为你所用？这个问题的答案很简单。市场对知识服务的需求并不高，且不稳定。知识分子将任由大众转瞬即逝的价值观摆布，而大众对知识分子的哲学问题并不感兴趣。因此，知识分子在市场中并不那么“受宠”。而另一方面，国家却能够迎合知识分子典型的过度的自我膨胀，并在其体制内为他们提供一个温暖、安全、永久的“庙堂”——被豢养。

However，it is not sufficient that you employ just some intellectuals。You must essentially employ them all—even the ones who work in areas far removed from those that you are primarily concerned with：that is，philoso phy，the social sciences and the humanities。For even intellectuals working in mathematics or the natural sciences，for instance，can obviously think for themselves and so become potentially dangerous。It is thus important that you secure also their loyalty to the state。Put differently：you must become a monopolist。And this is best achieved if all “educational” institutions，from kindergarten to universities，are brought under state control and all teaching and researching personnel is “state certified。”

但是，仅仅雇用一些知识分子是不够的。你必须雇佣他们所有人——即使是那些工作领域与你主要关心的领域相去甚远的人，包括哲学、社会科学和人文科学。例如，即使是从事数学或自然科学工作的知识分子，显然也会独立思考，因此会有潜在的危险。因此，确保他们对国家的忠诚是非常重要的。换句话说你必须成为一个垄断者。如果所有的“教育”机构，从幼儿园到大学，都在国家控制之下，所有的教学和研究人员都是“国家认证”的，这是实现这一目标的最佳途径。

But what if the people do not want to become “educated”？ For this，“education” must be made compulsory； and in order to subject the people to state controlled education for as long as possible，everyone must be declared equally “educable。” The intellectuals know such egalitarianism to be false，of course。Yet to proclaim nonsense such as “everyone is a potential Einstein if only given sufficient educational attention” pleases the masses and，in turn，provides for an almost limitless demand for intellectual services。

但是，如果人民不愿意“接受教育”呢？为此，“教育”必须成为义务性的；为了使人民尽可能长时间地接受国家控制的教育，必须宣布每个人都是平等的、都是“孺子可教”。很显然，知识分子知道这种平等主义的“有教无类”，显然是错误的，但是他们不会喧之于口。然而，政府和知识分子宣扬诸如“只要给予足够的教育关注，每个人都是潜在的爱因斯坦”之类的无稽之谈却可以营造取悦大众的社会氛围，而这种社会氛围反过来又会为知识服务提供近乎无限的需求。

None of all this guarantees “correct” statist thinking，of course。It certainly helps，however，in reaching the “correct” conclusion，if one realizes that without the state one might be out of work and may have to try one’s hands at the mechanics of gas pump operation instead of concerning oneself with such pressing problems as alienation，equity，exploitation，the deconstruction of gender and sex roles，or the culture of the Eskimos，the Hopis and the Zulus。

那么，谁来证明国家主义思想是“正确的”呢？如果知识分子发现，如果没有国家的雇佣，他可能会失业，可能成为加油站工人等等体力劳动者；而有国家的雇佣他就可以去关注那些貌似高大上的东西，诸如异化、公平、剥削、性别和性别角色的解构等话题，或爱斯基摩人、霍皮人和祖鲁人的文化等等，他们怎么会不致力去证明这种“正确性”呢？

In any case，even if the intellectuals feel underappreciated by you—that is：by one particular state administration—they know that help can only come from another state administration but not from an intellectual assault on the institution of the state as such。Hence，it is hardly surprising that，as a matter of fact，the overwhelming majority of contemporary intellectuals，including most conservative or socalled free market intellectuals，are fundamentally and philosophically statists。

在任何情况下，即使知识分子感到被你轻视了——也就是说，被一个特定的国家行政机构轻视了——他们心知肚明，帮助只能来自另一个国家的行政机构，而不是来自对国家机构本身的智力攻击。因此，毫不奇怪，事实上，绝大多数当代知识分子，包括最保守的或所谓的自由市场知识分子，骨子里和哲学上都是国家主义者。

Has the work of the intellectuals paid off for the state？ I would think so。If asked whether the institution of a state is necessary，I do not think it is exaggerated to say that 99 percent of all people would unhesitatingly say yes。And yet，this success rests on rather shaky grounds，and the entire statist edifice can be brought down—if only the work of the intellectuals is countered by the work of intellectual antiintellectuals，as I like to call them。

知识分子的工作为国家带来回报了吗？我认为答案是肯定的。如果被问及国家是否是必要的，我认为99%的人会毫不犹豫地说是的，这一点毫不夸张。然而，这种成功建立在相当不稳定的基础之上，如果知识分子的工作受到反知识分子的知识分子（我喜欢这样称呼他们）的抵制，那么整个国家主义的大厦将倾。

The overwhelming majority of state supporters are not philosophical statists，i.e.，because they have thought about the matter。Most people do not think much about anything “philosophical。” They go about their daily lives，and that is it。So most support stems from the mere fact that a state exists，and has always existed as far as one can remember （and that is typically not farther away than one’s own lifetime）。That is，the greatest achievement of the statist intellectuals is the fact that they have cultivated the masses’ natu ral intellectual laziness （or incapacity） and never allowed for “the subject” to come up for serious discussion。The state is considered as an unquestionable part of the social fabric。

绝大多数国家支持者并不是出于深思熟虑而成为哲学意义的国家主义者，也就是说，他们从未思考过这个问题。大多数人都不怎么思考“哲学”的东西。他们有着自己的岁月静好，日复一日。因此，大多数国家支持者的观念都来自于这样一个事实，就他的记忆而言，就他的有生之年而言，国家存在并一直存在。也就是说，国家主义知识分子最大的成就是他们培养了大众天生的智力惰性（或无能），并且从不允许对该“主题”进行严肃的讨论。在知识分子和他们受众的语境中，国家被认为是社会结构中不容置疑的一部分。

The first and foremost task of the intellectual antiintellectuals，then，is to counter this dogmatic slumber of the masses by offering a precise definition of the state，as I have done at the outset，and then to ask if there is not something truly remarkable，odd，strange，awkward，ridiculous，indeed ludicrous about an institution such as this。I am confident that such simple，definitional work will produce some very first，but serious，doubt regarding an institution that one previously had been taken for granted—a good start。Further，proceeding from less sophisticated （yet，not coincidentally，more popular） prostate arguments to more sophisticated ones：To the extent that intellectuals have deemed it necessary to argue in favor of the state at all，their most popular argument，encountered already at kinder garten age，runs like this：Some activities of the state are pointed out：the state builds roads，kindergartens，schools； it delivers the mail and puts the policeman on the street。Imagine there would be no state。Then we would not have these goods。Thus，the state is necessary。

At the university level，a slightly more sophisticated version of the same argument is presented。It goes like this：true，markets are best at providing many or even most things； but there are other goods markets cannot provide or cannot provide in sufficient quantity or quality。These other，socalled “public goods” are goods that bestow benefits onto people beyond those actually having produced or paid for them。Foremost among such goods ranks typically “education and research。” “Education and research，” for instance，it is argued，are extremely valuable goods。They would be underproduced，however，because of “free riders，” i.e.，“cheats，” who benefit—via socalled neighborhood effects—from “education and research” without paying for it。Thus，the state is necessary to provide otherwise unproduced or underproduced （public） goods such as education and research。

到了高等教育阶段，知识分子提出了稍微复杂一点的观点。这个观点是这样的论述：的确，市场最擅长提供许多甚至大多数东西；但是，还有一些商品市场无法提供，或者无法足质足量地提供。这些所谓的“公共财货”，指的是这样一些商品，它们给这些商品的非实际生产者或非实际支付者之外的人带来利益。在这些商品中，最重要的通常是“教育和研究”。例如，有人认为“教育和研究”是极具价值的商品。然而，由于“搭便车者”、“骗子”，由于所谓的邻里效应，他们从“教育和研究”中获益，却无需支付费用，结果就是这些商品将会供不应求。因此，国家有必要提供这些未生产或生产不足的（公共）商品，如教育和研究。

These statist arguments can be refuted by a combination of three funda mental insights：First，as for the kindergarten argument，it does not follow from the fact that the state provides roads and schools that only the state can provide such goods。People have little difficulty recognizing that this is a fallacy。From the fact that monkeys can ride bikes it does not follow that only monkeys can ride bikes。And second，immediately following，it must be recalled that the state is an institution that can legislate and tax； and hence，that state agents have little incentive to produce efficiently。State roads and schools will only be more costly and their quality lower。For there is always a tendency for state agents to use up as many resources as possible doing whatever they do but actually work as little as possible doing it。

Third，as for the more sophisticated statist argument，it involves the same fallacy encountered already at the kindergarten level。For even if one were to grant the rest of the argument，it is still a fallacy to conclude from the fact that states provide public goods that only states can do so。

第三，至于更复杂的国家主义论点，它涉及到在幼儿园阶段就已经遇到的同样的谬论。因为，即使我们同意这一论点的其余部分，从国家提供公共财货这一事实得出只有国家才能提供公共财货的结论，仍然是一个谬误。

More importantly，however，it must be pointed out that the entire argument demonstrates a total ignorance of the most fundamental fact of human life，namely，scarcity。true，markets will not provide for all desir able things。There are always unsatisfied wants as long as we do not inhabit the Garden of Eden。But to bring such unproduced goods into existence scarce resources must be expended，which consequently can no longer be used to produce other，likewise desirable things。Whether public goods exist next to private ones does not matter in this regard—the fact of scarcity remains unchanged：more “public” goods can come only at the expense of less “private” goods。Yet what needs to be demonstrated is that one good is more important and valuable than another one。This is what is meant by “economizing。”

Yet can the state help economize scarce resources？ This is the question that must be answered。In fact，however，conclusive proof exists that the state does not and cannot economize：For in order to produce anything，the state must resort to taxation （or legislation）—which demonstrates irrefut ably that its subjects do not want what the state produces but prefer instead something else as more important。Rather than economize，the state can only redistribute：it can produce more of what it wants and less of what the people want—and，to recall，whatever the state then produces will be produced inefficiently。

然而，国家能帮助节约稀缺资源吗？这是必须回答的问题。然而，事实上，有确凿的证据表明，国家没有做到也无法做到节约。为了生产任何东西，国家必须诉诸税收（或立法）——这已无可辩驳地表明，它的国民不想要国家生产的东西，而是更喜欢其他更重要的东西。国家无法节约，只能重新分配。它可以生产更多自己想要的，更少人民想要的——回想一下，无论国家生产什么，都将是低效的。

Finally，the most sophisticated argument in favor of the state must be briefly examined。From Hobbes on down this argument has been repeated endlessly。It runs like this：In the state of nature—before the establishment of a state—permanent conflict reigns。Everyone claims a right to everything，and this will result in interminable war。There is no way out of this pre dicament by means of agreements； for who would enforce these agreements？ Whenever the situation appeared advantageous，one or both parties would break the agreement。Hence，people recognize that there is but one solution to the desideratum of peace：the establishment，per agreement，of a state，i.e.，a third，independent party as ultimate judge and enforcer。Yet if this thesis is correct and agreements require an outside enforcer to make them bind ing，then a statebyagreement can never come into existence。For in order to enforce the very agreement that is to result in the formation of a state （to make this agreement binding），another outside enforcer，a prior state，would already have to exist。And in order for this state to have come into existence，yet another still earlier state must be postulated，and so on，in infinite regress。

on the other hand，if we accept that states exist （and of course they do），then this very fact contradicts the Hobbesian story。The state itself has come into existence without any outside enforcer。Presumably，at the time of the alleged agreement，no prior state existed。Moreover，once a statebyagree ment is in existence，the resulting social order still remains a selfenforcing one。To be sure，if A and B now agree on something，their agreements are made binding by an external party。However，the state itself is not so bound by any outside enforcer。There exists no external third party insofar as conflicts between state agents and state subjects are concerned； and likewise no external third party exists for conflicts between different state agents or agencies。Insofar as agreements entered into by the state visàvis its citizens or of one state agency visàvis another are concerned，that is，such agree ments can be only selfbinding on the State。The state is bound by nothing except its own selfaccepted and enforced rules，i.e.，the constraints that it imposes on itself。Visàvis itself，so to speak，the state is still in a natural state of anarchy characterized by selfrule and enforcement，because there is no higher state，which could bind it。

另一方面，如果我们接受国家的存在（当然它们确实存在），那么这个事实就与霍布斯的故事相矛盾。国家本身是在没有任何外部执行者的情况下建立的。据推测，在所谓的协议达成时，先前并不存在国家。此外，一旦通过协议创造出国家，由此产生的社会秩序仍然是一种自我强制的秩序。按照霍布斯的描述，可以肯定的是，如果A和B现在就某件事达成一致，那么他们的协议就会受到某一外部第三方的约束。然而，国家本身却又不受任何外部执行者的约束。就国家代理人和国家国民之间的冲突而言，不存在独立的外部第三方；同样，在不同国家的代理人或机构之间的冲突中，也不存在独立的外部第三方。因此，就国家与其公民之间，或一个国家机构与另一个国家机构签订协议而言，这种协议只能由国家自我约束。国家除了它自我接受和强制执行的规则外（它对自己施加的约束），不受任何其它约束。就此而言，我们可以这么说，国家仍然处于一种以自我约束和强制为特征的自然无政府状态，因为没有更高一级的国家可以约束它。

Further：If we accept the Hobbesian idea that the enforcement of mutually agreed upon rules does require some independent third party，this would actually rule out the establishment of a state。In fact，it would constitute a conclusive argument against the institution of a state，i.e.，of a monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking and arbitration。For then，there must also exist an independent third party to decide in every case of conflict between me （private citizen） and some state agent，and likewise an independent third party must exist for every case of intrastate conflict （and there must be another independent third party for the case of conflicts between various third par ties）—yet this means，of course，that such a “state” （or any independent third party） would be no state as I have defined it at the outset but simply one of many freely competing thirdparty conflict arbitrators。

进一步说，如果我们接受霍布斯的观点，即相互同意的规则的执行确实需要一些独立的第三方，这实际上就排除了建立一个国家的可能性。事实上，它将构成反对国家制度的决定性的论点——国家是最终决策和仲裁的垄断者。因此，必须存在一个独立的第三方来裁决我（私人公民）与某些国家机构之间的每一起冲突，同样，必须存在一个独立的第三方来处理每一起国家内部的冲突（必须有另一个独立的第三方来处理各种第三方之间的冲突）——当然，这意味着，这样一个“国家”（或任何独立的第三方）将不是我在一开始所定义的国家，而只是许多自由竞争的第三方冲突仲裁者之一。

let me conclude then：the intellectual case against the state seems to be easy and straightforward。But that does not mean that it is practically easy。Indeed，almost everyone is convinced that the state is a necessary institution，for the reasons that I have indicated。So it is very doubtful if the battle against statism can be won，as easy as it might seem on the purely theoreti cal，intellectual level。However，even if that should turn out to be impossible—at least let’s have some fun at the expense of our statist opponents。

归纳起来，从智力和知识上否定国家的合理性，论证是简单而直接的，但真的要将这样的理念投入实践却相当不容易。事实上，几乎每个人都相信国家是一种必要的制度，原因我已经阐明。因此，反对国家主义的斗争能否取得胜利是非常值得怀疑的，尽管在纯理论和知识层面看起来很容易。然而，即使结果被证明是不可能的——至少我们这些国家主义的反对亦可自黑，以此找点乐子。

And for that I suggest that you always and persistently confront them with the following riddle。Assume a group of people，aware of the possibil ity of conflicts between them。Someone then proposes，as a solution to this human problem，that he （or someone） be made the ultimate arbiter in any such case of conflict，including those conflicts in which he is involved。Is this is a deal that you would accept？ I am confident that he will be consid ered either a joker or mentally unstable。Yet this is precisely what all statists propose。

2 私有财产的伦理学与经济学

The Ethics and Economics of Private Property

I.社会的秩序问题

THE problem OF SOCIAL ORDER

Alone on his island，Robinson Crusoe can do whatever he pleases。For him，the question concerning rules of orderly human conduct—social coopera tion—simply does not arise。Naturally，this question can only arise once a second person，Friday，arrives on the island。Yet even then，the question remains largely irrelevant so long as no scarcity exists。Suppose the island is the Garden of Eden； all external goods are available in superabundance。They are “free goods，” just as the air that we breathe is normally a “free” good。Whatever Crusoe does with these goods，his actions have repercus sions neither with respect to his own future supply of such goods nor regarding the present or future supply of the same goods for Friday （and vice versa）。Hence，it is impossible that there could ever be a conflict between Crusoe and Friday concerning the use of such goods。A conflict is only possible if goods are scarce。only then will there arise the need to formulate rules that make orderly—conflictfree—social cooperation possible。

*originally published in The Elgar Companion to the Economics of Private Property，edited by Enrico Colombatto （London：Edward Elgar，2004）。

*最初发表于恩里科·科伦巴托编辑的《埃尔加私有财产经济学指南》（伦敦：爱德华·埃尔加出版社，2004 年）。

独自一人在岛上的鲁滨逊·鲁滨逊可以做任何他喜欢的事。对他来说，有关人类有序行为规则的问题——社会合作——根本就没有出现。当然，这个问题只有在第二个人星期五来到岛上时才会出现。然而，即便如此，只要不存在稀缺，这个问题在很大程度上仍然无关紧要。假设这个岛是伊甸园，所有的外部物质都非常充足。它们是“自由财货”，就像我们通常呼吸的空气一样，是“免费”商品。无论鲁滨逊对这些物品做什么，他的行为都不会对他自己在未来对这些物品的供应产生影响，也不会对星期五现在或未来对这些物品的供应产生影响（反之亦然）。因此，鲁滨逊和星期五之间不可能就这些物品的使用发生冲突。只有在商品稀缺的情况下才有可能发生冲突。在稀缺的世界，才有必要制定规则，使无冲突有序的社会合作成为可能。

In the Garden of Eden only two scarce goods exist：the physical body of a person and its standing room。Crusoe and Friday each have only one body and can stand only at one place at a time。Hence，even in the Garden of Eden conflicts between Crusoe and Friday can arise：Crusoe and Friday cannot occupy the same standing room simultaneously without coming thereby into physical conflict with each other。Accordingly，even in the Garden of Eden rules of orderly social conduct must exist—rules regarding the proper location and movement of human bodies。And outside the Garden of Eden，in the realm of scarcity，there must be rules that regulate not only the use of personal bodies but also of everything scarce so that all possible conflicts can be ruled out。This is the problem of social order。

即使在伊甸园，也有两件物品是稀缺的：一个人的身体和他站立的空间。鲁滨逊和星期五各自只有一个身体，一次只能站在一个地方。因此，即使在伊甸园中，鲁滨逊和星期五之间的冲突也会出现：鲁滨逊和星期五不能同时站在同一个地方，否则就会发生身体上的冲突。因此，即使在伊甸园中，有序的社会行为规则也必须存在——关于人体的适当位置和活动的规则。在伊甸园之外充满稀缺的现实世界，必须有规则，不仅规范个人身体的使用，也规范每一件稀缺物品的使用，以便消除所有可能的冲突。这是社会秩序的主题。

II.解决方案：私有财产和先占

THE SOLUTIon：PRIVAte PROPERTY AND originAL APPROPRIATIon

In the history of social and political thought，various proposals have been advanced as a solution to the problem of social order，and this variety of mutually inconsistent proposals has contributed to the fact that today’s search for a single “correct” solution is frequently deemed illusory。Yet as I will try to demonstrate，a correct solution exists； hence，there is no reason to succumb to moral relativism。The solution has been known for hundreds of years，if not for much longer。1 In modern times this old and simple solution was formulated most clearly and convincingly by Murray N.Rothbard。2

在社会和政治思想史上，人们为社会秩序问题提出了各种各样的解决方案，而这种相互矛盾的多样性建议导致了这样一个事实，即今天寻求唯一“正确”的解决方案往往被认为是虚幻的。然而，正如我将试图证明的那样，存在一个正确的解决方案；因此，没有理由屈服于道德相对主义。这个解决方案人们已经知道几百年了，甚至更早。[2] 现在，默里·罗斯巴德（Murray N . rothbard）已最清晰、最令人信服地阐述了这个古老而简单的解决方案。[3]

let me begin by formulating the solution—first for the special case represented by the Garden of Eden and subsequently for the general case represented by the “real” world of allaround scarcity—and then proceed to the explanation of why this solution，and no other，is correct。

接下来，我首先以伊甸园为例的特殊情况，来阐述这个解决方案，然后将其推广到稀缺性普遍存在的“现实”世界，最后解释为什么唯有这个答案是正确的。

In the Garden of Eden，the solution is provided by the simple rule stipulating that everyone may place or move his own body wherever he pleases，provided only that no one else is already standing there and occupying the same space。And outside of the Garden of Eden，in the realm of allaround scarcity the solution is provided by this rule：

在伊甸园中，解决方案是根据一条简单的规则提供的，每个人都可以将自己的身体放置或移动到他喜欢的任何地方，只要没有其他人已经站在那里并占据相同的空间。在伊甸园之外，是到处都存在稀缺的现实世界，提供解决方案的是这条规则：

Everyone is the proper owner of his own physical body as well as of all places and naturegiven goods that he occupies and puts to use by means of his body，provided that no one else has already occupied or used the same places and goods before him。This ownership of “originally appropriated” places and goods by a person implies his right to use and transform these places and goods in any way he sees fit，provided that he does not thereby forcibly change the physical integrity of places and goods originally appropriated by another person。In particular，once a place or good has been first appropriated，in John Locke’s words，by “mixing one’s labor” with it，ownership in such places and goods can be acquired only by means of a voluntary— contractual—transfer of its property title from a previous to a later owner。In light of widespread moral relativism，it is worth pointing out that this idea of original appropriation and private property as a solution to the problem of social order is in complete accordance with our moral “intuition。” Is it not simply absurd to claim that a person should not be the proper owner of his body and the places and goods that he originally，i.e.，prior to anyone else，appropriates，uses and/or produces by means of his body？ For who else，if not he，should be their owner？ And is it not also obvious that the over whelming majority of people—including children and primitives—in fact act according to these rules，and do so as a matter of course？

每个人都是他其身体的所有者，也是他以身体为手段占据和使用的所有地方以及自然赋予的物品的正当所有者，只要这些同样的地方和物品没有被他人在其之前占据或使用。一个人对“先占”的地方和物品拥有所有权，这意味着他有权以他认为合适的任何方式使用和改造这些地方和物品，只要他不因此强行改变另一人先占的地方和物品的物理完整性。特别是，一旦一个地方或物品，用约翰·洛克的话说，通过“混合一个人的劳动”被第一次占有，那么这些地方和物品的所有权只能通过自愿的——契约的——方式，将其财产所有权从前一个所有者转让到后一个所有者。鉴于普遍存在的道德相对主义，有必要指出的是，这种将先占和私有财产作为社会秩序问题的解决方案的观念，完全符合我们的道德“直觉”。声称一个人不应该正当拥有自己的身体，不应该拥有他先于他人占有或使用的地方和物品，不应该拥有他以自己的身体为手段生产出来的东西，这岂不是荒谬透顶？除他之外，又有谁能成为它们的所有者呢？而且，绝大多数人——包括儿童和原始人——实际上都是按照这些规则行事的，并且视为理所当然，这难道不是很明显吗？

Moral intuition，as important as it is，is not proof。However，there also exists proof of the veracity of our moral intuition。

道德直觉虽然很重要，但并不是证明。然而，也有证据证明我们的道德直觉的真实性。

The proof is twofold。on the one hand，the consequences that follow if one were to deny the validity of the institution of original appropriation and private property are spelled out：If person A were not the owner of his own body and the places and goods originally appropriated and/or produced with this body as well as of the goods voluntarily （contractually） acquired from another previous owner，then only two alternatives would exist。Either another person，B，must be recognized as the owner of A’s body as well as the places and goods appropriated，produced or acquired by A，or both persons，A and B，must be considered equal coowners of all bodies，places and goods。

In the first case，A would be reduced to the rank of B’s slave and object of exploitation。B would be the owner of A’s body and all places and goods appropriated，produced and acquired by A，but A in turn would not be the owner of B’s body and the places and goods appropriated，produced and acquired by B。Hence，under this ruling two categorically distinct classes of persons would be constituted—Untermenschen such as A and Übermenschen such as B—to whom different “laws” apply。Accordingly，such ruling must be discarded as a human ethic equally applicable to everyone qua human being （rational animal）。From the very outset，any such ruling is recognized as not universally acceptable and thus cannot claim to represent law。For a rule to aspire to the rank of a law—a just rule—it is necessary that such a rule apply equally and universally to everyone。

在第一种选择下，A会沦为B的奴隶和剥削对象。B将是A的身体以及被A占有、生产和获得的所有场所和物品的所有者，但反过来，A将不是B的身体以及被B占有、生产和获得的和物品的所有者。于是，在这个规则之下，存在截然不同的两类人，下等人A和上等人B，各自适用不同的“法律”。这样的规则决不能被当作一个平等地适用于每个有人格的人（理性的动物）的道德规范，因此必须予以抛弃。从一开始，任何这样的规则就被认为不是普遍接受的，因此不能声称代表法律。一个规则要想成为法律——一个公正的规则——就必须平等地、普遍地适用于每一个人。

Alternatively，in the second case of universal and equal coownership，the requirement of equal law for everyone would be fulfilled。However，this alternative would suffer from an even more severe deficiency，because if it were applied，all of mankind would instantly perish。（Since every human ethic must permit the survival of mankind，this alternative must also be rejected。） Every action of a person requires the use of some scarce means （at least of the person’s body and its standing room），but if all goods were coowned by everyone，then no one，at no time and no place，would be allowed to do anything unless he had previously secured every other co owner’s consent to do so。Yet how could anyone grant such consent were he not the exclusive owner of his own body （including his vocal chords） by which means his consent must be expressed？ Indeed，he would first need another’s consent in order to be allowed to express his own，but these oth ers could not give their consent without having first his，and so it would go on。

在第二种选择下，即是全体和均等的共同所有制，法律面前人人平等的要求得到了满足。然而，这个选择存在更为严重的缺陷。这是因为，如果这个规则真的得到应用，人类就会立即毁灭。（由于任何人类道德规范都必须允许人类生存，这个选择必须被拒绝）。这是因为，人的行动需要使用某种稀缺手段，至少要使用自己的身体和立足之地。但是，如果所有物品都是人人共有的，那么，除非得到每个共同所有者同意，没有人能够在任何时间和地点做任何事情。然而，假如一个人甚至不拥有自己的身体（包括他的发音器官），他又如何表达自己的同意呢？事实上，要表达他自己的同意，他要首先征得他人的同意，但没有他的同意，这些人同样无法表达他们的同意。如此等等。

This insight into the praxeological impossibility of “universal communism，” as Rothbard referred to this proposal，brings me immediately to an alternative way of demonstrating the idea of original appropriation and private property as the only correct solution to the problem of social order。3 Whether or not persons have any rights and，if so，which ones，can only be decided in the course of argumentation （propositional exchange）。Justifica tion—proof，conjecture，refutation—is argumentative justification。Anyone who denied this proposition would become involved in a performative con tradiction because his denial would itself constitute an argument。Even an ethical relativist would have to accept this first proposition，which is referred to accordingly as the a priori of argumentation。

From the undeniable acceptance—the axiomatic status—of this a priori of argumentation，two equally necessary conclusions follow。First，it follows from the a priori of argumentation when there is no rational solution to the problem of conflict arising from the existence of scarcity。Suppose in my ear lier scenario of Crusoe and Friday that Friday were not the name of a man but of a gorilla。Obviously，just as Crusoe could face conflict regarding his body and its standing room with Friday the man，so might he with Friday the gorilla。The gorilla might want to occupy the same space that Crusoe already occupied。In this case，at least if the gorilla were the sort of entity that we know gorillas to be，there would be no rational solution to their conflict。Either the gorilla would push aside，crush，or devour Crusoe—that would be the gorilla’s solution to the problem—or Crusoe would tame，chase，beat，or kill the gorilla—that would be Crusoe’s solution。In this situation，one might indeed speak of moral relativism。However，it would be more appropriate to refer to this situation as one in which the question of justice and rationality simply would not arise； that is，it would be considered an extramoral situation。The existence of Friday the gorilla would pose a technical，not a moral，problem for Crusoe。He would have no other choice than to learn how to successfully manage and control the movements of the gorilla just as he would have to learn to manage and control other inanimate objects of his environment。

从这种不可否认的先验性——具有公理地位——出发，可以得出两个必然结论。首先，当由于稀缺的存在而产生的冲突问题没有理性的解决方案时，这是从先验论证中得出的。假设在我之前提到的鲁宾逊和星期五的场景中，“星期五”不是一个人的名字，而是一只大猩猩的名字。大猩猩可能想要占据鲁滨逊已经占据的空间。在这种情况下，至少大猩猩是我们所知的那种生物，那么它们之间的冲突就没有理性的解决方式。只有两种解决方式，要么大猩猩把鲁滨逊赶走、撕成齑粉甚至吃掉——这就是大猩猩解决问题的办法——要么鲁滨逊驯服、驱逐、打败或杀死大猩猩——这就是鲁滨逊的办法。在这种情况下，我们可以说道德相对主义。然而，更恰当的说法是，这种情况根本上与公正和理性无涉；也就是说，它将被视为一种与道德无关的情况。大猩猩星期五的存在会给鲁滨逊带来技术问题，而不是道德问题。他别无选择，只能学习如何成功地管理和控制大猩猩的动作，就像他必须学习管理和控制环境中其他无生命的物体一样。

By implication，only if both parties in a conflict are capable of engaging in argumentation with one another，can one speak of a moral problem and is the question of whether or not there exists a solution to it a meaningful question。only if Friday，regardless of his physical appearance，is capable of argumentation （even if he has shown himself to be capable only once），can he be deemed rational and does the question whether or not a correct solution to the problem of social order exists make sense。No one can be expected to give any answer to someone who has never raised a question or，more to the point，who has never stated his own relativistic viewpoint in the form of an argument。In that case，this “other” cannot but be regarded and treated as an animal or plant，i.e.，as an extramoral entity。only if this other entity can pause in his activity，whatever it might be，step back，and say yes or no to something one has said，do we owe this entity an answer and，accordingly，can we possibly claim that our answer is the correct one for both parties involved in a conflict。

言下之意是，只有冲突双方能够相互论证，人们才能谈论道德问题，是否存在解决方案的问题才是一个有意义的问题。无论星期五的外貌如何，只有当他能够进行论证（即使他只表现出一次这样的能力），他才能被认为是理性的，那么此时讨论是否存在解决社会秩序问题的正确方法才有意义。谁也不能指望对一个从来没有提出过问题的人，或者更确切地说，一个从来没有以论证的形式阐述过自己的相对的观点的人能给出任何一个答案。在这种情况下，这个“他者”不能不被当作动物或植物来看待和对待，作为一个道德之外的实体。只有当这个 “他者 ”能够暂停他的活动，不管是什么活动，后退一步，对某人所说的话表示同意或不同意时，我们才欠这个实体一个答案。换句话说，只有冲突的双方都是能够表达的，我们才可能声称我们的答案对冲突中的双方来说都是正确的。

Moreover，it follows from the a priori of argumentation that every thing that must be presupposed in the course of an argumentation as the logical and praxeological precondition of argumentation cannot in turn be argumentatively disputed as regards its validity without becoming thereby entangled in an internal （performative） contradiction。

此外，论证的先验性作为逻辑学和行动学意义上的论证前提，根据这一点，论证中必须预先假定一些命题，这些命题的有效性不能反过来成为论证的对象，不然就会陷入内在（述行性的）的矛盾之中。

Now，propositional exchanges are not made up of freefloating propositions，but rather constitute a specific human activity。argumentation between Crusoe and Friday requires that both have，and mutually recognize each other as having，exclusive control over their respective bodies （their brains，vocal cords，etc。） as well as the standing room occupied by their bodies。No one could propose anything and expect the other party to convince himself of the validity of this proposition or deny it and propose something else unless his and his opponent’s right to exclusive control over their respec tive bodies and standing rooms were presupposed。In fact，it is precisely this mutual recognition of the proponent’s as well as the opponent’s property in his own body and standing room which constitutes the characteristicum specificum of all propositional disputes：that while one may not agree regarding the validity of a specific proposition，one can agree nonetheless on the fact that one disagrees。Moreover，this right to property in one’s own body and its standing room must be considered a priori （or indisputably） justified by proponent and opponent alike。Anyone who claimed any proposition as valid visàvis an opponent would already presuppose his and his opponent’s exclusive control over their respective bodies and standing room simply in order to say，“I claim such and such to be true，and I challenge you to prove me wrong。”

组成交换命题是特定的人类行为，而不是一些不知原因和自由漂浮的命题。鲁宾逊与星期五之间的论证需要双方相互承认各自有权独自支配自己的身体（大脑和发音器官等）以及身体占据的站立空间。除非预先假设一个人和与之论证的人有权独自支配自己的身体和站立的空间，否则他们中没有人能够提出任何命题，更不能期望另一方使自己相信命题的有效性，或者否认这个命题并给出新的命题。事实上，论证各方相互承认对方对自己的身体和站立空间的所有权，这一点构成论证的根本特征：一个人也许不同意某个提议的有效性，但他能够同意如下事实：有一个人不同意。此外，一个人对自己的身体和站立空间的财产权必须被论证双方看作是先验（无可争议地）正当的。任何声称自己的命题对对手有效的人，都已经预设了他和他的对手对各自的身体和站立空间的排他性控制权，这只不过是说，“我声称某个命题是正确的，提请你证明我的错误。”

Furthermore，it would be equally impossible to engage in argumenta tion and rely on the propositional force of one’s arguments if one were not allowed to own （exclusively control） other scarce means （besides one’s body and its standing room）。If one did not have such a right，then we would all immediately perish and the problem of justifying rules—as well as any other human problem—would simply not exist。Hence，by virtue of the fact of being alive，property rights to other things must be presupposed as valid，too。No one who is alive can possibly argue otherwise。

此外，如果一个人不被允许拥有（排他性控制）其他稀缺的手段（除了自己的身体和站立的空间之外），那么同样不可能进行论证，并论证自己命题的有效性。如果一个人没有这样的权利，那么我们都会立即灭亡，为规则辩护的问题——以及任何其他人类问题——就根本不存在了。因此，由于生命存续这个事实，对其他事物的财产权也必须被预设为是有效的。任何一个活着的人都不可能不这样论证。

Furthermore，if a person were not permitted to acquire property in these goods and spaces by means of an act of original appropriation，i.e.，by establishing an objective （intersubjectively ascertainable） link between him self and a particular good and/or space prior to anyone else，and if instead property in such goods or spaces were granted to latecomers，then no one would ever be permitted to begin using any good unless he had previously secured such a latecomer’s consent。Yet how can a latecomer consent to the actions of an early comer？ Moreover，every latecomer would in turn need the consent of other and later latercomers，and so on。That is，neither we，our forefathers，nor our progeny would have been or would be able to survive if one followed this rule。However，in order for any person—past，present，or future—to argue anything，survival must be possible； and in order to do just this，property rights cannot be conceived of as being timeless and unspecific with respect to the number of persons concerned。Rather，property rights must necessarily be conceived of as originating by means of action at definite points in time and space by definite individuals。otherwise，it would be impossible for anyone to ever say anything at a definite point in time and space and for someone else to be able to reply。Simply saying，then，that the firstuserfirstowner rule of the ethics of private property can be ignored or is unjustified implies a performative contradiction，as one’s being able to say so must presuppose one’s existence as an independent decisionmaking unit at a given point in time and space。4

还有，如果不允许一个人通过先占行动，即先于他人建立自己与特定物品或空间之间的关系，一个客观的（不同主体间可确定的）联系，从而获得对这些物品和空间的财产权；如果对这些物品或空间的财产权要得到后到者的承认，那么，除非先征得后到者的同意，没有人能够开始使用任何物品。然而，后到者又如何同意先来者的行动呢？此外，每个后到者需要依次征得其他和更晚的后到者的同意，如此等等。也就是说，假如按照这个规则，我们的祖先、我们自身以及我们的后代都无法生存。然而，为了让任何一个人——过去、现在或未来的人——进行任何论证，生存必须是可能的；而要做到这一点，产权就不能被认为在时间上是永恒的且在涉及的人数方面是不明确的。相反，产权必须被理解为是在特定的时间和空间点由特定的个人通过行动产生的。否则，任何人都不可能在特定的时间和空间点说出任何话，也不可能有其他人能够回应。简单地说，认为私有财产伦理的“先使用者则为先拥有者”规则可以被忽视或不正当，这意味着一种“谏言冲突”，因为一个人能够这样说必然以其在特定的时间和空间点作为一个独立的决策单位的存在为前提。[5]

III.误解和澄清

MISConcePTIonS AND CLARIFICATIonS

According to this understanding of private property，property ownership means the exclusive control of a particular person over specific physical objects and spaces。Conversely，property rights invasion means the uninvited physical damage or diminution of things and territories owned by other persons。In contrast，a widely held view holds that the damage or diminution of the value （or price） of someone’s property also constitutes a punishable offense。

As far as the （in）compatibility of both positions is concerned，it is easy to recognize that nearly every action of an individual can alter the value （price） of someone else’s property。For example，when person A enters the labor or the marriage market，this may change the value of B in these markets。And when A changes his relative valuations of beer and bread，or if A himself decides to become a brewer or baker，this changes the value of the property of other brewers and bakers。According to the view that value damage constitutes a rights violation A would be committing a punishable offense visàvis brewers or bakers。If A is guilty，then B and the brewers and bakers must have the right to defend themselves against A’s actions，and their defensive actions can only consist of physical invasions of A and his property。B must be permitted to physically prohibit A from entering the labor or marriage market； the brewers and bakers must be permitted to physically prevent A from spending his money as he sees fit。However，in this case the physical damage or diminution of the property of others cannot be viewed as a punishable offense。Since physical invasion and diminution are defensive actions，they are legitimate。Conversely，if physical damage and diminution constitute a rights violation，then B or the brewers and bakers do not have the right to defend themselves against A’s actions，for his actions—his entering of the labor and marriage market，his altered evaluation of beer and bread，or his opening of a brewery or bakery—do not affect B’s bodily integrity or the physical integrity of the property of brewers or bakers。If they physically defend themselves nonetheless，then the right to defense would lie with A。In that case，however，it cannot be regarded as a punishable offense if one alters the value of other people’s property。A third possibility does not exist。

当我们关注这两种观点的相容性时，不难理解，一个人的每个行动几乎都能改变另一个人的财产的价值（价格）。例如，当A进入劳动或婚姻市场时，这一行动会改变B在这些市场中的价值。当A改变他关于啤酒和面包的相对价值判断时，或者A决定生产啤酒或面包时，这将改变其他啤酒制造商和面包师的财产的价值。依照价值破坏构成侵权的观点，A就是在对啤酒制造商或面包师实行了可以惩罚的侵犯。如果A有罪，那么，B、啤酒制造商和面包师必定有权保护自己免受A的行动的伤害，而且他们的自卫行动只能构成对A及其财产的物理入侵。因此，必须允许B物理上禁止A进入劳动市场或婚姻市场；必须允许啤酒制造商和面包师物理上阻止A按照自己喜欢的方式花钱。然而，在这种情况下，他人财产的物理损坏或减损不能被视为应受惩罚的违法行为，因为这些物理侵犯和减损是自卫行为，是合法的。相反，如果物理损坏和减损构成侵权，那么，B或啤酒制造商和面包师就没有权利保护自己免受A的行动伤害，因为A的行动——进入劳动和婚姻市场，他改变了关于啤酒和面包的评价，或者他开设一个啤酒厂或面包店——并不影响B的人身的完整性，也不影响啤酒制造商和面包师的财产的物理完整性。如果后三者在物理上采取自卫，那么，自卫权就会属于A。然而，在这种情况下，一个人改变他人财产的价值就不能被视为应受惩罚的违法行为。不存在第三种可能。

both ideas of property rights are not only incompatible，however。The alternative view—that one could be the owner of the value or price of scarce goods—is indefensible。While a person has control over whether or not his actions will change the physical properties of another’s property，he has no control over whether or not his actions affect the value （or price） of another’s property。This is determined by other individuals and their evaluations。Consequently，it would be impossible to know in advance whether or not one’s planned actions are legitimate。The entire population would have to be interrogated to assure that one’s actions would not damage the value of someone else’s property，and one could not begin to act until a univer sal consensus had been reached。mankind would die out long before this assumption could ever be fulfilled。

这两种财产权观念不仅互不相容，而且还相互冲突。另一种观点——一个人可以是稀缺物品价值或价格的所有者——是站不住脚的。虽然一个人可以控制自己的行动是否会改变他人财产的物理属性，但他无法控制自己的行动是否会影响他人财产的价值（或价格）。因此，不可能事先知道自己计划的行动是否合法。为了确保自己的行动不会损害他人财产的价值，必须对整个人口进行调查，在达成统一共识之前，人们无法开始行动。在这一假设实现之前，人类早就灭亡了。

Moreover，the assertion that one has a property right in the value of things involves a contradiction，for in order to claim this proposition to be valid—universally agreeable—it would have to be assumed that it is permissible to act before agreement is reached。otherwise，it would be impossible to ever propose anything。However，if one is permitted to assert a proposition—and no one could deny this without running into contradictions— then this is only possible because physical property borders exist，i.e.，borders which everyone can recognize and ascertain independently and in complete ignorance of others’ subjective valuations。[6]

此外，“一个人对事物的价值拥有财产权 ”的主张内含一个矛盾，因为要使这一命题有效——普遍同意——就必须假定在达成一致意见之前是可以采取行动的。否则，就不可能提出任何主张。然而，如果一个人被允许断言一个命题——没有人可以否认这一点而不陷入矛盾——那么只有存在财产的物理边界，即每个人都可以独立地、在完全不了解他人主观评值的情况下就能辨别和确定的边界，才是可能的。[7]

Another，equally common misunderstanding of the idea of private property concerns the classification of actions as permissible or impermissible based exclusively on their physical effects，i.e.，without taking into account that every property right has a history （temporal genesis）。

对私有财产概念的另一个同样常见的误解是，完全根据行动的实际效果将其分为可允许的行动和不可允许的行动，即不考虑每项财产权都有其历史（时间起源）。

If A currently physically damages the property of B （for example by air pollution or noise），the situation must be judged differently depending on whose property right was established earlier。If A’s property was founded first，and if he had performed the questionable activities before the neigh boring property of B was founded，then A may continue with his activities。A has established an easement。From the outset，B had acquired dirty or loud property，and if B wants to have his property clean and quiet he must pay A for this advantage。Conversely，if B’s property was founded first，then A must stop his activities； and if he does not want to do this，he must pay B for this advantage。Any other ruling is impossible and indefensible，because as long as a person is alive and awake he cannot not act。An early comer can not，even if he wished otherwise，wait for a latecomer and his agreement before he begins acting。He must be permitted to act immediately。And if no other property besides one’s own exists （because a latecomer has not yet arrived），then one’s range of action can be deemed limited only by laws of nature。A latecomer can only challenge the legitimacy of an early comer if he is the owner of the goods affected by the early comer’s actions。However，this implies that one can be the owner of unappropriated things； i.e.，that one can be the owner of things one has not yet discovered or appropriated through physical action。This means that no one is permitted to become the first user of a previously undiscovered and unappropriated physical entity。

如果目前A有形地损害了B的财产（例如空气污染或噪音），则根据谁的产权更早确立，必须对这种情况进行不同的裁决。如果A的产权是先确立的，并且在B相邻的产权确立之前，他已经进行了有争议的活动，那么A可以继续他的活动。A建立了地役权。从一开始，B获得的就是肮脏和吵闹的财产，如果B想要他的财产干净和安静，他必须为这个改善付钱给A。相反，如果B的财产是先确立的，那么A必须停止他的活动；如果他不想停止活动，他必须为此向B支付代价。任何其他的规则都是不可能也是站不住脚的，因为只要一个人活着、醒着，他就不可能不行动。一个先来者，即使他愿意这样做，也不能等到后到者的同意后才开始行动。必须允许他立即采取行动。如果除了自己的财产之外没有其他财产存在（因为后到者还没有到来），那么，一个人的行动范围只能被视为仅受自然法则的限制。一个后到者拥有的物品受到了先来者行动的影响，他只能向先来者的合法性提出挑战。然而，这意味着一个人可以成为未被其占有的物品的所有者；也就是说，一个人可以成为他尚未发现或通过物理行动占有的物品的所有者。这意味着，不允许任何人成为先前未发现和未占有的物理实体的第一个使用者。

IV.私有财产经济学

THE EConOMICS OF PRIVAte PROPERTY

The idea of private property not only agrees with our moral intuitions and is the sole just solution to the problem of social order； the institution of private property is also the basis of economic prosperity and of “social welfare。” As long as people act in accordance with the rules underlying the institution of private property，social welfare is optimized。

私有财产的观念不仅符合我们的道德直觉，而且是解决社会秩序问题的唯一公正的办法；私有财产制度也是经济繁荣和“社会福利”的基石。只要人们遵照私有财产制度的基本规则行事，社会福利就会最大化。

Every act of original appropriation improves the welfare of the appropriator （at least ex ante）； otherwise，it would not be performed。At the same time，no one is made worse off by this act。Any other individual could have appropriated the same goods and territories if only he had recognized them as scarce and，hence，valuable。However，since no other individual made such an appropriation，no one else can have suffered a welfare loss on account of the original appropriation。Hence，the socalled Pareto criterion （that it is scientifically legitimate to speak of an improvement of “social welfare” only if a particular change increases the individual welfare of at least one person and leaves no one else worse off） is fulfilled。An act of original appropriation meets this requirement。It enhances the welfare of one person，the appropriator，without diminishing anyone else’s physical wealth （property）。Everyone else has the same quantity of property as before and the appropriator has gained new，previously nonexistent property。Thus，an act of original appropriation always increases social welfare。

Any further action with originally appropriated goods and territories enhances social welfare，for no matter what a person does with his property，it is done to increase his welfare。This is the case when he consumes his property as well as when he produces new property out of “nature。” Every act of production is motivated by the producer’s desire to transform a less valuable entity into a more valuable one。As long as acts of consumption and production do not lead to the physical damage or diminution of property owned by others，they are regarded as enhancing social welfare。

用先占的物品和领地进行的进一步行动为也增进社会福利。这是因为，无论一个人用自己的财产做什么，其目的总是增加他自身的福利。当他消费自己的财产和借助“自然”生产出新的财产时，他的福利增加。每个生产活动背后的动机总是生产者把不那么有价值的物品变成更有价值的物品。只要消费和生产行动不给他人拥有的财产造成物理上的损坏或减损，它们就是增进社会福利的行动。

Finally，every voluntary exchange （transfer） of appropriated or produced property from one owner to another increases social welfare。An exchange of property is only possible if both owners prefer what they acquire over what they surrender and thus expect to benefit from the exchange。Two persons gain in welfare from every exchange of property，and the property under the control of everyone else is unchanged。

最后，先占或生产出来的财产从一个所有者到另一个所有者的交换（转让）增进社会福利。财产交换之所以会发生，惟一的原因是，交易双方都更偏爱从交换中得到的物品而不是他们所放弃的物品，从而都期望在交换中获利。每次财产交换都使交换双方获利，而其他人支配下的财产未被改变。

In distinct contrast，any deviation from the institution of private property must lead to social welfare losses。

与之截然不同的是，对私有财产制度的任何偏离都必然导致社会福利的损失。

In the case of universal and equal coownership—universal communism instead of private property—the price to be paid would be mankind’s instant death because universal coownership would mean that no one would be allowed to do anything or move anywhere。Each actual deviation from a private property order would represent a system of unequal domination and hegemony。That is，it would be an order in which one person or group—the rulers，exploiters，or Übermenschen—would be permitted to acquire property other than by original appropriation，production or exchange，while another person or group—the ruled，exploited，or Untermenschen—would be prohibited from doing likewise。While hegemony is possible，it would involve social welfare losses and would lead to relative impoverishment。

在普遍而平等的共同所有权——普遍的共产主义而不是私有产权——的情况下，所要付出的代价将是人类的立即死亡，因为普遍的公有制意味着任何人都不被允许做任何事情或移动到任何地方。现实中对私有财产秩序的每一种偏离都代表着一个不平等的统治和霸权制度。也就是说，它会是这样一种秩序，其中，允许某些人或某个群体——统治者、剥削者或上等人——不经先占、生产或交换行动而获得财产，同时却不允许另一些人或另一个群体——被统治者、被剥削者或下等人——做类似的事情。霸权是可能的，但社会福利将会遭受损失，并会导致相对贫困。

If A is permitted to acquire a good or territory which B has appropriated as indicated by visible signs，the welfare of A is increased at the expense of a corresponding welfare loss on the part of B。The Pareto criterion is not fulfilled，and social welfare is suboptimal。The same is true with other forms of hegemonic rule。If A prohibits B from originally appropriating a hitherto unowned piece of nature； if A may acquire goods produced by B without B’s consent； if A may proscribe what B is permitted to do with his appropriated or produced goods （apart from the requirement that one is not permitted to physically damage or diminish others’ property）—in each case there is a “winner，” A，and a “loser，” B。In every case，A increases his supply of property at the expense of B’s corresponding loss of property。In no case is the Pareto criterion fulfilled，and a suboptimal level of social welfare always results。

如果允许A获得B以明显标记指明占有的物品或领地，那么，A的福利增进是以B的福利的相应减损为代价。帕累托规则没有得到满足，社会福利没有最大化。这一结论对于其他形式的霸权统治也同样成立。如果 A 禁止 B 先占一块迄今为止尚未拥有的自然物；如果 A 可以不经 B 同意而获得 B 生产的物品；如果 A 可以规定允许 B 如何处置他占有或生产的物品（除了不允许对他人财产造成实际损害或减损的要求之外）——在每种情况下，都有一个 “赢家”A，和一个 “输家” B。在任何情况下，帕累托标准都不会得到满足，结果总是社会福利没有最大化。

Moreover，hegemony and exploitation lead to a reduced level of future production。Every ruling which grants nonappropriators，nonproducers and nontraders control，either partial or full，over appropriated，produced or traded goods，leads necessarily to a reduction of future acts of original appropriation，production and mutually beneficial trade。For the person performing them，each of these activities is associated with certain costs，and the costs of performing them increases under a hegemonic system and those of not performing them decreases。Present consumption and leisure become more attractive as compared to production （future consumption），and the level of production will fall below what it otherwise would have been。As for the rulers，the fact that they can increase their wealth by expropriat ing property appropriated，produced or contractually acquired by others will lead to a wasteful usage of the property at their disposal。because they are permitted to supplement their future wealth by means of expropria tion （taxes），present orientation and consumption （high time preference） are encouraged，and insofar as they use their goods “productively” at all，the likelihood of misallocations，miscalculation，and economic loss is systematically increased。

此外，霸权和剥削还导致未来生产水平的降低。准许一些人部分或全部霸占另一些先占、生产和交换得来的物品，必定会减少未来的先占、生产和互利的交换活动。对于从事这些活动的人来说，这些活动中的每一个都有一定的成本，而在霸权统治的制度下，从事这些活动的成本增加，不从事它们的成本减少。与生产（未来消费）相比，当前的消费和休闲变得更具吸引力，生产水平将低于应有的水平。至于统治者，由于他们能够通过剥夺他人先占、生产或契约交换得来的财产来增加他们的财富，因此他们不珍惜财产的使用。这是因为，他们可以通过剥夺（征税）来增加他们未来的财富，这将鼓励短期行为和消费（较高的时间偏好），就物品在生产中的利用来说，资源配置扭曲、错误的计算和经济损失发生的可能性就会系统性地增加。

V.古典渊源

THE CLASSIC PEDIGreE

As noted at the outset，the ethics and economics of private property presented above does not claim originality。Rather，it is a modern expression of a “classic” tradition，going back to beginnings in Aristotle，Roman law，Aquinas，the late spanish Scholastics，Hugo Grotius and John Locke。 [8]

正如一开始所指出的，上述私有财产的伦理和经济学并不新奇。相反，它是一种“古典”传统的现代表述，可以追溯到亚里士多德、罗马法、阿奎那和晚期的西班牙经院哲学家、雨果·格劳秀斯和约翰·洛克。

In contrast to the communist utopia of Plato’s republic，Aristotle provides a comprehensive list of the comparative advantages of private property in Politics。First，private property is more productive。What is common to the greatest number gets the least amount of care。men pay most attention to what is their own； they care less for what is common； or at any rate they care for it only to the extent to which each is individually concerned。Even when there is no other cause for inattention，men are more prone to neglect their duty when they think that another is attending to it。 [9]

与柏拉图《理想国》中的共产主义乌托邦相反，亚里士多德在《政治学》中全面列举了私有财产制度的比较优势。第一，私有财产更具生产力。“大多数人公有的东西最少得到爱护。人们最爱护自己拥有的东西，而较少爱护公有的东西，或者他们关心后者的程度仅仅限于与个人利益有关的范围。即使没有其他疏于关心共有财产的理由，想到其他人正在关心它，人们也较倾向于忽视自己的责任。”

Secondly，private property prevents conflict and promotes peace。When people have their own separate domains of interest，“there will not be the same grounds for quarrels，and the amount of interest will increase，because each man will feel that he is applying himself to what is his。” [10] “Indeed，it is a fact of observation that those who own common property，and share in its management，are far more often at variance with one another than those who have property in severalty。” [11] Further，private property has existed always and everywhere，whereas nowhere have communist utopias sprung up spontaneously。Finally，private property promotes the virtues of benevo lence and generosity。It allows one to be so with friends in need。

第二，私有财产防止冲突，促进和平。当人们有各自分离的利益范围时，“没有争吵的共同基础，利益将会增加，因为每个人都觉得他是在为自己的事情忙碌。”“一个观察到的事实是，与各自独立拥有财产的人相比，有共有财产和共同参与其管理的人们更容易相互不和。”此外，私有财产始终普遍存在，而共产主义乌托邦却没有在任何一个地方自发地产生。最后，私有财产促进善行和慷慨。它允许一个人善待需要帮助的朋友。

Roman law，from the Twelve Tables to the Theodosian Code and the Justinian Corpus，recognized the right of private property as near absolute。Property stemmed from unchallenged possession，prior usage established easements，a property owner could do with his property as he saw fit，and freedom of contract was acknowledged。As well，Roman law distinguished importantly between “national” （Roman） law—ius civile—and “interna tional” law—ius gentium。

从《十二表法》到《狄奥多西法典》和《查士丁尼文集》，罗马法都近乎绝对地承认私有财产的权利。财产源于无异议的占有，先前的使用建立了地役权，财产所有人可以按照他认为合适的方式使用他的财产，契约自由得到承认。同样，罗马法在 “国内法”（罗马法）—— 市民法（ius civile）和 “国际法”—— 万民法（ius gentium）之间做出了重要区分。

The Christian contribution to this classic tradition—embodied in St。Thomas Aquinas and the late spanish Scholastics，as well as Protestants Grotius and Locke—is twofold。both Greece and Rome were slaveholding civilizations。Aristotle characteristically considered slavery a natural institution。In contrast，Western—Christian—civilization，notwithstanding some exceptions，has been essentially a society of free men。Correspondingly，for Aquinas as for Locke，every person had a proprietary right over himself （selfownership）。Moreover，Aristotle，and classic civilization generally，were disdainful of labor，trade，and moneymaking。In contrast，in accordance with the Old testament，the Church extolled the virtues of labor and work。Correspondingly，for Aquinas as for Locke，it was by work，use，and cultiva tion of previously unused land that property first came into existence。

基督教对这一古典传统的贡献有两个方面，体现在圣托马斯·阿奎那和晚期的西班牙经院哲学家，以及新教徒格劳秀斯和洛克的著作中。希腊和罗马都是蓄奴文明。典型地，亚里士多德认为奴隶制是一种自然制度。相比之下，西方基督教文明，尽管有一些例外，基本上是一个自由人的社会。相应地，对于阿奎那和洛克来说，每个人都对自己拥有所有权（自我所有权）。此外，亚里士多德和古典文明普遍蔑视劳动、交易和财富的获取。相反，与《旧约》相一致，教会颂扬劳动和工作的美德。因此，对于阿奎那和洛克来说，正是通过工作、利用和耕种先前未被利用过的土地，财产才第一次出现。

This classic theory of private property，based on selfownership，original appropriation （homesteading），and contract （title transfer），continued to find prominent proponents，such as J。B。Say。However，from the height of its influence in the eighteenth century until quite recently，with the advance of the Rothbardian movement，the classic theory had slipped into oblivion。

这一古典的私有财产理论，建立在自我所有权、先占（拓殖）和契约（所有权转让）的基础之上，还有另一些著名的支持者，如萨伊。然而，从其在18世纪的鼎盛一直到最近的罗斯巴德运动，这一古典理论一度走向湮没。

For two centuries，economics and ethics （political philosophy） had diverged from their common origin in natural law doctrine into seem ingly unrelated intellectual endeavors。Economics was a valuefree “posi tive” science。It asked，“What means are appropriate to bring about a given （assumed） end？” Ethics was a “normative” science （if it was a science at all）。It asked，“What ends （and what use of means） is one justified to choose？” As a result of this separation，the concept of property increasingly disappeared from both disciplines。For economists，property sounded too normative； for political philosophers property smacked of mundane economics。

In contrast，Rothbard noted，such elementary economic terms as direct and indirect exchange，markets and market prices，as well as aggression，crime，tort，and fraud，cannot be defined or understood without a theory of property。Nor is it possible to establish the familiar economic theorems relating to these phenomena without the implied notion of property and property rights。A definition and theory of property must precede the definition and establishment of all other economic terms and theorems。

两个世纪以来，经济学和伦理学（政治哲学）已经从它们共同的自然法学说的起源中分离出来，变成了看起来毫不相关的两门学科。经济学是一门价值无涉的“实证”科学。它研究的问题是，“什么手段适合达到一个给定的（假设的）目的？”伦理学是一门“规范的”科学（如果它是一门科学的话）。它的问题是，“选择什么样的目的（和手段的用途）是合理正当的？”这种分离的结果是，财产的概念在这两门学科中日益消失。对经济学家来说，财产听起来过于具有规范性；对于政治哲学家来说，财产带有世俗经济学的味道。相反，罗斯巴德指出，如果没有财产理论，直接和间接交换、市场和市场价格，以及侵犯、犯罪、侵权和欺诈等基本的经济学术语，就无法定义或理解。如果没有隐含的财产和财产权的概念，也不可能建立人们熟知的与这些现象有关的经济学定理。财产的定义和理论必须先于所有其他经济术语和定理的定义和确立。

Rothbard’s unique contribution，from the early 1960s until his death in 1995，was the rediscovery of property and property rights as the common foundation of both economics and political philosophy，and the systematic reconstruction and conceptual integration of modern，marginalist economics and natural law political philosophy into a unified moral science：libertarianism。

从20世纪60年代初到1995年去世，罗斯巴德的独特贡献是重新发现了财产和财产权是经济学和政治哲学的共同基础，并系统重建了现代边际主义经济学和自然法政治哲学，从概念上将其整合为统一的道德科学：自由意志主义。

VI.芝加哥转向

CHICAGO DIveRSIonS

At the time when Rothbard was restoring the concept of private property to its central position in economics and reintegrating economics with ethics，other economists and legal theorists associated with the University of Chicago，such as Ronald Coase，Harold Demsetz，and richard Posner，were also beginning to redirect professional attention to the subject of property and property rights。 [12]

当罗斯巴德重建私有财产的概念在经济学中的核心地位，并将经济学与伦理学重新整合时，其他与芝加哥大学有关的经济学家和法学家，如罗纳德·科斯、哈罗德·德姆塞茨和理查德·波斯纳，也开始将专业的注意力转向财产和财产权这一主题。

However，whereas for Rothbard private property and ethics logically precede economics，for the latter private property and ethics are subordinate to economics and economic considerations。According to Posner，whatever increases social wealth is just。 [13]

然而，对于罗斯巴德来说，私有财产和伦理在逻辑上先于经济学；而对于后者（波斯纳等人）来说，私有财产和伦理从属于经济学及经济考量。根据波斯纳的观点，任何增加社会财富的行为都是公正的。

The difference between the two approaches can be illustrated considering one of Coase’s problem cases：A railroad runs beside a farm。The engine emits sparks，damaging the farmer’s crop.What is to be done？

这两种方法之间的区别可以通过科斯的一个案例来说明：一条铁路在农场边通过，火车蹦出火花，损坏了农民的庄稼。该怎么办呢？

From the classic viewpoint，what needs to be established is Who was there first，the farmer or the railroad？ If the farmer was there first，he could force the railroad to cease and desist or demand compensation。If the rail road was there first，then it might continue emitting sparks and the farmer would have to pay the railroad to be sparkfree。

按照古典观点来看，需要确定的是谁先占那里，是农场主还是铁路？如果农民先占，他可以强迫铁路停运或要求赔偿。如果铁路先占那里，那么它可以继续蹦释火花，要让铁路消除火花，农场主就要付钱给铁路公司。

From the Coasean point of view，the answer is twofold。First and “positively，” Coase claims that it does not matter how property rights and liability are allocated as long as they are allocated，and provided （unrealistically） that transaction costs are zero。

从科斯的观点来看，答案有两个。首先，科斯“实证地”声称，只要产权和责任得到清楚的界定，并且（不切实际地）交易成本为零，那么如何界定并不重要。

Coase claims it is wrong to think of the farmer and the railroad as either “right” or “wrong” （liable），as “aggressor” or “victim。”The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is，How should we restrain A？ But this is wrong。We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature。To avoid the harm to B would be to inflict harm on A。The real question that has to be decided is，Should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A？ The problem is to avoid the more serious harm。[14]

科斯声称，考虑农场主和铁路是“对的”或“错的”（负有责任的），是“侵害人”或“受害者”是错误的思路。这个问题通常被认为是A对B造成了伤害，需要确定的是，我们应该如何约束A？但这是错误的。我们处理的是一个相互作用的问题。要避免伤害B，就会伤害A。真正需要决定的问题是，应该允许A伤害B还是应该允许B伤害A？问题是如何避免更严重的伤害。

Further，given the “equal” moral standing of A and B，for the allocation of economic resources it allegedly does not matter to whom property rights are initially assigned。Suppose the crop loss to the farmer，A，is $1，000，and the cost of a spark apprehension device （SAD） to the railroad，B，is $750。If B is found liable for the crop damage，B will install an SAD or cease opera tions。If B is found not liable，then A will pay a sum between $750 and $1，000 for B to install an SAD。both possibilities result in the installation of an SAD。Now assume the numbers are reversed：the crop loss is $750，and the cost of an SAD is $1，000。If B is found liable，he will pay A $750，but he will not install an SAD。And if B is found not liable，A is unable to pay B enough to install an SAD。Again，both scenarios end with the same result：there will be no SAD。Therefore，regardless of how property rights are initially assigned，according to Coase，Demsetz and Posner the allocation of production factors will be the same。

此外，鉴于A和B之间“平等的”道德地位，就经济资源的配置而言，按照科斯的说法，最初将产权界定给谁并不重要。假设农场主A的作物损失是1000美元，一个消除火花的装置（SAD）给铁路公司B带来的成本是750美元。如果认定B对作物损坏负有责任，那么，B将安装一个SAD或停止运行。如果认定B不负责任，那么，A将支付750美元至1000美元之间的一笔钱给B，使其安装一个SAD。两种情况的结果都是安装一个SAD。现在，把数字颠倒一下：作物损失是750美元，一个SAD的成本是1000美元。如果认定B有责任，他将付给A 750美元，但不会安装一个SAD。如果认定B没有责任，那么，A将不能向B支付足够的钱安装一个SAD。两种情况的结果相同：不会有SAD。因此，依照科斯、德姆塞茨和波斯纳，无论财产权最初如何界定，生产要素的配置是相同的。

Second and “normatively”—and for the only realistic case of positive transaction costs—Coase，Demsetz and Posner demand that courts assign property rights to contesting parties in such a way that “wealth” or the “value of production” is maximized。For the case just considered this means that if the cost of the SAD is less than the crop loss，then the court should side with the farmer and hold the railroad liable。otherwise，if the cost of the SAD is higher than the loss in crops，then the court should side with the railroad and hold the farmer liable。Posner offers another example。A fac tory emits smoke and thereby lowers residential property values。If property values are lowered by $3 million and the plant relocation cost is $2 million，the plant should be held liable and forced to relocate。Yet if the numbers are reversed—property values fall by $2 million and relocation costs are $3 million—the factory may stay and continue to emit smoke。

第二，由于交易成本为正这一符合现实的情况，科斯、德姆塞茨和波斯纳“规范地”要求法院按照“财富”或“产品价值”最大化的方式在争夺者中分配财产权。这意味着，在上面的例子中，如果SAD的成本小于作物损失，那么，法院应该站在农场主一边，并坚持铁路负有责任。否则，如果SAD的成本高于作物损失，那么，法院就应该站在铁路一边，并坚持农场主负有责任。波斯纳还给出了另一个例子。一个工厂排放烟雾，从而降低住宅财产价值。如果财产价值降低三百万美元，且工厂搬迁成本是二百万美元，那么，工厂应该负有责任，并被强制搬迁。然而，如果数字颠倒一下，财产价值降低二百万美元，而搬迁成本是三百万美元，那么，工厂就可以留下来，继续排放烟雾。

both the positive and the normative claim of Chicago law and economics must be rejected。[15] As for the claim that it does not matter to whom property rights are initially assigned，three responses are in order。First，as Coase cannot help but admit，it certainly matters to the farmer and the railroad，to whom which rights are assigned。It matters not just how resources are allocated but also who owns them。

芝加哥法学和经济学的实证的和规范的主张都必须被拒绝。至于财产权最初界定给哪一方无关紧要的说法，有如下三个回答。第一，正如科斯也不得不承认，对农场主和铁路公司来说，产权的分配都是重要的。产权的分配不仅影响资源的配置，还决定谁拥有它们。

Second and more importantly，for the value of social production it matters fundamentally how property rights are assigned。The resources allocated to productive ventures are not simply given。They themselves are the outcome of previous acts of original appropriation and production，and how much original appropriation and production there is depends on the incentive for appropriators and producers。If appropriators and producers are the absolute owners of what they have appropriated or produced，i.e.，if no liability visàvis second or thirdcomers arises out of acts of appropriation and production，then the level of wealth will be maximized。on the other hand，if original appropriators and producers can be found liable visàvis latecomers，as is implied in Coase’s “reciprocity of harm” doctrine，then the value of production will be lower than otherwise。That is，the “it doesn’t matter” doctrine is counterproductive to the stated goal of wealth maximization。

第二点，也是更重要的一点，对于社会生产的价值而言，产权如何分配至关重要。分配给生产性企业的资源并非简单地给定。它们本身是之前先占和生产行动的结果，而先占和生产的数量取决于占有者和生产者的激励。如果占有者和生产者是他们所占有或生产之物的绝对所有者，也就是说，如果占有和生产行为不会导致对后来者的责任，那么财富水平将实现最大化。另一方面，如果像科斯的“伤害的相互性”学说所暗示的那样，先占者和生产者可能被认定对后来者负有责任，那么生产的价值将低于其应有的水平。也就是说，“无关紧要”学说对所宣称的财富最大化目标起反作用。

Third，Coase’s claim that the use of resources will be unaffected by the initial allocation of property rights is not generally true。Indeed，it is easy to produce counterexamples。Suppose the farmer does not lose $1，000 in crops because of the railroad’s sparks，but he loses a flower garden worth $1，000 to him but worthless to anyone else。If the court assigns liability to the railroad，the $750 SAD will be installed。If the court does not assign liability to the railroad，the SAD will not be installed because the farmer simply does not possess the funds to bribe the railroad to install an SAD。The allocation of resources is different depending on the initial assignment of property rights。

第三，科斯关于资源的使用将不受产权的初始界定的影响这一说法一般来说也不正确。事实上，很容易举出反例。假设农场主没有因为铁路的火花而损失1000美元的庄稼，但他失去了一座花园，这座花园对他来说价值1000美元，但对其他人来说毫无价值。如果法院判决铁路公司承担责任，750美元的SAD将被安装。如果法院不将责任判定给铁路公司，则由于农场主根本没有足够的资金来贿赂铁路公司安装SAD，因此将不会安装SAD。资源的配置会因初始产权界定的不同而不同。

Similarly，contra the normative claim of Chicago law and economics that courts should assign property rights so as to maximize social wealth，three responses are in order。First，any interpersonal comparison of utility is scientifically impossible，yet courts must engage in such comparisons willynilly whenever they engage in costbenefit analyses。Such costbenefit analyses are as arbitrary as the assumptions on which they rest。For example，they assume that psychic costs can be ignored and that the marginal utility of money is constant and the same for everyone。

类似的，芝加哥法学和经济学的规范主张，即法院应该以社会财富最大化的方式界定产权，同样也有三个现成的回应。第一，进行个人之间的效用比较在科学上是不可能的，然而，每当法院进行成本-收益分析时，必须进行此类不容分辩的比较。这样的成本-收益分析就像其所依据的假设那样武断。例如，他们假设可以忽略（当事人的）心理成本，假设货币的边际效用是常量，且对于每个人来说都相同。

Second，as the numerical examples given above show，courts assign property rights differently depending on changing market data。If the SAD is less expensive than the crop damage，the farmer is found in the right，while if the SAD is more expensive than the damage，the railroad is found in the right。That is，different circumstances will lead to a redistribution of property titles。No one can ever be sure of his property。[16]legal uncertainty is made permanent。This seems neither just nor economical； moreover，who in his right mind would ever turn to a court that announced that it may reallocate existing property titles in the course of time depending on chang ing market conditions？

第二，正如上面给出的数值例子所示，法院根据不断变化的市场数据采用不同的方式界定产权。如果SAD比农作物损失少，则农场主占理，而如果SAD比损失多，则铁路公司占理。也就是说，情况的变化将导致财产所有权的重新分配。如此，没有人能确信自己的财产权，法律上的不确定性变成永久性的了，这显得既不公正也不经济；此外，如果一个法院宣布它可以根据随时间不断变化的市场情况重新界定现有财产权，那么，心智健全的人还会求助于这样的法院吗？

Finally，an ethic must not only have permanency and stability with changing circumstances； an ethic must allow one to make a decision about “just or unjust” prior to one’s actions，and it must concern something under an actor’s control。Such is the case for the classic private property ethic with its firstusefirstown principle。According to this ethic，to act justly means that a person employs only justly acquired means—means originally appropriated，produced，or contractually acquired from a previous owner—and that he employs them so that no physical damage to others’ property results。Every person can determine ex ante whether or not this condition is met，and he has control over whether or not his actions physically damage the property of others。In distinct contrast，the wealth maximization ethic fails in both regards。No one can determine ex ante whether or not his actions will lead to social wealth maximization。If this can be determined at all，it can only be determined ex post。Nor does any one have control over whether or not his actions maximize social wealth。Whether or not they do depends on others’ actions and evaluations。Again， who in his right mind would subject himself to the judgment of a court that did not let him know in advance how to act justly and how to avoid acting unjustly，but that would judge ex post，after the facts？

3 私有财产和家庭的起源*

The origin of Private Property and the Family

I.背景：历史

THE SETTING：HISTORY

It is reasonable to begin human history 5 million years ago，when the human line of evolutionary descent separated from that of our closest nonhuman relative，the chimpanzeE.It is also reasonable to begin it 2。5 million years ago，with the first appearance of Homo habilis； or 200，000 years ago，when the first representative of “anatomically modern man” madehits appearance； or 100，000 years ago，when the anatomically modern man had become the standard human form.Instead，I want to begin only 50，000 years ago，when “anatomically modern man” had evolved into “behaviorally modern man.”

说人类历史从500万年前开始是合理的，就是从那时起，人类祖先与我们最近的非人类亲戚黑猩猩开始分道扬镳，走上自己的进化之路。说人类历史从250万年前开始也是合理的，那时能人第一次出现；或者从20万年前开始，“解剖学意义上的现代人类”的第一个代表出现；或者从10万年前开始，解剖学上的现代人类已经进化为标准的人类形态。但是，我只想从5万年前开始，那时“解剖学意义上的现代人”已经进化成“行动学意义上的现代人”。这也是一个非常合理的起点。[17]

This is an eminently reasonable starting point，too。

这也是一个非常合理的起点。

“behaviorally modern human” refers to the existence of huntergatherers，of which even today some small pockets have remained.Based on archeological evidence，humans living 100，000 years ago were apparently still largely inept at hunting。They were certainly unable to take down large and dangerous animals，and it appears that they did not know how to fisH.Their tools were almost exclusively made of stone and wood and made of materials of local origin，indicating the absence of any distance travel or trading。In distinct contrast，about 50，000 years later the human tool kit took on a new，greatly advanced appearance.Other materials were used besides stone and wood：bone，antlers，ivory，teeth，shells，and the materials often came from distant places.The tools，including knifes，needles，barbed points，pins，borers，and blades were more complex and skillfully crafted.The missile technology was much improved and indicated highly developed hunting skills （although bows were invented only about 20，000 years ago）。As well，man knew how to fish and was apparently able to build boats.Moreover，next to plain，functional tools，seemingly purely artistic imple ments—or naments，figurines and musical instruments，such as birdbone flutes—appeared on the scene at this time.

“行动学意义上的现代人”指的是狩猎采集者的存在，直到今天，还有零星族群过着狩猎采集生活。根据考古学证据，生活在10万年前的人类显然在很大程度上还不擅长打猎。它们当然无法拿下大型危险动物，而且它们似乎不知道如何捕鱼。他们的工具几乎完全是由石头和木材制成的，并由当地来源的材料制成，这表明没有任何长途旅行或交易。与之形成鲜明对比的是，大约5万年后，人类使用的工具呈现出全新的、非常先进的面貌。除了石头和木材外，还使用了其他材料：骨头、鹿角、象牙、牙齿、贝壳，而这些材料通常来自遥远的地方。这些工具，包括刀、缝衣针、倒钩、钉、钻孔器和刀片，制作更复杂更精妙更纯熟。投掷技术得到了很大改进，显示出了高度发展的狩猎技能（尽管弓是在大约2万年前才发明的）。此外，人类也知道如何捕鱼，而且显然能够建造小船。此外，除了简单的实用工具，像饰品、雕像以及如鸟骨笛之类的乐器等纯粹艺术品，都在此时出现。

It has been hypothesized that what made this momentous development possible was a genetic change leading to the emergence of language，which involved a radical improvement in man’s ability to learn and inno vate.The archaic humans—Homo ergaster，Homo neanderthalensis，Homo erectus—did not have command of a language.To be sure，it can be safely assumed that they employed，as do many of the higher animals，the two socalled lower functions of language：the expressive or symptomatic function and the trigger or signal function.

有人推测，这种里程碑式的跨越是基因的突变的结果，这种突变导致语言的出现，语言使人类的学习和创新能力得到根本性提高。匠人、尼安德特人、直立人这些古人类没有掌握语言。可以肯定的是，我们可以安全地假设，他们和许多高等动物一样，使用了语言的两种所谓低级的功能：表达或表征功能以及触发或信号功能。[18]

However，they were apparently incapable of performing the two higher，cognitive functions of language：the descriptive and，especially，the argumentative function.These unique human abilities—so uniquely human，indeed，that one cannot think them “away” from our existence without falling into internal contradictions—of forming simple descriptive statements （propositions） such as “this （subject） is ‘a’ （predicate），” which claim to be true，and especially of presenting arguments （chains of propositions） such as “this is a； every a is b； hence，this is b，” which claim to be valid，emerged apparently only about 50，000 years ago。

然而，他们显然无法运用语言的两种更高级的认知功能：描述功能，尤其是论证功能。这些独特的人类能力——人类确实是独一无二的，以至于人们不能认为我们的存在可以“远离”这些能力而不陷入内在的矛盾——形成简单的描述性陈述（命题）的能力，如“这（主语）是a（谓语）”，称之为真命题，特别是提出论证（命题链），如“这是a；每个a是b；因此，这是b”，称之为有效命题，这些能力显然是在大约5万年前才出现的。[19]

Without language，human coordination had to occur via instincts，of which humans possess very few，or by means of physical direction or manipulation； and learning had to be either through imitation or by means of internal （implicit） inferences.In distinct contrast，with language—that is with words：sounds associated with and logically tied to certain objects and concepts （characteristics）—coordination could be achieved by mere symbols； and learning thus became independent of sense impressions （observations） and inferences could be made externally （explicitly） and hence became inter subjectively reproducible and controllable.That is，by means of language knowledge could be transmitted to distant places and times （it was no longer tied to perception）； one could communicate about matters （knowledge acquired and accumulated） far away in time and place. And because our reasoning process，our train of thought leading us to certain inferences and conclusions became “objectified” in external，intersubjectively ascertainable arguments it could not only be easily transferred through time and space but at the same time be publicly criticized，improved，and corrected.It is no wonder，then，that hand in hand with the emergence of language revolutionary changes in technology would come about。

如果没有语言，人类的沟通协调只能通过不多的本能，而人类拥有的本能很少，或者通过操弄肢体动作来进行沟通；学习也只能要么通过模仿，要么通过内在（隐性）推导进行。与之形成鲜明对比的是，有了语言——也就是有了文字：声音与某些物体和概念（特征）相关，并与之联系在一起——沟通协调可以通过纯粹的符号来实现。因此，学习独立于感觉印象（观察），推理可以在外部（显化）进行，也因此在各主体间得以复制传播而不走样。也就是说，知识可以通过语言传播到遥远的时空（它不再与知觉联系在一起）；人们可以在遥远的时空交流事物（即获取和积累的知识）。因为使我们得出某些推断和结论的思维过程和思路，在外部的、主体间可确定的论证中被 “客观化” 了，它不仅很容易通过时间和空间传递，同时也可以被公开批评、改进和纠正。因此毫不奇怪，随着语言的出现，技术上的革命性变化随之发生也就不足为奇了。

About 100，000 years ago，the population size of “modern humans，” our immediate predecessors，is estimated to have been around 50，000，spread across the African continent and northward into the Middle East，the region of today’s Israel。 From about 80，000 to 70，000 years ago，the earth experienced a significant cooling period.As a consequence，the nean derthals，who lived in Europe and in the course of many millennia had adjusted to cold climates，moved southward，where they clashed with and apparently destroyed their African relatives in large numbers.In addition，an extended dry period beginning about 60，000 years ago robbed “mod ern man” of much of his subsistence basis，such that 50，000 years ago the number of “modern humans” may not have exceeded 5，000，confined to northeast Africa.

大约100000年前，我们的直系祖先“现代人”的人口规模估计大约有5万人，分布在非洲大陆，向北延伸到中东，即今天的以色列地区。[20]从大约80000年到70000年前，地球经历了一个显著的冰期。生活在欧洲的尼安德特人在数千年的时间里原本已适应了寒冷的气候，冰期导致他们不得已向南迁徙，结果与来自非洲的亲戚发生冲突，看起来在冲突中有大量的非洲亲戚被消灭。此外，从大约60000年前开始的一段漫长的干旱期剥夺了“现代人”的大部分生存基础，以至于50000年前的“现代人”数量可能不会超过5000人，且仅局限于非洲东北部。[21]

However，from then on the rise of modern humans has been uninterrupted，spreading all across the globe and eventually displacing all of their archaic relatives.The last neanderthals，holed up in some caves near Gibraltar，are believed to have become extinct about 25，000 years ago。The last remnants of Homo erectus，found on the Indonesian island of Flores，date back about 13，000 years.

然而，从那时起，现代人类的崛起就再没间断。他们遍布全球，并最终取代了他们所有的古老亲戚。最后的尼安德特人居住在直布罗陀附近的一些洞穴里，据信大约在25000年前就已经灭绝。在印度尼西亚的弗洛雷斯岛发现最后一批直立人的遗迹，可以追溯到大约13000年前。

The “modern humans” led a nomadic huntergatherer lifestyle.Societies were composed of small bands of people （10–30），which occasionally met and formed a common genetic pool of about 150 and maybe up to 500 people （a size which geneticists have found to be necessary in order to avoid dysgenic effects）。6 The division of labor was limited，with the main partition being that between women—acting mostly as gatherers—and men—acting mostly as hunters.While private property of tools and implements was known and recognized，the nomadic lifestyle only allowed for little possessions and hence made huntergatherer societies comparatively egalitariaN. Nonetheless，life initially appears to have been good for our forebears. only a few hours of regular work allowed for a comfortable life，with good （high protein） nourishment and plenty of leisure time.Indeed，fossil findings （skeletons and teeth） seem to indicate that our huntergatherer forebears enjoyed a life expectancy of well above 30 years，which was only reached again in the course of the 19th century。 Contra Hobbes，their life was any thing but nasty，brutish，and short。

“现代人”过着游牧的狩猎采集生活。社会由10-30人的小群组成，这些小群团偶尔相遇并形成一个约150人的共同基因库，基因库有时可能多达500人（遗传学家发现，这是避免种群退化的必要规模）。[22]劳动分工是有限的，分工主要按性别划分，女性大多负责采集，而男性负责狩猎。虽然工具和用具的私有权被个人意识到，并被他人认可，但游牧的生活方式只能获得微不足道的财产，因此使狩猎采集社会相对平等。[23]尽管如此，对我们的祖先来说，生活最初似乎是美好的。[24]他们有良好的（高蛋白质）营养和充足的休闲时间，一天只有几个小时的常规工作，这些都使他们生活舒适。事实上，化石的发现（骨骼和牙齿）似乎表明，我们的狩猎采集者祖先的预期寿命远超30岁，这一点直到19世纪才再次达到的。[25]与霍布斯的说法恰恰相反，他们的生活绝不是肮脏、残忍和短命的。[26]

However，the life of hunters and gatherers faced a fundamental and ultimately unanswerable challenge.Huntergatherer societies led essentially parasitic lives.That is，they did not add anything to the naturegiven supply of goods.They only depleted the supply of goods.They did not produce （apart from a few tools） but only consumed.They did not grow and breed but had to wait for nature to regenerate and replenisH.At best，what they accomplished was that they did not overhunt or overgather so that the natural regeneration process was not disturbed or even brought to an entire standstill。In any case，what this form of parasitism obviously involved，then，was the inescapable problem of population growtH.In order to permit the comfortable life just described，the population density had to remain extremely low.It has been estimated that one square mile of territory was needed to comfortably sustain one to two persons，and in less fertile regions even larger erritories were necessary。 So what was one to do when the population size exceeded these more or less narrow limits？

然而，狩猎采集者的生活面临着一个根本性的、最终无法解决的挑战。狩猎采集者社会本质上过的是种寄生生活。也就是说，他们对大自然的供给没有任何贡献，而只是纯然的消耗。他们没有生产（除了一些工具），只有消费。他们不事种植和繁育，只是被动等待自然的再生和补充。具体到成就，充其量说，他们也只是没有过度捕猎或过度采集罢了，因此自然再生过程不会受到干扰，不致陷入完全停滞。无论如何，这种寄生方式很显然不可避免地涉及到人口增长问题。要达致上述舒适的生活水平，人口密度必须保持在极低的水平。据估计，需要一平方英里土地才能维持一到两个人的舒适生活，而在肥沃程度较低的地区，甚至需要更广的土地。[27]那么当人口规模或多或少超过这些狭窄的限制时，人们该怎么办呢？

People could of course try to prevent such population pressure from emerging，and indeed huntergatherer societies tried their best in this regard.They induced abortions，they engaged in infanticide，especially female infanticide，and they reduced the number of pregnancies by engaging in long periods of breastfeeding （which，in combination with the low bodyfat characteristic of constantly mobile and moving women，reduces female fertility）。Yet while this alleviated the problem it did not solve it。The population kept increasing。

当然，人们可以尝试阻止这种人口压力的出现，事实上，狩猎采集者社会在这方面尽了最大努力。他们通过引产、实施杀婴，尤其是杀女婴，并通过长时间哺乳来减少怀孕次数（这与女性长期移动和运动所导致的低体脂相结合，降低了女性的生育能力）。然而，尽管这缓解了问题，但并没有解决。人口持续增长。

Given that the population size could not be maintained at a stationary level，only three alternatives existed for the steadily emerging “excess” population.one could fight over the limited food supplies，one could migrate，or one could invent and adopt a new，technologically advanced societal organization mode that allowed for a larger population size to survive on the same，given territory。

鉴于人口规模不能维持在一个固定的水平，对于不断出现的“过剩”人口，只有三种选择。人们可以为有限的食物供应而争斗，可以迁移，或者可以发明并采用一种新的、技术先进的社会组织模式，允许更大规模的人口在同一有限的土地上生存。

As for the first option，i.e.，fighting，a few remarks shall suffice.In the literature，primitive man has been frequently described as peaceful and living in harmony with nature.Most popular in this regard is Rousseau’s portrayal of the “noble savage.” Aggression and war，it has been frequently held，were the result of civilization built upon the institution of private property。In fact，matters are almost exactly the reverse. true，the savagery of modern wars has produced unparalleled carnage.both World War I and World War II，for instance，resulted in tens of millions of deaths and left entire countries in ruins.And yet，as anthropological evidence has in the mean time made abundantly clear，primitive man has been considerably more warlike than contemporary man.It has been estimated that on the average some 30 percent of all males in primitive，huntergatherer societies died from unnatural—violent—causes，far exceeding anything experienced in this regard in modern societies. According to Keeley’s estimates，a tribal society on the average lost about 0。5 percent of its population in combat each year。 Applied to the population of the twentieth century this would amount to a casualty rate of some 2 billion people instead of the actual number of “merely” a few hundred million.Of course，primitive warfare was very different from modern warfare.It was not conducted by regular troops on battlefields，but by raids，ambushes and surprise attacks.How ever，every attack was characterized by utmost brutality，carried out without mercy and always with deadly results； and while the number of people killed in each attack might have been small，the incessant nature of these aggressive encounters made violent death an everpresent danger for every man （and abduction and rape for every woman）。 Moreover，increasing evidence for the widespread practice of cannibalism has been accumulated in recent times.Indeed，it appears that cannibalism was once upon a time an almost universal practice.

至于第一种选择，即争斗，只说几句话就够了。在文学作品中，原始人经常被描述成是和平的，与自然和谐共处。在这方面最流行的是卢梭对“高贵的野蛮人”的描述。经常进行的侵略和战争是建立在私有财产制度上的文明的结果。事实上，情况几乎恰恰相反。[28]的确，现代战争的野蛮行径已经造成了前所未有的大屠杀。例如，第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战都导致数千万人死亡，使国家整体沦为废墟。然而与此同时，人类学证据已经非常清楚地表明，原始人比当代人更好战。据估计，在原始的狩猎采集者社会中，平均约有30%的男性死于非自然暴力，远远超过了现代社会在这方面所经历的任何情况。[29]根据劳伦斯·基利的估计，一个部落社会平均每年在战斗中损失约0.5%的人口。[30]如果应用于20世纪的人口，这将相当于大约20亿人的伤亡率，而不是“仅仅”几亿人的实际伤亡数字。当然，原始战争与现代战争截然不同，它不是由正规军在战场上进行的，而是通过劫掠、伏击和突袭来进行的。然而，每一次攻击都极其残暴，毫不留情，而且总是造成致命的后果，管在每次袭击中丧生的人数可能很少，但这些侵略行为的持续性使每个男人永远处在死于暴力的危险中（每个女人则一直面对绑架和强奸的危险）。[31]此外，近年来越来越多的证据表明，当时人类相食的现象广泛存在。事实上，貌似同类相食曾经是一种几乎普遍存在的做法。[32]

More importantly，these findings regarding primitive man’s warlikeness are not just anthropological curiosities，i.e.，features that one might consider incidental to the true nature of huntergatherer societies.To the contrary，there exist fundamental theoretical reasons why such societies were characterized by incessant warfare，and peaceful relations were almost impossible to attain，in particular，if the possibility of evading one another was foreclosed because all surrounding land was occupied.because then it became unavoid able that the members of different huntergatherer tribes encountered each other more or less regularly on their various expeditions in search of plants and animals.Indeed，as the population size increased，such encounters became ever more frequent。And because hunters and gatherers did not add anything to the naturegiven supply of goods but only consumed what was provided by nature，their competition for food was necessarily of an antago nistic nature：either I pick the berries or hunt a given animal or you do it。No or little trade and exchange between the members of different tribes existed，because the members of one tribe engaged in essentially the same activities as those of any other tribe and neither one accumulated any surplus of goods that could be exchanged for others’ surplus goods.There existed only ineradi cable conflict and the more conflict the more the population number in each tribe exceeded its optimum size.In this situation，where everything appropri ated by one person （or tribe） was immediately consumed and the total sup ply of goods was strictly limited by natural forces，only deadly antagonism could exist between men.In the words of Ludwig von Mises，men became

deadly foes of one another，irreconcilable rivals in their endeav ors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature.Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies； his craving for the satisfaction of his own appetites would have brought him into an implaca ble conflict with all his neighbors.No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.

only the death of one’s rivals provided a solution to one’s own desire to survive.Indeed，to spare another man’s life would have left him equipped to create even more offspring and hence reduced one’s own future chance of survival still further。

更重要的是，这些关于原始人好战性的发现并不仅仅是人类学上的奇闻异事，人们可能认为这些只是狩猎采集社会本质特征之外的偶然现象。相反，存在着根本的理论原因说明为什么这样的社会以持续不断的战争为特征，而和平关系几乎无法实现，特别是在由于周围所有土地都被占据而无法相互躲避的情况下。因为在这种情况下，不同狩猎采集部落的成员在他们寻找植物和动物的各种探险中或多或少会定期相遇就变得不可避免。实际上，随着人口规模的增加，这样的相遇会变得更加频繁。因为狩猎采集者并没有给大自然的供给品增加任何东西，而只消耗自然提供的东西，他们对食物的竞争必然是敌对性质的：要么我摘这些浆果或猎杀这些动物，要么你这样做。不同的部落之间，他们从事的狩猎采集都差不多，部落之间并没有什么差异产品需要交换，也没有多少剩余产品投入交换，所以部落之间很少交易甚至没有交易。只存在无法根除的冲突，而且每个部落的人口数量越是超出其最佳规模，冲突就越多。在这种情况下，一个人（或一个部落）所获取的一切都会立即被消耗掉，而物品的总供给又严格地受到自然力量的限制，人与人之间只能存在致命的对抗。用路德维希·冯·米塞斯的话说，

人们成了彼此的死敌，在努力获取自然所提供的稀缺生活资料的过程中，他们成了不可调和的竞争对手。每个人都会被迫将所有其他人视为敌人；他对满足自己欲望的渴望会使他与所有邻居陷入不可调和的冲突之中。在这种情况下，不可能产生任何同情心。[33]

竞争对手的死亡才是解决自己生存欲望的唯一方案。事实上，放过另一个人的生命会让他有能力繁衍更多的后代，从而进一步降低自己未来生存的机会。[34]

The second available option to deal with the steadily reemerging problem of excess population was migration.While by no means costless—after all one had to leave familiar for unfamiliar territories—migration （as com pared to fighting） must have appeared frequently as the less costly option，especially as long as some open frontier existed.Hence，setting out from their homeland in EastAfrica，successively the entire globe was conquered by bands of people breaking away from their relatives to form new societies in areas hitherto unoccupied by humans.

解决反复出现的人口过剩问题的第二个可选项是迁徙。迁徙当然是有代价的，毕竟人们必须离开熟悉的地方到另一片不熟悉的土地，但是作为成本更低的选择（与战斗相比），迁徙一定经常发生，特别是只要有一些开放的边界存在。因此，一拨又一拨现代人类从他们的东非拓殖出发，脱离亲人，逐渐征服全球，在未被占领的处女地上形成新的社会。

It appears that this process began also about 50，000 years ago，shortly after the emergence of behaviorally modern man and the acquisition of the ability to build boats.From about this time on until around 12，000 to 11，000 years ago global temperatures gradually fell （since then we are in an interglacial warming period） and the sea levels accordingly fell。 People crossed over the red Sea at the Gate of Grief，which was then merely a narrow gap of water dotted with islands，to land at the southern tip of the Ara bian peninsula （which enjoyed a comparatively wet period at that time）。From there onward，preferring to stay in tropical climate zones to which one had been adjusted，the migration—of possibly not more than 150 people—continued eastward.Travel was mostly by boat，because until about certainly less reason to kill such a man than to kill a man who has added nothing but merely takes and consumes what is given （and hence inevitably reduces what remains 6，000 years ago when man learned how to tame horses，this form of trans portation was much faster and more convenient than travel by foot。Hence，migration took place along the coastline—and proceeded from there into the interior through river valleys—first all the way to India.From there，as the genetic evidence seems to indicate，the population movement split into two directions.on the one hand it proceeded around the Indian peninsula to southeast Asia and Indonesia （which was then connected to the Asian mainland） and finally to the now foundered former continent of Sahul （of Australia，new Guinea and Tasmania，which were joined until about 8，000 years ago），which was then only separated from the Asian mainland by a 60milewide channel of water dotted with islands permitting short distance island hopping，as well as northward up the coast to China and eventually JapaN.on the other hand，the migration process went from India in a northwesterly direction，through Afghanistan，Iran，and Turkey and ultimately EuropE.As well，splitting off of this stream of migration，people pressed in a northeasterly direction into southern Siberia.Later migrations，most likely in three waves，with the first about 14，000–12，000 years ago，went from Siberia across the bering Strait—then （until about 11，000 years ago） a land bridge—and onto the American continent，appar ently reaching Patagonia only about 1，000 years later （archeological find ings of human remains in southern Chile have been dated as 12，500 years old）。The last migration route set out from Taiwan，which was occupied about 5，000 years ago，sailing across the Pacific to reach the Polynesian islands and finally，only about 800 years ago，new Zealand.

这一大规模的迁徙过程似乎也开始于大约50000年前，也就是在行为上的现代人出现和获得造船能力之后不久。从这个时候开始到大约12000年到11000年前，全球气温逐渐下降（从那时起，我们就处于间冰期的变暖期），海平面也随之下降。[35]人们从“泪之门”穿过红海在阿拉伯半岛的南端登陆。（“泪之门”指阿拉伯半岛和非洲之间的曼德海峡，由于海峡内暗礁和浅滩众多，风力强大，给古代航行船只带来很大的危险和困难，使来往的旅客不禁畏惧而泪下，故阿拉伯语意为“泪之门”。当时红海只是一个点缀着岛屿的狭窄水域，而阿拉伯半岛也处于相对潮湿的时期。）从那时起，由于他们更愿意留在已经适应了的热带气候区，移民部落的人数可能不超过150人，这一小拨人继续向东迁移。由于直到大约6000年前人类学会驯服马匹前，乘船是比步行更快、更方便的交通方式，所以大部分旅行是通过船只进行的。因此，迁徙是沿着海岸线进行的，并从那里通过河谷进入内陆，然后一路迁徙到印度。从那里开始，正如遗传学证据所表明的那样，人口迁移分为两个方向。一方面，移民路线绕过印度半岛到达东南亚和印度尼西亚（当时与亚洲大陆相连），最后到达现在已经消失的前萨胡尔大陆（由澳大利亚、新几内亚和塔斯马尼亚组成，直到大约8000年前才连接在一起），该大陆当时与亚洲大陆只隔着一条60英里宽的水道，水道上点缀着许多岛屿，可以进行短距离的跳岛，并向北沿着海岸到达中国，最后到达日本。另一条路线，移民过程从印度向西北方向移动，经过阿富汗、伊朗和土耳其，最终到达欧洲。同样，从这一移民流中分裂出来的人们向东北方向进入西伯利亚南部。这一路线的迁徙，很可能分三波，第一波大约在14000-12000年前，从西伯利亚穿过白令海峡进入美洲大陆，当时（直到大约11000年前）白令海峡是一座陆桥，显然大约1000年后才到达巴塔哥尼亚（在智利南部考古发现的人类遗骸的年龄为12500年）。最后一条迁徙路线是从大约5000年前被占领的台湾出发的，横渡太平洋到达波利尼西亚群岛，最后在大约800年前，才到达新西兰。[36]

The process was essentially always the same：a group invaded some ter ritory，population pressure mounted，some people stayed put，a subgroup moved further on，generation after generation，along the coastline，follow ing rivers and game and avoiding deserts and high mountains.The migra tion from Africa all the way to Australia may have taken about 4，000 to 5，000 years，and migration to Europe 7，000 years （the oldest artifacts there ascribed to modern humans，found in Bulgaria，date about 43，000 years back） and another 7，000 years to reach western SpaiN. once broken up，practically no contact existed between the various huntergatherer Societies.Consequently，although initially closely related to one another through direct kinship relations，these societies formed separated genetic pools and， confronted with different natural environments and as the result of muta tions and genetic drift interacting with natural selection，in the course of time they took on distinctly different appearances.By and large，the genetic difference between various societies increased in correlation with the spatial distance between societies and the duration of their separation time. different ethnicities emerged and，further on，also distinctly different human races.These emerging，genetically based differences concerned matters such as skin color，physical build and strength，resistance to cold temperatures and to various diseases，and tolerance visàvis certain substances.They also concerned cognitive matters，however。Thus，genetic evidence exists for two significant further developments regarding the size and cognitive powers of the human braiN.one such development occurred about 37，000 years ago and affected most of the population in Europe as well as in East Asia （but left very few traces in Africa），and another occurred about 6，000 years ago and affected mostly people in the Middle East and Europe （but had less impact in East Asia and almost none in subSaharan Africa）。

这个过程基本上都是一样的：一群人占据了一片地方，人口压力增加，一些人留在原地，其中一个子群体继续前进，一代又一代，沿着海岸线，顺着河流，追逐野味，避开沙漠和高山。从非洲一路迁移到澳大利亚可能需要4000到5000年，从非洲迁移到欧洲则需要7000年（在保加利亚发现的现代人类最古老的文物可以追溯到43000年前），再过7000年才能到达西班牙西部。[37]部落之间一旦发生分离，各个狩猎采集社会之间几乎再没有任何联系。因此，尽管这些社会最初通过直接的亲属关系彼此密切相关，但却形成了分离的基因库，并面临不同的自然环境。由于突变和遗传漂移与自然选择相互作用，随着时间的推移，它们呈现出明显不同的面貌。总的来说，不同社会之间的遗传差异随着社会之间的空间距离和分离时间的持续而增加。[38]于是开始出现了不同的种族，后来也出现了明显不同的人种。人群之间基于基因差异而出现的表现差异，涉及到肤色、体格、体质、力量、耐受低温、疾病抵抗力、耐受某些物质等等方面。各部落人群之间的差异，也涉及到认知问题。我们的遗传学证据表明，在人类大脑的大小和认知能力方面有两次重大发展。其中一次发生在大约37000年前，影响了欧洲和东亚的大部分人口（但在非洲留下的痕迹很少），另一次发生在大约6000年前，影响了中东和欧洲的大部分人（但在东亚的影响较小，在撒哈拉以南非洲几乎没有）。[39]

Moreover，hand in hand with the geographical and correlated genetic differentiation of humans went a linguistic differentiation.very much in agreement with and supported by genetic （biological） evidence，some linguists，in particular merritt Ruhlen， following in the footsteps of the pioneering work of Joseph Greenberg，have made the plausible case for a single human protolanguage，from which all human languages can be derived as more or less distant relatives.Obviously，the original emigrants from the African homeland，some 50，000 years ago，would have spoken the same language，and so it seems hardly surprising that the above sketched population movement，and the splitting of groups of people into different genetic pools，more or less separated in time and space from one another，should be closely mirrored by a differentiation of languages，the grouping of different languages into language families，and the grouping of these into still larger superfamilies. Likewise，the process of the proliferation of languages appears to have followed a predictable pattern.First，with the spread of humans around the world as hunters and gatherers and the concomitant proliferation of distinct，separated genetic pools，a successively increasing number of different languages emerged.Thus，for instance，of the 6，000 different languages still spoken today，some 1，200 languages are spoken in new Guinea，one of the most “primitive” remaining world regions，half of which have no more than the “magic” number of 500 speakers and none more than 100，000。Then，however，with the beginning of human settlement some 11，000 years ago and the following transition to agriculture and the attendant expansion and intensification of the division of labor （more on which later on），a countervailing and even contrary tendency appears to have come into existence：just as the genetic pools appear to have widened，so the number of different languages spoken has successively diminished.

此外，随着人类地理分布的扩大和基因差异的出现，语言也发生了分化。根据基因证据，一些语言学家，尤其是梅里特·鲁伦[40]，追随约瑟夫·格林伯格的开创性工作，提出了一个可信的观点，即所有人类语言都源自一种原始语言，彼此之间存在或远或近的亲缘关系。显然，大约5万年前从非洲故乡迁出的早期人类讲的是同一种语言，因此，上述的人口迁徙和不同基因库的分化在时间和空间上分隔开来也就不奇怪了，这与语言的分化、不同语言的归类和更大语言超级家族的形成密切相关。[41]同样，语言扩散的过程似乎遵循了一个可预测的模式。首先，随着人类作为猎人和采集者在世界各地的传播，以及独立基因库的出现，逐渐涌现出越来越多的不同语言。例如，如今仍在使用的6000种不同语言中，有约1200种在新几内亚这个最“原始”的地区之一，那里的一半语言使用者不超过500人，且没有一种语言的使用者超过10万人。然而，随着大约1.1万年前人类开始定居，并逐渐过渡到农业以及随之而来的劳动分工的扩展和深化，出现了一种相反的趋势：随着基因库的扩大，语言种类的数量却在逐渐减少。

II.问题：理论

THE problem：THEORY

About 35，000 years ago，i.e.，15，000 years after the initial exodus from Africa，practically all of Europe，Asia，Australia and，of course，Africa itself had been occupied by our ancestors，the modern humans，and archaic humans，Homo neanderthalensis and Homo erectus，were on the verge of extinction.About 12，000 years ago，humans had also spread all across the Americas.Apart from the Polynesian islands，then，all land and all of the naturally given supply of earthly （economic） goods，of plants and animals，had been taken into human possession； and，given the parasitic lifestyle of huntergatherers，humans did not add anything to this land and the nature given supply of goods but merely reacted to natural changes.

大约35000年前，也就是最初离开非洲的15000年后，几乎整个欧洲、亚洲、澳大利亚，当然，还有非洲本身都已经被我们的祖先——现代人所占领。那些古人类：尼安德特人和直立人，则处于灭绝的边缘。大约12000年前，人类也已经遍布美洲。因此，除了波利尼西亚群岛之外，所有的土地和所有自然供给的世间的（经济）物品——植物和动物，都已被人类占有。然而，狩猎采集是一种寄生生活方式，人类并没有在大自然的禀赋之外增加任何东西，他们只不过对自然变化做出反应。

These changes were at times quite drastic。Changes in global climate，for instance，could and did significantly affect how much inhabitable land was available and the natural vegetation and animal population.In the time period under consideration，in the 20，000 plus years between 35，000 and 11，000 years ago，drastic changes in such natural conditions occurred.20，000 years ago，for instance，during the period known as the Last Gla cial Maximum，temperatures fell sharply and most of northern Europe and Siberia became uninhabitable.Britain and all of Scandinavia were covered by glaciers，most of Siberia turned into polar desert and steppetundra extended as far south as the mediterranean，the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.After 5，000 years，about 15，000 years ago，the glaciers began to retreat，allowing people，animals and plants to reoccupy previously deserted regions.Two and a half thousand years later，however，within merely a decade，tempera tures again plummeted back to almost the previous frigid conditions； and only another 1，000 years later，about 11，500 years ago，and again quite sud denly，did temperatures then experience a longsustained increase and the earth entered the socalled Holocene，the latest and still lasting interglacial warming period. （The Sahara began to turn into the present，extremely hot desert only less than 3，000 years ago。In preRoman times，the Sahara— and similarly the centralAsian deserts—was still a green savanna with an abundant supply of wildlifE.The power and the attraction of Carthage，for instance，was based largely on the fertility of its hinterland as a center of wheat production； this fact was an important reason for Rome’s desire to destroy Carthage and gain control of its northAfrican territories.）

然而大自然的变化有时相当剧烈。例如，全球气候的变化可以并且确实显著影响可居住土地的数量以及自然植被和动物种群。在所考虑的时期内，在35000年前至11000年前的20000多年间，这种自然条件发生了剧烈变化。例如，20000年前，在被称为末次盛冰期的时期，气温急剧下降，北欧和西伯利亚的大部分地区变得无法居住。不列颠和整个斯堪的纳维亚半岛都被冰川覆盖，西伯利亚的大部分地区变成了极地沙漠，草原苔原一直向南延伸到地中海、黑海和里海。5000年后，也就是大约15000年前，冰川开始退缩，使人类、动物和植物重新占据了以前曾经的荒芜地区。然而，2500年后，在短短十年内，气温再次骤降到，几乎回到了之前的严寒条件；又过了1000年后，大约11500年前，又是很突然的，气温长期持续上升，地球进入了所谓的全新世，这是最近且仍然持续的间冰期变暖期。[42]（撒哈拉沙漠变成现在这样极其炎热的沙漠，也才是从大约3000年前开始的。古罗马时代之前，今天的撒哈拉沙漠和中亚的沙漠那时却是一片绿色的热带大草原，有着丰富的野生动物供应。例如，那时位于北非的迦太基是一片肥沃的土地，是小麦生产中心，这是它力量和吸引力的来源，也是它招致罗马帝国摧毁并控制它的重要原因。[43]）

In any case and regardless of all complicating details and all changes that future empirical researchers will no doubt bring about concerning the foregoing historical narrative，at some point in time the landmass avail able to help satisfy human needs could no longer be enlarged.In economic jargon，the supply of the production factor “land” became fixed，and every increase in the size of the human population had to be sustained by the same，unchanged quantity of land.Of the formerly three available options in response to an increasing population pressure，to move，to fight or to invent，only the latter two remained opeN.What to do when faced with this challenge？

无论何种情况，无论未来实证研究会对上述历史叙事带来哪些复杂的细节和变化，然而毋庸置疑的是，在某个时间节点开始，可用以满足人类需求的土地将不再扩大。用经济学术语来说，生产要素“土地”的供应是固定的，人口规模的每一次增加都必须由相同的、不变的土地数量来维持。在应对日益增长的人口压力方面，以前有三种选择：迁移、争斗或发明，只有后两种选择仍然是开放的。面对这一挑战，该怎么办呢？

To bring the problem faced into even sharper relief it is useful to first take another，more detailed look at the admittedly rather limited extent of the division of labor within a huntergatherer society。

为了更加清楚地呈现所面临的问题，首先有必要更详细地审视一下狩猎采集社会中相当有限的劳动分工。

So far the antagonism between the members of different bands or clans has been explained while it has been taken for granted that within a given band or clan collaboration—peaceful cooperation—exists.But why should this be so？ intragroup cooperation is almost universally assumed as a matter of course.Nonetheless，it too requires an explanation，because a world without even this limited degree of cooperation is certainly conceivable.To be sure，there exists a biological basis for some forms of human cooperation.“The mutual sexual attraction of male and female，” writes Mises，“is inherent in man’s animal nature and independent of any thinking and theorizing。It is permissible to call it original，vegetative，instinctive，or mysterious.” The same can be said about the relationship between mother and child：if mothers did not take care of their offspring for an extended period of time，their children would instantly die and mankind would be doomed.However，this necessary，biologically determined degree of cooperation is a far cry from that actually observed in huntergatherer societies.Thus，Mises continues，

neither cohabitation，nor what precedes it or follows，generates social cooperation and societal modes of lifE.The animals too join together in mating，but they have not developed social relations.Family life is not merely a product of sexual intercourse.It is by no means natural and necessary that parents and children live together in the way they do in the family。The mating rela tion need not result in a family organization.The human family is an outcome of thinking，planning，and acting。It is this fact which distinguishes it radically from those animal groups which we call per analogiam animal families.

到目前为止，我们已经解释了不同族群或部落成员之间的对立，同时认为在一个特定的族群或部落内存在协作（和平合作）是理所当然的。但为什么会这样呢？群体内部的合作几乎被普遍认为是理所当然的事情。尽管如此，它也需要一个解释，因为一个没有这种有限程度的合作的世界是肯定可以想象的。可以肯定的是，某些形式的人类合作存在着生物学基础。米塞斯写道：“男性和女性的相互性吸引，是人的动物本性所固有的，与任何思想和理论无关，可以称其为原始的、机能的、本能的或神秘的。”[44]关于母亲和孩子之间的关系也可以这么说。如果母亲长时间不照顾她们的孩子，她们的孩子就会立即死亡，人类也将注定灭亡。然而，这种必要的、由生物学决定的合作程度与在狩猎采集社会中实际观察到的相差甚远。米塞斯继续说，

同居，无论是同居之前或之后，都不会产生社会合作和社会生活方式。动物在交配时也会结合在一起，但它们并没有发展出社会关系。家庭生活不仅仅是性交的产物。父母和孩子以他们的方式生活在一起绝不是自然和必要的。交配关系不一定会导致家庭组织。人类家庭是思考、计划和行动的结果。正是这一事实使它与那些我们称之为类动物家庭的动物群体截然不同。[45]

Why，for instance，did not each man and each woman，after they had left infancy，hunt or gather alone only to meet for occasional sex？ Why did it not occur what has been described as having occurred for groups of humans already on the level of individuals：one person，faced with a strictly limited supply of naturegiven goods，breaking away from another in order to avoid conflict until all land was taken into possession and then a war of everyone against everyone else （rather than merely a war of the members of one group against the members of all other groups） breaking out？ The answer to this is：because of the recognition that cooperation was more productive than isolated，selfsufficient action.Division of labor and cooperation based on such division of labor increased the productivity of human labor。

人与动物不同的地方，如每个雄性和雌性长大后各自单独狩猎或采集，只在偶尔的性交时才见面——人类并不这样，为什么？在资源有限时，个体为了避免冲突而各自占领自己的领地，直到所有的土地都被占领，然后爆发一个个体对所有个体的冲突——人类也不这样，又为什么？（当然人类也发生一个群体与另一个群体之间的对抗。）答案是：因为人们认识到合作比单独、自给自足的行动更有生产力。基于劳动分工的合作提高了人类劳动的生产率。

There are three reasons for this：First，there exist tasks which exceed the powers of any single man and require instead the combined efforts of several men in order to be successfully executed.certain animals，for instance，might be too large or too dangerous to be hunted by single individuals but require the cooperative engagement of many。Or there exist tasks which could，in principle，be executed by a single individual but that would take up so much time for an isolated actor that the final result does not appear worth the effort。only concerted action can accomplish these tasks in a time span sufficiently short to deem the task worthwhile.Searching for edible plants or animals，for instance，is fraught with uncer tainties.on one day one might stumble across suitable plants or animals quickly，but at another time one might search for them in vain seemingly without end.But if one pools this risk，i.e.，if a large number of gatherers or hunters begin their search separately only to call upon each other once any one of them has turned out to be lucky in his search，then gathering and hunting might be turned into routinely successful endeavors for each participant。

人类选择合作，有三个原因。首先，有一些任务超出了任何一个人的能力，而需要几个人的共同努力才能成功执行。例如，某些动物可能太大或者太危险，无法由单个人去捕猎，而需要许多人合作参与。或者有一些任务，原则上可以由一个人完成，但对于一个孤立的行动人来说，会占有大量的时间，最终的结果似乎不值得。只有协调一致的行动才能在足够短的时间内完成这些任务，从而使人们认为这项任务是值得的。例如，寻找可食用的动植物就充满了不确定性。在某一天，人们可能偶然会很快发现合适的植物或动物，但在另一个时候，人们寻找它们可能是徒劳的，而且这样的无用功似乎无休无止。但是，如果把这种风险集中起来，也就是说，如果大量的采集者或狩猎者分头开始各自的搜寻，一旦他们中的任何一个人在搜寻中碰到好运，就彼此招唤，那么狩猎和采集可能会变成每个参与者经常成功的努力。

Second：Even though the natural environment faced by each person might be more or less the same，each individual （even identical twins） is different from any other。men，for instance，are significantly different in their abilities than women.By their very nature，men are typically better hunters and women better gatherers.Adults are significantly different in their abilities than kids.Some people are physically strong and others show great dexterity。Some are tall and others are quick。Some have great vision and others a good sense of smell。Given such differences it is obviously advantageous to partition the various tasks neces sary to perform in order to secure a comfortable life in such a way that each person specializes in those activities in which he has an advantage over others.Women gather and men hunt。Tall individuals pick fruits off trees and short ones specialize in hunting mushrooms.Quick run ners relay messages.Individuals with good eyesight will spot distant events.Kids are used for the exploration of small and narrow holes.People with great dexterity produce tools.The strong will specialize in going in for the kill，etc。

第二，尽管每个人所面临的自然环境可能大致相同，但每个人（甚至是同卵双胞胎）都是不同的。例如，男性的能力与女性显著不同。就其本质而言，男性通常是更好的猎手，而女性是更好的采集者。成年人的能力与孩子有明显的不同。有些人身体强壮，而另一些人则表现得非常灵巧。有些人身材高大，有些人身手敏捷。有的人视力好，有的人嗅觉好。鉴于这种差异，为了保证舒适的生活，将必须完成的各种任务进行划分，使每个人都专门从事他比别人有优势的活动，这显然是有利的。女人采集，男人打猎。高个子从树上摘果子，矮个子专门采蘑菇。快速奔跑的人传递信息。视力好的人可以发现远处的事件。孩子们被用来探索小的和狭窄的洞。灵巧的人生产工具。强壮的人会专门从事杀人的工作，等等。

Third：Moreover，even if the members of one tribe are so distinguished from one another that one person is more efficient in every conceivable task than another，division of labor is still allaround more productive than isolated labor。An adult might be better at any task than a kid，for instance.Given the inescapable fact of the scarcity of time，however，even in this conceivably worstcase scenario it makes economic sense—that is，it leads to a greater physical output of goods produced per unit of labor—if the adult specializes in those tasks in which his greater efficiency （as compared to that of the kid） is particularly pronounced and leaves those tasks for the kid to perform in which the latter’s allaround lower efficiency is compara tively smaller。Even though the adult might be more efficient than the child in collecting small firewood，for instance，the adult’s far greater superiority in hunting large game would make it a waste of his time to gather wood.Instead，he would want the child to collect firewood and use all of his own precious time to perform that task in which his greater efficiency is espe cially marked，namely large game hunting。

第三：此外，即使一个部落的成员彼此之间如此不同，以至于一个人在每一项可以想到的任务中都比另一个人更有效率，劳动分工仍然比孤立的劳动更有效率。例如，一个成年人在任何任务上都可能比一个孩子更好。然而，考虑到时间稀缺这一不可避免的事实，即使在这种可以想象的最坏的情况下，如果成年人专门从事那些他的效率（与孩子相比）特别高的任务，并把那些他的效率相对较低的任务留给孩子去做，这也是有经济意义的，也就是说，它导致了每单位劳动产生更大的实物产出。例如，即使成人在收集小柴火方面可能比孩子更有效率，但成人在猎取大型猎物方面的更大优势会使收集柴火成为一种浪费时间的行为。相反，他会希望孩子收集小柴火，并利用自己所有的宝贵时间来完成他的效率特别高的任务，即猎杀大型猎物。

Nonetheless：While these advantages offered by the division of labor can explain intratribal cooperation （rather than fight） and，based on such，initially，maybe purely “selfishlymotivated” collaboration，for the gradual development of feelings of sympathy （good will） toward one’s fellowmen，which go above and beyond whatever biological basis there may exist for the special，morethannormallyfriendly relationship between close kin，this explanation still only goes so far。Given the peculiar，parasitic nature of huntergatherer societies and assuming land to be fixed，invariably the moment must arise when the number of people exceeds the optimal group size and average living standards will fall，threatening whatever degree of intragroup solidarity previously might have existed.

尽管如此。虽然分工带来的这些优势可以解释部落内的合作（而不是争斗），以及基于这种最初可能纯粹出自“自私动机”的合作，逐渐发展出对同胞的同情心（善意），这种同情超越了近亲之间的特殊的、超乎寻常的友好关系的可能存在的任何生物学基础，但这种解释仍然仅限于此。鉴于狩猎采集社会的特殊性和寄生性，并假设土地是固定的，不可避免地会出现这样的时刻：人数超过了最佳群体规模，平均生活水平下降，群体内以前存在的不同程度的团结受到威胁。[46]

This situation is captured and explained by the economic law of returns.

这种情形可由经济学报酬律来体现和解释。

The law of returns，popularly but somewhat misleadingly also called the law of diminishing returns，states that for any combination of two or more production factors an optimum combination exists （such that any deviation from it involves material waste，or “efficiency losses”）。 Applied to the two original factors of production，labor and land （naturegiven goods），the law implies that if one were to increase the quantity of labor （population） while the quantity of land and the available technology （hunting and gathering） remained fixed，eventually a point will be reached where the physical output per laborunit input is maximized.This point marks the optimal population size.If there is no additional land available and technology remains fixed at a “given” level，any population increase beyond the optimal size will lead to a progressive decline in per capita income.Living standards，on the average，will fall。A point of （absolute） overpopulation has been reached.This is，as Mises has termed it，the Malthusian law of population.

报酬律，通常也被称为收益递减定律，它指出，对于两个或两个以上的生产要素的任何组合，都存在一个最佳组合（因此，任何偏离该最佳组合的情况都会造成物质浪费或 “效率损失”）。[47]如果将报酬率应用于劳动力和土地（及其他自然赋予的物品）者两个原始的生产要素，则意味着如果土地数量和可用的狩猎采集技术不变，而增加劳动力的数量（人口），则会到达某个点，这个点上是单位劳动投入的实物产出的最大化。这个点就标志着最佳人口规模。如果没有额外的土地，技术仍然停留在“给定”的水平，任何超过最佳规模的人口增长都将导致人均收入的逐步下降。平均生活水平也将会下降。这时已经达到（绝对）人口过剩的程度。这就是米塞斯所说的马尔萨斯人口定律。

because of the fundamental importance of this Malthusian law of population and in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding，it is advisable to make also explicit what the law does not state.The law does not assert where exactly this optimal combination point is located—at soandso many people per square mile，for instance—but only that such a point exists.otherwise，if every quantity of output could be produced by increasing only one factor （labor） while leaving the other （land） unchanged，the latter （land） would cease to be scarce—and hence an economic good—at all； one could increase without limit the return of any piece of land by simply increasing the input of labor applied to this piece without ever having to consider expanding the size of one’s land.The law also does not state that every increase of one factor （labor） applied to a fixed quantity of another （land） must lead to a less than proportional increase of the output produced.In fact，as one approaches the optimum combination point an increase of labor applied to a given piece of land might lead to a more than proportional increase of output （increasing returns）。one additional man，for instance，might make it possible that an animal species can be hunted that cannot be hunted at all without this one extra hunter。The law of returns merely states that this cannot occur without definite limits.Nor does the law assert that the optimum combination point cannot be shifted up and outward.In fact，as will be explained in the following，owing to technological advances the optimum combination point can be so moved，allowing a larger population to enjoy a higher average living standard on the same quantity of land.What the law of returns does say is only that given a state of technological development （mode of production） and a corresponding degree of specialization，an optimum combination point exists beyond which an increase in the supply of labor must necessarily lead to a less then proportional increase of the output produced or no increase at all。

由于马尔萨斯人口定律的根本重要性，为了避免任何可能的误解，明确厘定该定律未表述的内容是明智的。该定律并没有断言这个最佳组合点到底在哪里——例如，每平方英里有多少人——而只是声称存在这样一个点。否则，如果每一个产出量都可以通过增加一个要素（劳动）而保持另一个要素（土地）不变来生产，那么后者（土地）将不再是稀缺的，因而也不再是一种经济物品；人们可以通过增加应用于这块土地的劳动投入而无限制地增加任何一块土地的收益，而不必考虑扩大自己的土地面积）。此外，该定律也从未断言必定是收入递减，也就是每次增加一个因素（劳动力）应用于固定数量的另一个因素（土地）时，产量增加都会小于之前的产出比例。实际上，当接近最佳组合点时，增加的劳动力可能会带来超过之前产出比例的产量增加（即收益递增）。例如，多一个人，就有可能猎取某个动物物种，而如果没有这个额外的猎人，该物种就根本无法被猎取。报酬律只是说，如果没有明确的限制，这种情况就不会发生。该定律也没有断言，最佳组合点不能向上和向外移动。事实上，正如下文将要解释的，由于技术的进步，最佳组合点可以这样移动，使更多的人在同样数量的土地上享受更高的平均生活水平。报酬律只是说在给定的技术发展状态（生产方式）和相应的专业化程度下，存在一个最佳的结合点，超过这个点，劳动供应的增加必然会导致产出的增长低于比例，或者根本不增加。

Indeed，for huntergatherer societies the difficulties of escaping the Malthusian trap of absolute overpopulation are even more severe than these qualifications regarding the law of returns might indicate.For while these qualifications might leave the impression that it is “only” a techno logical innovation that is needed to escape the trap，this is not the full truth.Not just any technological innovation will do。because hunter gatherer societies are，as explained，“parasitic” societies，which do not add anything to the supply of goods but merely appropriate and consume what nature provides，any productivity increase within the framework of this mode of production does not （or only insignificantly so） result in a greater output of goods produced （of plants gathered or animals hunted） but rather merely （or mostly） in a reduction of the time necessary to pro duce an essentially unchanged quantity of output。The invention of the bow and arrow that appears to have been made some 20，000 years ago，for instance，will not so much lead to a greater quantity of available animal meat to consume，thus allowing a larger number of people to reach or exceed a given level of consumption，but rather only to the same number of people enjoying more leisure with an unchanged standard of living in terms of meatconsumption （or else，if the population increases，the gain of more leisure time will have to be paid for by a reduction in meat con sumption per capita）。In fact，for huntergatherers the productivity gains achieved by technological advances such as the invention of the bow and arrow may well turn out to be no blessing at all or only a very shortterm blessing，because the greater ease of hunting that is thus brought about，for instance，may lead to overhunting，increasing the supply of meat per capita in the shortrun，but diminishing or possibly eliminating the meat supply in the longrun by reducing the natural rate of animal reproduction or hunting animals to extinction and thus magnifying the Malthu sian problem，even without any increase in population size.

事实上，对于狩猎采集社会来说，要摆脱马尔萨斯人口绝对过剩的陷阱，其难度甚至比报酬律中的这些限定所表明的还要严重。虽然这些限定可能会给人留下这样的印象：要摆脱这个陷阱，“仅仅”需要技术革新，但这并不是全部事实，并不是任何技术革新都可以。正如前面所解释的，由于狩猎采集社会是“寄生”社会，它不增加任何物品的供应，而只是占有和消耗自然界提供的东西，因此在这种生产方式的框架内，任何生产力的提高都不会（或只是微不足道地）导致产品（采集的植物或狩猎的动物）产量增加，而只是（或主要）减少了生产基本不变的产出量所需的时间。例如，大约20000年前发明的弓箭，并不会导致更多的动物肉可供食用，从而使更多的人达到或超过特定的消费水平，而只是使相同数量的人在肉类消费方面的生活标准不变的情况下享受更多的休闲（否则，如果人口增加，更多休闲时间的收益将只能以人均肉类消费的减少作为代价）。事实上，对于狩猎采集者来说，技术进步（如弓箭的发明）所带来的生产力提高很可能根本不是什么福音，或者只是非常短期的福音。例如，因为由此带来的更大的狩猎便利可能会导致过度狩猎，在短期内增加人均肉类供应，但从长远来看，通过降低动物的自然繁殖率或将动物猎杀至灭绝，从而放大马尔萨斯问题，甚至在人口规模没有任何增加的情况下，减少或可能消除肉类供应。[48]

III.解决方案：理论与历史

THE SOLUTIon：THEORY AND HISTORY

The technological invention，then，that solved （at least temporarily） the problem of a steadily emerging and reemerging “excess” of population and the attendant fall of average living standards was a revolutionary change in the entire mode of production.It involved the change from a parasitic lifestyle to a genuinely productive lifE.Instead of merely appropriating and consuming what nature had provided，consumer goods were now actively produced and nature was augmented and improved upon.

因此，技术发明解决了（至少是暂时的[49]）不断出现和再次出现的人口“过剩”问题和随之而来的平均生活水平下降的问题，这是整个生产方式的革命性变化。它涉及从寄生的生活方式到真正的生产性生活的变化。现在，人们不再仅仅占有和消耗自然界提供的东西，而是积极地生产消费品，自然界得到了扩充和改善。

This revolutionary change in the human mode of production is generally referred to as the “neolithic revolution”：the transition from food production by hunting and gathering to food production by the raising of plants and animals. It began about 11，000 years ago in the Middle East，in the region typically referred to as the “Fertile Crescent。” The same inven tion was made again，seemingly independently，less than 2，000 years later in central China，and again a few thousand years later （about 5，000 years ago） also in the Western hemisphere：in mesoamerica，in South America，and in the eastern part of today’s United States.From these centers of innovation the new technology then spread to conquer practically the entire earth.

人类生产方式的这一革命性变化一般被称为“新石器时代革命”：从靠狩猎和采集生产食物过渡到靠种植植物和饲养动物生产食物。[50]这场革命始于大约11000万年前的中东地区，该地区通常被称为“新月沃土”。同样的发明在不到2000年后在中国中部似乎独立地再次出现，几千年后（大约5000年前）在西半球的中美洲、南美洲和今天美国的东部地区又一次出现。然后，新技术从这些创新中心逐步扩散，几乎征服了整个地球。

The new technology represented a fundamental cognitive achievement and was reflected and expressed in two interrelated institutional innova tions，which from then on until today have become the dominant feature of human life：the appropriation and employment of ground land as private property，and the establishment of the family and the family household.

新技术代表了一种根本性的认知成果，并反映和体现在两项相互关联的制度创新中。从那时起到今天，这两项制度创新已成为人类生活的主要特征：将土地作为私有财产占有和使用，以及建立家庭和家户。

To understand these institutional innovations and the cognitive achievement underlying them one must first take a look at the treatment of the production factor “land” by huntergatherer societies.

为了理解这些制度创新和它们背后的认知成果，我们必须首先看看狩猎采集社会对生产要素“土地”的处理。

It can be safely assumed that private property existed within the framework of a tribal household.Private property certainly existed with regard to things such as personal clothing，tools，implements and ornaments.To the extent that such items were produced by particular，identifiable individuals or acquired by others from their original makers through either gift or exchange they were considered individual property。on the other hand，to the extent that goods were the results of some concerted or joint effort they were considered collective household goods.This applied most definitely to the means of sustenance：to the berries gathered and the game hunted as the result of some intratribal division of labor。without doubt，then，collective property played a highly prominent role in huntergatherer societies，and it is because of this that the term “primitive communism” has been often employed to describe primitive，tribal economies：each individual contributed to the house hold income “according to his abilities，” and each received from the collective income “according to his needs” （as determined by the existing hierarchies within the group）—not quite unlike the “communism” in “modern” households.

可以肯定地说，私有财产在部落家庭的框架内存在。私有财产肯定包括个人衣物、工具、器具和装饰品等物品。只要这些物品是由特定、可识别的个人制作或通过礼物或交换从原始制造者那里获得的，它们就被视为个人财产。另一方面，如果物品是通过集体或共同努力的结果，它们就被视为集体家庭财产。这一点尤其适用于生活资料：例如，通过部落内部分工采集的浆果和狩猎到的猎物。毫无疑问，集体财产在狩猎采集社会中占据重要地位。因此，”原始共产主义”一词经常被用来描述原始部落经济：每个人根据自己的能力为家庭收入做出贡献，每个人根据自己的需要从集体收入中获得分配（由群体内当时的等级制度决定）——这与“现代”家庭中的“共产主义”并没有太大不同。

Yet what about the ground land on which all group activities took place？ one may safely rule out that ground land was considered private property in huntergatherer societies.But was it collective property？ This has been typically assumed to be the case，almost as a matter of course.However，the question is in fact more complicated，because a third alterna tive exists：that ground land was neither private nor collective property but instead constituted part of the environment or more specifically the general conditions of action or what has also been called “common property” or，in short，“the commons.”

那么进行所有群体活动的土地呢？可以肯定地说，在狩猎采集社会中，土地并不被视为私有财产。但它是集体财产吗？通常人们会理所当然地认为是这样。然而，实际上这个问题更复杂，因为还存在第三种可能性：土地既不是私有财产，也不是集体财产，而是构成了环境的一部分，更具体地说，是行动的基本条件，也就是所谓的“共有财产”或简称为“共有资源”。[51]

In order to decide this question，standard anthropological research is of little or no help.Instead，some elementary as well as fundamental economic theory，including a few precise definitions，is required.The external world in which man’s actions take place can be divided into two categorically distinct parts.on the one hand，there are those things that are considered means—or economic goods； and on the other hand，there are those things that are considered environment—or also referred to sometimes，if somewhat misleadingly，as free goods.The requirements for an element of the external world to be classified as a means or an economic good have been first identified with all due precision by Carl menger。 They are threefold.First，in order for something to become an economic good （henceforth simply：a good），there must be a human need （an unachieved end or an unfulfilled human desire or want）。Second，there must be the human perception of a thing believed to be equipped or endowed with properties or characteristics causally connected （standing in a causal con nection） with，and hence capable of bringing about，the satisfaction of this need.Third，and most important in the present context，an element of the external world so perceived must be under human control such that it can be employed （actively，deliberately used） to satisfy the given need （reach the end sought）。Writes Mises：“A thing becomes a means when human reason plans to employ it for the attainment of some end and human action really employs it for this purpose.” only if a thing is thus brought into a causal connection with a human need and this thing is under human control can one say that this entity is appropriated—has become a good—and hence，is someone’s （private or collective） property。If，on the other hand，an element of the external world stands in a causal connection to a human need but no one can （or believes that he can） control and interfere with this element （but must leave it unchanged instead，left to its own natural devices and effects） then such an element must be considered part of the unappropriated environment and hence is no one’s property。Thus，for instance，sunshine or rainfall，atmospheric pressure or gravitational forces，may have a causal effect on certain wanted or unwanted ends，but insofar as man thinks himself incapable of interfering with such elements they are mere conditions of acting，not the part of any action.E.g.，rainwater may be causally connected to the sprouting of some edible mushrooms and this causal connection may well be known.However，if nothing is done about the rainwater，then this water is also not owned by anyone； it might be a factor contributing to production，but it is not strictly speaking a production factor。only if there is an actual interference with the natural rainfall，if the rainwater is collected in a bucket or in a cistern，for instance，can it be considered someone’s property and does it become a factor of production.

为了回答这个问题，标准的人类学研究帮助不大甚至没有帮助。相反，需要一些基本而重要的经济理论，包括一些精确的定义。人的行动所处的外部世界可以分为两类截然不同的部分。一方面，有些东西被视为手段或经济财货；另一方面，有些东西被视为环境，有时也被称为自由财货（尽管这个称呼有点误导性）。卡尔·门格尔首先精确地确定了将外部世界的元素分类为手段或经济财货的依据。[52]它们有三个。首先，为了使某物成为经济物品（以下简称物品），必须有一个人类需求（未实现的目标或未满足的愿望）。其次，人类必须认为某物具备与满足这种需求有因果关系的特性或特点。第三，也是本文中最重要的一点，人类必须能够控制这种外部世界的元素，以便可以用来满足特定需求（实现所追求的目标）。米塞斯写道：“当人类理性计划使用某物来实现某个目标，并且人的行动确实将其用于这个目的时，这个东西就成为了手段。”[53]只有当某物与人类需求存在因果关系并且在某人控制之下时，才能说这个东西被某人占有了，成为了财货，因此也成为了某个人（私人或集体）的财产。另一方面，如果某个外部世界的元素与人类需求存在因果关系，但没有人能（或认为自己能）控制和干预这个元素（必须任其保持自然状态），那么这种元素就必须被视为未被占有的环境的一部分，因此不属于任何人的财产。例如，阳光或降雨、大气压力或引力可能对某些想要或不想要的目的产生因果效应，但只要人认为自己没有能力干预这些元素，它们就只是行动的条件，而不是任何行动的一部分。例如，雨水可能与一些可食用菌的发芽有因果关系，这种因果关系很可能是众所周知的。但是，如果对雨水不做任何处理，那么这些水也不属于任何人；它可能是一个有助于生产的因素，但严格来说，它不是一个生产因素。只有在对自然降雨有实际干扰的情况下，例如，如果雨水被收集在水桶或蓄水池中，它才能被视为某人的财产，并成为一个生产要素。

before the backdrop of these considerations one can now proceed to address the question regarding the status of ground land in a hunter gatherer society。 certainly，the berries picked off a bush were property； but what about the bush，which was causally associated with the picked berries？ The bush was only lifted from its original status as an environ mental condition of action and a mere contributing factor to the satisfac tion of human needs to the status of property and a genuine production factor once it had been appropriated：that is，once man had purposefully interfered with the natural causal process connecting bush and berries by，for instance，watering the bush or trimming its branches in order to produce a certain outcome （an increase of the berry harvest above the level otherwise，naturally attained）。Further，once the bush had thus become property by grooming it or tending to it also future berry harvests became property，whereas previously only the berries actually harvested were someone’s property； moreover，once the bush had been lifted out of its natural，unowned state by watering it so as to increase the future berry harvest，for instance，also the ground land supporting the bush had become property。

在这些考虑的背景下，现在可以讨论狩猎采集社会中土地的地位了。[54]显然，从灌木上采摘的浆果是财产；但是，与这些浆果有因果关系的灌木是不是财产呢？只有当灌木被占有之后，它才从最初的环境条件和满足人类需求的辅助因素提升为财产和真正的生产要素。也就是说，当人类有意干预灌木与浆果的自然因果过程，例如给灌木浇水或修剪枝条以提高浆果收成时，灌木才被视为财产。进一步来说，一旦通过照料或修剪使灌木成为财产，未来的浆果收成都将成为财产，而之前只有实际采摘的浆果才是某人的财产。此外，一旦通过浇水等方式使灌木脱离自然的无主状态以增加未来的浆果收成，支撑灌木的土地也将成为财产。

Similarly，there is also no question that a hunted animal was property； but what about the herd，the pack or the flock of which this animal was a part？ Based on our previous considerations，the herd must be regarded as unowned nature as long as man had done nothing that could be interpreted （and that was in his own mind） causally connected with the satisfaction of a perceived need.The herd became property only once the requirement of interfering with the natural chain of events in order to produce some desired result had been fulfilled.This would have been the case，for instance，as soon as man engaged in the herding of animals，i.e.，as soon as he actively tried to control the movements of the herd.The herder then did not only own the herd，he thus became also the owner of all future offspring naturally generated by the herd.

同样，毫无疑问，被猎杀的动物也是财产；但是，这个动物所在的畜群或群落呢？根据我们前面的考虑，只要人类没有做任何可以被解释为（而且在他自己的头脑里）与满足感知需求有因果关系的事情，畜群就必须被视为无主的自然资源。只有当为了产生一些预期的结果而需要干预自然的事件链时，畜群才成为财产。例如，一旦人类从事放牧，也就是积极地试图控制畜群的活动，畜群就将成为财产。因此，牧民不仅拥有畜群，而且也成为畜群未来自然生育的所有后代的所有者。

What，however，about the ground land on which the controlled movement of the herd took place？ According to our definitions，the herdsmen could not be considered the owner of the ground land，at least not automatically so，without the fulfillment of a further requirement。because herders as conventionally defined merely followed the natural movements of the herd and their interference with nature was restricted to keeping the flock together so as to gain easier access to any one of its members should the need for the supply of animal meat arise.Herdsmen did not interfere with the land itself，however。They did not interfere with the land in order to control the movements of the herd； they only interfered with the movements of the members of the herd.Land only became property once herders gave up herding and turned to animal husbandry instead，i.e.，once they treated land as a （scarce） means in order to control the movement of animals by controlling land.This only occurred when land was somehow enclosed，by fencing it in or constructing some other obstacles （such as trenches），which restricted the free，natural flow of animals.Rather than being merely a contributing factor in the production of animal herds，land thus became a genuine production factor。

那么，被控制的畜群所活动的土地呢？根据我们的定义，牧民不能被视为这片土地的所有者，至少在没有满足进一步条件之前是不行的。因为传统意义上的牧民只是跟随畜群的自然移动，他们对自然的干预仅限于保持畜群的完整，以便在需要肉类供应时能更方便地获取某一只动物。然而，牧民并没有干预土地本身。他们并没有通过控制土地来控制畜群的移动，而只是干预了畜群个体的移动。那么，被控制的畜群所活动的土地呢？根据我们的定义，牧民不能被视为这片土地的所有者，至少在没有满足进一步条件之前是不行的。因为传统意义上的牧民只是跟随畜群的自然移动，他们对自然的干预仅限于保持畜群的完整，以便在需要肉类供应时能更方便地获取某一只动物。然而，牧民并没有干预土地本身。他们并没有通过控制土地来控制畜群的移动，而只是干预了畜群个体的移动。只有当牧民放弃游牧而转向畜牧业时，土地才成为财产，也就是说，一旦他们将土地作为一种（稀缺的）手段，通过控制土地来控制动物的移动。只有当土地以某种方式被围起来时，比如用栅栏围起来或建造一些其他障碍物（如壕沟），限制了牲畜的自由、自然流动，这种情况才会发生。土地因此不再仅仅是牲畜生产中的一个促成因素，而成为一个真正的生产要素。

What these considerations demonstrate is that it is erroneous to think of land as the collectively owned property of huntergatherer societies.Hunters were not herdsmen and still less were they engaged in animal husbandry； and gatherers were not gardeners or agriculturalists.They did not exercise control over the naturegiven fauna and flora by tending to it or grooming it。They merely picked pieces from nature for the taking。Land to them was no more than a condition of their activities，not their property。

这些考虑表明，认为土地是狩猎采集社会的集体所有财产是错误的。猎人不是牧民，更不是从事畜牧业的人；采集者也不是园丁或农民。他们没有通过照料或培育自然赋予的动植物来对其进行控制。他们只是从大自然中挑选可获取的东西。对他们来说，土地只不过是他们活动的一个条件，而不是他们的财产。

At best，very small sections of land had been appropriated （and were thus turned into collective property） by hunters and gatherers，to be used as permanent storage places for surplus goods for use at future points in time and as shelters，all the while the surrounding territories continued to be treated and used as unowned conditions of their existence.

充其量，狩猎采集者占用了非常小的一部分土地（从而将其变成了集体财产），用作剩余物品的永久储存地以供将来使用，以及用作庇护所，而周围的领土在整个过程中一直被当作无主的生存条件来对待和使用。

What can be said，then，to have been the decisive step toward a （tempo rary） solution of the Malthusian trap faced by growing huntergatherer soci eties was the establishment of property in land going above and beyond the establishment of mere storage places and sheltering facilities.pressured by falling standards of living as a result of absolute overpopulation，members of the tribe （separately or collectively） successively appropriated more and more of the previously unowned surrounding nature （land）。And underly ing and motivating this appropriation of surrounding ground land—and turning former places of storage and shelter into residential centers of agri culture and animal husbandry—was an eminent intellectual achievement。As Michael Hart has noted，“the idea of planting crops，protecting them，and eventually harvesting them is not obvious or trivial，and it requires a considerable degree of intelligence to conceive of that notion.No apes ever conceived of that idea，nor did Australopithecus，Homo habilis，Homo erectus， nor even archaic Homo sapiens.” Nor did any of them conceive of the even more difficult idea of the tending，taming，and breeding of animals.

因此，可以说，确立土地财产权这一决定性步骤，超越了仅仅建立储存地点和避难所，成为狩猎采集社会面临的马尔萨斯陷阱（即人口过多导致生活水平下降）的暂时解决方案。在生活水平因绝对人口过多而下降的压力下，部落成员（无论是单独还是集体）逐渐占有了越来越多原本无主的周围自然资源（即土地）。而这种对周围土地的侵占，以及将以前的储藏和庇护场所变成农业和畜牧业的居住中心，是一项杰出的智力成就。正如迈克尔·哈特所指出的，“种植作物、保护作物并最终收获作物的观念并不是显而易见或微不足道有，这需要相当程度的智慧才能构思出这个概念。猿类从来没有想到过这种观念，南方古猿、能人、直立人，甚至古代智人也没有”。[55]更不用说，他们谁也没有想到过照料、驯化和饲养动物这个更困难的观念。

formerly，all consumer goods had been appropriated in the most direct and quickest way possible：through foraging，i.e.，by “picking” such goods wherever they happened to be or go。In contrast，with agriculture and animal husbandry consumer goods were attained in an indirect and roundabout way：by producing them through the deliberate control of ground land.This was based on the discovery that consumer goods （plants and animals） were not simply “given” to be picked，but that there were natural causes affecting their supply and that these natural causes could be manipulated by taking control of ground land.The new mode of production required more time in order to reach the ultimate goal of food consumption （and insofar involved a loss of leisure），but by interposing ground land as a genuine factor of production it was more productive and led to a greater total output of consumer goods （food），thus allowing for a larger population size to be sustained on the same quantity of land.

More specifically with respect to plants：Seeds and fruits suitable for nutritional purposes were no longer just picked （and possibly stored），but the wild plants bearing them were actively cultivated.besides for their taste，seeds and fruits were selected for size，durability （storability），the ease of harvesting and of seedgermination，and they were not consumed but used as inputs for the future output of consumer goods，leading in the relatively short time span of maybe twenty to thirty years to new，domesticated plant varieties with significantly improved yields per unit of land.Among the first plants thus domesticated in the near and Middle East were the einkorn wheat，emmer wheat，barley，rye，peas and olives.In China it was rice and millet； much later，in mesoamerica it was corn，beans and squash； in South America potatoes and manioc； in northeast America sunflowers and goosefoot； and in Africa sorghum，rice，yams and oil palM.

The process of animal domestication proceeded along similar lines，and in this regard it was possible to draw on the experience gained by the first domestication and breeding of dogs，which had taken place some 16，000 years ago，i.e.，still under huntergatherer conditions，somewhere in Sibe ria.

Dogs are the descendants of wolves.Wolves are excellent hunters.How ever，they are also scavengers，and it has been plausibly argued that as such wolves regularly hung around human campsites for scraps.As scavengers，those wolves who were least afraid of humans and who displayed the friend liest behavior toward them obviously enjoyed an evolutionary advantage.It was likely from these semitame，campfollowing wolves that cubs were adopted into tribal households as pets and where it was then discovered that these could be trained for various purposes.They could be used in the hunt of other animals，they could be used to pull，they made for good bed warmers during cold nights，and they even provided a source of meat in cases of emergency。Most importantly，however，it was discovered that some of the dogs could bark （wolves rarely bark） and be selected and bred for their ability to bark and as such perform the invaluable task of warning and guarding their owners of strangers and intruders.It was this service above all，that appears to be the reason why，once the dog had been “invented，” this invention spread like wildfire from Siberia all across the world.Every one everywhere wanted to possess some offspring of this new，remarkable kind of animal，because in an era of constant intertribal warfare，the owner ship of dogs proved to be a great advantage.

once the dog had arrived in the region of the near East，which was to become the first center of human civilization，it must have added consider able momentum to the human “experiment” of productive living and its success.For while a dog used for sentry duty was an asset for mobile hunter gatherers，it was an even greater asset for stationary settlers.The reason for this is straightforward：because in sedentary societies there were simply more things to be protected.In huntergatherer societies one had to fear for one’s life，be it from external or internal aggression.However，because no member of society owned much of anything，there was little or no reason to steal。Matters were different，though，in a society of settlers.From its very incep tion，sedentary life was marked by the emergence of significant differences in the property and wealth owned by different members of society； hence，insofar as envy existed in any way，shape or form （as can be safely assumed） each member （each separate household） also faced the threat of theft or destruction of his property by others，including especially also members of his own tribe.Dogs provided invaluable help in dealing with this problem，especially because dogs，as a matter of biological fact，attach themselves to individual “masters，” rather than to people in general or，like cats，for instance，to particular places. As such，they themselves represented a prime example of something owned privately，rather than collectively。That is，they offered a “natural refutation” of whatever taboo might have existed in a primitive society against the private ownership of property。Moreover and more importantly，because dogs were unquestionably the property of par ticular individuals they proved also uniquely serviceable in guarding the private property of their natural owners from every kind of “foreign” invader。

Animals，even more so than plants，were valuable for humans for a variety of reasons：as sources of meat，milk，skin，fur and wool and also as potential means of transportation，pull and traction，for instance.How ever，as a matter of biological fact，most animals turn out to be undomesti cable. The first and foremost selection criterion，then，in the “production” of animals as livestock or pets was an animal species’ perceived degree of tamability or controllability。To test one’s hypothesis，in a first step it was checked whether or not an animal was suitable to herding。If so，it was then tried if a herd of wild animals could also be penned.If so，one would sub sequently select the tamer animals as parents of the next generation—but not all animals breed in captivity!—and so on and on.Finally，one would select among the tamed animal variety for other desirable properties such as size，strength，etc。，thus breeding eventually a new，domesticated animal species.Among the first large mammalian animals thus domesticated in the near and Middle East （around 10，000 years ago） were sheep，goats，and pigs （from wild boars），then cattle （from wild aurochs）。Cattle were also domesticated，apparently independently，in india at about the same time （about 8，000 years ago）。Roughly at about the same time as in the near and Middle East，sheep，goats and pigs were domesticated indepen dently also in China，and China was also to contribute the domesticated water buffalo （about 6，000 years ago）。Central Asia and Arabia contributed the domesticated Bactrian and Arabian camel respectively （around 4，500 years ago）。And the Americas，or more precisely the Andes region of South America，were to contribute the guinea pig （about 7，000 years ago），the llama and the alpaca （about 5，500 years ago）。Finally，an “invention” of particularly momentous consequences was the domestication of the horse，which occurred about 6，000 years ago in the region of today’s Russia and Ukraine.This achievement initiated a genuine revolution in land trans portation.Up until then，on land man had to walk from place to place，and the fastest way to cover distances was by boat。This changed dramati cally with the arrival of the domesticated horse，which from then on until the 19th century with the invention of the locomotive and the motorcar，was to provide the fastest means of overland transportation.Accordingly，not quite unlike the “invention” of the dog some 16，000 years ago，the “invention” of the horse was to spread like wildfire.However，coming some 10，000 years later，the latter invention could no longer diffuse as widely as the former。While the dog had reached practically all corners of the world，the climactic changes—the global warming—that had taken place in the meantime made it impossible for the same success to be repeated in the case of the horse.In the meantime，the Eurasian land mass was separated from the Americas and from indonesia，new Guinea and Australia by bod ies of water too wide to be bridged.Thus，it was only thousands of years later，after the European rediscovery of the Americas，for instance，that the horse was finally introduced there.（Wild horses had apparently existed on the American continent，but they had been hunted to extinction there so as to make any independent domestication impossible.）

动物甚至比植物对人类更有价值，原因有很多：例如，作为肉、奶、皮、毛的来源，以及作为潜在的运输、拉力和牵引力的手段。然而，就生物学事实而言，大多数动物最终都是无法驯养的。[63]因此，在“生产”动物作为家畜或宠物时，首要的选择标准是动物物种的可驯服性或可控制程度。为了验证自己的假设，首先要检查一种动物是否适合放牧。如果可以，那么就可以尝试是否可以将牧群里的野生动物圈养起来。这样也可以了，人们就会选择比较驯服的动物作为下一代的父母——但不是所有的动物都能在圈养环境中繁殖！——以此类推，循环往复。最后，人们将在被驯服的动物品种中进行选择，以获得其他令人满意的特性，如大小、力量等，从而最终培育出一个新的、被驯化的动物品种。在近东和中东，最早被驯化的大型哺乳动物（大约10000年前）是绵羊、山羊和猪（来自野猪），然后是牛（来自野牛）。大约在同一时期（大约8000年前），印度人显然也独立驯化了牛。几乎是与近东和中东同一时期，绵羊、山羊和猪也在中国被独立驯化，中国还贡献了驯化的水牛（大约6000年前）。中亚和阿拉伯分别贡献了驯化的双峰驼和阿拉伯驼（大约4500年前）。而美洲，或者更确切地说，南美洲的安第斯山脉地区，则贡献了豚鼠（大约7000年前）、美洲驼和羊驼（大约5500年前）。最后，一个具有特别重大影响的“发明”是马的驯化，它发生在大约6000年前的今天的俄罗斯和乌克兰地区。这一成就开启了一场真正的陆地运输革命。在此之前，在陆地上，人必须从一个地方走到另一个地方，覆盖距离最快的方法是乘船。随着驯化马的到来，这种情况发生了巨大的变化，从那时起直到19世纪火车和汽车的发明之前，马都提供了最快的陆路运输手段。因此，与大约16000年前狗的“发明”没有什么不同，马的“发明”像野火一样传播开来。然而，大约10000年后，马的“发明”不如狗的“发明”那样传播广泛了。虽然狗几乎到达了世界的各个角落，但在此期间发生的气候变化——全球变暖——使得同样的成功不可能在马身上重演。与此同时，欧亚大陆与美洲、印度尼西亚、新几内亚和澳大利亚被宽得无法跨越的水域分隔开来。只是在几千年后，例如，在欧洲人重新发现美洲之后，马才最终被引入到那里。（野马显然曾存在于美洲大陆，但它们已被猎杀殆尽，因此不可能有任何独立的驯化）。

The appropriation of land as property and basis of agriculture and animal husbandry was only half of the solution to the problem posed by an increasing population pressure，however。Through the appropriation of land a more effective use was made of land，allowing for a larger population size to be sustained.But the institution of land ownership in and of itself did not affect the other side of the problem：the continued proliferation of new and more offspring。This aspect of the problem required some solution as well。A social institution had to be invented that brought this prolifera tion under control。The institution designed to accomplish this task is the institution of the family，which developed not coincidentally hand in hand with that of land ownership.Indeed，as Thomas Malthus pointed out，in order to solve the problem of overpopulation，along with the institution of private property “the commerce between the sexes” had to undergo some fundamental change as well。

What was the commerce between the sexes before and what was the institutional innovation brought about in this regard by the family？ A pre cise answer to the first question is notoriously difficult，but it is possible to identify the principal structural change.In terms of economic theory，the change can be described as one from a situation where both the benefits of creating offspring—by creating an additional potential producer—and especially the costs of creating offspring—by creating an additional consumer （eater）—were socialized，i.e.，reaped and paid for by society at large rather than the “producers” of this offspring，to a situation where both benefits as well as costs involved in procreation were internalized by and economically imputed back to those individuals causally responsible for producing them.

Whatever the details may have been，it appears that the institution of a stable monogamous and also of a polygamous relationship between men and women that is nowadays associated with the term “family” is fairly new in the history of mankind and was preceded for a long time by an institution that may be broadly defined as “unrestricted” or “unregulated” sexual intercourse or as “group marriage.” The commerce between the sexes during this stage of human history did not rule out the existence of temporary pair relationships between one man and one woman.However，in principle every woman was considered a potential sexual partner of every man，and vice versa.“Männer （lebten） in Vielweiberei und ihre Weiber gleichzeitig in Vielmännerei，” noted Friedrich Engels，following in the footsteps of lewis H.Morgan’s researches in Ancient Society （1871），“und die gemeinsamen Kinder （galten） daher auch als ihnen allen gemeinsam （gehörig）。。。jede Frau （gehörte） jedem mann und jeder mann jeder Frau gleichmässig。”

无论细节如何，如今与家庭一词相关的男女之间稳定的一夫一妻制和一夫多妻关系在人类历史上是相当晚近新的，并且在这之前很长一段时间内，男女之间存在的是一种可以被广泛定义为 “不受限制”或“不受管制”的性交或“群婚”制。[65]不排除一男一女之间存在临时配偶关系。然而，原则上每个女人都被认为是每个男人的潜在性伴侣，反之亦然。“男人（生活）在一夫多妻制中，他们的妻子也同时处于一夫多妻制中，”弗里德里希·恩格斯追随刘易斯·H·摩根《古代社会研究》（1871）后指出，“因此，共同的孩子（被）认为也属于他们所有人。….，每个女人（属于）每个男人，每个男人也平等地属于每个女人”。[66]

What Engels and countless later socialists failed to notice in their glo rifying description of the past—and supposedly again future—institution of “free love，” however，is the plain fact that this institution has a direct and clear effect on the production of offspring。As Ludwig von Mises has commented：“it is certain that even if a socialist community may bring ‘free love，’ it can in no way bring free birth.” What Mises implied with this remark，and what socialists such as Engels and bebel apparently ignored，is that，certainly in the age before the availability of effective means of contraception，free love has consequences，namely pregnancies and births，and that births involve benefits as well as costs.This does not matter as long as the benefits exceed the costs，i.e.，as long as an additional member of society adds more to it as a producer of goods than it takes from it as a consumer—and this may well be the case for some time.But it follows from the law of returns that this situation cannot last forever，without limits.Inevitably，the point must arrive when the costs of additional offspring will exceed its benefits.Then，any further procreation must be stopped—moral restraint must be exercised—unless one wants to experience a progressive fall in average living standards.However，if children are considered every one’s or no one’s children，because everyone entertains sexual relations with everyone else，then the incentive to refrain from procreation disappears or is at least significantly diminished.Instinctively，by virtue of man’s biological nature，each woman and each man is driven to spread and proliferate her or his genes into the next generation of the species.The more offspring one creates the better，because the more of one’s genes will survive.No doubt，this natural human instinct can be controlled by rational delibera tion.But if no or little economic sacrifice must be made for simply follow ing one’s animal instincts，because all children are maintained by society at large，then no or little incentive exists to employ reason in sexual matters，i.e.，to exercise any moral restraint。

恩格斯和无数后来的社会主义者在他们美化过去（和未来可能）的“自由爱情”制度时，忽略了一个简单而明确的事实：这种制度直接影响了生育。正如路德维希·冯·米塞斯所评论的：“即使一个社会主义社会可能带来‘自由爱情’，但它绝不能带来自由生育。”[67]米塞斯的这句话的含义，以及恩格斯和贝贝尔等社会主义者显然忽略的，是在有效避孕手段出现之前，自由爱情会导致怀孕和出生，而出生既有好处也有成本。只要收益超过成本，也就是说，只要一个额外多出的社会成员作为商品生产者对社会的贡献大于作为消费者对社会的索取，这就没有关系——这种情况可能会持续一段时间。但根据报酬律，这种情况不可能永远持续下去，没有限制。不可避免地，当增加后代的成本将超过其收益时，这一点必然会到来。因此，任何进一步的生育都必须停止——必须进行道德约束——除非一个人想经历平均生活水平的逐步下降。然而，如果孩子被视为每个人的孩子或没有人专属的孩子，因为每个人都与其他人有性关系，那么避免生育的动机就会消失或大大减弱。根据人类的生物本性，每个女人和男人都有将自己的基因传播到下一代的本能。生育越多，生存下来的基因就越多。毫无疑问，这种自然本能可以通过理性来控制。但如果只需遵从动物本能，而不需要或只需要少量经济牺牲，因为所有孩子都由整个社会抚养，那么在性问题上运用理性的动机就不存在或大大减少，即缺乏任何道德克制的动机。

From a purely economic point of view，then，the solution to the problem of overpopulation should be immediately apparent。The ownership of children or more correctly the trusteeship over children must be privatized.Rather than considering children as collectively owned by or entrusted to “society” or viewing childbirths as some uncontrolled and uncontrol lable natural event and accordingly considering children as owned by or entrusted to no one （as mere favorable or unfavorable “environmental changes”），children must instead be regarded as entities which are privately produced and entrusted into private care.As Thomas Malthus first percep tively noted，this，essentially，is what is accomplished with the institution of a family：

the most natural and obvious check （on population） seemed to be to make every man provide for his own children； that this would operate in some respect as a measure and guide in the increase of population，as it might be expected that no man would bring beings into the world，for whom he could not find the means of support； that where this notwithstanding was the case，it seemed necessary，for the example of others，that the disgrace and inconvenience attending such a conduct should fall upon the individual，who had thus inconsiderately plunged himself and innocent children in misery and want。—The insti tution of marriage，or at least，of some express or implied obli gation on every man to support his own children，seems to be the natural result of these reasonings in a community under the difficulties that we have supposed.

从纯粹的经济角度来看，解决人口过剩问题的方案应该是显而易见的。孩子的所有权，或者更准确地说，孩子的监护权必须私有化。与其将孩子视为由“社会”集体拥有或托管，或者将生育视为某种无法控制的自然事件，从而认为孩子不属于任何人（只是有利或不利的“环境变化”），不如将孩子视为私人物品，由私人生产并由私人照管。正如托马斯·马尔萨斯首次敏锐地指出的，这实际上就是家庭制度所实现的：

Moreover and finally：with the formation of monogamous or polyga mous families came another decisive innovation.Earlier on，the members of a tribe formed a single，unified household，and the intratribal division of labor was essentially an intrahousehold division of labor。with the for mation of families came the breakup of a unified household into several， independent households and with that also the formation of “several”—or private—ownership of land.That is，the previously described appropriation of land was not simply a transition from a situation where something that was earlier on unowned became now owned，but more precisely something previously unowned was turned into something owned by sep arate households （thus allowing also for the emergence of interhousehold division of labor）。

此外，最后一点是，随着一夫一妻制或一夫多妻家庭的形成，出现了另一项决定性的创新。早期，部落成员组成一个统一的大家庭，部落内部的分工本质上是家庭内部的分工。随着家庭的形成，统一的家庭被分解成若干独立的家庭，，同时也形成了以户为单位——或私人——的土地所有权。也就是说，之前描述的土地占有不仅仅是从无主状态转变为有主状态，而更确切地说，是从无主状态转变为由不同家庭分别拥有的状态（这也允许家庭之间的分工出现）。

Consequently，then，the higher social income made possible by the ownership of land was no longer distributed，as was formerly the case，to each member of society “according to his need.” Rather，each separate household’s share in the total social income came to depend on the product economically imputed to it，that is，to its labor and its property invested in production.In other words：the formerly pervasive “communism” might have still continued within each household，but communism vanished from the relation between the members of different households.The incomes of different households differed，depending on the quantity and quality of invested labor and property，and no one had a claim on the income produced by the members of a household other than one’s own.Thus，“free riding” on others’ efforts became largely if not entirely impossible.He who did not work could no longer expect to still eat。

因此，由于土地所有权带来的更高社会收入不再像过去那样“按需”分配给社会的每个成员。相反，每个独立的家庭在总社会收入中的份额取决于他们在经济产品产生中的共线，也就是取决于它在生产中投入的劳动和资产。换句话说，家庭内的“共产主义”代替了部落内的“共产主义”，部落内的“共产主义”消失了。不同家庭的收入因投入的劳动和资产的数量和质量而异。除了自己家庭成员所生产的收入外，没有人有权要求其非自家家庭成员的收入。在别人的努力上“搭便车”的行为，变得不那么可行甚至完全不可能。不劳动者不再能指望仍然能吃有饭吃。[69]

Thus，in response to mounting population pressure a new mode of soci etal organization had come into existence，displacing the huntergatherer lifestyle that had been characteristic of most of human history。As Ludwig von Mises summarized the matter：

Private ownership in the means of production is the regulating principle which，within society，balances the limited means of subsistence at society’s disposal with the less limited ability of consumers to increase.By making the share in the social product which falls to each member of society depend on the product economically imputed to him，that is，to his labor and his property，the elimination of surplus human beings by the struggle for existence，as it rages in the vegetable and animal kingdom，is replaced by a reduction in the birthrate as a result of social forces.‘Moral restraint，’ the limitations of offspring imposed by social positions，replaces the struggle for existence.

因此，为了应对日益增长的人口压力，一种新的社会组织模式应运而生，取代了人类历史上大部分时期的狩猎采集生活方式。正如路德维希·冯·米塞斯总结的那样：

生产资料私有制是一个调节原则，在社会内部，它使社会支配的有限的生存资料同消费者较不那么有限的增加生存资料的能力达到平衡。使每个社会成员得到的社会产品份额，取决于在经济上应该归属于他的产品，即他的劳动和财产，这样一来，像动植物王国中流行的现象那样，通过生存竞争消灭多余人口的做法，就被出生率的降低所取代，这是社会力量导致的。“道德约束”，即社会处境对后代的限制，取代了生存竞争。[70]

Having first established some permanent storage and sheltering places，then，step by step，having appropriated more and more surrounding land as the basis for agricultural production and the raising of livestock and trans forming erstwhile centers of storage and shelter into extended settlements composed of houses and villages occupied by separate family households，the new lifestyle of the people of the near and Middle East as well as the other regions of original human settlement began to spread outward，slowly but inescapably。in principle，two modes are conceivable by which this diffusion could have taken place.Either the original settlers gradually dis placed the neighboring nomadic tribes in search of new tobecultivated land （demic diffusion），or else the latter imitated and adopted the new lifestyle on their own initiative （cultural diffusion）。Until recently，it had been generally believed that the first mode of diffusion was the predominant one. How ever，based on newly discovered genetic evidence this view now appears to be questionable，at least insofar as the spread of the new，sedentary lifestyle from the near East to Europe is concerned.If present Europeans were the descendants of near Eastern people at the time of the neolithic revolution，genetic traces for this should exist。In fact，however，very few such traces can be found among presentday Europeans.Thus，it appears more likely that the spread of the new，sedentary lifestyle occurred largely，if not exclusively，via the latter，secondmentioned route，while the role in this process played by the original near Eastern settlers was only a minor one.Perhaps a few such settlers pushed in northern and western direction，where they were then absorbed by neighboring people adopting their new and successful lifestyle， with the effect that their own genetic imprint became more and more diluted with increasing distance from their near Eastern point of origin.

在建立了一些永久的储存和庇护场所后，人们逐步占用了更多周围的土地作为农业生产和畜牧业的基础，将原来的储存和庇护中心变成由独立分散的家庭组成的房屋和村庄，形成了扩展的定居点。这种新的生活方式从近东和中东地区开始，逐渐向外扩展，尽管缓慢但不可避免。[71]原则上，有两种可能的扩散方式。要么原始定居者逐渐取代了附近的游牧部落，寻找新的土地进行耕种（人口扩散，耕种者取代牧民）；要么这些游牧部落主动模仿并采用了新的生活方式（文化扩散，牧民学会了耕种）。直到最近，人们普遍认为第一种扩散方式是主要的。[72]直到最近，人们普遍认为第一种扩散方式是主要的。然而，基于新发现的基因证据，这一观点现在看起来值得怀疑，至少就新石器时代生活方式从近东传播到欧洲而言。如果当今的欧洲人是新石器时代近东人的后裔，那么应该能找到相应的基因痕迹。。但实际上，当今欧洲人中很少有这样的近东人基因痕迹。因此，更可能的情况是，这种新的定居生活方式主要通过第二种方式传播开来，而近东原始定居者在这一过程中所扮演的角色很小。也许有少数定居者向北部和西部推进，然后被吸收进邻近部落，这些部落采纳了新的成功生活方式，导致近东人的基因印记随着与近东起源地的距离增加而越来越淡化。。

In any case，with the neolithic revolution the formerly universal hunter gatherer lifestyle essentially died out or was relegated to the outer fringes of human habitation.without doubt，the newly developing farming commu nities were attractive targets for nomadic raiders，and owing to their greater mobility neighboring nomadic tribes for a long time posed a serious threat to agricultural settlers.But ultimately，nomads were no match for them，because of their greater numbers.More specifically，it was the organization of larger numbers of people in communities of households—the location of separate households in close physical proximity to each other—that made for military superiority。Community life did not merely lower the transaction costs as far as intratribal exchange was concerned.Community life also offered the advantage of easily and quickly coordinated joint defense in the case of exter nal aggression.Moreover，besides the strength of greater numbers，settled agricultural communities allowed also for an intensified and expanded division of labor and for greater savings and thus facilitated the development of a weaponry superior to anything available to bands of nomads.

无论如何，随着新石器革命的到来，曾经普遍存在的狩猎采集生活方式基本上消失了，或者被迫退居到人类居住地的边缘地带。毫无疑问，新兴的农业社区对游牧掠夺者具有吸引力。游牧部落的机动性当然更强，邻近的游牧部落长时间对农业定居者构成了严重威胁。但最终，游牧部落无法与农业定居者相匹敌，主要原因在于定居者人数更多。更具体地说，以家庭为居住单位，家庭紧密相邻组织成定居点的大型社区，这形成了对于游牧掠夺者的军事优势。社区生活不仅降低了部落内部交换的交易成本，还提供了在外部侵略时快速协调共同防御的便利。除此之外，农业定居社区不仅拥有更多的人数优势，还允许更为密集和广泛的劳动分工以及更大的储蓄，从而有助于开发出远超游牧部落武器的装备。[73]

Fifty thousand years ago the human population size has been estimated to have been as low as 5，000 or possibly 50，000 people.At the beginning of the neolithic revolution，some 11，000 years ago，when essentially the entire globe had been conquered by tribes of hunters and gatherers having spread out in the course of thousands of years from their original home land somewhere in East Africa，the world population size has been esti mated to have reached about 4 million. Since then，slowly but steadily，the new mode of production：of agriculture and animal husbandry based on private （or collective） ownership of land and organized around separate family households，successively displaced the original huntergatherer order。

5万年前，全人类人口估计只有5000到50000人左右。约1.1万年前新石器革命开始时，那些来自东非某地的现代人祖先已经扩散到世界各地，形成一个个狩猎采集部落，此时世界人口估计达到了约400万。[74]此后，以私人或集体土地所有权为基础的，以家庭为组织方式的农业和畜牧业逐步取代了狩猎采集生活方式，人口数量也随之慢慢但稳步增长。

Consequently，at the beginning of the Christian era，the world population had increased to 170 million，and in 1800，which marks the onset of the socalled industrial revolution （the topic of the following chapter） and the close of the agrarian age，or as it has also been termed，the “old biological order，” it had reached 720 million.（Today’s world population exceeds 7 billion!） During this agrarian age，the size of cities occasionally reached or even surpassed one million inhabitants，but until the very end less than 2 percent of the population lived in big cities and even in the economically most advanced countries 80–90 percent of the population was occupied in agricultural production （while this number has fallen to less than 5 percent today）。

因此，在基督教时代之初，世界人口增加到1.7亿，到1800年，也就是所谓的工业革命（下一章的主题）开始和农业时代或被称为 “旧生物秩序时代”结束时，世界人口已达到7.2亿。（今天的世界人口超过70亿！）而在整个农业时代，城市规模偶尔能达到甚至超过一百万居民，但直到农业时代的最后，只有不到2%的人口生活在大城市，即使在经济最发达的国家，也有80%到90%的人口从事农业生产（而在发达国家今天这个数字已经下降到不足5%）。

4 从马尔萨斯陷阱到工业革命：对社会进化的一种解释*

4 From the Malthusian Trap to the industrial revolution：An Explanation of Social Evolution

I. 经济理论

EConOMIC THEORY

For economic theory the question of how to increase wealth and get rich has a straightforward answer。

对于经济理论来说，如何增加财富和致富的问题有一个简单明了的答案。

It has three components：you get richer （a） through capital accumulation，i.e.，the construction of intermediate “producer” or “capital” goods that can produce more consumer goods per unit time than can be produced without them or goods that cannot be produced at all with just land and labor （and capital accumulation in turn has something to do with （low） time preference）；（b） through participation and integration in the division of labor； and （c） through population control，i.e.，by maintaining the optimal population size.

致富有三个关键要素：（a）通过资本积累（b）通过参与和融入分工；（c）通过人口控制，即维持最佳人口规模。其中，资本积累可以制造中间产品和资本品，这些东西能提高生产效率，使单位时间内生产出更多的消费品；或者生产出仅靠土地和劳动力无法生产出的产品。资本积累与低时间偏好有关。

Robinson Crusoe，alone on his island，has originally only his own “labor” and “land” （nature） at his disposal。He is as rich （or poor） as nature happens to make him.Some of his most urgently felt needs he may be able to satisfy directly，equipped only with his bare hands.At the very least，he can always satisfy his desire of leisure in this way：immediately。However，the satisfaction of most of his wants requires more than bare nature and hands，i.e.，some indirect or roundabout—and timeconsuming—production method.Most，indeed almost all goods and associated sorts of satisfaction require the help of some only indirectly useful tools：of producer or capital goods.with the help of producer goods it becomes possible to produce more per unit time of the very goods that can be produced also with bare hands （such as leisure） or to produce goods that cannot be produced at all with just land and labor。In order to catch more fish than with his bare hands Crusoe builds a net； or in order to build a shelter that he cannot build with his bare hands at all，he must construct an axe.

However，to build a net or an axe requires a sacrifice （saving）。To be sure，production with the help of producer goods is expected to be more productive than without it； Crusoe would not spend any time building a net if he did not expect that he could catch more fish per unit time with the net than without it。Nonetheless，the production of a producer good involves a sacrifice； for it takes time to build a producer good and the same time cannot be used for the enjoyment or consumption of leisure or other immediately available consumer goods.In deciding whether or not to build the productivity enhancing net，Crusoe must compare and rank two expected states of satisfaction：the satisfaction which he can attain now，without any further waiting，and the satisfaction that he can attain only later，after a longer waiting time.In deciding to build the net，Crusoe has determined that he ranks the sacrifice，the value forgone of greater consumption now，in the present，below the reward：the value of greater consumption later，in the future.otherwise，if he had ranked these magnitudes differently，he would have abstained from building the net。

然而，制造一张网或一把斧头需要作出牺牲（储蓄）。可以肯定的是，在生产品的帮助下进行的生产预计会比没有生产品的情况下更有效率；如果鲁滨逊不指望在单位时间内用网捕到更多的鱼，他就不会花任何时间来造网。尽管如此，生产品的生产涉及到一种牺牲；因为建造生产品需要时间，而这些时间不能用来享受或消费休闲或其他即时可用的消费品。在决定是否制作提高生产力的鱼网时，鲁滨逊必须对两种预期的满足状态进行比较和排序：一种是他现在就能达到的满足，不需要进一步等待，另一种是他在等待更长时间以后才能达到的满足。在决定造网时，鲁滨逊已经决定将牺牲——现在放弃的更多消费的价值排在回报——未来更多消费的价值之下。否则，如果他对这些价值与以上的排序不同，他就会放弃造网。

This weighing and the possible exchange of present against future goods and associated satisfactions are governed by time preference.Present goods are invariably more valuable than future ones，and we exchange the former against the latter only at a premium.The degree，however，to which present goods are preferred to future ones，or the willingness to forgo some possible present consumption for a greater future consumption，i.e.，the willingness to save，is different from person to person and one point in time to another。Depending on the height of his personal time preferences Crusoe will save and invest more or less and his standard of living will be higher or lower。The lower his time preference，i.e.，the easier it is for Crusoe to delay current gratification in exchange for some anticipated greater satisfaction in the future，the more capital goods Crusoe will accumulate and the higher will be his standard of living。

这种权衡以及现在与未来商品之间的可能交换和相关的满足都受时间偏好的制约。现在的商品总是比未来的商品更有价值，我们只有在溢价的情况下才能用前者交换后者。然而，现在的商品比未来的商品更有价值的程度，或者为了更大的未来消费而放弃一些可能的现在消费的意愿，即储蓄的意愿，是因人而异的，也因时间而异。根据个人时间偏好的高低，鲁滨逊的储蓄和投资会更多或更少，相应的，他的生活水平会更高或更低。他对时间的偏好越低，也就是说，鲁滨逊越容易推迟当前的满足，以换取未来预期的更大满足，鲁滨逊就会积累更多的资本品，他的生活水平就越高。

Second，people can increase their wealth through participation in the division of labor。We assume that Crusoe is joined by Friday。because of their natural，physical，or mental differences or the differences of the “land” （nature） they face，almost automatically absolute and comparative advantages in the production of various goods emerge.Crusoe is better equipped to produce one good and Friday another。If they specialize in what each is particularly good at producing，the total output of goods will be larger than if they had not specialized and remained in a position of an isolated and selfsufficient producer。Alternatively，if either Crusoe or Friday is the superior producer of every good，the allaround superior producer is to specialize in those activities in which his advantage is especially great and the allaround inferior producer must specialize in those activities in which his disadvantage is comparatively smaller。Thereby，too，the overall output of goods produced will be greater than if each had remained in selfsufficient isolation.

人们可以通过参与劳动分工来增加自己的财富。我们假设星期五加入了鲁滨逊。由于他们在自然、身体或精神上的差异，或者他们所面对的“土地”（自然）的差异，在各种商品的生产中几乎自动地出现了绝对优势和相对优势。鲁滨逊更有能力生产一种商品，而星期五则更有能力生产另一种商品。如果他们专门生产各自特别擅长的东西，那么商品的总产量就会比他们不从事专门生产而仍处于孤立和自给自足的生产者处境时为大。另外，如果鲁滨逊或星期五其中一个是每种商品的优势生产者，那么，全面的优势生产者将专门从事其优势特别大的活动，而全面的劣势生产者则必须专门从事其劣势相对较小的活动。这样一来，所生产的商品的总产量也会比各自保持自给自足的孤立状态要更大。

Third，the wealth in society depends on the population size，i.e.，on whether or not the population is kept at its optimum size.That wealth depends on the population size follows from the “law of returns” and the “Malthusian law of population，” which Ludwig von Mises has hailed as

one of the great achievements of thought。Together with the principle of the division of labor it provided the foundations of modern biology and for the theory of evolution； the impor tance of these two fundamental theorems for the sciences of human action is second only to the discovery of the regularity in the intertwinement and sequence of market phenomena and their inevitable determination by the market data.The objec tions raised against the Malthusian law as well as against the law of returns are vain and trivial。both laws are indisputable.

第三，社会财富取决于人口规模，也就是说，取决于人口是否保持在最佳规模。财富取决于人口规模，这种说法来自于 “报酬律”和 “马尔萨斯人口定律”。路德维希·冯·米塞斯将“马尔萨斯人口定律”誉为

是一项伟大的思想成就。人口律和分工原理构成现代生物学和演化理论的基础；对于人的行动科学，这两个基本定律的重要性，仅次于发现各种市场现象的交错链接和发生顺序当中的规律性，以及这些现象取决于市场外生条件的必然性。那些反对马尔萨斯人口定律的意见，和反对报酬律的意见一样，是徒劳的、亦是不值一驳的。这两个定律是不容置疑的。[75]

In its most general and abstract form，the law of returns states that for any combination of two or more production factors there exists an optimum combination （such that any deviation from it involves material waste，or “efficiency losses”）。Applied to the two original factors of production，labor and land （naturegiven goods），the law implies that if one were to continuously increase the quantity of labor （population） while the quantity of land （and the available technology） remained fixed and unchanged，eventually a point will be reached where the physical output per laborunit input is maximized.This point marks the optimal population size.If the population were to grow beyond this size，income per head would fall； and likewise，income per head would be less if the population were to fall below this point （as the division of labor would shrink，with an accompanying efficiency loss）。To maintain the optimal level of income per person，then， the population must no longer grow but remain stationary。only one way exists for such a stationary society to further increase real income per head or to grow in size without a loss in per capita income：through technological innovation，i.e.，by the employment of better，more efficient tools made possible through savings brought about by the abstention from leisure or other immediate consumption.If there is no technological innovation （technology is fixed），the only possible way for the population to grow in size without a concomitant fall in per capita income is through taking more （and possibly better） land into use.If there is no additional land available and technology is fixed at a ‘given’ level，however，then any population increase beyond the optimal size must lead to a progressive decline in per capita income.

在其最一般和抽象的形式中，报酬律表明，对于任何两个或多个生产要素的组合，存在一个最佳组合（因此，任何偏离该组合的行为都会造成物质浪费或“效率损失”）。这条定律适用于劳动和土地（自然赋予的物品）这两种原始的生产要素，它意味着，如果人们不断地增加劳动力（人口）的数量，而土地的数量（和可用的技术）保持固定不变，最终会达到一个点，在这个点上，每单位劳动投入的物质产出最大化。这一点标志着最佳人口规模。如果人口增长超过这个规模，人均收入就会下降；同样，如果人口下降到这一点以下，人均收入也会减少（因为劳动分工会萎缩，并伴随着效率的下降）。因此，要维持最佳的人均收入水平，人口必须不再增长，而是保持稳定。对于这样一个静止的社会来说，只有一种方法可以进一步提高人均实际收入，或者在不损失人均收入的情况下扩大规模，那就是通过技术创新，也就是说，即通过使用更好、更有效的工具，通过放弃休闲或其他即时消费而带来的储蓄来实现。如果没有技术创新（技术是固定的），人口规模增长而人均收入不随之下降的唯一可能方式是通过使用更多（可能是更好）的土地。然而，如果没有额外的可用土地，而且技术被固定在一个“给定的”水平上，那么任何超过最佳规模的人口增长必然会导致人均收入的逐步下降。

This latter situation has been referred to also as the “Malthusian trap.” Ludwig von Mises has characterized it thus：

The purposive adjustment of the birthrate to the supply of the material potentialities of wellbeing is an indispensable con dition of human life and action，of civilization，and of any improvement in wealth and welfare. Where the average standard of living is impaired by the excessive increase in popula tion figures，irreconcilable conflicts of interest arise.Each indi vidual is again a rival of all other individuals in the struggle for survival。The annihilation of rivals is the only means to increase one’s wellbeing。 As natural conditions are，man has only the choice between the pitiless war of each against each or social cooperation.But social cooperation is impossible if people give rein to the natural impulses of proliferation.

后一种情况也被称为“马尔萨斯陷阱”，路德维希·冯·米塞斯是这样描述它的：

生育率的刻意调整，以适应幸福生活所依赖的物质供给潜力，是人的生命与行为不可或缺的一个条件，也是人类文明、财富与繁荣不可或缺的一个条件。…凡是在平均生活水准因人口过度增加而受损的地方，便会发生不可调和的利益冲突；每个人又会再度成为所有其他人在生存竞争中的对手；消灭竞争对手，仍是增进自己物质幸福的唯一手段。…自然的情况既是如此，人类只得在人人彼此残忍地争战或社会合作之间做选择。但是，社会合作是不可能的，如果人们放纵自然的繁衍冲动。[76]

It has been already described and explained （in the previous chapter） how all this worked out in huntergatherer societies.It is conceivable that mankind had never left the seemingly comfortable huntergatherer lifestyle.This would have been possible，if only mankind had been able to restrict all population growth beyond the optimal size of a huntergatherer band （of a few dozen members）。In that case，we might still live today very much like all of our direct forebears had lived for tens of thousands of years，until some 11，000 or 12，000 years ago。As a matter of fact，however，mankind did not manage to do so。The population did grow，and accordingly increasingly larger territories had to be taken into possession until one ran out of addi tional land.Moreover，technological advances made within the framework of huntergatherer societies （such as the invention of the bow and arrow some 20，000 years ago，for instance） increased （rather than decreased） the speed of this expansionisM.because hunters and gatherers （like all nonhu man animals） only depleted （consumed） the supply of naturegiven goods，but did not produce and thus add to this supply，better tools in their hands hastened （rather than delayed） the process of territorial expansion.

（在上一章中）我们已经描述和解释了这一切是如何在狩猎采集社会中进行的。可以想象的是，人类从未离开过看似舒适的狩猎采集生活方式。如果人类能够将所有的人口增长限制在狩猎采集群体（几十个成员）的最佳规模之内，这将是可能的。在这种情况下，我们今天的生活可能仍然很像我们所有的直系祖先直到大约11000或12000年前数万年以来所过的生活。然而，事实上，人类没有设法做到这一点。人口确实在增长，因此不得不占有越来越大的领土，直到耗尽额外的土地。此外，在狩猎采集社会框架内取得的技术进步（比如大约20000年前弓箭的发明）加快了（而不是减缓了）这种扩张主义的速度。因为猎人和采集者（像所有非人类的动物一样）只消耗（消费）自然赋予的物品的供应，但没有生产并因而增加这种供应，他们手中更好的工具加速了（而不是延缓了）领土扩张的过程。

The neolithic revolution，which began about 11，000 years ago，brought some temporary relief。The invention of agriculture and animal husbandry allowed for a larger number of people to survive on the same，unchanged quantity of land，and the institution of the family，in privatizing （internaliz ing） the benefits as well as the costs of the production of offspring，provided a new，hitherto unknown check on the growth of population.But neither innovation brought a permanent solution to the problem of excess popula tion.men still could not keep their pants up，and the greater productivity brought about by the new，nonparasitic mode of production represented by agriculture and animal husbandry was quickly exhausted again by a growing population size.A significantly larger number of people could be sustained on the globe than before，but mankind did not yet escape from the Mal thusian trap—until some 200 years ago with the beginning of the socalled industrial revolution.

大约11000年前开始的新石器革命带来了一些暂时的缓解。农业和畜牧业的发明使得更多的人能够在同样的、数量不变的土地上生存，而家庭制度通过私有化（内部化）生育后代的收益和成本，为人口增长提供了一种迄今未知的新的制约手段。但这两项创新都没有带来人口过剩问题的永久解决方案。男人们依然无法控制他们的拉链，而农业和畜牧业这样的非寄生生产方式的更高生产力所能带来的改善，很快又被不断增长的人口耗尽了。与以前相比，地球上可以养活更多的人，但人类尚未摆脱马尔萨斯陷阱——直到大约200年前，所谓的工业革命开始。

II. 经济史：问题

EConOMIC HISTORY：THE problem

The problem to be explained in the following has been captured by two charts depicting world population growth on the one hand and the development of per capita income （average living standards） on the other。

下面要解释的问题是通过两张图表反映出来，一方面描绘了世界人口增长，另一方面描绘了人均收入（平均生活水平）的发展。

The first chart，taken from Colin McEvedy and richard Jones， shows human population growth from 400 BC until the present （2，000 AD）。The population size was about four million at the beginning of the neolithic revolution.But up until about 7，000 years ago （5，000 BC） the area under crops （first merely in the region of the Fertile Crescent and then also in northern China） was too small to have much of an effect on the global pop ulation size.By then the population had grown to about five million.But since then，population growth increased rapidly：2，000 years later （3，000 BC） it had almost tripled to fourteen million，3，000 years ago （1，000 BC） it had reached fifty million， and only some 500 years later，when the chart sets in，the world population size stood at about 100 million.Since then，as the chart indicates，the population size has continued to increase slowly but more or less steadily up until about 1800 （to about 720 million），when a significant break occurred and the population growth sharply increased to presently，only some 200 years later to reach seven billion.

Figure I：Total World Population （millions）

图1 世界总人口（百万）

Figure 2：World Economic History in one Picture.Incomes Rose Sharply in many Countries after 1800 but Declined in Others.

The second chart，taken from Gregory Clark， shows the development of per capita income from the beginning of recorded human history to the present。It too shows a significant break occurring at around 1800。Until that time，i.e.，for most of recorded human history，real income per capita （in terms of food，housing，clothing，heating，and lighting） did not rise.That is，average living standards in eighteenth century England were not significantly higher than those in ancient Babylon，where the oldest records of wage rates and various consumer goods prices could be found.Naturally，with seden tary life and private landownership distinct differences in wealth and income came into existence.There existed large landowners （lords） who lived in enormous luxury，even by today’s standards，almost from the beginnings of settled lifE.Nor were average living standards always and everywhere equally low.There existed pronounced regional differences between，for instance，English，Indian，and West African real incomes in 1800。And of course，as far as crosstime comparisons are concerned，many technologies existed in 1800 England，which were unknown in ancient Rome，Greece，China，or Baby lon.Yet in any case，everywhere and at all times the overwhelming majority of the population，the mass of small landowners and most laborers，lived near or only a little bit above subsistence level。There were ups and downs in real incomes，due to various external events，but nowhere was there a continuous upward trend in real income per person discernible until about 1800。

第二张图表来自格雷戈里·克拉克（Gregory Clark），[79]显示了从有记录的人类历史开始到现在的人均收入的发展情况。它也显示了在1800年左右发生的一个重大突破。在那之前，即在有记录的人类历史的大部分时间里，人均实际收入（在食物、住房、衣服、取暖和照明方面）没有增加。也就是说，18世纪英国的平均生活水平并不比古巴比伦的生活水平高多少，在那里可以找到最古老的工资率和各种消费品价格记录。自然，随着定居生活和私人土地所有权的出现，财富和收入也出现了明显的差异。几乎从定居生活的一开始，就有大地主（领主）过着极其奢侈的生活，即使按照今天的标准也是如此。平均生活水平也并不总是到处都一样低。例如，在1800年，英国、印度和西非的实际收入之间存在着明显的地区差异。当然，就跨时间的比较而言，许多技术出现于1800年的英国，而这些技术在古罗马、希腊、中国或巴比伦都是不为人知的。然而，无论在何时何地，大多数人口，特别是小土地所有者和大多数劳动者，都生活在接近或略高于生存水平的状态。尽管由于各种外部因素，实际收入有时会有所起伏，但直到1800年左右，没有任何地方出现实际人均收入的持续上升趋势。

In combination，both charts capture the worldhistoric significance of the socalled industrial revolution，which occurred some 200 years ago，as well as the significance—and in particular the length—of the previous，Malthusian stage of human development。Until sometime around 1800，little difference in the economies of humans and nonhuman animals existed.For animals （and plants） it is always and invariably true that an increase in their number will encroach upon the available means of subsistence and eventually lead to overpopulation，to “supernumerary specimens，” as Mises has called them，which must be “weeded out” due to a lack of sustenance.Today，we know that as far as humans are concerned，this must not be so：no supernumerary specimens who are thus weeded out exist in modern，West ern societies.But for most of human life this was indeed the case.

两张图表结合在一起，反映了约 200 年前发生的称为工业革命的世界历史意义，以及人类发展的前一个阶段，即马尔萨斯阶段的意义，尤其是时间长度。人类和非人类动物的经济几乎没有差别，直到1800年左右。直到1800年左右的某个时候，人类经济与非人类动物的经济几乎没有差别。对于动物（和植物）来说，它们数量的增加总是会侵占可用的生存资源，并最终导致人口过剩，即米塞斯所称的“冗余个体”，由于缺乏生存资料，这些个体必须被“淘汰”。如今，我们知道就人类而言，情况并非必然如此：在现代西方社会中不存在这样被淘汰的冗余个体。但在人类大部分的历史中，情况确实如此。

To be sure，the population size could grow，mostly because more land was taken into possession for agricultural use，and partly because of better technology incorporated in producer goods and an extended and intensi fied division of labor。But all such economic “gains” were always eaten up quickly by a growing population that again encroached upon the available means of subsistence and led to overpopulation and the emergence of the “supernumerary specimen” for whom there was no space in the division of labor and who consequently had to die out silently or become a menace （an economic “bad”） in the form of beggars，vagrants，plunderers，bandits，or warriors.Throughout most of human history，then，the iron law of wages held sway。Income and wages were held down near subsistence level owing to the existence of a substantial class of supernumerary specimens.

当然，人口规模可能会增长，主要是因为更多的土地被用于农业用途，部分是因为更好的技术融入了生产品以及劳动分工的扩大和强化。但是，所有这些经济“收益”总是很快被不断增长的人口所吞噬，人口的增长又一次侵占了可用的生存手段，导致人口过剩和“冗余个体”出现，这些“冗余个体”在劳动分工中毫无容身之地，他们要么无声无息地死掉，要么成为社会的威胁——变成乞丐、流民、强盗、土匪或战士，成为经济中的一种“坏”。因此，在人类历史的大部分时间里，工资铁律一直在起作用。由于大量冗余个体、编外人员的存在，收入和工资被压低到接近维持生计的水平。

III. 历史的解释

HISTORY EXPLAIneD

Why did it take so long to get out of the Malthusian trap； and what hap pened that we finally succeeded？ Why did it take so long until we gave up a huntergatherer existence in favor of an existence as agricultural settlers？

人类为什么花了这么长的时间，才逐渐放弃了狩猎采集的游荡，选择农业定居的生活？人类又为什么花了那么长的时间，才摆脱马尔萨斯陷阱？成功摆脱的最终原因是什么？

And why，even after the invention of agriculture and animal husbandry，did it take more than another 10，000 years until mankind’s seemingly final escape from the Malthusian trap？ Economic theory，or what I have said about it，does not and cannot answer these questions.

在农业和畜牧业发明之后，人类似乎又花了一万多年的时间才最终摆脱马尔萨斯陷阱。为什么？经济理论，也就是我所指的这个范畴，并没有也不能回答这个问题。

The standard answer among economists，in particular also among libertarian economists，is：there must have been institutional impediments，in particular an insufficient protection of private property rights，that pre vented a quicker development and these impediments were removed only recently （about 1800）。This，essentially，is also Ludwig von Mises’s explana tion. Likewise，Murray N.Rothbard has advanced similar ideas. I want to argue that this explanation is mistaken or at least insufficient and present the outline of an alternative （hypothetical） explanation.

经济学家，特别是自由意志主义经济学家的标准答案是：一定有制度上的障碍，特别是对私有产权的保护不足，阻碍了经济的快速发展，这些障碍直到最近（大约1800年）才被消除。这基本上也是路德维希·冯·米塞斯的解释。[80]同样，默里·N·罗斯巴德也提出了类似的观点。[81] 然而，这种解释是错误的，至少是不充分的。我想重新论证一下这个问题，并提出另一种替代解释的大纲。

For one，hunters and gatherers，from all we know，had plenty of free time on their hands to invent agriculture and animal husbandry。again and again and at countless places，they suffered from excess population and con sequently falling incomes； and yet，although the opportunity cost of for gone leisure must have been low，no one anywhere，for tens of thousands of years，thought of agriculture and animal husbandry as an （at least temporary） escape from Malthusian conditions.Instead，until about 11，000 years ago huntergatherer tribes answered the recurring challenge of overpopulation always either by migration，i.e.，by taking additional land into use （until they finally ran out of land） or by fighting each other to the death until the population size was sufficiently reduced to prevent real incomes from falling。

首先，人类并不会主动选择农业和畜牧业。据我们所知，狩猎者和采集者有大量的空闲时间来发明农业和畜牧业。在无数地方，他们一次又一次地遭受人口过剩和收入持续下降之苦；然而，尽管闲暇的机会成本一定很低，但几万年来，没有人把农业和畜牧业作为（至少是暂时的）摆脱马尔萨斯状况的办法。相反，在大约 1.1 万年前，狩猎采集部落总是通过迁徙，即通过使用更多的土地（直到他们最终用完土地），或者通过互相厮杀，直到人口数量减少到足以防止实际收入下降，来应对人口过剩这一反复出现的挑战。

As well，property rights in settled societies were well protected at many places and times.The idea of private property and the successful protection of private property are not inventions and institutions of the recent past but have been known for a long time and practiced almost from the beginnings of settled lifE.From all we know，for instance，property rights in 1200 Eng land and in much of feudal Europe were better protected than they are today in contemporary England and Europe.That is，every institutional incentive favorable to capital accumulation and division of labor was in place—and yet nowhere，until about 1800，did mankind succeed in extricating itself from the Malthusian trap of excess population and stagnating per capita incomes.Thus，the institution of propertyprotection can and should be regarded as only a necessary，but not also as a sufficient condition of economic growth （rising per capita incomes）。

其次，私有产权不是经济增长的充要条件。在定居社会中，财产权在许多地方和时期都得到了很好的保护。私有财产的观念和对私有财产的成功保护并不是最近才有的发明和制度，而是长期以来一直为人所知，并且几乎从定居生活开始时就被实践了。例如，据我们所知，在1200年的英格兰和大部分封建欧洲，财产权比现在的英格兰和欧洲受到更好的保护。也就是说，每一个有利于资本积累和劳动分工的制度激励都已出现——然而，直到1800年左右，人类都没有成功地摆脱人口过剩和人均收入停滞的马尔萨斯陷阱。因此，财产保护制度可以而且应该被视为经济增长（人均收入增加）的必要条件，但不是充分条件。

There must be something else—some other factor，not appearing in economic theory—which will have to explain all this.

必须有其他的东西——一些经济理论中没有出现的其他因素——来解释这一切。

Part of the answer is obvious：mankind did not get out of the Malthu sian trap because，as noted before，men could not keep their pants up.If they had done so，there would have been no excess population.This can be only part of the answer，however。because population control can prevent the fall of real incomes，but it cannot make incomes rise. Some other，“empirical” factor not figuring in pure （aprioristic） economic theory must explain the length of the Malthusian age and how we finally got out of it。This missing factor is the historical variable of human intelligence，and the simple answer to the above questions，then，（to be elaborated in the following） is：because for most of history mankind was simply not intelligent enough—and it takes time to breed intelligence.

部分答案是显而易见的：人类没有走出马尔萨斯陷阱，正如前所述，男人们管不好他们的拉链（控制性欲）。倘若他们管好了，也许就不会出现人口过剩。然而，这可能只是答案的一部分。因为人口控制可以防止实际收入的下降，但它不能使收入增加。[82]要解释马尔萨斯时代的长度以及我们如何最终走出这个时代，必须加入一些其它的纯粹（先验的）经济理论中没有的“经验 ”因素。这个缺失的因素是人类智力这一历史变量，那么，对上述问题的简单回答（将在下文详述）是：因为在历史上的大部分时间里，人类只是不够聪明——而培养智力需要时间。[83]

Until some 11，000 or so years ago，mankind was not intelligent enough，such that not even its brightest members were capable of conceiving the idea of indirect or roundabout consumer goods production that underlies agricul ture and animal husbandry。The idea of first planting crops，then tending and protecting and finally harvesting them is not obvious or trivial。Nor is the idea of taming，husbanding，and breeding animals obvious or trivial。It requires a considerable degree of intelligence to conceive of such notions.It took tens of thousands of years of natural selection under huntergatherer conditions to finally breed enough intelligence to make such cognitive achievements possible.

直到大约11000年前，人类都还不够聪明，甚至连人类最聪明的成员也无法想象农业和畜牧业的基础是间接或迂回的消费品生产。首先种植庄稼，然后照料、保护并最终收获庄稼的观念并不明显或微不足道。驯服、饲养和繁殖动物的观念也是微不足道或者不是显而易见的。要构思出这样的观念需要相当高的智力，在狩猎采集者的状态下，经过数万年的自然选择，才最终培育出了足够的智力，使这种认知成就成为可能。

Similarly，it took several thousand years more of natural selection under agricultural conditions，then，to reach a threshold in the development of human intelligence （or more precisely：of low time preference correlated with high intelligence） such that productivity growth could continuously outstrip any population growtH.From the beginning of the neolithic revo lution until about 1800 enough inventions （technological improvements） were made by bright people （and imitated by others of lesser intelligence） to account （in addition to more agriculturally used land） for a significant increase in world population：from about four million to 720 million （now，seven billion）。But during the entire era，the rate of technological progress was never sufficient to allow for population growth combined with increas ing per capita incomes.

同样，在农业条件下，自然选择又经历了几千年的时间，才达到人类智力发展的一个阈值（或者更准确地说，与高智力相关的低时间偏好），使得生产力增长能够持续超过人口增长的速度。从新石器时代革命开始到大约1800年，聪明人做出了足够多的发明（技术改进）（并被其他智力较低的人模仿），从而导致了（除了更多的农业用地）世界人口的显著增长：从大约400万增加到7.2亿（现在是70亿）。但是，在整个时期内，技术进步的速度从未足够快，无法在人口增长的同时实现人均收入的增加。

Today，we take it for granted that it is solely the unwillingness to con sume less and to save more that imposes limits on economic growtH.We have a seemingly endless supply of natural resources and recipes how to produce more，better，and different goods，and it is only our limited savings that pre vent us from employing these resources and implementing such recipes.Yet this phenomenon is actually quite new.For most of human history savings were held back by a lack of ideas of how to productively invest them，i.e.，of how to convert plain savings （storing） into productive savings （producer goods production）。For Crusoe，for instance，it was not sufficient to have a low time preference and to save.Rather，Crusoe also had to conceive the idea of a net and must have known how to build it from scratcH.Most people are not intelligent enough to invent and implement anything new but can at best only imitate，more or less perfectly，what other，brighter people have invented before them.Yet if no one is capable to do this or to imitate what others have invented before，then even the safest of property rights will make no difference.Every incentive needs a receptor to work，and if a receptor is lacking or insufficiently sensitive，different incentive structures do not matter。Hence，the institution of propertyprotection must be regarded as only a necessary （but not sufficient） condition of economic growth （rising per capita incomes）。Likewise，it requires intelligence to recognize the higher physical productivity of the division of labor，and it requires intelligence to recognize the laws of human reproduction and thus allow for any form of deliberate population control，let alone an efficient—lowcost—control。

今天，我们理所当然地认为，仅仅是不愿意减少消费和增加储蓄限制了经济增长。我们似乎有无穷无尽的自然资源和如何生产更多、更好和不同产品的方法，只是我们有限的积蓄阻止了我们利用这些资源和实施这些方法。然而，这种现象实际上是相当新的。在人类历史的大部分时间里，由于缺乏如何进行有效投资的观念，即如何将普通储蓄（储存）转化为生产性储蓄（生产品生产），所以储蓄受到了抑制。例如，对鲁滨逊来说，仅有低时间偏好和储蓄是不够的。更进一步说，鲁滨逊还必须构思一个网的概念，并且必须知道如何从头开始制造它。大多数人都没有足够的智慧去发明和实施任何新的东西，而最多只能或多或少地模仿其他更聪明的人在他们之前所发明的东西。然而，如果没有人能够创造发明，或者模仿别人之前的发明，那么即使有最安全的产权也不会有任何改变。每个激励都需要接受者来发挥作用，如果接收者缺少或不够敏感，不同的激励结构也无济于事。因此，财产权的保护制度只能被视为经济增长（人均收入增加）的必要条件，但不是充分条件。同样，认识到劳动分工的更高生产力需要智力，理解人类生殖规律并进行任何形式的有计划的人口控制，乃至高效、低成本的控制，都需要智力。

The mechanism through which higher human intelligence （combined with low time preference） was bred over time is straightforward.Given that man is physically weak and illequipped to deal with brute nature，it was advantageous for him to develop his intelligence. higher intelligence translated into economic success，and economic success in turn translated into reproductive success （producing a larger number of surviving descen dants）。For the existence of both relationships massive amounts of empirical evidence are available.

随着时间的推移，培养出更高的人类智力（结合低时间偏好）的机制十分简单明了。鉴于人类身体较弱，没有能力对付野蛮的自然界，发展智力对他来说是有利的。[84]更高的智力转化为经济上的成功，而经济上的成功反过来又转化为生殖上的成功（产生大量幸存的后代）。对于这两种关系的存在，有大量的经验证据。[85]

There can be no doubt that a huntergatherer existence requires intel ligence：the ability to classify various external objects as good or bad，the ability to recognize a multiplicity of causes and effects，to estimate distances，time，and speed，to survey and recognize landscapes，to locate various （good or bad） things and to remember their position in relation to each other，etc。； most importantly，the ability to communicate with others by means of language and thus facilitate coordination.Not every member of a band was equally capable of such skills.Some were more intelligent than others.These differences in intellectual talents would lead to some visible status differen tiation within the tribe—of “excellent” hunters，gatherers，and communica tors and “lousy” ones—and this status differentiation would in turn result in differences in the reproductive success of various tribe members，especially given the “loose” sexual mores prevailing among huntergatherers.That is，by and large “excellent” tribe members would produce a larger number of surviving offspring and thus transmit their genes more successfully into the next generation than “lousy” ones.Consequently，if and insofar as human intelligence has some genetic basis （which seems undeniable in light of the evolution of the entire species），huntergatherer conditions would over time produce （select for） a population of increasing average intelligence and at the same time an increasingly higher level of “exceptional” intelligence.

毫无疑问，狩猎采集的生活方式需要智力：比如区分各种外部事物的好坏、识别多种因果关系、估算距离、时间和速度、观察和识别地形、定位各种事物（好或坏）并记住它们相互之间的位置等；最重要的是，通过语言与他人交流并促进协调的能力。部落中的每个成员在这些技能方面的能力并不相同，有些人比其他人更聪明。这些智力才能的差异会导致部落内出现明显的地位差异——有“优秀”的猎人、采集者和沟通者，也有“差劲”的人。这种地位差异反过来又会导致部落成员在繁殖成功率上的差异，特别是在狩猎采集者中普遍存在的“松散”性道德观下。也就是说，总的来说，“优秀”的部落成员会产生更多存活的后代，从而比“差劲”的成员更成功地将他们的基因传递给下一代。因此，如果人类智力在某种程度上有遗传基础（从整个物种的进化来看，这似乎是无可否认的），那么狩猎采集的环境条件会随着时间的推移，逐渐产生出平均智力水平提高的群体，同时“超常”智力水平的个体也会越来越多。

The competition within and between tribes，and the selection for and breeding of higher intelligence via differential rates of reproductive suc cess，did not come to a halt once the huntergatherer life had been given up in favor of agriculture and animal husbandry。However，the intellectual requirements of economic success became somewhat different under seden tary conditions.

部落之内和部落之间的竞争，以及通过不同的繁殖成功率进行的高智力选择和繁殖，并没有在人群放弃狩猎采集，采用农业和畜牧业后停止。只是，在定居条件下，经济成功所需的智力要求有所不同。

The invention of agriculture and animal husbandry was in and of itself an outstanding cognitive achievement。It required a lengthened planning horizon.It required longer provisions and deeper and fartherreaching insights into the chains of natural causes and effects.And it required more work，patience，and endurance than under huntergatherer conditions.In addition，it was instrumental for success as a farmer that one possessed some degree of numeracy so as to count，measure，and proportion.It required intelligence to recognize the advantages of interhousehold division of labor and to abandon selfsufficiency。It required some literacy to design contracts and establish contractual relations.And it required some skill of monetary calculation and of accountancy to economically succeed.Not every farmer was equally apt in these skills and had an equally low degree of time preference.To the contrary，under agricultural conditions，where each household was responsible for its own production of consumer goods and offspring and there was no longer any “free riding” as under huntergatherer conditions，the natural inequality of man，and the corresponding social differentiation of and between more or less successful members of a tribe became increasingly and strikingly visible （in particular through the size of one’s land hold ings）。Consequently，the translation of economic （productive） success and status into reproductive success，i.e.，the breeding of a comparatively larger number of surviving offspring by the economically successful，became even more direct and pronounced.

农业和畜牧业的发明本身就是一种卓越的认知成就。它需要更长远的计划，需要更长时间的准备和对自然因果链的更深入理解。此外，相较于狩猎采集条件，它还需要更多的工作、耐心和毅力。此外，成为一个成功的农民需要一定的计算能力，以便计数、测量和分配。需要具备一些智力来认识到家庭间分工的优势，并放弃自给自足。设计契约和建立契约关系也需要一定的读写能力。为了经济上的成功，还需要具备一些货币计算和会计技能。并不是每个农民在这些技能上都同样擅长，也不是每个人的时间偏好都同样低。相反，在农业条件下，每个家庭都负责自己生产消费品和抚养子女，不再像狩猎采集条件下那样有“搭便车”的现象，人类的自然不平等和部落成员之间的社会分化变得越来越明显（尤其是通过土地占有量的差异）。因此，经济（生产）成功和社会地位转化为繁殖成功，即经济成功者繁衍更多存活后代的现象，这种差异变得更加直接和显著。

Further，this tendency of selecting for higher intelligence would be particularly pronounced under “harsh” external conditions.If the human environment is unchangingly constant and “mild”—as in the seasonless tropics，where one day is like another year in and out—high or exceptional intelligence offers a lesser advantage than in an inhospitable environment with widely fluctuating seasonal variations.The more challenging the environment，the higher the premium placed on intelligence as a requirement of economic，and consequently reproductive，success.Hence，the growth of human intelligence would be most pronounced in harsher （historically，generally northern） regions of human habitation.

此外，这种选择高智力的趋势在“严酷”的外部条件下会特别明显。如果人类的环境是不变的和“温和的”——比如在很少季节变化的热带地区，日复一日、年复一年，并无什么不同——那么高智力或超常智力提供的优势就不如在一个季节变化很大的恶劣环境中所提供的优势。环境越具有挑战性，作为经济和繁殖成功的要求，智力的价值就越高。因此，人类智力的增长在人类居住环境更恶劣的地区（历史上通常是北方地区）最为明显。

Humans live on—consume—animals and plants，and animals live on other animals or plants.Plants，thus，stand at the beginning of the human food chaiN.The growth of plants in turn depends on the presence （or absence） of four factors：carbon dioxide （which is evenly distributed across the globe and hence of no interest here），solar energy，water，and，very importantly，minerals （such as potassium，phosphates，etc.）。

人类依靠——消费——动物和植物为生，而动物依靠其他动物或植物为生。因此，植物处于人类食物链的起点。植物的生长又取决于四个因素的存在（或缺失）：二氧化碳（在全球范围内均匀分布，因此在此勿需讨论）、太阳能、水，以及非常重要的矿物质（如钾、磷酸盐等）。[86]

At the equator，where （nearby） the first modern humans lived，two of the three conditions of biological growth were met perfectly。There existed an abundance of sunlight and of raiN.Rain fell predictably almost daily。Days and nights were equally long and temperatures yearround comfort ably warm，with little to no difference between day vs.night and summer vs.winter temperatures.In the tropical rainforest，temperatures rarely exceed 30 degrees Celsius （86 degrees Fahrenheit） and rarely fall below 20 degrees Celsius （68 degrees Fahrenheit）。Winds were generally calm，interrupted only by sudden brief storms.The conditions for human habitation，then，would appear quite appealing； and yet，the population density in tropical regions is and has always been extremely low as compared to that in regions further north （and south），sometimes，as in the rainforests of the Amazon，nearly as low as the population density typical of deserts or arctic regions.The reason for this is the extreme shortage of soil minerals in the tropics.

在赤道附近，现代人类最早的居住地，生物生长的三个条件中的有两个条件非常理想。这里阳光充足，降雨丰沛，几乎每天都有雨。昼夜长短相等，全年气温舒适温暖，昼夜和夏冬之间的温差很小。在热带雨林中，气温很少超过30摄氏度（86华氏度），也很少低于20摄氏度（68华氏度）。风一般都很平静，只是偶尔有短暂的暴风雨打断。看起来，这里的居住条件非常宜人。然而，与更北（或更南）的地区相比，热带地区的人口密度一直非常低，亚马逊雨林的部分地区人口密度低得像沙漠或北极地区的人口密度。植物生长三个条件中的另一个条件，土壤中的矿物质，在这里极度匮乏。

The soil of the tropics is，geologically speaking，old （as compared in par ticular to those regions affected by the earthhistorical sequence of glacial and interglacial periods） and almost completely drained of minerals （except for equatorial regions with volcanic—mineral producing—activity as on some indonesian islands such as Java，for instance，where the human population density has in fact always been significantly higher）。As a result，the enor mous biomass characteristic of the tropics produces no new，surplus or excess growtH.Growth is yearround，but it is slow，and it does not lead to an increase in the total biomass.once grown up，the rainforest only recycles itself。Moreover，the overwhelming proportion of this biomass is in the form of slow growing hardwood trees，i.e.，of dead matter； and the leaves of most tropical plants，due to their peculiar need for protection （cooling） against the intense equator sun，are not only hard and tough but often poisonous or at least distasteful to humans and other planteaters such as cattle and deer。This absence of surplus growth and the special chemistry of tropical plants explains the fact that，contrary to what is frequently imagined，the tropics support only amazingly few and smallish animals.Indeed，the only animals existing in abundance are ants and termites.A tropical biomass （mostly of wood） of more than 1，000 tons per hectare produces no more than 200 kilograms of meat （animal mass），i.e.，onefivethousandth of the plant mass.（In contrast，in the East African grassland savannah a mere fifty tons of plant mass per square kilometer （100 hectares） produces some twenty tons of animal mass：of elephants，buffaloes，zebras，gnus，antelopes，and gazelles.） Yet where there are so few and nonsizeable animals，only few humans can be sustained.（In fact，most people who lived in the tropics lived near rivers and sustained their lives essentially from fishing rather than hunting and gathering。）

At their place of origin，then，humans very quickly arrived at the point where they had to leave the paradisiacal，warm，stable，and predictable environment of the tropics and enter other regions in search of food.The regions northward （and southward） of the equator were seasonal regions，however。That is，they had less，and less constant rainfall than the trop ics，and the temperatures increasingly fell and varied more widely as one moved northward （or southward）。In northern regions of human habi tation，temperatures could easily vary by more than 40 degrees per day and seasonal temperatures by more than 80 degrees.The total biomass produced under such conditions was significantly less than in the tropics.However，further away from the equator the soil had （often） sufficient or even ample minerals to compensate for these climatic disadvantages and offered optimal conditions for the growth of vegetation suited for animal and human consumption：of plants that grew fast and，in spurts，produced large seasonal surpluses of fresh biomass—in particular of grasses （includ ing grains）—that could support a large number of sizable animals.

就这样，人类从他们天堂般的起源地出发，离开了温暖、稳定、可预测的热带环境，进入其他地区寻找食物。从赤道出发，向南、向北都进入季节性地区。这些地区比热带地区降雨少，降雨量不稳定，气温下降，气温变幅也变大。在人类居住的北方地区，气温每天的变化可能超过40℉，季节性温度变化可能超过80℉。在这种条件下产生的总生物量明显少于热带地区。然而，远离赤道的地方，土壤通常含有足够甚至丰富的矿物质，弥补了气候的不利条件，并为适合动物和人类食用的植被生长提供了适宜条件。这些植物生长迅速，并在短时间内产生大量的季节性的新鲜有机物，特别是草类（包括谷物），能够养活大量体型较大的动物。

During the last ice age，which ended some 10，000 years ago，the regions which offered this less than paradisiacal climatic conditions but a superior food supply included （concentrating here on the northern hemi sphere，where most of the considered development took place） all of supra equatorial Africa—including the Sahara—and most of the Eurasian land mass （except for stillarctic northern Europe and Siberia）。Since then，and essentially continuing until today，a northern belt of deserts，which widens toward the east，has come to separate the entire zone of seasonal regions into a southern one of subequatorial regions and a northern one that includes now also most of northern Europe and Siberia.From the huntergatherer stage of human development essentially until today，then，the highest population density could be found in these “moderate” seasonal regions （a pic ture further modified only by altitudes）。

今天的北半球的很多地区，包括赤道以北的整个非洲（撒哈拉沙漠所在地区），欧亚大陆的大部分地区（除了寒冷的北欧和西伯利亚），在一万年前上一个冰期结束的时候，为人类和其他动物提供了更好的食物供应。从那时起一直到今天，赤道附近一条宽阔的沙漠带在向东扩展的过程中，分隔了两个区域。南方是非洲南部的南亚热带和南温带地区，北方是北方温带和寒温带地区（包括北欧和西伯利亚）。自从人类发展的狩猎采集阶段开始，一直到今天，这些“温和”的季节性区域一直是人口密度最高的地方（这一点还受到海拔高度的影响）。

It is important to realize in this context，however，that what we have come to regard as “moderate” regions of human habitation were actually quite harsh living conditions，and in far northern latitudes even extremely harsh conditions as compared to those in the constantly warm tropics，to which humans first had been adapted.In contrast to the stable and unchang ing environment of the tropics，moderate regions presented increased change and fluctuation and thus posed （increasingly） difficult intellectual challenges to hunters and gatherers.Not only did they have to learn how to deal with large animals，which did not exist in the tropics （except for the volcanic parts of indonesia），and their movements.More importantly，outside equatorial regions seasonal changes and fluctuations in the human environment played an increasingly greater role，and it became increasingly important to predict such changes and fluctuations and to anticipate their effects on the future food supply （of plants and animals）。Those who could do so successfully and make appropriate preparations and adjust ments，had a better chance of survival and proliferation than those who could not。

人类最先适应的是持续温暖的热带地区，而前文提到的“温和”地区其实生活条件相当恶劣，而高纬度北方的生活条件甚至十分恶劣。热带地区稳定少变化，而温带地区的气候变化频繁且幅度大，因此狩猎采集者在这里生存不易，需要面临越来越困难的智力挑战。人们不仅要学习如何对付大型动物（这是他们先前在热带地区未曾遇到的），还要了解这些动物的活动规律和轨迹。离赤道地区越远，季节变化越明显，而食物（植物和动物）的波动性也越大。人类在这样的环境中生活，能否预测这些变化和波动影响着他们是否可以获得食物供应。

Outside the equatorial rainforest，to the north （and south），pronounced raining seasons existed and had to be taken into account。It rained during the summer and was dry in the winter。As well，the growth and distribution of plants and animals was affected by northeasterly （or，in the southern hemi sphere，southeasterly） trade winds.In regions still further to the north （or south），increasingly separated since the end of the last ice age from the sub equatorial regions by a belt of （northern and southern） deserts，the rain sea sons shifted，with rain in the winter and drought in the summer。The winds affecting the distribution of rain were prevailingly westerlies. Summers were hot and dry，while winter temperatures，even in low altitudes，could easily reach “deadly” freezing levels，even if only for short periods.Growing seasons were accordingly limited.Lastly，in the northernmost regions of human hab itation，i.e.，north of mediterranean latitudes，rain fell irregularly through out the year and，with prevailing westerly winds，more in the west （north ern Europe） than in the east （northern Asia）。otherwise，however，seasonal changes and fluctuations in this zone of human habitation were extreme.The lengths of days （light） and nights （dark） varied remarkably throughout the year。In extreme northern regions，a light summer day and a dark winter night both could last for more than a montH.More importantly，the entire region （and especially pronounced as one moved in a northeasterly direction） experienced extended periods of often extreme freezing conditions during the winter。During these periods，lasting from many months to most of the year，all plant growth came essentially to a standstill。Plants died or went dormant。nature stopped supplying food，and humans （and animals） were threatened with starvation and the danger of freezing to death.The growing seasons，during which a surplus of food and shelter could possibly be built up for this contingency，were accordingly short。Moreover，the extreme dif ferences between long，harsh，and freezing winters and the short，mild to warm growing seasons，affected the migration of animals.Unless they had fully adapted to arctic conditions and could go into some form of hiberna tion during “dead” seasons，animals had to migrate from season to season， often over long distances to and from far apart locations.And since animals constituted a major part of the human food supply，huntergatherers，too，had to migrate regularly over large distances.

能成功预测这些变化并做好准备和调整的个体，比那些做不到的个体，有更好的生存机会与繁衍机会。热带雨林之外的北方和南方温带地区，都有明显的雨季。夏天下雨冬天干燥，这些都是人们生产必须考虑的。北半球的东北信风地带或南半球的东南信风地带，植物和动物的生长都受到信风的影响。而在更北或更南的地区，自上一个冰期以来，被一条东西走向的沙漠地带隔开，表现为冬季下雨而夏季干旱（即所谓地中海气候——译者注）。在这个地带，影响降水量分布的季风主要是西风，此处夏季炎热干燥，而冬季温度，即使在低海拔地区，也很容易达到“致命”的冰点水平，即使只是短期的，植物的生长季节也因此受到限制。再向北看，在人类居住的最北段，即地中海维度以北，全年降雨不规律，而且在西风的影响下，处于西部的北欧的降雨量多于东部的西北亚。气候的变化很复杂，还不止前面所说的降雨问题。人类居住区，南北之间，日照长度变化也非常明显。在人类居住区的最北端，夏季可能出现一个多月的永昼（没有夜晚），冬季可能出现一个多月的永夜（没有阳光）。而且，更严重的是，越往北，气温越低，冬季甚至会出现极端的冰冻状态。所以越往北，冬季日照越短，气温越低，植物会生长停滞、死亡或休眠。在大自然的恶劣环境下，食物来源缺乏，人类和动物都面临着冻饿而死的风险。温暖的季节短，植物的生长季节也短，人们必须在这个阶段储存食物，建造居所，以度过糟糕的冬季。温暖、温和且万物生长的季节短，寒冷、严酷且万物肃杀的季节长，大多数动物难以在寒冷的季节迁徙。在北方寒温带和寒带的环境下，动物要么休眠，要么死掉（它们留下抗逆性强的卵），还有一部分动物可以长距离地迁徙，（在夏季的觅食场所与冬季的越冬场所之间）。以这些迁徙动物为食物的狩猎采集者，不得不也跟随着猎物长途迁徙。

before the background of this rough picture of human ecology and geography，further modified and complicated of course by the existence of mountain ranges，rivers，and bodies of water，it becomes apparent why the natural selection in favor of higher intelligence among huntergatherers would be more pronounced as one moved in a northern （or southern） direc tion toward the coldest regions of human habitation.No doubt，significant intelligence was required of humans to live successfully in the tropics.However，the equilibriumlike constancy of the tropics acted as a natural constraint on the further development of human intelligence.because one day was much like any other day in the tropics，little or no need existed for anyone to take anything into account in his actions except his immediate surroundings or to plan beyond anything but the immediately impending future.In distinct contrast，the increasing seasonality of regions outside the tropics made for an intellectually increasingly challenging environment。

The existence of seasonal changes and fluctuations—of rain and drought，summer and winter，scorching heat and freezing cold，winds and calms—required that more，and more remote factors including the sun，the moon，and the stars，and longer stretches of time had to be taken into account if one wanted to act successfully and survive and procreate.More and longer chains of causes and effects had to be recognized and more and longer chains of argument thought througH.The planning horizon had to be extended in time.one had to act now，in order to be successful much later。both the period of production—the time lapse between the onset of a productive effort and its completion—and the period of provision—the time span into the future for which present provisions （savings） had to be made—needed to be lengthened.In the northernmost regions，with long and deadly winters，provisions of food，clothing，shelter，and heating had to be made that would last through most of a year or beyond.Planning had to be in terms of years，instead of days or months.As well，in pursuit of seasonally and widely migrating animals，extensive territories had to be traversed，requiring exceptional skills of orientation and navigation.only groups intelligent enough on average to generate exceptional leaders who possessed such superior intellectual skills and abilities were rewarded with success—survival and procreation.Those groups and leaders，on the other hand，who were not capable of these achievements，were punished with failure，i.e.，extinction.

活下来，并繁衍后代，需要成功的行动。而成功的行动需要考虑季节的变化和波动，考虑降雨和干旱，夏季与冬季，酷暑与严寒，刮风与平静；更深远的，还要考虑考虑太阳、月亮和星星所代表的更长的时间。人们要活下来，需要认识到越来越长的因果链，思考越来越长的逻辑链条，考虑到未来某个时刻要获得成功，当下应该做什么。生产期——从开始生产到完成生产之间的时间间隔——和供应期——目前的供应（储蓄）必须持续到未来的时间跨度——都需要延长。在最北端的地区，冬季漫长而致命，食物、衣服、住所和取暖材料的供应必须能够维持一年或更长时间。计划必须以年为单位，而不是以天或月为单位。此外，为了追逐季节性大范围迁徙的动物，必须穿越广阔的地域，这需要特殊的定向和导航技能。有些群体的智力水平总体较高，也更能产生聪明卓越的领导者，他们才能活下来，并繁衍下去。另一些群体就没有那么幸运，他们可能不够聪明，或没有产生卓越的领导者，这些群体就没活下来，当然也就没能繁衍下去。

The greatest progress on the way toward the invention of agriculture and animal husbandry some 11，000 years ago，then，should have occurred in the northernmost regions of human habitation.Here，the competi tion within and between huntergatherer groups should have produced over time the most intelligent—provisionary and farsighted—population.And indeed，during the tens of thousands of years until about 11，000 years ago，every significant technological advance originated in northern regions：mostly in Europe or，in the case of ceramics，in JapaN.In contrast，during the same period the toolkit used in the tropics remained almost unchanged.

大约11000年前，农业和畜牧业的发明取得了最大的进步，而这些进步应该发生在人类居住的较北部地区。在这里，狩猎采集群体内部和之间的竞争，应该随着时间的推移产生了或者当时最聪明，或者最有远见的群体。事实上，在大约11000年之前的数万年里，每一次重大的技术进步都起源于北方地区：主要发生在欧洲，或者就陶瓷而言，起源于日本。相比之下，在同一时期，热带地区使用的工具组合几乎没有变化。

But the explanatory power of the above sketch of social evolution goes much further。The admittedly hypothetical theory presented here can explain why it took so long to get out of the Malthusian trap，and how such a feat was possible at all and we did not remain under Malthu sian conditions forever：mankind was simply not intelligent enough to achieve productivity increases that could continuously outstrip population growtH.A certain threshold of average and exceptional intelligence had to be reached first for this to become possible，and it took time （until about 1800） to “breed” such a level of intelligence.The theory can explain the wellestablished and corroborated （and yet for “political correctness” reasons persistently ignored） fact of intelligence research：that the aver age IQ of nations gradually declines as one moves from north to south （from about 100 or more points in northern countries to about seventy in subSaharan Africa）。 More specifically，the theory can thus explain why the industrial revolution originated and then took hold immediately in some—generally northern—regions but not in others，why there had always existed persistent regional income differences，and why these dif ferences could have increased （rather than decreased） since the time of the industrial revolution.

前面，我们概括了以地理为背景的人类社会进化的基本框架，它的解释力还不仅如此（涉及智力进化和筛选）。这里提出的公认的假设理论可以解释：为什么我们花了这么多时间才走出马尔萨斯陷阱？为什么我们可以走出马尔萨斯陷阱？为什么我们能将马尔萨斯陷阱抛诸在人类进化史的过往？这解释就是，过去的人类没有足够的智慧来支持生产率的增长超过人口增长。一直到1800年前后，人类的平均智力水平，和聪慧者的智力水平，其成长才超过了某个阈值。秉持着“政治正确”的观点，我们过去忽略了，但是现在不得不去承认的一个事实：一个国家人们的平均智商，如果以北方国家为100分，那么到撒哈拉以南非洲则只有70分左右。[87]更具体地说，这一理论可以解释为什么工业革命起源并且随即扎根于某些地区（通常是北方地区），而不是其他地区。为什么一直存在持续的地区收入差异，以及为什么这些差异自工业革命以来一直在增加（而不是减少）。

As well，the theory can explain what may at first appear as an anomaly：that it was not in the northernmost regions of human habitation where the neolithic revolution began some 11，000 years ago and whence it gradu ally and successively conquered the rest of the world，but in regions signifi cantly further south—yet still far north of the tropics：in the Middle East， in central China （the Yangtze Valley），and in mesoamerica.The reason for this seeming anomaly is easy to detect，however。In order to invent agriculture and animal husbandry two factors were necessary：sufficient intelligence and favorable natural circumstances to apply such intelligence.It was the second factor that was lacking in extreme northern regions and thus prevented its inhabitants from making the revolutionary invention.The extreme freezing conditions and the extreme brevity of the growing season there made agriculture and animal husbandry practically impossible，even if the idea might have been conceived.What was necessary to actually implement the idea were natural circumstances favorable to sed entary life：of a long and warm growing season （besides suitable crops，and domesticable animals）。（The greater scarcity of such crops and animals on the American continent is the likely reason for the somewhat belated third independent invention of agriculture and animal husbandry in meso america.） such climatic conditions existed in the mentioned “temperate” regions.Here，the competitive development of human intelligence among huntergatherers had made sufficient progress （even if it lagged behind that in the north） so that，combined with favorable natural circumstances，the idea of agriculture and animal husbandry could be implemented.Since the end of the last ice age about 10，000 years ago，then，the zone of tem perate climates expanded northward into higher latitudes，rendering agri culture and animal husbandry increasingly feasible there as well。meeting there an even more intelligent people，the new revolutionary production techniques were not merely quickly imitated and adopted，but most sub sequent improvements in these techniques had their origins here.South of the centers of the original invention，too，the new technique would be gradually adopted （with the exception of the tropics）—after all，it is easier to imitate something than to invent it。meeting a less intelligent people there，however，little or no contribution to the further development of more efficient practices of agriculture or animal husbandry would come from there.All further efficiency gains in these regions would stem from the imitation of techniques invented elsewhere，in regions further north.

在北半球靠北的地方，更能因自然环境的严酷和不可预料筛选出智力水平更高的人群。人类文明进化的起点看起来有点违反前面这个理论——大约11000年前，新石器时代并不起源于最北的地区，而是在更靠南边一点的地区。不过即使是靠南的地区，也在热带以北。这一现象看似反常，却也容易理解。农业和畜牧业的发明，需要两个条件：足够的智力，和应用这些智力的有利的自然环境。极北地区缺乏第二个因素，因而阻碍了居民做出革命性的发明。极北地区的极端冰冻条件和极其短暂的生长季节使得农业和畜牧业实际上是不可能的，即使这个观念可能已经被构想出来。真正要将农业和畜牧业从构想变成现实，需要的除了可以被驯化的植物和动物，还要又温暖且足够长的生长季节。这样的气候条件存在于上述“温带”地区。在这里，人类智力在狩猎采集者中的竞争性发展已经取得了足够的进步（即使它落后于北方），因此，结合有利的自然条件，农业和畜牧业的观念可以实现。自从大约10000年前最后一次冰期结束以来，温带气候区向北扩展到高纬度地区，使农业和畜牧业在那里也越来越可行。新的革命性的生产技术是可以被模仿和采用的，因此它们在北方被更聪明的人采用，也在北方被进行了大量的改进。在原始发明中心的南部，新技术也会逐渐被采用（热带地区除外）——毕竟，模仿比发明更容易。然而，如果在那里遇到的人不太聪明，那里对进一步发展更有效的农业或畜牧业的贡献就会很少或根本没有贡献。这些地区所有效率的进一步提升都将源自对更北方的其他地区所发明技术的模仿。

IV. 结论与展望

IMPLICATIonS AND OUTLOOK

Several implications and suggestions follow from this.First，the theory of social evolution sketched here entails a fundamental criticism of the egalitarianism rampant within the social sciences generally but also among many libertarians.true，economists allow for human “differences” in the form of different labor productivities.But these differences are generally interpreted as the result of different external conditions，i.e.，of different endowments or training。only rarely are internal，biologically anchored characteristics admitted as possible sources of human differences.Yet even when economists admit the obvious：that human differences have internal，biological sources as well，as Mises and Rothbard certainly do，they still typically ignore that these differences are themselves in turn the outcome of a lengthy process of natural selection in favor of human characteristics and dispositions （physical and mental） determinant of economic success and，more or less highly positively correlated with economic success，of reproductive success.That is，it is still largely overlooked that we，modern man，are a very different breed from our predecessors hundreds or even thousands of years ago。

由此得出几个结论和建议。首先，这里概述的社会进化理论对社会科学中普遍存在的平等主义进行了根本性的批评，这种平等主义也存在于许多自由主义者中。确实，经济学家承认人类在劳动生产率上的“差异”。但这些差异通常被解释为不同外部条件的结果，即不同的禀赋或训练。很少有人承认内部的、生物学上的特征也可能是人类差异的来源。即使经济学家承认显而易见的事实：人类差异也有内部的生物学来源，比如米塞斯和罗斯巴德就肯定承认这一点，他们仍然通常忽略了这些差异本身也是一个漫长自然选择过程的结果，这个过程有利于那些决定经济成功的（身体和精神上的）人类特征和倾向，并且这些特征与经济成功往往高度正相关，从而影响繁殖成功率。换句话说，我们现代人，与几百年甚至几千年前的先祖，已经是非常不同的种群，而这一点常常被忽视。

Second，once it is realized that the industrial revolution was first and foremost the outcome of the evolutionary growth of human intelligence （rather than the mere removal of institutional barriers to growth），the role of the State can be recognized as fundamentally different under Malthusian vs.postMalthusian conditions.Under Malthusian conditions the State doesn’t matter much，at least as far as macroeffects are concerned.A more exploitative State will simply lead to a lower population number （much like a pest would），but it does not affect per capita income.In fact，in lowering the population density，income per capita may even rise，as it did after the great pestilence in the midfourteenth century。And in reverse：a “good，” lessexploitative State will allow for a growing number of people，but per capita incomes will not rise or may even fall，because land per capita is reduced.All this changes with the industrial revolution.For if productivity gains continuously outstrip population increases and allow for a steady increase in per capita incomes，then an exploitative institution such as the State can continuously grow without lowering per capita income and reducing the population number。The State then becomes a permanent drag on the economy and per capita incomes.

其次，一旦认识到工业革命主要是人类智力进化的结果（而不仅仅是制度障碍的消除），就能明白国家在马尔萨斯条件和后马尔萨斯条件下的作用有根本区别。在马尔萨斯条件下，国家的作用不大，至少在宏观效果上影响不大。一个更具剥削性的国家只会导致人口减少（就像瘟疫一样），但不会影响人均收入。事实上，降低人口密度后，人均收入可能反而会上升，就像14世纪中叶大瘟疫之后的情况那样。反过来，一个“好”的、剥削较少的国家会允许人口增长，但人均收入不会增加，甚至可能下降，因为人均土地减少了。工业革命改变了这一切。如果生产力增长速度持续超过人口增长，并且允许人均收入稳步提高，那么剥削性制度（如国家）可以在不降低人均收入和人口数量的情况下不断扩张。这样一来，国家就成为经济和人均收入的长期拖累。

Third，whereas under Malthusian conditions positive eugenic effects reign：the economically successful produce more surviving offspring and the population stock is thus gradually bettered （cognitively improved）。Under postMalthusian conditions the existence and the growth of the State produces a twofold dysgenic effect，especially under democratic welfarestate conditions. For one，the “economically challenged，” as the principal “clients” of the welfare State，produce more surviving offspring，and the economically successful less.Second，the steady growth of a para sitic State，made possible by a growing underlying economy，Systematically affects the requirements of economic success.Economic success becomes increasingly dependent on politics and political talent，i.e.，the talent of using the State to enrich oneself at others’ expense.In any case，the popula tion stock becomes increasingly worse （as far as the cognitive requirements of prosperity and economic growth are concerned），rather than better。

第三，在马尔萨斯条件下，积极的优生效应占主导地位：经济上成功的人会有更多的后代存活，从而逐渐改善人口质量（认知能力提升）。在后马尔萨斯条件下，尤其是在民主福利国家的条件下，国家的存在和增长产生了双重的负面优生效应。[88]首先，作为福利国家主要受益者的“经济困难”群体生育更多存活的后代，而经济上成功的人则生育较少。其次，由于经济增长使寄生性国家的稳步扩张成为可能，国家又系统性地影响着社会。个人成功的才能也逐渐从经济才能转向了政治才能，而这是一种利用国家手段来剥削他人以自肥的才能。因此，就繁荣和经济增长所需的认知要求而言，人口质量会逐渐变差，而不是变好。

Finally，it is important to note in conclusion，then，that just as the industrial revolution and the attendant escape from the Malthusian trap was by no means a necessary development in human history so its success and achievements are also not irreversible.

最后，需要重点指出的是，工业革命和随之而来的逃离马尔萨斯陷阱的进程，并非人类历史发展的必然，而这些成功和成就也并非不可逆转。

5 论共有、公有和私有财产以及全面私有化的基本原理*

5 Of Common，Public，and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization

I have three goals.First，I want to clarify the nature and function of private property。Second，I want to clarify the distinction between “common” goods and property and “public” goods and property，and explain the construction error inherent in the institution of public goods and property。Third，I want to explain the rationale and principle of privatization.

本章有三个目标。第一，阐明私有财产的性质和功能。第二，阐明“共有”财货及财产，与“公共”财货及财产之间的区别，并解释“公共”财货及财产制度的内在结构性错误。第三，解释私有化的原理及原则。

I. 理论初步

ThroreTICAL PreLIMINARIES

I will begin with some abstract but fundamental theoretical considerations concerning the sources of conflicts and the purpose of social norms.If there were no interpersonal conflicts，there would be no need for norms.It is the purpose of norms to help avoid otherwise unavoidable conflicts.A norm that generates conflict，rather than helps avoid it，is contrary to the purpose of norms，i.e.，it is a dysfunctional norm or a perversion.

本文从一些虽然抽象但基础的理论思考起步，这些思考关系到冲突的起源及社会规范的目的。无人际冲突则无社会规范之必要。规范旨在协助避免本不可避免的冲突。一种规范，若非避免却反而滋生冲突，是与规范之本身目的相矛盾的，亦即一种失效规范或倒错（perversion）。

It is sometimes thought that conflicts result from the mere fact of different people having different interests or ideas.But this is false，or at least very incomplete.From the diversity of individual interests and ideas alone it does not follow that conflicts must arise.I want it to rain，and my neighbor wants the sun to shine.Our interests are contrary。However，because neither I，nor my neighbor controls the sun or the clouds，our conflicting interests have no practical consequences.There is nothing that we can do about the weather。Likewise，I may believe that A causes B，and you believe that B is caused by C； or I believe in and pray to God，and you don’t。But if this is all the difference there is between us nothing of any practical consequence follows.Different interests and beliefs can lead to conflict only when they are put into action—when our interests and ideas are attached to or implemented in physically controlled objects，i.e.，in economic goods or means of action.

人们有时认为，冲突不过是源于不同人拥有不同利益和观念的事实。但这种看法是错误的，或至少是不完整的。仅从个人利益分歧及观念多样出发，冲突并不必然发生。我愿下雨，而邻居盼天晴。我们的利益相反。然而，无论我还是邻居都不能控制阴晴，所以我们的冲突利益不会有实际后果。对天气我们无计可施。同样，我相信甲为乙因，你相信乙缘于丙；或我信神并向祂祷告而你不信。但如果以上是我们的全部差异，就不会有任何实际后果发生。不同的利益和信念，只有在付诸行动之时才会导致冲突——当我们的利益和观念被附着或施加于物理控制的客体，即经济财货或行为手段。

Yet even if our interests and ideas are attached to and implemented in economic goods，no conflict results so long as our interests and ideas are concerned exclusively with different—physically separate—goods.Conflict only results if our different interests and beliefs are attached to and invested in one and the same good.In the Schlaraffenland，[89] with a superabundance of goods，no conflict can arise （except for conflicts regarding the use of our physical bodies that embody our very own interests and ideas）。There is enough around of everything to satisfy everyone’s desires.In order for different interests and ideas to result in conflict，goods must be scarcE.only scarcity makes it possible that different interests and ideas can be attached to and invested in one and the same stock of goods.Conflicts，then，are physical clashes regarding the control of one and the same given stock of goods.People clash because they want to use the same goods in different，incompatible ways.

即便我们的利益和观念被附着或施加于经济财货，只要我们的利益和观念仅仅只是与不同的——物理分离的——财货有关，仍然不会有冲突发生。唯有当我们不同的利益和信念被附在或赋予同一财货，冲突才会发生。在天堂乐土，财货极大丰富，冲突不会发生（除了体现我们自身利益和观念的物理身体，在其使用上发生冲突）。周围一切足够满足每个人的欲望。要让不同的利益和观念起冲突，财货就必须是稀缺的。唯有稀缺性，才会使不同的利益和观念被附在及赋予同一财货。那么，冲突就是对同一特定财货控制的物理磨擦。人与人起冲突就是因为他们想以不同且不相容的方式使用同一财货。

Even under conditions of scarcity，when conflicts are possible，however，they are not necessary or unavoidable.All conflicts regarding the use of any good can be avoided if only every good is privately owned，i.e.，exclusively controlled by some specified individual（s） and it is always clear which thing is owned，and by whom，and which is not。The interests and ideas of different individuals may then be as different as can be，and yet no conflict arises so long as their interests and ideas are concerned always and exclusively with their own，separate property。

即使在资源稀缺、可能发生冲突的条件下，冲突也不是必然或不可避免的。只要每件财货皆为私有，涉及任何财货使用的一切冲突皆可避免，即每件财货都为某些特定个人（或多个人）排他性控制，哪件财货为谁所有，哪件则非，都是清楚明了的。无论不同人的利益和观念如何不一致，只要其利益和观念始终且仅仅只涉及其各自财产，则依然不会有任何冲突发生。

What is needed to avoid all conflict，then，is only a norm regarding the privatization of scarce things （goods）。More specifically，in order to avoid all conflict from the very beginning of mankind on，the required norm must con cern the original privatization of goods （the first transformation of nature given “things” into “economic goods” and private property）。Further，the original privatization of goods cannot occur by verbal declaration，i.e.，by the mere utterance of words，because this could work and not lead to per manent and irresolvable conflict only if，contrary to our initial assumption of different interests and ideas，a prestabilized harmony of the interests and ideas of all people existed.（Yet in that case no norms were needed in the first place!）

那么，唯有稀缺物（财货）私有化的规范，才是避免一切冲突所必要的规范。更具体而言，要从人类诞生之初就避免一切冲突，所需要的规范就必须涉及财货的最初私有化（自然赋予的“财货”初次转化为“经济财货”及私有财产）。其次，财货的最初私有化不可能通过口头声明，即仅仅通过语言表达来实现，因为只有当与我们最初假设的不同利益和观念相反，所有人的利益和观念存在一种预先稳定的和谐时，这种私有化才会起作用，才不会导致永久性的、无法解决的冲突（然而，在这种情况下，本来就不需要规范！）。

Rather，to avoid all otherwise unavoidable conflict，the original privati zation of goods must occur through actions：through acts of original appropriation of what were previously “things.” only through actions，taking place in time and space，can an objective—intersubjectively ascertainable—link be established between a particular person and a particular good.And only the first appropriator of a previously unappropriated thing can acquire this thing without conflict。For，by definition，as the first appropriator he cannot have run into any conflict with anyone in appropriating the good in ques tion，as everyone else appeared on the scene only later。All property must go back，then，directly or indirectly，through a chain of mutually beneficial and hence likewise conflictfree propertytitle transfers，to original appropriators and acts of original appropriation.

相反，为了避免一切本不可避免的冲突，对财货的最初私有化就必须借助于行动：通过对先前“东西”的先占。只有通过时空中发生的行动，在特定人和特定物之间的客观（主体间可确定的）联系才能建立。并且，只有是对先前无主物的初次占有，才能无冲突地取得该物。因为，根据定义，作为先占者，他不可能与任何人对占有该物发生冲突，这是由于其他人要待后来才出现。于是，一切财产，经由互利互惠从而摒绝冲突的财产名义所有权转让链条，都一定能直接或间接地回溯到先占者以及先占行动。

As a matter of fact，this answer is apodictically，i.e.，nonhypothetically，true.In the absence of a prestabilized harmony of all individual interests，only private property can help avoid otherwise—under conditions of scar city—unavoidable conflict。And only the principle of property acquisition by means of original appropriation or mutually beneficial transfer from an earlier to a later proprietor makes it possible that conflict can be avoided throughout—from the very beginning of mankind until the end.No other solution exists.Every other ruling is contrary to the nature of man as a rational actor。

事实上，这个答案是符合逻辑的，即是非假定性的，是真实的。在所有个人利益缺乏预先稳定的和谐的情况下，只有私有财产才能帮助避免在稀缺条件下不可避免的冲突。而且，只有通过先占或互利转让的方式从先前的所有者到后来的所有者获取财产的原则，才有可能避免冲突，从人类诞生之初直到终结。没有其他的解决办法。其他任何规则都有悖于人作为理性行动人的本性。

In conclusion，even under conditions of allaround scarcity it is possible that people with divergent interests and ideas can peacefully—without conflict—coexist，provided they recognize the institution of private （i.e.，exclusive） property and its ultimate foundation in and through acts of original appropriation.

总之，即使在遍布稀缺性的条件下，拥有不同利益和观念的人们依然可以和平地——避免冲突地—共处，只要他们认可私有（排他性的）财产制度及其通过先占行动体现出来的终极基础。

II. 私有财产、共有财货和公有财产

PRIVAte PROPERTY，COMMon GOODS AND PUBLIC PROPERTY

let me now move from theory to practice and application.let us assume a small village with privately owned houses，gardens，and fields.In principle，all conflicts regarding the use of these goods can be avoided，because it is clear who owns and has exclusive control of what house，garden，and field，and who doesn’t。

现在让我们从理论转到实践和应用。假定有一个小村庄，里面有私人房屋、花园及田地。原则上，对使用这些财货的一切冲突皆可避免，因为是谁（而非别人）拥有和排他性控制这些房屋、花园以及田地都是一目了然的。

But then there runs a “public” street in front of the private houses，and a “public” path leads through the woods at the edge of the village to some lake.What is the status of this street and this path？ They are not private property。Indeed，we assume that no one claims that he is the street’s or the path’s private owner。Rather，street and path are part of the natural environment in which everyone acts.Everyone uses the street，but no one owns it or exercises exclusive control regarding its utilization.

然而，在私有房屋的前面，有一条“公共”街道，以及一条穿过村边林荫通往某个湖泊的“公共”小径。这条街道以及小路的状态如何？它们不是私有财产。假定实际无人主张他是街道或是小径的私人所有者。相反，道路是每个人行动的自然环境的一部分。每个人都使用这条街道，却没有人拥有街道，或对街道的利用进行排他性的控制。

It is conceivable that this state of affairs with ownerless public streets can go on forever without leading to any conflict。It is not very realistic，however，because this requires the assumption of a stationary economy。Yet with economic change and growth，and in particular with a growing population，conflicts concerning the use of the public street are bound to increase.While “street conflicts” initially might have been so infrequent and so easy to avoid as not to cause anyone to worry，now they are ubiquitous and intolerable.The street is constantly congested and in permanent disrepair。A solution is required.The street must be taken out of the realm of the environment—of external “things” or common property—and brought into the realm of “economic goods.” This，the increasing economization of things previously considered and treated as “free goods，” is the way of civi lization and progress.

可以想象，无主公共街道的事态有可能永远持续而不引发任何冲突。然而，这个想象不太现实，因为这需要静态经济假设。随着经济改观及发展，尤其随着人口增长，对公共街道的使用冲突注定会增加。“街头冲突”开始时也许不太频繁，且很容易避免，不会引起任何担忧，可如今它们却到处发生，因而难以容忍。街道持续拥堵，永久失修，解决成为当务之急。这条街道必须被排除出（外部“事物”或共有财产的）环境范畴——归入“经济财货”的范畴。先前人们所认为的“免费财货”逐渐经济化，此正是文明、进步之途径。

Two solutions to the problem of managing increasingly intolerable conflicts concerning the use of “common property” have been proposed and tried.The first—and correct—solution is to privatize the street。The second—incorrect—solution is to turn streets into what is nowadays called “public property” （which is very different from the former，unowned “common” goods and property）。Why the second solution is incorrect or dys functional can best be grasped in contradistinction to the alternative privatization option.

“共有财产”使用上的冲突愈来愈难以容忍，必须设法解决这个问题，有两个解决方案获得提议及尝试。第一个——正确的——方案是私有化街道。第二个——错误的——方案是把街道变成今天所谓“公有财产”（这和先前无主的“共有”财货及财产截然不同）。为什么第二种解决方案是不正确的或功能失调的？将之与私有化的替代选择相比较，能极好地把握其原因。

How is it possible that formerly unowned common streets can be priva tized without thereby generating conflict with others？ The short answer is that this can be done provided only that the appropriation of the street does not infringe on the previously established rights—the easements—of privateproperty owners to use such streets “for free.” Everyone must remain free to walk the street from house to house，through the woods，and onto the lake，just as before.Everyone retains a rightofway，and hence no one can claim to be made worse off by the privatization of the street。Positively，in order to objectify—and validate—his claim that the formerly common street is now a private one and that he （and no one else） is its owner，the appropriator （whoever it may be） must perform some visible maintenance and repair work on and along the street。Then，as its owner，he—and no one else—can further develop and improve the streets as he sees fit。He sets the rules and regulations concerning the use of his street so as to avoid all street conflicts.He can build a hot dog or a bratwurst stand on his road， for instance，and exclude others from doing the same； or he can prohibit loitering on his street and collect a fee for the removal of garbage.Visàvis foreigners or strangers，the street owner can determine the rules of entry regarding uninvited strangers.Last but not least，as its private owner he can sell the street to someone else （with all previously established rightsofway remaining intact）。

私有化先前无主的共有街道而不致冲突，这如何才有可能？答案很简单，只要对街道的占有不触犯既有权利——地役权——即私人财产所有者对这些街道的免费使用权，私有化就是可行的。每个人理应保留在街上行走的自由，像以前一样走家串户、穿过林荫、抵达湖畔。每个人都保留通行权，因此街道私有化之后，不会有任何人宣称处境变坏。占有者（无论是谁），主张先前的共有街道现在成为私人街道，并且是他（而非别人）成为街道所有者，为使这个主张客观化——合法化，就必须积极主动地沿街或对路面实施某些明显的维护和修缮。然后，他（而非别人）作为街道所有者，只要认为合适就可以进一步开发和改良街道。他可以对街道的使用制定规则和制度，以避免一切街头冲突。例如，他可在路上修建一座热狗摊或腊肠店，但不许别人这么做；或者他可以禁止别人在街上随意游荡，并对清理垃圾收费。当碰到外国人或陌生人，街道的私人所有者可制定与不速之客有关的进入规则。最后同样重要的是，作为街道所有者，他可以将街道出售给其他任何人（全部既有通行权仍完好无损地保留）。

In all of this，it is more important that a privatization takes place than what specific form it assumes.on one end of the spectrum of possible privatizations we can imagine a single owner。A wealthy villager，for example，takes it upon himself to maintain and repair the street and thus becomes its owner。on the other end of the spectrum，we can imagine that the initial maintenance or repair of the street is the result of a genuine community effort。In that case，there is not just one owner of the street，but every community member is （initially） its equal coowner。In the absence of a prestabilized harmony of all interest and ideas，such coownership requires a decisionmaking mechanism regarding the further development of the street。let us assume that，as in a jointstock company，it is the majority of the street owners that determines what to do or not to do with it。This，i.e.，majority rule，smacks of conflict，but it isn’t so in this case.Every owner who is dissatisfied with the decisions made by the majority of owners，who believes that the burdens imposed on him by the majority are greater than the benefits he can derive from his （partial） street ownership，can always and at all times drop out or “exit。” He can sell his ownership share to someone else，thus opening the possibility for the concentration of ownership titles，conceivably in a single hand，all the while retaining his original rightofway。

这一切当中，私有化发生，而不是其呈现的具体形式，前者则更加重要。在各种可能的私有化中，一个极端是，可以想象只有单个所有者，例如某位富有村民，包揽了对街道的维护及修缮，从而成为街道的所有者。另一个极端则是，可以想象对街道的初始维护及修缮是整个社区成员努力的结果。在这种情况下，就不仅有一个街道所有者人，每个社团成员最初都是平等的街道共有所有者。在一切利益和观念的先定和谐不存在的情况下，对街道的进一步开发来说，这样的共有产权就需要一种决策机制。假定，正如一家股份制公司中的情形，是由大多数街道所有者决定该做还是不该做什么。这就是多数决规则，虽看似有冲突之虞，但在这种情况下却非如此。任何一位所有者，只要对大多数所有者的决策不满，只要他认为多数加于自身的负担，高于持有（部分）所有权的收益，总能够并随时可以退出或“脱离”。他可以将自己的所有权出售给别人，从而为所有权集中，也即设想中的掌控于一人之手提供了可能，而其最初通行权则始终保留。

In contrast，a very different sort of street property is created if the exit option does not exist，i.e.，if a person is not permitted to sell his share of street property or he is stripped of his former rightofpassage.This is，how ever，precisely what defines and characterizes the second，“public”property option.The public street in this modern sense of the word “public” is not unowned as it once was.There is a street owner—whether it is a particular individual，the king of the road，or a democratically elected street government—who has an exclusive say in setting the traffic rules and determining the future development of the street。But the street government does not permit its electors，i.e.，the people，who supposedly are the street’s equal coowners，to sell their ownership share （and so renders them compulsory owners of something of which they might rather want to divest themselves）。

相反，假如没有退出选项，个人既不被允许出售街道财产的份额，先前的通行权亦被剥夺，如此则产生了一种截然不同的街道财产。而这正是第二项“公共”财产的定义及特征。在“公共”一词的现代含义中，公共街道就不像先前那样是无主的。某个街道所有者——无论是特定个人、道路的君王，还是民选的街道政府——对于街道交通规则的制定，对街道未来发展的决策，都将是说一不二的。但是街道政府不允许其选民，即人民（他们被认为是街道的平等共同所有者）出售他们的所有权份额（从而使他们成为某种他们可能更想摆脱的东西的强制所有者）。

And neither government nor king allow the villageresidents unrestricted access and passage on the formerly free street but make its further use conditional on the payment of some user fee or contribution （thus rendering the village residents compulsory street owners again if only they want to continue using it as before）。

且无论是政府还是君主，都不允许村民不受限制地进入和通过先前的免费街道，除非以付费或纳贡为条件，才能继续使用街道（从而让村民成为被迫的街道所有者，而仅仅为了像从前那样继续使用街道。）

The results of this arrangement are predictable.In denying the “exit” option，the owner of the “public” street has gained a stranglehold on the village population.Accordingly，the fees and other conditions imposed on the village residents for the continued use of the formerly “free” street will tend to become increasingly more burdensome.Conflicts will not be avoided； quite to the contrary，conflicts are institutionalized.because the exit option is closed，i.e.，because the publicstreet users must now pay for what they formerly had for free，and no resident can sell and divest himself of his sup posed street ownership but remains continuously bound by the decisions made by the street government or king，not only are conflicts regarding the further use，maintenance and development of the street itself rendered permanent and ubiquitous.More importantly，with “public” streets conflict is also introduced into areas where it formerly did not exist。For if the private owners of the houses，gardens，and fields along the street must pay contributions to the street owner in order to continue doing what they had done before，i.e.，if they must pay taxes to the street owner，then，by the same token，the street owner has thereby gained control over their private properties.A private owner’s control concerning the use of his own house is then no longer an exclusive one.Rather，the owner of the adjacent street can interfere with a house owner’s decisions regarding his own house.He can tell the house owner what to do or not to do with his house if he wants to leave or enter it as before.That is，the publicstreet owner is in a position where he can limit，and ultimately even eliminate，i.e.，expropriate，all private property and property rights and thus render conflict unavoidable and allaround.

这种安排的结果是可想而知的。由于否认“脱离”选项，“公共”街道所有者就勒住了村民的脖子。为继续使用先前“免费”的街道，相应强加给村民的费用及其他条件，就变得越来越繁重。冲突不但无法避免，反而被制度化。不允许选择脱离，也就是说，公共街道使用者现在必须为先前免费之物付费，且居民不可出售和摆脱他的所谓街道所有权，故而不仅被街道政府或君主的决策继续束缚，继续使用、维护和开发街道本身的冲突，也将变得无休无止且无处不在。更要命的是，通过“公共”街道，冲突被引入进了先前没有冲突的领域。假如沿街的房屋、花园及土地私人所有者，要继续像先前一样使用街道，就必须向街道所有者纳贡（即缴税）；那么以同样理由，街道所有者就因此获得了对其私有财产的控制。一个私人所有者对自己房屋的使用，就不再是排他性的使用。相反，毗邻的街道所有者可以干扰屋主对自己房屋的决策。假如屋主像先前那样进出房屋，他可以对屋主发号施令。也就是说，公共街道所有者就处在一种可限制、甚至最终消灭即剥夺一切私有财产及财产权利的地位，冲突从而不可避免且四处蔓延。

III. 私有化原理

THE RATIonAle FOR PRIVATIZATIon

It should be clear now why the institution of public property is dys functional。Institutions and the norms underlying them are supposed to help avoid conflict。But the institution of “public” property—of “public” streets—creates and increases conflict。For the purpose of conflict avoidance （of peaceful human cooperation），then，public property must go。All public property must become private property。

现在应该清楚，为什么公有财产制度是功能失调的制度。制度及作为制度基础的规范理应协助避免冲突。但“公共”财产制度——“公共”街道——制造和增加了冲突。为了避免冲突（以实现人类的和平合作），就必须废除公有财产。一切公有财产必须成为私有财产。

But how to privatize in the “real world，” which has developed far beyond the simple village model that I have so far considered？ in this “real world” we have not just public streets，but also public parks，land，rivers，lakes，coastlines，housing，schools，universities，hospitals，barracks，air ports，harbors，libraries，museums，monuments，and on and on.Further，on top of local governments we have a hierarchy of “superior” provincial and ultimately “supreme” national or central governments as the owners of such goods.Predictably，moreover，parallel to the territorial extension and expansion of the domain of public goods，in which privateproperty owners have become implicated without any “way out，” the range of choices left to people regarding their private property has been increasingly limited and narrowed.only a small and increasingly smaller realm is left wherein privateproperty owners can still make free decisions，i.e.，free from possible intrusion or interference by some public authority。Not even within the four walls of one’s own house is one left free and can one exercise exclusive control over one’s property。Today，in the name of the public and as the owner of all “public goods，” governments can invade your house，confiscate any and all of your belongings，and even kidnap your children.

但真实世界的发展已经远远超出目前考虑的简单村落模型，在这样的世界里如何私有化？在真实世界中，不光有公共街道，还有公共花园、土地、河流、湖泊、海岸线、屋宇、学校、大学、医院、军营、机场、码头、图书馆、博物馆、纪念馆，等等。其次，在地方政府之上，还有“高级”省政府和“至高”的全国或联邦政府，它们是这些财产的所有者。再者，可以预料，与领土的扩展、延伸以及公有财货领域的扩张并行，私有财产者必然也受牵连拖累，最终“无路可逃”；留给人们对自己私产的选择范围，已经越发狭隘、逼仄。私有财产者的自主决策空间（即免于某些公共当局的侵扰或干预可能）所剩无几。甚至在居所四壁之内，个人不再享有自由，也不能对财产实施排他性控制。今天，作为“公有财货”的所有者，政府在公共名义下可以侵入你的住宅，任意没收你的财物，甚至绑架你的孩子。

Obviously，in the “real world，” the question of how to privatize is more difficult than in the simple village model。But the village model and elementary social theory can help us recognize the principle （if not all the complicating details） involved and to be applied in this task。The privatization of “public” goods must occur in such a way that does not infringe on the preestablished rights of privateproperty owners （in the same way as the first appropriator of a formerly unowned common street did not infringe on anyone’s rights if and insofar as he recognized every resident’s unrestricted rightofway）。

显而易见，在“真实世界”中，如何私有化的问题，比起简单村落模型要困难得多。但是，村落模型和基础社会理论可以帮助我们认识到涉及和应用于这项任务的原则（虽然不能涵盖所有复杂的细节）。“公共”财货私有化必须以不侵犯私有财产者既有权利的方式进行（就像先前无主的共有街道的首位占有者没有侵犯任何人的权利，只要他承认每位居民不受限制的通行权）。

because “public” streets were the springboards from which all other “public goods” sprang，the privatization process should begin with streets.with the transformation of formerly common streets into “public” streets the expansion of the domain of public goods and the powers of government started，and here one should begin with the solution.

因为“公共”街道是所有其他“公有财货”的起点，所以私有化进程应从街道开始。先前的共有街道转化成“公共”街道，公有财货领域及政府权力扩张皆由此滥觞，故而解决之道也理应从此入手。

The privatization of “public” streets has a twofold result。on the one hand，no resident is henceforth forced to pay any tax for the upkeep or development of any local，provincial，or federal street。The future funding of all streets is solely the responsibility of their new private owners （whomever they may be）。on the other hand，insofar as a resident’s rightsofway are concerned，the privatization must leave no one worse off than he was originally （while it also cannot make anyone better off）。originally，every village resident could travel freely on the local street along his property，and he could proceed equally freely from there as long as things around him were unowned.However，if in his travels he came across something that was visi bly owned，whether a house，a field，or a street，his entrance was conditional on the owner’s permission or invitation.Likewise，if a nonresident stranger came across a local street，entrance to this street was subject to its （domestic） owner’s permission.The stranger had to be invited by some resident onto his property。That is，people could move around，but no one had an entirely unrestricted right of passage.No one was free to move just anywhere with out ever requiring anyone’s permission or invitation.The privatization of streets cannot change this fact and remove such original，natural restrictions on the “freedom of movement。”

“公共”街道私有化有两个后果。一方面，居民今后不再被迫为任何地方道路、省道或国道的维护或开发缴税。将来，所有街道的资金完全是新的私人所有者（无论是谁）的职责。另一方面，对居民通行权来说，私有化不会使任何人比原来处境更差（但也可能不会使任何人处境更好）。最初，每个村民都可以沿着自己的财产，在当地街道上自由行进；只要周围都是无主之物，就能一直畅行无阻。然而，只要在行进中遇到明显的有主之物，无论是房屋、土地或街道，就要以所有者同意或邀请为进入条件。同样，假如一个非居民外来人来到当地街道，进入要取决于（当地）所有者的允许。这个外来人必须受到某些居民的邀请，才能前往该居民的财产。也就是说，人们可以四处迁徙，但没有人拥有完全不受限制的通行权。如果未曾得到允许或邀请，没有人能自由迁徙到任何地方。街道的私有化既不能改变这一事实，也不能消除对“自由迁徙”这种最初的、自然的限制。

Applied to the world of local，provincial，and federal streets，this means that as the result of the privatization of streets every resident must be per mitted to travel freely on every local，provincial，and federal street or high way as before.Entrance onto the streets of different states or provinces，and especially of different localities，however，is not equally free，but conditional on the permission or invitation of the owners of such streets.Local streets always—praxeologically—precede any inter or translocal streets，and hence entry into different localities was never free but always and every where conditional on some local permission or invitation.This original datum is reinstated and reinforced with privatized streets.

将这种原则应用到有地方道路、省道及国道的世界，街道私有化结果意味着每个居民必须得到允许，才能像先前一样在每条地方道路、省道及国道上自由行进。进入不同的州或省尤其是不同地方的街道，无论如何皆并非同等自由，都要以这些街道所有者的允许或邀请为条件。地方街道总是——从行动学上——先于任何跨地方或跨区域的街道，因此进入不同地方从来不是免费的，而总是并且无处不在地依赖于某种地方许可或邀请。这种原始基据（datum）随着街道的私有化得到恢复和强化。

Today，on “public” streets，where everyone is essentially permitted to go everywhere and anywhere，without any “discriminatory” access restric tion whatsoever，conflict in the form of “forced integration，” i.e.，of having to accept uninvited strangers into one’s midst and onto one’s property，has become ubiquitous.In distinct contrast，with every street and in particular every local street privatized，neighborhoods and communities regain their original right of exclusion，which is a defining element of private property （just as much as the right of inclusion，i.e.，the right to invite someone else onto one’s property）。The owners of neighborhood and community streets，while not infringing on any resident’s rightofway or right to invite，can determine the entrance requirement for uninvited strangers （undocumented aliens） onto their streets and thus prevent the phenomenon of forced integration.

现如今，在“公共”街道上，基本允许每个人去任一处地方，毫无“歧视性”访问的限制，这种“被迫一体化”的冲突，也即不得不接受不速之客闯入我们当中、造访我们的财产，变得普遍存在。与之鲜明对比的是，随着每一条街道尤其是每一条地方街道的私有化，街坊及社区恢复了排他性的原初权利，这是私有财产的基本要素（正如接纳权，即邀请他人光临自己财产的权利）。街坊及社区街道的所有者，在不侵犯任何居民通行权及邀请权的同时，可以对不速之客（非法移民）进入街道的要求做出决定，从而阻止被迫一体化的现象。

Yet who are the streets’ owners？ Who can claim，and validate his claim，that he owns the local，provincial，or federal streets？ These streets are not the result of some sort of community effort，nor are they the result of the work of some clearly identifiable person or group of persons.true，literally speaking，the street workers built the streets.But that does not make them the streets’ owners because these workers had to be paid to do their work。without funding，there would be no street。Yet the funds paid to the workers are the result of tax payments by various taxpayers.Accordingly，streets should be regarded as these taxpayers’ property。The former taxpayers，in accordance with their amount of local，state，and federal taxes paid，should be awarded tradable property titles in local，state，and federal streets.They then can either keep these titles as an investment，or they can divest themselves of their street property and sell it，all the while retaining their unrestricted rightofway。

但谁是街道的所有者？谁可以宣称他拥有地方道路、省道或国道，并使得他的主张生效？这些街道不是某种社区努力的结果，也不是某些清楚界定的人或团体的工作成果。确切说，诚然是街道工人建设了街道。但这并不能使他们成为街道所有者，因为必须接受报酬，这些工人才会工作。没有资金，就不会有街道。然而，支付给工人的资金，来自于不同纳税人的税款。相应的，街道理应被视为这些纳税人的财产。先前的纳税人，按照他们的地方、州及联邦税收的缴税额，应该被授予对这些地方、州及联邦街道的可交易财产权。他们或者保留这些权利作为投资，或者放弃这些财产并加以出售，同时始终保留不受限制的通行权。

The same essentially applies to the privatization of all other public goods，such as schools，hospitals，etc。As a result，all tax payments for the upkeep and operation of such goods stop.The funding and development of schools and hospitals，etc。，is henceforth solely up to their new，private own ers.Likewise，the new owners of such formerly “public” goods are those residents who actually financed them.They，in accordance with their amount of taxes paid，should be awarded saleable property shares in the schools，hospitals，etc。Other than in the case of streets，however，the new owners of schools and hospitals are unrestricted by any easements or rightsofway in the future uses of their property。Schools and hospitals，unlike streets，were not first common goods before being turned into “public” goods.Schools and hospitals simply did not exist at all as goods before，i.e.，until they had been first produced； and hence no one （except the producers） can have acquired a prior easement or rightofway concerning their use.Accordingly，the new private owners of schools，hospitals，etc。，are at liberty to set the entrance requirements for their properties and determine if they want to continue operating these properties as schools and hospitals or prefer to employ them for a different purpose.

同样原则基本适用于所有其他公有财货的私有化，例如学校、医院，等等。因此，所有为维护及运作这些财产的税收应停止缴纳。学校、医院（等）的资金及发展，今后完全取决于新的私人所有者。这些先前“公有财货”的新所有者，也就是那些实际为“公有财货”提供资金的居民。他们应按缴税额被授予学校、医院（等）可出售的财产份额。然而，不同于街道的情况，学校和医院的新所有者将来使用财产时，不受任何地役权或通行权的限制。学校及医院不像街道，在被转化为“公共”财产前，不是共有财产。在落成以前，学校和医院本非既有之物。相应的，学校、医院（等）的新的私人所有者，可自由制定其财产的进入要求，并决定是否保留原有用途继续运营或改作其他用途。

IV. 附录私有化：原则与应用

ADDENDUM PRIVATIZATIon：PRINCIple AND APPLICATIonS

The only effective solution to the problem of conflict，i.e.，the only rule or norm that can assure conflict avoidance from the beginning of man kind onward and produce “eternal peace” is the institution of private property，ultimately grounded in acts of original appropriation of previously unowned or “common” resources.In contrast，the institution of public property begins with conflict，i.e.，with an act of original expropriation of some formerly private property （rather than the appropriation of previously unowned goods）； and public property does not end conflict and expropriation but institutionalizes them and makes them permanent。Hence arises the imperative of privatization—and hence the principle of restitution，i.e.，the notion that public property be returned qua private property to those from whom it had been forcibly taken.That is，public goods should become the private property of those who financed or otherwise funded these goods and who can establish an objective—intersubjectively ascertainable—claim to this effect。

根基于对先前无主或“共有”资源先占行动的私产制度，是解决冲突的唯一有效方法，也是确保人类自始往后避免冲突，并产生“永久和平”的唯一规则或规范。相比之下，公有财产制度一开始就带有冲突，也即对某些之前的私有财产开始侵占（而非对先前无主财货的占有）；并且，公有财产非但不会终止冲突及侵占，而且还会使冲突制度化及永久化。因此，私有化势在必行——并因此，赔偿原则出现，即公有财产理应以私有财产名义返还给那些被掠夺财产的人。也就是说，公有财货理应成为那些以资金或其他方式资助它并因此确立客观（主体间可确定的）要求权之人的私有财产。

Applying this principle to the existing world is often complicated and requires considerable legal effort。I shall only consider three realistic privati zation cases in order to address some central questions and decisions.

将这个原则应用于现实世界往往复杂棘手，需要下大量法律功夫。为解决一些关键问题及决策，我将仅考虑三种现实的私有化情形。

The first case，most closely approximated by the former Soviet Union，is that of a society where each and every property is public property，administered by a state government。Everyone is a state employee and works in public offices，enterprises，factories，and shops； and everyone moves and lives on public land and in public housing。There is no private property except in immediate consumer goods，in one’s underwear，toothbrush，etc。Moreover，all records concerning the legal past are lost or destroyed such that no one，based on such records，can substantiate a claim to any identifiable part of public property。

第一种情形，大概最接近于前苏联社会，一切财产都是政府管理的公有财产。每个人都是政府雇员，在公共部门、企业、工厂和商店工作；每个人都生活在公地及公屋里面。除了内衣、牙刷等直接消费品外，没有私有财产。此外，所有的关于法律沿革的记录都丢失或者损毁；这样任何人都不能根据记录证实他对公有财产任何可识别部分的要求权。

In this case，the principle that every claim to public property must be based on objective，intersubjectively ascertainable “data” would lead one to award private ownership （and saleable property titles） based on present or past occupancy：the bureaus go to the bureaucrats who occupy them，the factories to the workers，the fields to the farmers，and the houses to the residents.retired workers are awarded property titles in their former work places in accordance with the duration of their employment。As present or past occupants of the property in question，only they have an objective tie to this property。They are the ones who have maintained the property as it is while others were working elsewhere at other public workplaces.

在这种情形中，对公有财产的每个要求权都必须建基于客观的、主体间可确定“数据”的之上，这一原则会导致根据现有或过去的占有情况授予私有财产权（和可出售的财产权）：官署归占有它们的官员，工厂归工人，土地归农民，房屋归居住者。根据工龄授予退休工人先前工场的财产权。作为当前及先前的占有者，只有他们才与该财产存在客观联系。他们是事实上的财产维护者，正如其他公共工场的工人。

Everything else，i.e.，all public property that is not currently occupied and maintained by anyone （E.g。，the “wilderness”） becomes “common” property and is opened up to all members of the society for privatization by way of original appropriation.

对于其他所有目前未被任何人占有及维护的公有财产（如荒地），则成为“共有”财产对全社会成员开放，其私有化皆采用先占方式。

This solution only leaves out one important question.All legal documents are presumably lost。But people have not lost their memories.They still remember past crimes.There are victims and witnesses to acts of murder，battery，torture，and imprisonment。What to do with those who committed these crimes，who ordered or commissioned them，or who cooperated in their execution？ Should the torturers of the secret police and the Communist nomenklatura， for instance，be included in this privatization scheme and become the private owners of the police sta tions and government palaces where they administered and planned their crimes？ Justice requires instead that every alleged criminal offender be brought to trial by his supposed victims and，if sentenced and convicted，not only be excluded from obtaining any public property whatsoever，but also possibly be handed much harsher punishment （such as having his throat cut）。

The second case differs from the first one in only one respect：the legal past has not been wiped out。Documents and records exist to prove past expropriations，and based on such documents specific people can lay objective claim to specific pieces of public property。This was essentially the case in the Soviet Union’s former vassal states，such as East germany，Czecho slovakia，Poland，etc。，where the Communist takeover had taken place only some 40 years or about one generation before （rather than more than 70 years，as in the Soviet Union）。

第二种情形与第一种大同小异：法律沿革未被抹去。证明过去被侵占、剥夺的文档依然存在，根据这些档案，特定人可以对特定公有财产提出客观要求权。这基本上是苏联前附庸国的情况，如在东德、捷克斯洛伐克、波兰等国，共产党掌权大约仅有40年或仅隔一代（而非像苏联那样超过70年）。

In this case，the original，expropriated owners or their legal heirs should be restored as private owners to the public property in question.But what about capital improvements？ More specifically，what about newly erected structures （of houses and factories）—that would come to be privately owned by their current or past occupants—that were built on land restored to a different，original landowner？ How many property shares should the landowner receive and how many the owners of the structure？ Structures and land cannot be physically separated.In terms of economic theory，they are absolutely specific，complementary production factors whose relative contribution to their jointvalue product cannot be disentangled.In this case no alternative exists for the contending parties but to bargaiN.

这种情形中，被剥夺的原所有者或他们的合法继承人，理应被恢复成相关公有财产的私人所有者。但如何处理资本增量？更具体地说，那些在土地上新建的房屋和工厂怎么办？建筑物应归使用者（现在的和过去的）所有，而其下的土地所有权应恢复给原来的土地所有者。难题在于，建筑物和土地无法物理分割，土地所有者和建筑物所有者应该分别获得多少产权份额？从经济理论上讲，建筑物和土地是绝对特定的、互补的生产因素，它们对产品产出的贡献也无法分割。在这种情况下，争议双方别无选择，只能通过协商解决。

The third case is that of the socalled mixed economies.In these Societies a public sector exists side by side with a nominally private sector。There are public goods and public employees next to nominally private property and the owners and employees of private business.Typically，the public employees who administer public property do not produce goods or services that are sold on the market。（For the atypical case of valueproductive public enterprises，see below.） Their sales revenue and their market income are zero。Their salaries and all other costs involved in the operation of public goods are instead paid for by others.These others are the owners and employees of private business.Private business and employees，in contrast to their public counterparts，produce goods and services that are sold in the market and thus earn an income.Out of this income，private business does not merely pay the salaries of its own employees and provide for the maintenance of its own property； it also pays—in the form of income and property taxes—the （net） salaries of all public employees and the operating costs of all public property。

第三种情形是所谓混合经济。在这些社会中，公共部门与名义的私营部门共存。存在公有财货和公共雇员，也有名义上的私有财产及所有者、私企雇员。典型情况是，掌管公有财产的公共雇员，并不生产市场出售的产品或服务。（对于价值生产型公共企业的非典型情况见下面。）他们的销售收入及市场收入为零；工资薪酬及经营公有财货涉及的全部其他费用，都是由他人支付。这些其他人，是指私营企业的所有者及雇员。私营企业及雇员，与公共企业及雇员不同，前者生产市场销售的商品及服务，从而赚取收入。从这种收入当中，私营企业不仅支付自己雇员的薪酬，同时也维护自身的财产；也以所得税及财产税的形式，支付所有公共雇员的（净）薪酬，以及所有公有财产的运作成本。

In this case，the principle that public property should be restored qua private property to those who actually funded it would lead one to assign ownership titles exclusively to private owners，producers，and employees in accordance with their past property and income tax payments，while public managers and employees would be excluded.All government offices and palaces，for instance，would have to be vacated by their current occupants.Publicsector salaries were paid only—and public property exists only— because of the funding provided by privatebusiness owners and their employees.Hence，while public employees may keep their private property，they have no claim to the public property that they used and administered.

这种情形中，根据公有财产理应以私产名义归还给实际资金提供者的原则，基于他们过去的财产税及所得税缴纳额，将财产权排他性地分配给私人所有者、生产者及雇员，而公共部门的管理者及雇员则排除在外。例如，当前占有者必须搬出所有政府办公室及大楼。公共部门的薪酬支付及公有财产的之所以存在，完全依靠私营企业所有者及其雇员提供的资金。因此，虽然公共雇员可保留其私有财产，但对其使用及掌管的公有财产则没有要求权。

（This is different only in the atypical case where a public enterprise，such as a governmentowned car factory，produced marketable goods and services and thus earned a market income.In that case，the public employees may have a legitimate claim to ownership，depending on the circum stances.They have a claim to full ownership of the factory，if no previously expropriated owner exists who can lay claim to the factory and if the factory never received any tax subsidies.If a previous owner exists，the factory employees can claim at best partial ownership and must bargain with the owner concerning their relative share of ownership titles.And if and to the extent that the factory had been tax subsidized，the factory workers would have to further divide their proportion of ownership titles with private sector employees qua taxpayers.）

（这和公共企业如国有汽车工厂，生产可销售的市场产品及服务，从而赚取市场收入的非典型情况不同。这时公共雇员可视情况拥有对所有权的法定要求权。假如没有可对工厂提出要求权的、被剥夺的前所有者，且假如工厂没有接受任何税收补贴，公共雇员就拥有对工厂全部所有权的要求权。如果存在前所有者，工厂雇员充其量只能要求部分所有权，且必须与工厂所有者就相应所有权份额进行协商。只要工厂是由税收补贴的，，那么在一定程度上，工厂工人将不得不与纳税人身份的私营部门雇员进一步分配所有权份额。）

Simultaneously with the privatization of all public property，all nominally private property would be restored to its original state as real private property。That is，all nominally private property would be freed of all property or income taxes and of all legislative restrictions on its use （while previously concluded agreements concerning the use of property between private parties remain in effect）。without taxes，then，there are no government expenditures，and without government expenditures all public employees will be unsalaried and must look for productive work to earn a living。Likewise，every recipient of government grants，subsidies，or purchase orders will see his income reduce or disappear entirely and must look for alternatives.

在公有财产全面私有化的同时，名义私有财产将全面恢复成真正私有财产的原状。也就是说，名义私有财产全面免除财产税和所得税，以及所有关于其使用的立法限制（与此同时，先前私人间关于财产使用达成的协议依然有效）。没有税收，就没有任何政府支出；没有政府支出，所有政府雇员就无薪水可领，必须从事生产性工作以谋生。同样，每个接受政府拨款、补贴或采购订单的人都会看到自己的收入减少或完全消失，而不得不另谋生计。

This solution leaves still one important question unresolved.once all net taxpayers have been allotted their appropriate number of publicproperty shares，how do they take hold of this property and exercise their rights as privateproperty owners？ Even if an inventory of all public property exists，most people do not have the faintest idea of what it is that they now （partially） own.Most people have a fairly good idea of local public property，but about the public property at other，distant locations，they know next to nothing，except regarding a few “national monuments.” It is practically impossible for anyone to reach a realistic appraisal of the “correct” price for all of public property，and hence also of the “correct” price of an individual share in this property。Consequently，the prices asked and paid for such shares would be highly indeterminate and widely fluctuating and divergent，at least initially； and it would be rather unwieldy and highly timeconsuming until some investor or group of investors had bought up the majority of all shares in order to then begin operating or selling off parts of this property to earn a return on the investment。

这个解决方案仍有一个关键尚待解决。一旦所有净纳税人分得适当数量的公有财产份额，他们如何掌控财产，并作为私有财产者行使权利？即使所有的公有财产清单存在，绝大多数人对他们现在（部分）所有的财产连最模糊的概念都没有。大多数人对本地公有财产有相当不错的了解，但对其他遥远地区的公有财产，除了“名胜古迹”以外，就知之甚少。对任何人来说，要给出所有公有财产“准确”价格的现实估价，及该财产中个人份额的“准确”价格，实际上都不可能。因此，至少一开始，对这些份额的讨价还价都是高度不确定的，且大幅波动、充满分歧；直到某些或某批投资者收购大多数份额之后投入经营，或者出售部分财产以赚取投资回报之前，这个过程都是相当繁琐与耗时。

This difficulty can be overcome by bringing the idea of original appropriation back into play。The titles in the hands of net taxpayers are not only saleable tickets.More importantly，they entitle their owners to repossess formerly public and nowvacated property。Public property is opened to original appropriation，and the tickets are claims to vacated，momentarily unowned public property。Everyone can take his titles to specific pieces of public property and register as their owner。Since the first one to register with a particular piece of property would be its initial owner，it is assured that all pieces of public property would be almost instantly repossessed.More specifically，most public property would thus，at least initially，come to be owned by local residents，i.e.，by people living in close proximity to a given piece of property and most knowledgeable concerning its potential value productivity。Moreover，because the value per property share increasingly falls as additional ticketholders register with one and the same piece of property，any oversubscription or undersubscription of specific proper ties would be avoided or weeded out quickly。very quickly，each piece of property would be appraised realistically according to its value productivity。

这个难题可以通过重新引入先占的概念来解决。净纳税人手中的名义所有权不只是可出售的票据；更重要的是给予所有者重新占有先前公有而现在空置的财产权利。公有财产对先占开放，这些票据代表着对空置的、暂时无主的公有财产的要求权。每个人都可以对特定的公有财产行使自己的权利并注册为财产所有者。由于特定财产的首位注册者成为其最初所有者，确保了所有公有财产几乎在短期内被重新占有。更具体的说，大部分公有财产至少在一开始会因此被当地居民拥有，即被居住在该财产附近，以及最了解其潜在价值生产力的人所拥有。此外，由于每个额外的票据持有人注册同一块财产时，该财产每股的价值会下降，因此，任何特定财产的超额认购或不足认购问题都会很快被避免或消除。很快，每块财产都会根据其价值生产力被现实地评估。

6 自然秩序、国家和移民问题*

Natural Order，the State，and the immigration problem

I.

Human cooperation is the result of three factors：the differences among men and/or the geographical distribution of naturegiven factors of production； the higher productivity achieved under the division of labor based on the mutual recognition of private property （the exclusive control of every man over his own body and his physical appropriations and possessions） as compared to either selfsufficient isolation or aggression，plunder and domination； and the human ability to recognize this latter fact。Were it not for the higher productivity of labor performed under division of labor and the human ability to recognize this fact，explains Ludwig von Mises，men would have forever remained deadly foes of one another，irreconcilable rivals in their endeavors to secure a portion of the scarce supply of means of sustenance provided by nature.Each man would have been forced to view all other men as his enemies； his craving for the satisfaction of his own appe tites would have brought him into an implacable conflict with all his neigh bors.No sympathy could possibly develop under such a state of affairs.

人类合作是三个因素促成的结果：一是人与人之间的差异和/或自然生产要素地理分布上的不同；二是与自给自足的孤立或侵犯、掠夺和统治相比，在相互承认私有财产（每个人对自己的身体、物理占有物和财产的排他性控制）的基础上进行劳动分工，实现了更高的生产力；三是人类有能力认识到后一事实。正如路德维希·冯·米塞斯所解释的那样，如果不是劳动分工下劳动生产率的提高和人类认识到这一事实的能力，人类将永远是彼此的死敌，在努力获取大自然提供的稀缺的生存手段的过程中，他们是不可调和的对手。每个人都将被迫视其他所有人为敌人；他渴望满足自己的欲望，这将使他与所有的邻居发生不可调和的冲突。在这种情况下，不可能产生同情。[91]

The higher productivity achieved under the division of labor and man’s ability to recognize this fact explain the origin of the most elementary and fundamental of human institutions：the family and the family household. Second，it explains the fact of neighborhood （community） among homoge neous people （families，clans，tribes）：of neighborhood in the form of adja cent properties owned by separate and “equal” owners and in the “unequal” form of the relationship characteristic of a father and his son，a landlord and his tenant，or a community founder and his followerresidents. Third and most important for our purposes，it explains the possibility of the peaceful coexistence of heterogeneous and alien communities.Even if the members of different communities find each other physically and/or behaviorally strange，irritating，or annoying，and do not want to associate as neighbors，they may still engage in mutually beneficial trade if they reside spatially separated from each other。

在劳动分工下实现的更高生产率，以及人类认识到这一事实的能力，解释了最根本和最核心的人类制度——家庭和家户的起源。[92]其次，它解释了同族人（家庭、氏族、部落）之间的邻里关系（社区）的事实：邻里关系是由独立的、“平等的”所有者拥有的相邻财产，以及父亲和儿子、地主和佃户、社区创始人和他的追随者之间“不平等”的关系为特征所构成的。[93]第三，也是对我们的目的来说最重要的，它解释了异质和外来社区和平共处的可能性。即使不同社区的成员发现彼此的外貌和/或行为上很奇怪，令人恼火或惹人讨厌，并且不想作为邻居交往，如果他们在空间上彼此分开居住，他们仍然可能从事互利的贸易交换。[94]

let us broaden this picture and assume the existence of different races，ethnicities，languages，religions，and cultures （henceforth summarily：ethno cultures）。Based on the insight that “likes” associate with other likes and live spatially separated from “unlikes，” the following picture emerges：People of one ethnoculture tend to live in close proximity to one another and spatially separated and distant from people of another ethnoculture.Whites live among Whites and separate from Asians and Blacks.Italian speak ers live among other Italians and separate from English speakers.Chris tians live among other Christians and separate from Muslims.Catholics live among Catholics and separate from Protestants，etc。Naturally，some “overlap” and “mixing” of different ethnocultures in various “borderter ritories” exists.Moreover，as centers of interregional trade，cities naturally display a higher degree of ethnocultural heterogeneity。This notwithstand ing，however，neighborhoods and communities are internally homogeneous （unicultural）。In fact，even in border territories and cities the same spatial association and separation of likes and unlikes is found.Nothing like a society where members of different ethnocultures live as neighbors or in close physical proximity to each other （as propagated by some American multi culturalists） emerges.Rather，the emerging multiculturalism is one in which many distinctly different ethnocultures coexist in physicalspatial separa tion and distance from one another，and trade with each other from afar。

让我们扩大这幅图景，假设存在着不同的种族、民族、语言、宗教和文化（以下简称民族文化）。基于“相似的人”与其他相似的人联系在一起，与“不相似的人”在空间上分开的这一观点，下面的画面就出现了：同一种民族文化的人往往彼此生活得很近，而与另一种民族文化的人在空间上是分开的，彼此之间距离很远。白人与白人生活在一起，与亚洲人和黑人分开。说意大利语的人和其他意大利人生活在一起，与说英语的人分开。基督徒与其他基督徒生活在一起，与穆斯林分开。天主教徒与天主教徒生活在一起，与新教徒分开，等等。自然，不同民族文化在不同的“边界领土”中存在一些“重叠”和“混合”。此外，城市作为区域间交易的中心，自然表现出较高程度的民族文化异质性。然而，尽管如此，邻里和社区内部是同质的（单一文化的）。实际上，即使在边境区域和城市中，也是同一族群小聚居于不同族群大杂居的格局中。那种不同民族文化的成员像邻居一样生活在一起或在很近的物理距离内相处的社会（如一些美国多元文化主义者所宣扬的那样）并没有出现。相反，正在出现的多元文化主义是这样一种文化，在这种文化中，许多截然不同的民族文化在物理空间上彼此分离，彼此疏远，相隔千里却有贸易往来。[95]

let us take one more step and assume that all property is owned privately and the entire globe is settled.Every piece of land，every house and building，every road，river，and lake，every forest and mountain，and all of the coastline is owned by private owners or firms.No such thing as “public” property or “open frontier” exists.let us take a look at the problem of migration under this scenario of a “natural order。”

让我们再进一步，假设我们居住的地球，所有的财产都归私人所有。每一块土地，每一栋房屋和建筑，每一条道路、河流和湖泊，每一片森林和山脉，以及所有的海岸线都归私人所有者或公司所有。不存在“公共”财产或“开放的边界”这样的东西。让我们来看看这种“自然秩序”条件下的移民问题。

First and foremost，in a natural order，there is no such thing as “freedom of migration.” People cannot move about as they please.Wherever a person moves，he moves on private property； and private ownership implies the owner’s right to include as well as to exclude others from his property。Essentially，a person can move only if he is invited by a recipient property owner，and this recipientowner can revoke his invitation and expel his invitees whenever he deems their continued presence on his property undesirable （in violation of his visitation code）。

首先，在自然秩序中，不存在 “迁徙自由”。无论一个人在哪里迁移，他都是在私有财产上迁移；而私有权意味着财产所有者有权将他人接纳进自己的财产，也有权将他人排除在自己的财产之外。从根本上说，一个人只有在接受财产所有者邀请的情况下才能迁移，而接受邀请的财产所有者只要认为被邀请者在自己的财产上继续逗留是不受欢迎的（违反了他的访问守则），就可以撤销他的邀请并驱逐他。

There will be plenty of movement under this scenario because there are powerful reasons to open access to one’s property，but there are also reasons to restrict or close access.Those who are the most inclusive are the owners of roads，railway stations，harbors，and airports，for example .Interregional movement is their business.Accordingly，their admission standards can be expected to be low，typically requiring no more than the payment of a user fee.However，even they would not follow a completely nondiscriminatory admission policy。For instance，they would exclude intoxicated or unruly people and eject all trespassers，beggars，and bums from their property，and they might videotape or otherwise monitor or screen their customers while on their property。

在这种情况下会有很多的迁移活动，因为有充分的理由开放自己财产的使用权，但也有理由限制或关闭使用权。最具包容性的是道路、火车站、港口和机场的所有者，例如，区域间的流动是他们的业务。因此，它们的准入标准可能会很低，通常只需要支付使用费。然而，即使是他们也不会遵循完全无歧视的准入政策。例如，他们会排除酗酒或不守规矩的人，并将驱逐所有的擅自闯入者、乞丐和流浪汉，他们可能会对在其财产内的顾客进行录像或以其他方式进行监视或筛查。

The situation for the owners of retail establishments，hotels，and restaurants is similar。They are in the business of selling and renting and thus offer easy access to their property。They have every economic incentive not to discriminate unfairly against “strangers” or “foreigners，” because this would lead to reduced profits or losses.However，they must be significantly more circumspect and restrictive in their admission policy than the owners of roads or airports.They must take into account the localdomestic repercussions that the presence of strangers may have.If localdomestic sales suffer due to a retailer’s or hotel’s open admission policy visàvis foreigners，then discrimination is economically justified.In order to overcome this possible problem，commercial establishments can be expected to require of their “foreign” visitors at a minimum adherence to local standards of con duct and appearance.

零售场所、酒店和餐馆的老板的情况也类似。他们的业务是出售和出租，因此会允许他人便捷的进入他们的财产。他们有充分的经济动机不去不公平地歧视“陌生人”或“外国人”，因为这会导致利润减少或损失。然而，他们的准入政策必须比道路或机场的所有者更加谨慎和严格。他们必须考虑到陌生人的出现可能对当地带来的影响。假如零售商或酒店对外国人的开放政策，会导致他们对于本地人的销售额下降，那么歧视外来人员在经济上就是合理的。为了克服这个可能出现的问题，这些商业机构可以要求他们的“外国”来访者至少遵守当地的行为和着装标准。[96]

The situation is similar for local employers.They prefer lower to higher wage rates； hence，they are not predisposed against foreigners.However，they must be sensitive to the repercussions on the local labor force that may result from the employment of foreigners； that is，they must be fearful of the possibility that an ethnoculturally heterogeneous work force might lead to lower productivity。Moreover，employment requires housing，and it is in the residential housing and real estate market where discrimination against and exclusion of ethnocultural strangers will tend to be most pronounced.For it is in the area of residential as contrasted to commercial property where the human desire to be private，secluded，protected，and undisturbed from external events and intrusions is most pronounced.The value of residential property to its owner depends essentially on its almost total exclusivity。only family members and occasionally friends are included.And if resi dential property is located in a neighborhood，this desire for undisturbed possession—peace and privacy—is best accomplished by a high degree of ethnocultural homogeneity （as this lowers transaction costs while simulta neously increasing protection from external disturbances and intrusions）。By renting or selling residential property to strangers （and especially to strangers from ethnoculturally distant quarters），heterogeneity is intro duced into the neighborhood.Transaction costs tend to increase，and the peculiar peaceandprivacy security—the freedom from external，foreign intrusions—sought and expected of residential property tends to fall，result ing in lower residential property values.[97]

当地雇主的情况也类似。他们偏爱低工资甚于高工资；因此，他们并不倾向于排斥外来人口。但是，他们必须对雇佣外来人口可能对当地劳动力造成的影响保持敏感；也就是说，他们一定会担心一个不同民族文化的劳动力可能会降低生产率。此外，就业需要住房，而在住宅和房地产市场中，对不同种族文化的陌生人的歧视和排斥往往最为明显。因为与商业地产相比，在住宅领域，人们对隐私、安静、受保护和不受外部事件侵扰的渴望最为强烈。住宅物业对其所有者而言，其价值基本上取决于几乎百分百的排他性。只有家庭成员，偶尔也包括朋友才会被接纳。如果住宅物业位于一个社区，这种对不受干扰的拥有——和平和隐私——的渴望，最好是通过高度的民族文化同质性来实现的（因为这降低了交易成本，同时增加了对外部干扰和入侵的保护）。通过将住宅物业出租或出售给陌生人（特别是来自遥远地区的不同种族文化的陌生人），将异质性引入社区，交易成本趋于增加，对住宅物业特有的和平与隐私安全——不受外部、外国入侵的自由——的追求和期望趋于下降，导致住宅物业价值下降。

Under the scenario of a natural order，then，it can be expected that there will be plenty of interregional trade and travel。However，owing to the natu ral discrimination against ethnocultural strangers in the area of residential housing and real estate，there will be little actual migration，i.e.，permanent resettlement。And whatever little migration there is，it will be by individuals who are more or less completely assimilated to their newly adopted com munity and its ethnoculture.

因此，在自然秩序的情景下，可以预期将会有大量的区域间交易和旅行。然而，由于在住房和房地产领域对不同种族文化的陌生人的自然歧视，实际永居的移民很少。无论有多少移民，都是那些或多或少被这些新移民社区及其民族文化同化的人。[98]

II.

let us now introduce the institution of a State.The definition of a State assumed here is rather uncontroversial：A State is an agency which possesses the exclusive monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking and conflict arbitration within a given territory。In particular，a State can insist that all confiicts involving itself be adjudicated by itself or its agents.Implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge，as the second defining element of a State，is its power to tax：to unilaterally determine the price justice seekers must pay to the State for its services as the monopolistic provider of law and order。

现在让我们引入国家制度。这里假定对国家的定义是完全没有争议的：国家是在某一领土内垄断了最终决策和冲突仲裁的机构。特别是，一个国家可以坚称所有涉及它自身的冲突都必须由它自己或其代理人来裁决。作为国家的第二个界定因素，排除所有其他人担任最终裁判者，隐含着其征税的权力：单方面决定寻求公正的人必须为国家这个法律和秩序的垄断者提供的服务所需支付的价格。[99]

certainly，based on this definition it is easy to understand why there might be a desire to establish a State.It is not，as we are told in kindergarten，in order to attain the “common good” or because there would be no order without a State，but for a reason far more selfish and basE.For he who is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make and cre ate laws in his own favor rather than recognize and apply existing law； and he who can legislate can also tax and thus enrich himself at the expense of others.

当然，根据这一定义，很容易理解为什么人们会有建立国家的愿望。这不像我们在幼儿园里被告知的那样，是为了实现“共同利益”，也不是因为没有国家就没有秩序，而是出于一个更自私、更卑劣的原因。因为作为在一定领土内最终仲裁的垄断者，可以制定和创立有利于自己的法律，而不是承认和适用现有法律；能立法的人也就能征税，从而损人肥己。

Here it is impossible to cover the fascinating question of how such an extraordinary institution as a State with the power to legislate and tax can possibly arise，except to note that ideologies and intellectuals play a decisive role. Rather，States are assumed “given，” and the changes as regards migra tion that result from their existence will be considered.

在这里，除了指出意识形态和知识分子起着决定性作用外，不可能涵盖这样一个引人入胜的问题，即像一个拥有立法和征税权力的国家这样一个异乎寻常的机构是如何可能产生的。[100]此外，假定国家是“既定存在的”，我们将进一步考虑由于其存在而导致的移民方面的变化。

First，with the establishment of a state and territorially defined state borders，“immigration” takes on an entirely new meaning。In a natural order，immigration is a person’s migration from one neighborhoodcom munity into a different one （micromigration）。In contrast，under statist conditions immigration is immigration by “foreigners” from across state borders，and the decision whom to exclude or include，and under what conditions，rests not with a multitude of independent private property own ers or neighborhoods of owners but with a single central （and centralizing） stategovernment as the ultimate sovereign of all domestic residents and their properties （macromigration）。If a domestic residentowner invites a person and arranges for his access onto the residentowner’s property but the government excludes this person from the state territory，it is a case of forced exclusion （a phenomenon that does not exist in a natural order）。on the other hand，if the government admits a person while there is no domestic residentowner who has invited this person onto his property，it is a case of forced integration （also nonexistent in a natural order，where all movement is invited）。

首先，随着国家的建立和领土边界的界定，“移民”有了一个全新的含义。在自然秩序中，移民是一个人从一个社区迁移到另一个社区（微观移民）。相比之下，在国家主义的条件下，移民是由跨越国家边界的“外国”移民构成，根据什么条件，排除或接受什么人的决定，不取决于众多独立的私人财产所有者或私人所有者构成的社区，而是取决于一个单一的中央（和中心化的）政府，它是所有国内居民及其财产的最终的决策者（宏观移民）。

III.

In order to comprehend the significance of this change from decentralized admission by a multitude of property owners and ownerassociations （micromigration） to centralized admission by a state （macromigration），and in particular to grasp the potentialities of forced integration under statist conditions，it is necessary first to briefly consider a state’s policy of domestic migration.Based on the state’s definition as a territorial monopolist of legislation and taxation and the assumption of “selfinterest，” the basic features of its policy can be predicted.

为了理解这种从众多财产所有者和社区的去中心化接纳（微观移民）到国家的中心化接纳（宏观移民）的转变的意义，特别是为了理解国家主义条件下强制一体化的可能性，首先有必要简短考虑一个国家的国内移民政策。基于国家的定义，作为某一领土的立法和税收的垄断者，以及“自利”假设，可以预测其政策的基本特征。

Most fundamentally，it can be predicted that the state’s agents will be interested in increasing （maximizing） tax revenues and/or expanding the range of legislative interference with established private property rights，but they will have little or no interest in actually doing what a state is supposed to do：protecting private property owners and their property from domestic and foreign invasion.

最根本的是，可以预测，国家代理人将对增加（最大化）税收，和/或立法扩大对既定私有财产权的干预范围感兴趣，但他们实际上对做一个国家应该做的事情几乎没有兴趣：保护私人财产所有者及其财产免受国内外的侵犯。

More specifically，because taxes and legislative interference with private property rights are not paid voluntarily but are met with resistance，a state，to assure its own power to tax and legislate，must have an existential interest in providing its agents access to everyone and all property within the state’s territory。In order to accomplish this，a state must take control of （expropriate） all existing private roads and then use its tax revenue to construct more and additional “public” roads，places，parks and lands，until everyone’s private property borders on or is encircled by public lands and roads.

更具体地说，由于税收和对私有产权的立法干预不是民众自愿支付的，而是会遭到抵制，一个国家为了确保自己的税收和立法权力，必须让其代理人能够接触到国家领土内的每个人及其所有财产，这是一种实实在在的利益。为了实现这一目标，国家必须控制（征用）一切现有的私人道路，然后利用其税收来建造更多的“公有”道路、场所、花园以及开拓土地，直到每个人的私有财产都与公有土地和道路接壤或被公有土地和道路的汪洋大海包围。

many economists have argued that the existence of public roads indi cates an imperfection of the natural—free market—order。According to them，the free market “underproduces” the socalled “public” good of roads； and taxfunded public roads rectify this deficiency and enhance over all economic efficiency （by facilitating interregional movement and trade and lowering transaction costs）。Obviously，this is a starryeyed view of the situation.

许多经济学家认为，公有道路的存在表明了自然自由市场秩序的不完善。根据他们的说法，自由市场“生产不足”所谓的道路这种“公共”商品；由税收资助的公有道路弥补了这一不足，并提高了总体经济效率（通过促进区域间的流动和交易以及降低交易成本）。很显然，这只是对实际形势的一厢情愿的幻想。[101]

free markets do produce roads，although they may well produce fewer and different roads than under statist conditions.And viewed from the perspective of a natural order，the increased production of roads under statist conditions represents not an improvement but an “overproduction，” or better yet “malproduction，” of roads.Public roads are not simply harmless facilitators of interregional exchange.First and foremost，they are facilitators of state taxation and control，for on public roads the government’s taxmen，police，and military can proceed directly to everyone’s doorstep.

自由市场的确生产道路，尽管比国家主义制度条件下相比，生产的道路数量可能更少、且类型也不同。从自然秩序的角度来看，在国家主义制度条件下道路产量的增加并不是一种改进，而是道路的“生产过剩”，或者贴切的说法是“生产不良”。公有道路不仅仅是地区间交流的有益无害的辅助。它们首先是国家税收和控制的辅助，有了公有道路，政府的税吏、警察和军队可以长驱直入，到每家每户的门口。[102]

In addition，public roads and lands lead to a distortion and artificial breakup of the spatial association and separation characteristic of a natural order。As explained，there are reasons to be close and inclusive，but there are also reasons to be physically distant and separated from others.The overproduction of roads occurring under statist conditions means on the one hand that different communities are brought into greater proximity to one another than they would have preferred （on grounds of demonstrated preference）。on the other hand，it means that one coherent community is broken up and divided by public roads.

此外，公有道路和土地会导致自然秩序所特有的空间关联与分隔特征出现扭曲和人为的破坏。如前文所述，人们有亲近和包容他人的理由，但也有与他人保持实际距离、相互分隔的理由。在国家主义条件下出现的道路过度生产现象，一方面意味着不同社区彼此间的距离比它们原本希望的（基于展示的偏好）更近了；另一方面，这意味着一个完整统一的社区会被公有道路分割得支离破碎。[103]

Moreover，under the particular assumption of a democratic state even more specific predictions can be made.Almost by definition，a state’s terri tory extends over several ethnoculturally heterogeneous communities，and dependent on recurring popular elections，a stategovernment will predict ably engage in redistributive policies.[104] in an ethnoculturally mixed terri tory this means playing one race，tribe，linguistic or religious group against another； one class within any one of these groups against another （the rich versus the poor，the capitalists versus the workers，etc。）； and finally，mothers against fathers and children against parents.The resulting income and wealth redistribution is complex and varied.There are simple transfer pay ments from one group to another，for instance.However，redistribution also has a spatial aspect。In the realm of spatial relations it finds expression in an ever more pervasive network of nondiscriminatory “affirmative action” policies imposed on private property owners.

此外，在民主国家的特殊假设下，甚至可以做出更具体的预测。几乎可以用定义来说明，一个国家的领土延伸到几个种族文化不同的社区，并且依赖于经常性的民众选举，政府将可以有预见地参与再分配政策。在一个民族文化混杂的地区，这意味着存在不同种族、部落、语言或宗教团体之间的对抗；这些群体中的一个阶级对抗另一个阶级（富人对抗穷人，资本家对抗工人，等等）；最后，夫妻反目、父子成仇。由此产生的收入和财富再分配复杂而多样。例如，有从一个群体到另一个群体的简单转移支付。然而，再分配也有空间方面的影响。在空间关系领域，它表现为强加给私人财产所有者一个愈发普遍的、非歧视性 “平权运动 ”政策网络。

An owner’s right to exclude others from his property is the means by which he can avoid “bads” from happening：events that will lower the value of his property。By means of an unceasing flood of redistributive legislation，the democratic state has worked relentlessly not only to strip its citizens of all arms （weapons） but also to strip domestic property owners of their right of exclusion，thereby robbing them of much of their personal and physical protection.Commercial property owners such as stores，hotels，and restau rants are no longer free to exclude or restrict access as they see fit。Employers can no longer hire or fire who they wisH.In the housing market，landlords are no longer free to exclude unwanted tenants.Furthermore，restrictive covenants are compelled to accept members and actions in violation of their very own rules and regulations.In short，forced integration is ubiquitous，making all aspects of life increasingly uncivilized and unpleasant。

所有者有权将他人排除在其财产之外，这是他避免“坏事”发生的一种手段：那些会降低其财产价值的事件。通过源源不断的再分配立法洪流，民主国家不仅无情地剥夺了其公民的所有武器，而且剥夺了国内财产所有者的排斥权，从而剥夺了他们的许多人身和有形的保护。商业地产的所有者，如商店、酒店和餐馆，不再可以自由地排斥或限制他们认为不合适的访客。雇主也不再能自主决定雇佣或解雇谁。在住房市场，房东不再能自由地拒绝不受欢迎的租户。此外，限制性条款被迫接受违反其自身规章制度的成员和行为。简而言之，强制一体化无处不在，使得生活的方方面面变得越来越不文明、令人不快。[105]

IV.

with this backdrop of domestic state policies we can return to the problem of immigration under statist conditions.It is now clear what state admission implies.It does not merely imply centralized admission.By admitting someone onto its territory，the state also permits this person to proceed on public roads and lands to every domestic resident’s doorsteps，to make use of all public facilities and services （such as hospitals and schools），and to access every commercial establishment，employment，and residential housing，protected by a multitude of nondiscrimination laws.

在这种国内政策的背景下，我们回到国家主义条件下的移民问题。现在很清楚国家准入意味着什么。它并不仅仅意味着中心化的准入。国家准许某人进入其领土，也就允许此人在公有道路和土地上通行，直抵每一位国内居民的家门口，使用所有公共设施和服务（如医院和学校），并进入每一家商业机构、获得就业机会以及入住居民住房，而且这一切都受到众多反歧视法律的保护。[106]

only one more element is missing in this reconstruction.Why would immigration ever be a problem for a state？ Who would want to migrate from a natural order into a statist area？ A statist area would tend to lose its residents，especially its most productive subjects.It would be an attraction only for potential statewelfare recipients （whose admission would only further strengthen the emigration tendency）。If anything，emigration is a problem for a state.In fact，the institution of a State is a cause of emigration； indeed，it is the most important or even the sole cause of modern mass migrations （more powerful and devastating in its effects than any hurricane，earthquake or flood and comparable only to the effects on migration of the various ice ages）。

这次重构只少了一个元素。为什么移民会成为一个国家的问题？谁会想从自然秩序地区移民到国家主义地区呢？一个国家主义地区往往会失去它的居民，尤其是它最具生产力的居民。它只会吸引潜在的国家福利接受者（他们的加入只会进一步强化移民倾向）。如果有的话，移民是一个国家的问题。事实上，国家体制是移民的一个原因；事实上，它是现代大规模移民的最重要甚至是唯一的原因（其影响比任何飓风、地震或洪水都更强大和更具破坏性，能与相媲美的唯有各种冰河时期对移民的影响）。

What has been missing in this reconstruction is the assumption of a multitude of states partitioning the entire globe （the absence of natural orders anywhere）。Then，as one state causes mass emigration，another state will be confronted with the problem of mass immigration； and the general direction of mass migration movements will be from territories where states exploit （legislatively expropriate and tax） their subjects more （and wealth accordingly tends to be lower） to territories where states exploitless （and wealth is higher）。

在这种重构中一直缺失的是这样一种假设：众多国家将整个地球划分得四分五裂（任何地方都不存在自然秩序）。于是，当一个国家导致大规模移民外流时，另一个国家就会面临大规模移民涌入的问题；而大规模移民流动的总体方向将是从那些国家对其国民剥削（通过立法进行剥夺和征税）更严重（因而财富往往更少）的地区，流向那些国家剥削较轻（且财富更多）的地区。

We have finally arrived in the present，when the Western world—West ern Europe，north America，and Australia—is faced with the specter of Statecaused mass immigration from all over the rest of the world.What can be and is being done about this situation？

终我们终于来到了当下这个时代，此时西方世界——西欧、北美和澳大利亚——面临着由国家因素导致的来自世界其他各地大规模移民的幽灵般的困扰。针对这种情况，可以采取什么措施，又正在采取哪些措施呢？

Out of sheer selfinterest States will not adopt an “open border” policy。If they did，the influx of immigrants would quickly assume such propor tions that the domestic statewelfare System would collapsE.on the other hand，the Western welfare states do not prevent tens or even hundreds of thousands （and in the case of the United States well in excess of a million） of uninvited foreigners per year from entering and settling their territo ries.Moreover，as far as legal （rather than tolerated illegal） immigration is concerned，the Western welfare states have adopted a nondiscriminatory “affirmative action” admission policy。That is，they set a maximum immigration target and then allot quotas to various emigration countries or regions，irrespective of how ethnoculturally similar or dissimilar such places and regions of origin are，thus further aggravating the problem of forced integration.As well，they typically allow an “open” （unspecified） number of “politi cal asylum” seekers to enter—of government approved “victim” groups （to the exclusion of other，“politically incorrect” victims）。[107]

纯粹为自身利益计，各国不会采取“开放边境”的政策。如果他们这样做了，涌入的移民将迅速达到一定的规模，将会导致国内福利制度的崩溃。另一方面，西方福利国家并不阻止每年数万甚至数十万（在美国超过100万）未经邀请的外国人进入并定居在他们的领土上。此外，就合法（而不是可被容忍的非法）移民而言，西方福利国家采取了非歧视性的“平权运动”的准入政策。也就是说，它们设定了一个最大移民目标，然后将配额分配给各个移民国家或地区，而不管这些地方和地区的民族文化相似度如何，从而进一步加剧了强制一体化的问题。此外，它们通常允许数量“不限”（未明确规定）的“政治庇护”寻求者入境——这些人属于政府认可的“受害”群体（而将其他“政治不正确”的受害者排除在外）。

In light of the unpopularity of this policy，one might wonder about the motive for engaging in it。However，given the nature of the state it is not difficult to discover a rationale.States，as will be recalled，are also promoters of forced domestic integration.forced integration is a means of breaking up all intermediate social institutions and hierarchies （in between the state and the individual） such as family，clan，tribe，community，and church and their internal layers and ranks of authority。Through forced integration individuals are isolated （atomized） and their power of resistance visàvis the State is weakened.

鉴于强制一体化是一项不受欢迎的政策，人们可能会对这项政策的动机产生怀疑。然而，考虑到国家的本质，洞察其基本原理并不困难。大家应该记得，国家也是强制国内一体化的推动者。强制一体化是一种打破所有中间社会机构和等级制度（位于国家和个人之间）的手段，如家庭、氏族、部落、社区和教会，以及它们的内部层级和权威等级。通过强制一体化，个人被孤立（原子化），他们抵抗国家的能力被削弱。[108]

In the “logic” of the state，a hefty dose of foreign invasion，especially if it comes from strange and faraway places，is reckoned to further strengthen this tendency。And the present situation offers a particularly opportune time to do so，for in accordance with the inherently centralizing tendency of States and statism generally and promoted here and now in particular by the U.S.as the world’s only remaining superpower，the Western world—or more precisely the neoconservativesocialdemocratic elites controlling the state governments in the U.S.and Western Europe—is committed to the establishment of supranational states （such as the European Union） and ultimately one world state.National，regional or communal attachments are the main stumbling blocks on the way to this goal。A good measure of unin vited foreigners and government imposed multiculturalism is calculated to further weaken and ultimately destroy national，regional，and communal identities and thus promote the goal of a one World Order，led by the U.S.，and a new “universal man.”

按照国家的 “逻辑”，大量的外国入侵，尤其是来自陌生且遥远地方的入侵，被认为会进一步强化这种趋势。而当前的形势为此提供了一个尤为适宜的时机，因为依照国家及国家主义普遍固有的中心化倾向，特别是当下由作为世界仅存超级大国的美国所推动的这种倾向，西方世界——或者更确切地说，是掌控着美国和西欧各国政府的新保守主义社会民主派精英们——致力于建立超国家的政体（比如欧盟），并最终建立一个世界政府。民族、地区或社区的归属感是实现这一目标的主要绊脚石。大量未经邀请的外国人和政府强制推行的多元文化主义，被认为会进一步削弱并最终摧毁民族、地区和社区的认同感，从而推动由美国领导的世界秩序以及新 “世界公民” 这一目标的实现。[109]

V.

What，if anything，can be done to spoil these statist designs and regain security and protection from invasion，whether domestic or foreign？ let us begin with a proposal made by the editors of the Wall Street Journal，the Cato institute，the Foundation for Economic Education，and various leftlibertarian writers of an open or noborder policy—not because this proposal has any merit，but because it helps to elucidate what the problem is and what needs to be done to solve it。

要想破坏这些国家主义的图谋，重新获得抵御国内外入侵的安保与保护，（如果有可能的话）能做些什么呢？让我们先从《华尔街日报》的编辑们、卡托研究所、经济教育基金会以及形形色色的左翼自由意志主义作家所提出的开放边境或无边境政策的提议说起——并非因为这个提议有任何可取之处，而是因为它有助于阐明问题所在以及解决问题需要做些什么。

It is not difficult to predict the consequences of an openborder policy in the present world.If Switzerland，Austria，germany or Italy，for instance，freely admitted everyone who made it to their borders and demanded entry，these countries would quickly be overrun by millions of thirdworld immi grants from Albania，Bangladesh，India，and Nigeria，for example.As the more perceptive openborder advocates realize，the domestic statewelfare programs and provisions would collapse as a consequence. This would not be a reason for concern，for surely，in order to regain effective protection of person and property the welfare state must be abolished.But then there is the great leap—or the gaping hole—in the openborder argument：out of the ruins of the democratic welfare states，we are led to believe，a new natu ral order will somehow emerge.

在当今世界，不难预测开放边境政策的后果。例如，如果瑞士、奥地利、德国或意大利自由地接纳每一个到达他们边境并要求入境的人，这些国家将很快被来自阿尔巴尼亚、孟加拉国、印度和尼日利亚的等第三世界的数百万移民所淹没。正如更有洞察力的开放边境的倡导者所意识到的那样，国内的国家福利计划和规定将因此崩溃。[110]这不是一个令人担忧的理由，因为为了重新获得对人身和财产的有效保护，福利国家必须被废除。但是，在开放边境的论点中，有一个巨大的跳跃——或者说是巨大的漏洞：我们被诱导相信，在民主福利国家的废墟中，一种新的自然秩序将以某种方式神奇地出现。

The first error in this line of reasoning can be readily identified.once the welfare states have collapsed under their own weight，the masses of immigrants who have brought this about are still there.They have not been miraculously transformed into Swiss，Austrians，Bavarians or Lombards，but remain what they are：Zulus，Hindus，Ibos，Albanians，or Ban gladeshis.Assimilation can work when the number of immigrants is small。It is entirely impossible，however，if immigration occurs on a mass scale.In that case，immigrants will simply transport their own ethnoculture onto the new territory。Accordingly，when the welfare state has imploded there will be a multitude of “little” （or not so little） Calcuttas，Daccas，Lago ses，and Tiranas strewn all over Switzerland，Austria and Italy。It betrays a breathtaking sociological naiveté to believe that a natural order will emerge out of this admixture.Based on all historical experience with such forms of multiculturalism，it can safely be predicted that in fact the result will be civil war。There will be widespread plundering and squatterism leading to massive capital consumption，and civilization as we know it will disappear from Switzerland，Austria and Italy。Furthermore，the host population will quickly be outbred and，ultimately，physically displaced by their “guests.” There will still be Alps in Switzerland and Austria，but no Swiss or Austrians.

很容易发现这种推理的第一个错误。一旦福利国家在自身的重压下崩溃，带来这一切的大批移民却仍滞留在那里。他们并没有奇迹般地变成瑞士人、奥地利人、巴伐利亚人或伦巴第人，而是仍然保持其原有的身份：祖鲁人、印度人、伊博人、阿尔巴尼亚人或班格拉迪斯人。当移民人数较少时，同化可以起作用。然而，如果移民大规模发生，同化是完全不可能的。在这种情况下，移民只会把自己的民族文化带到新的领土之上。因此，当福利国家崩溃时，将会有大量的“大大小小”的加尔各答、达卡、拉各斯和地拉那遍布瑞士、奥地利和意大利。相信一种自然秩序会从这种混合中产生，这暴露了一种惊人的社会学的无知。基于这种形式的多元文化主义的所有历史经验，可以有把握地预测，其实际结果将是内战。将会滋生大规模的掠夺和非法占有，同时导致大量的资本消耗，我们所熟知的文明将从瑞士、奥地利和意大利消失。此外，东道主很快就会在生育上被“外来客”超过，最终从地域上被其取代。瑞士和奥地利仍会有阿尔卑斯山，但却不会再有瑞士人或奥地利人了。[111]

However，the error in the open border proposal goes further than its dire consequences.The fundamental error of the proposal is moral or ethical in nature and lies in its underlying assumption that foreigners are “entitled，” or have a “right，” to immigrate.In fact，they have no such right whatsoever。

然而，开放边境提案中的错误远不止其带来的可怕后果。该提案的根本错误在于其道德或伦理性质，也在于其潜在的假设，即外国人“有资格”或有“权利”移民。事实上，他们根本没有这样的权利。

Foreigners would have a right to enter Switzerland，Austria or Italy only if these places were uninhabited （unowned） territories.However，they are owned，and no one has a right to enter territories that others own unless invited by the owner。Nor is it permissible to argue，as some openborder proponents have done，that while foreigners may not enter private property without the owner’s permission they may do so with public property。In their eyes，public property is akin to unowned property and thus “open” to everyone，domestic citizens and foreigners alike.However，this analogy between public property and unowned resources is wrong。There is a cat egorical difference between unowned resources （open frontier） and public property。Public property is the result of stategovernment confiscations— of legislative expropriations and/or taxation—of originally privately owned property。While the state does not recognize anyone as its private owner，all of government controlled public property has in fact been brought about by the taxpaying members of the domestic public。Austrians，Swiss，and Italians，in accordance with the amount of taxes paid by each citizen，have funded the Austrian，Swiss，and Italian public property。Hence，they must be considered its legitimate owners.Foreigners have not been subject to domestic taxation and expropriation； hence，they cannot claim any rights regarding Austrian，Swiss or Italian public property。

外国人只有在瑞士、奥地利或意大利是无人居住（无主）的领土时才有权进入。然而，它们早已归他人所有，除非得到所有者的邀请，否则无人有权进入他人拥有的领土。也不允许像一些开放边境支持者所辩称的那样，尽管外国人未经所有者许可不得进入私有财产，但他们有权进入公有财产。[112] 在他们看来，公有财产类似于无主财产，因此对所有人“开放”，无论是国内公民还是外国人。然而，将公有财产与无主资源进行类比是错误的。无主资源（开放边境）与公有财产之间存在着绝对的区别。公有财产是国家政府征收——通过立法征收和/或征税——原本属于私人所有的财产的结果。虽然国家不承认任何人是其私人所有者，但所有政府控制的公有财产实际上都是由纳税的国内公众创造的。每个奥地利人、瑞士人和意大利人，按照所缴纳的税款，为奥地利、瑞士和意大利的公有财产提供资金。因此，他们必须被视为其合法所有者。外国人没有受到这些国家内部的税收和征用；因此，他们不能对奥地利、瑞士或意大利的公有财产主张任何权利。

The recognition of the moral status of public property as expropriated private property is not just sufficient grounds for rejecting the openborder proposal as a moral outrage.It is equally sufficient for combating the present semiopen “affirmative action” immigration policies of the Western welfare States.

承认公有财产作为被征用的私有财产的道德地位，这不仅是拒绝开放边境提议，将其视为道德暴行的充分理由。它同样也是对抗西方福利国家当前半开放的“平权运动”移民政策的充分理由。

Up to now，in the debate on immigration policy too much emphasis has been placed on consequentialist （utilitarian） arguments.Apologists of the status quo have argued that most immigrants work and become productive，so immigration contributes to a rising domestic standard of living。Critics have argued that the existing statewelfare institutions and provisions increasingly invite welfareimmigration，and they have warned that the only advantage of the current policies over the openborder alternative is that the former will take decades until it ultimately leads to similarly dire effects，while the latter will produce such effects within years.As important as the resolution of these issues is，it is not decisive.The opposition against current immigration policies is ultimately independent of whether immigration will make per capita GDP （or similar statistical measures） rise or fall。It is a matter of justice：of right and wrong。

到目前为止，在关于移民政策的论证中，结果主义（功利主义）的论点被过分强调了。为现状辩护的人认为，大多数移民都在工作，并且变得富有，因此移民有助于提高国内生活水平。批评者则认为，现行的国家福利制度和规定越来越多地吸引福利移民，他们警告说，与开放边境替代方案相比，当前政策的唯一优势是，前者需要几十年的时间才能最终产生类似的直接影响，而后者将在几年内产生这种影响。尽管解决这些问题很重要，但它不是决定性的。对当前移民政策的反对最终与移民是否会使人均GDP（或类似的统计指标）上升或下降无关。这是一个公正的问题：正确亦或错误。

Understandably，the democratic welfare states try to conceal the source of public property （i.e.，acts of expropriation）。However，they do acknowledge that public property is “somehow” the property of their citizens and that they are the citizens’ trustees in regard to public property。Indeed，the modern state’s legitimacy is derived from its claim to protect its citizens and their property from domestic and foreign invaders，intruders，and trespass ers.regarding foreigners，this would require that the state act like the gate keepers in private gated communities.The State would have to check every newcomer for an invitation and monitor his movement while en route to his final destination.once it is made clear that the government actually tolerates or even promotes the intrusion and invasion of masses of aliens who by no stretch of the imagination can be deemed welcome or invited by domestic residents，this is or may become a threat to a government’s legitimacy and exert enough pressure on it to adopt a more restrictive and discriminatory admission policy。

可以理解的是，民主福利国家试图隐瞒公有财产的来源（即征用行为）。然而，他们确实承认，公有财产“在某种程度上”是公民的财产，他们是公有财产的公民受托人。事实上，现代国家的合法性来源于其保护公民及其财产免受国内外侵犯者、闯入者和非法侵入者侵害的主张。面对外国人，这将要求国家像私人封闭社区的门卫一样行事。国家必须检查每个新来者是否收到邀请，并在其前往最终目的地的途中监视他的行动。国民一旦弄清楚，政府实际上容忍甚至促进了大量外国人的闯入和入侵，而这些外国人无论如何也不会被国内居民视为是受欢迎的或是受邀请的，这就会就有可能成为政府合法性的威胁，并对其施加足够的压力，使其采取更具限制性和歧视性的入境政策。[113]

But this can only be the beginning； even if public opinion induced the state to adopt an immigration stance more in accordance with popular sentiments and justice，this fact would not change that the interests of private property owners and those of the State as a territorial monopolist of legislation and taxation are incompatible and in permanent conflict with each other。A State is a contradiction in terms：it is a property protector who may expropriate the property of the protected through legislation and taxation.Predictably，a State will be interested in maximizing its tax revenues and power （its range of legislative interference with private property rights） and disinterested in protecting anything except itself。What we experience in the area of immigration is only one aspect of a general problem.States are also supposed to protect their citizens from domestic intrusion and invasion，yet as we have seen，they actually disarm them，encircle them，tax them，and strip them of their right to exclusion，thus rendering them helpless.

但这仅仅只是一个开始；即使公众舆论促使国家采取更符合民意和公正的移民立场，这一事实也不会改变私人财产所有者与国家作为立法和税收的领土垄断者这两者之间的利益是不相容的，并且彼此之间存在永久性的冲突。国家这个词本身就是自相矛盾的：它是财产的保护者，却又可以通过立法和征税来剥夺被保护者的财产。可以预见的是，国家会热衷于将其税收收入和权力（其对私有财产权进行立法干预的范围）最大化，并且除了保护它自身之外，对保护其他任何事物都不感兴趣。我们在移民领域所经历的只是一个普遍问题的一个面向而已。国家也应该保护其公民免受国内的侵犯和入侵，然而正如我们所看到的，国家实际上解除了公民的武装，对其进行包围、征税，剥夺他们的排他权，从而使他们孤立无援。

Accordingly，the solution to the immigration problem is at the same time the solution to the general problem inherent in the institution of a State and of public property。It involves the return to a natural order by means of secession.To regain security from domestic and foreign intrusion and invasion，the central nation States will have to be broken up into their constituent parts.The Austrian and the Italian central States do not own Austrian and Italian public property； they are its citizens’ trustees.Yet they do not protect them and their property。Hence，just as the Austrians and the Italians （and not foreigners） are the owners of Austria and Italy，so by extension of the same principle do the Carinthians and the Lombards （in accor dance with individual tax payments） own Carinthia and Lombardy，and the bergamese，bergamo （and not the Viennese and the Roman governments）。

因此，移民问题的解决方式同时就是国家体制和公有财产所固有的一般问题的解决方式。它包括通过脱离的方式回到自然秩序。为了从国内外的侵犯和入侵中重新获得安全，必须将中心化的民族国家分裂成多个组成部分。奥地利和意大利这些中心化的国家并不拥有奥地利和意大利的公有财产；他们只是其公民的受托人。然而，他们并未保护公民及其财产。因此，正如奥地利人和意大利人（而不是外国人）是奥地利和意大利的所有者一样，同样的原则延伸开来，卡林西亚人和伦巴第人（根据个人纳税情况）拥有卡林西亚和伦巴第，而贝加莫人拥有贝加莫（这些地方的所有者不是维也纳政府也不是罗马政府）。

In a decisive first step，individual provinces，regions，cities，towns and villages must declare their independence from Rome，Vienna，berlin，Paris，and proclaim their status as “free territories.” Extensive efforts by the central States to the contrary notwithstanding，strong provincial affiliations and attachments still exist in many regions，cities and villages all across Europe.It is vital to tap into these provincial and local sentiments in taking this first step.with every successive act of regional secession the power of the central State will be diminished.It will be stripped of more of its public property，its agents’ range of access will increasingly be restricted，and its laws will apply in smaller and smaller territories，until it ultimately withers away。

作为决定性的第一步，各省、地区、城市、城镇和村庄必须宣布从罗马、维也纳、柏林、巴黎独立出来，并宣布其为“自由领土”。尽管中央政府作出了不懈的努力，但与此相反，在欧洲各地的许多地区、城市和村庄仍然存在着强烈的地方认同感和归属感。在迈出第一步时，充分利用这些地方情感是至关重要的。随着每一次连续的地区脱离行动，中央政府的权力将被削弱。它将被剥夺更多的公有财产，其代理人管辖的范围将日益受到限制，其法律的适用范围也会越来越小，直到最终消亡。

However，it is essential to go beyond “political secession” to the privatization of property。After all，provincial and local political bodies （governments） have no more right to provincial property than the central government had to national property。The secession process must proceed further。Provincial or communal public property：roads，parks，government build ings，schools，courthouses，etc。，must be returned to their genuine private owners and owner associations.Who owns what share of provincial or com munal property？ in principle，each owns according to his （compulsory） contribution to this property! in the case in which private property was expropriated by local government for purposes of “eminent domain，” the property is simply returned to its original owner。As for the rest （and most） of public property，tradable property shares should be distributed among community members in accordance with their individual taxpayments.Every public road，park，school，etc。，was funded by taxpayers； hence，local taxpayers，in accordance with their tax payments，should be awarded local public property。This has a twofold implication.First，some residents have paid more taxes than others，so it is only natural and just that the former should be awarded more shares than the latter。Second and more specifically，some residents will be excluded altogether from receiving public property shares.For one，welfare recipients should be excluded.Presumably，they have paid no taxes but lived instead on taxes paid by others.Hence，they cannot claim any ownership share in public property。Likewise，all government officials and civil servants must be excluded from receiving ownership shares in public property，for their net （after tax） salary has been paid out of taxes paid by others.Just like welfare recipients，civil servants have not been taxpayers but taxconsumers.Hence，they too have no claim to communal property。

但是，必须超越“政治脱离”，实现财产私有化。毕竟，省级和地方政治机构（政府）对于省级财产所拥有的权利，并不比中央政府对于国家财产所拥有的权利更多。脱离进程必须进一步推进。省级或社区的公有财产，如道路、公园、政府大楼、学校、法院等，必须归还给它们真正的私人所有者及所有者协会。那么，省级或社区财产的各部分分别归谁所有呢？原则上，每个人根据其（强制性的）对该财产的贡献来拥有相应份额！如果私有财产曾被地方政府以“征收权”为由予以没收，那么该财产应直接归还给其原所有者。至于其余（也是大部分）的公有财产，应按照社区成员各自的纳税情况向他们分配可交易的财产份额。每一条公有道路、每一座公园、每一所学校等等，都是由纳税人出资建设的；因此，当地纳税人应根据其纳税情况获得当地的公有财产。[114] 这有双重含义。首先，一些居民比其他人缴纳了更多的税，因此前者应该比后者获得更多的股份，这是自然的也是公正的。其次，更具体地说，部分居民将被完全排除在公有财产份额之外。首先，福利领取者应该被排除在外。可以推测，他们没有纳税，而是靠别人交的税生活。因此，他们不能对任何公有财产的所有权份额提出要求。同样，所有政府官员和公务员都必须被排除在公有财产的所有权股份之外，因为他们的净（税后）工资是由他人缴纳的税款支付的。和福利领取者一样，公务员也不是纳税人，而是税款消费者。因此，他们也没有权利对公有财产的提出任何主张。[115]

with the central state withered away and the privatization of public property complete，the right to exclusion inherent in private property and essential for personal security and protection is returned into the hands of a multitude of independent private decisionmaking units.immigration once again becomes a microphenomenon and disappears as a social “problem.”

随着中央国家的萎缩和公有财产私有化的完成，私有财产固有的排他权，对个人安全和保护至关重要的排他权又重新回到众多独立的私人决策单位的手中。移民再次成为一个微观现象，作为社会“问题”的移民问题消失了。

7 自由贸易和限制移民的理由*

The Case for Free Trade and Restricted immigration

It is frequently maintained that “free trade” belongs to “free immigration” as “protectionism” does to “restricted immigration.” That is，the claim is made that while it is not impossible that someone might combine protectionism with free immigration，or free trade with restricted immigration，these posi tions are intellectually inconsistent，and thus erroneous.Hence，insofar as people seek to avoid errors，they should be the exception rather than the rule.The facts，to the extent that they have a bearing on the issue，appear to be consistent with this claiM.As the 1996 Republican presidential primaries indicated，for instance，most professed free traders are advocates of relatively （even if not totally） free and nondiscriminatory immigration policies，while most protectionists are proponents of highly restrictive and selective immigration policies.

人们常常认为，“自由贸易” 与 “自由移民” 相关联，就如同 “保护主义” 与 “限制移民” 相关联一样。也就是说，有人提出这样的观点：虽然有人将保护主义与自由移民相结合，或者将自由贸易与限制移民相结合并非完全不可能，但这些立场在逻辑上是不一致的，因此是错误的。因此，就人们力求避免错误而言，上述情况应该是例外而非常规。就与该问题相关的事实来看，似乎与这一说法相符。例如，1996年共和党总统初选表明，大多数自称的自由贸易者是相对（即便不是完全）自由且非歧视性移民政策的倡导者，而大多数保护主义者则是高度限制性和选择性移民政策的支持者。

Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding，I will argue that this thesis and its implicit claim are fundamentally mistaken.In particular，I will demonstrate that free trade and restricted immigration are not only perfectly consistent but even mutually reinforcing policies.That is，it is not the advocates of free trade and restricted immigration who are wrong，but rather the proponents of free trade and free immigration.In thus taking the “intellectual guilt” out of the free trade and restricted immigration position and putting it where it actually belongs，I hope to promote a change in the present state of public opinion and facilitate substantial political realignment。

尽管表面上与此相反，但我认为这一论点及其隐含的主张根本上是错误的。特别是，我将证明自由贸易和限制移民不仅是完全一致的，而且是相辅相成的政策。也就是说，错的不是主张自由贸易和限制移民的人，而是主张自由贸易和自由移民的人。将“智识歉疚”从自由贸易和限制移民的立场中移除，并将其置于其真正所属的恰当位置，我希望推动当前公众舆论态势的变化，并以此促进实质性的政治重组。

I. 自由贸易的理由

THE CASE FOR FREE TRADE

Since the days of Ricardo，the case for free trade has been logically unassailable.For the sake of argumentative completeness，it would be useful to briefly summarize it。The restatement will be in the form of a reductio ad absurdum of the protectionist thesis as proposed most recently by Pat Buchanan.

自李嘉图时代以来，自由贸易的理由在逻辑上是无懈可击的。为了论证的完整性，简要概括一下是必要的。重述的形式是对帕特-布坎南（Pat Buchanan）最近提出的保护主义论点进行归谬。

The central argument advanced in favor of protectionism is one of domestic job protection.How can American producers who pay their workers $10 per hour possibly compete with Mexican producers paying $1 or less per hour？ They cannot，and American jobs will be lost unless import tariffs are imposed to insulate the American wages from Mexican competitioN.Free trade is possible only between countries that have equal wage rates，and thus that compete “on a level playing field.” As long as this is not the case—as with the U.S.and Mexico—the playing field must be made level by means of tariffs.As for the consequences of a policy of domestic job protection，Buchanan and other protectionists claim that it will lead to domestic strength and prosperity。In support of their claim，examples are cited of freetrade countries that lost their oncepreeminent international economic position，such as 19thcentury England，as well as of protectionist countries which gained such preeminence，such as 19th century America.

支持保护主义的核心论点之一是保护国内就业。付给工人10美元时薪的美国生产商怎么可能与付给工人1美元或更少时薪的墨西哥生产商竞争？除非征收进口关税，使美国的工资与墨西哥的竞争隔绝开来，否则美国的就业机会将会流失。自由贸易只有在工资水平相同的国家之间才有可能，因此在“公平的竞争环境”上竞争。只要这种情况没有发生——就像美国和墨西哥一样——竞争环境就必须通过关税来实现公平。至于国内就业保护政策的后果，布坎南和其他保护主义者声称，将会带来国内的繁荣与富强。为了支持他们的主张，他们列举了一些例子，如自由贸易国家失去了曾经卓越的国际经济地位，如19世纪的英国，以及保护主义国家获得了这样的卓越地位，如19世纪的美国。

This or any other alleged empirical proof of the protectionist thesis must be rejected out of hand as containing a post hoc，ergo propter hoc fallacy。The inference drawn from historical data is no more convincing than if one were to conclude from the observation that rich people consume more than poor people that it must be consumption that makes a person rich.Indeed，protectionists such as Buchanan characteristically fail to understand what is actually involved in defending their thesis.Any argument in favor of international protectionism is simultaneously an argument in favor of interregional and interlocal protectionisM.Just as different wage rates exist between the U.S.and Mexico，Haiti，or China，for instance，such differences also exist between new York and Alabama，or between manhattan，the Bronx，and Harlem.Thus，if it were true that international protection ism could make an entire nation prosperous and strong，it must also be true that interregional and interlocal protectionism could make regions and localities prosperous and strong。In fact，one may even go further。If the protectionist argument were right，it would amount to an indictment of all trade，and a defense of the thesis that everyone would be the most prosper ous and strongest if he never traded with anyone else and remained in self sufficient isolatioN.Certainly，in this case，no one would ever lose his job，and unemployment due to “unfair” competition would be reduced to zero。In thus deducing the ultimate implication of the protectionist argument，its complete absurdity is revealed，for such a “fullemployment society” would not be prosperous and strong； it would be composed of people who，despite working from dawn to dusk，would be condemned to destitution，or even death from starvatioN.

International protectionism，while obviously less destructive than a policy of interpersonal or interregional protectionism，would result in precisely the same effect and constitute a sure recipe for America’s further economic declinE.To be sure，some American jobs and industries would be saved，but such savings would come at a pricE.The standard of living and the real income of the American consumers of foreign products would be forcibly reduced.The cost to all U.S.producers who employ the protected industry’s products as their own input factors would be raised，and they would be rendered internationally less competitivE.Moreover，what could foreigners do with the money they earned from their U.S.imports？ They could either buy American goods，or they could leave it here and invest it，and if their imports were stopped or reduced，they would buy fewer American goods or invest smaller amounts.Hence，as a result of saving a few inefficient Ameri can jobs，a far greater number of efficient American jobs would be destroyed or prevented from coming into existencE.

国际保护主义的破坏性显然小于人与人之间或地区与地区之间的保护主义政策，但其结果却完全相同，必将导致美国经济进一步衰退。所有使用受保护行业的产品作为投入要素的美国生产商的成本都会提高，他们的国际竞争力也会下降.。美国如果停止或减少进口，那么出口国也会减少购买美国商品或减少向美国的投资。因此，由于挽救了一些效率低下的美国工作岗位，更多的美国高效工作岗位将被摧毁或无法存在。

Thus，it is nonsense to claim that England lost its former preeminence because of its freetrade policies.It lost its position despite its freetrade policy，and because of the socialist policies，which later took hold.Likewise，it is nonsense to claim that the rise of the U.S.to economic preeminence in the course of the 19th century was due to its protectionist policies.The U.S.attained this position despite its protectionism，and because of its unrivaled internal laissezfaire policies.Indeed，America’s current economic decline，which Buchanan wishes to reverse，is the result not of her alleged freetrade policies，but of the circumstance that America，in the course of the 20th century，has gradually adopted the same socialist policies that earlier ruined England.

II. 贸易与移民

TRADE AND immigration

Given the case for free trade，we will now develop the case for immigration restrictions to be combined with freetrade policies.More specifically，we will build a successively stronger case for immigration restrictions：from the initial weak claim that free trade and immigration restrictions can be combined and do not exclude each other to the final strong claim that the principle underlying free trade actually requires such restrictions.

有了自由贸易的理由，我们现在来讨论将移民限制与自由贸易政策相结合的理由。更具体地说，我们将为移民限制提出一个更有力的理由：从最初的 “自由贸易与移民限制可以结合且互不排斥 “的微弱主张，到最后的 “自由贸易的基本原则实际上要求这种限制 “的强力主张。

From the outset，it must be emphasized that not even the most restrictive immigration policy or the most exclusive form of segregationism has anything to do with a rejection of free trade and the adoption of protectionism.From the fact that one does not want to associate with or live in the neighborhood composed of Mexicans，Haitians，Chinese，Koreans，Germans，Catholics，Moslems，Hindus，etc。，it does not follow that one does not want to trade with them from a distance.Moreover，even if it were the case that one’s real income would rise as a result of immigration，it does not follow that immigration must be considered “good，” for material wealth is not the only thing that counts.Rather，what constitutes “welfare” and “wealth” is subjective，and one might prefer lower material living standards and a greater distance from certain other people to higher material living standards and a smaller distance.It is precisely the absolute voluntariness of human association and separation—the absence of any form of forced integration—which makes peaceful relationships—free trade—between racially，ethnically，linguistically，religiously，or culturally distinct people possible.

从一开始就必须强调，即使是最严格的移民政策或最排外的种族隔离形式也与拒绝自由贸易和采取保护主义没有任何关系。一个人不想与墨西哥人、海地人、中国人、韩国人、德国人、天主教徒、穆斯林、印度教徒等组成的社区联系或生活在一起，这并不意味着人们不想与他们进行远距离贸易。此外，即使一个人的实际收入会因为移民而增加，也不能因此认为移民一定是“好的”，因为物质财富并不是唯一重要的东西。相反，什么是“福利”和“财富”是主观的，一个人可能更喜欢较低的物质生活水平和与某些人保持较大距离，而不是较高的物质生活水平和较小的距离。正是由于人与人之间的联系和分离是绝对自愿的，不存在任何形式的强制一体化，才使得不同种族、不同民族、不同语言、不同宗教或不同文化背景的人之间可以建立和平关系，进行自由贸易。

The relationship between trade and migration is one of elastic substitut ability （rather than rigid exclusivity）：the more （or less） you have of one the less （or more） you need of the other。Other things being equal，businesses move to lowwage areas，and labor moves to highwage areas，thus effecting a tendency toward the equalization of wage rates （for the same kind of labor） as well as the optimal localization of capital。With political borders separating high from low wage areas，and with national （nationwide） trade and immigration policies in effect，these normal tendencies—of immigration and capital export—are weakened with free trade and strengthened with protectionisM.As long as Mexican products—the products of a lowwage area—can freely enter a highwage area such as the U.S.，the incentive for Mexican people to move to the U.S. is reduced.In contrast，if Mexican products are prevented from entering the American market，the attraction for Mexican workers to move to the U.S.is increased.Similarly，when U.S. producers are free to buy from and sell to Mexican producers and consum ers，capital exports from the U.S. to Mexico will be reduced； however，when U.S. producers are prevented from doing so，the attraction of moving production from the U.S.to Mexico is increased.

贸易和移民之间的关系是一种弹性替代能力（而不是刚性排他性）：你拥有的其中一种越多（或越少），你对另一种的需求就越少（或更多）。在其他条件相同的情况下，企业向低工资地区转移，劳动力向高工资地区转移，从而影响（同一种劳动力）工资率均衡化趋势以及资本的最佳本地化。随着政治边界将高工资地区和低工资地区分开，以及国家（全国性）贸易和移民政策的实施，这些正常的趋势——移民和资本出口——在自由贸易中被削弱，在保护主义中被加强。只要墨西哥产品——低工资地区的产品——可以自由进入像美国这样的高工资地区，墨西哥人移居美国的动机就会降低。相反，如果墨西哥产品被禁止进入美国市场，对墨西哥工人移居美国的吸引力就会增加。同样，当美国生产商可以自由地与墨西哥生产商和消费者进行买卖时，美国对墨西哥的资本出口将会减少；然而，当美国生产商被禁止这样做时，将生产从美国转移到墨西哥的吸引力就会增加。

Similarly，as the foreign trade policy of the U.S.affects immigration，so does its domestic trade policy。Domestic free trade is what is typically referred to as laissezfaire capitalisM.In other words，the national government follows a policy of noninterference with the voluntary transactions between domestic parties （citizens） regarding their private property。The government’s policy is one of helping to protect its citizens and their private property from domestic aggression，damage，or fraud （exactly as in the case of foreign trade and aggression）。If the U.S.followed strict domestic free trade policies，immigration from lowwage regions such as Mexico would be reduced，while when it pursues “social welfare” policies，immigration from lowwage areas becomes more attractive.

同样的，美国的对外贸易政策影响移民，其国内贸易政策也会影响移民。国内自由贸易，通常被称为自由放任的资本主义。换句话说，国家政府遵循不干涉国内各方（公民）之间关于其私有财产的自愿贸易的政策。政府的政策是帮助保护其公民及其私有财产免受国内侵犯、破坏或欺诈（与对外贸易和侵犯的情况一样）。如果美国实行严格的国内自由贸易政策，来自墨西哥等低工资地区的移民就会减少，而当美国实行“社会福利”政策时，对来自低工资地区的移民来说，就会变得更有吸引力。

III.“开放边境”、入侵和强制一体化

“OPEN BORDERS，” INVASION，AND FORCED integration

Insofar as a highwage area such as the U.S.engaged in unrestricted free trade，internationally as well as domestically，the immigration pressure from lowwage countries would be kept low or reduced，and hence，the ques tion as to what to do about immigration would be less urgent。On the other hand，insofar as the U.S.engaged in protectionist policies against the products of lowwage areas and in welfare policies at home，immigration pressure would be kept high or even raised，and the immigration question would assume great importance in public debate.

只要像美国这样的高工资地区从事不受限制的自由贸易，无论是在国际上还是在国内，来自低工资国家的移民压力就会保持在低水平或减少，因此，如何处理移民的问题就不那么紧迫了。另一方面，只要美国对来自低工资地区的产品采取保护主义政策同时实行在国内实习福利政策，移民压力就会保持在很高的水平，甚至会增加，移民问题就会在公众舆论中占据重要地位。

Obviously，the world’s major highwage regions—north America and Western Europe—are presently in this latter situation，in which immigration has become an increasingly urgent public concerN.In light of steadily mounting immigration pressure from the world’s lowwage regions，three general strategies of dealing with immigration have been proposed：unconditional free immigration，conditional free immigration，and restrictive immigration.While our main concern will be with the latter two alter natives，a few observations regarding the unconditional free immigration position are appropriate，if only to illustrate the extent of its intellectual bankruptcy。

显然，世界上主要的高工资地区——北美和西欧——目前正处于后一种情况（译者注：即在对待低工资地区的产品采取贸易保护主义政策的同时，又在国内实行高福利政策），在这种情况下，移民已成为公众日益迫切关注的问题。发达国家面临来自世界低工资地区的不断增加的移民压力，有三种处理移民的一般性策略：无条件自由移民，有条件自由移民和限制性移民。虽然我们主要关注的将是后两种选择，但对无条件的自由移民立场做几点评论也是恰当的，即便只是为了说明其在理论层面破产的程度。

According to proponents of unconditional free immigration，the U.S.qua highwage area would invariably benefit from free immigration； hence，it should enact a policy of open borders，regardless of any existing conditions，i.e.，even if the U.S.were ensnared in protectionism and domestic welfarE.Yet surely，such a proposal strikes a reasonable person as fantastic。Assume that the U.S.，or better still Switzerland，declared that there would no longer be any border controls，that anyone who could pay the fare might enter the country，and，as a resident then be entitled to every “normal” domestic welfare provisioN.Can there be any doubt how disastrous such an experi ment would turn out in the present world？ The U.S.，and Switzerland even faster，would be overrun by millions of thirdworld immigrants，because life on and off American and Swiss public streets is comfortable compared to life in many areas of the third world.Welfare costs would skyrocket，and the strangled economy would disintegrate and collapse，as the subsistence fund—the stock of capital accumulated in and inherited from the past—was plundered.civilization in the U.S.and Switzerland would vanish，just as it once did from Rome and Greece.

Since unconditional free immigration must be regarded as a prescription for national suicide，the typical position among free traders is the alternative of conditional free immigration.According to this view，the U.S.and Switzerland would have to first return to unrestricted free trade and abolish all taxfunded welfare programs，and only then should they open their borders to everyone who wanted to come.In the meantime，while the welfare state is still in place，immigration would have to be made subject to the condition that immigrants are excluded from domestic welfare entitlements.

由于无条件的自由移民必须被视为国家自取灭亡之道，自由贸易者的典型立场是选择有条件的自由移民。根据这种观点，美国和瑞士一方面应恢复不受限制的自由贸易，另一方面应废除所有用税收资金支持的福利项目，然后才可以对所有想来的人开放边境。与此同时，在福利国家仍然存在的情况下，移民将不得不受制于一个条件，即移民被排除在国内的福利权之外。

While the error involved in this view is less obvious and the consequences less dramatic than those associated with the unconditional free immigration，the view is nonetheless erroneous and harmful。To be sure，the immigration pressure on Switzerland and the U.S.would be reduced if this proposal were followed，but it would not disappear。Indeed，with free trade policies，both foreign and domestic，wage rates within Switzerland and the U.S.may further increase relative to those at other locations （with less enlightened economic policies）。Hence，the attraction of both countries might even increase.In any event，some immigration pressure would remain，so some form of immigration policy would have to exist。Do the principles underlying free trade imply that this policy must be one of conditional “free immigration”？ They do not。There is no analogy between free trade and free immigration，and restricted trade and restricted immigration.The phenomena of trade and immigration are different in a fundamental respect，and the meaning of “free” and “restricted” in conjunction with both terms is categorically different。People can move and migrate； goods and services，of themselves，can not。

尽管与无条件自由移民相关的错误相比，这种观点的错误不那么明显，其后果也不那么引人注目，但这种观点仍然是错误的和有害的。可以肯定的是，如果这一提议被采纳，瑞士和美国的移民压力将会减少，但这种压力不会消失。事实上，在国内外自由贸易政策的推动下，瑞士和美国的工资率可能会比其他经济政策不那么开明的国家进一步提高。因此，两国的吸引力甚至可能会增加。无论如何，移民压力将继续存在，因此某种形式的移民政策将不得不存在。自由贸易的基本原则是否意味着这种政策必须是一种有条件的“自由移民”？并非如此。自由贸易和自由移民之间没有可比性，限制贸易和限制移民之间也没有可比性。贸易现象和移民现象在一个根本方面存在差异，而且与这两个术语相关联的“自由”和“限制”的含义也完全不同。人可以移动和迁徙；而商品和服务本身是无法自行移动的。

Put differently，while someone can migrate from one place to another without anyone else wanting him to do so，goods and services cannot be shipped from place to place unless both sender and receiver agree.Trivial as this distinction may appear，it has momentous consequences.For free in conjunction with trade then means trade by invitation of private households and firms only； and restricted trade does not mean protection of households and firms from uninvited goods or services，but invasion and abrogation of the right of private households and firms to extend or deny invitations to their own property。In contrast，free in conjunction with immigration does not mean immigration by invitation of individual households and firms，but unwanted invasion or forced integration； and restricted immigration actually means，or at least can mean，the protec tion of private households and firms from unwanted invasion and forced integration.Hence，in advocating free trade and restricted immigration，one follows the same principle：requiring an invitation for people as for goods and services.

换句话说，一个人可以从一个地方迁移到另一个地方而勿需其他人要求他如此，但除非发送方和接收方都同意，否则货物和服务不能从一个地方运到另一个地方。尽管这种区别看起来微不足道，但却有着重大的影响。因此，就贸易而言，“自由”意味着只有私人家庭和公司之间的邀请贸易；而“限制贸易”并不“保护私人家庭或企业免于受到未经邀请的商品和服务的侵扰”，而是“侵犯和废除私人家庭和企业的对自己财产的邀请权或拒绝权”。与此相反，自由移民并不意味着个体家庭和公司邀请移民，而是不受邀请的入侵或强制一体化；而限制移民实际上意味着，或至少可以意味着，保护私人家庭和公司免受不受邀请的入侵和强制一体化。因此，在倡导自由贸易和限制移民时，我们遵循的原则是一样的：货物与服务的进入需要邀请，人的进入也需要邀请。（译者注：限制贸易意味着家庭和企业想买什么自己不能做主，自由移民也意味着公民是否想和别人一体化这件事自己不能做主）。

In contrast，the advocate of free trade and free markets who adopts the （conditional） free immigration position is involved in intellectual inconsistency。Free trade and markets mean that private property owners may receive or send goods from and to other owners without government interference.The government stays inactive visàvis the process of foreign and domestic trade，because a willing （paying） recipient exists for every good or service sent，and hence all locational changes，as the outcome of agree ments between sender and receiver，must be deemed mutually beneficial。The government’s sole function is that of maintaining the trading process （by protecting citizen and domestic property）。

相反，自由贸易和自由市场的倡导者如果采取（有条件的）自由移民的立场，就会陷入思想上的不一致。自由贸易和市场意味着私人财产所有者可以在没有政府干预的情况下从其他所有者那里接收或发送货物。政府在对外贸易和国内贸易的过程中不采取任何行动，因为每一种商品或服务都有一个愿意（付费）接受的人，因此所有地点的变化，作为发送者和接受者之间协议的结果，都必须被认为是互惠互利的。政府的唯一职能是维护交易过程（保护公民和国内财产）。

However，with respect to the movement of people，the same government will have to do more in order to fulfill its protective function than merely permit events to take their own course，because people，unlike products，possess a will and can migrate.Accordingly，population movements，unlike product shipments，are not per se mutually beneficial events because they are not always—necessarily and invariably—the result of an agreement between a specific receiver and sender。There can be shipments （immigrants） without willing domestic recipients.In this case，immi grants are foreign invaders，and immigration represents an act of invasioN.Surely，a government’s basic protective function includes the prevention of foreign invasions and the expulsion of foreign invaders.Just as surely then，in order to do so and subject immigrants to the same requirement as imports （of having been invited by domestic residents），this government cannot rightfully allow the kind of free immigration advocated by most free traders.Just imagine again that the U.S.and Switzerland opened their borders to whomever wanted to come—provided only that immigrants be excluded from all welfare entitlements，which would be reserved for U.S.and Swiss citizens.Apart from the sociological problem of thus creating two distinct classes of domestic residents and thus causing severe social tensions，there is also little doubt about the outcome of this experiment in the present world.The result would be less drastic and less immediate than under the scenario of unconditional free immigration，but it too would amount to a massive foreign invasion and ultimately lead to the destruction of American and Swiss civilization.Thus，in order to fulfill its primary function as protector of its citizens and their domestic property，a highwagearea government cannot follow an immigration policy of laissezpasser，but must engage in restrictive measures.

然而，在人员流动方面，政府要想履行其保护职能，就必须采取更多措施，而不仅仅是听任事态发展，因为人不同于产品，是有自由意志，可以迁移的。因此，人口迁移与产品运输不同，本身并不是互利的事件，因为它们并不总是——必然和不变地——特定的接收者和发送者之间达成协议的结果。可能会有运送（移民）而没有愿意的国内接受者。在这种情况下，移民是外来入侵者，移民代表了一种入侵行为。当然，政府的基本保护职能包括防止外敌入侵和驱逐外国侵略者。同样可以肯定的是，为了做到这一点，并使移民与进口商品一样受到同样的要求（受到国内居民的邀请），那么政府就不能理所当然地允许大多数自由贸易者所倡导的那种自由移民。再想象一下，如果美国和瑞士向任何想来的人开放边境，条件是移民不能享受所有福利待遇，而这些福利待遇是专门为美国和瑞士公民准备的。除了在社会学上造成两类不同的国内居民，从而引发严重的社会矛盾之外，这一实验在当今世界的结果也是毋庸置疑的。与无条件自由移民的情况相比，其结果不会那么严重，也不会那么直接，但它也会导致大规模的外国入侵，并最终导致美国和瑞士文明的毁灭。因此，为了履行其作为公民及其国内财产保护者的主要职能，高工资地区的政府不能遵循自由放任的移民政策，而必须采取限制性措施。

IV. 无政府资本主义模式

THE ANARCHOCAPITALIST MODEL

From the recognition that proponents of free trade and markets cannot advocate free immigration without falling into inconsistency and contradiction，and hence，that immigration must—logically—be restricted，it is but a small step to the further recognition of how it must be restricted.As a matter of fact，all highwageare a governments presently restrict immigration in one way or another。Nowhere is immigration “free，” unconditionally or conditionally。Yet the restrictions imposed on immigration by the U.S.and by Switzerland，for instance，are quite different。What restrictions should then exist？ Or，more precisely，what immigration restrictions is a free trader and free marketeer logically compelled to uphold and promote？ The guiding principle of a high wagearea country’s immigration policy follows from the insight that immigration，to be free in the same sense as trade is free，must be invited immigration.The details follow from the further elucidation and exemplification of the concept of invitation versus invasion and forced integration.

认识到自由贸易和市场的支持者不可能在不陷入前后矛盾和自相矛盾的情况下主张自由移民，因此，从逻辑上讲，移民必须受到限制，这只是进一步认识必须如何限制移民的一小步。事实上，所有高工资地区的政府目前都以这样或那样的方式限制移民。移民在任何地方都不是“自由的”，无论是无条件还是有条件的。然而，例如美国和瑞士对移民施加的限制就大不相同。那么应该存在什么样的限制呢？或者更准确地说，一个自由贸易者和自由市场倡导者从逻辑上讲必须支持和推动什么样的移民限制呢？高工资地区国家的移民政策的指导原则源于这样一种洞见，即移民要像贸易自由一样自由，就必须邀请移民。下文将进一步阐明和举例说明邀请与入侵和强制一体化的概念。

For this purpose，it is necessary to assume first，as a conceptual bench mark，the existence of what political philosophers have described as a private property anarchy，anarchocapitalism，or ordered anarchy：all land is privately owned，including all streets，rivers，airports，harbors，etc。With respect to some pieces of land，the property title may be unrestricted，that is，the owner is permitted to do with his property whatever he pleases as long as he does not physically damage the property of others.With respect to other territories，the property title may be more or less restricted.As is currently the case in some developments，the owner may be bound by contractual limitations on what he can do with his property （restrictive covenants，voluntary zoning），which might include residential rather than commercial use，no buildings more than four stories high，no sale or rent to unmarried couples，smokers，or Germans，for instance.

为了说明这一点，首先需要假设一个概念性基准。即政治哲学家所描述的私有财产无政府状态、无政府资本主义或有序无政府状态——所有土地都是私有的，包括所有的街道、河流、机场、港口等。在产权私有的前提下，使用权还有些不同。对于某些土地，产权可能是不受限制的，也就是说，所有者可以随心所欲地使用自己的财产，只要不对他人的财产造成物理损害。对于另一些土地，产权可能有不同程度的限制。就像目前在一些开发区中一样，所有者可能受到契约限制，规定他可以对其财产进行什么样的使用（限制性条款、自愿分区），例如只能用于住宅而不能用于商业用途，不得建造超过四层高的建筑，不得出售或出租给未婚情侣、吸烟者或德国人等。

Clearly，in this kind of society，there is no such thing as freedom of immigration，or an immigrant’s right of way。What does exist is the freedom of independent private property owners to admit or exclude others from their own property in accordance with their own restricted or unrestricted property titles.Admission to some territories might be easy，while to others it might be nearly impossible.Moreover，admission to one party’s property does not imply the “freedom to move around，” unless other property own ers have agreed to such movements.There will be as much immigration or nonimmigration，inclusivity or exclusivity，desegregation or segregation，nondiscrimination or discrimination as individual owners or owners’ asso ciations desire.

很明显，在这样的社会里，没有所谓的移民自由，或者移民通行权。真正存在的是独立的私人财产所有者根据自己有限或不受限制的财产所有权允许或排斥他人使用自己财产的自由。进入某些地区可能很容易，而另一些地区近乎不可能。此外，进入一方的财产并不意味着“行动自由”，除非其他财产所有者同意这种行动。移民或非移民、包容性或排他性、废除种族隔离或种族隔离、非歧视或歧视，将视个人所有者或所有者协会的意愿而定。

The reason for citing the model of an anarchocapitalist society is that by definition no such thing as forced integration （uninvited migration） is possible （permitted） within its framework。Under this scenario，no differrence between the physical movement of goods and the migration of people exists.As every product movement refiects an underlying agreement between sender and receiver，so all movements of immigrants into and within an anarchocapitalist society are the result of an agreement between the immigrant and one or a series of receiving domestic property owners.Hence，even if the anarchocapitalist model is ultimately rejected—and if for realism’s sake the existence of a government and of “public” （in addition to private） goods and property is assumed—it brings into clear relief what a government’s immigration policy would have to be，if and insofar as this government derived its legitimacy from the sovereignty of the “people” and was viewed as the outgrowth of an agreement or “social contract” （as is the case with all modern，postmonarchical governments，of course）。A “popular” government which assumed as its primary task the protection of its citi zen and their property （the production of domestic security） would surely want to preserve，rather than abolish，this noforcedintegration feature of anarchocapitalism!

In order to realize what this involves，it is necessary to explain how an anarchocapitalist society is altered by the introduction of a government，and how this affects the immigration problem.Since in an anarchocapitalist society there is no government，there is no clearcut distinction between inlanders （domestic citizens） and foreigners.This distinction appears only with the establishment of a government。The territory over which a government’s power extends then becomes inland，and everyone residing out side of this territory becomes a foreigner。State borders （and passports），as distinct from private property borders （and titles to property），come into existence，and immigration takes on a new meaning。immigration becomes immigration by foreigners across state borders，and the decision as to whether or not a person should be admitted no longer rests exclu sively with private property owners or associations of such owners but with the government qua domestic security producer。Now，if the government excludes a person while there exists a domestic resident who wants to admit this very person onto his property，the result is forced exclusion； and if the government admits a person while there exists no domestic resident who wants to have this person on his property，the result is forced integration.

Moreover，hand in hand with the institution of a government comes the institution of public property and goods，that is，of property and goods owned collectively by all domestic residents and controlled and adminis tered by the government。The larger or smaller the amount of publicgovernment ownership，the greater or lesser will be the potential problem of forced integration.Consider a socialist society like the former Soviet Union or East Germany，for examplE.All factors of production，including all land and natural resources，are publicly owned.Accordingly，if the government admits an uninvited immigrant，it potentially admits him to any place within the country； for without private land ownership，there exist no limi tations on his internal migrations other than those decreed by government。Under socialism，therefore，forced integration can be spread everywhere and thus immensely intensified.（In fact，in the Soviet Union and East Germany，the government could quarter a stranger in someone else’s private house or apartment。This measure—and the resulting highpowered forced integration—was justified by the “fact” that all private houses rested on public land.）

Socialist countries will not be highwage areas，of course，or at least will not remain so for long。Their problem is not immigration but emigration pressure.The Soviet Union and East Germany prohibited emigration and killed people for trying to leave the country。However，the problem of the extension and intensification of forced integration persists outside of socialism.To be sure，in nonsocialist countries such as the U.S.，Switzerland，and the Federal Republic of Germany，which are favorite immigration destina tions，a governmentadmitted immigrant could not move just anywherE.The immigrant’s freedom of movement would be severely restricted by the extent of private property，and private land ownership in particular。Yet，by proceeding on public roads，or with public means of transportation，and in staying on public land and in public parks and buildings，an immigrant can potentially cross every domestic resident’s path，even move into anyone’s immediate neighborhood and practically land on his very doorsteps.The smaller the quantity of public property，the less acute the problem will be.But as long as there exists any public property，it cannot be entirely escaped.

当然，社会主义国家不会是高工资地区，至少不会长期如此。他们的问题不是移民，而是移民压力。苏联和东德禁止移民，并杀害试图去国之人。然而，强制一体化的扩大和加剧问题在社会主义之外仍然存在。当然，在非社会主义国家，如美国、瑞士和德意志联邦共和国，这些国家都是移民的首选之地，政府承认的移民不可能随便迁移到任何地方。移民的行动自由将受到私有财产，特别是私人土地所有权的严重限制。然而，通过使用公有道路、公共交通工具，以及在公有土地、花园和公共建筑物中逗留，移民有可能会越过每个国内居民的道路，甚至搬到任何人的附近，实际上几乎就在他的家门口。公有财产的数量越少，这个问题就越不严重。但是，只要存在任何公有财产，就不可能完全避免这个问题。

V. 纠正和预防

CORRECTION AND PREVENTION

A popular government that wants to safeguard its citizens and their domes tic property from forced integration and foreign invaders has two methods of doing so，a corrective and a preventive one.The corrective method is designed to ameliorate the effects of forced integration once the event has taken place （and the invaders are there）。As indicated，to achieve this goal，the government must reduce the quantity of public property as much as possiblE.Moreover，whatever the mix of private and public property，the government must uphold—rather than criminalize—any private property owner’s right to admit and exclude others from his property。If virtually all property is owned privately and the government assists in enforcing private ownership rights，then uninvited immigrants，even if they succeeded in entering the country，would not likely get much farther。

一个人民政府想要保护其公民及其国内财产免受强制一体化和外国侵略者的侵害，有两种方法可以做到这一点，一种是纠正，另一种是预防。纠正方法的目的是在事件发生（入侵者已经存在）后，改善强制一体化的影响。如上所述，为了实现这一目标，政府必须尽可能减少公有财产的数量。此外，无论私有财产和公有财产的混合情况如何，政府都必须维护——而不是将其定为犯罪——任何私人财产所有者允许和排斥他人使用其财产的权利。如果几乎所有的财产都是私人所有，政府协助执行私人所有权，那么未经邀请的移民，即使他们成功入境，也不太可能走得更远。

The more completely this corrective measure is carried out （the higher the degree of private ownership），the less there will be a need for protec tive measures，such as border defense.The cost of protection against for eign invaders along the U.S.Mexico border，for instance，is comparatively high，because for long stretches no private property on the U.S.side exists.However，even if the cost of border protection can be lowered by means of privatization，it will not disappear as long as there are substantial income and wage differentials between high and lowwage territories.Hence，in order to fulfill its basic protective function，a highwageare a government must also be engaged in preventive measures.At all ports of entry and along its borders，the government，as trustee of its citizens，must check all newly arriving persons for an entrance ticket—a valid invitation by a domestic property owner—and everyone not in possession of such a ticket will have to be expelled at his own expense.

上述这种纠正措施执行得越彻底（私有制程度越高），对边境防御等保护措施的需求就越少。例如，美国和墨西哥边境地区抵御外来入侵者的成本相对较高，因为美国一侧很长一段边境地区都没有私有财产。然而，即使通过私有化降低了边境保护的成本，只要高工资地区和低工资地区之间存在巨大的收入和工资差异，边境保护的成本就不会消失。因此，为了履行其基本的保护职能，高薪地区的政府也必须采取预防措施。在所有入境口岸和边境沿线，政府作为公民的受托人，必须检查所有新抵达的人是否有入场券——由国内财产所有者发出的有效邀请——所有未持有入场券的人都必须被驱逐出境，且费用自理。

Valid invitations are contracts between one or more private domes tic recipients，residential or commercial，and the arriving persoN.Qua contractual admission，the inviting party can dispose only of his own private property。Hence，the admission implies negatively—similarly to the scenario of conditional free immigration—that the immigrant is excluded from all publicly funded welfarE.Positively，it implies that the receiving party assumes legal responsibility for the actions of his invitee for the duration of his stay。The invitor is held liable to the full extent of his property for any crimes the invitee commits against the person or property of any third party （as parents are held accountable for the crimes of their offspring as long as they are members of the parental household）。This obligation，which implies practically speaking that inviters will have to carry liability insurance for all of their guests，ends once the invitee has left the country，or once another domestic property owner has assumed liability for the person in question （by admitting him onto his property）。

有效的邀请函是一个或多个私人接收人（住宅或商业）与抵达者之间的契约。根据契约的许可，邀请方只能处分自己的私有财产。因此，接纳移民是消极的，与有条件自由移民的情况类似，都意味着该移民被排除在所有公共资助的福利之外。从正面来看，这意味着接受方对被邀请者在其逗留期间的行为承担法律责任。对于被邀请者对任何第三方的人身或财产所犯的罪行，邀请者须以其全部财产承担法律责任（正如父母须为其子女所犯罪行负责一样，只要他们是父母家庭的成员）。这项义务实际上意味着邀请者必须为其所有客人购买责任保险，一旦被邀请者离开这个国家，或者一旦另一个国内财产所有者（通过允许该人进入其财产）承担了对该人的责任，这项义务才会终止。

The invitation may be private （personal） or commercial，temporally limited or unlimited，concerning only housing （accommodation，residency） or housing and employment （but there cannot be a valid contract involving only employment and no housing）。In any case，however，as a contractual relationship，every invitation may be revoked or terminated by the inviter； and upon termination，the invitee—whether tourist，visiting businessman，or resident alien—will be required to leave the country （unless another resi dent citizen enters an invitationcontract with him）。

邀请可以是私人（个人）邀请，也可以是商业邀请；可以是有时间限制的邀请，也可以是无时间限制的邀请；可以只涉及住房（住宿、居留），也可以只涉及住房和就业（但不能签订只涉及就业而不涉及住房的有效契约）。但是，在任何情况下，作为一种契约关系，每一次邀请都可以由邀请人撤销或终止签证终止后，被邀请者——无论是游客、来访的商人，还是常住外国人——将被要求离开美国（除非另一位常住公民与他签订了邀请契约）。

The invitee may lose his legal status as a nonresident or resident alien，who is at all times subject to the potential risk of immediate expulsion，only upon acquiring citizenship.In accordance with the objective of making all immigration （as trade） invitedcontractual，the fundamental requirement for citizenship is the acquisition of property ownership，or more precisely the ownership of real estate and residential property。

受邀者可能会失去其作为非居民或常住外国人的合法身份，在任何时候都有可能面临被立即驱逐出境的风险，只有在获得公民身份后，才能免于这种境况。根据实现所有移民（如同贸易一样）成为受邀契约移民的目标，获得公民身份的基本要求是取得财产所有权，或者更确切地说是不动产和住宅物业的所有权。

In contrast，it would be inconsistent with the very idea of invited migration to award citizenship according to the territorial principle，as in the U.S.，whereby a child born to a nonresident or resident alien in a host country automatically acquires this country’s citizenship.In fact，such a child acquires，as most other highwagearea governments recognize，the citizenship of his parents.For the host country’s government to grant this child citizenship instead involves the nonfulfillment of its basic protec tive function，and actually amounts to an invasive act perpetrated by the government against its own citizenry。Rather，becoming a citizen means acquiring the right to stay in a country permanently，and a permanent invitation cannot be secured other than by purchasing residential property from a citizen resident。Only by selling real estate to a foreigner does a citizen indicate that he agrees to a guest’s permanent stay （and only if the immigrant has purchased and paid for real estate and residential housing in the host country will he assume a permanent interest in his new coun try’s wellbeing and prosperity）。Moreover，finding a citizen willing to sell residential property and being prepared and able to pay for it，although a necessary requirement for the acquisition of citizenship，may not also be sufficient。If and insofar as the domestic property in question is subject to restrictive covenants，the hurdles to be taken by a prospective citizen may be significantly higher。In Switzerland，for instance，citizenship requires that the sale of residential property to foreigners be ratified by a majority or even all directly affected local property owners.

VI. 结论

conclusion

Judged by the immigration policy required to protect one’s own citizens from foreign invasion and forced integration—and to render all interna tional population movements invited and contractual migrations—the Swiss government does a significantly better job than the United States.It is more difficult to enter Switzerland as an uninvited person or to stay on as an uninvited alieN.In particular，it is far more difficult for a foreigner to acquire citizenship，and the legal distinction between resident citizens and resident aliens is more clearly preserved.These differences notwithstanding，the governments of both Switzerland and the U.S.pursue immigration poli cies that must be deemed far too permissivE.

Moreover，the excessive permissiveness of their immigration policies and the resulting exposure of the Swiss and American population to forced integration with foreigners is aggravated by the fact that the extent of public property in both countries （and other highwage areas） is quite substantial； that taxfunded welfare provisions are high and growing，and foreigners are not excluded； and that contrary to official pronouncements，even the adher ence to freetrade policies is anything but perfect。Accordingly，in Switzer land，the U.S.，and most other highwage areas，popular protests against immigration policies have grown increasingly louder。

此外，瑞士和美国两国（以及其他高工资地区）的公有财产规模相当庞大，由税收资助的福利供给水平很高且还在不断增长，而且外国人并未被排除在福利享受范围之外，另外与官方声明相悖的是，就连对自由贸易政策的遵循也远非完美无缺。这些情况使得两国过度宽松的移民政策以及由此导致的瑞士和美国民众被迫与外国人一体化的状况进一步恶化。因此，在瑞士、美国以及大多数其他高工资地区，针对移民政策的民众抗议声浪日益高涨。

It has been the purpose of this essay not only to make the case for the privatization of public property，domestic laissezfaire，and international free trade，but in particular also for the adoption of a restrictive immigration policy。By demonstrating that free trade is inconsistent with （uncondition ally or conditionally） free immigration，and that free trade requires instead that migration be subject to the condition of being invited and contractual，it is our hope to contribute to more enlightened future policies in this area.

本文的目的不仅在于为公有财产私有化、国内自由放任政策以及国际自由贸易提供论据，而且尤其在于倡导采取限制性的移民政策。通过论证自由贸易与（无条件或有条件的）自由移民并不相容，且自由贸易实际上要求移民须遵循受到邀请并签订契约的条件，我们希望能为这一领域未来更为明智的政策制定贡献一份力量。

8 论人、自然、真理和公正*

On man，nature，Truth，and Justice

It is possible to describe and explain man in naturalistic terms，in the same way as we describe and explain stones，plants and animals：in the language of physics，chemistry，biology，genetics，neurology，etc。

But a purely naturalistic account of man，while entirely legitimate，and even if true，must fail to capture the essence of man：what makes man unique and distinguishes him from all other things：from stones，plants and animals.That this is the case can be easily recognized in asking oneself what it is that one is doing when debating the question at hand—the nature of man—or any other question for that matter。The answer：We speak to each other in meaningful words and sentences—we present arguments—and we do so with the purpose of argumentative success，of reaching agreement regarding the validity of an argument or the truth of some propositioN.Yet it is obviously impossible to give a naturalistic account of this undeniable part of human nature：of meaningful words，sentences and arguments，of intention and purpose，of truth and falsehood，and of success and failure.There is nothing purposeful，meaningful，true，false，successful or unsuccessful in nature.nature and the laws of nature are what they are and they work the way they do，unchangingly and unfailingly。Yet human propositions or sen tences are intentional，meaningful，and true or false，i.e.，all meaning and all truths are in a most fundamental sense meaningandtruthsforman rather than meaningandtruthsansicH.

但是，对人类的纯粹自然主义的描述，虽然完全合理，而且即使是正确的，也一定无法捕捉到人的本质：是什么使人独一无二，并将人与其他万物（石头、植物和动物）区别开来。只要扪心自问，在论证当前的问题——人的本质或任何其他问题——时，我们究竟在做什么，就不难发现这一点。答案是：我们用有意义的词语和句子相互交谈——我们提出论点——我们这样做的目的是为了论证成功，即就论证的有效性或某个命题的真实性达成一致。然而，要对人类本性中这一不可否认的部分：有意义的词语、句子和论点、意图和目的、真理与谬误、以及成功与失败等给出自然主义的解释，显然是不可能的。自然界不存在目的、意义、真假、成功或失败的概念。自然和自然法则就是这样，它们以自己的方式运作，亘古不变，永不失败。然而，人类的命题或句子是有意向的、有意义的、有真假的，也就是说，从最根本的视角看，所有的意义和真理都是因人而在的，而非自在的。

Hence，every natural scientist—whether biologist，physiologist，chemist，geneticist or neurologist—who claims that man can be reduced to nothing but nature becomes entangled in contradiction.

因此，每一位自然科学家——无论是生物学家、生理学家、化学家、遗传学家还是神经学家——如果声称人可以被简化为纯粹的自然产物而别无其他，就会陷入自相矛盾之中。

On the one hand，the ‘man’ this scientist speaks and writes about：man asnature （which he claims to be the only ‘man’ there is），has no purpose and no meaning and nothing about its inner workings is true or false，successful or failing。Everything works the way it does，in accordance with unchanging and unfailing causal laws.Even life and death have no meaning。Death and bodily decay do not falsify causal laws.Nor does life confirm these laws.The same laws of nature hold for life and death equally。Life and death are not a “success” or “failure，” as far as manasnature is concerned.They simply are：morally （valuationally） “neutral” events.And yet：On the other hand，he，the very scientist，who obviously counts himself as a member of the class of ‘man，’ follows a purpose in conducting his research on manasnature.He conducts purposeful operations and must employ meaningful sentences to describe the results of his research concerning “ansich” meaningless natural materials and processes.He claims these results to be true rather than falsE.And given his purpose，he considers his research a success or a failure.And for him，in contrast to manasnature，death and bodily malfunctions do have meaning and are indeed failures and malfunctions.Yet they have meaning and are failures or malfunctions only insofar as they are related to a human purpose：the purpose of wanting to preserve life and health （as something “good”） and to prevent illness and death （as something “bad”）。

Instead of a necessarily insufficient and incomplete “naturalistic” account，then，I want to present what one might call a cultural（istic） account of man，which captures what the naturalistic account leaves out and thus elucidates what distinguishes man from everything else.

那么，我不想给出一种必然不充分且不完整的“自然主义”描述，而是要呈现一种可以被称作关于人的“文化（主义）”描述，这种描述涵盖了自然主义描述所遗漏的内容，从而阐明了人区别于其他一切事物的特质。

And we have already gained a nonnaturalistic starting point from which we must begin this endeavor：the apriori of argumentation.

我们已经有了一个非自然主义的起点：论证的先验性。

man can undeniably argue.Not only is arguing what we do here and now，there is simply no other starting point available，for whatever we may choose as such a point，we cannot but speak and argue about it。We can not deny that argumentation must be the starting point，and the point of departure of all talk about man，without falling into some （immediately to be explained） form of contradiction.

不可否认，人是能够进行论证的。论证不仅是我们当下正在做的事情，而且根本不存在其他可用的出发点，因为无论我们选择什么作为出发点，我们都不得不对此进行言说和论证。我们不得不承认，论证必定是所有关于人的讨论的起点和出发点，否则就会陷入某种（马上要加以说明的）自相矛盾的形式。

Setting out from the apriori of argumentation as my necessary and undeniable—and hence apriori true—starting point，then，it is my plan to explain everything that is already “implied” in this apriori and hence like wise must be regarded as apriori true.

那么，以论证的先验性作为我必要且不可否认的——因而也是先验为真的——出发点，我打算解释一切在这一先验性中已然“蕴含”的内容，因此这些内容同样也必须被视作先验为真的。

That is，my following argument aims to establish and elucidate what must be presupposed by argumentation，i.e.，what an arguer must accept as more basic and elementary than argumentation，as the preargumentative foundation of argumentation，if you will，and that makes argumentation possible.

也就是说，我接下来的论证旨在确立并阐明论证所必须预设的内容，即一个论证者必须承认哪些内容比论证本身更为基础和根本，可以说，这些内容是论证的前论证基础，正是它们使得论证成为可能。

Four immediate insights spring to mind：（1） argumentation presupposes action.action comes before argumentation.All arguing is acting and every arguer knows what it is to act。But only very few actions are argumen tatioN.（2） Even most of our speech acts—acts accompanied by words—are not argumentation.The employment of language for other，nonargumen tative purposes also comes before and is presupposed by argumentation.（3） In fact，most of the time we do not speak at all when we act。We act silently，and silent action，too，comes before and is presupposed by argumentation.（4） Argumentative discourse is rare and has the unique purpose and aim of resolving disagreements regarding the truth of certain propositions or the validity of certain arguments.

脑海中立刻浮现出四点见解：（1）论证以行动为前提。行动先于论证。所有的论证都是一种行动，而且每个论证者都知道行动是怎么回事。但只有极少数的行动属于论证。（2）甚至我们大多数的言语行动——伴有话语的行为——也并非论证。将语言用于其他非论证性目的的情况同样先于论证且是论证的前提。（3）实际上，在我们行动时，大多数时候我们根本不说话。我们默默地行动，而无声的行动同样也先于论证且是论证的前提。（4）论证性的话语较为少见，其有着独特的目的和目标，即解决关于某些命题的真实性或某些论证的有效性方面的分歧。

First：Since many here are familiar with Mises’s work，I can be brief regarding the first point。Arguing is a special case of acting。Everything that can be stated about actions in general applies also to the special case of argumentation.Like all action，argumentation takes place in time and space and is constrained by scarcity and timE.argumentation，too，is a motivated，purposeful activity。

首先：由于这里很多人都熟悉米塞斯的著作，所以关于第一点我可以简要说明。论证是行动的一种特殊情况。关于一般行动所能阐述的一切内容，也同样适用于论证这种特殊情况。和所有行动一样，论证发生在时间和空间之中，并且受到稀缺性和时间的限制。论证同样也是一种有动机、有目的的活动。

But：Not all action is argumentation.argumentation is an activity sui generis.

但是：并非所有行动都是论证。论证是一种独特的活动。

Second：While arguing is also a form of communicative—language using—action （interaction） aimed at the successful coordination of the actions of a community of speakers，most communicative action is non argumentative，i.e.，is speech not concerned with the clarification of truth claims.In fact，even the request or the suggestion to enter into an argumen tation is apparently not itself a right or wrong proposition or argument，but a request or a suggestioN.Which demonstrates that nonargumentative communication comes and must have been learned temporally and logically prior to argumentation.Most fundamentally，before we can ever engage in argumentation，we must already know and have learned （at a minimum） how to use words to call upon someone and how to point out，draw attention or refer to something to be done or expected.It would be senseless to deny this，because the proponent of this argument must already presuppose these abilities as an apriori ‘given’ both for himself as well as for his opponent。The apriori of argumentation，then，implies as its logical and practical— praxeological—presupposition and foundation，an apriori of communicative action.

第二：虽然论证也是一种沟通——语言使用——行动（互动）的形式，旨在成功协调说话者群体的行动，但大多数沟通行动并非论证，即不涉及澄清真理。事实上，即使是请求论证或建议论证，本身也不涉及命题的对错或论证，而是一种请求或建议。大多数的沟通不是论证，建议论证也不是论证，这证明了非论证性的交流在时间上和逻辑上先于论证性交流，而交流是一种习得的交流方式。最根本的是，在我们能够进行论证之前，我们必须已经知道并学会（至少）如何使用语言来召集某人，学会如何表达、引起注意或指示有关某事物的做法或期望。否认这一点是毫无意义的，因为提出这一论点的人必须预先假定这些能力既是他自己的 “既定 “能力，也是他对手的 “既定 “能力。因此，论证的先验性作为其逻辑和实践——行动学——的前提和基础，意味着沟通行动的先验性。

Analytically，in any type of human speech act or communicative action we can distinguish two categorically distinct parts or constituents.On the one hand，all speech has a propositional part。Therein something is stated regarding certain facts （what it is that we are talking about）。On the other hand，every speech has an illocutionary or performative part whereby the speaker places the propositional part of his speech into a social or interactive context，commenting，so to say，to other speakers what to make of it。The same propositional content：for instance，“this banana，” can be presented in various performative modes such as “Is this a banana？” “I promise you this banana，” “this is my banana，” “take this banana，” “I am telling you a story about a banana，” “I am ordering you to get rid of this banana，” etc。Speak ing，then，is more than a mere statement of facts （facts being what proposi tions are about）。It involves always and invariably that a given propositional content is uttered and placed in some specific performative modE.

从分析的角度来看，在任何类型的人类言语行动或沟通行动中，我们都可以区分出两种截然不同的部分或成分。一方面，所有言语都有命题部分。有关于某些事实的陈述（我们正在谈论的是什么）。另一方面，每一个表达都有一个言外或述行部分，说话者通过这个部分把将其演讲的命题部分置于一个社会或互动的语境中，向其他说话者做出评论，也就是说，向其他说话者评论该怎么做。同样的命题内容：例如，“这只香蕉”可以以不同的述行模式呈现，例如“这是一只香蕉吗？”“我答应给你这根香蕉”、“这是我的香蕉”、“拿着这根香蕉”、“我给你讲一个关于香蕉的故事”、“我命令你扔掉这根香蕉”等等。因此，“说”不仅仅是对事实的陈述（事实就是命题的内容），它总是且不可避免地涉及特定命题内容的陈述，并将其置于某种特定的述行模式中。

Accordingly，the success （or failure） of a communicative action aimed at coordination depends on a twofold accomplishment。The understand ing of the speech’s propositional content and the acceptance of the modus of proposing it。

因此，以协调为目的的沟通行动的成功（或失败）取决于两方面的成就：对言语命题内容的理解和提出命题的方式的接受程度。

coordination is successful if I ask you to bring me a banana and you bring me one.It is unsuccessful if you don’t know the meaning of “banana” or “bring”—and you bring me a teddy bear instead or you respond to my request by saying，for instance，“I am 60 years old” （indicating that you haven’t understood the entire purpose of my speech）。Likewise，coordination is unsuccessful if you understand what I say，but you reject my proposal and reply，for example，“I don’t take orders from you，” or “I have no time，” or simply walk away from mE.

如果我让你给我一个香蕉，于是你给我一个，协调就是成功的。如果你不知道“香蕉”或“给”的意思，你给我一只泰迪熊，或者你对我的要求做出回应，例如，“我60岁了”（表明你没有完全理解我说话的目的），这都是不成功的。同样，如果你明白我说的话，但你拒绝我的提议并回答，例如，“我不听你的命令”，或者“我没有时间”，或者干脆从我面前走开，那么协调也是不成功的。

Moreover and importantly，unsuccessful coordination （discoordination） can take two possible forms or outcomes：“simple” disappointment or “serious” confiict。After you （disappointingly） walked away from my request （and my speech act has failed），we both go about our daily business as before （silently），I with the means under my control and you with the means under your control。A case of disappointment。

A conflict results，if，instead of you bringing me a banana （successful communication） or walking away from me （disappointing communication），you respond，for example，by taking a pocket knife against my protestations out of my hand or pulling my hair。As well，confiict results if I respond to your disappointing refusal by following you against your protestation into your house（the house previously under your undisputed control）。In both cases，we clash，because we want to employ the very same scarce means—the knife，the hair，the house—for incompatible purposes.because of the scarcity of physical means，only one purpose can be realized and fulfilled.We must clash.

如果你不是给我一根香蕉（成功的沟通），也不是从我身边走开（令人失望的沟通），你的反应却是，不顾我的抗议，从我手中夺走一把小刀，或者扯我的头发，这就产生了冲突。同样，如果我对你令人失望的拒绝做出回应，不顾你的抗议，强行进入你的房子（房子一直都无可争议的在你的控制之下），这也产生了冲突。在这两种情况下，我们发生了冲突，因为我们都想用同样的稀缺手段——刀、头发、房子——来达到不相容的目的。由于物质手段的稀缺性，只有一个目的可以实现和满足，因此我们必定有冲突。

Let me pause here for a moment for a few critically important empirical observations.The achievements of the social sciences are often belittled or even ridiculed.And in view of much if not most of contemporary academic sociology，this assessment is certainly well deserved.Yet this should not blind us toward noticing some rather obvious facts.

请允许我在此稍作停顿，谈谈一些至关重要的经验之谈。社会科学的成就常常被轻视甚至嘲笑。从当代学术社会学的大部分成果来看，这种评价无疑是实至名归。然而，我们不应因此而忽视一些显而易见的事实。

It must surely come as reassuring and refreshing to observe that much if not most of our communicative action—our speechacts—is successful，both in being understood and in being accepted for what it is.Far more communication is successful than not。And if communication is not successful and fails to reach its end of interpersonal coordination，these failures are mostly mere disappointments.Failed communication in the form of confiict is a comparatively rare occurrence （and its notoriety is derived from this rarity）。By and large，we are amazingly successful as speakers in bringing about coordination.

观察到我们的大部分（如果不是大多数的话）沟通行动——我们的言语——既能被人理解也能被人接受，这两方面都是成功的，肯定会让人感到安心和振奋。成功的交流远远多于失败的交流。如果沟通不成功，未能达到人际协调的目的，这些失败大多只是令人失望而已。以冲突形式出现的沟通失败是一种相对罕见的现象（其恶名也正是来源于这种罕见性）。总的来说，我们作为言说者在实现协调方面取得了惊人的成功。

And if speaking is and does for us in the social world （made up of other people and their actions） what engineering is and does for us in the natural world （made up of stones，plants and animals and their behavior），then we must actually come to the conclusion that we are quite successful as social engineers，as people effecting coordination by means of speech.

如果在由其他人及其行动构成的社会世界里，说话对于我们而言就如同在由石头、植物、动物及其行为构成的自然世界里工程学对于我们的意义和作用一样，那么我们实际上必须得出这样的结论：作为通过言语实现协调的人，我们作为社会工程师是相当成功的。

Moreover，even if communicative action sometimes fails to attain coor dination，we have a method of learning and improving it。

此外，即使沟通有时无法达到协调的目的，我们也有学习和改进的方法。

I will come back to the subject of argumentation.But before some first attention must be given to silent or speechless action and the categorically distinct purpose of communicative action vs.instrumental action.

我将回到论证的主题上来。但在此之前，我们必须首先关注无声或无言的行为，以及沟通行动与工具性行动截然不同的目的。

Most of what we do is silent or speechless action.In fact，just as communicative action comes before and is presupposed by argumentation，so silent action comes before and is presupposed by communicative action.On the one hand，this is revealed by the fact that，as children，we learn to act before we learn to speak and use words to identify and describe our actions as actions.And on the other hand，it is revealed by the fact that，however important communicative action may otherwise be in human life，acting man cannot live off and sustain his life from words alone.He must first transform nature to produce material goods for the ultimate purpose of consumption in order to then find the time to engage in communication or argumentation.

我们所做的大多数事情都是无声的或无言的行动。事实上，正如交流行动先于论证且是论证的前提一样，无声行动也先于交流行动且是其前提。一方面，这一点从我们儿时先学会行动，之后才学会说话并用词语来识别和描述我们的行动这一事实中便可看出。另一方面，这也体现在，无论交流行动在人类生活中原本可能有多重要，行动着的人都无法仅靠话语来维持生计。他必须首先改造自然以生产出用于最终消费目的的物质产品，然后才能抽出时间来进行交流或论证。

Getting dressed，cooking，eating，walking，working，observing，planting，harvesting，building，measuring，counting，cutting，cleaning，repairing，driving，drinking，etc。，are all examples of silent action.In all of these activities we follow methodically ordered practical recipes of how to use scarce physical means in order to reach an anticipated goal （being dressed，having cooked，eaten，etc。）。If asked，and on refiection，we could give an account of our actions in terms of meaningful words and sentences：about their purposes，about the means used，and about the recipes followed and applied in using such means.And other speakers could understand this account，because we all are united by a common language learned through common practice in language games.But we are silent，because we judge the success （or failure） of our action as independent of any communicative effort （otherwise communication would have to be part of the recipe lead ing to success）。We stay silent，because we deem the success of our action as dependent solely on us，as if we were the only person on earth，as if we stood in a purely monologic relation to the world and were the sole judge of success and failure.

穿衣、下厨、吃饭、走路、工作、观察、种植、收获、建造、测量、计数、切割、清洁、修理、驾驶、饮酒等，都是无声行动的例子。在所有这些活动中，我们都有条不紊地遵循使用方法，即如何使用稀缺的物理手段达到预期目标（穿衣、下厨、吃饭等）。如果有人问起，我们经过反思可以用有意义的词语和句子来描述我们的行动：关于行动的目的，关于使用的手段，以及在使用这些手段时遵循和应用的方法。其他说话的人也能理解这种说法，因为我们都是通过在语言游戏中的共同练习学到共同语言而联系在一起的。但我们保持沉默，是因为我们判断自身行动的成败并不取决于任何交流努力（否则交流就必须成为通向成功的要素之一了）。我们保持沉默，是因为我们认为自身行动的成败完全取决于我们自己，仿佛我们是地球上唯一的人，仿佛我们与世界处于一种纯粹的独白式关系中，并且是成败的唯一评判者。

As already noted，every instrumental or speechless activity involves the use of scarce physical means in reach and under control of a given actor，with the purpose of transforming or rearranging the physicalmaterial world around him into another more highly valued anticipated future arrangement or configuration of his material surroundings.In this，he is always guided by some ideas or knowledge in the form of actionrecipes.If he reaches his goal，his recipes are considered correct and the knowledge contained in them can be said to be true.If he fails to reach his goal，the recipes are incorrect and his knowledge is considered false or insufficient。

如前所述，每一种工具性行动或无言行动，都涉及到使用稀缺的物理手段，这些手段在特定的行动人的控制范围内，目的是改变或重新安排他周围的物质世界，使之成为他所预期的物质环境的另一种更有价值的未来安排或配置。在这种情况下，他总是以行动方法的形式受到一些观念或知识的指导。如果他达到了他的目标，他的方法被认为是正确的，其中包含的知识就可以说是正确的或真实的。如果他没有达到他的目标，那么他的方法就是不正确的，他的知识就被认为是错误的或不充分的。

Interestingly，in the wake of the writings of such prominent intellectual figures as Willard v.O.Quine，Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend，the relativism and skepticism characteristic of much of the philosophy of the social sciences has also taken increasing hold in the philosophy of the natu ral sciences.Even in the natural sciences，these authors claim in their various ways，there exists no rocksolid foundation and no systematic and methodi cal progress，and hence the possibility of any “growth of knowledge” must be put in fundamental doubt。Instead，much is made by them of the “inde terminacy of translation，” “ontological relativity，” the “incommensurability of paradigms，” and “methodological anarchism.”

有趣的是，在威拉德·范·奥曼·蒯因、托马斯·库恩和保罗·费耶阿本德等杰出知识界人物的著作问世之后，社会科学哲学中颇具代表性的相对主义和怀疑主义在自然科学哲学中也越发盛行起来。这些作者以各自不同的方式宣称，即便在自然科学领域，也不存在坚如磐石的基础，不存在系统且有条不紊的进步，因此，任何“知识增长”的可能性都必须受到根本性的质疑。相反，他们大谈 “翻译的不确定性”、”本体论的相对性”、”范式的不可通约性 “和 “方法论的无政府主义”。

In light of what has already been noted about the role of knowledge as a mental tool in the pursuit of successful instrumental action and the intentional transformation of nature into culture，these relativistic views， however popular or fashionable they may currently be，must be considered fundamentally mistaken.Indeed，as I am going to further demonstrate，they should strike one as nothing short of absurd.

鉴于上文已经提到的知识作为一种心智工具，在追求成功的工具性行动和有意图地将自然转化为文化中的作用，这些相对主义的观点，无论目前多么流行或时髦，都必须从根本上被认为是错误的。事实上，正如我将进一步证明的那样，它们应该让人觉得荒谬至极。

For one，it would seem to be obvious that most—and increasingly more—of the world around us is not “raw nature” or naturegiven “environment，” but made up instead of manufactured goods （or means）。We are surrounded by houses and streets，farms，factories，tables，chairs，toasters，telephones，pipes，wires，cars，boats，napkins，toilet paper，and on and oN.Almost never，in our daily lives，do we encounter “raw nature.” What we encounter almost exclusively instead is a world of manmade culture：of “artificial” objects，designed for a definite purpose.

首先，很明显的是，我们周围世界的大部分——而且越来越多——并非 “原始自然 “或自然赋予的 “环境”，而是由制成品（或手段）构成的。我们被房屋、街道、农场、工厂、桌子、椅子、烤面包机、电话、管道、电线、汽车、船只、餐巾纸、卫生纸等等包围着。在日常生活中，我们几乎从未遇到过 “原始自然”。相反，我们所遇到的几乎完全是一个人造文化的世界：一个为明确目的而设计的“人造”物体的世界。

Importantly （but regularly overlooked by relativistic philosophers of the natural sciences），also the natural scientist in particular does not approach nature with his bare hands，as it were，but with the help of purposefully manufactured goods.To make his natureobservations，he employs man made surfaces，planes，rulers，lines，points，angles，circles，curves，clocks，scales，calculators，microscopes，telescopes，burners，lighters，thermometers，Xray machines，etc.，etc。Without these instruments，there would be no observations，and without the proper functioning of these instruments his observations would not be “scientific” observations.As well，whenever the natural scientist conducts an experiment，he must，so as to isolate the effect of one variable on another，hold other variables constant。That is，he must artificially design and arrange nature in order to only then generate his data，and again these data are “scientific” data only if the experiment was designed and conducted properly。Indeed，even “plain” or “raw” observations，such as an eyewitness account，for instance，require that the observer is properly placed or situated visàvis the observed object，and hence，his observations，too，are “artificial，” purposefully generated data.

重要的是（但这一点经常被自然科学领域持相对主义观点的哲学家们忽视），尤其是自然科学家并非可以说是赤手空拳地去探索自然，而是借助有目的地制造出来的物品。为了进行对自然的观察，他会使用人造的平面、直尺、线条、点、角、圆、曲线、时钟、天平、计算器、显微镜、望远镜、燃烧器、打火机、温度计、X光机等等。没有这些仪器，就不会有观察结果，而且如果这些仪器不能正常运作，他的观察结果就不能算是“科学”观察结果。同样，每当自然科学家进行一项实验时，为了分离出一个变量对另一个变量的影响，他必须使其他变量保持恒定。也就是说，他必须人为地设计和安排自然，然后才能生成数据，而且只有在实验设计和实施得当的情况下，这些数据才是“科学”数据。事实上，即使是“普通的”或“原始的”观察，例如目击者的叙述，也要求观察者对所观察的对象有适当的位置或处境，因此，他的观察也是“人为的”，有目的地生成数据。

Moreover，empirically equally obvious，most of our actions involving manufactured means and most of the natural scientists’ manufactured data turn out to be working and valid.

此外，经验上同样显而易见的是，我们大多数涉及人造工具的行动以及大多数自然科学家所获取的人造数据结果都有效且有根据。

Most of the products used in our daily lives work as they are intended to do。The house gives shelter，the toaster toasts，the telephone rings and transmits distant sounds，the car drives on streets made for driving，the chair allows us to sit down，the table stands still and provides a sur face，the wire serves as a fence or transmits electricity，the pipe holds air，water，oil or gas inside，etc。，etc。The recipes leading up to these products，then，must obviously be correct recipes.What these recipes tell us must be true knowledge of nature and its way，because it leads us to instrumental success.And judged by the great and increasing number and variety of different artificially manufactured objects all around us，we must obvi ously have discovered increasingly more correct recipes and accumulated increasingly more true knowledge of nature.（So much for any skepticism regarding the possibility of a “growth of knowledge.”）

Of course it is also true that we sometimes fail in our instrumental actions.The house，the chair or the table collapse，the telephone remains silent，the wire breaks or the pipe leaks.We fail to reach our purposes.How ever，even in the comparatively rare cases when our instrumental actions fail and we do not reach our goal，we do not only immediately recognize that we failed.We also ascribe this failure to us and a faulty or incorrectly applied recipe，i.e.，to our deficient knowledge or its incorrect applicatioN.We do not blame nature.nature，as has been already repeatedly emphasized，is the way it is.What distinguishes a working house，chair，table，toaster，car，boat，or whatever，from a broken one，is not nature and the laws of nature—they hold true and apply to both functioning and broken implements equally— but the presence of a human purpose，i.e.，the fact that only a standing house，chair or table，a toasting toaster，and a swimming boat are judged by us a success （whereas a broken one is considered a failure）。both success and fail ure are due to us，and to our correct or incorrect construction recipes.

当然，我们的工具性行为有时也会失败，这也是事实。房子、椅子或桌子塌了，电话没有声音，电线断了或管道漏了。我们未达目的。然而，即使在相对罕见的情况下，我们的工具性行动失败了，我们没有达到我们的目标，我们不仅立即认识到我们失败了，我们还会把失败归咎于我们自己，归咎于错误的或不正确的应用方法，即归咎于我们的知识或其不正确的应用。我们不怪大自然。正如我们已经反复强调的那样，自然无非是其所是。把能用的房子、椅子、桌子、烤面包机、汽车、船之类的东西与坏掉的东西区分开来的，不是自然和自然法则——它们同样适用于正常运转的和坏掉的工具——而是在于人类目的之存在。我们认为，只有竖立的房子、椅子或桌子、能烤面包的面包机和会行使的游船才是成功的（而坏掉的则被认为是失败的）。成功和失败都取决于我们，取决于我们正确或不正确的建造方法。

All this applies also to the natural scientist。His instruments：his manufactured surfaces，rulers，circles，clocks，scales，calculators，thermometers，lenses，etc。，etc。，too，mostly work and function the way they are supposed to do。The ruler rules，the circle circles，the clock clocks and the calcula tor calculates.Likewise，the natural scientist’s design and construction of “controlled experiments” is routinely successful。The construction recipes for these instruments and artificial arrangements，then，must be correct and the knowledge embodied in them must be true.

所有这些情况也同样适用于自然科学家。他所使用的仪器：人造平面、直尺、圆规、时钟、天平、计算器、温度计、透镜等等，大多也都能按照预期的方式正常工作和发挥作用。直尺能用来测量长度，圆规能画出圆形，时钟能显示时间，计算器能进行计算。同样，自然科学家设计和开展“对照实验”通常也都是成功的。那么，这些仪器的制造方法以及人为设置的实验安排的构建方案肯定是正确的，其中所蕴含的知识也必定是真实的。

It is also possible of course，even if comparatively rare，that the natural scientist’s instruments fail to do what they are intended to do。The ruler，the circle，the clock，the calculator，the thermometer are broken，or an experiment has spun out of control。However，in this case the natural scientist，too，is not only to find out quickly that he failed.He also knows that the failure lies with him and his faulty or incorrectly applied construc tion recipe for his ruler，circle or calculator，and not with nature and its laws.The broken ruler，circle or calculator are just as much part of nature and behave in accordance with natural laws as are a properly functioning ruler，circle or calculator。It is only the natural scientist，depending on the purpose of his research，that makes the distinction between “broken” and “properly” functioning implements.The ruler does not “know，” as is were，how to measure，and the calculator does not “know” how to calculate，i.e.，to distinguish correct from incorrect measurements and calculations，as the existence of broken rulers and calculators conclusively demonstrates.It is the scientist，who knows how to correctly measure and calculate and thus also to distinguish between faulty and functioning rulers and calcu lators.Similarly，it is only the scientist，not the “experiment” itself，that determines whether something was a successful—replicable—experiment or not。

当然，自然科学家的仪器也有可能达不到预期的效果，尽管这种情况比较少见。直尺、圆规、时钟、计算器、温度计坏了，或者实验失控了。然而，在这种情况下，自然科学家不仅很快发现自己失败了。他还知道，失败的原因在于他自己，在于他对直尺、圆规或计算器的错误或不正确的应用，而不在于大自然及其规律。破损的尺、圆规或计算器与正常使用的尺、圆规或计算器一样，都是自然的一部分，都遵循自然规律。只有自然科学家，根据其研究目的，才能区分“坏掉的”和“正常”使用的工具。可以说，直尺并“不知道”如何进行测量，计算器也并“不知道”如何进行计算，即如何区分正确的与错误的测量和计算，破损的直尺和损坏的计算器的存在就确凿地证明了这一点。是科学家知道如何正确地进行测量和计算，从而也能够区分出有故障的和能正常使用的直尺及计算器。同样，只有科学家，而不是“实验”本身，才能判定某一实验是否是一次成功的——可重复的——实验。

Moreover，whenever the natural scientist’s instruments—his ruler，circle or calculator—fail or his experiments go awry，he in particular also knows where the failure lies and what needs to be improved or repaired in the con struction recipes of his tools or his experimental design.

此外，每当自然科学家的工具——直尺、圆规或计算器——失灵或实验出错时，他也完全知道故障所在，以及他的工具的构造方法或实验设计中需要改进或修复的地方。

Truth and truth seeking，then，are our method and means for the attain ment of our ends，i.e.，of success.We do not seek the truth-an-sich，we seek the truth，because it leads to and is a requirement of success.The more true recipes we know，the more actions we can successfully perform.

那么，真理和寻求真理就是我们达到目的（即成功）的方法和手段。我们追求真理，并不是单纯为了追求真理而追求真理，只因为真理是通向成功的途径，也是成功的必要条件。我们知道的正确方法越多，我们就越能成功地采取更多的行动。

Fourth：But—and this brings me back to my final point：to argumenta tion as an action sui generis—although the recipes we follow in our silent actions can be right or wrong，we rarely if ever argue whether they are one or the other。If they are right，they lead to success，and if they are wrong，they lead to failure.The decision is always easy。The proof is in the pudding。Lengthy public trials à la Galilei are not needed to decide in the field of manufacturing and engineering。There is no need for a public debate about what recipe to follow in constructing a plane surface，a ruler，a triangle，a circle，a clock，a brick，a wall，a house，etc。Everyone can try and see the con sequences for himself。And because of this intimate connection of truth and success，new and improved recipes，once they become known，are quickly，without much or even any discussion，frictionless if you will，adopted by other actors as in their own interest in success.

第四点：但是——这就把我带回到我要讲的最后一点了：即论证作为一种独特的行动——尽管我们在无声行动中所遵循的方法可能是对的也可能是错的，但我们极少（就算有过的话）会去争论它们到底是对是错。如果方法是对的，就会带来成功；如果是错的，就会导致失败。判断起来总是很容易的。实践出真知嘛。在制造业和工程领域，并不需要像伽利略所经历的那种漫长的公开审判来做决断。在建造一个平面、一把直尺、一个三角形、一个圆、一个时钟、一块砖、一堵墙、一所房子等等的时候，并不需要就该遵循什么样的方法进行公开辩论。每个人都可以自己去尝试并亲眼看到结果。正因为真理和成功之间存在着这种紧密的联系，新的且经过改进的方法一旦为人所知，就会很快地（可以说毫无阻碍地，即便没有经过多少甚至完全没有经过讨论）被其他行动者采纳，因为这符合他们对成功的自身利益需求。

A need for any lengthy discussion regarding the truthclaims of various recipes，i.e.，for argumentation，arises typically only in connection with conflict。That is，the first time we seriously discuss and debate matters of truth，whether or not something is “really” true，is in discussions concerning matters of justice，of right and wrong。

通常只有在出现冲突的情况下，才会产生就各种方法的真实性主张进行冗长讨论的需要，也就是进行论证的需要。也就是说，我们第一次认真地讨论和辩论真实性问题，即某件事是否“真的”为真，是在涉及公正、是非对错等问题的讨论中。

You and I want to use one and the same good for incompatible pur poses.Plain communication has failed to achieve coordination.We clash.But we can still argue.And in any case，it is impossible to argue consistently （without falling into contradictions） that we cannot do anything about our apparent discoordination except to fight。We can do something else，as this very argument，in claiming itself to be true，manifestly and conclusively demonstrates.

你和我想把同一种物品用于不相容的目的。单纯的沟通未能实现协调。我们产生了冲突。但我们仍可进行论证。而且无论如何，若始终如一地（且不陷入自相矛盾）辩称，面对我们这种明显的不协调状况，除了争斗之外我们别无他法，这是不可能的。我们可以采取其他做法，正如这一论证本身在宣称其真实性时，已明显且确凿地证明了这一点。

We can describe the actions leading to our confiict verbally，and we can identify two incompatible truthclaims as the source of our confiict：“You are the proper owner of the good in question” （the knife，the hair，the house，or whatever）—and hence your plan comes to execution—versus “I am the proper owner”—and hence my plan is implemented.By means of words，then，we can institute a “trial，” conducted in a public language，in which we present our rival truth claims with the purpose of finding a definitive answer of “yes” or “no，” “true” or “false，” “right” or “wrong”—the true recipe—that will restore coordination and prevent future confiict。

我们可以用言语描述导致我们产生冲突的那些行为，并且我们能够确定两个相互矛盾的真实性主张是我们冲突的根源：“你才是所涉物品（比如那把刀、那缕头发、那所房子或其他任何东西）的正当所有者”——因此你的计划得以执行——与之相对的是“我才是正当所有者”——因此我的计划得以实施。那么，通过言语，我们可以发起一场用公共语言进行的“审判”，在这场审判中，我们提出相互对立的真实性主张，目的是找到一个明确的答案，即“是”或“否”、“真”或“假”、“对”或“错”——也就是那个能恢复协调并防止未来冲突的正确方法。

And we have discovered such an answer—which explains why confiicts are comparatively rare in our lives and the overwhelming bulk of our actions，whether communicative or silent，runs peacefully，even if some times disappointingly。

我们已经找到了这样一个答案——它解释了为什么在我们的生活中，冲突相对较少，而我们绝大多数的行动，无论是有沟通的还是无声沉默的，都是和平进行的，即使有时令人失望。

The recipe concerns the “proper”—“right，” “true，” or “correct”—owner ship （exclusive control） of scarce physical means.It prescribes that “proper” ownership of means，or “property，” is to be established solely through first—that is，unopposed or confiictfree—appropriation and subsequent trans formation of such means，or else through a mutually agreed upon—and hence likewise unopposed—transfer of property from one actor to another。Always，in all of your actions employ only such means that you have first unopposed appropriated and produced or that you have received in a mutually agreed on exchange from others who had unopposed possession （property） of the good in question before you! If you follow this recipe，the world will still be full of surprises and disappointments，but all confiict can be avoided，from the beginning of mankind until its end.

原则涉及稀缺物质手段的“正当”——“正确”、“真实”或“正确”——所有权（排他性控制）。它规定，对手段或“财产”的“正当”所有权只能通过——即无异议或无冲突的——先占和随后对这种手段的改造，或者通过双方同意的——因此同样是无异议的——将财产从一个行动人转移到另一个行动人。总是，在你所有的行动中，你只使用这样的手段：是你无异议地先占和生产的，或者你是在彼此同意的交换中从其他人那里获得的，而这些人在你之前已经无异议地占有了该物品（财产）。如果你遵循这个原则，虽然这个世界依然会充满惊喜与失望，但所有的冲突都可以避免，从有人伊始直至灭亡。

That we indeed know the correct recipe of confiictavoidance is revealed in the fact that in our daily lives we routinely abstain from interfering with the use of means that are already under the visible or noticeable control of someone else and restrict our actions instead exclusively to means that we already have control of。

我们确实知道避免冲突的正确方法，这一点从我们日常生活中的如下事实便可看出：我们通常会避免干涉他人已经明显掌控的手段的使用，且将我们的行动完全局限于我们自己已经掌控的手段范围内。

However，this knowledge is largely habituated and subconscious.It is only upon refiection—in speaking about actions and typically motivated by some rare event of confiict—that we can not only verbalize and formulate this rule，but that we can recognize further，via a transcendental argument， that this very rule is already “implied” in or，more correctly，presupposed by argumentation.That is，that following this rule is what makes argumentation as an action sui generis at all possible； and hence，that its truth and validity as a recipe of “engineering” social coordination cannot be argumentatively denied without falling into a performative contradiction.

然而，这种知识在很大程度上是习惯性的且处于潜意识层面。只有经过反思——在谈及行动时，并且通常是受到某些罕见冲突事件的触动——我们不仅能够用言语表述并明确阐述这条规则，而且还能通过一种先验论证进一步认识到，这条规则本身已经 “蕴含” 于论证之中，或者更准确地说，是论证的预设前提。也就是说，正是由于遵循了这一规则，论证作为一种自成一类的行动才成为可能；因此，论证作为一种 “设计 ”社会协调的方法，其真实性和有效性是无法通过论证加以否定的，否则就会陷入谏言冲突。

argumentation is a purposeful activity。It is not aimless，freefioating sounds.It is speech acts aimed at coordination.More specifically，it is speech acts aimed at coordination by means of nothing but arguments.But as an action，argumentation also involves the employment of scarce physical means.First and foremost among these means is our physical body。both the proponent and the opponent of an argument must make use of their bodies to generate their arguments and engage in argumentation.I must use my body，and you yours.And my “proper” ownership of my body，and yours of yours，cannot be argumentatively disputed without falling into contradictions.For to argue back and forth and impute the arguments to you or me，as my arguments or yours，you and I must recognize each other’s “proper” ownership of our distinct and separate physical bodies.

论证是有目的的行动。它不是漫无目的的、自由流动的声音。这是一种旨在协调的言语行动。更具体地说，它是一种旨在通过论证实现协调的言语行动。但作为一种行动，论证也涉及到使用稀缺的物理手段。在这些手段中，首先同样也是最重要的是我们的身体。一个论点的支持者和反对者都必须使用他们的身体来提出他们的论点并进行论证。我得用我的身体，你也得用你的。而且，如果不陷入自相矛盾的话，就无法从论证的角度对我对自己身体的“正当”所有权以及你对你自己身体的“正当”所有权提出质疑。因为要来回进行论证，并将这些论证归之于你或我，视其为我的论证或你的论证，你我就必须承认彼此对各自不同且独立的身体有着“正当”的所有权。

Moreover，both our bodies are already “naturally” appropriated，in that only I can control my body directly，at will，and that only you can control your body directly。Mutatis mutandis，I can control your body，and you can control my body，only indirectly，by using our directly controlled bodies first。This demonstrates the practical and logical—or praxeological—prior ity of direct before and above indirect appropriatioN.To claim in an argument，then，that I am the proper owner of your body （or you of mine） involves a performative contradiction.because I must presuppose that I am the proper owner of my own body （with which to produce my arguments） and you are the proper owner of your body （with which to produce your arguments）。To impute an argument to me （or to you） the means employed to produce it must be mine （or yours），too。

此外，我们两人的身体都已经被“自然地”占有了，因为只有我能随意直接控制自己的身体，也只有你能直接控制你自己的身体。在做必要的变更后，我只能通过首先运用我自己能直接控制的身体，才能间接控制你的身体，你也只能通过首先运用你自己能直接控制的身体，才能间接控制我的身体。这表明了直接占有相对于间接占有在实践和逻辑上——或者说在行为学上——具有优先性。那么，在一场论证中声称我是你身体的正当所有者（或者你是我身体的正当所有者），就会陷入谏言冲突。因为我必须预设我是自己身体的正当所有者（我要用自己的身体来进行论证），并且你是你身体的正当所有者（你要用自己的身体来进行论证），要向我（或你）阐述一个论点，它所使用的手段也必须是我（或你）的。

And something else，besides each person’s proper ownership of his nat urally appropriated physical body，is presupposed by argumentation.You and I have already acted，silently and communicatively，long before we ever engaged in argumentation.Prior to any argumentative encounter，you and I have with the help of our respective bodies—and unopposed by either you or me—already appropriated，produced，exchanged，consumed or accu mulated countless goods.We could not be engaged in argumentation now without such prior activities and prior possessions.They make our present argumentation at all possiblE.Accordingly，we must admit （and cannot deny without “performative” contradiction） that prior and ultimately first possession is the “proper” route to the ownership of scarce physical means.In presenting our arguments back and forth，you and I affirm that we are not only the proper owners of our “naturally” owned and directly controlled physical bodies with which we produce these arguments，but also of all the things that you or I have previously，prior to our argument，and unopposed by you or me，purposefully done or produced.Indeed，to argue consistently to the contrary—that property be established and determined by disputed later and ultimately last possession—is literally impossible.We would have no feet or ground on which to stand on and make our arguments.Neither you nor I could have ever acted silently and on our own，or separately from one another，side by side，sometimes may be disappointed，but in any case without confiict。

除了每个人对其自然占有的身体的正当所有权之外，论证还预设了其他一些东西。早在我们参与论证之前，你和我就已经行动起来，沉默地交流互动。在任何争论之前，你和我已经借助各自的身体——在你我都没有反对的情况下——占有、生产、交换、消费或积累了无数商品。如果没有这些先前的活动和先前的财产，我们现在就不可能进行论证。它们使我们目前的论证完全成为可能。因此，我们必须承认（在不产生谏言冲突的情况下无法否认），先占和最初的占有是获取稀缺物质手段的所有权的“正当”途径”。在反复阐述我们的论点时，你我都确认，我们不仅是我们 “自然” 拥有且能直接控制的身体的正当所有者（我们正是用这些身体来提出这些论点的），而且也是你我在展开这场争论之前、未遭到彼此反对的情况下，有目的地完成或生产出来的所有事物的正当所有者。实际上，始终如一地提出相反的论点——即认为财产应通过有争议的后占乃至最终的占有来确立和判定 ——是完全不可能的。其结果就是，我们将无立锥之地，也无法阐述我们的论点。无论是你还是我，都不可能沉默地单独行动，也不可能彼此分开，而是并肩而行，虽然有时可能会失望，但无论如何都不会有冲突。

Philosophical analysis，then，confirms and reinforces our intuition.We have indeed a perfect and unfailing recipe of how to avoid confiict and thus systematically improve coordination，and we have a perfect recipe to resolve each and every confiict should it still occur。And with this recipe we have also a true and unfailing criterion of justice，i.e.，of deciding between just （or true） vs.unjust （or false） ownership claims and determining how to restore justice if injustice has occurred.Not everything is open to dispute in an argumentation over confiicting ownership claims.The validity of the priority principle of just acquisition itself cannot be argumentatively disputed，for without it any argumentation between you and me would be impossible.Under dispute，then，can only be the application of this principle in particular instances and with respect to specific means.There can be dispute about whether or not you or I have misapplied the principle in some instances and with regard to particular means.We can disagree as to the “true” facts of a case：who was where and when and who had possession of this or that at such and such times and places？ And it can be at times tedious and time consuming to establish and sort out these facts.

因此，哲学分析证实并强化了我们的直觉。对于如何避免冲突，从而系统地促进协调，我们确实有一个完美无缺的方法，而且，假如仍然会发生冲突，我们也有一个完美的方法来解决每一个冲突。有了这个方法，我们也就有了一个真实而持久的公正标准，即在公正（或真实）与不公正（或虚假）的所有权主张之间做出裁决，以及在发生不公正的情况下决定如何恢复公正。在关于相互冲突的所有权主张的论证过程中，并非所有事情都是可以拿来争论的。正当获取的优先权原则本身的有效性不容争辩，因为没有它，你我之间的任何论证都是不可能的。因此，有争议的只能是这一原则在特定情况下和具体手段方面的适用。至于你我是否在某些情况下和特定手段上错误地应用了这一原则，则可能存在争议。我们可能会对案件的 “真实 “性产生分歧：某人处在何时何地，谁又在何时何地拥有此或彼？有时，确立和理清这些事实既费时又费力。

However，just as the principle is beyond dispute，so is the procedure，the recipe，of sorting out the relevant facts and reaching a conclusion.The procedure is logically dictated by the principle：In every case of confiict brought to a public trial of arguments，the presumption is invariably in favor of the current owner and，mutatis mutandis，the burden of a “proof to the contrary” is always on the opponent of some current state of affairs and of current possessions.The opponent must demonstrate that he，contrary to current appearance，has a possessive claim on some specific good that is older and dated prior to the current owner’s claim，and hence，that he has been dispossessed by the current owner。If，and only if the opponent can successfully demonstrate this beyond a reasonable doubt in a public trial of arguments，must the questionable possession be restored as property to hiM.On the other hand，if the opponent fails to make his case，then not only does the possession remain as property with its current owner，but the cur rent owner in turn has acquired a possessive claim against his opponent。For the current owner’s body and time was misappropriated by the opponent during his failed and rejected argument。He could have done other preferred things with his bodytime except argumentatively defend himself against his opponent。

然而，正如原则是无可争议的一样，整理相关事实并得出结论的程序、方法也是无可争议的。这一程序在逻辑上是由以下原则决定的：在每一个公开论证的冲突案例中，推定总是有利于当前的所有者，而 “反证 “的责任总是落在某种现状和现有财产的反对者身上。反对方必须证明，与现状相反，他对某一特定物品拥有产权，他对该物品的主张，比当前所有者的主张更早，年代也更久远，因此，他是被当前所有者剥夺了产权。当且仅当反对方能够在公开论证中排除合理怀疑，且成功证明这一点时，如此才必须将有争议的财产归还予他。另一方面，如果反对者未能证明其主张，不仅财产仍归当前所有者，当前所有者还可以对反对者提出反控，因为反对者在失败的论证中占用了当前所有者的时间和精力。他本可以用自己的身体和时间去做其他更喜欢的事情，而不是在与对手的争辩中为自己进行辩护。

Let me formulate a brief conclusion now：What I have tried to do here is to refute the naturalist （or behaviorist），who wants to explain man—the nature of man—fully and exclusively in terms of the natural sciences and，more specifically and importantly，the skeptic，who claims that there is no such thing as a constant and unchanging human nature and immutable laws of man （of man’s essence）。Who claims instead，that everything there is to say about man is the story and study of history，i.e.，of past actions； that the best we can achieve is knowledge of past regularities，and based on these，of tentative conjectures concerning future events； and that the most we can thus attain are hypothetical—not yet falsified—truths，but that no such thing exists in human affairs as apodictic or apriori truths； and in any case，that there is no such thing as universal and immutable principles of justice，i.e.，of right and wrong。

现在让我做一个简短的总结：我在这里所要做的是驳斥自然主义者（或行为主义者），他们想要完全地、只用自然科学来解释人——人的本质，更具体且更重要的是，我还要驳斥怀疑论者，他们声称不存在永恒不变的人性以及关于人（人的本质）的不变法则这类事物。相反，他们声称，关于人类的一切，都是历史故事和历史研究，即过去行动的研究。我们所能达到的最好结果就是了解过去的规律，并在此基础上对未来的事件作出尝试性的推测；因此，我们最多只能获得假设性的真理，而不是被证伪的真理，而在人类事务中不存在绝对的真理或先验的真理；无论如何，也不存在普遍的、永恒不变的公正原则，即是非原则。

I have argued instead that we do know—and that we cannot without performative contradiction deny knowing—quite a few apriori truths about man.Once spelled out they appear almost selfevident and trivial，but their recognition has important philosophical consequences.We cannot deny that we can argue with each other in a common and public language.That we can communicate with each other。That we can coordinate our actions by means of words，and can become “better，” i.e.，more successful，in our attempts at communicative coordination in learning how to speak better，i.e.，how to use our words more properly and clearly。

相反，我一直主张我们确实知晓——而且若否定知晓这些内容，我们就会陷入谏言冲突——不少关于人的先验真理。一旦阐明，它们看上去几乎是不言而喻且平淡无奇的，但对它们的认知有着重要的哲学影响。我们无法否认我们能够用一种通用的公共语言相互争论。我们能够相互交流。我们能够借助话语来协调我们的行动，并且能够在尝试通过学会更好地说话，即更恰当、更清晰地运用词汇来进行交流协调的过程中变得“更好”，也就是更成功。

With that we can immediately dispose of all talk about “solipsism，” “other egos” or “ultrasubjectivism” and all Hobbesian ruminations of a war of all against all as idle mental gymnastics and pseudo problems—because whoever writes about these matters refutes himself by virtue of the fact that he writes and argues his case in a public language and thus shows himself as a cultured or socialized person （neither solipsist nor wolf ）。

有了上述认识，我们就可以立刻把所有关于“唯我论”、“他我论”或“超主观主义”的讨论，以及所有霍布斯关于“所有人反对所有人的战争”的遐想，都当作无聊的思维体操和伪问题来处理了——因为无论是谁在论述这些问题，他都是在驳斥自己，他在用一种公共语言来写作和论证自己的观点，从而表明自己是一个有教养的或社会化的人（既不是唯我论者，也不是狼一般的孤立个体）。

Further，we cannot deny that we can act in silence，alone and without any communicative purpose whatsoever （because we have acted alone before we started to talk with each other，and we can stop talking again）。That in doing so，we employ directly and indirectly appropriated goods with the purpose of producing some more highly valued future goal or good.That we follow recipes （howtodo rules） in the pursuit of this good，whatever it may be.That these recipes can lead to either success or failure，and hence，given their purpose，are objectively true or false recipes.And that we can learn from our successes or failures and methodically improve our recipes by means of successive experimentation，i.e.，by trying them out。

此外，我们不能否认，我们可以在沉默中单独行动，不带任何沟通目的（因为我们在开始彼此交谈之前就已经单独行动了，而且我们可以不再交谈）。在这样做的过程中，我们直接或间接地使用了已占有的物品，目的是为了生产一些更有价值的未来目标或物品。无论这个目标或物品是什么，我们在追求它的过程中会遵循一些方法（即操作规则）。这些方法可能会导致成功或失败，因此，鉴于其目的，它们是客观上正确或错误的方法。而且我们能够从自己的成功或失败中学习，并通过连续的试验，即通过尝试这些方法，有条不紊地改进我们的方法。

This refutes all fashionable talk about “methodological anarchism，” of the “untranslatability of languages，” of the “incommensurability of paradigms，” and of the impossibility of a systematic growth of knowledge.

这驳斥了所有时髦的“方法论无政府主义”、“语言的不可翻译性”、“范式的不可通约性”以及知识不可能系统增长的说法。

Finally，we cannot deny that we know the true recipe of how to avoid confiict，and how to resolve it should it still occur。That we can distinguish between unopposed prior possessions as argumentatively justifiable possessions （as property） versus opposed later possessions as argumentatively unjustifiable dispossessions （as theft）。And that we know how to restore justice if injustice has occurred.And this refutes all talk about cultural and ethical relativism，of legal positivism，might makes right，etc。

最后，我们无法否认我们知道如何避免冲突，以及在冲突发生时如何解决冲突的正确方法。我们能够区分无异议的先占作为论证上正当的占有（作为财产），反对后占，认为后占是论证上不正当的剥夺（作为盗窃）。如果发生了不公正，我们知道如何恢复公正。这驳斥了所有关于文化和伦理相对主义、法律实证主义、强权即公理等无稽之谈。

9 论民主、再分配和对财产的破坏*

On Democracy，redistribution，and the Destruction of Property

Imagine a world government，democratically elected according to the prin ciple of onemanonevote on a worldwide scale.What would the probable outcome of an election be？ Most likely，we would get a ChineseIndian coalition government。And what would this government most likely decide to do in order to satisfy its supporters and be reelected？ The government would probably find that the socalled Western world had far too much wealth and the rest of the world，in particular China and India，far too little，and that a systematic wealth and income redistribution would be necessary。 Or imagine that in your own country the right to vote were expanded to seven year olds.While the government would not likely be staffed of children，its policies would most definitely refiect the “legitimate concerns” of children to have “adequate and “equal” access to “free” french fries，lemon ade，and videos.

设想存在一个世界政府，它是按照一人一票的原则在全球范围内通过民主选举产生的。这样一场选举可能的结果会是什么呢？最有可能的情况是，我们会得到一个由中国和印度组成的联合政府。而这个政府为了取悦其支持者并能够获得连任，最有可能决定做什么呢？该政府很可能会发现，所谓的西方世界拥有的财富实在是太多了，而世界上的其他地区，尤其是中国和印度，拥有的财富则太少了，因此有必要进行系统性的财富和收入再分配。[116]或者设想一下，在你自己的国家，投票权被扩大到了七岁儿童。虽然政府不太可能由儿童组成，但其政策肯定会反映出儿童们的“合理关切”，即能够“充分且平等”地获取“免费”的炸薯条、柠檬水和视频。[117]

With these “thought experiments” in mind，there can be no doubt about the consequences which resulted from the process of democratization that began in Europe and the U.S.in the second half of the nineteenth cen tury and has come to fruition since the end of World War I。The successive expansion of the franchise and finally the establishment of universal adult suffrage did within each country what a world democracy would do for the entire globe：it set in motion a seemingly permanent tendency toward wealth and income redistribution.3

考虑到这些“思想实验”，对于始于19世纪下半叶的欧洲和美国、并自第一次世界大战结束以来趋于成熟的民主化进程所产生的后果，无疑是清晰可见的。选举权的不断扩大，以及成人普选权的最终确立，在每个国家内部所产生的影响，就如同世界民主制会对全球产生的影响一样：它启动了一种看似永久性的财富和收入再分配趋势。[118]

onemanonevote combined with “free entry” into government democracy implies that every person and his personal property comes within reach of and is up for grabs by everyone else.A “tragedy of the commons” is created.4 It can be expected that majorities of “havenots” will relentlessly try to enrich themselves at the expense of minorities of “haves.” This is not to say that there will be only one class of havenots and one class of haves，and that the redistribution will occur uniformly from the rich onto the poor。To the contrary。While the redistribution from rich to poor will always play a prominent role，it would be a sociological blunder to assume that it will be the sole or even the predominant form of redistribution.5 After all，the “permanently” rich and the “permanently” poor are usually rich or poor for a reason.The rich are characteristically bright and industrious，and the poor typically dull，lazy，or both.6 It is not very likely that dullards，even if they make up a majority，will sys tematically outsmart and enrich themselves at the expense of a minority of bright and energetic individuals.Rather，most redistribution will take place within the group of the “nonpoor，” and frequently it will actu ally be the betteroff who succeed in having themselves subsidized by the worseoff。Consider，for example，the almost universal practice of offering a “free” university education，whereby the working class，whose children rarely attend universities，pay through taxation for the education of middleclass children!7 Moreover，it can be expected that there will be many competing groups and coalitions trying to gain at the expense of others.There will be various changing criteria defining what it is that makes one person a “have” （deserving to be looted） and another a “havenot” （deserving to receive the loot）。At the same time，individuals will be members of a multitude of groups of “haves” and/or “havenots，” losing on account of one of their characteristics and gaining on account of another，with some individuals ending up netlosers and others netwinners of redistribution.The recognition of democracy as a machinery of popular wealth and income redistribution in conjunction with one of the most fundamental principles in all of economics that one will end up getting more of what ever it is that is being subsidized provides the key to understanding the present age.8

一人一票加上可“自由进入”政府的民主制度意味着每个人及其个人财产都处于其他人可触及并可随意争夺的范围之内。这就造成了一种“公地悲剧”。[119]可以预料，占多数的 “无产者” 将会不遗余力地试图以牺牲占少数的 “有产者” 为代价来使自己致富。这并不是说只会存在一类 “无产者” 和一类 “有产者”，也不是说再分配会整齐划一地从富人向穷人进行。恰恰相反。虽然富人对穷人的再分配将始终发挥突出作用，但如果认为这将是唯一的甚至是最主要的再分配形式，那将是社会学上的一个大错。[120]毕竟，“永久 ”的富人和 “永久 ”的穷人通常都是有原因的。富人往往聪明且勤奋，而穷人通常愚笨、懒惰，或者两者兼具。[121]即使蠢笨的人占多数，他们也不太可能系统地比聪明人更聪明，并以牺牲少数聪明和精力充沛的人的利益为代价使自己致富。相反，大多数再分配将发生在 “非贫困” 群体内部，而且往往实际上是境况较好的人成功地让境况较差的人对其进行补贴。例如，考虑一下几乎普遍存在的提供 “免费” 大学教育的做法，在这种情况下，工人阶级（其子女很少上大学）通过纳税为中产阶级子女的教育买单！[122] 此外，可以预料会有许多相互竞争的团体和联盟试图以牺牲他人为代价来获利。将会有各种各样不断变化的标准来界定是什么让一个人成为“有产者”（理应被掠夺），而另一个人成为“无产者”（理应获取掠夺所得）。与此同时，个人会成为众多“有产者”和/或“无产者”团体的成员，会因自身的某一特征而受损，又会因另一特征而获益，一些人最终会成为再分配中的净受损者，而另一些人则会成为净受益者。认识到民主是一种大众财富和收入再分配的机制，再结合经济学中最基本的原理之一，即人们最终会获得更多得到补贴的东西，这为理解当今时代提供了关键。[123]

All redistribution，regardless of the criterion on which it is based，involves “taking” from the original owners and/or producers （the “havers” of something） and “giving” to nonowners and nonproducers （the “non havers” of something）。The incentive to be an original owner or producer of the thing in question is reduced，and the incentive to be a nonowner and nonproducer is raised.Accordingly，as a result of subsidizing indi viduals because they are poor，there will be more poverty。By subsidizing people because they are unemployed，more unemployment will be cre ated.Supporting single mothers out of tax funds will lead to an increase in single motherhood，“illegitimacy，” and divorce. 9 In outlawing child labor，income is transferred from families with children to childless persons （as a result of the legal restriction on the supply of labor，wage rates will rise）。Accordingly，the birthrate will fall。On the other hand，by subsidizing the education of children，the opposite effect is created.Income is transferred from the childless and those with few children to those with many children.As a result the birthrate will increase.Yet then the value of children will again fall，and birthrates will decline as a result of the socalled social security system，for in subsidizing retirees （the old） out of taxes imposed on current income earners （the young），the institution of a family—the intergenerational bond between parents，grandparents，and children—is systematically weakened.The old need no longerrely on the assistance of their children if they have made no provision for their own old age，and the young （with typically less accumulated wealth） must support the old （with typically more accumulated wealth） rather than the other way around，as is typical within families.Parents’ wish for children，and childrens’ wish for parents will decline，family breakups and dysfunctional families will increase，and provisionary action—saving and capital formation—will fall，while consumption rises.10

所有的再分配，无论其所依据的标准是什么，都涉及从事物的原始所有者和/或生产者（“拥有者”）那里 “拿走”，并 “给予 ”非所有者和非生产者（“非拥有者”）。这就降低了成为相关物品的原所有者或生产者的积极性，而提高了成为非所有者和非生产者的积极性。因此，由于因某人贫穷就对其进行补贴，贫困现象将会增多。因某人失业就对其进行补贴，将会制造出更多的失业情况。用税收资金资助单身母亲，将会导致单身母亲数量增加、“非婚生育” 现象增多以及离婚率上升。[124] 在禁止使用童工的情况下，收入会从有孩子的家庭转移到没有孩子的人手中（由于对劳动力供给的法律限制，工资率将会上升）。相应地，出生率将会下降。另一方面，通过对儿童教育进行补贴，则会产生相反的效果。收入会从没有孩子和孩子较少的人转移到孩子较多的人手中。结果，出生率将会上升。然而，随后儿童的价值又会下降，并且由于所谓的社会保障制度，出生率将会再次下降，因为通过向当前的收入赚取者（年轻人）征税来补贴退休人员（老年人），家庭这一制度——父母、祖父母和子女之间的代际纽带——被系统性地削弱了。如果老年人没有为自己的晚年生活做准备，他们就不再需要依靠子女的帮助，而年轻人（通常积累的财富较少）必须赡养老年人（通常积累的财富较多），而不是像家庭中通常那样相反的情况。父母对子女的期望以及子女对父母的期望都会降低，家庭破裂和家庭功能失调的情况将会增加，储蓄和资本形成等预备性行动将会减少，而消费将会增加。[125]

As a result of subsidizing the malingerers，the neurotics，the careless，the alcoholics，the drug addicts，the AIDSinfected，and the physically and mentally “challenged” through insurance regulation and compulsory health insurance，there will be more illness，malingering，neuroticism，carelessness，alcoholism，drug addiction，AIDS infection，and physical and mental retardation.11 By forcing noncriminals，including the victims of crime，to pay for the imprisonment of criminals （rather than making criminals compensate theirvictims and pay the full cost of their own apprehension and incarcera tion），crime willincrease.12 By forcing businessmen，through “affirmative action” （nondiscrimination） programs，to employ more women，homo sexuals，blacks，or other “minorities” than they would like to，there will be more employed minorities，and fewer employers and fewer male，het erosexual，and white employment。13 By compelling private land owners to subsidize （“protect”） “endangered species” residing on their land through environmental legislation，there will be more and betteroff animals，and fewer and worseoff humans.14

通过保险监管和强制医疗保险来补贴精神错乱者、神经质者、粗心大意者、酗酒者、吸毒者、艾滋病感染者以及身心 “残障 ”者，将会导致更多的疾病、精神错乱、酗酒、吸毒、艾滋病感染以及身心残障。[126]通过强迫包括犯罪受害者在内的非罪犯为罪犯的监禁买单（而不是让罪犯赔偿其受害者并支付抓捕和监禁他们自己的全部费用），犯罪将会增加。[127]通过 “平权运动”（非歧视）计划强迫商人雇用超过他们原本愿意雇用的更多的女性、同性恋者、黑人或其他 “少数群体” 成员，那么将会有更多被雇用的少数群体成员，但雇主数量会减少，男性、异性恋者以及白人的就业机会也会减少。[128] 通过环境立法迫使私人土地所有者补贴（“保护”）栖息在其土地上的“濒危物种”，将会出现更多、境况更好的动物，而人类的数量会减少，境况也会变差。[129]

Most importantly，by compelling private property owners and/or market income earners （producers） to subsidize “politicians，” “political par ties，” and “civil servants” （politicians and government employees do not pay taxes but are paid out of taxes），15 there will be less wealth formation， fewer producers and less productivity，and ever morewaste，“parasites” and parasitism.

最重要的是，通过强迫私有财产所有者和/或市场收入赚取者（生产者）去补贴“政客”、“政党”以及“公务员”（政客和政府雇员不纳税，却靠税收来获取收入），[130]将会导致财富形成减少、生产者数量减少、生产率降低，并且会出现越来越多的浪费、“寄生虫”以及寄生现象。

Businessmen （capitalists） and their employees cannot earn an income unless they produce goods or services which are sold in markets.The buyers’ purchases are voluntary。By buying a good or service，the buyers （consumers） demonstrate that they prefer this good or service over the sum of money that they must surrender in order to acquire it。In contrast，politicians，parties，and civil servants produce nothing which is sold in markets.No one buys government “goods” or “services.” They are produced，and costs are incurred to produce them，but they are not sold and bought。On the one hand，this implies that it is impossible to determine their value and find out whether or not this value justifies their costs.because no one buys them，no one actu ally demonstrates that he considers government goods and services worth their costs，and indeed，whether or not anyone attaches any value to them at all。From the viewpoint of economic theory，it is thus entirely illegitimate to assume，as is always done in national income accounting，that government goods and services are worth what it costs to produce them，and then to simply add this value to that of the “normal，” privately produced （bought and sold） goods and services to arrive at gross domestic （or national） prod uct，for instancE.It might as well be assumed that government goods and services are worth nothing，or even that they are not “goods” at all but “bads，” and hence，that the cost of politicians and the entire civil service should be subtracted from the total value of privately produced goods and services.Indeed，to assume this would be far more justified.For on the other hand，as to its practical implications，the subsidizing of politicians and civil servants amounts to a subsidy to “produce” with little or no regard for the wellbeing of one’s alleged consumers，and with much or sole regard instead for the wellbeing of the “producers，” i.e.，the politicians and civil servants.Their salaries remain the same，whether their output satisfies consumers or not。Accordingly，as a result of the expansion of “public” sector employ ment，there will be in creasing laziness，carelessness，incompetence，disser vice，maltreatment，waste，and even destruction—and at the same time ever more arrogance，demagoguery，and lies （“we work for the public good”）。[131]

After less than one hundred years of democracy and redistribution，the predictable results are iN.The “reserve fund” that was inherited from the past is apparently exhausted.For several decades （since the late 1960s or the early 1970s），real standards of living have stagnated or even fallen in the West。[132] The “public” debt and the cost of the existing social security and health care system have brought on the prospect of an imminent economic meltdowN.[133] At the same time，almost every form of undesirable behav ior，unemployment，welfare dependency，negligence，recklessness，incivility，psychopathy，hedonism，and crime has increased，and social confiict and societal breakdown have risen to dangerous heights.[134] If current trends con tinue，it is safe to say that the Western welfare state （social democracy） will collapse just as Eastern （Russianstyle） socialism collapsed in the late 1980s.

However，economic collapse does not automatically lead to improve ment。Matters can become worse rather than better。What is necessary besides a crisis are ideas—correct ideas—and men capable of understanding and implementing them once the opportunity arises.Ultimately，the course of history is determined by ideas，be they true or false，and by men acting upon and being inspired by true or false ideas.The current mess is also the result of ideas.It is the result of the overwhelming acceptance，by public opinion，of the idea of democracy。As long as this acceptance prevails，a catastrophe is unavoidable，and there can be no hope for improvement even after its arrival。On the other hand，as soon as the idea of democracy is rec ognized as false and vicious—and ideas can，in principle，be changed almost instantaneously—a catastrophe can be avoided.

The central task of those wanting to turn the tide and prevent an out right breakdown is the “delegitimation” of the idea of democracy as the root cause of the present state of progressive “civilization.” To this purpose，one should first point out that it is difficult to find many proponents of democracy in the history of political theory。Almost all major thinkers had nothing but contempt for democracy。Even the Founding Fathers of the U.S.，nowadays considered the model of a democracy，were strictly opposed to it。Without a single exception，they thought of democracy as nothing but mobrule.They considered themselves to be members of a “natural aristoc racy，” and rather than a democracy they advocated an aristocratic republic。[135] Furthermore，even among the few theoretical defenders of democracy such as Rousseau，for instance，it is almost impossible to find anyone advocat ing democracy for anything but extremely small communities （villages or towns）。Indeed，in small communities where everyone knows everyone else personally，most people must acknowledge that the position of the “haves” is typically based on their superior personal achievement just as the position of the “havenots” finds its typical explanation in their personal deficiencies and inferiority。Under these circumstances，it is far more difficult to get away with trying to loot other people and their personal property to one’s advantage.In distinct contrast，in large territories encompassing millions or even hundreds of millions of people，where the potential looters do not know their victims，and vice versa，the human desire to enrich oneself at another’s expense is subject to little or no restraint。[136]

More importantly，it must be made clear again that the idea of democ racy is immoral as well as uneconomical。As for the moral status of majority rule，it must be pointed out that it allows for A and B to band together to rip off C，C and A in turn joining to rip off B，and then B and C conspiring against A，and so oN.This is not justice but a moral outrage，and rather than treating democracy and democrats with respect，they should be treated with open contempt and ridiculed as moral frauds.[137]

On the other hand，as for the economic quality of democracy，it must be stressed relentlessly that it is not democracy but private property，production，and voluntary exchange that are the ultimate sources of human civilization and prosperity。In particular，contrary to widespread myths，it needs to be emphasized that the lack of democracy had essentially noth ing to do with the bankruptcy of Russianstyle socialism.It was not the selection principle for politicians that constituted socialism’s problem.It was politics and political decisionmaking as sucH.Instead of each private producer deciding independently what to do with particular resources，as under a regime of private property and contractualism，with fully or par tially socialized factors of production each decision requires someone else’s permissioN.It is irrelevant to the producer how those giving permission are choseN.What matters to him is that permission must be sought at all。As long as this is the case，the incentive of producers to produce is reduced and impoverishment will ensuE.Private property is as incompat ible with democracy as it is with any other form of political rule.[138] Rather than democracy，justice as well as economic efficiency require a pure and unrestricted private property society，an “anarchy of production” in which no one rules anybody，and all producers’ relations are voluntary and thus mutually beneficial。[139]

Lastly，as for strategic considerations，in order to approach the goal of a nonexploitative social order，i.e.，private property anarchy，the idea of majoritarianism should be turned against democratic rule itself。Under any form of governmental rule，including a democracy，the “ruling class” （politicians and civil servants） represents only a small proportion of the total populatioN.While it is possible that one hundred parasites may lead a com fortable life on the products of one thousand hosts，one thousand parasites cannot live off one hundred hosts.Based on the recognition of this fact，it would appear possible to persuade a majority of the voters that it is adding insult to injury to let those living off other peoples’ taxes have a say in how high these taxes are，and to thus decide，democratically，to take the right to vote away from all government employees and everyone who receives government benefits，whether they are welfare recipients or government contractors.

In addition，in conjunction with this strategy it is necessary to rec ognize the overwhelming importance of secession and secessionist movements.If majority decisions are “right，” then the largest of all possible majorities，a world majority and a democratic world government，must be considered ultimately “right，”[140] with the consequences predicted at the outset of this chapter。In contrast，secession always involves the break ing away of smaller from larger populations.It is thus a vote against the principle of democracy and majoritarianism.The further the process of secession proceeds to the level of small regions，cities，city districts，towns，villages，and ultimately individual households and voluntary associa tions of private households and firms，the more difficult it will become to maintain the current level of redistributive policies.At the same time，the smaller the territorial units，the more likely it will be that a few individu als，based on the popular recognition of their economic independence，outstanding professional achievement，morally impeccable personal life，superior judgment，courage，and taste，will rise to the rank of natural，vol untarily acknowledged elites and lend legitimacy to the idea of a natural order of competing （nonmonopolistic） and freely （voluntarily） financed peacekeepers，judges，and overlapping jurisdictions as exists even now in the arena of international trade and travel。A pure private law society is the answer to democracy and any other form of political （coercive） rule.[141]

Part Two Money，State，and defense

第二辑：货币、国家和安保

10 国家为何要求控制货币*

Why the State Demands the Control of Money

Imagine you are in command of the state，defined as an institution that possesses a territorial monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking in every case of conflict，including conflicts involving the state and its agents itself，and，by implication，the right to tax，i.e.，to unilaterally determine the price that your subjects must pay you to perform the task of ultimate decisionmaking。To act under these constraints—or rather，lack of constraints—is what constitutes politics and political action，and it should be clear from the out set that politics，then，by its very nature，always means mischief。Not from your point of view，of course，but mischief from the point of view of those subject to your rule as ultimate judge.Predictably，you will use your position to enrich yourself at other people’s expense.

想象一下，你是国家的统帅，而国家的定义是，在任何冲突的情况下，包括涉及国家及其代理人本身的冲突，你都拥有领土上的终极决策垄断权，以及隐含的征税权，即单方面决定你的国民为完成终极决策任务而必须向你支付的价格。在这些约束——或者更确切地说，缺乏约束——下行动，构成政治和政治行动的要素，从我们的界定中可以清楚地看出，政治，就其本质而言，总是意味着损害。当然，不是从你的角度来看，而是从那些接受你作为最终裁决，服从你的统治的人的角度来看。可以预见的是，你会利用自己的地位损人利己。

More specifically，we can predict in particular what your attitude and policy visàvis money and banking will be.

更具体地说，我们尤其可以预测你对货币和银行业的态度和政策。

Assume that you rule over a territory that has developed beyond the stage of a primitive barter economy and where a common medium of exchange，i.e.，a money，is in usE.First off，it is easy to see why you would be particularly interested in money and monetary affairs.As state ruler，you can in principle confiscate whatever you want and provide yourself with an unearned income.But rather than confiscating various producer or consumer goods，you will naturally prefer to confiscate money。because money，as the most easily and widely saleable and acceptable good of all，allows you the greatest freedom to spend your income as you like，on the greatest vari ety of goods.First and foremost，then，the taxes you impose on society will be money taxes，whether on property or income.You will want to maximize your moneytax revenues.

假设你统治的领土已经超越了原始的物物交换的经济的阶段，使用一种共同的交换媒介，即货币。不难理解，你为什么会对金钱和货币交易特别感兴趣。作为国家统治者，你原则上可以随心所欲地征收税款，为自己提供不劳而获的收入。但是，与其向各种生产资料或消费商品课税，你自然更愿意想货币收入课税。因为货币作为最适销和最容易被广泛接受的商品，给了你最大的自由，可以随心所欲地把你的收入花在各种各样的商品上。最首要的是，你对社会征收的税将是货币税，无论是财产税还是所得税。你希望货币税收入最大化。

In this attempt，however，you will quickly encounter some rather intractable difficulties.Eventually，your attempts to further increase your tax income will encounter resistance in that higher tax rates will not lead to higher but to lower tax revenuE.Your income—your spending money— declines，because producers，burdened with increasingly higher tax rates，simply produce less.

然而，在这一尝试中，你很快就会遇到一些相当棘手的困难。最终，你进一步提高税收收入的尝试会遇到阻力，因为税率的提高不会导致税收收入的增加，反而会导致税收收入的减少。你的收入——你的支出——下降了，因为生产者在税率越来越高的情况下，只会减少生产。

In this situation，you only have one other option to further increase or at least maintain your current level of spending：by borrowing such funds.And for that you must go to banks—and hence your special interest also in banks and the banking industry。If you borrow money from banks，these banks will automatically take an active interest in your future wellbeing。They will want you to stay in business，i.e.，they want the state to go on in its exploitation business.And since banks tend to be major players in society，such support is certainly beneficial to you。On the other hand，as a negative，if you borrow money from banks you are not only expected to pay your loan back，but to pay interest on top.

在这种情况下，要想进一步增加或至少维持现有的支出水平，你只有一个选择：借贷资金。为此，你必须去银行——因此你对银行和银行业也特别感兴趣。如果你向银行借款，这些银行就会积极主动地关注你的未来福祉。他们希望你继续统治下去，也就是说，他们希望国家继续其剥削业务。而且，由于银行往往在社会中扮演重要的角色，因此这种支持对你来说无疑是有益的。另一方面，作为负面因素，如果你从银行借钱，你不仅要偿还贷款，还要支付利息。

The question，then，that arises for you as the ruler is，How can I free myself of these two constraints，i.e.，of taxresistance in the form of falling tax revenue and of the need to borrow from and pay interest to banks？It is not too difficult to see what the ultimate solution to your problem is.

那么，作为统治者，你所面临的问题是：我如何才能摆脱这两个制约因素，即税收减少带来的税收阻力，以及向银行借款并支付利息的必要性？我们不难看出问题的最终解决方法是什么。

You can reach the desired independence of taxpayers and tax payments and of banks，if only you establish yourself first as a territorial monopolist of the production of money。On your territory，only you are permitted to produce money。But that is not sufficient。because as long as money is a regular good that must be expensively produced，there is nothing in it for you except expenses.More importantly，then，you must use your monopoly position in order to lower the production cost and the quality of money as close as possible to zero。Instead of costly quality money such as gold or silver，you must see to it that worthless pieces of paper that can be produced at practically zero cost will become money。（Normally，no one would accept worthless pieces of paper as payment for anything。Pieces of paper are acceptable as payment only insofar as they are titles to something else，i.e.，property titles.In other words then，you must replace pieces of paper that were titles to money with pieces of paper that are titles to nothing。）

只要你首先确立自己在货币生产领域的垄断者地位，你就可以实现纳税人、纳税和银行所期望的独立性。在你的领土上，只有你可以生产货币。但这并不足够，因为只要货币是一种必须以昂贵代价生产的常规商品，那么对你来说，除了开支之外，它对你就毫无益处。更重要的是，你必须利用你的垄断地位，尽可能地降低货币的生产成本和货币成色，使其趋近于零。你必须确保那些几乎可以零成本生产的毫无价值的纸张变成货币，而不是像黄金或白银这样昂贵的优质货币。（通常情况下，没有人会接受毫无价值的纸片作为任何东西的支付。只有当纸片是其他物品的所有权（即财产所有权）的情况下，它们才可以作为付款方式。换句话说，你必须用没有任何所有权的纸片来代替有货币所有权的纸片。）

Under competitive conditions，i.e.，if everyone were free to produce money，a money that can be produced at almost zero cost would be produced up to a quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost，and because marginal cost is zero the marginal revenue，i.e.，the purchasing power of this money，would be zero as well。Hence，the necessity to monopolize the production of paper money，so as to restrict its supply，in order to avoid hyper infiationary conditions and the disappearance of money from the market altogether （and a fiight into “real values”）—and the more so the cheaper the money commodity。

在竞争条件下，即如果每个人都可以自由地生产货币，那么几乎可以零成本生产的货币的生产量就会达到边际收益等于边际成本的数量，而由于边际成本为零，边际收益，即这种货币的购买力，也将为零。因此，有必要垄断纸币的生产，以限制其供应，从而避免出现恶性通货膨胀的情况和货币从市场上完全消失（以及向“实际价值”的逃离）——而且货币商品越便宜，就越有必要这样做。

In a way，you have thus accomplished what all alchemists and their sponsors wanted to achieve：you have produced something valuable （money with purchasing power） out of something practically worthless.What an achievement。It costs you practically nothing and you can turn around and buy yourself something really valuable，such as a house or a Mercedes； and you can achieve these wonders not just for yourself but also for your friends and acquaintances，of which you discover that you have all of a sudden far more than you used to have （including many economists，who explain why your monopoly is really good for everyone）。

在某种程度上，你已经实现了所有炼金士和他们的赞助商想要实现的目标：你已经实际上从一些毫无价值的东西中创造出了有价值的东西（有购买力的货币）。多么了不起的成就啊。它几乎不花一分钱，就能为自己买到真正有价值的东西，如房子或奔驰车；你不仅可以为自己创造这些奇迹，也可以为你的朋友和熟人创造这些奇迹，你会突然发现你拥有的比以前多得多（包括许多经济学家，他们解释了为什么你的垄断对每个人都有好处）。

What are the effects？ First and foremost，more paper money does not in the slightest affect the quantity or quality of all other，nonmonetary goods.There exist just as many other goods around as beforE.This imme diately refutes the notion—apparently held by most if not all mainstream economists—that “more” money can somehow increase “social wealtH.” To believe this，as everyone proposing a socalled easymoney policy as an effi cient and “socially responsible” way out of economic troubles apparently does，is to believe in magic：that stones—or rather paper—can be turned into bread.

有什么影响？首先，更多的纸币丝毫不会影响所有其他非货币商品的数量和质量。周围的其他商品与以前一样多。这直接驳斥了 “更多 “的货币能以某种方式增加 “社会财富”的观点——这种观点显然为大多数甚至所有主流经济学家所持有。显然，每个提出所谓宽松货币政策作为摆脱经济困境的有效便捷且 “对社会负责 “的方法的人都相信这一点，这就等于相信魔法：石头——或者说纸——可以变成面包。

Rather，what the additional money you printed will effect is twofold.On the one hand，money prices will be higher than they would otherwise be，and the purchasing power per unit of money will be lower。In a word，the result will be infiatioN.More importantly，however，all the while the greater amount of money does not increase （or decrease） the total amount of presently existing social wealth （the total quantity of all goods in society），it redistributes the existing wealth in favor of you and your friends and acquaintances，i.e.，those who get your money first。You and your friends are relatively enriched （own a larger part of the total social wealth） at the expense of impoverishing others （who as a result own less）。

相反，多印的钱会带来两方面的影响。一方面，货币价格会比原来高，单位货币的购买力会降低。一言以蔽之，结果将是通货膨胀。然而，更重要的是，无论如何，在货币数量增加的同时，并没有增加（或减少）现有社会财富的总量（社会中所有商品的总量），而是重新分配了现有财富，使之有利于你和你的朋友及熟人，即那些先得到你的钱的人。你和你的朋友相对更富裕了（拥有了社会财富总量的更大的一部分），而其他人却更贫穷了（他们拥有的财富更少了）。

The problem，for you and your friends，with this institutional setup is not that it doesn’t work。It works perfectly，always to your own （and your friends’） advantage and always at the expense of others.All you have to do is to avoid hyperinfiatioN.For in that case people would avoid using money and fiee into real values，thus robbing you of your magic wand.The problem with your papermoney monopoly，if there is one at all，is only that this fact will be immediately noticed also by others and recognized as the big，criminal ripoff that it indeed is.

对你和你的朋友来说，这种制度设置的问题并不在于它不起作用。它运作完美，总是对你自己（和你的朋友）有利，而且总是以牺牲他人利益为代价。你所要做的就是避免恶性通货膨胀。因为在这种情况下，人们会避免使用金钱而逃往真正的价值，从而剥夺你的魔杖。你的纸币垄断的问题，如果有的话，只是这个事实也会立即被其他人注意到，并认为这是一个巨大的犯罪的欺诈行为，当然，它确实就是。

But this problem can be overcome，too，if，in addition to monopolizing the production of money，you also set yourself up as a banker and enter the banking business with the establishment of a central bank。

但这个问题也是可以克服的，如果你除了垄断货币生产之外，还自封为银行家，并通过建立中央银行进入银行业。

because you can create paper money out of thin air，you can also create credit out of thin air。In fact，because you can create credit out of nothing （without any savings on your part），you can offer loans at cheaper rates than anyone else，even at an interest rate as low as zero （or even at a negative rate）。With this ability，not only is your former dependency on banks and the banking industry eliminated； you can，moreover，make banks dependent on you，and you can forge a permanent alliance and complicity between banks and statE.You don’t even have to become involved in the business of invest ing the credit yourself。That task，and the risk involved in it，you can safely leave to commercial banks.What you，your central bank，need to do is only this：You create credit out of thin air and then loan this money，at below market interest rates，to commercial banks.Instead of you paying interest to banks，banks now pay interest to you。And the banks in turn loan out your newly created easy credit to their business friends at somewhat higher but still submarket interest rates （to earn from the interest differential）。In addition，to make the banks especially keen on working with you，you may permit the banks to create a certain amount of their own new credit （of checkbook money） in addition and on top of the credit that you have cre ated （fractionalreserve banking）。

因为你可以凭空创造纸币，所以你也可以凭空创造信用。事实上，因为你可以凭空创造信用（你没有任何储蓄），所以你可以以比别人更低的利率，甚至低至零利率（甚至是负利率）提供贷款。有了这种能力，你不仅可以消除以前对银行和银行业的依赖，此外，你还可以使银行依赖你，你可以在银行和国家之间建立永久的联盟和共谋关系。你甚至不需要亲自参与投资信贷的业务。这个任务，以及其中的风险，你可以放心地交给商业银行。你们的中央银行需要做的只是：凭空创造信贷，然后把这些钱以低于市场利率的价格贷给商业银行。现在不是你向银行支付利息，而是银行向你支付利息。反过来，银行将你新创建的宽松信贷贷款给他们的商业朋友，利率略高，但仍低于市场（从利差中获利）。你甚至不需要亲自参与投资信贷的业务。这个任务，以及其中的风险，你可以放心地交给商业银行。你们的中央银行需要做的只是：凭空创造信贷，然后把这些钱以低于市场利率的价格贷给商业银行。现在不是你向银行支付利息，而是银行向你支付利息。反过来，银行将你新创建的宽松信贷贷款给他们的商业朋友，利率略高，但仍低于市场（从利差中获利）。此外，为了使银行特别热衷于与你合作，你可以允许银行在你已经创造的信用（部分准备金银行）的基础上创造一定数量的新信用（支票簿上的钱）。

What are the consequences of this monetary policy？ To a large extent they are the same as with an easy money policy：First，an easy credit policy is also infiationary。More money is brought into circulation and prices will be higher，and the purchasing power of money lower，than would have been the case otherwisE.Second，the credit expansion too has no effect on the quantity or quality of all goods currently in existencE.It neither increases nor decreases their amount。More money is just this：more paper。It does not and cannot increase social wealth by one iota.Third，easy credit also engen ders a systematic redistribution of social wealth in favor of you，the central bank，and the commercial banks within your cartel。You receive an interest return on money that you have created at practically zero cost out of thin air （instead of on money costly saved out of an existing income），and so do the banks，who earn additional interest on your costless money loans.both you and your banker friends thereby appropriate an “unearned income.” You and the banks are enriched at the expense of all “real” money savers （who receive a lower interest return than they otherwise would，i.e.，without the injection of your and the banks’ cheap credit into the credit market）。

这种货币政策的后果是什么？在很大程度上，它们与宽松的货币政策是一样的：首先，宽松的信贷政策也会导致通货膨胀。更多的货币进入流通，物价会比其他情况下更高，货币的购买力会比其他情况下更低。其次，信贷扩张对当前存在的所有商品的数量和质量也没有影响。它既不增加也不减少它们的数量。更多的货币就是更多的纸。它不会也不可能使社会财富增加一点。第三，宽松的信贷还造成了社会财富的系统性再分配，有利于你、中央银行以及你的卡特尔成员的商业银行。你用几乎零成本凭空创造的资金（而不是用现有收入节省下来的资金）获得利息回报，银行也是如此，他们从你的无成本资金贷款中赚取额外利息。因此，你和你的银行家朋友都有一笔“不劳而获的收入”。你和银行卡特尔联盟，以牺牲所有 “真正 “的货币储蓄者（他们获得的利息回报低于他们本应获得的回报，即在没有你们和银行的廉价信贷注入信贷市场的情况下）的利益为代价而致富。

On the other hand，there also exists a fundamental difference between an easy，printandspend money policy and an easy，printandloan credit policy。

另一方面，宽松的印钞货币政策和宽松的印贷政策之间也存在着根本的区别。

First off，an easy credit policy changes the production structure—what is produced and by whom—in a highly significant way。

首先，宽松的信贷政策在很大程度上改变了生产结构——生产什么，谁来生产。

You，the chief of the central bank，can create credit out of thin air。You do not have to first save money out of your money income，i.e.，cut your own expenses，and thus abstain from buying certain nonmoney goods （as every normal person must，if he extends credit to someone）。You only have to turn on the printing press and can thus undercut any interest rate demanded of borrowers by savers elsewhere in the market。Granting credit does not involve any sacrifice on your part （which is why this institution is so “nice”）。If things then go well，you will be paid a positiveinterest return on your paper investment，and if they don’t go well—well，as the monopoly producer of money，you can always make up losses more easily than anyone else：by covering your losses with even more printed paper。

你，央行行长，可以凭空创造信贷。你不必先从你的金钱收入中存钱，即削减自己的开支，从而不购买某些非货币商品每个正常人在向他人提供信贷时都必须这样做）。你只需开动印钞机，就可以降低市场上其他地方的储户对借款人提出的任何利率要求。发放贷款不需要你做出任何牺牲（这就是为什么这个机构如此之“好”）。如果一切顺利，你的纸质投资将获得正的利息回报，如果进展不顺，作为货币的垄断生产者，你总能比其他人更容易地弥补损失：印刷更多的纸张来掩盖你的损失。

Without costs and no genuine，personal risk of losses，then，you can grant credit essentially indiscriminately，to everyone and for any purpose，without concern for the creditworthiness of the debtor or the soundness of his business plaN.because of your “easy” credit，certain people （in particular investment bankers） who otherwise would not be deemed sufficiently cred itworthy，and certain projects （in particular of banks and their main clients） that would not be considered profitable but wasteful or too risky instead do get credit and do get funded.

没有成本，也没有真正的个人损失风险，那么，你基本上就可以不加区别地向每个人、为任何目的发放信贷，而不必担心债务人的信誉或其商业计划的可靠性。由于你的“宽松”信贷，某些人（特别是投资银行家）本来不会被认为有足够的信用，而某些项目（特别是银行及其主要客户）不会被认为有利可图，而是浪费的或风险太大的，却获得了信贷并得到了资金。

Essentially，the same applies to the commercial banks within your banking cartel。because of their special relationship to you，as the first recipients of your costless lowinterest papermoney credit，the banks，too，can offer loans to prospective lenders at interest rates below market interest rates—and if things go well for them they go well； and if they don’t，they can rely on you，as the monopolistic producer of money，to bail them out in the same way as you bail yourself out of any financial trouble：by more paper money。Accordingly，the banks too will be less discriminating in the selection of their clients and their business plans and more prone to fund ing the “wrong” people and the “wrong” projects.

从本质上讲，这同样适用于你银行卡特尔中的商业银行。由于它们与你的特殊关系，作为你无成本低息纸币信贷的第一批接受者，银行也可以以低于市场利率的利率向潜在贷款人提供贷款——如果事情进展顺利，他们就会这么干，如果情况不妙，他们就可以依靠你，作为垄断性的货币生产者，用更多的纸币来拯救他们，就像你用更多的纸币从金融危机中拯救自己一样。相应地，银行在选择客户和商业计划时也会减少辨别力，而更倾向于为“错误的”人和“错误的”项目提供资金。

And there is a second significant difference between a printandspend and a printandloan policy and this difference explains why the income and wealth redistribution in your and your banker friends’ favor that is set in motion by easy credit takes the specific form of a temporal—boom–bust— cycle，i.e.，of an initial phase of seeming general prosperity （of expected increases in future incomes and wealth） followed by a phase of widespread impoverishment （when the prosperity of the boom period is revealed as a widespread illusion）。

此外，”印钞政策 “与 “印信政策 “之间还有第二个重大区别，这一区别解释了为什么你们和你们的银行家同僚们的收入和财富再分配会因宽松的信贷而受到时间上的 “繁荣萧条周期 “的影响，即初期看似普遍繁荣（预期未来收入和财富会增加），随后却普遍陷入贫困（繁荣时期的繁荣被揭示为普遍的幻觉）。

This boom–bust feature is the logical—and physically necessary—con sequence of credit created out of thin air，of credit unbacked by savings，of fiduciary credit （or however else you may call it） and of the fact that every investment takes time and only shows later on，at some time in the future，whether it is successful or not。

这种繁荣-萧条的特征是以下所列诸因素的逻辑上和自然规律的必然结果：无中生有的信贷、没有储蓄支持的信贷、信托信贷（无论你如何称呼它），以及每一项投资都需要时间，且只有在未来的某个时候才会验证它成功与否。

The reason for the business cycle is as elementary as it is fundamental。Robinson Crusoe can give a loan of fish （which he has not consumed） to Friday。Friday can convert these savings into a fishing net （he can eat the fish while constructing the net），and with the help of the net，then，Friday，in principle，is capable of repaying his loan to Robinson，plus interest，and still earn a profit of additional fish for himself。But this is physically impossible if Robinson’s loan is only a paper note，denominated in fish，but unbacked by real fish savings，i.e.，if Robinson has no fish because he has consumed them all。

商业周期的原因既基本又必不可少。鲁滨逊·鲁滨逊可以借给星期五一条鱼（他还没有吃掉）。星期五可以把这些储蓄转化成一张渔网（他可以在织网的同时吃到鱼），在渔网的帮助下，星期五原则上有能力偿还鲁滨逊借给他的贷款，加上利息，而且还能为自己赚到更多的鱼。如果鲁滨逊的贷款只是一张以鱼计价的纸币，但没有真正的鱼储蓄作为担保。鲁滨逊并没有鱼，因为他已经吃光了所有的鱼，于是前述的过程实际上就不可能发生。

Then，and necessarily so，Friday must fail in his investment endeavor。In a simple barter economy，of course，this becomes immediately apparent。Friday will not accept Robinson’s paper credit in the first place （but only real，commodity credit），and because of this，the boom–bust cycle will not get started.But in a complex monetary economy，the fact that credit was created out of thin air is not noticeable：every credit note looks like any other，and because of this the notes are accepted by the takers of credit。

那么，星期五的投资努力必然会失败。当然，在简单的物物交换经济中，这一点立即变得显而易见。星期五首先不会接受鲁滨逊的纸币信用（而只会接受真实的商品信用），正因为如此，繁荣-萧条周期不会开始。但在一个复杂的货币经济中，凭空创造出的信用并不会引起人们的注意：每张信用纸币看起来都和其他纸币一样，正因为如此，这些纸币才会被信贷用户接受。

This does not change the fundamental fact of reality that nothing can be produced out of nothing and that investment projects undertaken with out any real funding whatsoever （by savings） must fail，but it explains why a boom—an increased level of investment accompanied by the expectation of higher future income and wealth—can get started （Friday does accept the note instead of immediately refusing it）。And it explains why it then takes a while until the physical reality reasserts itself and reveals such expectations as illusory。

这并不能改变现实的基本事实，即任何东西都不可能无中生有，没有任何实际资金（储蓄）的情况下投资的项目一定会失败，但它解释了为什么繁荣——投资水平的提高伴随着对未来收入和财富的更高预期——能够开始（星期五确实接受了这张纸币，而不是立即拒绝）。这也解释了为什么需要一段时间，物理现实才会重现自己，并揭示这种期望是虚幻的。

But what’s a little crisis to you？ Even if your path to riches is through repeated crises，brought about by your papermoney regime and central bank policies，from your point of view—from the viewpoint as the head of state and chief of the central bank—this form of printandloan wealth redistribution in your own and your banker friends’ favor，while less imme diate than that achieved with a simple printandspend policy，is still much preferable，because it is far more difficult to see through and recognize for what it is.Rather than coming across as a plain fraud and parasite，in pursu ing an easycredit policy you can even pretend that you are engaged in the selfiess task of “investing in the future” （rather than spending on present frivolities） and “healing” economic crises （rather than causing them）。

但对你们来说，一点小危机又算得了什么呢？即使你的致富之路是由纸币制度和中央银行政策带来的反复危机多铺就得，但从你的角度来看——从国家元首和中央银行行长的角度来看——这种有利于你自己和你的银行家朋友的印贷政策形式的财富再分配，虽然没有简单的印钞政策来得直接，但仍然更可取，因为它更难被看穿和认清。在推行宽松信贷政策的过程中，你甚至可以假装自己是在从事 “投资未来”（而不是花在眼前的蝇头小利上）和 “治愈 “经济危机（而不是制造危机）的无私的任务，而不是给人留下明显的骗子和寄生虫的印象。

What a world we live in!

我们生活在一个怎样的世界啊!

11利用法定财产和法定货币的企业家精神*

Entrepreneurship with Fiat Property and Fiat Money

let me begin with a brief description of what a capitalistentrepreneur does，and then explain how the job of the capitalistentrepreneur is changed under statist conditions.

What the capitalist does is this：He saves (or borrows saved funds)，hires labor，buys or rents capital goods and land，and he buys raw materials.Then he proceeds to produce his product or service，whatever it may be，and he hopes that he will make a profit。

首先，让我简要介绍一下资本企业家的工作，然后说明在国家主义条件下，资本企业家的工作是如何变化的。资本家的做法是：他储蓄（或借入储蓄资金）、雇用劳动力、购买或租用资本货物和土地，并购买原材料。然后，他开始生产他的产品或服务，不管是什么产品或服务，他希望能从中获利。

Profits are defined simply as an excess of sales revenue over the costs of production.The costs of production，however，do not determine the rev enuE.If the cost of production determined price and revenue，everyone could be a capitalist。No one would ever fail。Rather，it is anticipated prices and revenues that determine what production costs the capitalist can pos sibly afford.

利润被简单地定义为销售收入超过生产成本的部分。然而，生产成本并不能决定收入。如果生产成本决定了价格和收入，那么每个人都可以成为资本家，没有人会失败。相反，是预期的价格和收入决定了资本家可以承受的生产成本。

The capitalist does not know what the future prices will be or what quantity of his product will be bought at such prices.This depends on the consumers，and the capitalist has no control over them.The capitalist must speculate what the future demand for his products will be，and he can go wrong in his speculation，in which case he does not make profits but will incur losses instead.

资本家不知道未来的价格是多少，也不知道在这个价格上他的产品有多少会被买走。这取决于消费者，资本家无法控制他们。资本家必须推测他产品的未来需求量，而他的推测可能会出错，在这种情况下，他不仅无法获利，反而会蒙受损失。

To risk your own money in anticipation of an uncertain future demand is obviously a diffcult task。Great profits may await you，but so also may total financial ruin.Few people are willing to take this risk，and even fewer are good at it and stay in business for any length of time.In fact，there is even more to be said about the difficulty of being a capitalist。

为了不确定的未来的需求预期而拿自己的钱去冒险，这显然是一项艰巨的任务。可能会赚的盆满钵满，但也有可能血本无归。很少有人愿意去尝试这种风险，而善于冒险并能长久经营下去的人更是少之又少。事实上，资本家的艰辛一言难尽。

Every capitalist stands in permanent competition with every other one for the invariably limited amounts of money to be spent on their goods and services by consumers.Every product competes with every other product。Whenever consumers spend more (or less) on one thing，they must spend less (or more) on another。Even if a capitalist has produced a successful product and earned a profit，there is nothing that guarantees that this will go on.Other businessmen can imitate his product，produce it more cheaply，underbid his price and out compete him.To prevent this，every capitalist must thus continuously strive to lower his production costs.Yet even trying to produce whatever you produce ever more cheaply is not enough.

每个资本家都在与其他资本家进行长期竞争，以争夺消费者花在其商品和服务上的始终有限的资金。每种产品都相互竞争。每当消费者在一种产品上花费更多（或更少）时，他们就必须在另一种产品上花费更少（或更多）。即使资本家生产了一种成功的产品并赚取了利润，也不能保证这种情况会持续下去。其他商人可以模仿他的产品，以更低的价格生产，以低于他的价格与他竞争。为了防止发生这种情况，每个资本家都必须不断地努力降低他的生产成本。然而，仅仅努力以更低的成本生产你的产品是不够的。

The set of products offered by various capitalists is in constant flux，and so is the evaluation of these products by consumers.Continuously new or improved products are offered on the market and consumer tastes con stantly change.Nothing remains constant。The uncertainty of the future facing every capitalist never disappears.There is always the lure of profits but also the threat of losses.again，then，it is very difficult to be continu ously successful as a businessman and not to sink back to the rank of an employeE.

各种资本家提供的产品不断涌现，消费者对这些产品的评价也在不断变化。市场上不断出现新产品或改良产品，消费者的口味也在不断变化。没有什么是一成不变的。每个资本家所面临的未来的不确定性永远不会消失。既有利润的诱惑，也有亏损的威胁。同样，作为一名商人，要想持续取得成功而又不沦为一名打工仔，是非常困难的。

In all of this there is only one thing that the businessman can count on and take for granted，and that is his real，physical property—and even that is not safe，as we will seE.

在所有这一切中，只有一样东西是商人可以信赖并认为是理所当然的，那就是他的真实的、有形的财产——即使是这样，我们也会看到，这并不安全。

His real property comes in two forms.First，there are the physical resources，the means of production，including labor services，that the capi talist has bought or rented for some time and that he combines in order to produce whatever he produces.The value of all of these items is variable，as already explained.It depends ultimately on consumer evaluations.What is stable about them is only their physical character and capability。But with out this physical stability of his productive property the capitalist could not produce what he produces.

他的真实财货有两种形式。首先是有形资源，即生产资料，包括劳务，是资本家在一段时间内购买或租用的，他将这些资源结合起来，生产出他所生产的任何产品。如前所述，所有这些物品的价值都是可变的。它最终取决于消费者的评价。稳定的只是它们的物理特征和功能。但是，如果没有生产财产的这种物理上的稳定性，资本家就无法生产他所生产的产品。

Second，besides his productive property，the capitalist can count on his ownership of real money。Money is neither a consumer good nor a producer good.It is the common medium of exchange.As such，it is the most eas ily and widely sold good.And it is used as the unit of account。In order to calculate profit and loss，the capitalist needs recourse to money。The input factors and the output，his products to be produced，are incommensurable，like apples and oranges.They are made commensurable only insofar as they can all be expressed in terms of money。without money，economic calculation is impossible，as Ludwig von Mises above all has explained.The value of money，too，is variable，like the value of everything else.But money，too，has physical characteristics.It is commodity money，such as gold or silver，and money profits are reflected in an increase in the supply of this commod ity，gold or silver，at the disposal of the capitalist。

其次，除了生产财产，资本家还拥有真正的货币。货币既不是消费品，也不是生产品。它是通用的交换媒介。因此，它是最容易和最广泛销售的商品。它被用作记账单位。为了计算盈亏，资本家需要借助货币。投入要素和产出（即他要生产的产品），是不可比较的，就像苹果和橘子一样。只有当它们都可以用货币来表示时，它们才具有可比性。正如路德维希·冯·米塞斯首先解释的那样，没有货币，经济计算是不可能的。金钱的价值也是可变的，就像其他东西的价值一样。但金钱也有物理特征。它是商品货币（如黄金或白银），货币利润反映在资本家支配的这种商品，即黄金或白银供应的增加上。

What can be said，then，about both the capitalist’s means of production and his money，is this：their physical characteristics do not determine their value，but without their physical characteristics，they would have no value at all，and changes in the physical quality and quantity of his property do affect the value of his property，whatever other factors (such as changing consumer evaluations) may affect the value of his property also。

那么，关于资本家的生产资料和他的货币，我们可以说的是:它们的物理特性并不能决定它们的价值，但是如果没有它们的物理特性，它们就根本没有价值，他的财产的物理质量和数量的变化确实会影响其财产价值，不管其他因素(比如消费者评价的变化)是否也会影响其财产的价值。

Now let me introduce the state and see how it affects the business of the capitalist。

现在我引入国家，看它如何影响资本家的生意。

The state is conventionally defined as an institution that possesses a territorial monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking in every case of conflict，including conflicts involving the state and its agents，and，by implication，the right to tax—i.e.，to unilaterally determine the price that its subjects must pay to perform the task of ultimate decisionmaking。

传统上，国家被定义为一个机构，在所有冲突中，包括在涉及国家及其代理人的冲突中，拥有对最终决策的领土垄断权，并隐含着征税权，即单方面决定其国民为执行最终决策任务而必须支付的价格。

To act under these constraints—or rather，lack of constraints—is what constitutes politics and political action，and it should be clear from the out set that politics，then，by its very nature，always means mischief。

在这些约束下行动——或者更确切地说，缺乏约束——才是政治和政治行动的构成要素，从我们的设定中可以清楚地看到，政治，就其本质而言，总是意味着侵犯。

More specifically，we can make two interrelated predictions as to the effect of a state on the business of business.First，and most fundamentally，under statist conditions real property will become what may be called fiat property。And secondly and more specifically，real money will be turned into fiat money。

更具体地说，关于国家对商业的影响，我们可以做出两个相互关联的预测。首先，最根本的一点是，在国家主义的条件下，真实财货将成为所谓的法定财产。其次，更具体地说，真钱将变成法定货币。

First，with the state being the ultimate arbiter in every case of con flict including those in which it is involved itself，the state has essentially become the ultimate owner of all property。In principle，it can provoke a conflict with a businessman and then decide against him by expropriating him and making itself (or someone of its liking) the owner of the business man’s physical property。Or else，if it doesn’t want to go as far，it can pass legislation or regulations that involve only a partial expropriation.It can restrict the uses that the businessman can make of his physical property。certain things the businessman is no longer permitted to do with his property。

首先，由于国家是每起冲突（包括涉及国家自身的冲突）的最终仲裁者，国家实质上已成为所有财产的最终所有者。原则上，国家可以挑起与商人的冲突，通过做出不利于商人的决定，即征用商人的财产，使自己（或自己喜欢的人）成为商人有形财产的所有者。或者，如果政府不想显得吃相太难看，也可以通过只涉及部分征用的立法或法规，如此可以限制商人对其有形财产的使用，结果是，商人不得再用其财产做某些事情。

The state cannot increase the quality and quantity of real property。But it can redistribute it as it sees fit。It can reduce the real property at the disposal of businessmen or it can limit the range of control that they are allowed over their property; and it can thereby increase its own property (or that of its allies) and increase its own range of control over existing physical things.

国家不能提高真实财货的质量和数量，但可以按照自己的意愿重新分配真实财货。国家可以减少商人可以支配的真实财货，也可以限制商人对其财产的控制范围；国家还可以因此增加自己（或其盟友）的财产，扩大自己对现有实物的控制范围。

The businessmen’s property，then，is their property in name only。It is granted to them by the state，and it exists only as long as the state does not decide otherwise. Constantly，the sword of Damocles is hanging over the heads of businessmen. The execution of their business plans is based on their assumption of the existence，at their disposal，of certain physical resources and their physical capabilities，and all of their value speculations are based on this physical basis being given. But these assumptions about the physical basis can be rendered incorrect at any time—and their value calculations vitiated as well—if only the state decides to change its current legislation and regulations.

因此，商人的财产只是名义上的财产，是国家赋予他们的，只要国家不另作决定，它就存在。达摩克利斯之剑始终悬在商人的头上。他们的商业计划的执行是基于他们的假设，即某些有形资源及其有形能力的存在和支配，而他们所有的价值推测都是建立在这一有形基础之上的。但是，只要国家决定修改现行法律法规，这些关于有形基础的假设随时都可能变得不正确，其价值计算也会失效。

The existence of a state，then，heightens the uncertainty facing the busi nessman.It makes the future less certain than would be the case otherwise.realizing this，many people who might otherwise become businessmen will not become businessmen at all。And many businessmen will see their busi ness plans spoiled—not because they did not correctly anticipate future consumer demand，but because the physical basis，on which their plan was based，was altered by some unexpected and unanticipated change in state laws and regulations.

因此，国家的存在增加了商人面临的不确定性。它使得未来的不确定性增加了。意识到这一点，许多本来可能成为商人的人根本就不会成为商人。许多商人会看到他们的商业计划被打乱——不是因为他们没有正确预测未来的消费需求，而是因为他们的计划所依据的有形基础，被国家法律法规中一些意想不到的变化所改变。

Second，rather than meddling with a businessman’s productive capital through confiscation and regulation，however，the state prefers to meddle with money。because money is the most easily and widely salable good，it allows the state operators the greatest freedom to spend their income as they like.Hence the state’s preference for money taxes，i.e.，for confiscating money income and money profits.real money becomes subject to confiscation and changing rates of confiscation.This is the first sense in which money becomes fiat money under statist conditions.People own their money only insofar as the state allows them to keep it。

其次，与其通过没收和监管来干预商人的生产资本，国家更愿意干预货币。因为货币是最便利和最广泛销售的商品，它使得国家经营者有最大限度地自由支配他们的收入。因此，国家倾向于征收货币税，即对货币收入和货币利润征税。真实货币受到没收和不断变化的没收率的制约。这是货币在国家主义条件下成为法定货币的第一种意义。只有在国家允许的范围内，人们才拥有自己的货币。

But there is also a second，even more perfidious，way in which money becomes fiat money under statist conditions.

但还有另一种更不可靠的方式，在国家主义的条件下，货币变成了法定货币。

States everywhere have discovered an even smoother way of enriching themselves at the expense of productive people：by monopolizing the production of money and replacing real，commodity money and commodity credit with genuine fiat money and fiat or fiduciary credit。

世界各地的国家都发现了一种以牺牲有生产能力的人民为代价来使自己致富的更顺利的方法：垄断货币生产，用真正的法定货币和法定信用或信托信用取代真正的商品货币和商品信用。

on its territory，per legislation，only the state is permitted to produce money。But that is not sufficient。For as long as money is a real good，i.e.，a commodity that is costly to produce，there is nothing in it for the state except expenses.More importantly，then，the state must use its monopoly position in order to lower the production cost and the quality of money as close as possible to zero。Instead of costly，quality money such as gold or silver，the state must see to it that worthless pieces of paper，which can be produced at practically zero cost，will become money。

根据法律，只有国家可以在其领土上生产货币。但这还不够，因为只要货币是一种真正的商品，即一种生产成本高昂的商品，那么对国家来说，除了开支之外就没有任何东西。更重要的是，国家必须利用其垄断地位尽可能地降低货币的生产成本和质量，使之近乎为零。国家必须确保那些几乎可以零成本生产的、毫无价值的纸张将成为货币，而不是像黄金或白银这样昂贵的优质货币。

Under competitive conditions—i.e.，if everyone is free to produce money—a money that can be produced at zero cost would be produced up to a quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost。And since marginal cost is zero，the marginal revenue，i.e.，the purchasing power of this money，would be zero as well。Hence，the necessity to monopolize the production of paper money，so as to be able to restrict its supply，in order to avoid hyperinfiationary conditions and the disappearance of money from the market altogether (and a fiight into “real values”)—and the more so the cheaper the money commodity。

在竞争条件下，即如果每个人都可以自由生产货币，那么可以零成本生产的货币就会生产到边际收益等于边际成本的数量。由于边际成本为零，边际收益，即货币的购买力，也将为零。因此，有必要垄断纸币的生产，以便能够限制纸币的供应，从而避免出现恶性通货膨胀和纸币从市场上完全消失（以及向 “实际价值 “的逃离）——而且纸币越便宜，这种必要性就越大。

Having monopolized the production of money and reduced its pro duction cost and quality to virtually zero，the state has made a marvelous accomplishment。It costs almost nothing to print money and one can turn around and buy oneself something really valuable，such as a house or a mercedes.

国家垄断了货币的生产，将货币的生产成本和质量降至几乎为零，这是一项“伟大”的成就。印钞票几乎无成本，而这些人却可以转过身来就为自己买到一些真正有价值的东西，如房子或奔驰车。

What are the effects of such fiat money，and in particular what are the effects for the business of business? First and in general，more paper money does not in the slightest affect the quantity or quality of all other，nonmon etary goods.Rather，what the additional money does is twofold.on the one hand，money prices will be higher than they would otherwise be and the purchasing power per unit of money will be lower。And secondly，with the injection of additional paper money existing wealth will be redistributed in favor of those receiving and spending the new money first and at the expense of those receiving and spending it later or last。

这种法定货币会产生什么影响，特别是对商业活动会产生什么影响？首先，一般来说，更多的纸币丝毫不会影响所有其他非货币商品的数量和质量。相反，增加纸币的作用是双重的。一方面，货币价格会比不贬值时高，单位货币的购买力会降低。其次，随着更多纸币的注入，现有财富将被重新分配，有利于那些先收到和花掉新钱的人，而损害那些稍后收到和花掉新钱的人或最后收到和花掉新钱的人。

And specifically regarding the capitalist，then，paper money adds another dose of uncertainty to his business.If and as long as money is a commodity，such as gold or silver，it may not be exactly “easy” to predict the future supply and purchasing power of money。However，based on information about current production costs and industry profits，it is very well possible to come up with a realistic estimate.In any case，the task is not pure guesswork。And while it is conceivable that，with gold or silver as money，nominal money profits may not always equal “real” profits，it is at least impossible that a nominal profit should ever amount to nothing at all。There is always something left：quantities of gold or silver。

具体到资本家，纸币又给他的生意增加了不确定性。如果货币是一种商品，如黄金或白银，那么要预测未来的货币供应量和购买力可能并不 “容易”。然而，根据当前的生产成本和行业利润信息，我们完全有可能得出一个切合实际的估计。无论如何，这项任务并不是纯粹的猜测。虽然可以想象，用黄金或白银作为货币，名义货币利润可能并不总是等于 “实际 “利润，但至少不可能出现名义利润等于零的情况。总会有剩余：黄金或白银的数量。

In distinct contrast，with paper money，the production of which is unconstrained by any kind of natural (physical) limitations (scarcity) but dependent solely on subjective whim and will，the prediction of the future money supply and purchasing power does become guesswork。What will the money printers do? And it is not just conceivable but a very real inpossibility that nominal money profits will turn out to represent literally nothing but bundles of worthless paper。

与纸币形成鲜明对比的是，纸币的生产不受任何自然（物理）限制（稀缺性）的约束，而完全取决于主观的心血来潮和意志，对未来货币供应量和购买力的预测确实变成了猜测。印钞者会怎么做？名义上的货币利润将变成一捆捆毫无价值的纸张，这不仅是可以想象的，并且有一种非常现实的可能性。

Moreover，hand in hand with fiat money comes fiat or fiduciary credit，and this creates still more uncertainty。

此外，与法定货币相伴而来的是法定信贷或信托信贷，这带来了更多的不确定性。

If the state can create money out of thin air it also can create money credit out of thin air。And because it can create credit out of thin air，i.e.，without any previous savings on its part，it can offer cheaper loans than any one else，at belowmarket rates of interest，even at rates as low as zero。The interest rate is thus distorted and falsified，and the volume of investment will become divorced from the volume of savings. Systematic malinvestment is thus generated，i.e.，investment unbacked by savings.An unsustainable investment boom is set in motion，necessarily followed by a bust，revealing largescale clusters of entrepreneurial errors.

如果国家可以凭空创造货币，那么它也可以凭空创造货币信贷。因为它可以凭空创造信贷，所以，在没有任何储蓄的情况下，它可以提供比任何人都便宜的贷款，利率低于市场利率，甚至低至零利率。因此，利率被扭曲和伪造，投资量将与储蓄量脱节。这样就会产生系统性的不良投资，即没有储蓄支持的投资。不可持续的投资热潮开始了，随之而来的必然是泡沫破裂后的萧条，暴露出大规模的企业家错误群体。

Last but not least，under statist conditions，i.e.，under a regime of fiat property and fiat money，the character of businessmen and of doing busi ness is changed，and this change introduces another hazard into the world.Absent a state，it is consumers that determine what will be produced,in what quality and quantity，and who among businessmen will succeed or fail。with the state，the situation facing businessmen becomes entirely different。It is now the state and its operators，not consumers，who ultimately decide who will succeed or fail。The state can keep any businessman alive by subsidizing him or bailing him out; or else it can ruin anyone by deciding to investigate him and find him in violation of state laws and regulations.

最后但并非最不重要的是，在国家主义的条件下，即在法定财产和法定货币的制度下，商人和经商的性质发生了变化，这种变化给世界带来了另一种危险。在没有国家的情况下，由消费者来决定生产什么，以什么质量和多少数量生产，以及商人中谁会成功、谁会失败。在有国家的情况下，商人面临的情况变得完全不同。现在是国家及其经营者，而不是消费者，最终决定谁会成功或失败。国家可以通过补贴或救助任何商人，让他继续生存下去；或者，国家可以通过调查任何人，发现他违反了国家法律法规，从而毁掉他。

Moreover，the state is fiush with taxes and fiat money and can spend more money than anyone else.It can make any businessman rich (or not)。And the state and its operators have a different spending behavior than normal consumers.They do not spend their own money，but other people’s money，and in most cases not for their own，personal purposes，but for those of some anonymous third parties.Accordingly，they are frivolous and waste ful in their spending。neither the price nor the quality of what they buy is of great concern to them.

此外，国家拥有大量税收和法定货币，可以比任何人花更多的钱。它可以让任何商人致富（或不致富）。国家及其经营者的消费行为与普通消费者不同。他们花的不是自己的钱，而是别人的钱，而且在大多数情况下不是为了自己的个人目的，而是为了某些匿名第三方的目的。因此，他们的消费是轻率和浪费的。他们对所购物品的价格和质量都不太在意。

In addition，the state can go into business itself。And because it doesn’t have to make profits and avoid losses，as it can always supplement its earnings through taxes or madeup money，it can always outcompete any private producer of the same or similar goods or services.

此外，国家本身也可以参与商业活动。而且由于国家不必盈利也毋须避免亏损，因为它总是可以通过税收或补足资金来补充收入，因此国家总是可以在相同或类似商品或服务的竞争中胜过任何私人生产商。

And finally，by virtue of its ability to legislate，to make laws，the state can grant exclusive privileges to some businesses，insulating or shielding them from competition，and by the same token partially expropriate and disadvantage other businesses.

最后，凭借立法和制定法律的能力，国家可以授予某些企业排他性的特权，使它们免受竞争，并以同样的方式，部分剥夺其他企业，使其处于不利地位。

In this environment，it is imperative for every businessman to pay con stant and close attention to politics.In order to stay alive and possibly pros per，he must spend time and effort to concern himself with matters that have nothing to do with satisfying consumers，but with power politics.And based on his understanding of the nature of the state and of politics，then，he must make a choice：a moral choice.

在这种情形下，每个商人都必须持续密切地关注政治。为了生存和可能的成功，他必须花时间和精力去关注那些与满足消费者无关，而与权力政治有关的问题。基于他对国家和政治本质的理解，他必须做出选择：一种道德上的选择。

He can either join in and become a part of the vast criminal enterprise that is the state.He can bribe politicians，political parties or public officials，whether with cash or in kind (including promises of future employment in the “private” sector as “boardmembers,” “advisors,” or “consultants”)，in order to gain for himself economic advantages at the expense of other busi nesses.That is，he can pay bribes to secure state contracts or subsidies for himself and at the exclusion of others.Or he can pay bribes for the passing or maintenance of legislation that secures him and his business legal privi leges and monopoly profits (and capital gains) while partially expropriating and thus screwing his competitors.needless to say，countless businessmen have chosen this patH.In particular big banking and big industry have thus become intricately involved in the state，and many a wealthy businessman has made his fortune more on account of his political skills than his abilities as a consumerserving economic entrepreneur。

他可以加入并成为国家这个庞大的犯罪集团的一部分。他可以贿赂政客、政党或公职人员，无论是现金还是实物（包括承诺将来在 “私营 “部门担任 “董事”、”顾问 “或 “咨询人”），以牺牲其他企业的利益为自己谋取经济利益。也就是说，他可以通过行贿来为自己争取国家契约或补贴，而排斥其他人。或者，他可以通过行贿来通过或维持立法，以确保他和他的企业享有合法特权和垄断利润（以及资本收益），同时部分征用并因此坑害他的竞争对手。不用说，无数商人都选择了这条路子。特别是大银行和大工业因此与国家错综复杂地勾连在一起，许多富有的商人发家致富更多的是靠他的政治技巧，而不是靠他作为一个为消费者服务的经济企业家的能力。

Or else，a businessman can choose the honorable but at the same time also the most difficult patH.This businessman is aware of the nature of the state.He knows that the state and its operators are out to get him and bully him，to confiscate his property and money and，even worse，that they are arrogant，selfrighteous，haughty，and full of themselves.Based on such understanding，this very different breed of businessman then tries his best to anticipate and adjust to the state’s every evil move.But he does not join the gang。He does not pay bribes to secure contracts or privileges from the state.Instead，he tries as well as he can to defend whatever is still left of his property and property rights and make as large profits as possible in doing so。

或者，商人可以选择一条光荣但同时也是最艰难的道路。这种商人了解国家的性质。他知道，国家和国家的经营者都是为了对付他、欺负他，以控制他的财产和金钱，更糟糕的是，他们傲慢、自以为是、卑鄙无耻、自以为是。基于这种认识，这种与众不同的商人就会尽力预测并适应国家的每一个邪恶举动。但他没有加入这个黑帮。他不会通过行贿从国家获得契约或特权。相反，他尽其所能保护自己仅存的财产和产权，并在此过程中获得尽可能多的收益。

12 持有货币的收益*

The Yield from Money Held

Franz Čuhel occupies an honored place in the history of economic thought and of the “Viennese” or “Austrian” School of economics in particular。In his book Zur lehre von den bedürfnissen （1907），Čuhel presented for the first time a strictly ordinal interpretation of marginal utility and thus contributed to a Systematic advance of pure economic theory。Since this lecture is named in Čuhel’s honor，I felt it appropriate that I，too，should discuss here a purely theoretical problem of economics.My subject is not the general theory of value，however，but，more specifically，the theory of money。

弗朗茨-丘赫尔在经济思想史上，尤其是在 “维也纳 “或 “奥地利 “经济学派的发展史上，占有崇高的地位。在他的《边际效用论》（Zur lehre von den bedürfnissen，1907 年）一书中，丘赫尔首次提出了对边际效用的严格序数解释，从而为纯粹经济理论的系统发展做出了贡献。因为这次讲座是为了纪念丘赫尔而命名的，我觉得我也应该在这里讨论一个纯粹的经济学理论问题。不过，我的主题不是一般的价值理论，而是更具体的货币理论。

I have chosen the title of my lecture after a famous article by William H.Hutt，“The Yield from Money Held.” 1Like Hutt，I want to attack the follow ing notion：that money held in cash balances and deposit accounts is some how “unproductive，” “barren，” or “sterile，” offering a “yield of nil”； that only consumer goods and producer （investment） goods are productive of human welfare； that the only productive use of money lies in its “circulation，” i.e.，in its spending on consumer or producer goods； and that the holding，i.e.，the notspending，of money diminishes future consumption and production.

我是参照威廉·H·赫特（William H. Hutt）的一篇著名文章《持有货币的收益》来选定我此次讲座的标题的。[142]和赫特一样，我想要反驳以下这种观点：即认为以现金余额和存款账户形式持有的货币在某种程度上是“非生产性的”、“贫瘠的”或“不结果实的”，收益为“零”；认为只有消费品和生产（投资）品才对人类福祉有生产性贡献；认为货币唯一具有生产性的用途在于其“流通”，也就是说，在于将其用于购买消费品或生产资料；并且认为持有货币，也就是不花掉货币，会减少未来的消费和生产。

This view is extremely popular within the economics profession and outside.Hutt offers many examples of its proponents.I will offer only two here.The first is John Maynard Keynes.one famous quote from his general Theory will suffice for my purpose：“An act of individual saving，” by which Keynes means cash holding or “hoarding” instead of consumption or investment spending，

means—so to speak—a decision not to have dinner today。But it does not necessitate a decision to have dinner or buy a pair of boots a week hence or a year hence or to consume any speci fied thing at any specified date.Thus it depresses the business of preparing today’s dinner without stimulating the business of making ready for some future act of consumption.It is not a substitution of future consumptiondemand for present consumptiondemand—it is a net diminution of such demand.2

这种观点在经济学界内外都非常流行。赫特列举了许多支持者的例子。在此我只举两个例子。第一个是约翰-梅纳德-凯恩斯。凯恩斯的《通论》中有一句名言：”个人储蓄行为 “指的是现金持有或 “囤积”，而不是消费或投资支出。

这意味着——可以这么说——决定今天不吃晚饭。 但这并不意味着必须决定一周后或一年后吃晚饭或买一双靴子，或在任何特定日期消费任何特定物品。因此，它抑制了为今天的晚餐做准备的行为，却没有刺激为未来的消费行为做准备的行为。这并不是用未来的消费需求替代现在的消费需求，而是这种需求的净减少。[143]

Here it is：the holding of money，i.e.，the notspending of it on either consumer or investment goods，is unproductive，indeed detrimental。According to Keynes，the government or its central bank must create and then spend the money that “savers，” i.e.，the holders of cash balances，are unproductively holding back，so as to stimulate both consumption and investment。（needless to say，this is precisely what governments and central banks are presently doing to supposedly rectify the current economic crisis.）

这里的意思是：持有货币，即不把货币用于消费品或投资品，是无益的，甚至是有害的。根据凯恩斯的观点，政府或其中央银行必须创造并花掉 “储蓄者”（即现金余额的持有者）所持有的非生产性的货币，以刺激消费和投资（不用说，这正是目前各国政府和中央银行为了据称是纠正当前经济危机正在做的事情）。

The second example is from closer to home，i.e.，from the proponents of “free banking” such as Lawrence White，george Selgin，and Roger Gar rison.According to them，an （unanticipated） increase in the demand for money “pushes the economy below its potential” （Garrison），and requires a compensating moneyspending injection from the banking System.

第二个例子来自我们更为熟悉的领域，即来自劳伦斯·怀特（Lawrence White）、乔治·塞尔金（George Selgin）和罗杰·加里森（Roger Garrison）等“自由银行业”的倡导者。按照他们的观点，货币需求（意外的）增加会“使经济低于其潜在水平”（加里森语），并且需要银行系统注入一笔用于支出的补偿性货币。

Here it is again：an “excess demand for money” （Selgin and White） has no positive yield or is even detrimental； hence，help is needed.For the free bankers help is not supposed to come from the government and its central bank，but from a System of freely competing fractionalreserve banks.How ever，the idea involved is the same：the holding of （some “excess”） money is unproductive and requires a remedy。3

这里又出现了：”货币需求过剩”（塞尔金和怀特语）没有正收益，甚至是有害的；因此，需要帮助。对于自由银行制度的倡导者来说，帮助不应该来自政府及其中央银行，而应该来自自由竞争的部分准备金银行体系。无论如何，所涉及的理念是相同的：持有（一些 “过剩”）货币是没有收益的，需要采取补救措施。[144]

I do not want to engage in a textual critique of Keynes or the “free bankers” here.I only mentioned them to further elucidate the idea that I want to attack，and to indicate how widespread—and consequential— its acceptance is within the economics profession，both inside and outside Keynesian circles.Unlike Hutt，who proceeds “critically” in his article，i.e.，through a textual examination of various authors，and arrives at his own contrary view of the （positive） yield from money held in a rather indirect and circumstantial way，I want to proceed “apodictically”：by way of a positive demonstration of money’s unique productivity。4

我不想在这里对凯恩斯或 “自由银行制度的倡导者 “进行文本批判。我提到他们，只是为了进一步阐明我要反驳的观点，并说明在凯恩斯主义圈子内外，经济学界对这一观点的接受有多么普遍，以及其影响有多大。与赫特不同，赫特在其文章中是通过对不同作者的著述进行文本考证这种“批判性”的方式展开论述的，并且是以一种相当间接和迂回的方式得出了他自己关于持有货币（正向）收益的相反观点。而我想要以一种“无可置疑”的方式展开论述：通过对货币独特生产力的正面论证来进行阐述。[145]

The first natural response to the thesis that money held in or added to cash balances is unproductive is to counter，Why，then，if money held in or added to cash balances is unproductive of human welfare，do people hold them or add to them？ If cash holdings are indeed “good for nothing，” no one would hold or add to them—and yet almost everyone does so all the time! And since all money is always held or hoarded by someone—when it “circulates，” it only leaves one holding hand to be passed into another— money must be continuously “good for something” all the while it is being held （which is always）。

对于 “现金余额中持有或增加的货币是无益的 “这一论点，人们的第一个自然反应是反驳：如果现金余额中持有或增加的货币对人类福利无益，那么人们为什么还要持有或增加它们呢？如果持有现金真的 “一无是处”，那么就不会有人持有或增加现金——然而，几乎每个人都一直持有或增加现金！既然所有的货币总是被某个人持有或囤积——当它 “流通 “时，它只是从一个持有者转手到另一个持有者——那么货币在被持有的过程中（总是）就必须持续 “有益”。

To understand what this “good for something” of money is，it is best to ask，When，under what conditions，would there be no demand for cash holdings？ interestingly，wide agreement exists within the economics profes sion on the answer。It has been most lucidly stated by Ludwig von Mises.No money，and no demand for cash balances，would exist in “general equilib rium，” or as Mises calls it，within the imaginary construction of an “evenly rotating economy。” in this construction，all uncertainty is by assumption removed from human action.Everyone knows precisely the terms，times，and locations of every future action，and accordingly all exchanges can be prearranged and take the form of direct exchanges.

要理解货币的这种 “有益 “是什么，最好先问一下，在什么时候和什么情况下，对持有现金没有需求？有趣的是，经济学界对这一问题的答案达成了广泛的一致，路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）对此做出了最清晰的阐述：在 “一般均衡状态 “下，或者按照米塞斯的说法，在 “均匀轮转经济 “的假构中，不存在货币，也不存在对现金余额的需求。在这种假构中，所有的不确定性都被假定从人类行动中排除了。每个人都精确地知道每一个未来行动的条件、时间和地点，因此所有的交换都可以预先安排，并采取直接交换的形式。

Writes Mises，

In a System without change in which there is no uncertainty whatever about the future，nobody needs to hold cash.Every individual knows precisely what amount of money he will need at any future date.He is therefore in a position to lend all the funds he receives in such a way that the loans fall due on the date he will need them.5

米塞斯写道：

在一个没有变化、对未来不存在任何不确定性的系统中，没有人需要持有现金。每个人都精确地知道他在未来某一天需要多少钱。因此，他可以把他收到的所有资金以这样一种方式借出，并且使得贷款在他需要的日子到期。[146]

Based on this fundamental insight，we can state as a first provisional conclusion concerning the positive theory of money that money and cash balances would disappear with the disappearance of uncertainty （never） and，mutatis mutandis，that the investment in money balances must be conceived of as an investment in certainty or an investment in the reduction of subjectively felt uneasiness about uncertainty。

根据这一基本见解，我们可以就货币实证理论得出第一个初步结论：货币和现金余额会随着不确定性的消失而消失（但不确定性永远不会消失），并且，相应地，对货币余额的投资必须被视作是对确定性的投资，或者说是对减轻因不确定性而主观感受到的不安逸的一种投资。

In reality，outside the imaginary construction of an evenly rotating economy，uncertainty exists.The terms，times，and locations of all future actions and exchanges cannot be predicted perfectly （with certitude）。action is by nature speculative and subject to error。Presently unpredictable surprises can occur。Whenever double coincidences of wants between pairs of prospective buyers and sellers are absent，for instance，i.e.，when one does not want what the other has to sell or vice versa，any direct trade （exchange） becomes impossible.

在现实生活中，除了均匀轮转经济的假构之外，不确定性是存在的。所有未来行动和交换的条件、时间和地点都不可能完全（肯定地）预测。行动本质上是投机性的，容易出错。目前无法预测的意外可能发生。例如，每当潜在的买卖双方之间不存在需求的双重巧合时，也就是说，当一方不想要另一方要出售的东西，或者反之亦然时，任何直接的交易（交换）就变得不可能了。

Faced with this challenge of unpredictable contingencies，man can come to value goods on account of their degree of marketability （rather than their usevalue for him as consumer or producer goods） and consider trading also whenever a good to be acquired is more marketable than that to be surrendered，such that its possession would facilitate the future acquisi tion of other directly or indirectly serviceable goods and services.That is，a demand for media of exchange can arise，i.e.，a demand for goods valued on account of their marketability or resalability。

面对这种不可预知的意外情况的挑战，人们可能会根据商品的适销性（而不是作为消费品或生产资料的使用价值）对它们估价，而且当要获得的商品比要放弃的商品更适销时，也会考虑进行交易，因为拥有这种商品会有助于将来获得其他直接或间接可使用的商品和服务。也就是说，可能会产生对交换媒介的需求，即对因其适销性或可转售性而有价值的商品的需求。

And since a more easily and widely resalable good is preferable to a less easily and widely resalable good as a medium of exchange，“there would be，” as Mises writes，

an inevitable tendency for the less marketable of a series of goods used as media of exchange to be one by one rejected until at last only a single commodity remained，which was universally employed as a medium of exchange； in a word，money。6

既然一种更容易广泛转售的商品比一种不那么容易广泛转售的商品更适合作为交换媒介，“那么就会有，”米塞斯写道：

一种不可避免的趋势是，作为交换媒介的一系列商品，销路较差的商品被逐一摒弃，直至最后只剩下一种商品，这种商品存在被普遍用作交换媒介的必然趋势；换句话说，就是货币。[147]

While this brief reconstruction of the origin of money is familiar，insufficient attention has been drawn to the fact that，as the most easily and widely salable good，money is at the same time the most universally present—instantly serviceable—good （which is why the interest rate，i.e.，the discount rate of future goods against present goods，is expressed in terms of money） and，as such，the good uniquely suited to alleviate presently felt uneasiness about uncertainty。

虽然对货币起源的这种简要重构是人们所熟知的，但人们一直没有充分注意到这样一个事实：作为最容易且最广泛可售的商品，货币同时也是最为普遍存在的——即刻可用的——商品（这就是为什么利率，即未来商品相对于现在商品的贴现率，是以货币来表示的原因），并且正因如此，货币是唯一适合缓解当下因不确定性而感受到的不安逸的商品。

because money can be employed for the instant satisfaction of the widest range of possible needs，it provides its owner with the best humanly possible protection against uncertainty。In holding money，its owner gains in the satisfaction of being able to meet instantly，as they unpredictably arise，the widest range of future contingencies.The investment in cash balances is an investment contra the （subjectively felt） aversion to uncertainty。A larger cash balance brings more relief from uncertainty aversion.

因为货币可被用于即时满足各种各样可能的需求，所以它为其所有者提供了人类所能拥有的应对不确定性的最佳保障。持有货币时，其所有者能够在未来各种突发情况（因其不可预测地出现）发生时即时应对，从而在这方面获得满足感。对现金余额的投资就是对（主观感觉到的）不确定性厌恶的投资。现金余额越大，对不确定性厌恶的缓解就越大。

The term uncertainty aversion is meant here in its technical sense，as opposed to risk aversion.The categorical distinction between uncertainty on the one hand and risk on the other was introduced into economics by Frank H.Knight and further elaborated on by Ludwig von Mises with his distinction between case probability and class probability。7

Risks （instances of class probability） are contingencies against which it is possible to take out insurance，because objective longrun probability distributions concerning all possible outcomes are known and predictable.We know nothing about an individual outcome，but we know everything about the whole class of events，and we are certain about the future.

风险（类概率事件）是可以投保的意外事件，因为关于所有可能结果的客观长期概率分布是已知且可预测的的。我们对单个结果一无所知，但我们对整类事件了如指掌，并且我们对未来有确定性的把握。

Insofar as man faces a risky future，then，he does not need to hold cash.To satisfy his desire to be protected against risk，he can buy or produce insurance.The sum of money that he spends on insurance is an indication of the height of his aversion to risk。Insurance premiums are money spent，not held，and are as such invested in the physical production structure of producer and consumer goods.The payment of insurance reflects a man’s subjectively felt certainty concerning （predictable） future contingencies （risks）。

因此，假如人类只是面临一个充满风险的未来，他就不需要持有现金。为了满足他消除风险的愿望，他可以购买或生产保险。他花在保险上的钱数表明了他对风险的厌恶程度。保险费是花出去的钱，而不是持有的钱，因此是投资于生产资料和消费品的实际生产结构。保费赔付反映了一个人对（可预测的）未来偶然事件（风险）主观上感受到的确定性。

In distinct contrast，insofar as man faces uncertainty he is，quite literally，not certain concerning future contingencies，i.e.，as to what he might want or need and when.In order to be protected against unpredictable contingencies at unpredictable moments，he cannot invest in producer goods （as in the case of risk insurance）； for such investments would reflect his certainty concerning particular future needs.

与此形成鲜明对比的是，就人所面临的不确定性而言，他对未来的偶然事件，即他可能想要或需要什么以及什么时候需要，完全无法确定。为了在不可预知的时刻防范不可预知的偶然事件，他无法像应对风险投保那样对生产资料进行投资；因为此类投资反映了他对特定未来需求的确定性。

only present，instantly serviceable goods can protect against unpredictable contingencies （uncertainty）。Nor does a man want to invest in consumer goods for uncertainty protection.For an investment in consumer goods，too，is an expression of certainty concerning specific momentary or immediately impending wants.only money，on account of its instant and unspecific wideranging salability，can protect him against uncertainty。Thus，just as insurance premiums are the price paid for protection against risk aversion，so cash holdings are the price paid for protection against uncertainty aversion.

只有当下即时可用的商品才能抵御不可预知的偶然事件（不确定性）。一个人也不会为了抵御不确定性而投资消费品。因为对消费品的投资同样是对特定的即时需求或即将出现的迫切需求具有确定性的一种表现。只有货币，由于其即时和非专用的广泛适销性，才能保护他免受不确定性的影响。因此，正如保险费是防范风险厌恶所付出的代价一样，现金持有是防范不确定性厌恶所付出的代价。

To the extent that a man feels certain regarding his future needs，he will invest in consumer or producer goods.To invest in money balances is to invest neither in consumer goods nor producer goods.Unlike consumer and producer goods，which are used up in consumption or production，money is neither used up through its use as a medium of exchange nor transformed into another commodity。To invest in cash balances means，“I am uncertain about my present and future needs and believe that a balance of the most easily and widely salable good on hand will best prepare me to meet my asofyet unknown needs at asofyet unknown times.”

在一个人对自己未来的需求有一定把握的程度上，他会对消费品或生产资料进行投资。投资货币余额既不是投资于消费品，也不是投资于生产资料。消费品和生产资料在消费或生产过程中会消耗掉，而货币则不同，它既不会因为作为交换媒介而消耗掉，也不会转化为另一种商品。投资现金余额的意思是：”我不确定我现在和将来的需求，我相信手头上最容易和最广泛适销的商品余额将为我在未知的时间满足未知的需求做最好的准备”。

If a person then adds to his cash balance，he does so because he is confronted with a situation of （subjectively perceived） increased uncertainty regarding his future.The addition to his cash balance represents an investment in presently felt certainty visàvis a future perceived as less certain.In order to add to his cash balance，a person must restrict his purchases or increase his sales of nonmoney goods （producer or consumer goods）。In either case，the outcome is an immediate fall in certain nonmoney goods’ prices.As the result of restricting his purchases of x，y，or z，the money price of x，y，or z will be lowered （as compared to what it would have been otherwise），and likewise，by increasing his sales of a，b，or c，their prices will fall。

如果一个人随后增加其现金余额，他这么做是因为他面临着一种（主观感知到的）未来不确定性增加的情况。增加现金余额代表着针对被视为不太确定的未来进行的一种对当下所感受到的确定性的投资。为了增加现金余额，一个人必须限制其对非货币商品（生产资料或消费品）的购买或增加其对这些商品的销售。在这两种情况下，结果都是某些非货币商品的价格立即下跌。由于限制了对x、y或z的购买，x、y或z的货币价格将会降低（相较于原本可能的价格而言），同样，通过增加对a、b或c的销售，它们的价格也会下跌。

The actor thus accomplishes exactly and immediately what he wants.He commands a larger （nominal and real） cash balance and is better prepared for an increasingly uncertain future.The marginal utility of the added cash is higher than （ranks above） the marginal utility of the nonmoney goods sold or unbought。He is better off with more cash on hand and less nonmoney goods，otherwise he would not have reallocated his assets in this way。There is more investment in the removal of perceived uncertainty，and there is less investment in needs，present or future，considered as certain.

这样，行动人就能立即实现他的愿望。他获得了更多的（名义和实际的）现金余额，并为日益不确定的未来做好了更充分的准备。所新增的现金的边际效用高于（排序高于）已出售或未购买的非货币商品的边际效用。手头持有更多现金而非货币商品更少的情况下，他的状况更好了，否则他就不会以这种方式重新分配资产。在消除感知到的不确定性方面的投资增多了，而在被视为确定的当下或未来需求方面的投资则减少了。

The situation does not change if there is a general increase in the demand for money，i.e.，if all or most people try to increase their cash holdings，in response to heightened uncertainty。with the total quantity of money given，the average size of cash holdings cannot increase，of course.Nor is the total quantity of producer and consumer goods that make up the physical production structure affected by a general increase in the demand for money。It remains unchanged.

如果货币需求普遍增加，即如果所有人或大多数人为了应对不确定性的增加而试图增加他们的现金持有量，这种情况也不会改变。在货币总量既定的情况下，现金的平均持有量当然不会增加。构成实际生产结构的生产资料和消费品的总量也不会受到货币需求普遍增加的影响，它保持不变。

In generally striving to increase the size of their cash holdings，however，the money prices of nonmoney goods will be bid down，and the purchas ing power per unit of money will correspondingly rise.Thus，the （increased） demand for and the （given） supply of money are equilibrated again，but at a higher purchasing power per unit of money and lower prices of nonmoney goods.That is，even if nominal cash balances cannot rise as a result of a general increase in the demand for money，the real value of cash balances can； and it is this increase in the value of real cash balances that brings about precisely and immediately the effect desired：being better prepared for a future deemed as less certain.

一般来说，在人们普遍努力增加现金持有量的过程中，非货币商品的货币价格会被压低，单位货币的购买力也会相应提高。因此，（增加的）货币需求量和（给定的）货币供应量再次达到平衡，但单位货币的购买力更高，非货币商品的价格更低。也就是说，即使名义现金余额不能因货币需求的普遍增加而增加，现金余额的实际价值却可以增加；而正是现金余额实际价值的增加，恰恰立即带来了人们所期望的效果：为被认为不那么确定的未来做好了更充分的准备。

No one cares about the nominal number of money units in his posses sion.Rather，people want to keep cash with a definite amount of purchasing power on hand.If the purchasing power per unit of money increases as the result of an increased demand for cash holdings，each unit of money confronted with an array of generally lower nonmoney goods prices can do a better job in affording its owner protection against uncertainty。

没人会在意自己所拥有的货币单位的名义数量。相反，人们希望手头持有具有一定购买力的现金。如果由于对现金持有需求的增加导致单位货币的购买力提高，那么面对一系列普遍降低的非货币商品价格，每一单位货币就能更好地为其所有者提供抵御不确定性的保障。

This shall suffice as my attempt to provide a positive demonstration of the unique productivity of cash holdings as “yielders of certainty” in an uncertain world.only a brief additional comment concerning the present，unprecedentedly severe economic crisis and the consequences that our theoretical considerations imply for its solution seems to be in order。

在这个充满不确定性的世界里，我已尝试对现金持有作为“确定性的提供者”所具有的独特生产性进行了正面论证，上述内容应该已经足够了。关于当前空前严重的经济危机，以及我们的理论思考对解决方案所蕴含的影响，似乎只需要做一个简短的补充评论。

I shall say nothing here about the cause of the present crisis，except that I consider it another，spectacular vindication of the socalled Austrian—or “Mises–Hayek”—businesscycle theory。In any case，the crisis has led to heightened uncertainty。People want more certainty visàvis a future considered far less certain than before.Accordingly，their demand for cash increases.with the quantity of money given，the higher demand for money can be satisfied only by bidding down nonmoney goods’ prices.Consequently，as the overall “level” of prices falls，the purchasing power per unit of money correspondingly rises.Each unit of money is productive now of more certainty，and the desired level of uncertainty protection is restored.The crisis is ended.

在此，我不想谈论当前危机的原因，只想说，我认为这是对所谓的奥地利学派或 “米塞斯-哈耶克 “商业周期理论的又一次有力证明。无论如何，这场危机加剧了不确定性。比起一个被认为比以前更加不确定的未来，人们想要更多的确定性。因此，他们对现金的需求增加了。在货币数量既定的情况下，货币需求的增加只能通过降低非货币商品的价格来满足。因此，随着价格总 “水平 “的下降，每单位货币的购买力也相应提高。现在，每单位货币都能提供更多的确定性，从而恢复了所需的不确定性保护水平。危机结束。

The solution to the crisis suggested instead by most economists and pundits and officially adopted by governments everywhere is entirely different。It is motivated by the herecriticized，fundamentally flawed doctrine that money held in or added to cash balances is money unproductively withheld from production and consumption.The additions to their cash holdings that people want to bring about are thus interpreted，wrongly，as a diminution of human welfare.Accordingly，huge efforts are now under taken to increase the amount of spending。

（译者注：如前所述，面对不确定性的时候，人们倾向于持有更多的货币，而这导致了不确定性的降低。也就是，只要保持总货币量的稳定，系统会自动导致确定性增加。）大多数经济学家和专家建议的、并被各国政府正式采纳的危机解决方案却完全不同。它的动机是一种受到批评的、根本上有缺陷的学说，即在现金余额中持有的货币或增加到现金余额中的货币是生产和消费中被扣留的非生产性货币。因此，人们希望增加的现金持有被错误地解释为人类福利的减少。因此，目前各国政府正在作出巨大的努力来增加开支。

But this stands at crosspurpose to the general public’s needs and desires：in order to be better protected against heightened perceived uncertainty，prices must fall and the purchasing power of money must rise.Yet with an influx of additional，newly created money，prices will be higher and the purchasing power per unit of money will be lower than otherwise.Thus，as the result of the current monetary policy，the restoration of the desired level of uncertainty protection will be delayed and the crisis prolonged.

但这与普通大众的需求和愿望背道而驰：为了更好地抵御不确定性的加剧，价格必须下降，货币的购买力必须上升。然而，随着额外的、新创造的货币的流入，价格将会更高，单位货币的购买力将比原本更低。因此，由于当前货币政策的影响，恢复到理想的不确定性防护水平将被延迟，危机绵绵无绝期。

13 国家或私法社会？*

State or Private-Law Society？

I. 社会秩序问题

THE problem OF SOCIAL ORDER

Alone on his island，Robinson Crusoe can do whatever he pleases.For him，the question concerning rules of orderly human conduct—social cooperation—simply does not arise.This question can only arise once a second person，Friday，arrives on the island.Yet even then，the question remains largely irrelevant so long as no scarcity exists.Suppose the island is the Garden of EdeN.All external goods are available in superabundance.They are “free goods，” just as the air that we breathe is normally a “free” good.Whatever Crusoe does with these goods，his actions have no repercussions—neither with respect to his own future supply of such goods nor regarding the present or future supply of the same goods for Friday （and vice versa）。Hence，it is impossible that a conflict concerning the use of such goods could arise between Crusoe and Friday。A conflict is possible only if goods are scarce； and only then is there a need to formulate rules that make orderly，conflict free social cooperation possible.

独自一人在孤岛上，鲁滨逊可以做任何他喜欢的事。对他来说，有关人类有序行为规则的问题——社会合作——根本就没有出现。这个问题只有当第二个人星期五来到岛上的时候才会出现。然而，即便如此，只要不存在稀缺，这个问题在很大程度上仍然无关紧要。假设这个岛是伊甸园。所有外部商品都供应充足。它们是“自由财货”，就像我们呼吸的空气通常是一种“自由”财货一样。无论鲁滨逊如何处理这些物品，他的行为都不会产生任何影响——既不会影响他自己未来对这些物品的供应，也不会影响 “星期五 “现在或未来对这些物品的供应（反之亦然）。因此，鲁滨逊和 “星期五 “之间不可能就这些物品的使用发生冲突。只有在物品稀缺的情况下，冲突才有可能发生；也只有在这种情况下，才有必要制定规则，使有序的、无冲突的社会合作成为可能。

In the Garden of Eden only two scarce goods exist：a person’s physical body and its standing room.Crusoe and Friday each have only one body and can stand only at one place at a time.Hence，even in the Garden of Eden conflicts between Crusoe and Friday can arise：Crusoe and Friday cannot occupy the same standing room simultaneously without coming into physical conflict with each other。Accordingly，even in the Garden of Eden rules of orderly social conduct must exist—rules regarding the proper location and movement of human bodies.Outside the Garden of Eden，in the realm of allaround scarcity，there must be rules that regulate the use not only of personal bodies，but of everything scarce，such that all possible conflicts can be ruled out。This is the problem of social order。

伊甸园里只有两种稀缺物品：人的身体和站立的空间。鲁滨逊和星期五各自只有一个身体，一次只能站在一个地方。因此，即使在伊甸园里，鲁滨逊和星期五之间也会发生冲突：鲁滨逊和星期五不能同时占据同一个站立空间而不发生肢体冲突。因此，即使在伊甸园里，也必须存在有序的社会行为规则——关于人体的适当位置和活动的规则。在伊甸园之外，在普遍稀缺的领域中，必须有规则不仅规范个人身体的使用，而且规范一切稀缺物品的使用，从而避免一切可能的冲突。这就是社会秩序问题。

II. 解决方案：私有财产的观念

THE SOLUTIon：THE ideA OF PRIVAte PROPERTY

In the history of social and political thought，myriad proposals have been offered as solutions to the problem of social order，and this multitude of mutually incompatible proposals has contributed to the widespread belief that the search for a single “correct” solution is futile and illusory。Yet a correct solution does exist。There is no reason to succumb to moral relativism.Indeed，the solution to the problem of social order has been known for hundreds of years.The solution is the idea of private property。

在社会和政治思想史上，人们提出了无数方案来解决社会秩序问题，这些互不相容的方案导致人们普遍认为，寻求单一的 “正确 “解决方案是徒劳且虚幻的。然而，确实存在一个正确的解决方案。我们没有理由屈从于道德相对主义。事实上，解决社会秩序问题的方法早在几百年前就已为人所知。解决之道就是私有财产的观念。

let me formulate the solution first for the special case represented by the Garden of Eden and subsequently for the general case represented by the real world of allaround scarcity。

让我先为以伊甸园为代表的特殊情况制定解决方案，然后为普遍存在稀缺性的以现实世界所代表的一般情况制定解决方案。

在伊甸园中，解决方案是由一个简单的规则提供的，只要没有其他人站在那里占据同样的空间，每个人都可以随心所欲地放置或移动自己的身体。

Outside of the Garden of Eden，in the realm of allaround scarcity，the solution is provided by four logically interrelated rules：

在伊甸园之外，在普遍稀缺的领域，解决方案是由四条逻辑上相互关联的规则提供的：

Every person is the private （exclusive） owner of his own physical body。Indeed，who else，if not Crusoe，should be the owner of Crusoe’s body？ Friday？ Or Crusoe and Friday jointly？ Yet that would not help avoid conflict。Rather，it would create conflict and make it permanent。
每个人都是自己身体的私人（排他性的）所有者。事实上，如果不是鲁滨逊，还有谁应该是鲁滨逊身体的所有者呢？星期五吗？还是鲁滨逊和星期五共同拥有？然而，这无助于避免冲突，反而会制造冲突，并使冲突永久化。
Every person is the private owner of all naturegiven goods that he has perceived as scarce and put to use by means of his body，before any other person.again，who else，if not the first user，should be their owner？ The second user？ Or the first and the second user jointly？ Yet such rulings again would be contrary to the very purpose of norms：of helping to avoid conflict，rather than to create it。
每个人都是大自然赋予他的所有物品的私人所有者，这些物品是他认为稀缺的，并通过他的身体先于其他人使用的。同样，如果不是第一个使用者，还有谁应该是它们的所有者？第二个使用者吗？还是第一个使用者和第二个使用者共同拥有？然而，这样的规则将再次违背规范的根本目的：帮助避免冲突，而不是制造冲突。
Every person who，with the help of his body and his originally appropriated goods，produces new products thereby becomes the proper owner of these products，provided only that in the process of production he does not physically damage the goods owned by another person.
每个人，只要在生产过程中不对他人所有的物品造成物理损害，都可以利用自己的身体和先占的物品生产新产品，并且成为这些新产品的正当所有人。
once a good has been first appropriated or produced，ownership in it can be acquired only by means of a voluntary，contractual transfer of its property title from a previous to a later owner。
一旦物品被先占或生产出来，其所有权的获得方式，只能通过自愿的契约的转让，从先前的所有者手中转移到后来的所有者手中。

I can spare myself here the task of providing a detailed ethical as well as economic justification of these rules.This has been done elsewhere.How ever，a few statements in this connection are in order。

在此，我不想对这些规则进行详细的伦理和经济论证。这项工作已在其他地方完成。不过，我还是要就此发表一些看法。

Contrary to the frequently heard claim that the institution of private property is only a convention，it must be categorically stated：a convention serves a purpose，and it is something to which an alternative exists.The Latin alphabet，for instance，serves the purpose of written communication and there exists an alternative to it，the Cyrillic alphabet。That is why it is referred to as a convention.

与人们常听到的那种认为私有财产制度仅仅是一种惯例的说法相反，必须明确指出：惯例是有其目的用途的，并且存在替代选项。例如，拉丁字母表服务于书面交流的目的，并且存在它的一种替代物，即西里尔字母表。这就是为什么它被称作一种惯例。

What，however，is the purpose of action norms？ If no interpersonal conflict existed—that is：if，due to a prestabilized harmony of all interests，no situation ever arose in which two or more people wanted to use one and the same good in incompatible ways—then no norms would be needed.It is the purpose of norms to help avoid otherwise unavoidable conflict。A norm that generates conflict rather than helping to avoid it is contrary to the very purpose of norms.It is a dysfunctional norm or a perversion.

那么，行动规范的目的是什么？如果不存在人际冲突——也就是说，如果由于所有利益的预先稳定与和谐，从来没有出现过两个或两个以上的人想要以不相容的方式使用同一个物品的情况——那么就不需要规范了。规范的目的是帮助避免原本无法避免的冲突。一个规范如果不是帮助避免冲突，而是产生冲突，那么它就违背了规范的根本目的。这是一种功能失调的规范或倒错。

with regard to the purpose of conflict avoidance，however，the institution of private property is definitely not just a convention，because no alter native to it exists.only private （exclusive） property makes it possible that all otherwise unavoidable conflicts can be avoided.And only the principle of property acquisition through acts of original appropriation，performed by specific individuals at a specific time and location，makes it possible to avoid conflict from the beginning of mankind onward，because only the first appropriation of some previously unappropriated good can be conflictfree— simply，because—per definitionem—no one else had any previous dealings with the good.

然而，就避免冲突的目的而言，私有财产制度绝对不仅仅是一种惯例，因为不存在任何替代办法。只有私有（排他性）财产才有可能使原本无法避免的冲突得以避免。只有借助特定的个人在特定的时间和地点通过先占行动获得财产的原则，才有可能避免自人类自诞生以来就存在的冲突，因为只有对先前未被占有的物品的首次占有才不存在冲突——简单地说，因为——根据定义——以前没有其他人与该物品有过任何关系。

III. 社会秩序的执行和私有财产的保护：国家

THE ENforcemenT OF SOCIAL ORDER AND THE PROteCTIon OF PRIVAte PROPERTY：THE STAte

As important as this insight is—that the institution of private property，ultimately grounded in acts of original appropriation，is without alternative given the desideratum of conflict avoidance （peace）—it is not sufficient to establish social order。For even if everyone knows how conflict can be avoided，it is still possible that people simply do not want to avoid conflict，because they expect to benefit from it at the expense of others.

私有财产制度归根结底是以先占行动为基础的，鉴于要实现避免冲突（和平）这一必要条件，它不存在其他替代选择。这一见解固然重要，但仅靠它还不足以建立社会秩序。因为即便每个人都知道如何避免冲突，人们仍有可能根本就不想去避免冲突，因为他们指望能以牺牲他人为代价从冲突中获益。

In fact，as long as mankind is what it is，there will always exist murderers，robbers，thieves，thugs and con artists，i.e.，people not acting in accordance with the abovementioned rules.Hence，every social order，if it is to be successfully maintained，requires institutions and mechanisms designed to keep such rule breakers in check。How to accomplish this task，and by whom？

事实上，只要人类如是存在，就会有杀人犯、强盗、小偷、暴徒和骗子这类不按上述规则行事的人。因此，任何社会秩序要想成功维持，就需要设计一些制度和机制来约束这些破坏规则的人。那么，如何完成这项任务，以及由谁来完成呢？

The standard reply to this question is to say that this task，i.e.，the enforcement of law and order，is the first and primary duty—indeed，the raison d’être—of the state.In particular，this is the answer also given by classi cal liberals such as my own intellectual master，Ludwig von Mises.Whether or not this answer is correct depends on how “state” is defined.

对于这个问题的标准回答是，这项任务，即维护法律和秩序，是国家的首要和基本职责——实际上，这也是国家存在的理由。特别是，这也是像我的学术导师路德维希·冯·米塞斯这样的古典自由主义者给出的答案。这个答案是否正确取决于“国家”是如何被定义的。

The state，according to the standard definition，is not a regular，specialized firm.Rather，it is defined as an agency characterized by two unique，logically connected features.First，the state is an agency that exercises a territorial monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking。That is，the state is the ultimate arbiter in every case of conflict，including conflicts involving itself。It allows no appeal above and beyond itself。Second，the state is an agency that exercises a territorial monopoly of taxation.That is，it is an agency that unilaterally fixes the price that private citizens must pay for the state’s service as ultimate judge and enforcer of law and order。

根据标准定义，国家不是一个常规的、专业化的企业。相反，它被定义为这样的一个机构，具有两个独特的、逻辑上相互关联的特征。首先，国家是一个在领土范围内对最终决策权实行垄断的机构。也就是说，在每一起冲突事件中，包括涉及国家自身的冲突，国家都是最终的仲裁者。它不允许有任何超越其自身的上诉途径。其次，国家是一个在领土范围内对征税权实行垄断的机构。也就是说，它是一个单方面确定公民必须为国家作为法律和秩序的最终裁决者与执法者所提供的服务而支付价格（即纳税额）的机构。

IV.“国家主义”的根基性错误

THE funDAmenTAL ERROR OF “STATISM”

As widespread as the standard view regarding the necessity of the institution of a state as the provider of law and order is，it stands in clear contradiction to elementary economic and moral laws and principles.

尽管关于国家作为法律和秩序提供者的必要性的标准观点非常普遍，但它明显违背了基本的经济和道德的法则与原则。

First of all，among economists and philosophers two nearuniversally accepted propositions exist：

首先，在经济学家和哲学家中存在着两个几乎被普遍接受的命题：

Every “monopoly” is “bad” from the viewpoint of consumers.Monopoly is here understood in its classic meaning as an exclusive privilege granted to a single producer of a commodity or service，or as the absence of “free entry” into a particular line of production.only one agency，A，may produce a given good or service，X。such a monopoly is “bad” for consum ers，because，shielded from potential new entrants into a given area of production，the price of the product will be higher and its quality lower than otherwise，under free competition.
从消费者的角度来看，任何“垄断”都是“不好的”。垄断在这里的经典含义是指给予某种商品或服务的单一生产者的独占特权，或指没有 “自由进入 “某一特定产品生产领域的权利。只有一个机构A可以提供特定的商品或服务X。这样的垄断对消费者来说是“坏”的，因为在一个特定的生产领域，屏蔽了潜在的新进入者，产品的价格将比在自由竞争下更高，同时质量却更差。
The production of law and order，i.e.，of security，is the primary func tion of the state （as just defined）。Security is here understood in the wide sense adopted in the American Declaration of independence：as the protec tion of life，property，and the pursuit of happiness from domestic violence （crime） as well as external （foreign） aggression （war）。
法律和秩序的建立，即安保的生产，是国家的首要职能（如前所述）。这里所说的安保是按照美国《独立宣言》中的广义角度来理解的：即保护生命、财产和追求幸福的权利，使其免受国内暴力（犯罪）和外来（外国）侵略（战争）的侵害。

both propositions are apparently incompatible with each other。This has rarely caused concern among philosophers and economists，however，and in so far as it has，the typical reaction has been one of taking exception to the first proposition rather than the second.Yet there exist fundamental theoretical reasons （and mountains of empirical evidence） that it is indeed the second proposition that is in error。

这两个命题显然是互相矛盾的。然而，这种矛盾很少引起哲学家和经济学家的关注，即使有关注，典型的反应也是对第一个命题而不是第二个命题提出异议。然而，基本的理论理由（和大量的实证证据）表明，实际上第二个命题是错误的。

As a territorial monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking and law enforcement，the state is not just like any other monopoly，such as a milk or a car monopoly that produces milk and cars of comparatively lower qual ity and higher prices.In contrast to all other monopolists，the state not only produces inferior goods，but “bads” （nongoods）。In fact，it must first produce bads （such as taxes） before it can produce anything that might be considered a （inferior） good.

作为在最终决策和执法方面拥有领土垄断权的机构，国家与其他任何垄断企业都不一样，比如牛奶或汽车行业的垄断企业，它们生产的牛奶和汽车质量相对较差且价格较高。与所有其他垄断者相比，国家不仅生产劣质商品，而且还生产“劣货”（bads）（非财货nongoods）。事实上，国家必须先生产劣货（bads）（如税收），然后才能生产任何可能被视为（劣质）商品的东西。

If an agency is the ultimate judge in every case of conflict，then it is also judge in all conflicts involving itself。Consequently，instead of merely pre venting and resolving conflict，a monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking will also cause and provoke conflict in order to settle it to his own advantage.That is，if one can only appeal to the state for justice，justice will be perverted in the favor of the state，constitutions and supreme courts notwithstanding。These constitutions and courts are state constitutions and courts，and whatever limitations on state action they may set or find are invariably determined by agents of the very same institution under consideration.

如果一个机构是每个冲突案例的最终仲裁者，那么如果这个机构是冲突的一方时，它也是最终仲裁者。（译者注：在这种情形发生时，这种具有仲裁者权力的机构肯定会偏袒自己，从中牟利）。因此，拥有最终决策权的垄断者不仅不会预防和解决冲突，反而会为了自身利益制造和挑起冲突。也就是说，如果人们只能向国家寻求公正，那么尽管有宪法和最高法院，公正也会被扭曲，变成有利于国家。这些宪法和法院都是国家的宪法和法院，而且无论它们可能设定或发现的对国家行为的何种限制，无一例外地都是由正在被考量的同一机构的人员所决定的。

Predictably，the definition of property and protection will be continually altered and the range of jurisdiction expanded to the state’s advantage.The idea of some “given” eternal and immutable law that must be discovered will disappear and be replaced by the idea of law as legislation—as arbitrary，statemade law.

可以预见的是，财产和保护的定义将不断被改变，管辖权的范围也将不断扩大，从而对国家有利。某种 “给定的 “永恒不变的法律是必须被发现的观念将消失，取而代之的是作为立法的法律——任意武断的、国家制定的法律。

Moreover，as ultimate judge the state is also a monopolist of taxation，i.e.，it can unilaterally，without the consent of everyone affected，determine the price that its subjects must pay for the state’s provision of （perverted） law.However，a taxfunded lifeandproperty protection agency is a contra diction in terms：an expropriating property protector。Motivated，as every one is，by selfinterest and the disutility of labor，but equipped with the unique power to tax，state agents will invariably strive to maximize expendi tures on protection—and almost all of a nation’s wealth can conceivably be consumed by the cost of protection—and at the same time to minimize the actual production of protection.The more money one can spend and the less one must work for it，the better off one will be.

此外，作为最终的仲裁者，国家也是税收的垄断者，也就是说，它能够在未经所有受影响者同意的情况下，单方面决定其国民必须为国家提供的（扭曲的）法律支付的代价。然而，一个靠税收资助的生命和财产保护机构是一个矛盾体：它是一个剥夺财产的保护者。和所有人一样，国家代理人受自身利益和劳动负效用的驱使，但由于他们拥有独一无二的征税权力，就必然会竭力将用于保护的开支最大化——可以想象，一个国家几乎所有的财富都可能被保护成本消耗殆尽——同时将实际提供的保护最小化。一个人能花的钱越多，为此而付出的劳动越少，他的境况就会越好。

V. 错上加错：民主国家

THE ERROR COMPOUNDED：THE DEMOCRATIC STATE

Apart from the fundamental error of statism generally，additional errors are involved in the special case of a democratic state.A detailed treatment of this subject has been provided elsewhere，but a brief mention is indicated.

除了一般意义上的国家主义的根基性错误外，民主国家的特殊情况还涉及其他错误。关于这个问题的详细论述已在其他地方提供，这里只作简要介绍。

The traditional，premodern state form is that of a （absolute） monarchy。Yet monarchy was faulted，in particular also by classical liberals，for being incompatible with the basic principle of “equality before the law.” Monarchy instead rested on personal privilege.Thus，the critics of monarchy argued，the monarchical state had to be replaced by a democratic one.In opening participation and entry into state government to everyone on equal terms，not just to a hereditary class of nobles，it was thought that the principle of the equality of all before the law had been satisfied.

传统的、前现代的国家形式是（绝对的）君主制。然而，君主制却因不符合 “法律面前人人平等 “的基本原则而受到谴责，尤其是受到古典自由主义者的谴责。君主制建立在个人特权之上，因此，君主政体的批评者认为，君主政体的国家必须被民主政体所取代。人们认为，基于平等的条件，人人都可以参与和进入国家政府，而不仅仅是世袭的贵族阶层，这就满足了法律面前人人平等的原则。

However，this democratic equality before the law is something entirely different from and incompatible with the idea of one universal law，equally applicable to everyone，everywhere，and at all times.In fact，the former objectionable schism and inequality of a higher law of kings versus a subordinate law of ordinary subjects is fully preserved under democracy in the separation of “public” versus “private” law and the supremacy of the former over the latter。

然而，这种法律面前的民主平等与那种普遍适用于所有人、所有地方以及所有时间的统一法律的理念完全不同且不相容。事实上，在民主制度下，过去那种令人反感的、君主的高等法律与普通国民的从属法律之间的分裂和不平等现象，在“公”法与“私”法的区分以及前者对后者的至高无上地位中被完整地保留了下来。

Under democracy，everyone is equal insofar as entry into government is open to all on equal terms.Everyone can become king，so to say，not only a privileged circle of people.Thus，in a democracy no personal privileges or privileged persons exist。However，functional privileges and privileged functions exist。Public officials，as long as they act in an official capacity，are governed and protected by public law and occupy thereby a privileged position visàvis persons acting under the mere authority of private law.

在民主制度下，就进入政府的机会对所有人平等开放而言，每个人都是平等的。可以说，每个人都能成为君主，而不只是某一特权群体能当君主。因此，在民主制度下不存在个人特权或特权人物。然而，职能特权和享有特权的职能是存在的。只要公职人员以官方身份行事，他们就受公法管辖和保护，因此，相对于仅根据私法授权行事的人而言，公职人员享有特权地位。

In particular，public officials are permitted to finance or subsidize their own activities through taxes.That is，they do not，as every privatelaw subject must，earn their income through the production and subsequent sale of goods and services to voluntarily buying or notbuying consumers.Rather，as public officials，they are permitted to engage in，and live off，what in private dealings between privatelaw subjects is considered “theft” and “stolen loot。” Thus，privilege and legal discrimination—and the distinction between rulers and subjects—will not disappear under democracy。To the contrary。Rather than being restricted to princes and nobles，under democ racy，privileges will be available to all：everyone can engage in theft and live off stolen loot if only he becomes a public official。

特别是，公职人员可以通过税收为自己的活动提供资金或补贴。也就是说，他们不用像每一个私法主体那样，通过生产并随后向自愿购买或不愿购买的消费者出售商品和服务来赚取收入。相反，作为公职人员，他们被允许从事在私法主体之间的私人交易中被视为 “盗窃 “和 “销赃 “的行为，并以此为生。因此，特权和法律上的歧视——以及统治者和被统治者之间的区别——在民主制度下不会消失。恰恰相反，在民主制度下，特权将不再局限于王公贵族，而是向所有人开放：只要成为公职人员，每个人都可以从事盗窃，依赖偷来的赃物为生。

Predictably，then，under democratic conditions the tendency of every monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking to increase the price of justice and to lower its quality and substitute injustice for justice and is not diminished but aggravated.As hereditary monopolist，a king or prince regards the territory and people under his jurisdiction as his personal property and engages in the monopolistic exploitation of his “property。”

可以预见的是，在民主条件下，每一个对最终决策权的垄断都会提高公正的成本、降低其质量，并以不公正取代公正，而这种趋势不但没有减弱，反而加剧了。作为世袭的垄断者，君主或王子会将其管辖下的领土和人民视为自己的私人财产，并对其“财产”进行垄断性的剥削。

Under democracy，monopoly and monopolistic exploitation do not disappear。Rather，what happens with democracy is this：instead of a prince and a nobility who regard the country as their private property，a temporary and interchangeable caretaker is put in monopolistic charge of the country。The caretaker does not own the country，but as long as he is in office he is permitted to use it to his and his protégés’ advantage.He owns its current use—usufruct—but not its capital stock。This does not eliminate exploitation.To the contrary，it makes exploitation less calculating and carried out with little or no regard to the capital stock。Exploitation becomes short sighted and capital consumption will be Systematically promoted.

在民主制度下，垄断和垄断性剥削并不会消失。实际情况是，民主制度下会发生这样的情况：取代将国家视为私人财产的王子和贵族的，是一个临时性且可更替的管理者，由其对国家进行垄断性管理。这位管理者并不拥有这个国家，但只要他在位，就被允许利用国家来为自己及其亲信谋取利益。他拥有国家当下的使用权——用益权，但不拥有其资本存量。这并没有消除剥削。恰恰相反，它使得剥削变得不那么精打细算，而且在进行剥削时很少或根本不考虑资本存量。剥削变得急功近利，并且会系统性地推动对资本的涸泽而渔。

VI. 解决之道：以私法社会代替国家

THE SOLUTION：PRIVATELaw SOCIETY inSteAD OF STAte

If the state，and especially the democratic state，is demonstrably incapable of creating and maintaining social order； if，instead of helping avoid conflict，the state is the source of permanent conflict； and if，rather than assuring legal security and predictability，the state itself continuously generates insecurity and unpredictability through its legislation and replaces constant law with “flexible” and arbitrary whim，then inescapably the question as to the correct—obviously，nonstatist—solution to the problem of social order arises.

如果国家，尤其是民主国家，明显无法创建和维护社会秩序；如果国家非但无助于避免冲突，反而是持久冲突的根源；如果国家本身非但不能确保法律的安全性和可预测性，反而通过其立法不断制造不安全和不可预测性，并以 “灵活 “和任意武断的突发奇想取代恒定的法律，那么，关于社会秩序问题的正确解决方案（显然是非国家主义的解决方案）这一问题就不可避免地出现了。

The solution is a privatelaw society，i.e.，a society in which every individual and institution is subject to one and the same set of laws.No public law granting privileges to specific persons or functions （and no public property） exists in this society。There is only private law （and private property），equally applicable to each and everyone.No one is permitted to acquire property by any means other than through original appropriation，production，or voluntary exchange，and no one possesses a privilege to tax and expropriate.Moreover，in a privatelaw society no one is permitted to prohibit anyone else from using his property in order to enter any line of production he wishes and compete against whomever he pleases.

Specifically regarding the problem at hand：in a privatelaw society the production of security—of law and order—will be undertaken by freely financed individuals and agencies competing for a voluntarily paying （or notpaying） clientele，just as the production of all other goods and services.It would be presumptuous to predict the precise shape and form of the security industry emerging within the framework of a privatelaw society。However，it is not difficult to predict a few central changes that would fundamentally—and favorably—distinguish a competitive security industry from the present，alltoowellknown statist production of （in）justice and （dis）order。

具体就当前所涉及的问题而言：在一个私法社会中，安保的生产——即法律和秩序的维护——将由通过自由出资成立的个人和机构来承担，它们会为争取自愿付费（或不付费）的客户群体而展开竞争，就如同所有其他商品和服务的生产那样。要预测在私法社会框架内应运而生的安保行业的确切形态和模式，未免有些狂妄。然而，要预测出一些核心变化并不困难，这些变化将从根本上且有利地把竞争性的安保行业与当下众所周知的由国家主导的（不）公正及（混）乱的状况区分开来。

First，while in a complex society based on the division of labor self defense will play only a secondary role （for reasons yet to be explained），it should be emphasized from the outset that in a privatelaw society every one’s right to defend oneself from aggression against one’s person and property is entirely undisputed.In distinct contrast to the present，statist practice，which renders people increasingly unarmed and defenseless against aggressors，in a privatelaw society no restrictions on the private ownership of firearms and other weapons exist。Everyone’s elementary right to engage in selfdefense to protect his life and property against invaders would be sacrosanct，and as one knows from the experience of The Not So Wild，Wild West，as well as numerous recent empirical investigations into the relation ship between the frequency of gun ownership and crime rates，more guns imply less crime.

首先，虽然在一个以劳动分工为基础的复杂社会中，自卫只会发挥次要作用（原因尚待解释），但应该从一开始就强调，在私法社会中，每个人都有权保护自己免受人身和财产侵犯，这一点完全无可争议。国家主义的实践使人们越来越缺乏武装，在面对侵犯时手无寸铁，与目前这种国家主义的实践形成鲜明对比的是，在私法社会中，对私人拥有枪支和其他武器没有任何限制。每个人都有自卫的基本权利，以保护自己的生命和财产免受侵害人的侵害，这是神圣不可侵犯的。正如人们从《不那么狂野的西部》（The Not So Wild，Wild West）的经验中所了解到的，以及最近对枪支持有率与犯罪率之间关系的大量实证研究所揭示的那样，更多的枪支意味着更少的犯罪。

Just as in today’s complex economy we do not produce our own shoes，suits，and telephones，however，but partake in the advantages of the division of labor，so it is to be expected that we will also do so when it comes to production of security，especially the more property a person owns and the richer a society as a whole.Hence，most security services will without doubt be provided by specialized agencies competing for voluntarily paying clients：by various private police，insurance，and arbitration agencies.

正如在当今复杂的经济体中，我们并不生产自己的鞋子、衣服和电话，而是分享劳动分工的好处，因此可以预见，我们在生产安保服务时也将如此，尤其是个人拥有的财产越多、整个社会越富裕的时候。因此，毫无疑问，大多数安保服务将由专门机构提供，如各种私人警察、保险和仲裁机构，这些机构将争夺自愿付费的客户。

If one wanted to summarize in one word the decisive difference and advantage of a competitive security industry as compared to the current statist practice，it would be this：contract。The state，as ultimate decision maker and judge，operates in a contractless legal vacuum.There exists no contract between the state and its citizens.It is not contractually fixed，what is actually owned by whom，and what，accordingly，is to be protected.It is not fixed，what service the state is to provide，what is to happen if the state fails in its duty，nor what the price is that the “customer” of such “service” must pay。

如果要用一个词来概括竞争性安保行业与当前国家主义做法的决定性区别和优势，那就是：契约。国家作为最终的决策者和仲裁者，在无契约的法律真空中运作。国家与其公民之间不存在契约。实际上谁拥有什么，以及相应地要保护什么，这些都不是通过契约确定的。国家应提供何种服务、如果国家未能履行其职责会发生什么情况，以及这种“服务”的“顾客”必须支付的价格是多少，这些也都没有确定下来。

Rather，the state unilaterally fixes the rules of the game and can change them，per legislation，during the game.Obviously，such behavior is inconceivable for freely financed security providers.Just imagine a security provider，whether police，insurer，or arbitrator，whose offer consisted in some thing like this：

相反，国家单方面制定游戏规则，并可在游戏过程中通过立法改变规则。显然，这种行为对于自由出资的安保供应商来说是不可想象的。试想一下，无论是警察、保险商，还是仲裁者，如果他们提供的安保服务是这样的，那么，他们会怎么做呢？

I will not contractually guarantee you anything。I will not tell you what specific things I will regard as your tobeprotected property，nor will I tell you what I oblige myself to do if，according to your opinion，I do not fulfill my service to you—but in any case，I reserve the right to unilaterally determine the price that you must pay me for such undefined service.

我不会在契约上向你承诺任何事情。我不会告诉你我将把哪些具体的事物视为你受保护的财产，我也不会告诉你，假如根据你的意见，我没有履行我对你的服务，以及我有义务履行什么——但无论如何，我保留单方面决定你必须为这种未定义的服务向我支付的价格的权利。

Any such security provider would immediately disappear from the market due to a complete lack of customers.Each private，freely financed security producer instead must offer its prospective clients a contract。And these contracts must，in order to appear acceptable to voluntarily paying consumers，contain clear property descriptions as well as clearly defined mutual services and obligations.Moreover，each party to a contract，for the duration or until the fulfillment of the contract，would be bound by its terms and conditions； and every change of terms or conditions would require the unanimous consent of all parties concerned.

由于完全缺乏客户，任何此类安保供应商都会立即从市场上消失。相反，每个自由出资的私人安保生产商必须向其潜在客户提供一份契约。为了让自愿付费的消费者能够接受，这些契约必须包含清晰的财产说明，以及明确界定的相互之间的服务与义务。此外，契约的每一方，在契约有效期间或履行完结之前，将受其条款和条件的约束；条款或条件的任何更改都需要有关各方的一致同意。

具体而言，为了使安保产品的购买方可以接受，这些契约必须包含在保护者或保险公司和他们所保护或投保的客户之间发生冲突或争议时的处理条款，以及在不同保护者或保险公司和他们各自的客户之间发生冲突时的处理条款。在这方面，只有一个双方都能接受的解决方案：在这些情况下，冲突各方通过契约同意由双方共同信任的独立第三方进行仲裁。

And as for this third party，it too is freely financed and stands in competition with other arbitrators or arbitration agencies.Its clients，i.e.，the insurers and the insured，expect of it that it come up with a verdict that is recognized as fair and just by all sides.only arbitrators capable of forming such judgments will succeed in the arbitration market。Arbitrators incapable of this and viewed as biased or partial will disappear from the market。

至于这个第三方，它也是自由出资，并与其他仲裁者或仲裁机构竞争。它的客户，即保险公司和被保险公司，希望它能做出一个各方都认可的公平公正的裁决。只有能够做出这种裁决的仲裁者才能在仲裁市场上取得成功。无法做到这一点并被视为有偏见或偏袒的仲裁者将从市场上消失。

From this fundamental advantage of a privatelaw society all other advantages follow.

从私法社会的这一基本优势出发，所有其他优势都会随之而来。

First，competition among police，insurers，and arbitrators for paying clients would bring about a tendency toward a continuous fall in the price of protection （per insured value），thus rendering protection increasingly more affordable，whereas under monopolistic conditions the price of protection will steadily rise and become increasingly unaffordable.

首先，警察、保险公司和仲裁者之间对付费客户的竞争将导致保护价格（按保险价值计算）持续下降的趋势，从而使保护越来越容易负担，而在垄断条件下，保护价格将节节攀升，变得越来越难以负担。

Furthermore，as already indicated，protection and security are goods and services that compete with others.If more resources are allocated to protection，fewer can be expended on cars，vacations，food，or drink，for example.Also，resources allocated to the protection of group A （people living along the Pacific，for instance） compete with resources expended on the protection of group B （people living along the Atlantic）。

此外，如前所述，安保和安全是与其他商品和服务竞争的商品和服务。例如，假如把更多的资源用于安保，那么在汽车、度假、食物或饮料等方面的花费就会减少。此外，用于保护 A 组（例如太平洋沿岸居民）的资源与用于保护 B 组（大西洋沿岸居民）的资源相互竞争。

The state，as a taxfunded protection monopolist，will necessarily allocate resources arbitrarily。There will be overproduction （or underproduction） of security as compared to other competing goods and services，and there will be overprotection of some individuals，groups，or regions and underprotection of others.

国家作为一个由税收资助的安保的垄断者，必然会任意分配资源。与其他竞争性商品和服务相比，会出现安保生产过剩（或生产不足）的情况，而且会出现对某些个人、群体或地区保护过度，而对其他个人、群体或地区保护不足的情况。

In distinct contrast，in a System of freely competing protection agen cies all arbitrariness of allocation （all over and underproduction） would disappear。Protection would be accorded the relative importance that it has in the eyes of voluntarily paying consumers，and no person，group，or region would receive protection at the expense of any other one.Each and every one would receive protection in accordance with his own payments.

与之形成鲜明对比的是，在一个由自由竞争的安保机构所组成的体系中，所有分配上的任意性（所有的生产过剩和生产不足）都会消失。安保服务将会获得其在自愿付费的消费者眼中所具有的相对重要性，并且没有任何人、任何群体或任何地区会以牺牲其他人为代价而获得安保服务。每个人都会根据自己的付费情况获得相应的安保服务。

The most important advantage of a private，contractbased production of law and order，however，is of a qualitative nature.

然而，私营的、以契约为基础的法律和秩序生产的最重要的优势在于其质量。

First，there is the fight against crime.The state is notoriously inefficient in this regard，because the state agents entrusted with this task are paid out of taxes，i.e.，independent of their productivity。Why should one work if one is also paid for doing nothing at all？

首先是打击犯罪。国家在这方面的效率是出了名的低，因为负责这项任务的国家代理人的工资来自税收，即与他们的工作效率无关。如果一个人什么都不做也能得到工资，那他为什么还要干活呢？

In fact，it can be expected that state agents will have an interest in maintaining a moderately high crime rate，because this way they can justify everincreased funding。Worse，for state agents the victims of crime and the indemnification and compensation of such victims play an at best negligible role.The state does not indemnify the victims of crime.To the contrary，the harmed victims are still further insulted in making them，qua taxpayers，pay for the incarceration and “rehabilitation” of the criminal （should he be captured）。

事实上，可以预料到的是，国家代理人会有兴趣维持一个适度偏高的犯罪率，因为这样他们就能为不断增加的经费开支找到理由。更糟糕的是，对于国家代理人来说，犯罪受害者以及对这些受害者的赔偿和补偿所起的作用往好了说也是微不足道的。国家不会对犯罪受害者进行赔偿。恰恰相反，那些受到伤害的受害者还会进一步遭到侮辱，因为他们作为纳税人，还要为罪犯（如果罪犯被抓获的话）的监禁和“改造”付费。

The situation in a privatelaw society is entirely different。Security pro viders，insurers in particular，have to indemnify their clients in the case of actual damage （otherwise they would find no clients） and hence，they must operate efficiently。They must be efficient in the prevention of crime，for unless they can prevent a crime，they would have to pay up.Further，even if a criminal act could not be prevented，they must be efficient in detecting and recovering stolen loot，because otherwise they must pay to replace these goods.In particular，they must be efficient in the detection and apprehen sion of the criminal，for only if the criminal is apprehended is it possible for them to make him pay for the compensation owed to the victim and thus reduce their costs.

私法社会的情况则完全不同。安保服务供应商，尤其是保险公司，必须在实际损害发生时赔偿其客户（否则他们就找不到客户），因此，他们必须高效运作。他们必须有效地防止犯罪，原因在于，除非他们能够防止犯罪，否则他们就必须支付赔偿。此外，即使不能阻止犯罪行为，他们也必须有效地侦查和追回被盗赃物，否则他们就必须支付重置这些物品的费用。特别是，他们必须在犯罪侦查和逮捕方面高效，因为只有抓住罪犯，他们才能让其支付应付给受害者的赔偿，从而降低他们的成本。

Moreover，a private，competitive，and contractbased security industry has a general peacepromoting effect。States are，as already explained，by nature aggressive.They can cause or provoke conflict in order to then “solve” it to their own advantage.

此外，一个私营的、竞争性的、基于契约的安保行业具有普遍的促进和平的作用。如前所述，国家具有侵犯性。它们可以制造或挑起冲突，然后以对自己有利的方式 “解决 “冲突。

Or，to put it differently，as taxfunded monopolists of ultimate decisionmaking，states can externalize the costs associated with aggressive behavior onto others，i.e.，the hapless taxpayers，and accordingly will tend to be more aggressive visàvis their own population as well as “foreigners.”

或者换句话说，作为由税收资助的最终决策垄断者，国家可以将与侵犯行为相关的成本外部化，将其转嫁予他人，那些倒霉透顶的纳税人，因此，无论是对本国民众还是对 “外国人”，国家往往都会表现得更具侵略性。

In distinct contrast，competing private insurers are by nature defenive and peaceful。on the one hand this is because every act of aggression is costly，and an insurance company engaged in aggressive conduct would require comparatively higher premiums，involving the loss of clients to cheaper nonaggressive competitors.

与之形成鲜明对比的是，相互竞争的私营保险公司本质上是防御性的、和平的。一方面，这是因为每一种侵犯行动都是代价高昂的，而从事侵犯行动的保险公司需收取相对较高的保费，这会导致客户流失，转而投向收费更低且无侵犯性的竞争对手。

On the other hand，it is not possible to insure oneself against every conceivable “risk。” Rather，it is only possible to insure oneself against “accidents，” i.e.，risks over whose outcome the insured has no control and to which he contributes nothing。Thus，it is possible to insure oneself against the risk of death and fire，for instance，but it is impossible to insure oneself against the risk of committing suicide tomorrow or setting one’s own house on fire.

另一方面，不可能针对每一种能想到的“风险”都为自己投保。相反，只有针对“意外事故”才能为自己投保，也就是说，针对那些结果不受投保人控制且投保人对其发生毫无促成作用的风险才能投保。例如，人们可以为自己投保以防死亡和火灾的风险，但不可能为自己投保以防明天自杀或放火烧自己房子的风险。

Similarly，it is impossible to insure oneself against the risk of business failure，of unemployment，or of disliking one’s neighbors，for in each case one has some control over the event in question.Most significantly，the uninsurability of individual actions and sentiments （in contradistinction to accidents） implies that it is also impossible to insure oneself against the risk of damages resulting from one’s own prior aggression or provocation.

同样，人们也不可能为商业失败、个人失业或不喜的邻里关系这样的风险的投保，因为在以上每种情况下，个人对相关事件都有一定的掌控力。最重要的是，个人行动和情感的不可保性（与意外事故不同）意味着，人们也无法为自己投保以防范因自己先前的侵犯或挑衅行为而导致损害的风险。

Instead，every insurer must restrict the actions of his clients so as to exclude all aggression and provocation on their part。That is，any insurance against social disasters such as crime must be contingent on the insured sub mitting themselves to specified norms of civilized，nonaggressive conduct。

Further，due to the same reasons and financial concerns，insurers will tend to require that their clients abstain from all forms of vigilante justice （except perhaps under quite extraordinary circumstances），for vigilante justice，even if justified，invariably causes uncertainty and provokes possible thirdparty intervention.By obliging their clients instead to submit to regular publicized procedures whenever they think they have been victimized，these disturbances and associated costs can be largely avoided.

Lastly，it is worthwhile pointing out that while states as taxfunded agencies can—and do—engage in the largescale prosecution of victimless crimes such as “illegaldrug” use，prostitution，or gambling，these “crimes” would tend to be of little or no concern within a System of freely funded protection agencies.“Protection” against such “crimes” would require higher insurance premiums，but since these “crimes”—unlike genuine crimes against persons and property—do not create victims，very few people would be willing to spend money on such “protection.”

Still more：while states，as already noted，are always and everywhere eager to disarm their populations and thus rob them of an essential means of selfdefense，privatelaw societies are characterized by an unrestricted right to selfdefense and hence by widespread private gun and weapon ownership.Just imagine a security producer who demanded of its pro spective clients that they would first have to completely disarm them selves before it would be willing to defend the clients’ life and property。Correctly，everyone would think of this as a bad joke and refuse such an offer。

此外，如前文所述，国家无论何时何地总是热衷于解除民众的武装，从而剥夺他们一项非常重要的自卫手段，而私法社会的特点则是拥有不受限制的自卫权，因此私人普遍拥有枪支和武器。想象一下，一个安保生产商要求其潜在客户首先必须完全解除自己的武装，然后才愿意保护其客户的生命和财产。没错，每个人都会认为这是一个蹩脚的笑话，同时拒绝这样的提议。

freely financed insurance companies that demanded potential clients first hand over all of their means of selfdefense as a prerequisite of pro tection would immediately arouse the utmost suspicion as to their true motives，and they would quickly go bankrupt。In their own best interest，insurance companies would reward armed clients，in particular those able to certify some level of training in the handling of arms，charging them lower premiums reflecting the lower risk that they represent。Just as insur ers charge less if homeowners have an alarm System or a safe installed，so would a trained gun owner represent a lower insurance risk。

自由出资的保险公司要求其潜在客户首先交出所有的安保手段，以此作为获得保护的先决条件，这将立即引起人们对其真实动机的极大怀疑，他们很快就会破产。为了自身的最大利益，保险公司会奖励持有武器的客户，特别是那些能够证明自己接受过某种程度的武器操作培训的客户，向他们收取较低的保费，以彰显他们所代表的较低风险。就像如果房主安装了警报系统或保险箱，保险公司就会降低保险费一样，训练有素的持枪者也会降低保险风险。

Last and most importantly，a System of competing protection agen cies would have a twofold impact on the development of law.on the one hand，it would allow for greater variability of law.Rather than imposing a uniform set of standards onto everyone （as under statist conditions），protection agencies could compete against each other not just via price but also through product differentiation.There could exist side by side，for instance，Catholic protection agencies or insurers applying canon law，Jewish agencies applying Mosaic law，Muslim agencies applying Islamic law，and agencies applying secular law of one variety or another，all of them sustained by a voluntarily paying clientele.Consumers could choose the law applied to them and their property。No one would have to live under “foreign” law.

on the other hand，the very same System of private law and order production would promote a tendency toward the unification and harmoniza tion of law.The “domestic”—Catholic，Jewish，Roman，etc。—law would apply only to the person and property of those who had chosen it。Canon law，for instance，would apply only to professed Catholics and deal solely with intraCatholic conflict and conflict resolution.

另一方面，同样的私法与秩序生产体系会推动法律趋于统一与协调。“内部的”——天主教、犹太教、罗马法等等——法律将仅适用于那些选择了该法律之人的人身和财产。例如，教会法将仅适用于公开表明信仰天主教的人，并且仅处理天主教内部的冲突以及冲突解决事宜。

Yet it is also possible，of course，that a Catholic might come into conflict with the subscriber of some other law code，E.g。，a MusliM.If both law codes reached the same or a similar conclusion，no difficulties exist。However，if competing law codes arrived at distinctly different conclusion （as they would at least in some cases），a problem arises.

当然，天主教徒也有可能与其他法典（如穆斯林法典）的使用者发生冲突。如果两部法典得出相同或相似的结论，就不存在任何难点。然而，如果相互竞争的法典得出截然不同的结论（至少在某些情况下会如此），问题就出现了。

In this case，“domestic” （intragroup） law would be useless，but natu rally every insured person would want protection against the contingency of intergroup conflicts as well。In this situation，it cannot be expected that one insurer and the subscribers of its law code simply subordinate their judgment to that of another insurer and its law.Rather，as I have already explained，in this situation there exists only one credible and acceptable way out of this predicament：from the outset，every insurer would have to be contractually obliged to submit itself and its clients to arbitration by an independent third party。This party would not only be independent but at the same time the unanimous choice of both parties.

在这种情况下，”内部的”（群体内）法律将毫无用处，但自然而然，每个投保人都希望在群体间冲突发生时得到保护。在这种情况下，我们不能指望一家保险公司及其法律规范的使用者会简单地将自己的判决服从于另一家保险公司及其法律的判决。相反，正如我已经解释过的，在这种情况下，只有一个可信的、可接受的办法来摆脱这种困境：从一开始，每家保险公司就必须在契约上表明义务，将自己及其客户交由独立的第三方仲裁。这个第三方不仅是独立的，而且是双方一致选择的。

It would be agreed upon because of its commonly perceived ability to find mutually agreeable （fair） solutions in cases of intergroup disagreement。If an arbitrator failed in this task and arrived at conclusions that were per ceived as “unfair” or “biased” by either one of the insurers or their clients，this person or agency would not likely be chosen as an arbitrator in the future.

人们之所以认同仲裁者，是因为人们普遍认为仲裁者有能力在群体间出现分歧时找到双方都能接受的（公平的）解决方案。如果仲裁者未能完成此项任务，得出的结论被其中一方保险公司或其客户视为 “不公平 “或 “有偏见”，那么此人或此机构今后不太可能会被选为仲裁者。

As a result of the constant cooperation of various insurers and arbitrators，then，a tendency toward the unification of property and contract law and the harmonization of the rules of procedure，evidence，and conflict resolution would be set in motion.Thus，in buying protection insurance，every insurer and insured becomes a participant in an integrated System of conflict avoidance and peacekeeping。Every single conflict and damage claim，regardless of where and by or against whom，would fall under the jurisdiction of one or more specific insurance agencies and would be handled either by an individual insurer’s “domestic” law or by the “international” or “universal” law provisions and procedures agreed upon by every one in advance.

由于各类保险公司和仲裁者的不断合作，一种促使财产法和契约法趋于统一以及使程序、证据和冲突解决规则趋于协调的趋势将会形成。因此，在购买安保保险时，每一家保险公司和每一位投保人都成为了一个综合性的冲突避免与维和体系的参与者。每一起冲突和损害索赔，无论发生在何处、涉及何人或针对何人，都将归属于一家或多家特定保险机构的管辖范围，并将依据某家保险公司“内部的”法律，或者依据所有人事先商定的“国际的”或“通用的”法律条款及程序来进行处理。

Hence，instead of permanent conflict，injustice，and legal insecurity— as under the present statist conditions—in a privatelaw society，peace，justice，and legal security would hold sway。

因此，在私法社会中，和平、公正和法律安全将占据主导地位，而不是像在目前的国家主义条件下那样长期存在冲突、不公正和法律不安全。

14 防卫的私人生产*

The Private Production of defense

Among the most popular and consequential beliefs of our age is the belief in collective security。Nothing less significant than the legitimacy of the modern state rests on this belief。

我们这个时代最流行、影响最大的信仰之一就是集体安保。现代国家的合法性无一不是建立在这一信仰之上。

I will demonstrate that the idea of collective security is a myth that provides no justification for the modern state，and that all security is and must be private.Yet，before coming to the conclusion let me begin with the problem.First，I will present a twostep reconstruction of the myth of collective security，and at each step raise a few theoretical concerns.

我将证明，集体安保的理念是一个神话，它没有为现代国家提供任何正当理由，所有的安保都是而且必须是私人的。不过，在得出结论之前，让我先从问题入手。首先，我将对集体安保这一神话分两步进行重构，并且在每一步中都提出一些理论关切。

The myth of collective security can also be called the Hobbesian myth.Thomas Hobbes，and countless political philosophers and economists after him，argued that in the state of nature，men would constantly be at each others’ throats.Homo homini lupus est。Put in modern jargon，in the state of nature a permanent underproduction of security would prevail。Each indi vidual，left to his own devices and provisions，would spend too little on his own defense，and hence，permanent interpersonal warfare would result。The solution to this presumably intolerable situation，according to Hobbes and his followers，is the institution of a state.In order to institute peaceful coop eration among themselves，two individuals，A and B，require a third inde pendent party，S，as ultimate judge and peacemaker。However，this third party，S，is not just another individual，and the good provided by S，that of security，is not just another “private” good.Rather，S is a sovereign and has as such two unique powers.on the one hand，S can insist that his subjects，A and B，not seek protection from anyone but him； that is，S is a compulsory territorial monopolist of protection.on the other hand，S can determine unilaterally how much A and B must spend on their own security； that is，S has the power to impose taxes in order to provide security “collectively。”

集体安保神话也可称为霍布斯神话。托马斯-霍布斯以及他之后的无数政治哲学家和经济学家都认为，在自然状态下，人们会不断地相互争斗。人之于人无异于狼（Homo homini lupus est。）用现代的行话说，在自然状态下，普遍存在着安保生产长期不足的现象。倘若任由每个人自行其是、自行筹备，每个人在自身防卫上的投入就会过少，因此，就会导致持续不断的人际战争。霍布斯和他的追随者认为，解决这种大概难以忍受的状况的办法就是建立国家。为了在彼此之间建立和平合作关系，A、B 这两个人需要有第三方独立主体 S 来充当最终裁决者与和平缔造者。然而，这个第三方 S 并非只是另一个普通个体，而且 S 所提供的安保这种 “商品” 也并非只是另一种 “私人” 商品。相反，S 是一个主权者，因而拥有两项独特的权力。一方面，S 可以要求其国民 A 和 B 除了向他寻求保护之外，不得向其他任何人寻求保护；也就是说，S 是强制性的地域性保护垄断者。另一方面，S 能够单方面决定 A 和 B 必须在自身安保方面投入多少；也就是说，S 有权征税以便 “集体性地” 提供安保服务。

In commenting on this argument，there is little use in quarreling over whether man is as bad and wolflike as Hobbes supposes，except to note that Hobbes’s thesis obviously cannot mean that man is driven only and exclu sively by aggressive instincts.If this were the case，mankind would have died out long ago。The fact that he did not demonstrates that man also possesses reason and is capable of constraining his natural impulses.The quarrel is only with the Hobbesian solution.given man’s nature as a rational animal，is the proposed solution to the problem of insecurity an improvement？ Can the institution of a state reduce aggressive behavior and promote peaceful cooperation，and thus provide for better private security and protection？ The difficulties with Hobbes’s argument are obvious.For one，regardless of how bad men are，S—whether king，dictator，or elected president—is still one of them.man’s nature is not transformed upon becoming S.Yet how can there be better protection for A and B，if S must tax them in order to provide it？ Is there not a contradiction within the very construction of S as an expropriating property protector？ in fact，is this not exactly what is also—and more appropriately—referred to as a protection racket？ To be sure，S will make peace between A and B but only so that he himself in turn can rob both of them more profitably。Surely S is better protected，but the more he is protected，the less A and B are protected from attacks by S.Collec tive security，it would seem，is not better than private security。Rather，it is the private security of the state，S，achieved through the expropriation，i.e.，the economic disarmament，of its subjects.Further，statists from Thomas Hobbes to James Buchanan have argued that a protective state S would come about as the result of some sort of “constitutional” contract。1 Yet who in his right mind would agree to a contract that allowed one’s protector to determine unilaterally—and irrevocably—the sum that the protected must pay for his protection？ And the fact is，no one ever has! 2

在评论这一论点时，争论人类是否如霍布斯所设想的那般恶劣、如狼一般，并没有多大用处，不过需要指出的是，霍布斯的论点显然不可能意味着人类仅仅且完全受攻击性本能的驱使。如果是这样的话，人类早就灭绝了。人类并未灭绝这一事实表明，人类也拥有理性，并且能够克制自己的自然冲动。争议只在于霍布斯提出的解决方案。鉴于人类作为理性动物的本性，针对不安全问题所提出的这一解决方案算得上是一种改进吗？国家制度能否减少侵犯行为，促进和平合作，从而提供更好的私人安保和保护？霍布斯这一论点的问题是显而易见的。首先，不管人类有多恶劣，S—— 无论是君主、独裁者还是民选总统——终归也是人。人的本性并不会在成为 S 之后就发生改变。然而，如果 S 必须向 A 和 B 征税才能提供保护，那又怎么能说给 A 和 B 带来了更好的保护呢？把 S 构建成一个通过剥夺财产来提供保护的角色，其本身难道不存在矛盾吗？事实上，这不正是所谓的 “保护伞”（protection racket）吗？可以肯定的是，S 确实会在 A 和 B 之间促成和平，但那只是为了方便他回头能更有利可图地劫掠他们二人罢了。当然，S（国家或主权者）自身得到了更好的保护，但它受到的保护越多，A 和 B 受到来自 S 的侵犯的保护就越少。看来，集体安保并不比私人安保更好。相反，它是国家（S）通过剥夺其国民（即对国民进行经济层面的缴械）而实现其自身的安保此外，从托马斯・霍布斯到詹姆斯・布坎南的这些国家主义者都辩称，一个保护性国家S是某种 “立宪 ”契约的结果。[149]然而，但凡头脑清醒的人，谁会同意这样一份契约呢？这份契约允许自己的保护者单方面且不可撤销地决定被保护者必须为其保护所支付的金额。而事实是，从来都没有人会同意这样的契约！ [150]

let me interrupt my discussion here，and return to the reconstruction of the Hobbesian myth.once it is assumed that in order to institute peace ful cooperation between A and B it is necessary to have a state S，a twofold conclusion follows.If more than one state exists，S1，S2，S3，then，just as there can presumably be no peace among A and B without S，so there can be no peace between the states S1 S2，and S3 as long as they remain in a state of nature （i.e.，a state of anarchy） with regard to each other。Consequently，in order to achieve universal peace，political centralization，unification，and ultimately the establishment of a single world government are necessary。

让我在此中断一下我的论述，回过头来继续重构霍布斯式神话。一旦假定为了在A和B之间建立和平合作关系就必须要有一个国家S，那么就会得出一个双重结论。如果存在不止一个国家，比如S1、S2、S3，那么，就像倘若没有S，A和B之间大概就不会有和平一样，只要这些国家S1、S2和S3彼此之间处于自然状态（即无政府状态），它们之间也就不会有和平。因此，为了实现世界普遍和平，政治上的集中化、统一化，以及最终建立一个单一的世界政府就是必要的。

Commenting on this argument，it is first useful to indicate what can be taken as noncontroversial。To begin with，the argument is correct，as far as it goes.If the premise is correct，then the consequence spelled out follows.The empirical assumptions involved in the Hobbesian account appear at first glance to be borne out by the facts，as well。It is true that states are constantly at war with each other，and a historical tendency toward political centralization and global rule does indeed appear to be occurring。Quarrels arise only with the explanation of this fact and tendency，and the classifi cation of a single unified world state as an improvement in the provision of private security and protection.First，there appears to be an empirical anomaly for which the Hobbesian argument cannot account。The reason for the warring among different states S1，S2，and S3，according to Hobbes，is that they are in a state of anarchy visàvis each other。However，before the arrival of a single world state not only are S1，S2，and S3 in a state of anarchy relative to each other but in fact every subject of one state is in a state of anarchy visàvis every subject of any other state.Accordingly，there should exist just as much war and aggression between the private citizens of various states as between different states.Empirically，however，this is not so。The private dealings between foreigners appear to be significantly less warlike than the dealings between different governments.Nor does this seem to be surprising。After all，a state agent S，in contrast to every one of its subjects，can rely on domestic taxation in the conduct of his foreign affairs.given his natural human aggressiveness，however pronounced it may initially be，is it not obvious that S will be more brazen and aggressive in his conduct toward foreigners if he can externalize the cost of such behavior onto others？ Surely，I am willing to take greater risks and engage in more provocation and aggression if I can make others pay for it。And surely there is a tendency of one state—one protection racket—to want to expand its territorial protection monopoly at the expense of other states and thus bring about，as the ultimate result of interstate competition，world government。3 But how is this an improvement in the provision of private security and protection？ The opposite seems to be the case.The world state is the winner of all wars and the last surviving protection racket。Doesn’t this make it particularly dangerous？ And will not the physical power of any single world government be overwhelming as compared to that of any one of its individual subjects？

在评论这一论点时，首先有必要指出哪些内容可被视为毫无争议的。首先，就其本身而言，这一论点是正确的。如果前提是正确的，那么所阐述的结果必定也是正确的。乍一看，霍布斯的论述中所涉及的经验性假设似乎也得到了事实的印证。确实，各个国家之间征伐不断，而且政治集中化和全球一统的历史趋势似乎也确实正在显现。争论的焦点仅在于如何解释这一事实和趋势，以及将单一的大一统的世界国家归类为提供私人安保和保护方面的改进这一点上。首先，似乎存在一个经验性的反常情况，霍布斯的论点无法对此作出解释。按照霍布斯的说法，不同国家S1、S2和S3之间相互交战的原因是它们彼此处于无政府状态。然而，在单一世界国家出现之前，不仅S1、S2和S3彼此处于无政府状态，而且事实上，一个国家的每一位国民与其他任何国家的每一位国民之间也都处于无政府状态。因此，不同国家的公民个人之间的战争和侵略应该和不同国家之间的战争和侵略一样多。然而从经验层面来看，情况并非如此。外国人之间的私人交往似乎远没有不同政府之间的交往那样充满火药味。这似乎也并不令人意外。毕竟，一个国家代理人 S，与它的每一个国民不同，在处理外交事务时可以依赖国内税收。考虑到人类天生的侵犯性，无论这种侵犯性最初是多么明显，如果 S 可以将这种行为的成本外部化到其他人身上，那么它在对外交往中会更加肆无忌惮且更具攻击性，这难道不是显而易见的吗？当然，如果能让别人买单，我愿意冒更大的风险，进行更多的挑衅和侵犯。而且，肯定存在这样一种趋势，即一个国家——一个保护伞—— 会想要以牺牲其他国家利益为代价来扩大其地域性的保护垄断范围，从而导致国家间竞争的最终结果是形成世界政府。[151]但这如何能算是在提供私人安全和保护方面的一种进步呢？实际情况似乎恰恰相反。世界国家是所有战争的赢家，也是最后幸存的保护伞。这难道不会使它变得尤其危险吗？而且，相较于其任何一个单个国民的力量而言，任何一个单一世界政府的武力难道不具有压倒性吗？

I. 经验证据

THE EMPIRICAL EVidence

let me pause here in my abstract theoretical considerations to take a brief look at the empirical evidence bearing on the issue at hand.As noted at the outset，the myth of collective security is as widespread as it is consequential。I am not aware of any survey on this matter，but I would venture to predict that the Hobbesian myth is accepted more or less unquestioningly by well over 90 percent of the adult population.However，to believe something does not make it true.Rather，if what one believes is false，one’s actions will lead to failure.What about the evidence？ Does it support Hobbes and his followers，or does it confirm the opposite anarchist fears and contentions？

请允许我暂停抽象的理论思考，简要回顾一下与当前问题有关的经验证据。正如开头所指出的，集体安保这一神话流传甚广，影响深远。我不清楚是否有这方面的调查，但我敢预言，超过 90% 的成年人或多或少都不加质疑地接受了霍布斯神话。然而，相信某事并不会使它成真。相反，如果一个人所相信的是错误的，那么其行动就会导向失败。证据情况又如何？它是支持霍布斯及其追随者，还是证实了与之相反的无政府主义者的担忧和论点呢？

The U.S.was explicitly founded as a protective state à la Hobbes.let me quote to this effect from Jefferson’s Declaration of independence：

We hold these truths to be selfevident：that all men are created equal； that they are endowed by their creator with inalienable rights； that among these are life，liberty，and the pursuit of hap piness：that to secure these rights，governments are instituted among men，deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

美国显然是按照霍布斯的理念作为一个保护性国家而建立起来的。在此，我援引杰斐逊《独立宣言》中的相关内容来说明这一点：

我们认为以下真理不证自明：人人生而平等；造物主赋予他们不可剥夺的权利；其中包括生命权、自由权和追求幸福的权利；为了保障这些权利，人类才在他们之间建立政府，政府的正当权力来自被统治者的授予。

Here we have it：The U.S.government was instituted to fulfill one and only one task：the protection of life and property。Thus，it should provide the perfect example for judging the validity of the Hobbesian claim as to the status of states as protectors.After more than two centuries of protective statism，what is the status of our protection and peaceful human cooperation？ Was the American experiment in protective statism a success？

我们得出以下结论：美国政府成立的目的只有一个，那就是保护生命和财产。因此，它应该是判断霍布斯关于国家作为保护者的地位的主张是否有效的绝佳范例。经过两个多世纪的保护性国家主义，现如今我们的安保与人类和平合作的状况如何？美国的保护性国家主义实验是否成功？

According to the pronouncements of our state rulers and their intellectual bodyguards （of whom there are more than ever before），we are better protected and more secure than ever。We are supposedly protected from global warming and cooling，from the extinction of animals and plants， from the abuses of husbands and wives，parents and employers，from poverty，disease，disaster，ignorance，prejudice，racism，sexism，homophobia，and countless other public enemies and dangers.In fact，however，matters are strikingly different。In order to provide us with all this protection，the state managers expropriate more than 40 percent of the incomes of private producers year in and year out。Government debt and liabilities have increased without interruption，thus increasing the need for future expropriations.owing to the substitution of government paper money for gold，financial insecurity has increased sharply，and we are continually robbed through currency depreciation.Every detail of private life，property，trade，and contract is regulated by ever higher mountains of laws （legislation），thereby creating permanent legal uncertainty and moral hazard.In particular，we have been gradually stripped of the right to exclusion implied in the very concept of private property。As sellers we cannot sell to，and as buyers we cannot buy from whomever we wish.And as members of associations we are not permitted to enter into whatever restrictive covenant we believe to be mutually beneficial。As Americans，we must accept immigrants we do not want as our neighbors.As teachers，we cannot get rid of lousy or ill behaved students.As employers，we are stuck with incompetent or destruc tive employees.As landlords，we are forced to cope with bad tenants.As bankers and insurers，we are not allowed to avoid bad risks.As restaurant or bar owners，we must accommodate unwelcome customers.And as members of private associations，we are compelled to accept individuals and actions in violation of our own rules and restrictions.In short，the more the state has increased its expenditures on social security and public safety，the more our private property rights have been eroded，the more our property has been expropriated，confiscated，destroyed，or depreciated，and the more we have been deprived of the very foundation of all protection：economic inde pendence，financial strength，and personal wealth.[152]4 The path of every presi dent and practically every member of Congress is littered with hundreds of thousands if not millions of nameless victims of personal economic ruin，financial bankruptcy，impoverishment，despair，hardship，and frustration.

根据我们国家的统治者及其智识卫队（他们的人数比以往任何时候都多）的声明，我们受到了比以往更好的保护，也比以往更加安全。据称，我们受到保护，免受全球变暖和变冷的影响，免受动植物灭绝的威胁，免受夫妻、父母及雇主的虐待，免受贫困、疾病、灾难、无知、偏见、种族主义、性别歧视、恐同心理以及数不清的其他公敌和危险的侵害。然而，事实却截然不同。为了给我们提供所有这些保护，国家管理者年复一年地剥夺私人生产者 40% 以上的收入。政府债务和负债不断增加，从而增加了未来剥夺的需求。由于政府用纸币代替了黄金，金融不安全性急剧增加，我们不断因货币贬值而被掠夺。私人生活、财产、贸易以及契约的每一个细节都受到堆积如山且日益增多的法律（立法）的管制，从而造成了长期的法律不确定性和道德风险。尤其是，我们逐渐被剥夺了私有财产这一概念本身所蕴含的排他权。作为卖家，我们不能把东西卖给任何我们想卖的人；作为买家，我们也不能从任何我们想交易的对象那里购买商品。作为协会的成员，我们不被允许订立任何我们认为对彼此有益的限制性契约。作为美国人，我们必须接纳那些我们不想要的移民成为我们的邻居。作为教师，我们无法摆脱那些差劲或行为不端的学生。作为雇主，我们不得不留用那些不称职或具有破坏性的员工。作为房东，我们被迫去应对那些不良租户。作为银行家和保险商，我们不被允许规避不良风险。作为餐馆或酒吧老板，我们必须接纳那些不受欢迎的顾客。而且作为私人社团的成员，我们被迫接受那些违反我们自身规则与限制的个人及行为。简而言之，国家在社会保障和公共安全方面的支出越多，我们的私有财产权就被侵蚀得越厉害，我们的财产被征收、没收、损毁或贬值的情况就越多，我们被剥夺所有保护之根基——经济独立、财务实力以及个人财富——的程度也就越高。每位总统以及几乎每一位国会议员走过的权力之路，都布满了数十万甚至数百万无名的受害者，他们遭受了个人经济损失、财务破产、贫困、绝望、艰难困苦和人生挫败。

The picture appears even bleaker when we consider foreign affairs.never during its entire history has the continental U.S.been territorially attacked by any foreign army。（Pearl Harbor was the result of a preceding U.S.provo cation.） Yet the U.S.has the distinction of having possessed a government that declared war against a large part of its own population and engaged in the wanton murder of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens.Moreover，while the relations between American citizens and foreigners do not appear to be unusually contentious，almost from its very beginnings the U.S.government pursued relentless aggressive expansionisM.beginning with the spanishAmerican War，culminating in World War I and World War II，and continuing to the present，the U.S.government has become entangled in hundreds of foreign conflicts and risen to the rank of the world’s dominant imperialist power。Thus，nearly every president since the turn of this century also has been responsible for the murder，killing，or starvation of countless innocent foreigners all over the world.In short，while we have become more helpless，impoverished，threatened，and insecure，the U.S.government has become ever more brazen and aggressive.In the name of national security，it defends us，equipped with enormous stockpiles of weapons of aggression and mass destruction，by bullying ever new “Hitlers，” big or small，and all suspected Hitlerite sympathizers anywhere and everywhere outside of the territory of the U.S. 5

当我们考虑外交事务时，情况似乎更加黯淡。在其整个历史上，美国本土从未遭受过任何外国军队的领土攻击。（珍珠港事件是美国此前挑衅行为导致的结果。）然而，美国却有着这样的“独特之处”：其政府曾对本国很大一部分民众宣战，并肆意杀害了数十万本国公民。此外，虽然美国公民与外国人之间的关系似乎并没有特别大的争议，但几乎从建国伊始，美国政府就一直在进行无情的侵略扩张。从美西战争开始，在第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战时达到顶峰，并一直持续至今，美国政府卷入了数以百计的对外冲突，已然崛起成为世界上占主导地位的帝国主义强国。因此，自本世纪初以来，几乎每一位总统都要对世界各地无数无辜外国人的遇害、被杀或饿死负有责任。简而言之，在我们变得更加无助、贫困、受威胁恐吓且缺乏安全感的同时，美国政府却变得越发无所顾忌和更具侵略性。它以国家安全之名，凭借大量的攻击性武器和大规模杀伤性武器来“保卫”我们，通过欺凌各类大小不一的新“希特勒”们以及美国领土之外任何地方、所有被怀疑同情希特勒的人来达到这一目的。[153]

The empirical evidence thus seems clear。The belief in a protective state appears to be a patent error，and the American experiment in protective statism a complete failure.The U.S.government does not protect us.To the contrary，there exists no greater danger to our life，property，and pros perity than the U.S.government，and the U.S.president in particular is the world’s single most threatening and armed danger，capable of ruining everyone who opposes him and destroying the entire globe.

因此，经验证据似乎很清晰。保护性国家的信念似乎是一个明显的错误，而美国在保护性国家主义方面的尝试是一场彻底的失败。美国政府并没有保护我们。恰恰相反，对我们的生命、财产以及繁荣而言，没有比美国政府更大的威胁了，尤其是美国总统，是世界上最具威胁性且武装到牙齿的危险人物，他有能力毁掉任何反对他的人，甚至摧毁整个地球。

II. 剖析国家主义者的反应

How TO THINK ABOUT THE STATIST reSPonSE

Statists react much like socialists when faced with the dismal economic performance of the Soviet Union and its satellites.They do not necessarily deny the disappointing facts，but they try to argue them away by claiming that these facts are the result of a Systematic discrepancy （deviancy） between “real” and “ideal” or “true” statism，respectively socialism.To this day，socialists claim that “true” socialism has not been refuted by the empirical evidence，and everything would have turned out well and unparalleled prosperity would have resulted，if only Trotsky’s，or Bucharin’s，or better still their very own brand of socialism，rather than Stalin’s，had been implemented.Similarly，statists interpret all seemingly contradictory evidence as only accidental。If only some other president had come to power at this or that turn in history，or if only this or that constitutional change or amendment had been adopted，everything would have turned out beautifully，and unparalleled security and peace would have resulted.Indeed，this may still happen in the future，if their own policies are employed.

面对苏联及其卫星国令人沮丧的经济表现，国家主义者的反应与社会主义者十分相似。他们并不一定否认这些令人失望的事实，但他们试图辩解这些事实，声称这些事实是 “现实 ”与 “理想 ”或 “真正 ”的国家主义（即社会主义）之间存在系统性差异（deviancy）的结果。时至今日，社会主义者仍宣称 “真正的” 社会主义并未被经验证据所驳倒，而且他们声称只要实施的是托洛茨基的、布哈林的，或者更好的是他们自己那一套社会主义，而非斯大林的社会主义，一切都会进展顺利，还会带来空前的繁荣。同样，国家主义者将所有看似与之矛盾的证据都仅仅视作偶然情况。他们认为，要是历史的这个或那个转折点上是别的某位总统上台执政，或者要是通过了这项或那项宪法变更或修正案，一切都会变得很美好，还会带来空前的安全与和平。事实上，如果采用他们自己的政策，一个美丽的新世界依然可期。

We have learned from Ludwig von Mises how to respond to the social ists’ evasion （immunization） strategy。6 As long as the defining characteris tic—the essence—of socialism，i.e.，the absence of the private ownership of the factors of production，remains in place，no reform will be of any help.The idea of a socialist economy is a contradictio in adjecto，and the claim that socialism represents a higher，more efficient mode of social production is absurd. In order to reach one’s own ends efficiently and without waste within the framework of an exchange economy based on division of labor，it is necessary that one engage in monetary calculation （costaccounting）。Everywhere outside the System of a primitive selfsufficient single house hold economy，monetary calculation is the sole tool of rational and efficient action.only by being able to compare inputs and outputs arithmetically in terms of a common medium of exchange （money） can a person deter mine whether his actions are successful or not。In distinct contrast，socialism means to have no economy，no economizing，at all，because under these conditions monetary calculation and costaccounting is impossible by definition.If no private property in the factors of production exists，then no prices for any production factor exist； hence，it is impossible to determine whether or not they are employed economically。Accordingly，socialism is not a higher mode of production but rather economic chaos and regression to primitivism.

我们从路德维希·冯·米塞斯那里学到了该如何应对社会主义者的回避（免疫）策略。[154]只要社会主义的决定性特征——其本质，即生产要素的私有制不存在，任何改革都无济于事。社会主义经济这一理念本身就是自相矛盾的说法，而声称社会主义代表着一种更高级、更高效的社会生产模式的观点是荒谬的。为了能在基于劳动分工的交换经济框架内高效且无浪费地达成个人目的，人们必须进行货币计算（成本核算）。在原始的自给自足的单一家庭经济体系之外的所有地方，货币计算都是合理且高效行动的唯一工具。只有能够通过一种通用的交换媒介（货币）从算术角度对投入和产出进行比较，一个人才能确定其行动是否成功。与之形成鲜明对比的是，社会主义意味着根本不存在经济，也无从进行节约，因为在社会主义条件下，货币计算和成本核算顾名思义是不可能的。如果不存在生产要素的私有财产，那么就不存在任何生产要素的价格；因此，就不可能确定它们是否被经济地使用。因此，社会主义并非一种更高级的生产模式，而是经济混乱以及向原始状态的倒退。

How to respond to the statists’ evasion strategy has been explained by Murray N.Rothbard.7 But Rothbard’s lesson，while equally simple and clear and with even more momentous implications，has remained to this day far less known and appreciated.So long as the defining characteristic—the essence—of a state remains in place，he explained，no reform，whether on the level of personnel or of the constitution，will be to any avail。given the principle of government—judicial monopoly and the power to tax—any notion of limiting its power and safeguarding individual life and property is illusory。Under monopolistic auspices the price of justice and protection must rise and its quality must fall。A taxfunded protection agency is a contradiction in terms and will lead to ever more taxes and less protection.Even if a government limited its activities exclusively to the protection of preexisting property rights （as every protective state is supposed to do），the further question of how much security to provide would arise.Motivated （like everyone else） by selfinterest and the disutility of labor，but with the unique power to tax，a government’s answer will invariably be the same：to maximize expenditures on protection—and almost all of a nation’s wealth can conceivably be consumed by the cost of protection—and at the same time to minimize the production of protection.Furthermore，a judicial monopoly must lead to a deterioration in the quality of justice and protection.If one can only appeal to government for justice and protection，justice and protection will be perverted in favor of government，constitutions，and supreme courts notwithstanding。After all，constitutions and supreme courts are state constitutions and courts，and whatever limitations to government action they might contain is determined by agents of the very institution under consideration.Accordingly，the definition of property and protection will continually be altered and the range of jurisdiction expanded to the government’s advantage.

如何应对国家主义者的“鸵鸟”策略，默里-罗斯巴德（Murray N.Rothbard）已经给出了解释。[155]但罗斯巴德所传达的道理虽然同样简单明了，且有着更为重大的影响，却直至今日都远未得到足够的了解与重视。他解释道，只要国家的决定性特征——其本质——依然存在，那么无论是人事层面还是宪法层面的改革都将无济于事。鉴于政府的原则——司法垄断以及征税的权力——任何限制其权力、保障个人生命和财产的想法都是虚幻的。在垄断的加持下，司法和保护的价格必然上升，质量必然下降。由税收资助的保护机构自相矛盾，会导致税收越来越多，保护越来越少。即使政府的活动仅限于保护已有的财产权（正如每个奉行保护主义的国家理应做的那样），也会产生应提供多少安保这一更进一步的问题。出于（与其他人一样的）自利动机以及对劳动负效用的考量，再加上拥有独一无二的征税权力，政府的答案必然总是相同的：将保护方面的支出最大化——可以想象，一个国家几乎所有的财富都可能被保护成本消耗殆尽——同时将保护的生产最小化。此外，司法垄断必然导致司法和保护的质量下降。如果人们只能向政府寻求司法和保护，那么即便有宪法和最高法院的存在，司法与保护也会朝着有利于政府的方向被扭曲。毕竟，宪法和最高法院都是国家的宪法和法院，它们可能对政府行为的任何限制都是由正被考量的这个机构的代理人所决定的。因此，财产和保护的定义将会不断被更改，管辖范围也会朝着对政府有利的方向不断扩大。

Hence，Rothbard pointed out，it follows that just as socialism cannot be reformed but must be abolished in order to achieve prosperity，so can the institution of a state not be reformed but must be abolished in order to achieve justice and protection.“defense in the free society （including such defense services to person and property as police protection and judicial findings），” Rothbard concluded，

would therefore have to be supplied by people or firms who （a） gained their revenue voluntarily rather than by coercion and （b） did not—as the State does—arrogate to themselves a com pulsory monopoly of police or judicial protection …defense firms would have to be as freely competitive and as noncoercive against noninvaders as are all other suppliers of goods and ser vices on the free market。defense services，like all other services，would be marketable and marketable only。[156]8

因此，罗斯巴德指出，正如社会主义不能改革而必须废除才能实现繁荣一样，国家制度也不能改革而必须废除才能实现正义和保护。“自由社会中的防卫（包括诸如针对人身和财产的警察保护、司法裁决等防卫服务）”，罗斯巴德总结道：

因此，（防卫服务）必须由这样的个人或企业来提供：（a）他们是自愿获取收入，而非通过强制手段；（b）他们不会——像国家那样——擅自将警察或司法保护方面的强制垄断权据为己有…… 防卫企业必须像自由市场上所有其他商品和服务的供应商一样，能够自由竞争，且不会对非侵犯者进行强制。防卫服务，如同所有其他服务一样，将是市场化的，而且只能是市场化的。

That is，every private property owner would be able to partake of the advantages of the division of labor and seek better protection of his property than that afforded through selfdefense by cooperation with other owners and their property。Anyone could buy from，sell to，or otherwise contract with anyone else concerning protective and judicial services，and one could at any time unilaterally discontinue any such cooperation with others and fall back on selfreliant defense，or change one’s protective affiliations.

也就是说，每位私有财产所有者都可以分享劳动分工带来的好处，并通过与其他所有者及其财产的合作，为自己的财产寻求比自卫更好的保护。任何人都可以就安保和司法服务与其他任何人进行买卖交易，或者签订其他形式的契约，而且人们可以在任何时候单方面终止与他人的此类合作，重新依靠自力更生式的防卫，或者变更自己所属的安保合作关系。

III. 支持私人安保的理由

THE case FOR PRIVAte SECURITY

Having reconstructed the myth of collective security—the myth of the state—and criticized it on theoretical and empirical grounds，I now must take on the task of constructing the positive case for private security and protection.In order to dispel the myth of collective security，it is not just sufficient to grasp the error involved in the idea of a protective state.It is just as important，if not more so，to gain a clear understanding of how the nonstatist security alternative would effectively work。Rothbard，building on the pathbreaking analysis of the Frenchbelgian economist Gustave de Molinari，9 has given us a sketch of the workings of a freemarket System of protection and defense.10 As well，we owe Morris and Linda Tannehill for their brilliant insights and analyses in this regard. 11 Following their lead，I will proceed deeper in my analysis and provide a more comprehensive view of the alternativenonstatistSystem of security production and its ability to handle attacks，not just by individuals or gangs but in particular also by states.

在重构了集体安全的神话——国家的神话——并从理论和经验层面对其加以批判之后，我现在必须承担起为私人安保与保护构建积极论证的任务。为了破除集体安全的神话，仅仅认识到保护性国家这一理念中所包含的错误是不够的。同样重要的是，甚至更重要的是，要清楚地了解非国家主义的安保替代方案将如何有效运作。罗斯巴德以法国贝尔格经济学家古斯塔夫-德-莫利纳里（Gustave de Molinari）的开创性分析为基础，[157]为我们勾勒出了自由市场保护与防卫体系的运作方式。[158] 同样，我们要感谢莫里斯・坦尼希尔和琳达・坦尼希尔在这方面所提出的深刻洞见与分析。[159]在他们的引领下，我将更深入地分析，对替代性的非国家主义安保生产体系及其应对攻击的能力提供一个更为全面的视角，这里所说的攻击不仅来自个人或犯罪团伙，尤其还包括来自国家的攻击。

There exists widespread agreement—among liberallibertarians such as Molinari，Rothbard，and the Tannehills as well as most other commentators on the matter—that defense is a form of insurance，and defense expenditures represent a sort of insurance premium （price）。Accordingly，as Rothbard and the Tannehills in particular would emphasize，within the frame work of a complex modern economy based on a worldwide division of labor the most likely candidates for offering protection and defense services are insurance agencies.The better the protection of insured property，the lower are the damage claims and hence an insurer’s costs.Thus，to provide efficient protection appears to be in every insurer’s own financial interest； and in fact even now，although restricted and hampered by the state，insurance agencies provide wideranging services of protection and indemnification （compensation） to injured private parties.Insurance companies fulfill a second essential requirement。Obviously，anyone offering protection ser vices must appear able to deliver on his promises in order to find clients.That is，he must possess the economic means—the manpower as well as the physical resources—necessary to accomplish the task of dealing with the dangers，actual or imagined，of the real world.on this count insurance agencies appear to be perfect candidates，too。They operate on a nation wide and even international scale，and they own large property holdings dispersed over wide territories and beyond single state boundaries.Accord ingly，they have a manifest selfinterest in effective protection，and are big and economically powerful。Furthermore，all insurance companies are con nected through a network of contractual agreements of mutual assistance and arbitration as well as a System of international reinsurance agencies，representing a combined economic power which dwarfs that of most if not all existing governments.

在诸如莫利纳里、罗斯巴德和坦尼希尔夫妇这样的自由意志主义者以及大多数其他就此问题发表评论的人士当中，存在着一种广泛的共识，即防卫是一种保险形式，防卫支出则是一种保险费（价格）。因此，正如罗斯巴德，尤其是坦尼希尔夫妇会着重强调的那样，在基于全球劳动分工的复杂现代经济框架内，最有可能提供保护和防卫服务的候选者是保险公司。被保险财产受到的保护越好，损害索赔就越低，进而保险公司的成本也就越低。这样一来，提供高效的保护似乎符合每一家保险公司自身的经济利益；而事实上，即便如今受到国家的限制和阻碍，保险公司也依然为遭受损失的私人团体提供范围广泛的保护及赔偿（补偿）服务。保险公司还满足了第二项基本要求。显然，任何提供保护服务的主体都必须看上去有能力兑现承诺，这样才能招揽到客户。也就是说，其必须具备完成应对现实世界中实际存在或想象中的种种危险这一任务所必需的经济手段——人力以及物力资源。在这一点上，保险公司似乎也是绝佳的候选者。它们在全国乃至国际范围内运营，并且在广阔的地域乃至跨越单个国家边界拥有大量资产。因此，它们在有效保护方面有着明显的自身利益考量，而且规模庞大、经济实力强劲。此外，所有的保险公司都通过互助与仲裁的契约协议网络以及国际再保险机构体系相互联结，它们所代表的联合经济力量，即便不是让所有现存政府相形见绌，也足以令大多数现存政府自叹弗如。

I want to further analyze and Systematically clarify this suggestion：that protection and defense are insurance and can be provided by insurance agencies.To reach this goal，two issues must be addressed.First，it is not possible to insure oneself against every risk of life.I cannot insure myself against committing suicide，for instance，or against burning down my own house，or becoming unemployed，or not feeling like getting out of bed in the morning，or not suffering entrepreneurial losses，because in each case I have full or partial control over the likelihood of the respective outcome.Risks such as these must be assumed individually。No one except myself can possibly deal with them.Hence，the first question will have to be what makes protection and defense an insurable rather than an unin surable risk？ After all，as we have just seen，this is not selfevident。In fact，doesn’t everyone have considerable control over the likelihood of an attack on and invasion of his person and property？ Do I not deliberately bring about an attack by assaulting or provoking someone else，for instance，and is not protection then an uninsurable risk，like suicide or unemployment，for which each person must assume sole responsibility？

我想进一步分析并系统地阐明这一观点：保护和防卫属于保险范畴，并且可以由保险公司来提供。为实现这一目标，有两个问题必须加以探讨。首先，人们不可能针对生活中的每一种风险都进行投保。例如，我无法为自己投保以防自杀，也无法投保以防自己烧毁自家房屋、失业、早上不想起床或者避免遭受创业损失，因为在上述每一种情况中，我对相应结果出现的可能性都有着全部或部分的掌控权。诸如此类的风险必须由个人自行承担。诸如此类的风险必须由个人自行承担。除了我自己，没人能够应对它们。因此，首要的问题将是，是什么使得保护和防卫成为一种可投保的风险，而非不可投保的风险呢？毕竟，正如我们刚刚所说，这一点并非不言自明。事实上，难道每个人对自身及财产遭受攻击和侵犯的可能性不是有着相当大的掌控力吗？例如，我难道不是通过攻击或挑衅他人而故意招致攻击的吗？如此一来，保护不就像自杀或失业一样，属于一种不可投保的风险，每个人必须独自为此承担责任吗？

The answer is a qualified yes and No.Yes，insofar as no one can possibly offer unconditional protection，i.e.，insurance against any invasion what soever。That is，unconditional protection can only be provided，if at all，by each individual on his own and for himself。But the answer is no，insofar as conditional protection is concerned.only attacks and invasions that are provoked by the victim cannot be insured.However，unprovoked and thus accidental attacks can be insured against。12 That is，protection becomes an insurable good only if and insofar as an insurance agent contractually restricts the actions of the insured so as to exclude every possible provocation on their part。Various insurance companies may differ with respect to the specific definition of provocation，but there can be no difference between insurers with regard to the principle that each must Systematically exclude （prohibit） all provocative and aggressive action among its own clients.

答案既是肯定的，也是否定的，需要具体情况具体分析。从肯定的方面来说，鉴于任何人都不可能提供无条件的保护，也就是针对任何形式的侵犯都能提供保险保障，这意味着，无条件的保护（如果真有可能存在的话）只能由每个人自行给自己提供。但从否定的方面来说，就有条件的保护而言，答案是否定的。只有那些由受害者自身挑起的攻击和侵犯行为是无法投保的。然而，无端的、也就是意外的攻击是可以投保的。[160] 也就是说，只有当保险公司通过契约限制被保险公司的行动，以排除他们任何可能的挑衅行为时，保护才会成为一种可投保的商品。不同的保险公司对于挑衅的具体定义可能会有所不同，但就每家保险公司都必须系统性地排除（禁止）其客户之间所有挑衅性和攻击性的行动这一原则而言，各保险公司之间并无差异。

As elementary as this first insight into the essentially defensive—non aggressive and nonprovocative—nature of protectioninsurance may seem，it is of fundamental importance.For one，it implies that any known aggres sor and provocateur would be unable to find an insurer，and hence，would be economically isolated，weak，and vulnerable.on the other hand，it implies that anyone wanting more protection than that afforded by selfreliant self defense could do so only if and insofar as he submitted himself to speci fied norms of nonaggressive，civilized conduct。Furthermore，the greater the number of insured people—and in a modern exchange economy most people want more than just selfdefense for their protection—the greater would be the economic pressure on the remaining uninsured to adopt the same or similar standards of nonaggressive social conduct。Moreover，as the result of competition between insurers for voluntarily paying clients，a tendency toward falling prices per insured property values would come about。At the same time，a tendency toward the standardization and unification of property and contract law would be set in motion.Protection contracts with standardized property and product descriptions would come into existence； and out of the steady cooperation between different insurers in mutual arbitration proceedings，a tendency toward the standardization and unification of the rules of procedure，evidence，and conflict resolution （including compensation，restitution，punishment，and retribution），and steadily increasing legal certainty would result。Everyone，by virtue of buy ing protection insurance，would be tied into a global competitive enterprise of striving to minimize aggression （and thus maximize defensive protection），and every single conflict and damage claim，regardless of where and by or against whom，would fall into the jurisdiction of exactly one or more enumerable and specific insurance agencies and their mutually defined arbitration procedures.

尽管对保护保险本质上具有防御性——非攻击性且非挑衅性——这一特性的这一初步见解可能看似浅显，但却具有根本性的重要意义。一方面，这意味着任何已知的侵犯者和挑衅者都将无法找到保险公司，因此，他们在经济上会陷入孤立，变得弱小且易受攻击。另一方面，这意味着任何人想要得到比自力更生式的自卫所提供的更多的保护，就必须遵守特定的非攻击性文明行为规范。此外，投保人数越多——在现代交换经济中，大多数人希望获得的保护不只是自卫——对其余未投保人的经济压力就越大，他们就会采取相同或类似的非攻击性社会行为标准。此外，由于保险公司之间为争取自愿付费客户而展开竞争，每单位被保险财产价值的保险价格会呈现下降趋势。与此同时，财产法和契约法的标准化和统一化趋势也将启动。带有标准化财产及产品描述的保护契约将会出现；并且，通过不同保险公司在相互仲裁程序中的持续合作，程序规则、证据规则以及冲突解决规则（包括赔偿、归还、惩处和报复等方面）标准化和统一化的趋势将会形成，法律的确定性也会稳步提高。每个人凭借购买保护保险，都将被纳入一个致力于将侵犯行为最小化（从而将防御性保护最大化）的全球性竞争体系之中，而且每一项冲突及损害索赔，无论发生在何地、涉及何人或者由何人发起针对何人，都将落入一个或多个明确可数且特定的保险公司及其相互界定的仲裁程序的管辖范围之内。

IV. 进一步讨论侵犯保险

V. 政治边界与保险

POLITICAL BORDERS AND inSURAnce

let me first contrast defenseprotection insurance with that against natu ral disasters.Frequently an analogy between the two is drawn，and it is instructive to examine if or to what extent it holds.The analogy is that just as every individual within certain geographical regions is threatened by the same risk of an earthquake，a flood，or a hurricane，so does every inhabitant within the territory of the U.S.or germany，for instance，face the same risk of being victimized by a foreign attack。Some superficial similarity—to which I shall come shortly—notwithstanding，it is easy to recognize two fundamental shortcomings in the analogy。For one，the borders of earthquake，flood，or hurricane regions are established and drawn according to objective physical criteria and hence can be referred to as natural。In distinct contrast，political boundaries are artificial boundaries.The borders of the U.S.changed throughout the entire 19th century，and germany did not exist as such until 1871，but was composed of nearly 50 separate countries.Surely，no one would want to claim that this redrawing of the U.S.or german borders was the outcome of the discovery that the security risk of every American or german within the greater U.S.or germany was，contrary to the previously held opposite belief，homogeneous （identical）。

首先，请允许我将防卫保险与自然灾害保险进行对比。人们常常会对这两者进行类比，考察一下这种类比是否成立或者在多大程度上成立是很有启发意义的。这种类比认为，正如在某些地理区域内的每个人都面临着同样的地震、洪水或飓风风险一样，例如，美国或德国境内的每一位居民也面临着遭受外国攻击的相同风险。尽管存在一些表面上的相似性（我稍后会谈到这一点），但我们很容易就能发现这种类比存在的两个根本性缺陷。一方面，地震、洪水或飓风区域的边界是依据客观的自然标准确定并划分的，因此可被称作自然边界。与之形成鲜明对比的是，政治边界属于人为划定的边界。美国的国界在整个19世纪一直在变化，而德国直到1871年才以如今的形态存在，此前是由将近50个独立的邦国组成的。当然，没人会想说美国或德国国界的这种重新划定，是因为发现了在范围更大的美国或德国境内，每个美国人或德国人的安全风险（与此前持有的相反看法不同）同质（相同）的结果。

There is a second obvious shortcoming。nature—earthquakes，floods，hurricanes—is blind in its destruction.It does not discriminate between more and less valuable locations and objects，but attacks indiscriminately。In distinct contrast，an aggressorinvader can and does discriminate.He does not attack or invade worthless locations and things，like the Sahara Desert，but targets locations and things that are valuable.Other things being equal，the more valuable a location and an object，the more likely it will be the target of an invasion.

第二个明显的缺陷是，大自然——地震、洪水、飓风——在其造成破坏时是盲目的。它不会区分价值高低不同的地点和物体，而是不加选择地进行破坏。与之形成鲜明对比的是，侵害人或入侵者能够而且确实会进行区分。他不会去攻击或入侵像撒哈拉沙漠那样毫无价值的地点和事物，而是会瞄准有价值的地点和事物。在其他条件相同的情况下，一个地点或物体的价值越高，它就越有可能成为入侵的目标。

This raises the crucial next question.If political borders are arbitrary and attacks are in any case never indiscriminate but directed specifically toward valuable places and things，are there any nonarbitrary borders separating different securityrisk （attack） zones？ The answer is yes.such nonarbitrary borders are those of private property。Private property is the result of the appropriation and/or production of particular physical objects or effects by specific individuals at specific locations.Every appropriatorproducer （owner） demonstrates with his actions that he regards the appropriated and produced things as valuable （goods），otherwise he would not have appropri ated or produced them.The borders of everyone’s property are objective and intersubjectively ascertainable.They are simply determined by the extension and dimension of the things appropriated and/or produced by any one particular individual。And the borders of all valuable places and things are coextensive with the borders of all property。At any given point in time，every valuable place and thing is owned by someone； only worthless places and things are owned by no one.

这就引出了至关重要的下一个问题。如果政治边界是任意划定的，而且攻击无论如何都绝非不加选择，而是专门针对有价值的地点和事物，那么是否存在划分不同安全风险（攻击）区域的非任意边界呢？答案是肯定的。这样的非任意边界就是私有财产的边界。私有财产是特定个体在特定地点对特定的有形物体或成果进行占有和/或生产的结果。每一个占有者兼生产者（所有者）都通过其行动表明，他认为所占有和生产出来的东西是有价值的（商品），否则他当初就不会去占有或生产它们了。每个人财产的边界都是客观的，且是主体间可确定的。它们仅仅是由任何一个特定个体所占有和/或生产的事物的范围及规模来决定的。而且，所有有价值的地点和事物的边界与所有财产的边界是一致的。在任何给定的时间点上，每一个有价值的地点和事物都归某人所有；只有毫无价值的地点和事物才不归任何人所有。

Surrounded by other men，every appropriator and producer can also become the object of an attack or invasion.Every property—in contrast to things （matter）—is necessarily valuable； thus，every property owner becomes a possible target of other men’s aggressive desires.Consequently，every owner’s choice of the location and form of his property will，among countless other considerations，also be influenced by security concerns.Other things being equal，everyone will prefer safer locations and forms of property to locations and forms that are less safE.Yet，regardless of where an owner and his property are located and whatever the property’s physical form，every owner，by virtue of not abandoning his property even in view of potential aggression，demonstrates his personal willingness to protect and defend these possessions.

在被其他人环视的情况下，每一个占有者和生产者也都可能成为攻击或入侵的对象。每一项财产——与物品（物质）不同——必然是有价值的；因此，每一位财产所有者都可能成为他人侵犯欲望的目标。结果就是，每一位所有者对其财产所处位置和形式的选择，在诸多其它考虑因素之外，也会受到安全方面的考量影响。在其他条件相同的情况下，相较于安全性较差的地点和财产形式，每个人都会更倾向于选择更安全的地点和财产形式。然而，无论所有者及其财产位于何处，也无论财产的实际形态如何，每一位所有者即便面临潜在的侵犯也不放弃自己的财产，这就表明了他个人保护和捍卫这些财产的意愿。

However，if the borders of private property are the only nonarbitrary borders standing in Systematic relation to the risk of aggression，then it follows that as many different security zones as there are separately owned property holdings exist，and that these zones are no larger than the extension of these holdings.That is，even more so than in the case of industrial accidents，the insurance of property against aggression would seem to be an example of individual rather than group （mutual） protection.

然而，如果私有财产的边界是唯一与遭受侵犯风险存在系统性关联的非任意性边界，那么就会得出这样的结论：存在着与单独所有的财产数量一样多的不同安全区域，而且这些区域不会比这些财产的范围更大。也就是说，相较于工业事故的情况，针对财产免受侵犯的保险似乎更像是个体保护的例子，而非团体（互助）保护的例子。

Whereas the accidentrisk of an individual production process is typi cally independent of its location—such that if the process were replicated by the same producer at different locations his margin of error would remain the same—the risk of aggression against private property—the production plant—is different from one location to another。By its very nature，as privately appropriated and produced goods，property is always separate and distinct。Every property is located at a different place and under the control of a different individual，and each location faces a unique security risk。It can make a difference for my security，for instance，if I reside in the coun tryside or the city，on a hill or in a valley，or near or far from a river，ocean， harbor，railroad or street。In fact，even contiguous locations do not face the same risk。It can make a difference，for instance，if I reside higher or lower on the mountain than my neighbor，upstream or downstream，closer to or more distant from the ocean，or simply north，south，west，or east of him.Moreover，every property，wherever it is located，can be shaped and transformed by its owner so as to increase its safety and reduce the likelihood of an aggression.I may acquire a gun or safedeposit box，for instance，or I may be able to shoot down an attacking plane from my backyard or own a laser gun that can kill an aggressor thousands of miles away。Thus，no location and no property are like any other。Every owner will have to be insured individually，and to do so every aggressioninsurer must hold sufficient capital reserves.

单个生产过程中的意外风险通常与其所处位置无关——也就是说，如果同一生产者在不同地点复制这一生产过程，其误差范围将保持不变——然而，私有财产（生产厂房）遭受侵犯的风险却会因地点不同而有所差异。就其本质而言，作为私人占有和生产的物品，财产总是相互独立且各不相同的。每一项财产都位于不同的地点，处于不同个体的掌控之下，并且每个地点都面临着独特的安全风险。例如，我居住在乡村还是城市、在山上还是山谷中、距离河流、海洋、港口、铁路或街道是近还是远，这些因素都会对我的安全产生影响。事实上，即使是相邻的地点面临的风险也不尽相同。比如，相较于我的邻居，我在山上居住的位置是更高还是更低、是处于河流上游还是下游、离海洋更近还是更远，又或者仅仅是在他的北边、南边、西边还是东边，这些情况都会产生影响。而且，每一项财产，无论位于何处，其所有者都可以对其进行改造塑形，以增强其安全性并降低遭受侵犯的可能性。例如，我可以购置一把枪或一个保险箱，又或者我能够从自家后院击落一架来袭的飞机，再或者拥有一把可以击毙数千英里之外侵犯者的激光枪。因此，没有哪一个地点、哪一项财产是与其他的完全一样的。每一位所有者都必须单独投保，而为此，每一家提供防范侵犯保险的保险公司都必须持有充足的资本储备金。

VI. 民主国家与全面战争

THE DEMOCRATIC STAte AND TOTAL WAR

The analogy typically drawn between insurance against natural disasters and external aggression is fundamentally flawed.As aggression is never indiscriminate but selective and targeted，so is defense.Everyone has different locations and things to defend，and no one’s security risk is the same as anyone else’s.And yet the analogy also contains a kernel of truth.However，any similarity between natural disasters and external aggression is due not to the nature of aggression and defense but to the rather specific nature of state aggression and defense （interstate warfare）。As explained above，a state is an agency that exercises a compulsory territorial monopoly of protection and the power to tax，and any such agency will be comparatively more aggressive because it can externalize the costs of such behavior onto its subjects.How ever，the existence of a state does not just increase the frequency of aggression； it changes its entire character。The existence of states，and especially of democratic states，implies that aggression and defense—war—will tend to be transformed into total，undiscriminating，war。13

通常将针对自然灾害的保险与抵御外来侵犯进行类比，这种做法从根本上就是有缺陷的。正如侵犯从来都不是无差别的，而是有选择性和针对性的，防卫也是如此。每个人所处的位置不同，需要保卫的事物也不一样，而且任何人所面临的安全风险都与其他人不尽相同。不过，这种类比也包含着一定的合理之处。然而，自然灾害与外来侵犯之间的任何相似性，并非源于侵犯和防卫的本质，而是源于国家侵犯和防卫（国家间战争）的特定性质。如上文所述，国家是一个对保护实施强制性地域垄断并拥有征税权力的机构，任何此类机构都会相对更具侵犯性，因为它可以将这种行为的成本外部化，转嫁给其国民。然而，国家的存在不仅会增加侵犯行为的频率，还会改变侵犯的整个性质。国家的存在，尤其是民主国家的存在，意味着侵犯与防卫——战争——往往将会转变成全面的、不加区分的战争。[161]

Consider for a moment a completely stateless world.Most property owners would be individually insured by large，often multinational insurance companies endowed with huge capital reserves.Most if not all aggressors，being bad risks，would be left without any insurance what soever。In this situation，every aggressor or group of aggressors would want to limit their targets，preferably to uninsured property，and avoid all “collateral damage，” as they would otherwise find themselves confronted with one or many economically powerful professional defense agencies.Likewise，all defensive violence would be highly selective and targeted.All aggressors would be specific individuals or groups，located at specific places and equipped with specific resources.In response to attacks on their clients，insurance agencies would specifically target these locations and resources for retaliation，and they would want to avoid any collateral damage，as they would otherwise become entangled with and liable to other insurers.

暂且设想一个完全不存在国家的世界。大多数财产所有者会由那些拥有巨额资本储备的大型（通常是跨国的）保险公司单独承保。大多数（即便不是全部）侵害者，由于属于高风险对象，将根本得不到任何保险。在这种情况下，每个侵害者或侵害者团伙都希望限制其攻击目标，最好是将目标锁定在未投保的财产上，并且避免一切 “附带损害”，因为否则他们就会发现自己要面对一个或多个经济实力强大的专业防卫机构。同样，所有防卫性的暴力行为也都会极具选择性和针对性。所有侵害者都将是特定的个人或团体，处于特定的地点，并配备特定的资源。针对客户受到的攻击，保险公司会专门针对这些地点和资源进行报复，并希望避免任何附带损害，因为否则它们就会与其他保险公司产生纠葛并承担责任。

All of this fundamentally changes in a statist world with interstate war fare.For one，if a state，the U.S.，attacks another，for instance Iraq，this is not just an attack by a limited number of people，equipped with limited resources and located at a clearly identifiable place.Rather，it is an attack by all Americans and with all of their resources.Every American supposedly pays taxes to the U.S.government and is thus defacto，whether he wishes to be or not，implicated in every government aggression.Hence，while it is obviously false to claim that every American faces an equal risk of being attacked by Iraq，（low or nonexistent as such a risk is，it is certainly higher in new York City than in Wichita，Kansas，for instance） every American is rendered equal with respect to his own active，if not always voluntary，participation in each of his government’s aggressions.

在存在国家间战争的国家主义世界里，这一切都发生了根本性的变化。首先，如果一个国家，比如美国，攻击另一个国家，例如伊拉克，这就不只是由数量有限、配备有限资源且位于明确可识别地点的人员所发起的攻击。相反，这是全体美国人利用他们所有资源发起的攻击。每个美国人按理都向美国政府纳税，因此，无论其是否愿意，实际上都卷入了政府的每一次侵犯当中。因此，虽说声称每个美国人面临着被伊拉克攻击的同等风险显然是错误的（这种风险即便有也是很低或者根本不存在的，例如在纽约市的风险肯定要比在堪萨斯州威奇托市的风险高），但就每个美国人主动（即便不总是自愿）参与其政府的每一次侵犯而言，他们在这方面是被同等对待的。

Second，just as the attacker is a state，so is the attacked，Iraq。As its U.S.counterpart，the Iraqi government has the power to tax its popula tion or draft it into its armed forces.As taxpayer or draftee，every Iraqi is implicated in his government’s defense just as every American is drawn into the U.S.government’s attack。Thus，the war becomes a war of all Americans against all Iraqis，i.e.，total war。The strategy of both the attacker and the defender state will be changed accordingly。While the attacker still must be selective regarding the targets of his attack，if for no other reason than that even taxing agencies （states） are ultimately constrained by scarcity，the aggressor has little or no incentive to avoid or minimize collateral damage.To the contrary，since the entire population and national wealth is involved in the defensive effort，collateral damage，whether of lives or property，is even desirable.No clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants exists.Everyone is an enemy，and all property provides support for the attacked government。Hence，everyone and everything becomes fair game.Likewise，the defender state will be little concerned about collateral damage resulting from its own retaliation against the attacker。Every citizen of the attacker state and all of their property is a foe and enemy property and thus becomes a possible target of retaliation.Moreover，every state，in accordance with this character of interstate war，will develop and employ more weapons of mass destruction，such as atomic bombs，rather than longrange precision weapons，such as my imaginary laser gun.

其次，正如攻击者是一个国家（美国）一样，被攻击者伊拉克也是一个国家。与美国政府一样，伊拉克政府有权向其民众征税或征召民众入伍。作为纳税人或应征入伍者，每个伊拉克人都卷入了本国政府的防御行动，就如同每个美国人都被卷入美国政府的攻击行动一样。于是，这场战争就变成了全体美国人对全体伊拉克人的战争，也就是总体战。攻击方和防御方国家的战略都会相应地发生改变。虽然攻击者出于资源稀缺等原因仍必须对攻击目标有所选择，但侵略者几乎没有或根本没有动力去避免或尽量减少附带损害。恰恰相反，由于全体民众和国家财富都参与到防御行动中，所以无论是生命还是财产方面的附带损害甚至都是可取的。战斗人员和非战斗人员之间不存在明确的区分。每个人都是敌人，所有财产都为被攻击的政府提供支持。因此，所有人和所有事物都成了可以攻击的目标。同样，防御国也不会太在意其针对攻击者进行报复所造成的附带损害。攻击方国家的每一位公民都是敌人，其所有财产都是敌方财产，因而都可能成为报复的目标。而且，依照国家间战争的这种特性，每个国家都会研制并使用更多的大规模杀伤性武器，比如原子弹，而不是像我设想的激光枪那样的远程精确武器。

Thus，the similarity between war and natural catastrophes—their seemingly indiscriminate destruction and devastation—is exclusively a feature of a statist world.

因此，战争与自然灾难之间的相似性——它们看似不加区分的破坏和毁灭——完全是国家主义世界的一个特征。

VII. 保险与激励

INSURAnce AND inceNTIveS

This brings on the last problem.We have seen that just as all property is private，all defense must be insured individually by capitalized insurance agencies，very much like industrial accident insurance.Yet，we have also seen that both forms of insurance differ in one fundamental respect。In the case of defense insurance，the location of the insured property matters.The premium per insured value will be different at different locations.Further more，aggressors can move around，their arsenal of weapons may change，and their entire character of aggression can alter with the presence of states.Thus，even given an initial property location，the price per insured value can alter with changes in the social environment or surroundings of this location.How would a System of competitive insurance agencies respond to this challenge？ in particular，how would it deal with the existence of states and state aggression？

至此引出了最后一个问题。我们已经看到，正如所有财产都是私有的一样，所有的防卫都必须由资本化的保险公司为个人提供保险，这很像工业意外保险。然而，我们也看到，这两种保险形式在一个基本方面有所不同。就防卫保险而言，被保险财产的位置很重要。不同位置的单位保险价值的保险费是不同的。此外，侵害者可以四处移动，他们的武器库可能会改变，而且他们整个侵害的性质可能会随着国家（的出现）而改变。因此，即使给定一个初始的财产位置，单位保险价值的价格也会随着这个位置的社会环境或周边情况的变化而改变。竞争性的保险公司体系将如何应对这一挑战呢？特别是，它将如何应对国家的存在和国家的侵犯呢？

In answering these questions it is essential to recall some elementary economic insights.Other things being equal，private property owners generally，and business owners in particular，prefer locations with low protec tion costs （insurance premiums） and rising property values to those with high protection costs and falling property values.Consequently，there is a tendency toward the migration of people and goods from highrisk and fall ing propertyvalue areas into lowrisk and increasing propertyvalue areas.Furthermore，protection costs and property values are directly related.Other things being equal，higher protection costs （greater attack risks） imply lower or falling property values，and lower protection costs imply higher or increasing property values.These laws and tendencies shape the operation of a competitive System of insuranceprotection agencies.

在回答这些问题时，有必要回顾一些基本的经济学观点。在其他条件相同的情况下，一般私有财产所有者，特别是企业所有者，更倾向于选择保护成本（保险费）低、财产价值上升的地区，而不是保护成本高、财产价值下降的地区。因此，出现了一种趋势，即人员和财货从高风险和财产价值下降的地区向低风险和财产价值上升的地区迁移。此外，保护成本与财产价值是直接相关的。在其他条件相同的情况下，更高的保护成本（更大的受攻击风险）意味着更低的财产价值或财产价值下降，而更低的保护成本则意味着更高的财产价值或财产价值上升。这些规律和趋势形塑了保险保护机构竞争体系的运作方式。

First，whereas a taxfunded monopolist will manifest a tendency to raise the cost and price of protection，private profitloss insurance agencies strive to reduce the cost of protection and thus bring about falling prices.At the same time insurance agencies are more interested than anyone else in rising property values，because this implies not only that their own property holdings appreciate but in particular that there will also be more of other people’s property for them to insure.In contrast，if the risk of aggression increases and property values fall，there is less value to be insured while the cost of protection and price of insurance rises，implying poor business conditions for an insurer。Consequently，insurance companies would be under permanent economic pressure to promote the former favorable and avert the latter unfavorable condition.

首先，靠税收供资的垄断者往往会有提高保护成本及价格的倾向，而自负盈亏的私营保险机构则会努力降低保护成本，进而促使价格下降。与此同时，保险机构比其他任何机构都更关注财产价值的上升，因为这不仅意味着它们自身持有的财产会增值，尤其还意味着可供它们承保的他人财产也会增多。相反，如果遭受侵犯的风险增加且财产价值下降，那么可承保的价值就会减少，而保护成本和保险价格却会上升，这意味着保险公司的经营环境不佳。因此，保险公司将长期面临经济压力，促使其推动前一种有利状况的出现，并避免后一种不利状况的发生。

This incentive structure has a fundamental impact on the operation of insurers.For one，as for the seemingly easier case of the protection against common crime and criminals，a System of competitive insurers would lead to a dramatic change in current crime policy。To recognize the extent of this change，it is instructive to look first at the present and thus familiar statist crime policy。While it is in the interest of state agents to combat common private crime （if only so that there is more property left for them to tax），as taxfunded agents they have little or no interest in being par ticularly effective at the task of preventing it，or else，if it has occurred，at compensating its victims and apprehending and punishing the offenders.Moreover，under democratic conditions，insult will be added to injury。For if everyone—aggressors as well as nonaggressors and residents of high crime locations as well as those of lowcrime locations—can vote and be elected to government office，a Systematic redistribution of property rights from nonaggressors to aggressors and the residents of lowcrime areas to those of high crime areas comes into effect and crime will actually be promoted.Accordingly，crime，and consequently the demand for private security services of all kinds are currently at an alltime high.Even more scandalously，instead of compensating the victims of the crimes it did not prevent （as it should have），the government forces victims to pay again as taxpayers for the cost of the apprehension，imprisonment，rehabilitation，and/or entertainment of their aggressors.And rather than requiring higher protection prices in high crime locations and lower ones in lowcrime locations，as insurers would，the government does the exact opposite.It taxes more in lowcrime and high propertyvalue areas than in highcrime and low propertyvalue ones，or it even subsidizes the residents of the latter locations—the slums—at the expense of those of the former and thus erodes the social conditions unfavorable to crime while promoting those favorable to it。14

这种激励机制对保险公司的运营有着根本性的影响。其一，就防范普通犯罪及犯罪分子这一看似较为简单的情况而言，一个竞争性的保险公司体系将会使当前的犯罪政策发生重大变化。要认识到这种变化的程度，首先审视一下目前人们所熟悉的国家主义的犯罪政策是很有启发意义的。虽然打击普通的私人犯罪符合国家代理人的利益（哪怕只是为了有更多的财产可供他们征税），但作为靠税收供养的公职人员，他们对于特别有效地预防犯罪这一任务几乎没有兴趣，或者说即便犯罪已经发生，他们对于赔偿受害者、缉拿并惩处罪犯也没什么兴趣。而且，在民主制度下，往往是雪上加霜。因为如果每个人——侵犯者与非侵犯者、高犯罪率地区居民以及低犯罪率地区居民——都能投票并当选公职，那么一种将财产权从非侵害者向侵害者、从低犯罪率地区居民向高犯罪率地区居民进行系统性再分配的情况就会发生，而犯罪实际上就会受到助长。相应地，犯罪以及由此引发的对各类私人安保服务的需求目前正处于历史最高水平。更可耻的是，政府不但没有（本应如此）对那些它未能阻止的罪行的受害人进行赔偿，反而强迫受害人作为纳税人再次为抓捕、监禁、改造甚至优待侵犯他们的人而支付费用。保险公司会根据情况在高犯罪率地区收取较高的安保费用，在低犯罪率地区收取较低的费用，然而政府的做法却恰恰相反。政府在低犯罪率、高财产价值的地区征收的税比在高犯罪率、低财产价值地区征收的更多，甚至还以牺牲前者（低犯罪率、高财产价值地区）居民的利益为代价去补贴后者（高犯罪率地区，也就是贫民窟）的居民，这样一来，就侵蚀了抑制犯罪滋生的社会条件，反而助长了有利于犯罪的环境。[162]

The operation of competitive insurers would be in striking contrast。For one，if an insurer could not prevent a crime，it would have to indemnify the victim.Thus，above all insurers would want to be effective in crime prevention.And if they still could not prevent it，they would want to be efficient in the detection，apprehension，and punishment of criminal offenders，because in finding and arresting an offender，the insurer could force the criminal— rather than the victim and its insurer—to pay for the damages and cost of indemnification.

竞争性保险公司的运作情况会与之形成鲜明对比。其一，如果一家保险公司未能阻止犯罪发生，它就必须对受害者进行赔偿。因此，最重要的是，所有保险公司都会希望能有效地预防犯罪。而且，如果它们仍然没能阻止犯罪发生，它们会希望能高效地侦查、缉拿并惩处犯罪者，因为通过找到并逮捕犯罪者，保险公司可以迫使罪犯——而非受害者及其保险公司——来支付损害赔偿费用和补偿成本。

More specifically，just as insurance companies currently maintain and continually update a detailed local inventory of property values so they would then maintain and continually update a detailed local inventory of crimes and criminals.Other things being equal，the risk of aggression against any private property location increases with the proximity and the number and resources of potential aggressors.Thus，insurers would be interested in gathering information on actual crimes and known criminals and their locations，and it would be in their mutual interest of minimizing property damage to share this information with each other （just as banks now share information on bad credit risks with each other）。Furthermore，insurers would also be particularly interested in gathering information on potential （not yet committed and known） crimes and aggressors，and this would lead to a fundamental overhaul of and improvement in current— statist—crime statistics.In order to predict the future incidence of crime and thus calculate its current price （premium），insurers would correlate the frequency，description，and character of criminals and crimes with the social surroundings in which they occur and operate，and develop and under competitive pressure continually refine an elaborate System of demographic and sociological crime indicators.15 That is，every neighbor hood would be described，and its risk assessed，in terms and in light of a multitude of crime indicators，such as the composition of sexes，age groups，races，nationalities，ethnicities，religions，languages，professions，and incomes.

更具体地说，就像保险公司目前维护并不断更新当地财产价值的详细清单一样，他们也会维护并不断更新当地犯罪和犯罪分子的详细清单。在其他条件相同的情况下，任何私有财产所在地遭受侵犯的风险会随着潜在侵害者的临近程度、数量以及资源的增加而上升。因此，保险公司会有兴趣收集有关实际犯罪、已知犯罪分子及其所在位置的信息，而且为了将财产损失降到最低，它们相互分享这些信息是符合彼此共同利益的（就像如今银行之间会相互分享不良信用风险信息一样）。此外，保险公司还会对收集有关潜在（尚未实施且尚不为人知）犯罪及侵犯者的信息特别感兴趣，而这将促使对当前的——国家主义的——犯罪统计数据进行根本性的全面修订与完善。为了预测未来犯罪发生率，进而计算出当下的犯罪保险价格（保费），保险公司会将犯罪分子及犯罪行为的频率、描述以及特征与它们发生及实施的社会环境相关联，并在竞争压力下开发且不断完善一套详尽的人口统计学及社会学犯罪指标体系。 [163]也就是说，每个社区都会基于众多犯罪指标来进行描述，并对其风险作出评估，这些指标包括性别构成、年龄群体、种族、国籍、民族、宗教、语言、职业以及收入情况等。

Consequently，and in distinct contrast to the present situation，all interlocal，regional，racial，national，ethnic，religious，and linguistic income，and wealth redistribution would disappear，and a constant source of social conflict would be removed permanently。Instead，the emerging price （premium） structure would tend to accurately reflect the risk of each location and its particular social surrounding，such that no one would be forced to pay for the insurance risk of anyone but his own and that associated with his particular neighborhood.More importantly，based on its continually updated and refined System of statistics on crime and property values and further motivated by the noted migration tendency from highrisk lowvalue （henceforth “bad”） to lowriskhighvalue （henceforth “good”） locations，a System of competitive aggression insurers would promote a tendency toward civilizational progress （rather than decivilization）。

因此，与当前状况形成鲜明对比的是，所有跨地区、跨区域、跨种族、跨国家、跨民族、跨宗教以及跨语言的收入和财富再分配现象都将消失，一个社会冲突的持久根源将被永久消除。相反，逐渐形成的价格（保险费）结构将倾向于准确反映各个地点及其特定社会环境的风险，这样一来，除了为自己以及与自己所在特定社区相关的保险风险付费外，没人会被迫为其他人的保险风险买单。更重要的是，基于其不断更新和完善的犯罪及财产价值统计体系，再加上前文提及的从高风险低价值（此后称为“孬”）地区向低风险高价值（此后称为“好”）地区迁移的趋势所带来的进一步推动作用，一个由相互竞争的防范侵犯保险公司所构成的体系将会推动文明进步（而非去文明化）的趋势。

Governments—and democratic governments in particular—erode “good” and promote “bad” neighborhoods through their tax and transfer policy。They do so also，and with possibly an even more damaging effect，through their policy of forced integration.This policy has two aspects.on the one hand，for the owners and residents in “good” locations and neigh borhoods who are faced with an immigration problem，forced integration means that they must accept，without discrimination，every domestic immi grant，as transient or tourist on public roads，as customer，client，resident，or neighbor。They are prohibited by their government from excluding any one，including anyone they consider an undesirable potential risk，from immigration.on the other hand，for those owners and residents in “bad” locations and neighborhoods，who experience emigration rather than immigration，forced integration means that they are prevented from effective selfprotection.Rather than being allowed to rid themselves of crime through the expulsion of known criminals from their neighborhood，they are forced by their government to live in permanent association with their aggressors.16

政府——尤其是民主政府——通过其税收及转移支付政策侵蚀 “好 ”社区，助长“孬 ”社区的发展。它们还通过强制一体化政策这么做，而且可能会产生更具破坏性的影响。这项政策包含两个方面。一方面，对于身处 “好” 地段及 “好” 社区且面临移民问题的所有者和居民来说，强制一体化意味着他们必须一视同仁地接纳每一位国内移民，无论是作为公共道路上的过客或游客，还是作为顾客、客户、居民或邻居。政府禁止他们将任何人（包括他们认为存在不良潜在风险的任何人）排除在移民行列之外。另一方面，对于那些身处“孬”地段及“孬”社区、面临人口外流而非人口流入情况的所有者和居民来说，强制一体化意味着他们被阻止进行有效的自我保护。他们不能通过将已知犯罪分子驱逐出自己所在社区的方式来摆脱犯罪困扰，而是被政府强迫要永远与侵犯他们的人为邻。[164]

The results of a System of private protection insurers would be in strik ing contrast to these all too familiar decivilizing effects and tendencies of statist crime protection.To be sure，insurers would be unable to eliminate the differences between “good” and “bad” neighborhoods.In fact，these differences might even become more pronounced.However，driven by their interest in rising property values and falling protection costs，insur ers would promote a tendency to improve by uplifting and cultivating both “good” and “bad” neighborhoods.Thus，in “good” neighborhoods insurers would adopt a policy of selective immigration.Unlike states，they could not and would not want to disregard the discriminating inclinations among the insured toward immigrants.To the contrary，even more so than any one of their clients，insurers would be interested in discrimination：in admitting only those immigrants whose presence adds to a lower crime risk and increased property values and in excluding those whose presence leads to a higher risk and lower property values.That is，rather than eliminating discrimination，insurers would rationalize and perfect its practice.Based on their statistics on crime and property values，and in order to reduce the cost of protection and raise property values，insurers would formulate and continually refine various restrictive （exclusionary） rules and procedures relating to immigration and immigrants and thus give quantitative precision—in the form of prices and price differentials—to the value of discrimination （and the cost of nondiscrimination） between potential immigrants （as high or lowrisk and valueproductive）。

私人安保保险公司体系所产生的结果，将与人们耳熟能详的国家主义犯罪防范措施那去文明化的种种影响及趋势形成鲜明对比。诚然，保险公司无法消除 “好 ”社区和 “孬”社区之间的差异。事实上，这些差异甚至会变得越发显著。不过，出于对财产价值上升和保护成本下降的利益考量，保险公司会推动一种通过提升和培育 “好”“孬” 社区来实现改善的趋势。因此，在 “好” 社区，保险公司会采取选择性移民政策。与国家不同，它们不能也不会无视被保险公司对移民所抱有的差别对待倾向。恰恰相反，相较于它们的任何一位客户，保险公司会对差别对待更感兴趣：它们只会接纳那些能降低犯罪风险、提升财产价值的移民，而拒绝接纳那些会导致更高风险和更低财产价值的移民。也就是说，保险公司不会消除差别对待，反而会使其做法合理化并加以完善。基于它们有关犯罪和财产价值的统计数据，并且为了降低保护成本、提高财产价值，保险公司会制定并不断完善各种与移民及移民相关的限制性（排他性）规则和程序，从而以价格及价格差异的形式，对潜在移民之间（作为高风险或低风险以及能创造价值与否）差别对待的价值（以及无差别对待的成本）给出量化的精确界定。

Similarly，in “bad” neighborhoods the interests of the insurers and the insured would coincide.Insurers would not want to suppress the expulsion ist inclinations among the insured toward known criminals.They would rationalize such tendencies by offering selective price cuts （contingent on specific cleanup operations）。Indeed，in cooperation with one another，insur ers would want to expel known criminals not just from their immediate neighborhood，but from civilization altogether，into the wilderness or open frontier of the Amazon jungle，the Sahara，or the polar regions.

同样，在“孬”社区，保险公司和投保人的利益将会是一致的。保险公司不会想要压制投保人驱逐已知犯罪分子的倾向。它们会通过提供有选择性的降价（依据具体的清理行动而定）来使这类倾向合理化。事实上，通过相互合作，保险公司会希望不仅将已知犯罪分子从它们临近的社区驱逐出去，而且是将其彻底逐出文明世界，赶到荒郊野外，或是驱至亚马逊丛林、撒哈拉沙漠或极地地区那样的偏远地带。

VIII. 防范国家侵犯

INSURING againST STAte AGGreSSIon

Yet what about defense against a state？ How would insurers protect us from state aggression？

然而，针对国家的防卫情况又如何呢？保险公司将如何保护我们免受国家的侵犯呢？

First，it is essential to remember that governments qua compulsory，tax funded monopolies are inherently wasteful and inefficient in whatever they do。This is also true for weapons technology and production，military intel ligence and strategy，especially in our age of high technology。Accordingly，states would not be able to compete within the same territory against voluntarily financed insurance agencies.Moreover，most important and general among the restrictive rules relating to immigration and designed by insur ers to lower protection cost and increase property values would be the one concerning government agents.States are inherently aggressive and pose a permanent danger to every insurer and insured.Thus，insurers in particular would want to exclude or severely restrict—as a potential security risk—the immigration （territorial entry） of all known government agents，and they would induce the insured，either as a condition of insurance or of a lower premium，to exclude or strictly limit any direct contact with any known government agent，be it as visitor，customer，client，resident，or neighbor。That is，wherever insurance companies operated—in all free territories— state agents would be treated as undesirable outcasts，potentially more dan gerous than any common criminal。Accordingly，states and their personnel would be able to operate and reside only in territorial separation from，and on the fringes of，free territories.Furthermore，owing to the comparatively lower economic productivity of statist territories，governments would be continually weakened by the emigration of their most valueproductive residents.

首先，必须牢记，政府作为依靠强制征税维持的垄断机构，无论做什么，本质上都是浪费且低效的。在武器技术与生产、军事情报及战略方面也是如此，在我们所处的高科技时代尤其如此。因此，在同一地域内，国家无法与自愿出资的保险机构相竞争。而且，在保险公司为降低保护成本、增加财产价值而制定的与移民相关的限制性规则中，最为重要且普遍的一条会是涉及政府代理人的规则。国家天生具有侵犯性，对每一家保险公司及每一位投保人都构成持久的威胁。因此，保险公司尤其会希望将所有已知的政府代理人的移民（入境）行为作为一种潜在的安全风险加以排除或严格限制，而且它们会引导投保人（将此）作为获得保险或降低保费的一个条件，去排除或严格限制与任何已知政府代理人的直接接触，无论是将其当作访客、顾客、客户、居民还是邻居。

Now，what if such a government should decide to attack or invade a free territory？ This would be easier said than done! Who and what would one attack？ There would be no state opponent。only private property own ers and their private insurance agencies would exist。No one，least of all the insurers，would have presumably engaged in aggression or even provoca tion.If there were any aggression or provocation against the state at all，this would be the action of a particular person，and in this case the interest of the state and insurance agencies would fully coincide.both would want to see the attacker punished and held accountable for all damages caused.But without any aggressorenemy，how could the state justify an attack and even more so any indiscriminate attack？ And surely it would have to justify it! For the power of every government，even the most despotic one，rests ultimately on opinion and consent，as La Boétie，Hume，Mises and Rothbard have explained.17 Kings and presidents can issue an order to attack，of course.But there must be scores of others willing to execute their order to put it into effect。There must be generals receiving and following the order，soldiers willing to march，kill，and be killed，and domestic producers will ing to continue producing to fund the war。If this consensual willingness were absent because the orders of the state rulers were considered illegiti mate，even the seemingly most powerful government would be rendered ineffectual and collapse，as the recent examples of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet Union have illustrated.Hence，from the viewpoint of the leaders of the state an attack on free territories would have to be considered extremely risky。No propaganda effort，however elaborate，would make the public believe that its attack were anything but an aggression against innocent vic tims.In this situation，the rulers of the state would be happy to maintain monopolistic control over their present territory rather than running the risk of losing legitimacy and all of their power in an attempt at territorial expansion.

那么，如果这样一个政府决定去攻击或入侵一片自由领地，情况会如何呢？说起来容易做起来难！要去攻击谁、攻击什么呢？那里不会有作为对手的国家存在，只有私有财产所有者及其私人保险公司。大概没有人，尤其是那些保险公司，会去实施侵犯甚或挑衅。即便真的存在针对这个国家的任何侵犯或挑衅，那也只会是某个特定个人的举动，在这种情况下，国家和保险公司的利益将会完全一致。双方都会希望看到攻击者受到惩罚，并为造成的所有损失承担责任。但是，如果没有任何侵犯者/敌人，国家如何正当化一次攻击行动，更别说是无差别的攻击行动？很显然，它必定需要给出正当理由！正如拉博埃西、休谟、米塞斯和罗斯巴德所阐释的那样，每个政府，哪怕是最专制的政府，其权力最终都建基于舆论和民众的认同。[165]国王和总统当然可以下达攻击的命令。但必须有许多其他人愿意执行他们的命令，才能将其付诸实施。有士兵愿意出征、杀敌以及赴死，国内的生产者愿意继续生产以资助战争。如果由于国家统治者的命令被认为是非法的，而缺乏这种基于认同的意愿，那么即便看似最强大的政府也会失效并走向垮台，近期伊朗国王和苏联的例子足以说明此点。因此，从国家领导人的角度来看，对自由领地发起攻击必须被视为极具风险之举。无论多么精心策划的宣传活动，都无法让公众相信这种攻击不是对无辜受害者的侵犯。在这种情况下，国家统治者会乐于维持对现有领土的垄断控制，而不是冒着失去合法性和所有权力的风险试图扩张领土。

However，as unlikely as this may be，what would happen if a state still attacked and/or invaded a neighboring free territory？ in this case the aggressor would not encounter an unarmed population.only in statist ter ritories is the civilian population characteristically unarmed.States every where aim to disarm their own citizenry so as to be better able to tax and expropriate it。In contrast，insurers in free territories would not want to dis arm the insured.Nor could they。For who would want to be protected by someone who required him as a first step to give up his ultimate means of selfdefense？ To the contrary，insurance agencies would encourage the ownership of weapons among their insured by means of selective price cuts.

然而，尽管这种可能性不大，但如果一个国家仍然攻击和/或入侵邻近的自由领地，会发生什么情况呢？在这种情况下，侵犯者不会遇到手无寸铁的民众。只有在实行国家主义的地区，平民百姓才通常是没有武器的。各国到处都致力于解除本国公民的武装，以便能够更好地对其征税和没收财产。与此相反，自由领地的保险公司不会想要解除投保人的武装，它们也没办法这么做。因为谁会愿意让一个首先要求自己放弃最终自卫手段的人来提供保护呢？恰恰相反，保险机构会通过有选择性的降价手段来鼓励投保人拥有武器。

Moreover，apart from the opposition of an armed private citizenry，the aggressor state would run into the resistance of not only one but in all likelihood several insurance and reinsurance agencies.In the case of a successful attack and invasion，these insurers would be faced with mas sive indemnification payments.Unlike the aggressing state，however，these insurers would be efficient and competitive firms.Other things being equal，the risk of an attack—and hence the price of defense insurance— would be higher in locations adjacent or in close proximity to state ter ritories than in places far away from any state.To justify this higher price，insurers would have to demonstrate defensive readiness visàvis any possible state aggression to their clients，in the form of intelligence services，the ownership of suitable weapons and materials，and military personnel and training。In other words，the insurers would be prepared—effectively equipped and trained—for the contingency of a state attack and ready to respond with a twofold defense strategy。on the one hand，insofar as their operations in free territories are concerned insurers would be ready to expel，capture，or kill every invader while at the same time trying to avoid or minimize all collateral damage.on the other hand，insofar as their operations on state territory are concerned insurers would be prepared to target the aggressor—the state—for retaliation.That is，insurers would be ready to counterattack and kill，whether with longrange precision weap ons or assassination commandos，state agents from the top of the government hierarchy of king，president，or prime minister on downward while at the same time seeking to avoid or minimize all collateral damage to the property of innocent civilians （nonstate agents），and they would thereby encourage internal resistance against the aggressor government，promote its delegitimization，and possibly incite the liberation and transformation of the state territory into a free country。

此外，除了民间武装的抵抗之外，侵略国遇到的将不仅仅是一家，而很可能是多家保险和再保险公司的抵制。倘若侵略和入侵得逞，这些保险公司将面临巨额赔偿支出。然而，与侵略国不同的是，这些保险公司都是高效且有竞争力的企业。在其他条件相同的情况下，靠近或紧邻国家领土的地方遭受攻击的风险会高于远离任何国家的地方，因此防卫保险的价格也会高于这些地方。为了证明这种高昂的价格是合理的，保险公司必须向其客户证明，在面对任何可能的国家侵犯时，他们已经做好了防御准备，其形式包括情报服务、拥有合适的武器及物资、配备军事人员并开展相关训练等。换句话说，保险公司会针对国家发动攻击这一突发情况做好准备——配备有效的装备并进行训练，而且时刻准备采用双重防御策略予以应对。一方面，就其在自由地区的行动而言，保险公司会随时准备驱逐、俘获或击毙每一个入侵者，同时努力避免或尽量减少一切附带损害。另一方面，就其在国家领土上的行动来说，保险公司会准备将侵略者——也就是国家——作为报复目标。也就是说，保险公司会准备进行反击并实施打击，无论是使用远程精确武器还是派遣暗杀突击队，对从君主、总统或总理等政府高层往下的国家代理人采取行动，同时力求避免或尽量减少对无辜平民（非国家代理人）财产造成的所有附带损害。通过这样的方式，它们会鼓励针对侵略政府的内部抵抗，促使其丧失合法性，并有可能煽动将该国领土解放并转变为一个自由国度。

IX. 重获自我防卫的权利

REGAINING OUR RIGHT TO SELFdefense

I have thus come full circle with my argument。First，I have shown that the idea of a protective state and state protection of private property is based on a fundamental theoretical error，and that this error has had disastrous consequences：the destruction and insecurity of all private property and per petual war。Second，I have shown that the correct answer to the question of who is to defend private property owners from aggression is the same as for the production of every other good or service：private property own ers，cooperation based on the division of labor，and market competition.Third，I have explained how a System of private profitloss insurers would effectively minimize aggression，whether by private criminals or states，and promote a tendency toward civilization and perpetual peace.The only task outstanding，then，is to implement these insights：to withdraw one’s consent and willing cooperation from the state and to promote its delegitimization in public opinion so as to persuade others to do the same.without the erroneous public perception and judgment of the state as just and necessary and without the public’s voluntary cooperation，even the seemingly most powerful government would implode and its powers evaporate.Thus liber ated，we would regain our right to selfdefense and be able to turn to freed and unregulated insurance agencies for efficient professional assistance in all matters of protection and conflict resolution.

这样一来，我的论证就已完整地呈现。首先，我已经表明，保护性国家以及国家对私有财产提供保护的理念是基于一个根本性的理论错误，而且这个错误已经造成了灾难性的后果：所有私有财产遭到破坏、缺乏安全保障以及战乱不断。其次，我已经说明，对于由谁来保护私有财产所有者免受侵犯这一问题，正确答案与其他任何商品或服务的生产问题的答案是一样的：那就是私有财产所有者、基于劳动分工的合作以及市场竞争。第三，我已经解释了一个基于盈亏考量的私人保险公司体系将如何有效减少来自私人犯罪分子或国家的侵犯行为，并推动走向文明与永久和平的趋势。那么，剩下的唯一任务就是践行这些见解：不再认同国家，不再自愿与国家合作，并且在公众舆论中促使其丧失合法性，以便说服其他人也这么做。倘若公众不再错误地认为国家是公正且必要的，倘若公众不再自愿与国家合作，那么即便看似最强大的政府也会内爆，其权力也会烟消云散。如此一来获得解放后，我们就能重获自卫的权利，并且能够向自由且不受管制的保险机构寻求高效、专业的协助，以处理所有保护及解决冲突方面的事务。

15 关于国家与战争的反思*

reflections on State and War

Conventionally，the state is defined as an agency with two unique charac teristics.First，it is a compulsory territorial monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking （jurisdiction）。That is，it is the ultimate arbiter in every case of conflict，including conflicts involving itself。Second，the state is a territorial monopolist of taxation.That is，it is an agency that unilaterally fixes the price citizens must pay for its provision of law and order。

传统上，国家被定义为具有两个独特特征的机构：第一，它是最终决策（管辖权）的强制性领土垄断者，即它是所有冲突（包括涉及其自身的冲突）的最终仲裁者；第二，国家是税收的领土垄断者。也就是说，它是单方面决定公民为其所提供的法律和秩序而必须支付的价格的机构。

Predictably，if one can only appeal to the state for justice，justice will be perverted in favor of the state.Instead of resolving conflict，a monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking will provoke conflict in order to settle it to his own advantage.Worse，while the quality of justice will fall under monopolistic auspices，its price will rise.Motivated like everyone else by selfinterest but equipped with the power to tax，the state agents’ goal is always the same：to maximize income and minimize productive effort。

可以预见的是，如果人们只能向国家寻求公正，那么公正就会向国家倾斜从而被扭曲。最终决策的垄断者不仅不会解决冲突，反而会为其自身私利从而挑起冲突。更糟糕的是，在一言堂下，公正的质量会下降，其价格会上升。国家代理人像其他人一样受到自我利益的驱动，但他们拥有征税权，他们的目标始终如一：最大化收入，同时最小化生产性努力。

I. 国家、战争和帝国主义

STATE，WAR，AND IMPERIALISM

Instead of concentrating on the internal consequences of the institution of a state，however，I will focus on its external consequences，i.e.，foreign rather than domestic policy。

然而，我不会着重探讨国家制度带来的内部影响，而是将聚焦于其外部影响，也就是外交政策而非国内政策。

For one，as an agency that perverts justice and imposes taxes，every state is threatened with “exit。” Especially its most productive citizen may leave to escape taxation and the perversions of law.No state likes this.To the contrary，instead of seeing the range of control and tax base shrink，state agents prefer that they be expanded.Yet this brings them in conflict with other states.Unlike competition between “natural” persons and institutions， however，the competition between states is eliminative.That is，there can be only one monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking and taxation in any given area.Consequently，the competition between different states promotes a tendency toward political centralization and ultimately one single world state.

首先，作为一个扭曲公正和征税的机构，每个国家都面临着“退出”的威胁。尤其是最有生产力的公民可能会为了逃避税收和扭曲的法律而选择离开。没有哪个国家喜欢这样。相反，国家不希望看到控制范围和税基缩小，而是希望它们扩大。然而，这却会导致国与国之间发生冲突。与 “自然人 “和机构之间的竞争不同，国家之间的竞争是淘汰性的，也就是说，在任何特定区域，最终的决策者和税收垄断者只能有一个。因此，不同国家之间的竞争促进了政治集中化的趋势，最终形成一个单一的世界国家。

Further，as taxfunded monopolists of ultimate decisionmaking，states are inherently aggressive institutions.Whereas “natural” persons and institutions must bear the cost of aggressive behavior themselves （which may well induce them to abstain from such conduct），states can externalize this cost onto their taxpayers.Hence，state agents are prone to become provocateurs and aggressors and the process of centralization can be expected to proceed by means of violent clashes，i.e.，interstate wars.

此外，作为由税收资助的最终决策垄断者，国家本质上是具有侵犯性的机构。”自然人 “和机构必须自己承担侵犯行为的成本（这很可能促使他们放弃这种行为），而国家却可以将这种成本外部化到纳税人身上。因此，国家代理人很容易成为挑衅者和侵犯者，可以预料到集权化的进程会通过暴力冲突，即国家间战争，来推进。

Moreover，given that states must begin small and assuming as the starting point a world composed of a multitude of independent territorial units，something rather specific about the requirement of success can be stated.Victory or defeat in interstate warfare depend on many factors，of course，but other things such as population size being the same，in the long run the decisive factor is the relative amount of economic resources at a state’s disposal。In taxing and regulating，states do not contribute to the creation of economic wealth.Instead，they parasitically draw on existing wealth.However，state governments can influence the amount of existing wealth negatively。Other things being equal，the lower the tax and regulation burden imposed on the domestic economy，the larger the population will tend to grow and the larger the amount of domestically produced wealth on which the state can draw in its conflicts with neighboring competitors.That is，states that tax and regulate their economies comparatively little—liberal states—tend to defeat and expand their territories or their range of hegemonic control at the expense of less liberal ones.

此外，鉴于国家必须从小规模开始，并假设世界最初由众多独立的领土单位组成，可以对成功的要求做出一些具体的陈述。当然，国家间战争的胜负取决于很多因素，但在人口数量等其他因素不变的情况下，从长远来看，决定性因素是一国可支配的经济资源的相对数量。在征税和监管方面，国家并没有为创造经济财富做出贡献。相反，国家以寄生的方式汲取现有财富。然而，国家政府可以对现有财富的数量产生负面影响。在其他条件相同的情况下，对国内经济施加的税收和监管负担越低，人口就越容易增长，国家在与周边竞争对手的冲突中可以汲取的国内生产财富也就越多。也就是说，对内经济征税和管制相对较少的国家——自由主义的国家——往往以牺牲自由主义程度较低的国家为代价，战胜并扩大其领土或霸权控制范围。

This explains，for instance，why Western Europe came to dominate the rest of the world rather than the other way around.More specifically，it explains why it was first the Dutch，then the British and finally，in the 20th century，the United States，that became the dominant imperial power，and why the United States，internally one of the most liberal states，has conducted the most aggressive foreign policy，while the former Soviet Union，for instance，with its entirely illiberal （repressive） domestic policies has engaged in a comparatively peaceful and cautious foreign policy。The United States knew that it could militarily beat any other state； hence，it has been aggressive.In contrast，the Soviet Union knew that it was bound to lose a military confrontation with any state of substantial size unless it could win within a few days or weeks.

例如，这就解释了为何西欧得以统治世界其他地区，而不是反过来被其他地区统治。更确切地说，这解释了为何先是荷兰，接着是英国，最后在20世纪是美国成为了占主导地位的帝国势力；也解释了为何美国——其国内是最自由的国家之一——却奉行着最具侵略性的外交政策，而像前苏联，因其国内政策完全是不自由的（具有压制性），却奉行着相对和平且谨慎的外交政策。美国知道自己在军事上能够击败任何其他国家，所以它一直表现得很有侵略性。相比之下，苏联知道，除非能在几天或几周内取胜，否则它必然会在与任何规模可观的国家的军事对抗中落败。

II. 从君主制和军队战争到民主制和全面战争

FROM MonARCHY AND WARS OF ARMIES TO DEMOCRACY AND TOTAL WARS

Historically，most states have been monarchies，headed by absolute or constitutional kings or princes.It is interesting to ask why this is so，but here I have to leave this question aside.Suffice it to say that democratic states （including socalled parliamentary monarchies），headed by presidents or prime ministers，were rare until the French revolution and have assumed worldhistoric importance only after World War I。

从历史上看，大多数国家曾是君主制国家，由专制君主或立宪君主、亲王等领导。探究为何会如此是个有趣的问题，但在此我先把这个问题搁置一旁。只需说明一点就够了，即由总统或首相领导的民主制国家（包括所谓的议会君主制国家）在法国大革命前十分罕见，并且只是在第一次世界大战后才具备了世界历史性的重要意义。

While all states must be expected to have aggressive inclinations，the incentive structure faced by traditional kings on the one hand and modern presidents on the other is different enough to account for different kinds of war。Whereas kings viewed themselves as the private owner of the territory under their control，presidents consider themselves as temporary caretakers.The owner of a resource is concerned about the current income to be derived from the resource and the capital value embodied in it （as a reflec tion of expected future income）。His interests are longrun，with a concern for the preservation and enhancement of the capital values embodied in “his” country。In contrast，the caretaker of a resource （viewed as public rather than private property） is concerned primarily about his current income and pays little or no attention to capital values.

尽管可以预料所有国家都会有侵略倾向，但传统君主与现代总统所面临的激励机制差异颇大，足以导致不同类型战争的出现。君主将自己视为所掌控领土的私人所有者，而总统则把自己看作临时的管理者。资源所有者关心的是能从该资源中获取的当前收益以及蕴含其中的资本价值（这体现了预期的未来收益）。他着眼于长远利益，关注的是“他的”国家所蕴含的资本价值的保全与增值。相比之下，资源的管理者（将资源视作公有财产而非私有财产）主要关心的是自己的当前收益，对资本价值很少关注甚至毫不在意。

The empirical upshot of this different incentive structure is that monar chical wars tended to be “moderate” and “conservative” as compared to democratic warfare.

这种不同的激励结构的经验结论是，与民主战争相比，君主战争往往是“温和的”和“保守的”。

Monarchical wars typically arose out of inheritance disputes brought on by a complex network of interdynastic marriages.They were characterized by tangible territorial objectives.They were not ideologically motivated quarrels.The public considered war the king’s private affair，to be financed and executed with his own money and military forces.Moreover，as conflicts between different ruling families，kings felt compelled to recognize a clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants and target their war efforts exclusively against each other and their family estates.Thus military historian Michael Howard noted about 18thcentury monarchical warfare：

on the [European] continent commerce，travel，cultural and learned intercourse went on in wartime almost unhindered.The wars were the king’s wars.The role of the good citizen was to pay his taxes，and sound political economy dictated that he should be left alone to make the money out of which to pay those taxes.He was required to participate neither in the decision out of which wars arose nor to take part in them once they broke out，unless prompted by a spirit of youthful adventure.These matters were arcane regni，the concern of the sovereign alone.1

君主制战争通常源于因王朝间错综复杂的联姻网络所引发的继承争端。这类战争有着明确的领土目标，并非受意识形态驱动的纷争。民众认为战争是君主的私人事务，应由君主们自己出钱和出军队来付诸实施。此外，当不同统治家族之间发生冲突时，君主们觉得必须明确区分战斗人员和非战斗人员，并将战争目标完全对准彼此及其家族产业。军事历史学家迈克尔-霍华德（Michael Howard）在谈到 18 世纪的君主制战争时如是说：

在（欧洲）大陆，商业、旅行、文化以及学术交流在战时几乎畅通无阻。战争是君主的战争。良民的职责就是缴税，而健全的政治经济学原则要求应让民众安心挣钱来缴纳这些税款。民众既无需参与引发战争的决策，战争一旦爆发也无需参战，除非受到年少冒险精神的驱使。这些事务属于王室机密，仅是君主一人乾纲独断之事。[166]

Similarly Ludwig von Mises observed about the wars of armies：

In wars of armies，the army does the fighting while the citizens who are not members of the army pursue their normal lives.The citizens pay the costs of warfare； they pay for the maintenance and equipment of the army，but otherwise they remain outside of the war events.It may happen that the war actions raze their houses，devastate their land，and destroy their other property； but this，too，is part of the war costs which they have to bear。It may also happen that they are looted and incidentally killed by the warriors—even by those of their “own” army。But these are events which are not inherent in warfare as such； they hinder rather than help the operations of the army leaders and are not tolerated if those in command have full control over their troops.The warring state which has formed，equipped，and maintained the army considers looting by the soldiers an offense； they were hired to fight，not to loot on their own.The state wants to keep civil life as usual because it wants to preserve the taxpaying ability of its citizens； conquered territories are regarded as its own domain.The System of the market economy is to be maintained during the war to serve the requirement of warfare.

同样，路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）也对军队战争发表了看法：

在军队战争中，军队进行战斗，而非军队成员的公民则继续过着正常的生活。公民支付战争费用，包括军队的维持费和装备费，但除此之外，他们置身于战争事物之外。战争可能会夷平他们的房屋，毁坏他们的土地，摧毁他们的其他财产；但这也是他们必须承担的战争代价的一部分。他们还可能遭到战士们的抢劫和意外杀害——甚至是他们 “自己 “军队的战士。但是，这些情况并非战争本身所固有的；它们阻碍而非帮助军队指挥官的作战行动，如果指挥官能够完全控制自己的部队，就不会容忍这些情况发生。组建、装备和维持军队的交战国认为士兵抢劫是一种犯罪行为；他们是被雇佣来打仗的，而不是来抢劫的。国家希望保持公民生活如常，因为它要维护公民的纳税能力；被征服的领土被视为自己的领地。战争期间，市场经济体系需要保持，以支持战争需求。[167]

In contrast to the limited warfare of the ancien régime，the era of democratic warfare—which began with the French revolution and the Napole onic Wars，continued during the 19th century with the American War of Southern independence，and reached its apex during the 20th century with World War I and World War II—has been the era of total war。

与旧制度下的有限战争不同，民主战争时代——肇始于法国大革命和拿破仑战争，在 19 世纪随着美国南方独立战争得以延续，并在 20 世纪的第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战期间达到顶峰——是全面战争时代。

In blurring the distinction between the rulers and the ruled （“we all rule ourselves”），democracy strengthened the identification of the public with a particular state.Rather than dynastic property disputes which could be resolved through conquest and occupation，democratic wars became ideological battles：clashes of civilizations，which could only be resolved through cultural，linguistic，or religious domination，subjugation and，if necessary，extermination.It became increasingly difficult for members of the public to extricate themselves from personal involvement in war。resistance against higher taxes to fund a war was considered treasonous.because the democratic state，unlike a monarchy，was “owned” by all，conscription became the rule rather than the exception.And with mass armies of cheap and hence easily disposable conscripts fighting for national goals and ideals，backed by the economic resources of the entire nation，all distinctions between combatants and noncombatants fell by the wayside.Collateral damage was no longer an unintended sideeffect but became an integral part of warfare.“once the state ceased to be regarded as ‘property’ of dynastic princes，” Michael Howard noted，and

became instead the instrument of powerful forces dedicated to such abstract concepts as Liberty，or Nationality，or revolution，which enabled large numbers of the population to see in that state the embodiment of some absolute Good for which no price was too high，no sacrifice too great to pay； then the “temperate and indecisive contests” of the rococo age appeared as absurd anachronisms.3

民主制度模糊了统治者与被统治者之间的区别（”我们都在自我统治”），从而加强了公众对特定国家的认同。民主战争不再是可以通过征服和占领来解决的王朝财产争端，而是变成了意识形态之争：文明的冲突，只能通过文化、语言或宗教的统治、征服甚至必要时的灭绝才能解决。公众越来越难以摆脱个人对战争的参与。反对提高税收以资助战争被视为是叛国行径。只因民主国家不同于君主制，归全民“所有”，所以征兵成为常态而非例外。此外，有了大批由廉价因而可轻易牺牲的应征入伍者组成的军队，他们为国家目标和理想而战，并且得到整个国家经济资源的支持，战斗人员与非战斗人员之间的所有区别都被抛到了一边。附带损害不再是意外的副作用，而是成了战争不可或缺的一部分。“一旦国家不再被视为王朝君主的‘财产’，”迈克尔·霍华德（Michael Howard）指出：

“反而成为致力于诸如自由、民族性或革命这类抽象概念的强大力量的工具，这使得大量民众认为国家体现着某种至善，为了它无论付出多高的代价、做出多大的牺牲都不为过；那么，洛可可时代那种‘温和且优柔寡断的争斗’就显得像是荒谬的不合时宜之物了。”[168]

Similar observations have been made by the military historian Major general J。F。C。Fuller：

The influence of the spirit of nationality，that is of democracy，on war was profound，。。。[it] emotionalized war and，consequently，brutalized it；。。。National armies fight nations，royal armies fight their like，the first obey a mob—always demented，the second a king，generally sane.All this developed out of the French revolution，which also gave to the world conscription—herd warfare，and the herd coupling with finance and commerce has begotten new realms of war。For when once the whole nation fights，then is the whole national credit available for the purpose of war。4

军事历史学家 J. F. C.福勒少将也提出了类似的看法：

民族精神（也就是民主精神）对战争的影响是深远的……它使战争情绪化，进而使战争变得残酷；……民族军队是为民族而战，王室军队则是与同类（其他王室军队）作战，前者听从的是群氓——群氓总是疯狂的，后者听从的是国王，而国王通常是理智的。所有这一切都源自法国大革命，法国大革命还给世界带来了征兵制——群体战争，而群体与金融、商业相结合便催生了新的战争领域。因为一旦整个民族投入战斗，那么整个国家的信用便可用于战争的目的。[169]

And William A.Orton thus summarized matters：

Nineteenthcentury wars were kept within bounds by the tradi tion，well recognized in international law，that civilian property and business were outside the sphere of combat。Civilian assets were not exposed to arbitrary distraint or permanent seizure，and apart from such territorial and financial stipulations as one state might impose on another，the economic and cultural life of the belligerents was generally allowed to continue pretty much as it had been.Twentiethcentury practice has changed all that。during both World Wars limitless lists of contraband coupled with unilateral declarations of maritime law put every sort of commerce in jeopardy，and made waste paper of all precedents.The close of the first war was marked by a determined and successful effort to impair the economic recovery of the principal losers，and to retain certain civilian properties.The second war has seen the extension of that policy to a point at which international law in war has ceased to exist。For years the Government of germany，so far as its arms could reach，had based a policy of confiscation on a racial theory that had no standing in civil law，international law，nor Christian ethics； and when the war began，that violation of the comity of nations proved contagious.AngloAmerican leadership，in both speech and action，launched a crusade that admitted of neither legal nor territorial limits to the exercise of coercion.The concept of neutrality was denounced in both theory and practice.Not only enemy assets and interests，but the assets and interests of any parties whatsoever，even in neutral countries，were exposed to every constraint the belligerent pow ers could make effective； and the assets and interests of neutral states and their civilians，lodged in belligerent territories or under belligerent control，were subjected to practically the same sort of coercion as those of enemy nationals.Thus “total war” became a sort of war that no civilian community could hope to escape； and “peace loving nations” will draw the obvious inference.5

威廉-奥顿（William A.Orton）这样总结道：

19 世纪的战争是在国际法公认的传统范围内进行的，即平民财产和商业活动不属于战争范围。平民的财产不会被任意扣押或永久扣押，除了一个国家可能对另一个国家施加的领土和财政规定外，交战国的经济和文化生活通常都被允许得以继续。二十世纪的实践改变了这一切。在两次世界大战期间，无穷无尽的违禁品清单加上单方面的海事法声明，使各种商业活动岌岌可危，并使所有先例沦为废纸。第一次世界大战后，主要战败国的经济恢复受到有意的削弱，同时保留了一些民用财产。第二次世界大战将这一政策扩展到国际法几乎失效的地步。多年来，德国政府在其武力所及范围之内，一直将没收政策建立在种族理论的基础之上，而这一理论在民法、国际法和基督教伦理中都是站不住脚的。英美领导层在言论和行动上都发起了一场“圣战”，在实施强制手段时既不受法律限制，也不受领土范围限制。中立概念无论在理论上还是实践中都遭到了抨击。不仅敌方的资产和利益，而且任何一方的资产和利益，哪怕是在中立国家的，都面临着交战国能够施加的各种有效限制；而中立国家及其平民位于交战国领土内或处于交战国控制下的资产和利益，实际上也遭受着与敌国国民资产和利益相同类型的强制手段。于是，“总体战”成了一种任何平民群体都无望逃避的战争形式；而“热爱和平的国家”将会得出显而易见的推论。[170]

III. 附录：民主和平论

EXCURSUS：THE DOCTRIne OF DEMOCRATIC peace

I have explained how the institution of a state leads to war； why，seemingly paradoxical，internally liberal states tend to be imperialist powers； and how the spirit of democracy has contributed to the decivilization in the conduct of war。More specifically，I have explained the rise of the United States to the rank of the world’s foremost imperial power； and，as a consequence of its successive transformation from the early beginnings as an aristocratic republic into an unrestricted mass democracy which began with the War of Southern independence，the role of the United States as an increasingly arrogant，selfrighteous and zealous warmonger。

What appears to be standing in the way of peace and civilization，then，is above all the state and democracy，and specifically the world’s model democracy：the United States.Ironically if not surprisingly，however，it is precisely the United States which claims that it is the solution to the quest for peace.

那么，似乎阻碍和平与文明的，首先是国家和民主，尤其是世界民主的典范：美国。然而，令人啼笑皆非的是，恰恰是美国声称自己在寻求和平的解决方案。

The reason for this claim is the doctrine of democratic peace，which goes back to the days of Woodrow Wilson and World War I，has been revived in recent years by george W.Bush and his neoconservative advisors，and by now has become intellectual folklore even in liberallibertarian circles.The theory claims：

Democracies do not go to war against each other。
Hence，in order to create lasting peace，the entire world must be made democratic。

And as a—largely unstated—corollary：

Today，many states are not democratic and resist internal— democratic—reform.
Hence，war must be waged on those states in order to convert them to democracy and thus create lasting peace.

I do not have the patience for a fullblown critique of this theory。I shall merely provide a brief critique of the theory’s initial premise and its ultimate conclusion.

民主国家不会相互开战。
因此，为了创造持久的和平，整个世界都必须民主化。
当前许多国家并不民主，并且抵制内部的民主改革。
因此，必须对这些国家发动战争，将其转变为民主国家，从而创造持久和平。

我没有耐心对这一理论进行全面的批判，我只想对这一理论的初始前提和最终结论进行简要的批判。

First：Do democracies not go to war against each other？ Since almost no democracies existed before the 20th century the answer supposedly must be found within the last hundred years or so。In fact，the bulk of the evidence offered in favor of the thesis is the observation that the countries of Western Europe have not gone to war against each other in the post–World War II era.Likewise，in the Pacific region，Japan and South Korea have not warred against each other during the same period.Does this evidence prove the case？ The democraticpeace theorists think so。As “scientists” they are interested in “statistical” proof，and as they see it there are plenty of “cases” on which to build such proof：germany did not war against France，Italy，England，etc。； France did not war against Spain，Italy，belgium，etc。Moreover，there are permutations：germany did not attack France，nor did France attack germany，etc。Thus，we have seemingly dozens of confirmations—and that for some 60 years—and not a single counterexample.But do we really have so many confirming cases？

首先，民主国家之间是否不会发生战争？由于在20世纪之前几乎没有民主国家，这个问题的答案必须在过去一百年左右的时间里寻找。事实上，支持这一论点的主要证据是，西欧国家在二战后没有相互开战。同样，在太平洋地区，日本和韩国在同一时期也没有相互开战。这个证据是否真的证明了民主和平论的正确性？民主和平论者是这样认为的。作为 “科学家”，他们对 “统计”证据感兴趣，而在他们看来，有足够的“案例”来建立这种证明：德国没有与法国、意大利、英格兰等国开战；法国没有与西班牙、意大利、比利时等国开战。此外，还有一些排列组合：德国没有进攻法国，法国也没有进攻德国，等等。因此，我们似乎有几十个确证案例——就在大约60 年的时间里——并且没有一个反例。但是，我们真的有这么多确证案例吗？

The answer is no：we have actually no more than a single case at hand.with the end of World War II，essentially all of—by now，democratic— Western Europe （and democratic Japan and South Korea in the Pacific region） has become part of the U.S.Empire，as indicated by the presence of U.S.troops in practically all of these countries.What the post–World War II period of peace then “proves” is not that democracies do not go to war against each other but that a hegemonic，imperialist power such as the United States did not let its various colonial parts go to war against each other （and，of course，that the hegemon itself did not see any need to go to war against its satellites—because they obeyed—and they did not see the need or did not dare to disobey their master）。

答案是否定的：实际上我们手头只有一个案例。第二次世界大战结束后，基本上所有的西欧——现在是民主的西欧（以及太平洋地区民主的日本和韩国）——都已成为美帝国的一部分，美军驻扎在几乎所有这些国家就表明了这一点。第二次世界大战后的和平时期所 “证明 “的，不是民主国家之间不会相互开战，而是像美国这样的霸权帝国主义强国不会让其殖民地的各个部分相互开战（当然，霸权帝国本身也认为没有必要对其卫星国开战——因为它们服从——而卫星国也认为没有必要或不敢违抗其美国主子）。

Moreover，if matters are thus perceived—based on an understanding of history rather than the naïve belief that because one entity has a different name than another their behavior must be independent from one another—it becomes clear that the evidence presented has nothing to do with democracy and everything with hegemony。For instance，no war broke out between the end of World War II and the end of the 1980s，i.e.，during the hegemonic reign of the Soviet Union，between East germany，Poland，Czechoslovakia，Romania，Bulgaria，Lithuania，Estonia，Hungary，etc。Was this because these were communist dictatorships and communist dictatorships do not go to war against each other？ That would have to be the conclusion of “scientists” of the caliber of democraticpeace theorists! But surely this conclusion is wrong。No war broke out because the Soviet Union did not permit this to happen—just as no war between Western democracies broke out because the United States did not permit this to happen in its dominion.To be sure，the Soviet Union intervened in Hun gary and Czechoslovakia，but so did the United States at various occasions in Central America，such as in Guatemala for instance.（Incidentally：How about the wars between Israel and Palestine and lebanon？ Are not all these democracies？ Or are Arab countries ruled out by definition as undemocratic？）

此外，如果这样看待问题——基于对历史的理解，而不是天真地认为一个实体与另一个实体的名称不同，它们的行为就一定是相互独立的——那么很显然，所提供的证据与民主无关，而与霸权有关。例如，从第二次世界大战结束到 20 世纪 80 年代末，即在苏联霸权统治时期，东德、波兰、捷克斯洛伐克、罗马尼亚、保加利亚、立陶宛、爱沙尼亚、匈牙利等国之间之间没有爆发战争。这是因为这些国家是共产主义独裁国家，而共产主义独裁国家不会相互开战吗？这只能是民主和平论者这样的 “科学家 “得出的结论！但这个结论肯定是错误的。没有爆发战争是因为苏联不允许这种情况发生——正如西方民主国家之间的没有爆发战争是因为美国不允许这种情况在其统治范围内发生一样。当然，苏联在匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克进行过干预，但美国也在中美洲的不同地区进行过干预，例如在危地马拉。（顺便问一句：以色列与巴勒斯坦和黎巴嫩之间的战争呢？这些国家难道都不是民主国家吗？还是阿拉伯国家被定义为非民主国家而被排除在外？）

Second：What about democracy as a solution to anything，let alone peace？ Here the case of democraticpeace theorists appears even worse.Indeed，the lack of historical understanding displayed by them is truly frightening。Here are only some fundamental shortcomings：

其次，民主是否能解决任何问题？民主是否能解决和平问题？民主和平论者在这一点上的表现更是令人失望。事实上，他们所表现出的对历史理解的缺乏着实令人震惊。以下只是一些根本性的缺陷：

First，the theory involves a conceptual conflation of democracy and liberty （freedom） that can only be called scandalous，especially coming from selfproclaimed libertarians.The foundation and cornerstone of liberty is the institution of private property； and private—exclusive—property is logically incompatible with democracy—majority rule.Democracy has nothing to do with freedom.Democracy is a soft variant of communism，and rarely in the history of ideas has it been taken for anything else.Incidentally，before the outbreak of the democratic age，i.e.，until the beginning of the 20th century，government （state） taxexpenditures （combining all lev els of government） in Western European countries constituted somewhere between 7 and 15% of national product，and in the still young United States even less.less than a hundred years of fullblown majority rule have increased this percentage to about 50% in Europe and 40% in the United States.

首先，该理论在概念上混淆了民主与自由，这种混淆简直堪称恶劣，尤其这话出自那些自称自由意志主义者之口就更是如此了。自由的基础与基石是私有财产制度；而私有——排他性的——财产在逻辑上与民主——多数决规则——是不相容的。民主与自由毫无关联。民主是共产主义的一种温和变体，而且在思想史上，它几乎从未被当作别的什么来看待。顺便提一下，在民主时代爆发之前，也就是直至20世纪初，西欧国家的政府（国家）税收支出（将各级政府加总起来）大约占国民生产总值的7%到15%，而在当时还很年轻的美国，这一比例甚至更低，还不到7%。而在全面实行多数决规则还不到一百年的时间里，这一比例在欧洲已增至约50%，在美国也达到了40%。

Second，the theory of democratic peace distinguishes essentially only between democracy and nondemocracy，summarily labeled dictatorship.Thus not only do all aristocraticrepublican regimes disappear from view but，more importantly for my current purposes，so do all traditional monarchies.They are equated with dictatorships à la lenin，Mussolini，Hitler，Stalin，Mao。In fact，however，traditional monarchies have little in common with dictatorships （while democracy and dictatorship are intimately related）。

其次，民主和平论本质上仅对民主政体和非民主政体做出区分，一概将非民主政体简单地贴上独裁的标签。这样一来，不仅所有贵族共和政体被忽视了，而且就我当下的论述目的而言更为重要的是，所有传统君主制政体也被无视了。它们被等同于列宁、墨索里尼、希特勒、斯大林、毛式的独裁政权。然而，事实上传统君主制与独裁政权几乎没有共同之处（而民主与独裁却是密切相关的）。

Monarchies are the semiorganic outgrowth of hierarchically structured natural—stateless—social orders.Kings are the heads of extended families，of clans，tribes，and nations.They command a great deal of natural，voluntarily acknowledged authority，inherited and accumulated over many generations.It is within the framework of such orders （and of aristocratic republics） that liberalism first developed and flourished.In contrast，democracies are egalitarian and redistributionist in outlook； hence，the abovementioned growth of state power in the 20th century。Characteristically，the transition from the monarchical age to the democratic one，beginning in the second half of the 19th century，has seen a continuous decline in the strength of liberal parties and a corresponding strengthening of socialists of all stripes.

君主制是等级结构的自然-无国家-社会秩序的半有机产物。君主是大家族、氏族、部落和国家的首领。他们拥有大量自然的、自愿承认的权威，这些权威是世世代代继承和积累下来的。自由主义正是在这种秩序（以及贵族共和国）的框架内发展和繁荣起来的。与此相反，民主政体具有平等主义和再分配主义的观念，因此在 20 世纪出现了上述国家权力增长的现象。从 19 世纪下半叶开始，从君主制时代向民主制时代过渡的典型特点是，自由主义政党的力量不断衰退，而各种社会主义政党的力量则相应增强。

Third，it follows from this that the view democraticpeace theorists have of conflagrations such as World War I must be considered grotesque，at least from the point of view of someone allegedly valuing freedom.For them，this war was essentially a war of democracy against dictatorship； hence，by increasing the number of democracies，it was a progressive，peaceenhancing，and ultimately justified war。

第三，由此可见，民主和平论者对第一次世界大战等战乱的看法显得十分荒谬，至少从一个所谓珍视自由的人的角度来看是如此。对民主和平论者而言，这场战争本质上是一场民主对抗独裁的战争；因此，通过增加民主国家的数量，这场战争被视为一种进步的、促进和平的终归也是一场具有正当性的战争。

In fact，matters are very different。To be sure，prewar germany and Austria may not have qualified as democratic as England，France，or the United States at the time.But germany and Austria were definitely not dictatorships.They were （increasingly emasculated） monarchies and as such arguably as liberal—if not more so—than their counterparts.For instance，in the United States，antiwar proponents were jailed，the german language was essentially outlawed，and citizens of german descent were openly harassed and often forced to change their names.Nothing comparable occurred in Austria and germany。

事实上，情况大不相同。当然，战时的德国和奥地利可能不像当时的英国、法国或美国那样民主。但德国和奥地利绝对不是独裁国家。这些国家都是（日益被阉割的）君主制国家，因此可以说与其同类国家一样自由，甚至更加自由。例如，在美国，反战支持者被关进监狱，德语基本上被取缔，德裔公民受到公开骚扰，经常被迫改名。在奥地利和德国没有发生过类似的情况。

In any case，however，the result of the crusade to make the world safe for democracy was less liberal than what had existed before （and the versailles peace dictate precipitated World War II）。Not only did state power grow faster after the war than before.In particular，the treatment of minorities deteriorated in the democratized post–World War I period.In newly founded Czecho slovakia，for instance，the germans were Systematically mistreated （until they were finally expelled by the millions and butchered by the tens of thousands after World War II） by the majority Czechs.Nothing remotely comparable had happened to the Czechs during the previous Habsburg reign.The situa tion regarding the relations between germans and southern Slavs in prewar Austria versus postwar Yugoslavia respectively was similar。

Nor was this a fluke.As under the Habsburg monarchy in Austria，for instance，minorities had also been treated fairly well under the Ottomans.However，when the multicultural Ottoman Empire disintegrated in the course of the 19th century and was replaced by semidemocratic nationstates such as Greece，Bulgaria，etc。，the existing Ottoman Muslims were expelled or exter minated.Similarly，after democracy had triumphed in the United States with the military conquest of the Southern Confederacy，the Union government quickly proceeded to exterminate the Plains indians.As Mises had recognized，democracy does not work in multiethnic societies.It does not create peace but promotes conflict and has potentially genocidal tendencies.

这并非侥幸。例如，在奥地利哈布斯堡君主制时期，少数民族在奥斯曼帝国统治下也得到了相当好的待遇。然而，当多元文化的奥斯曼帝国在 19 世纪解体，取而代之的是希腊、保加利亚等半民主民族国家时，当时的奥斯曼穆斯林被驱逐或消灭了。同样，民主在美国取得胜利，军事征服了南方邦联之后，联邦政府迅速着手消灭平原的印第安人。正如米塞斯所解释的，民主在多民族社会行不通。它不会创造和平，反而只会助长冲突，并具有潜在的种族灭绝倾向。

Fourth，and intimately related，the democraticpeace theorists claim that democracy represents a stable “equilibrium.” This has been expressed most clearly by Francis Fukuyama，who labeled the new democratic world order as the “end of history。” However，overwhelming evidence exists that this claim is patently wrong。

第四，与此密切相关的是，民主和平论者声称民主代表了一种稳定的“均衡”。这一观点由弗朗西斯·福山（Francis Fukuyama）最为明确地表达，他将新的民主世界秩序称为“历史的终结”。然而，已有大量证据表明，这一主张显然是错误的。

on theoretical grounds：How can democracy be a stable equilibrium if it is possible that it be transformed democratically into a dictatorship，i.e.，a System that is considered not stable？ Answer：that makes no sense!

从理论层面来看：如果民主有可能通过民主的方式转变成独裁，也就是转变成一种被认为不稳定的体制，那么民主又怎么能是一种稳定的均衡呢？答案是：这根本说不通！

Moreover，empirically democracies are anything but stable.As indicated，in multicultural societies democracy regularly leads to the discrimination，oppression，or even expulsion and extermination of minorities—hardly a peaceful equilibrium.And in ethnically homogeneous societies，democracy regularly leads to class warfare，which leads to economic crisis，which leads to dictatorship.Think，for example，of postCzarist Russia，post–World War I Italy，Weimar germany，Spain，Portugal，and in more recent times Greece，Turkey，Guatemala，Argentina，Chile，and Pakistan.

此外，从经验层面来看，民主根本谈不上稳定。如前所述，在多元文化社会中，民主往往会导致对少数群体的歧视、压迫，甚至驱逐和灭绝——这很难说是一种和平的均衡状态。而在种族同质化的社会中，民主常常引发阶级斗争，阶级斗争进而导致经济危机，经济危机又会引发独裁。例如，想想沙俄之后的俄国、一战后的意大利、魏玛德国、西班牙、葡萄牙，以及更近一些时候的希腊、土耳其、危地马拉、阿根廷、智利和巴基斯坦的情况吧。

Not only is this close correlation between democracy and dictatorship troublesome for democraticpeace theorists；worse，they must come to grips with the fact that the dictatorships emerging from crises of democracy are by no means always worse，from a classical liberal or libertarian view，than what would have resulted otherwise.cases can be easily cited where dicta torships were preferable and an improvement。Think of Italy and Mussolini or Spain and Franco。In addition，how is one to square the starryeyed advocacy of democracy with the fact that dictators，quite unlike kings who owe their rank to an accident of birth，are often favorites of the masses and in this sense highly democratic？ Just think of lenin or Stalin，who were cer tainly more democratic than Czar Nicholas II； or think of Hitler，who was definitely more democratic and a “man of the people” than Kaiser Wilhelm II or Kaiser Franz Joseph.

民主与独裁之间的这种紧密关联不仅让民主和平论者感到棘手；更糟糕的是，他们必须正视这样一个事实，即从古典自由主义或自由意志主义的观点来看，因民主危机而产生的独裁政权并不总是比原本可能出现的情况更糟。很容易就能列举出一些独裁政权更可取且有所改善的例子。想想意大利与墨索里尼或者西班牙与佛朗哥的情况吧。此外，既然独裁者与因出身偶然因素而获得地位的国王截然不同，他们往往是民众的宠儿，从这个意义上来说是高度 “民主” 的，那么人们又该如何将对民主那种充满幻想的倡导与这一事实相协调呢？只要想想列宁或斯大林，他们肯定比沙皇尼古拉二世更 “民主”；或者想想希特勒，他无疑比德皇威廉二世或奥匈帝国皇帝弗朗茨・约瑟夫更 “民主”，更算得上是 “人民的一员”。

According to democraticpeace theorists，then，it would seem that we are supposed to war against foreign dictators，whether kings or demagogues，in order to install democracies，which then turn into （modern） dictator ships，until finally，one supposes，the United States itself has turned into a dictatorship，owing to the growth of internal state power which results from the endless “emergencies” engendered by foreign wars.

根据民主和平论者的观点，那么似乎我们应该对外与独裁者（无论是君主还是蛊惑民心的政客）开战，以便建立民主政权，而这些民主政权随后又会转变为（现代）独裁政权，直至最后，人们可以设想，由于对外战争引发的没完没了的 “紧急状况” 导致国内国家权力不断膨胀，美国自身也会变成一个独裁国家。。

better，I dare say，to heed the advice of Erik von Kuehneltleddihn and，instead of aiming to make the world safe for democracy，we try making it safe from democracy—everywhere，but most importantly in the United States.

IV. 让世界远离民主而安全，或如何抵御美国

MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FROM DEMOCRACY OR：How TO DEFEND oneSELF againST THE UNIteD STAteS

After this excursion into the theory of democratic peace I am back to the proposition that there is no greater threat to lasting peace than the democratic state，and in particular the United States.Thus the question is：how to defend oneself against the U.S.

在对民主和平论进行了一番探讨之后，我又回到了这样一个命题：对持久和平的最大威胁莫过于民主国家，尤其是美国。因此，问题是：如何抵御美国？

Incidentally，this is not only a question for foreigners but Americans as well。After all，the territory constituting the U.S.too is occupied territory—conquered by the U.S.government。

顺便提一下，这不仅是外国人的问题，也是美国人的问题。毕竟，构成美国的这片领土也是被占的领土——被美国政府征服的领土。

let us assume，then，that a small territory within the borders of the current U.S.—a village，a town，a county—declares its independence and secedes from the U.S.What can and will the U.S.do in response？

让我们假设，美国境内的一小块领土——一个村、一个镇、一个县——宣布独立并脱离美国。美国政府能够并且将会采取什么应对措施？

It is possible that the U.S.will invade the territory and crush the secessionists.This is what the French republic did to the vendée during the French revolution，what the Union did to the Confederacy，and on a much smaller scale，what the U.S.government did in Waco。But history also provides examples to the contrary：the Czechs and Slovaks separated peacefully，Russia let Lithuania，Estonia and Latvia go； the Slovenes were let go； Singapore was even expelled from a previous union with Malaysia.Obviously，the relative population size matters in the decision to war or not to war。Likewise it matters what resources are at the secessionists’ disposal。Also the geographical location can weigh in favor oragainst intervention.But this cannot be all。For how is one to explain，for instance，that France has not long ago conquered Monaco，or germany Luxemburg，or Switzerland Liechtenstein，or Italy Vatican City，or theU.S.Costa Rica？ Or how is one to explain that the U.S.does not “finish the job” in Iraq by simply killing all Iraqis.Surely，in terms of population，technology and geography such are manageable tasks.

美国有可能入侵相关地区并镇压分裂势力。法国大革命期间法兰西共和国对旺代地区就是这么做的，美国联邦政府对南部邦联也是如此，而从规模小得多的情况来看，美国政府在韦科镇事件中也是这么干的。但历史上也有相反的例子：捷克和斯洛伐克和平分离，俄罗斯任由立陶宛、爱沙尼亚和拉脱维亚独立；斯洛文尼亚被准许独立；新加坡甚至是被从之前与马来西亚组成的联邦中分离了出去。显然，相对人口规模在决定是否开战的问题上起着重要作用。同样，分裂势力所掌握的资源情况也很关键。地理位置也会对是否进行干预产生影响。但这肯定不是全部因素。例如，该如何解释法国很久以前没有征服摩纳哥，德国没有征服卢森堡，瑞士没有征服列支敦士登，意大利没有征服梵蒂冈城，美国没有征服哥斯达黎加呢？又或者如何解释美国没有通过杀光所有伊拉克人来“彻底解决”伊拉克问题呢？当然，就人口、技术和地理位置而言，这些（征服行动）本应是可以做到的事。

The reason is not that French，german，Swiss，Italian or U.S.state rulers have scruples against conquest，confiscation，and the imprisonment or killing of innocents—they do these things on a daily basis to their “own” population.Bush，for instance，has no compunction ordering to kill innocent Iraqis.He does so every day。Rather，what constrains the conduct of state rulers is public opinion.

原因并不是法国、德国、瑞士、意大利或美国的国家统治者忌惮征服、没收、监禁或滥杀无辜——他们每天都在对 “自己 “的人民做这些事。例如，布什毫不犹豫地下令杀害无辜的伊拉克人。他每天都这样做。相反，制约国家统治者行为的是公众舆论。

As La Boétie，Hume，Mises and Rothbard have explained，government power ultimately rests on opinion，not brute force.Bush does not himself kill or put a gun to the head of those he orders to kill。generals and soldiers follow his orders on their own.Nor can Bush “force” anyone to continue providing him with the funds needed for his aggression.The citizenry must do so on its own.on the other hand，if the majority of generals，soldiers and citizens stop believing in the legitimacy of Bush’s commands，his commands turn into nothing more than hot air。It is this need for legitimacy that explains why state governments itching to go to war must offer a reason.The public is not typically in favor of killing innocent bystanders for fun or profit。Rather，in order to enlist the public’s assistance “evidence” must be manipulated so as to make aggression appear as defense （for what reasonable person could be against defense）。

正如拉伯蒂（La Boétie）、休谟、米塞斯和罗斯巴德所阐释的那样，政府权力归根结底依赖于民意，而非武力。布什本人并不会去杀人，也不会拿枪顶着那些他下令去杀之人的脑袋。将军们和士兵们是自愿听从他的命令的。而且布什也无法“强迫”任何人继续为他的侵略行径提供所需资金。民众必须是自愿这么做的。另一方面，如果大多数将军、士兵和民众不再相信布什命令的合法性，那么他的命令就不过是一纸空文而已。正是这种对合法性的需求解释了为什么急于发动战争的国家政府必须给出一个理由。公众通常并不赞成为了乐趣或利益而杀害无辜的旁观者。相反，为了争取公众的支持，必须操纵 “证据”，使侵犯看起来像是自卫（有哪个通情达理的人会反对自卫）。

We know the catchwords：Fort Sumter，the U.S.S.Maine，the Lusitania，Pearl Harbor，9–11。

我们知道这些标志性事件：萨姆特要塞、美国海军 “梅因”号战舰、”卢西塔尼亚 “号邮轮、珍珠港事件、9·11事件。

It thus turns out that not even an overwhelming size advantage is deci sive in determining the course of action.That David Koresh and his followers in Waco could be brutally killed by the U.S.government was due to the fact that they could be portrayed as a bunch of child molesters.Had they been “normal people” an invasion might have been considered a public relations disaster。Moreover，regardless of whatever disadvantage the secessionists have in terms of size，resources or location，this can be made up by a favorable international public opinion，especially in the internet age when the spread of news is almost instantaneous.

事实证明，即使是压倒性的规模优势也不能决定行动的方向。大卫-科雷什（David Koresh）和他在韦科的同伙之所以能被美国政府残忍杀害，是因为他们可以被描绘成一群儿童性骚扰者。如果他们是 “正常人”，入侵可能会被认为是一场公关灾难。此外，无论分离主义者在规模、资源或位置上处于何种劣势，都可以通过有利的国际舆论来弥补，尤其是在新闻传播几乎是即时的互联网时代。

These considerations bring me to the final points.The new secessionist country can be another state or it can be a free，stateless society。I will argue that the likelihood of successful defense against U.S.aggression is higher if the secessionists form a stateless society than if they opt for another state； for whether large or small，states are good at aggression and bad at defense.（Granting，maybe prematurely，that the U.S.had nothing to do with 9–11 directly，the events of that day certainly show that the U.S.was not good at defending its own citizens：first，by provoking the attacks and，secondly，in having its population disarmed and defenseless visàvis boxcutter wield ing foreign invaders.）

这些考虑引出了最后的观点。新的分离主义国家可以是另一个国家，也可以是一个无国家的自由社会。我认为，如果分离主义者组成一个无国家的社会，成功抵御美国侵略的可能性要高于他们选择另一个国家；因为国家无论大小，都擅长于侵犯，而不擅长于防御。（承认美国与 “9-11 “事件没有直接关系，这可能为时过早，但当天发生的事件无疑表明，美国并不善于保护自己的公民：首先，它挑起了袭击，其次，在面对挥舞着屠刀的外国侵略者时，美国民众被解除武装、手无寸铁）。

How would the defense of a free society differ from that of a state？

自由社会的防御与国家政府的国防有何不同？

As explained，the likelihood of an attack depends essentially on the ease of manipulating the evidence so as to camouflage aggression as defense— and to “discover” such evidence is much easier in the case of a state.Even the most liberal state has a monopoly of jurisdiction and taxation and thus cannot but create victims who，properly stylized as “victims of human rights violations，” may provide the “excuse” for an invasion.Worse，if the new state is a democracy it is unavoidable that one group—the Catholics or the Protestants，the Shiites or the sunnis，the Whites or the Blacks—will use its power to dominate another—and again there exists an “excuse” for invasion：to “free an oppressed minority。” better still：the oppressed are incited to “cry out” for help.Moreover，in reaction to domestic oppression terrorists may grow up who try to “revenge” the injustice：just think of the red Brigades，the RAF，the IRA，the ETA—and both：their continued existence as well as the attempt of eradicating them may provide “reason” to intervene （to pre vent the spread of terrorism or to come to the rescue of freedom fighters）。In contrast，in a free society only private property owners and firms，including insurers，police，and arbitrators，exist。If there are any aggressions，they are those of criminals—of murderers，rapists，burglars，and plain frauds—and it is difficult to portray the treatment of criminals as criminals as a reason for an invasion.

如前所述，攻击的可能性主要取决于操纵证据的难易程度，以便将侵略伪装成防御——而 “发现 ”这种证据对于国家来说要容易得多。即使是最自由的国家也垄断了管辖权和征税权，因此也会产生受害者，而这些受害者被恰当地称为 “人权受侵犯的受害者”，从而为入侵提供了 “借口”。更糟糕的是，如果新国家是一个民主国家，那么不可避免的是，一个群体——天主教徒或新教徒、什叶派教徒或逊尼派教徒、白人或黑人——将利用自己的权力统治另一个群体，这又为入侵提供了 “借口”：“解放受压迫的少数群体”。更妙的是：受压迫者被煽动起来 “大声呼救”。此外，在国内压迫的反作用下，可能会滋生出试图 “报复 “不公正的恐怖分子：想想红色旅、红军派、爱尔兰共和军、埃塔这些组织吧——而且无论是它们的持续存在，还是试图消灭它们的行动，都可能为我们提供干预的 “理由”（防止恐怖主义蔓延或拯救自由战士）。

What if the attack does occur？ in that case it might well be best to give up quickly，especially if the secessionist territory is very small。Thus Mogens Glistrup，founder of the Danish Progress Party，once recommended that the defense Department of tiny Denmark be replaced with an answering machine announcing （to the Russians） that “we surrender。” This way，no destruction occurs and yet the reputation of the invading government as a “defender and promoter of liberty” is soiled forever。

要是攻击真的发生了该怎么办呢？在那种情况下，或许最好迅速投降，尤其是当要求分离的地区面积非常小的时候。因此，丹麦进步党创始人摩根斯·格利斯楚普（Mogens Glistrup）曾建议，面积狭小的丹麦的国防部可以用一台答录机来取代，（向俄罗斯人）宣告“我们投降”。这样一来，就不会有破坏发生，而且入侵政府作为“自由捍卫者和推动者”的声誉将永远被玷污。

This leads to our central question regarding the effectiveness of states versus free societies in matters of defense.As a monopolist of ultimate deci sionmaking，the state decides for everyone bindingly whether to resist or not； if to resist，whether in the form of civil disobedience，armed resistance or some combination thereof； and if armed resistance，of what form.If it decides to put up no resistance，this may be a wellmeaning decision or it may be the result of bribes or threats by the invading state—but in any case，it will be contrary to the will of many who would have liked to resist and who are thus put in double jeopardy because as resisters they now disobey their own state as well as the invader。on the other hand，if the state decides to resist，this again may be a wellmeaning decision or it may be the result of pride or fear—but in any case，it too will be contrary to the preferences of many who would have liked not to resist or to resist by different means and who are now entangled as accomplices in the state’s schemes and subjected to the same collateral fallout and victor’s justice as everyone else.

这就引出了我们的核心问题，即国家与自由社会在国防安保问题上的有效性。作为终极决策权的垄断者，国家会对所有人作出有约束力的决定，决定是否抵抗；如果抵抗，是以公民不服从、武装抵抗还是两者相结合的形式；如果是武装抵抗，又该采取何种形式。如果国家决定不抵抗，这可能是一个善意的决定，也可能是受到入侵国贿赂或威胁的结果 ——但无论如何，这都将违背许多本想抵抗之人的意愿，而这些人因此陷入了双重困境，因为作为抵抗者，他们现在既要违抗本国的决定，又要面对侵略者。另一方面，如果国家决定抵抗，这也可能是一个善意的决定，也可能是骄傲或恐惧的结果–但无论如何，这也将违背许多人的意愿，他们本不想抵抗或以不同的方式抵抗，但现在却作为共犯卷入了国家的阴谋，要和其他人一样承受同样的附带损害以及战胜者的所谓 “正义”裁决。

The reaction of a free territory is distinctly different。There is no government which makes one decision.Instead，there are numerous institutions and individuals who choose their own defense strategy，each in accordance with his own risk assessment。Consequently，the aggressor has far more difficulties conquering the territory。It is no longer sufficient to “know” the government，to win one decisive battle or to gain control of government headquarters.Even if one opponent is “known，” one battle is won or one defense agency defeated，this has no bearing on others.

一个自由地区的反应截然不同。这里没有作出统一决策的政府。相反，有众多机构和个人会依据各自的风险评估来选择各自的防御策略。因此，侵略者要征服这片地区会困难得多。仅仅“了解”政府、打赢一场决定性战役或者控制政府总部已经远远不够了。即便了解了某个对手、赢得了一场战斗或者击败了一家防卫机构，这对其他机构和个人也不会产生影响。

Moreover，the multitude of command structures and strategies as well as the contractual character of a free society affect the conduct of both armed and unarmed resistance.As for the former，in stateterritories the civilian population is typically unarmed and heavy reliance exists on regular，taxanddraftfunded armies and conventional warfare.Hence，the defense forces create enemies even among its own citizenry，which the aggressor state can use to its own advantage，and in any case there is little to fear of the aggressor once the regular army is defeated.In contrast，the population of free territories is likely heavily armed and the fighting done by irregular militias led by defense professionals and in the form of gue rilla or partisan warfare.All fighters are volunteers and all of their sup port：food，shelter，logistical help，etc。，is voluntary。Hence，guerrillas must be extremely friendly to their own population.But precisely this：their entirely defensive character and nearunanimous support in public opin ion can render them nearly invincible，even by numerically far superior invading armies.History provides numerous examples：Napoleon’s defeat in Spain，France’s defeat in Algeria，the U.S.defeat in Vietnam，Israel’s defeat in South lebanon.

此外，众多的指挥结构与战略以及自由社会的契约性质，会对武装和非武装抵抗的行动产生影响。就前者（武装抵抗）而言，在国家统治的地区，平民百姓通常手无寸铁，高度依赖依靠税收和征兵来维持的正规军队以及常规战争形式。因此，国防部队甚至会在本国公民中树敌，而侵略国可以利用这一点为自己谋利，而且无论如何，一旦正规军被击败，对侵略者就没什么可惧怕的了。相比之下，自由地区的民众很可能是全副武装的，战斗是由防卫专业人员领导的非正规民兵进行的，并且采取游击战或游击式作战的形式。所有参战人员都是志愿者，他们所获得的所有支持——食物、住所、后勤援助等等——也都是自愿提供的。因此，游击队员必须对本地区民众极为友好。但恰恰是这一点——他们完全的防御性质以及在民意方面近乎一致的支持，能让他们几乎坚不可摧，即便面对在人数上远超自己的入侵军队也是如此。历史上有诸多这样的例子：拿破仑在西班牙的战败、法国在阿尔及利亚的战败、美国在越南的战败以及以色列在南黎巴嫩的战败。

This consideration leads immediately to the other form of defense：civil disobedience.Provided only that the secessionists have the will to be free，the effectiveness of this strategy can hardly be overestimated.recall that power does not rest alone on brute force but must rely on “opinion.” The conquerors cannot put one man next to each secessionist and force him to obey their orders.The secessionists must obey by their own freewill。However，if they do not，the conquerors will fail。Most importantly：civil disobedience can occur in many forms and degrees.It can range from ostentatious acts of defiance to entirely unobtrusive ways，thus allowing almost everyone to participate in the defense effort：the courageous and the timid，the young and the old，leaders and followers.one may hide armed fighters or not hinder them.one may publicly refuse to obey certain laws，or evade and ignore them.one may engage in sabotage，obstruction，negligence，or simply display a lack of diligence.one may openly scoff at orders or comply only incompletely。Tax payments may be refused or evaded.There may be demonstrations，sitins，boycotts，workstoppages or plain slackingoff。The conquerors may be maltreated，molested，ridiculed，laughed at or simply ostracized and never assisted in anything。In any case：all of this contributes to the same result：to render the conquerors powerless，make them despair and finally resign and withdraw.

这一考量会立刻引出另一种防御形式：公民不服从。只要分离主义者有追求自由的意愿，那么这种策略的有效性怎么高估都不为过。回想一下，权力并非仅仅依靠野蛮的暴力，而是必须依赖“民意”。征服者没办法在每一个分离主义者身边都安排一个人，然后强迫其服从命令。分离主义者必须是出于自愿而服从。然而，如果他们不服从，征服者就会失败。最为重要的是：公民不服从可以有多种形式和程度。它可以从公然的反抗行动到完全不引人注目的方式，这样几乎所有人都能参与到防御行动中来：勇敢者与胆小者、年轻人与老年人、领导者与追随者都能参与。有人可以藏匿武装战斗人员或者不妨碍他们；有人可以公开拒绝遵守某些法律，或者逃避、无视这些法律；有人可以进行破坏、阻挠、消极怠工，或者仅仅表现出不够勤勉；有人可以公开嘲笑命令，或者只是不完全遵照执行。可以拒绝或逃避纳税。可以举行示威、静坐、抵制、罢工或者就是消极怠工。可以虐待、骚扰、嘲弄、讥笑征服者，或者干脆孤立他们，在任何事情上都不给予协助。无论如何，所有这些都会促成同一个结果：让征服者变得无能为力，使他们绝望，最终放弃并撤军。

As is often the case，the first step in the antiimperialistantidemocratic struggle is the most difficult。Indeed，the difficulties are enormous.once the first step has been successfully taken，however，things get successively easier。once the number of secessionist territories has reached a critical mass—and every success in one location will promote imitation by other localities—the difficulties of crushing the secessionists will increase exponentially。In fact，the more time passes the greater will the comparative economic and technological advantage of free territories become，and in light of the ever increasing attractiveness and economic opportunities offered by the free territories the imperialist powers will be increasingly happy if they can hang on to their power rather than risk whatever legitimacy they still have in an attack。

通常情况下，反帝反民主斗争的第一步是最艰难的。事实上，困难重重。然而，一旦成功迈出了第一步，随后的事情就会逐渐变得容易。一旦分离主义地区的数量达到了一个临界规模——而且一个地方取得的每一次成功都会促使其他地方效仿——镇压分离主义者的难度就会呈指数级增加。事实上，随着时间推移，自由地区在经济和技术方面的相对优势会越发明显，鉴于自由地区所提供的吸引力和经济机遇与日俱增，帝国主义列强会越发乐见保有自己的权力，而非冒着丧失现有合法性的风险发动攻击。

Economic Theory

第三辑经济学理论

16 关于确定性和不确定性*

on certainty and uncertainty

The honest historicist would have to say：Nothing can be asserted about the future.

—Ludwig von Mises1

诚实的历史主义者会说：关于未来，没有什么是可以断言的。

——路德维希·冯·米塞斯[171]

The future is to all of us unknowable.

—Ludwig Lachmann 2

未来对我们所有人来说都是不可知的。

——路德维希-拉赫曼[172]

I.

It is possible to imagine a world characterized by complete certainty。All future events and changes would be known in advance and could be predicted precisely。There would be no errors and no surprises.We would know all of our future actions and their exact outcomes.In such a world，nothing could be learned，and accordingly，nothing would be worth knowing。Indeed，the possession of consciousness and knowledge would be useless.For why would anyone want to know anything if all future actions and events were completely predetermined and it would not make any difference for the future course of events whether or not one possessed this or any knowledge？ Our actions would be like those of an automaton—and an automaton has no need of any knowledge.Thus，rather than representing a state of perfect knowledge，complete certainty actually eliminates the value of all knowledge.

我们可以设想一个完全确定的世界。所有未来的事件和变化都能提前知晓并被精准预测。不会有差错，也不会有意外情况。我们会清楚自己未来的所有行动以及它们的确切结果。在这样一个世界里，人们无从学习新东西，相应地，也就没有什么值得去了解的了。事实上，拥有意识和知识将毫无用处。因为如果所有未来的行动和事件都完全是预先确定好的，而一个人是否拥有这些知识或任何知识对未来事件的进程都没有任何影响，那又有谁会想要去了解任何事物呢？我们的行动会如同自动机器一般——而自动机器不需要任何知识。因此，完全确定性非但不代表一种完美知识的状态，实际上还消除了所有知识的价值。

Obviously，we do not inhabit a world of complete certainty。We cannot predict all of our future actions and their outcome.There are in our world surprises.Our knowledge of future events and outcomes is less than perfect。

显然，我们并不生活在一个完全确定的世界里。我们无法预测我们未来的所有行为及其结果。我们的世界总有惊喜。我们对未来事件和结果的了解并不完美。

We make errors，can distinguish between failure and success，and are capable of learning。Unlike for an automaton，for us knowledge is valuable.To know something or not makes a difference.knowledge is not of predetermined events and states of affairs，but knowledge of how to interfere with and divert the natural course of events so as to improve our subjective wellbeing。knowledge does not help us predict an unalterable course of events but is a tool of purposefully changing and hopefully bettering future outcomes and events.Our actions，unlike the operations of an automaton，are not a series of predetermined events，which the knower cannot influence and with respect to whose outcome he is indifferent。Rather，our actions are sequences of decisions （choices） of altering the predetermined course of events to our advantage.We are never neutral or indifferent toward the course of future events.Instead，we always prefer one course of events to another，and we use our knowledge to bring about our preferences.For us，knowledge is practical and effective，and while it is imperfect and subject to error，it is the only means of achieving human betterment。

我们会犯错，能够区分成功与失败，并且具备学习的能力。与自动机器不同，对我们来说，知识是有价值的。是否知道某件事情，结果是不同的。知识不是关于预先确定的事件和事物的知识，而是关于如何干预和改变事件的自然进程，从而改善我们的主观幸福感。知识并不能帮助我们预测不可改变的事件进程，而是一种有目的地改变并希望改善未来结果和事件的工具。我们的行动与自动机器的运行不同，不是一系列预先确定的事件，知者无法影响这些事件，也对其结果漠不关心。相反，我们的行动是一系列的决定（选择），这些决定（选择）改变了预定的事件进程，使其对我们有利。对于未来事件的发展，我们从不保持中立或漠不关心。相反，我们总是更偏好某一种事件进程，而非另外一种，我们用我们的知识来实现我们的偏好。对我们来说，知识是真实有效的，虽然它是不完美的、也是容易出错的，但它是实现人类进步的唯一手段。

II.

From the recognition of the fact that perfect foresight eliminates the very need of knowing and knowers，and that such a need only arises if，as in our world，foresight is less than perfect，and insofar as knowledge is a means of bringing about preferences，it does not follow that everything is uncertain.Quite to the contrary。In a world where everything is certain，the idea of certainty would not even come into existence.The idea of certain knowledge requires，as its logical counterpart，the idea of uncertainty。certainty is defined in contrast to uncertainty，and not everything can be certain.Likewise，uncertainty cannot be defined without reference to certainty，and not all knowledge can be uncertain.It is this latter part of one and the same conclusion which critics of the model of perfect foresight，such as Ludwig Lachmann，have failed to recognize.From the correct insight that we do not inhabit a world of perfect knowledge it does not follow that we live in a world of perfect uncertainty； i.e.，in a world with no certainty at all，and from the fact that I cannot predict all of my and others’ future actions it does not follow that I can say nothing at all about them.In fact，even if I do not know everything about my future actions，for instance，I do know something to be true about each and every one of them：that I will，as long as I act，employ my knowledge to interfere in the natural course of events so as to—hopefully—bring about a more preferable state of affairs.

我们认识到，完美的预见消除了对知识和知者的需要，只有在我们的世界中，预见不那么完美时，才会产生这种需要，而知识是产生偏好的一种手段，这并不意味着一切都是不确定的。恰恰相反，在一个一切都确定无疑的世界里，确定性的概念甚至都不会出现。“确定性”知识的概念需要 “不确定性”的概念作为其逻辑对应物。”确定性 “是相对于 “不确定性 “而言的，而并非所有事物都是确定的。同样，不确定性也不能在不参考确定性的情况下定义，而且并非所有知识都是不确定的。路德维希·拉赫曼（Ludwig Lachmann）等完美预见模型的批评者未能认识到的正是这一结论的后一部分。从我们并不生活在一个完美知识的世界这一正确观点出发，并不能推导出我们生活在一个完全不确定的世界中；也就是说，生活在一个完全没有确定性的世界中，而且从我无法预测自己和他人的所有未来行动这一事实出发，并不能推导出我对他们一无所知。事实上，即使我不知道我未来行动的一切，例如，我确实知道关于每一个行动的一些真实情况：只要我行动，我就会运用我的知识来干预事件的自然进程，以便——希望——带来一种更可取的事态。

Later on，more will be said about the importance of this insight。But it is worth emphasizing from the outset that the idea of perfect or radical uncertainty （or ignorance） is either openly contradictory insofar as it is meant to say，“everything about the future is uncertain except that there will be uncertainty—about this we are certain，” or it entails an implicit contradiction if it is meant to say，“everything is uncertain and that there is nothing but uncertainty，is uncertain，too。” （I do know such and such to be the case，and I do not know whether such and such is the case or not。） only a middleoftheroad position between the two extremes of perfect knowledge and perfect ignorance is consistently defensible：3 There exists uncertainty but this we know for certain.Hence，also certainty exists，and the boundary between certain and uncertain knowledge is certain （based on certain knowledge）。

稍后，将会更多地谈及这一见解的重要性。但从一开始就值得强调的是，完全不确定性（或无知）这一概念要么是公然自相矛盾的，因为它意在表明“关于未来的一切都是不确定的，除了存在不确定性这一点——对此我们是确定的”；要么它隐含着矛盾，因为它的本意是说，“一切都是不确定的，除了不确定之外什么都没有，连不确定也是不确定的。”（我确实知道某事是这样的情况，而且我也确实不知道某事是否是这样的情况。）只有介于全知和全无知这两个极端之间的折衷立场，才始终是站得住脚的。[173]不确定性是存在的，但我们可以确定这一点。因此，确定性也是存在的，确定知识与不确定知识之间的界限是确定的（基于确定的知识）。

III.

Nothing about the external，physical world is or can be known with certainty—except for those rather abstract but universal and real things that are already implied in the certain knowledge of acting and action：that this must be a world of objects and objectqualities （predicates），of countable units，physical magnitudes，and quantitative determinateness （causality）。without objects and objectqualities there can be no such thing as propositions； without countable units there can be no arithmetic； and without quantitative determinateness the fact that definite quantities of causes only bring about definite （limited） effects—there can be no ends and means （goods），i.e.，no active interference in the course of external events with the purpose of bringing about a more highlyvalued end （preferred effect）。Apart from the laws of propositional logic，arithmetic，and causality，however，all other knowledge about the external world is uncertain （a posteriori）。We do not and cannot know with certainty （a priori） what kinds of objects and object qualities exist，how many units of what physical dimensions there are， and what quantitative causeandeffect relationships exist （or do not exist） between various magnitudes of various objects.All of this must be learned from experience E.Moreover，experience is invariably past experience，that of past events.It cannot reveal whether or not the facts and relationships of the past will also hold in the future.We cannot but assume that this will be the case，by and large.But it cannot be ruled out categorically that we might be mistaken，and that the future will be so different from the past that all of our past knowledge will be entirely useless.It is possible that none of our instruments or machines will work anymore tomorrow，that our houses will collapse on top of us，that the earth will open up，and that all of us will perish.It is in this sense that our knowledge of the external physical world must be ultimately regarded as uncertain.

关于外部的物质世界，没有任何事物能够被确定地知晓——除了那些相当抽象但具有普遍性且真实存在的事物，它们已然隐含在对行为及行动的确定认知之中：这必定是一个由物体及物体属性（谓词）、可数单位、物理量以及定量确定性（因果关系）所构成的世界。没有物体及物体属性，就不会有命题这一事物；没有可数单位，就不会有算术；没有定量确定性，即一定量的原因只会产生特定（有限）的结果这一事实，就不会有目的和手段（物品），也就是说，不会为了实现一个更具价值的目的（更合意的结果）而对外在事件的进程进行积极干预。然而，除了命题逻辑、算术和因果关系的规律之外，所有关于外部世界的其他知识都是不确定的（后验的）。我们没有也不可能（先验地）确定地知道存在着什么样的物体和物体的性质，有多少物理维度的单位，以及各种物体的不同量之间存在（或不存在）什么样的定量的因果关系。所有这些都必须从经验中学习。而且，经验总是过去的经验，是过去事件的经验。它不能揭示过去的事实和关系在未来是否仍然成立。我们不得不假定情况大致如此。但是，我们也不能断然排除这样的可能性，即我们可能搞错了，未来会与过去大相径庭，以至于我们过去的所有知识都将毫无用处。有可能明天我们所有的仪器或机器都不再运转，我们的房屋会在我们头顶坍塌，大地会裂开，而我们所有人都会丧生。正是在这个意义上，我们对外部物质世界的知识最终必须被视作是不确定的。

Notwithstanding this ultimate uncertainty of our knowledge concern ing the external world，however，as a result of contingent circumstances，the relative stability and regularity in the concatenation of external objects and events，it has been possible for mankind to accumulate a vast and expanding body of practically certain knowledge.This knowledge does not render the future predictable，but it helps us predict the effects to be produced by definite actions.Even though we do not know why things work the way they do，and whether or not they must always work in this way，we do know with complete practical certitude that and how certain things will operate now and tomorrow.one would never know it from the writings of the apostles of radical uncertainty but an innumerable and growing number of events （outcomes） can be produced literally at will and predicted with almost perfect exactitude.My toaster will toast，my key will open the door，my com puter，telephone，and fax will work as they are supposed to，my house will protect me from the weather，cars will drive，airplanes will fly，cups will still hold water，hammers will still hammer，and nails will still nail。much of our future is，practically speaking，perfectly certain.Every product，tool，instru ment or machine represents a piece of practical certainty。To claim，instead，that we are faced with radical uncertainty and that the future is to all of us unknowable is not only selfcontradictory but also appears to be a position devoid of common sense.

IV.

Our practical certainty concerning future outcomes and events extends even further。There are many future events about whose outcome we are practically certain because we literally know how to produce them （the outcome is under our complete practical control）。We can also predict with practical certainty a great and growing number of outcomes outside and beyond anyone’s control。Sometimes my tools，machines，and products are defective.My toaster does not toast，my telephone is silent，a hurricane or an earthquake has destroyed my house，my airplane crashes，or my cup is broken.I had no knowledge that this would happen to me here and now，and hence I could not have acted differently from the way I did.I am thus taken by surprise.But my surprise and my uncertainty must not be complete.For while I may know absolutely nothing about the single event—this cup will now break，this airplane will now crash，my house will be destroyed in an earthquake two years from now—and thus cannot possibly predict and alter any such event，I may know practically everything with respect to the whole class of events （broken cups，crashing airplanes，earthquakes） of which this single event is a member。I may know，based on the observation of longrun frequency distributions，that airplanes of a certain type crash every so often，that 1 in 10，000 cups produced is defective，that machines of such and such a type function on the average for 10 years，and that an earthquake strikes a certain region on the average twice a year and destroys，in the long run，1 percent of the existing housing stock per year。Then，although the single event still comes as a surprise，I do know with practical certainty that surprises such as these exist and how frequent they are.I am surprised neither by the type of surprise nor its longrun frequency。My surprise is only relative.I am surprised that such and such happens here and now rather than elsewhere or later。But I am not surprised that it happens at all，here，there，now，or later。In thus delineating the range and frequency of possible surprises，my uncertainty concerning the future，while not eliminated，is Systematically reduced.

我们对未来结果和事件的实际确定性甚至更进一步。

cases of limited surprises or reduced uncertainty are，of course，what Frank Knight first classified as “risk” （as opposed to “uncertainty”），and what Ludwig von Mises，building on Knight and the work on the foundations of probability theory of his mathematician brother，richard von Mises，would later define as “class probability” （as opposed to “case probability”）[174]：“Class probability means：We know or assume to know，with regard to the problem concerned，everything about the behavior of a whole class of events or phenomena； but about the actual singular events or phenomena we know nothing but that they are elements of this class.”[175] I know nothing about whether this or that cup will be broken，and I know nothing about whether my house or your house will be destroyed by a tornado within the next year，but I do know from the observation of longrun frequency distributions regarding cups and tornadoes，for instance，that no more than 1 in 10，000 cups is defective and that of a thousand houses in a given territory，no more than one per year on the average will be destroyed.If，based on this knowledge，I adopted a strategy of always predicting that the next cup will not be broken，and that my house will not be destroyed next year，I would commit errors.But in the long run，the strategy would assure more successes than errors：my errors would be ‘correct’ errors.on the other hand，if I adopted the strategy of predicting always that the next cup will be broken and my house destroyed，I might well be correct。But in the long run this strategy would assuredly fail：I would be erroneously correct。Whenever the conditions of class probability are met and we do not know enough to avoid mistakes altogether but enough to make only correct mistakes，it is possible to take out insurance.As a producer of cups，for instance，I know that on the average I will have to produce 10，001 cups in order to have 10，000。I cannot avoid broken cups，but I can insure myself against the risk of broken cups by including it，as a regularly occurring loss，in my costaccounting，and by thus associating a correspondingly higher cost with my production of cups.Similarly，I cannot avoid tornadoes，but I can insure myself against them.because tornado losses are large and infrequent in relation to the size and operations of my household，it would be difficult （although not impossible） to provide insurance internally （within my household）。But it is possible to pool my tornado risk with yours and that of other households or firms in a given region.Not one of us knows who will be affected by the risk in question，but based on the knowledge of the objective longrun frequency of tornadoes and tornado damage for the entire region，it is possible to calculate a premium against payment of which each one of us can be insured for this hazard.

当然，弗兰克

It is not only the knowledge incorporated in our tools，instruments，and machines，then，which provides practical certain information about our future：in this case，knowledge of how we will generate various singular events.Also，the knowledge incorporated in any form of insurance，whether internally practiced or by method of pooling，represents practical certain knowledge：in this case，knowledge of how to be prepared for various classes of events whose individual occurrence is beyond anyone’s control。To be sure，while the conditions of class probability and insurability can be stated exactly，with certainty，the question of whether or not there exist insurable events，which ones，and the various expenses of insuring against them，cannot be answered with certainty。on the one hand，the knowledge of objective probability distributions must be acquired through observational experience，and as is the case for all knowledge based on such experience，we can never know whether or not past regularities will also hold in the future.We may have to make revisions.on the other hand，even in order to collect such information，it is necessary that various singular events be classified from the outset as falling into one and the same class （of events）。This cup or tornado and that cup or that tornado，are both members of the same class of cup or tornado。Yet any such classification is tainted with uncertainty。The joint classification of a series of singular events is only correct （for the purpose of insurance） if it holds that I do not know more about any of the single class members than that each one of them is a member of the same class.If I learned，however，that one cup was made of clay A and another from clay B，for instance，and that this fact makes a difference for the longrun frequency of defects，my initial classification would become faulty。Similarly，I might learn from experience that tornado damage on the east side of a given valley is Systematically higher than on its western side.In this case，too，my original classification would have to be changed，new and revised classes and subclasses of insurable events would have to be formed，and new and different insurance premiums would have to be calculated.These uncertainties notwithstanding，however，it deserves to be pointed out that as a contingent fact of human life，the actual range of insurance，and hence of relatively certain information about future events and outcomes，is vast and growing：We know how many ships will likely sink，how many airplanes crash，how often it will rain or shine，how many people of a given age will die，how many hotwater boilers will explode，how many people will be struck by cancer，that more women than men will be affected by breast cancer，that smokers will die earlier than nonsmokers，that Jews suffer more frequently from TaySachs disease than gentiles，and Blacks more from sickle cell anemia than Whites，that tornadoes，earthquakes，and floods occur here but not there，etc。Our future is most definitely not unknowable.

V.

Little of this ever attracts the attention of theoreticians of radical uncertainty。The existence of a practical working technology and of a vast and flourishing insurance industry constitutes an embarrassment for any theory of radical uncertainty。If pressed sufficiently hard，of course，Lachmann and his followers would probably admit the undeniable and，as if all of this did not matter，quickly move on to another problem.So far，it might be pointed out with some justification，attention has been directed almost exclusively either to the technological rather than the economic aspect of action—to accidents rather than to actions.The phenomenon of radical uncertainty，however，arises in a different arena.While it may be possible to predict the physical outcomes if such and such an action is taken，and while it may be possible also to predict the pattern of various physical events entirely out side of human control，matters are completely different when it comes to predicting our own future actions.I can predict that my toaster will toast if I employ it in a certain way，and I can predict that toasters generally do not work longer than 10 years，but presumably I cannot predict whether or not I will actually employ my toaster in the future，nor could I have predicted before it actually happened that I ever wanted—and constructed or bought—a toaster in the first place.It is here，in the arena of human choices and preferences，where supposedly radical uncertainty reigns.

这些都没有引起极端的不确定性理论家的注意。一种实用可行的技术和一个庞大而繁荣的保险业的存在，使任何具有极端的不确定性的理论都感到尴尬。当然，如果逼得太紧，拉赫曼和他的追随者们很可能会承认这一点，然后，好像这一切都无关紧要似的，迅速转向另一个问题。到目前为止，我们有理由指出，人们的注意力几乎完全集中在行动的技术层面而非经济层面，集中在意外事故层面而非行动层面。然而，极端的不确定性现象出现在另一个领域。我们有可能预测采取这样或那样行动的物理结果，也有可能预测完全不受人类控制的各种物理事件的模式，但预测我们自己未来的行为时，情况就完全不同了。我可以预测我的烤面包机如果以某种方式使用就会烤焦，我也可以预测烤面包机的使用寿命一般不会超过

Lachmann and his followers are correct in emphasizing that the problem of predicting my and others’ future actions is categorically different from that of predicting the physical outcomes of given actions or of natural events.In fact，the destructive part of Lachmann’s argument is largely correct even though it is hardly new （and entirely insufficient to establish his constructive thesis of radical uncertainty）。[176] This is the roof that not only the idea of perfect foresight，underlying general equilibrium theory，is mistaken，but likewise the idea，advanced by rational expectations theorists，that all human uncertainty can be subsumed under the heading of insurable risks：that the uncertainty concerning our future actions in particular is no different from that regarding the future of natural events，such that we can，based on our observation of longrun frequency distributions，predict their general pattern in the same way as we can predict the pattern of earthquakes，torna does，cancer，or car accidents，for example.

拉赫曼和他的追随者们强调，预测自己和他人未来行动的问题与预测既定行动或自然事件的物理结果的问题截然不同，这一点是正确的。事实上，拉赫曼论证的破坏性部分大体上是正确的，尽管它并不新颖（而且完全不足以确立他关于极端的不确定性的建设性论点）。这不仅证明了一般均衡理论的基础——完美预见的观点是错误的，而且证明了理性预期理论家提出的人类所有不确定性都可以归入可保风险的观点也是错误的：关于我们未来行为的不确定性与关于自然事件的未来的不确定性没有什么不同，因此，我们可以根据对长期频率分布的观察，预测它们的一般模式，就像我们可以预测地震、龙卷风、癌症或车祸的模式一样。

As Lachmann points out，and as Frank Knight and Ludwig von Mises explained long before，the new theory of rational expectations suffers from essentially the same deficiency as the old general equilibrium model of perfect foresight：it cannot account for the phenomenon of learning and，hence，of knowledge and consciousness.Rational expectation theorists only replace the model of man as a neverfailing automaton with that of a machine subject to random errors and breakdowns of known types and characteristics.Rather than possessing perfect knowledge of all singular （individual） actions，man is assumed to possess merely perfect knowledge of the probability distribution of all future classes of actions.He is assumed to commit forecasting errors，but his errors are always correct errors.False predictions never require a revision of a person’s given stock of knowledge.There is no learning from success or failure and，hence，there is no change，or only predictable change，in the future pattern of human actions.such a model of man，Knight，Mises，and Lachmann agree，is no less faulty than the one it is supposed to replace.It not only stands in manifest contradiction to the facts，but any proponent of this model is also inevitably caught up in logical contradictions.

正如拉赫曼所指出的，以及弗兰克

First off，if our expectations （predictions） concerning our future actions were indeed as rational as rational expectation theorists believe them to be，this would imply that it would be possible to give an exhaustive classification of all possible actions （just as one could list all possible outcomes of a game of roulette or all possible locations of a physical body in space）。For without a complete enumeration of all possible types of actions there can be no knowledge of their relative frequencies.Obviously，no such list of all possible human actions exists，however。We know of a great number of types of action performed then or now，but this list is always open and incomplete.Indeed，actions are designed to alter the natural course of events in order to bring about something as yet nonexistent。They are the result of creative imagination.new and different actions are constantly added to the list，and old ones dropped.For instance，new or different products and services are constantly added to the preexisting list of products and services，while others disappear from the list。However，something as yet nonexistent—a new product—cannot appear on any list until after it has been imagined and produced by someone.Even the producer of a new product X does not know—and could not have predicted—anything regarding the relative frequency of actions such as the supply of or the demand for X before he had actually had the new idea of X—yet any new product idea and any new product must necessarily upset （alter） the entire preexisting pattern of the relative frequency of various forms of action （and of relative prices）。

首先，如果我们对未来行为的预期（预测）确实像理性预期理论家所认为的那样理性，这就意味着我们有可能对所有可能的行为进行详尽的分类（就像我们可以列出轮盘赌的所有可能结果或物体在空间中的所有可能位置一样）。因为没有完整列举所有可能的行动类型，就不可能知道它们的相对频率。然而，很明显，不存在这样一个包含所有可能的人类行为的清单。

Moreover，if we could indeed predict our future actions，either perfectly or subject only to random errors，then it would have to be implicitly assumed as well that every actor must possess the same （identical） knowledge as everyone else.I must know what you know，and you must know what I know.otherwise，if our knowledge were somehow different，it would be impossible that both our predictions could be equally correct or else equally correctly wrong。Instead，either my predictions would have to be correct and yours would have to be wrong，or vice versa，and either my predictions or yours then would have to be wrongly wrong。The error （mine or yours） would not be random but Systematic，for it could have been avoided had I （or you） known what you （or I） knew.This precisely is the case，however：our knowledge is not identical。You and I may know some things in common，but I also know things （about myself，for instance） that you do not know，and vice versa.Our knowledge，and hence our predictions and expec tations concerning future actions，are in fact different。Yet if different actors possess different knowledge，the likelihood （frequency） of their predicting correctly or incorrectly will be different as well。Hence，neither the success nor the failure of our predictions can be considered purely random but will have to be ascribed instead，at least partially，to a person’s moreandbetter or lessandworse individual knowledge.

此外，如果我们真的可以预测自己未来的行为，无论是完美预测还是随机误差预测，那么就必须暗含这样的假设，即每个行动人都必须拥有与其他人相同（完全相同）的知识。我必须知道你所知道的，你也必须知道我所知道的。

Most importantly，however，the rational expectations’ model of man as a machine which is endowed with perfect knowledge of the relative frequency distribution of all of its possible future classes of actions （but that knows nothing about any particular action falling into any one of these classes except that it is a member of such and such a class and that this class of action has such and such a relative frequency） is fraught with inescapable internal contradictions.on the one hand，as far as the assumption that all actors possess identical knowledge is concerned，any proponent of this view is caught in a performative contradiction：his words are belied by the very fact of uttering them.For there would be no need to say what he is saying if everyone else already knew what he knows.Indeed，if everyone’s knowledge were identical to everyone else’s，no one would have to communicate at all。That men do communicate demonstrates that they must assume instead，contrary to the stated assumption，that their knowledge is not identical。Rational expectations theorists，too，by virtue of presenting their ideas to the reading public，must obviously assume that the public does not yet know what they already know，and hence，that the public’s predictions concerning the future course of actions—in contrast to their own predictions—will be Systematically flawed until it has successfully absorbed the lesson of rational expectations.

然而，最重要的是，理性预期模型将人视为一台机器，它对未来所有可能的行动类别的相对频率分布具有完美的知识（但它对属于这些类别中任何一类的任何特定行动一无所知，只知道它属于这样或那样的类别，这些类别的行动具有这样或那样的相对频率），这种模型充满了不可避免的内部矛盾。一方面，就所有的行动人都具有相同的知识这一假设而言，任何支持这种观点的人都陷入了践言冲突之中：他所说的话本身就被说话这一事实所否定。因为，如果其他人都已经知道言说者所知道的，那此人就没有必要说他所说的话了。事实上，如果每个人的知识都与其他人的相同，就根本不需要交流了。

Similarly，anyone proposing the assumption of a given list of all possible forms of human actions，with its implied denial of all learning，is caught up in contradictions.For one，if his knowledge was indeed given，this would imply assuming that he already knows everything that he will ever know （otherwise，if he could learn something tomorrow that is not already known today，his list of possible classes of actions could no longer be assumed to be complete）。Yet if this were the case，then inevitably the question arises how he ever came to know this.If he cannot learn，it would appear that he also could not possibly have learned to know that there is no human learning。Rather，this knowledge must have always been there，as part of his initial natural endowment，like his hands and fingers.But this idea—that our knowledge is given as our hands and fingers are given—is absurd.knowledge is always the knowledge of something：the knowledge of hands and fingers，for instance，and it cannot possibly be conceived of as anything but sequentially （in time） acquired knowledge （as something based upon and learned about some logically and temporarily prior facts）。Moreover，the denial of the pos sibility of learning is again belied by the proponent’s action.In proposing his thesis，he cannot but assume that others can understand and possibly learn from him something that they do not yet know.And in waiting for and listening to the response of others to his proposition—by engaging in any form of argumentation—he cannot but also assume that he himself can possibly learn from what others have to say。otherwise，if he already knew what they would respond and how he would respond to their responses，and so on，there would simply be no purpose to the whole enterprise of communication and argumentation.Indeed，if he knew in advance all of his arguments （propositions） and all possible replies and counterreplies （or at least their relative frequency distribution），it would also be senseless to even engage in any form of internal，intrapersonal argumentation，because his knowledge would already be complete，and he would already possess the answers to all questions.Of course，the rational expectation theorists do engage in argumentation—and no one could argue that he cannot argue without thereby falling into a contradiction—and they do conduct research （which no one would do if he already knew everything there is to know）。Hence，they demonstrate through their own actions that their model of man must be considered Systematically flawed，and that man must think of himself as capable of learning something as yet unknown （unpredictable）。

同样，提出假定人类行为的所有可能形式的给定列表，并暗示否认所有学习的任何一个人，他们都陷入了矛盾之中。首先，如果他的知识确实已经给定，这就意味着假设他已经知道了他将要知道的一切（否则，如果他明天能学到一些今天还不知道的东西，他列出的可能的行动类别就不能再被认为是完整的）。然而，如果是这样的话，问题就不可避免地出现了：他是如何知道这一点的？如果他不能学习，那么他似乎也不可能通过学习知道

VI.

What are the consequences as regards the nature of the social sciences that follow from the recognition of man as a learning actor？ It is in the answer to this question that Knight and Mises on the one hand，and Lachmann on the other，ultimately part company。They would agree only on one consequence：that there exists a categorical difference between the logic of the natural sciences and that of the social sciences.Indeed，it follows from the recognition of man as a learning actor that the （still） dominating positivist （or falsificationist） philosophy，which assumes that all （empirical） sciences follow the same method—a uniform logic of science—is selfcontradictory。[177]

It is one thing to predict the physical outcomes resulting from a given action （technology） or to predict the future pattern of a given class of natural events outside an actor’s physical control （insurance）。It is an entirely different matter to predict what action an actor will actually per form or against which classes of natural events he will actually want to insure himself。As far as the former problem is concerned，there is no need to dispute what Positivism has to say：an actor wants to produce a certain physical result and he has an idea about what type of interference of his is capable of bringing about such a change.His idea is a hypothetical one.The actor never can be ultimately certain that his action will lead to the desired result。He can only try and see what happens.If his action is successful and the anticipated outcome is achieved，his idea is confirmed.However，even then the actor cannot be sure that the same interference will always bring about the same result。All that a confirmation adds to his previous knowledge is the certitude that his hypothesis so far has not yet been shown to be faulty。on the other hand，if his action fails，his idea is falsified and a new，revised or amended hypothesis will have to be formed.Thus，even if certainty is out of human reach，it is still possible，through a process of trial and error，that an actor may continuously improve his technological knowhow.Likewise，as regards natural events outside one’s control，insofar as an actor is not indifferent （unconcerned） about such events but prefers the presence of any such event over its absence，or vice versa，he may form an idea concerning the relative frequency distribution of the entire class of the particular event in question.This idea，based as it is on the joint classification of singular events and the observation of longrun frequencies，is hypothetical，too。In this case，however，the occurrence of a single favorable or unfavorable event does not constitute a confirmation or a falsification of one’s hypothesis.Rather，because the hypothesis refers to an entire class of favorable or unfavorable events and does not state anything regarding any singular event except that it is a member of this class，the question whether or not the course of future events confirms or falsifies one’s idea can only be decided based on the observation of a large number of cases.This fact，although seemingly less than completely satisfying，does not imply that the experiences of f and falsification，of success and failure，and of scientific progress proceeding through trial and error are any less real，however。In this case，whether or not one’s hypothesis is confirmed or falsified can be decided based on the “hard” and objective fact that an insurer—whether a single individual who insures himself over time through personal savings or an agency that insures a class of individuals across time against payment of a premium—either has，or has not，saved or collected premiums sufficient to cover the cost resulting from the occurrence of each and all unfavorable singular events.If he has，his hypothesis is temporarily confirmed，and if he has not，his hypothesis is falsified，and he will either have to change his frequency estimate and increase his savings or premiums，or he will have to revise his classification of singular events and introduce a new，further differentiated System of classes and subclasses.Thus，even if certainty is again unattainable，continuous scientific progress is possible also with respect to man’s ability to forecast accidents （natural events outside of his control）。

预测某一特定行动（技术）产生的物理结果，或预测行动人物理控制范围之外的某类自然事件（保险）的未来模式，是一回事。要预测一个行动人究竟会采取什么行动，或者他究竟想对哪类自然事件投保，这完全是两码事。就前一个问题而言，没有必要质疑实证主义的观点：一个行动人想要产生某种物理结果，而他知道他的哪种干预能够带来这种变化。他的观念只是一种假设。行动人永远无法最终确定他的行动会带来预期的结果。他只能尝试并观察会发生什么。如果他的行动成功了，预期的结果实现了，他的观念就得到了证实。

Granted that this is so，however，the question arises if it is also true，as positivists maintain，that man can be thought of as following the same logic—of hypothetical conjecture，confirmation or falsification，and of scientific progress proceeding through a process of trial and error—when it comes to the problem of predicting his own future actions.But this must be categorically denied.For in proceeding in the way he does regarding the world of physical events inside or outside his control，an actor must necessarily conceive of himself as capable of learning （otherwise，why conduct any research at all？）。Yet if man can learn and possibly improve his predictive mastery over nature，it must be assumed that he cannot only alter his knowledge，and hence his actions，in the course of time，but also that these possible changes must be regarded by him as in principle unpredictable （such that any progress in his ability to predict these changes must be considered Systematically impossible）。Or putting things somewhat differently，if man proceeds，as positivists say he does，to interpret a predictive success as a confirmation of his hypothesis such that he would，given the same circumstance，employ the same knowledge in the future，and if he interprets a predictive failure as a falsification such that he would not employ the same but a different hypothesis in the future，he can only do so if he assumes—even if only implicitly—that the behavior of the objects under consideration does not change over the course of time.otherwise，if their behavior were not assumed to be timeinvariant—if the same objects were to behave sometimes this way and at other times in a different way—no conclusion as to what to make of a predictive success or failure would follow.A success would not imply that one’s hypothesis had been temporarily confirmed，and hence，that the same knowledge should be employed again in the future.Nor would any predictive failure imply that one should not employ the same hypothesis again under the same circumstances.But this assumption—that the objects of one’s research do not alter their behavior in the course of time—cannot be made with respect to the very subject engaging in research without thereby falling into a selfcontradiction.For in interpreting his successful predictions as confirmations and his failed predictions as falsifications，the researcher must necessarily assume himself to be a learning subject—someone who can learn about the behavior of objects conceived by him as nonlearning objects.Thus，even if everything else may be assumed to have a constant nature，the researcher cannot make the same assumption with respect to himself。He must be a different person after each confirmation or falsification than he was before，and it is then his nature to be able to change his personality over the course of time.[178]

既然如此，那么问题来了，是否也可以像实证主义者所坚持的那样，认为人在预测自己未来行动的问题上，也遵循同样的逻辑——假设猜想、证实或证伪，以及通过试错的过程取得科学进步。但这一点必须坚决予以否认。

But if the positivistfalsificationist view of a uniform logic of science is rejected and the logic of the social sciences considered categorically different from that applying to the natural sciences，as Knight，Mises，and Lachmann would agree，then what is the method appropriate for the study of human action？ It is here that Knight and Mises would fundamentally disagree with Lachmann.Knight and Mises argue—correctly，as will be seen—that it does not follow from the recognition of man as a learning actor that every thing concerning the future of human actions must be considered unknowable—indeed，they would consider such a view selfcontradictory—but rather only that one must admit the existence of two categorically different branches within the social sciences：of apodictic （aprioristic） theory （economics） on the one hand and of history and entrepreneurship on the other。[179] Lachmann and his followers conclude precisely this：（1） that there can be no such thing as economic theory capable of prediction at all，that all of the social sciences are nothing but history and “economists must confine their generalizations to the knowable past”； [180] and （2） that all of our predictions concerning human actions，which we must venture day in and day out，are nothing but haphazard guesses，that “man in his true humanity，” as Lachmann approvingly cites Shackle，“can neither predict nor be predicted.”[181]

但是，如果实证证伪主义关于科学统一逻辑的观点被抛弃，社会科学的逻辑与自然科学的逻辑截然不同，正如奈特、米塞斯和拉赫曼都同意的那样，那么什么才是适合研究人的行动的方法呢？正是在这一点上，奈特和米塞斯根本不同意拉赫曼的观点。奈特和米塞斯认为——正如我们将看到的，这是正确的——承认人是会学习的行动人，并不能由此得出关于人类未来行为的一切都必须被认为是不可知的结论——事实上，他们会认为这种观点是自相矛盾的——而只是必须承认在社会科学中存在着两个截然不同的分支：一个是绝对（先验）理论（经济学），另一个是历史和企业家精神。拉赫曼及其追随者的结论正是：（

VII.

regarding the first of Lachmann’s two contentions on the impossibility of economic theory—it should be noted from the outset that this thesis—contrary to Lachmann’s own claim，and in particular the selfcongratulatory attitude found among some of his younger disciples—is anything but new and original，but represents instead a return to Lachmann’s intellectual beginnings as a student of Werner Sombart and the “historicist” teachings of the german Kathedersozialisten （and thus most definitely has nothing whatsoever to do with Austrian Economics）。[182]

关于拉赫曼关于经济理论不可能性的两个论点中的第一个——首先应该指出，与拉赫曼自己的说法相反，特别是与他的一些年轻弟子的自我安慰的态度相反——这个论点不是新的和原创的，而是拉赫曼作为维尔纳·桑巴特（

Ludwig von Mises，the twentieth century’s foremost Austrian econo mist and lifelong critic of historicism，has thus characterized its doctrine：

The fundamental thesis of historicism is the proposition that 。。。there is no knowledge but that provided by history The honest historicist would have to say：Nothing can be asserted about the future.Nobody can know how a definite policy will work in the future.All we believe to know is how similar policies worked in the past。Provided all relevant conditions remain unchanged，we may expect that the future effects will not widely differ from those of the past。But we do not know whether or not these relevant conditions will remain unchanged.Hence we cannot make any prognostication about the—necessarily future—effects of any measure considered.We are dealing with the history of the past，not with the history of the future.[183]

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，二十世纪最重要的奥地利经济学家，也是历史决定论的终身批评者，这样描述了它的学说：

历史主义的基本论点是这样一个命题：除了历史提供的知识之外，没有其他知识。

That this is also an accurate description of Lachmann’s position is made perfectly clear by Lachmann’s following comment on the socalled Austrian theory of the trade cycle：

Here we have a body of analytical thought designed to meet the requirements set out above：to depict a recurrent pattern of events with booms and depressions following each other in ceaseless succession.But can we really believe that agents witnessing these events will learn nothing from them and act in successive cycles in identical fashion？ Is it not more likely that their action in each cycle will be affected by the lessons they have learnt from its predecessors，even though，as always happens，different people learn different lessons from the same events？ once we admit that people learn from experience，the cycle cannot be reproduced time after time.These considerations suggest that it may be better to give up the doubtful quest for a model of the business cycle and to regard phenom ena such as cyclical fluctuations in output and prices simply as phenomena of history in the explanation of which changes in human knowledge will naturally play a part，with the events of each successive cycle requiring different，although often enough similar，explanations.[184]

这也是对拉赫曼立场的准确描述，拉赫曼对所谓的奥地利学派商业周期理论的以下评论非常清楚地表明了这一点：

While in and of itself this does not yet prove Lachmann wrong，it is a first step in the direction of a rigorous refutation that the position taken by Lachmann involves nothing less than an allout social relativism—indeed：nihilism—that cannot but immediately strike one as entirely counterintuitive.The relativistic consequences of historicism are hinted at clearly in the just quoted passage from Mises，while they may appear somewhat obscured by Lachmann in restricting his remarks to but one theory，the theory of the trade cycle （incidentally without bothering to explain，even if only briefly，what the theory actually states）。However，there can be no doubt whatsoever that the trade cycle theory is cited by Lachmann as an example and that he actually believes his argument to be equally applicable to all other economic theorems.In the same way and for the same reason that there can be no such thing as the theory of the trade cycle，according to Lachmann，there also can be no such thing as the theory of exchange，the theory of prices，the theory of money，the theory of interest，the theory of wages，the theory of socialism，the theory of taxation，the theory of wage and price controls，or the theory of interventionism.What holds for the phenomenon of cyclical fluctuations supposedly also holds for all other phenomena：that they must be regarded as phenomena of history in the explanation of which changes in human knowledge will naturally play a part，with each successive exchange，price，use of money，interest，wage，socialism，tax，wage and price control，and government intervention requiring different，although often enough similar，explanations.But can we really believe this？ Can we really believe，as Lachmann does，that we cannot say anything “applying equally to future and past” exchanges，prices，monies，or taxes？ Can we really believe that，due to the possibility of learning，it may no longer be true in the future that every voluntary exchange will—ex ante—be beneficial to both exchangers，and that every coercive exchange such as a tax will benefit one （the taxman） at the expense of the other （the taxed）？ Can we really believe that each suc cessive socialist experiment requires a different explanation，and that it is impossible to say anything applicable to each and every form of socialism，so that as long as there exists no private ownership of the means of production，and hence no factor prices，economic calculation （costaccounting） will be impossible and permanent misallocation （waste） will have to result？ Can we really believe that，as long as socialism is not actually abolished，this proposition may no longer hold true，because agents can learn from experience and may no longer act in an identical fashion？ Can we really believe that if a central bank were to double the paper money supply overnight，this would not，now and forever，lead to a drop in the purchasing power of money as well as a Systematic income redistribution in favor of the central bank and the early receivers of the newlycreated money at the expense of those receiving it later or not at all？ Can we really believe that if the minimum wage were fixed today at one million dollars per hour and if this decree were strictly enforced and no increase in the money supply were to take place，this mea sure might not lead to mass unemployment and a breakdown of the division of labor because people can learn from experience？ To be sure，Lachmann believes all of this，and it is easy to understand why some other people— taxmen，socialists，central bankers，and minimum wage legislators—would like us to believe as he does.But it is difficult to imagine how anyone but Lachmann—including even those who would personally benefit from us believing that the future effects of various policies can never be known in advance—can actually consider any of this seriously。

虽然就其本身而言，这还不能证明拉赫曼是错误的，但它是朝着严格反驳的方向迈出的第一步，即拉赫曼所采取的立场不仅仅是一种完全的社会相对主义——实际上是虚无主义——这不能不使人立即感到完全违背直觉。刚刚引述的米塞斯的一段话清楚地暗示了历史决定论的相对主义后果，而拉赫曼的论述仅限于一种理论，即商业周期理论（顺便说一句，他并没有费心解释，即使只是简短地解释，这种理论实际上论述了什么），这似乎有些模糊了历史决定论的后果。然而，毫无疑问，拉赫曼只是将贸易周期理论作为一个例子，他实际上认为自己的论点同样适用于所有其他经济定理。拉赫曼认为，不可能有所谓的商业周期理论，出于同样的原因，同样也不可能有交换理论、价格理论、货币理论、利息理论、工资理论、社会主义理论、税收理论、工资和价格控制理论或干预主义理论。对周期性波动现象的解释，理应也适用于所有其他现象：即必须将其视为历史现象，人类知识的变化自然会在解释中发挥作用，每一次连续的交换、价格、货币使用、利息、工资、社会主义、税收、工资和价格控制，以及政府干预，都需要不同的解释，尽管往往足够相似。

As already indicated in section II above，the fundamental logical error involved in Lachmann’s reasoning consists in the fact that it does not follow from the proposition that human actors face an uncertain future that everything regarding our future must be considered uncertain.[185] Nor does it follow from the fact that humans can learn，and hence their actions may change in the course of time，that everything concerning the future of human actions may possibly change in the course of time.Quite the contrary。To draw these conclusions，as Lachmann does，is selfcontradictory for evidently Lachmann claims to know for certain the unknowability of future knowledge and，by logical extension，of actions.Yet then he does know something about future knowledge and action.He must assume to know something about knowledge and action as such.Likewise，in claiming to know that humans are capable of learning and altering their actions in accordance with what they may learn，Lachmann must admit knowing something about man as such.He must assume to know not only that man may change his future behavior，but also that these changes are the result of a process of learning； that is，that they are the result of man being able to distinguish between success and failure，between confirmation and falsification，and draw conclusions dependent upon such categorically distinct experiences； and hence，that all possible changes in the behavior of man，unpredictable as their specific content may be，follow a predictable pattern—a uniform and constant logic of human action and learning。To use a perfect analogy while it is true that I am unable to predict everything that I will say or write in the future，this does not imply that I cannot predict anything about my future speaking and writing。I can predict，and indeed I can predict with perfect certainty，and regardless of whether I will speak or write in English or german，that，as long as I will speak or write at all，in any language whatsoever，all of my speaking and writing will have a constant and invariable logical （propositional） structure：that I must use identifying expressions，such as proper names，and predicators to assert or deny some specific property of the identified or named object，for instance.[186] in the same way it holds that even though I cannot predict what goals I may pur sue in the future，what means I will deem appropriate to reach these goals，and what other conceivable courses of action I will choose to reject in order to do what I will actually do （my opportunity cost），I can still predict that as long as I act at all，there will be goals，means，choices，and costs； that is，I can predict the general，logical structure of each and every one of my actions，whether past，present or future.And this is precisely what economic theory or，as Mises has termed it，praxeology，is all about：providing knowledge regarding actions as such and knowledge about the structure which any future knowledge and learning must have by virtue of the fact that it invari ably must be the knowledge and learning of actors.

To be sure，the knowledge of the invariant logical structure of acting and learning is acquired knowledge，too，as is all human knowledge.man is not endowed with it。However，once learned，the knowledge conveyed by praxeology as well as that conveyed by propositional logic can be recognized as necessarily true—a priori valid—knowledge，such that no future learning from experience could possibly falsify it。While all of my knowledge regarding the external world is，and forever will be tainted by uncertainty （it is not inconceivable that the law of gravitation may no longer hold in the future or that the sun will not rise tomorrow），my knowledge concerning the structure of my future action and learning is and forever will be non hypothetically true：it is inconceivable that，as long as I am alive，I will not act and reach or not reach my goal and revise or not revise my knowledge depending on the outcome of my actions.learning is the learning from success and failure，and there can be no learning of the fact that there is no success or failure.Thus，writes Mises，man as he exists on this planet in the present period of cosmic history may one day disappear。But as long as there are beings of the species Homo sapiens there will be human action of the categorical kind praxeology deals with.In this restricted sense praxeology provides exact knowledge of future conditions.。。。

The predictions of praxeology are，within their range of applicability，absolutely certain.[187]

可以肯定的是，关于行动和学习的不变的逻辑结构的知识也是后天获得的知识，就像人类所有的知识一样。人不是天生就了解这种知识的。然而，一旦了解到，行动学和命题逻辑所传达的知识就可以被认为是必然正确的——先验有效的——知识，以至于未来的经验学习都不可能证伪它。虽然我关于外部世界的所有知识现在和将来都将受到不确定性的影响（万有引力定律在未来可能不再成立，或者明天太阳不会升起，这些都并非不可想象），但我对我未来的行动和学习结构的知识是非假定性的，而且永远都是真实的：不可想象的是，只要我还活着，我不会行动，不会达到或不达到我的目标，不会根据我行动的结果修正或不修正我的知识。学习就是从成功和失败中学习，而没有成功和失败就不可能有学习这个事实。因此，米塞斯写道，人类存在于宇宙历史当前阶段的这个星球，也许有一天会消失。

行动学的预测，在其适用范围内，是绝对确定的。

How is it possible，then，especially in light of the fact that Lachmann was familiar with Mises and his writings，that he could have committed an elementary logical blunder such as not to recognize that it does not follow from the fact that we are capable of learning that everything about the future of human actions is unknowable？ How could he not recognize that only those aspects of our actions which may actually be affected by learning can be considered unpredictable，while those aspects that are a necessary part of any action and learning and thus cannot be altered by future learning—the underlying logical structure of action and learning itself—cannot？ The answer to this riddle lies in the fact that although he considered himself a staunch opponent of the positivist philosophy，Lachmann still fell prey to one of its fundamental misconceptions.Like Friedrich A.Hayek，his second teacher，Lachmann，whether wittingly or not，accepted the view of Hayek’s friend and protégé Karl R。Popper that all scientific knowledge must be such that，in principle，it is falsifiable by experience，and that all knowledge that is not falsifiable is not genuine knowledge at all but represents merely empirically empty tautologies，i.e.，arbitrary definitions （formalisms）。It is thus that Lachmann can write in response to the challenge posed to his thesis of an unknowable future by Mises and his idea of a logic of action that

precisely by virtue of the logical necessity inherent in it，it is impotent to engender empirical generalizations.Its truth is purely abstract and formal truth.The means and ends it con nects are abstract entities.In the real world the concrete means used and ends sought are everchanging as knowledge changes and what seemed worthwhile yesterday no longer seems so today。We appeal in vain to the logic of means and ends to pro vide us with support for empirical generalizations.[188]

米塞斯提出的行动逻辑正是由于其内在的逻辑必然性而无法产生经验的概括。行动学的真理纯粹是抽象的和形式的真理。它所连接的手段和目的是抽象的存在。在现实世界中，随着知识的变化，所使用的具体手段和所追求的具体目的也在不断变化，昨天看似有价值的东西今天看来就不再有价值了。我们徒劳地诉诸手段和目的的逻辑来为我们的经验概括提供支持。

But surely，as popular as this view of regarding all nonhypothetically true propositions—such as the laws of prepositional logic，for instance—as empirically empty formalisms has become in the wake of the rise of the pos itivist philosophy，it is completely fallacious.[189] in referring to highly abstract entities such as objects and properties，rather than concrete ones such as my cactus and its red blossoms，I am still speaking about real phenomena.The term “tree” is more abstract than the term “pine tree，” but the former has no less an empirical content than the latter。In the same vein，in saying something about ends，means，exchange，money，or interest—rather than about my desire to please my wife with flowers，a trade of two oranges against three apples，U.S.dollars，or my exchange of two present socks for four socks three months hence—I am still stating something about real phe nomena with an empirical content。Notes Mises，

if one accepts the terminology of logical Positivism and espe cially also that of Popper，a theory or hypothesis is “unscientific” if in principle it cannot be refuted by experience.Consequently，all a priori theories，including mathematics and praxeology，are unscientific。 This is merely a verbal quibble.No serious man wastes his time in discussing such a terminological question.Praxeology and economics will retain their paramount signifi cance for human life and action however people may classify and describe them.[190]

但可以肯定的是，在实证主义哲学兴起之后，这种将所有非假设的真命题——例如命题逻辑法则——视为经验上空洞的形式主义的观点虽然很流行，但却是完全谬误的。在提到对象和属性等高度抽象的存在，而不是我的仙人掌和它的红花等具体的存在时，我仍然在谈论真实的现象。“树”一词比“松树”一词更抽象，但前者的经验内容并不比后者少。同样地，在谈论目的、手段、交换、货币或利息——而不是我想用鲜花来取悦我的妻子——时，用两个橙子换三个苹果或者我用现在的两只袜子换三个月后的四只袜子——我仍然是在陈述一些具有经验内容的真实现象。米塞斯说到：

如果接受逻辑实证主义的术语，特别是波普尔的术语，一种理论或假设如果原则上无法被经验反驳，那么它就是 “不科学的”。因此，所有先验理论，包括数学和行动学，都是不科学的。这只不过是口头上的诡辩。无论人们如何对行动学和经济学进行分类和描述，它们对于人类的生活和行动仍将具有极其重要的意义。

In light of Lachmann’s multiple logical errors，one can now turn back to our rhetorical questions raised in response to his claim of the impossibility of any and all economic theory and prediction.The reason it appeared absurd that one should be unable to predict anything regarding each and every voluntary exchange，tax，socialism，money supply increase，and minimum wage law，is that while man may learn many things and alter his behavior in many ways，he is unable to experience and learn anything that is at variance with the laws of logic and the nature of man as an actor。I may not be able to predict that I will engage in voluntary exchanges，when，what it is that will be exchanged，or the exchange ratio at which the goods or services in question will be traded，etc。，because all of this may indeed be affected by my and others’ knowledge and change as this knowledge changes.But I can predict with perfect certitude that if a voluntary exchange takes place，regardless of where，when，what，and at what exchange ratio，both exchange partners must have had opposite preference orderings and must have expected to benefit from the exchange.No possible learning can ever change this.Likewise，I may not be able to predict that or when a socialist experiment will be undertaken or discontinued.Nor will I ever be able to predict such an experiment’s many specific features.All of this may be affected by learning。But regardless of whatever people may learn and how their learning may shape the peculiar shape of socialism，I can still predict with absolute certainty that as long as one is in fact dealing with socialism，any and all economic calculation will be impossible and permanent misallocations of production factors must result because this consequence is already logically implied in what socialism is.Similarly，I may not be able to forecast that a money will actually come into existence，and it is certainly possible that mankind may one day revert back to barter。Nor can I predict with certainty what specific kind of money will be employed in the future.But I can predict with perfect certitude that if there is any money in use at all，an increase in its supply must lead to a reduction in its purchasing power below what it otherwise would have been.This follows simply from the definition of money as a medium of exchange.Lastly，Lachmann also errs regarding the example of the Austrian theory of the trade cycle.He claims that due to the fact that businessmen can learn—they may hear of or read about Mises’s theory—they may possibly alter their future behavior in such a way that the effects predicted by the theory will no longer ensue.[191] But such a claim simply involves a misunderstanding of what the theory actually states.true enough，people can learn from Mises，and this may actually prevent business cycles from occurring at all，just as people may learn from Mises never to engage in a socialist experiment in the first place.However，this is entirely beside the point，for the theory states that if a bank creates additional papermoney credit，above and beyond the credit made available by the public’s voluntary savings，and if this additional credit is in fact placed into the hands of borrowers and the interest rate is thus lowered below what it otherwise would have been，i.e.，the natural rate of inter est，then，and only then，will there be first a boom—overinvestment—and consequently a bust—the Systematic liquidation of some of the investments as malinvestment。Whatever businessmen may learn after a credit expansion has actually taken place cannot possibly affect this predicted outcome in the slightest，because an intertemporal discoordination is already logically implied in the stated premises.And if the ifclause is not fulfilled，then the theory of the trade cycle is not refuted，of course.It simply does not apply。[192]

VIII.

Having rejected Lachmann’s first contention of the impossibility of economic theory applicable to past and future alike，and having argued the case of Knight’s and in particular Mises’s instead，not only of the possibility of such theory but，even more strongly，of a priori theory and apodictic （non hypothetical） prediction，in this final section Lachmann’s second conten tion—the “kaleidic” nature of the social world and the haphazard character of entrepreneurial prediction—will have to be examined.

在驳斥了拉赫曼的第一个论点——不可能有适用于过去和未来的经济理论——并论证了奈特，尤其是米塞斯的观点之后，我们不仅要论证这种理论的可能性，而且要更坚决地论证了先验理论和绝对（非假设）预测的可能性，拉赫曼的第二个论点——社会世界的

Even if the existence of a logic of action—praxeology—is admitted，as it must be，it does not follow that the knowledge provided by it can render our future certain.Praxeology allows us to predict with certainty some future events and aspects of the world of human actions，but its range of applica bility is strictly limited.There are many events and aspects，and indeed far more of far greater practical significance，about which praxeology has nothing to say。As Mises explains，“there is，but for Robinson Crusoe before he met his man Friday，no action that could be planned or executed without paying full attention to what the actor’s fellow men will do。action implies understanding other men’s reactions.”[193]

即使我们承认行动学逻辑的存在（这是必须的），但这并不意味着它所提供的知识可以使我们的未来变得确定。行动学使我们能够有把握地预测未来事件和人的行动世界的某些方面，但其适用范围受到严格限制。有许多事件和方面，实际上还有更多具有更大实际意义的事件和方面，行动学对此无话可说。正如米塞斯所解释的，

The task with which acting man，that is，everybody，is faced in all relations with his fellows does not refer to the past； it refers to the future.To know the future reactions of other people is the first task of acting man.It is

obvious that this knowledge which provides a man with the ability to anticipate to some degree other people’s future attitudes is not a priori knowledge.The a priori discipline of human action，praxeology，does not deal with the actual content of value judgments； it deals only with the fact that men value and then act according to their valuations.What we know about the actual content of judgments of value can be derived only from experience.[194]

行动人，即每个人，在与他人的所有关系中面临的任务不是指过去，而是指未来。了解他人未来的反应是行动人的首要任务。显然，

这种使人有能力在一定程度上预测他人未来态度的知识并不是先验知识。关于人的行动的先验学科，即行动学，并不涉及价值判断的实际内容；它只涉及人的评值，然后根据他们的评值采取行动这一事实。我们对价值判断实际内容的了解只能来自经验。

Quite apart from whatever praxeology，technology，and insurance can possibly teach us about the future，then，Mises （as well as Knight） would agree with Lachmann that there remains as one of mankind’s most pressing problems the need to predict our fellowmen’s concrete value judgments，the specific means they will choose to bring their valued ends about，and their evaluations once the results of their actions are in.And as has already been explained，they would also agree with Lachmann that because humans are capable of learning and their learning may affect their values，choices of means，and evaluations of outcomes，the positivistfalsificationist pre scriptions of how to deal with this problem are logically inappropriate and impotent。But what else can we do？ Or can nothing be done to deal with this aspect of uncertainty？

撇开行动学、技术学和保险学可能告诉我们的未来不谈，米塞斯（以及奈特）会同意拉赫曼的观点，即人类最紧迫的问题之一仍然是需要预测我们的同胞的具体价值判断，他们为实现其价值目标而选择的具体手段，以及他们在行动结果出来之后的评值。正如前面已经解释过的，他们也会同意拉赫曼的观点，即由于人类具有学习能力，而他们的学习可能会影响他们的价值观、对手段的选择以及对结果的评值，因此，实证证伪主义者关于如何解决这一问题的预设在逻辑上是不恰当的，也是无效的。但是，我们还能做什么呢？或者说，在处理不确定性这个方面，我们什么也做不了吗？

While it may appear that Lachmann’s answer to these questions is similar to Mises’s—both refer throughout their writings to the same group of philosophers of the geisteswissenschaften and the social sciences，most notably Max Weber and Alfred Schuetz，and both mention the method of understanding （verstehen）—this impression is mistaken （although due to Lachmann’s generally lessthanclear writing and a considerable amount of hedging on his part，this issue is admittedly somewhat difficult to decide）。[195] For whereas Mises’s answer to the above questions is an unambiguous yes，there exists a method of dealing with the ineradicable uncertainty of future human choices，and even though this method is not，and never can be，perfect，by not availing ourselves of it we would rob ourselves of the very intellectual tool of successful action and encounter more frequent disappoint ments than otherwise would be the case.Lachmann seems to hold precisely this：that regardless of what we do，our successes or failures in predicting our fellow men’s future actions are purely random.

虽然拉赫曼对这些问题的回答似乎与米塞斯相似——

As for Mises’s position，it is essential to recognize that—and why—he rejects the view that the future of human actions may be considered random or haphazard.To entertain such a view can mean one of two things.It can mean that we know literally nothing。But this is clearly false，for we do know something：we know that the future events in question are human actions and will display the structure inherent in each and every action，and hence，that while our knowledge may be deficient，we are still in a position to say more than simply ignoramus.[196] Or it can mean that with regard to the problem of future human choices，we know everything about the behavior of the whole class of events，but we do not know anything about any singu lar choice except that it is an element of the entire class of human choices.The view that human actions may be regarded as instances of “class prob ability” has already been rejected above.We do not，and never will，know everything about the whole class of human actions.But from this it does not follow that we will have to confess complete ignorance regarding singular human choices （apart from the known fact that they are all choices）。In fact，we do know something （more） about each singular event：we know that each singular event is the result of individual actors acting based on indi vidual knowledge subject to changes by individual learning，such that each event as it unfolds in human history past and future，must be conceived of as a unique and nonrepeatable event （with each event being in a class by itself ）； and we also know that in order to grasp the past or anticipate the future actions of our fellow men，we will have to pay attention and try to understand their individual knowledge，their individual values and personal knowhow.It is thus that Mises characterizes the epistemological task faced by man in his dealings with his fellows as one of “case probability。” “case probability （or the specific understanding of the sciences of human action）…means：We know，with regard to a particular event，some of the factors which determine its outcome； but there are other determining factors about which we know nothing。” [197] Categorically different as this situation of case probability is from that of class probability，it is hardly a situation in which the future is random or haphazard.Indeed，in some respect we are in a better （not worse） epistemological position in the field of human history，past and future，than we are in the field of natural events，of technology and insurance.For in the latter field we are categorically precluded from the inpossibility of understanding。Each singular event must be treated as a member of a class of homogeneous，except for their class membership indistinguishable singular events.In contrast，in the field of past and future human history，we are capable of distinguishing between every singular event （each event can be treated as heterogeneous）； and to improve our grasp of the past，and our anticipations of the future actions of our fellows，we know and are capable of learning something about the individual causes—the personal knowledge—uniquely affecting the outcome of each and every singular human event （with each event deserving of its own special attention）。

至于米塞斯的立场，我们必须认识到，他反对把人的行动的未来视为随机或偶然的观点，这一点至关重要，也是他反对这种观点的原因。这种观点有两种含义，一种是我们什么都不知道，但这显然是错误的，因为我们确实知道一些东西：我们知道所讨论的未来事件是人的行动，并将显示每个行动的固有的内在结构，因此，尽管我们的知识可能有缺陷，但我们能够说得仍然比单纯的无知更多。或者说，对于人的未来的选择问题，我们对整个事件类别的行为了如指掌，但我们对任何单一选择一无所知，只知道它是人的整个选择类别中的一个元素。上文已经驳斥了把人的行动视为

While neither random nor haphazard，then，the task of anticipating our fellows’ actions based on an understanding of their individuality is not with out its inescapable difficulties and imperfections，for every understanding of an individual is always an understanding of his past values and knowledge.However，as Mises was quoted above，our first task in life is to know the future reactions of other people.“knowledge of their past value judgments and actions，although indispensable，is only a means to this end.”[198] Thus，in all of our attempts of anticipating the future，in addition to an understanding of the past actions of a given individual，we must also necessarily make a judgment regarding the relative stability or instability of the various parts of his System of values and knowledge as displayed in the past； that is，we must form an opinion about his personality or character。As Mises explains，we must “assume that，by and large，the future conduct of people will，other things being equal，not deviate without special reason from their past con duct，because we assume that what determined their past conduct will also determine their future conduct。However different we may know ourselves to be from other people，we try to guess how they will react to changes in their environment。Out of what we know about a man’s past behavior，we construct a scheme about what we call his character。We assume that this character will not change if no special reasons interfere，and，going a step farther，we even try to foretell how definite changes in conditions will affect his reactions.”[199] Likewise，if we are concerned about the future behavior of groups of individuals （rather than only a single one），we cannot but classify individuals according to the similarity or dissimilarity of their character or personality； that is，we cannot but form ideas of group characters—ideal types—and sort individuals according to their membership in such types.“If an ideal type refers to people，” explains Mises，“it implies that in some respect these men are valuing and acting in a uniform or similar way。When it refers to institutions，it implies that these institutions are products of uniform or similar ways of valuing and acting or that they influence valuing and acting in a uniform or similar way。” [200]

在理解他人个性的基础上预测他人的行动，这既不是随机的，也不是杂乱无章的，但也存在着不可避免的困难和不完善之处，因为对个人的每一种理解都是对其过去的价值观和知识的理解。然而，正如上文所引用的米塞斯的话，我们生活中的首要任务是了解他人的未来反应。

Our anticipations，based on an understanding of the past，and the construction of character and ideal types and the classification of individuals and groups into such types，are necessarily hypothetical，or rather，tentative predictions.In ascribing a certain character to an actor，we attempt to reduce the uncertainty surrounding his future behavior。We form a tentative judgment concerning more or less stable parts of his personality and predict that the future changes in his behavior，whatever they may be，will be changes in line with his character，i.e.，changes which follow a general—predictable—pattern.Our prediction may turn out to be successful or not。We may have mis classified the actor（s）。Or，contrary to our judgment，the actor（s） may change their very character； and indeed，over the course of time some character types may die out and new ones may emerge，requiring the development of a different and changing System of classification.Or our character constructs may turn out too abstract or too specific； that is，even though they may yield correct predictions，we may find，in retrospect，that what they predict is of lesser importance than anticipated.The prediction may turn out to say too little of much importance，or too much of little importance，requiring further typological revisions.Moreover，whether we evaluate our predictions as successful or not，the meaning of success and failure is necessarily ambiguous.In the natural sciences，success means that so far your hypothesis has not been falsified； apply it again； and failure means that your hypothesis as it stands is wrong； change it。In our dealings with our fellow men，the implications are not，and never can be，as clearcut。Maybe our prediction was wrong because some people，as can happen sometimes，acted out of character—in this case we would want to use our hypothesis again even though it had been apparently falsified.Or maybe our prediction was successful，but the individual in question has meanwhile undergone a change in his character—in this case we would not want to use our hypothesis again even though it had just been seemingly confirmed.Or maybe the actor in question knew our prediction and deliberately acted so as to confirm or falsify our hypothesis，in which case we might or might not want to change our future prediction.Every success and every failure，then，bears only inconclusive results and necessitates another tentative judgment，a new and updated understanding of the actors concerned and a renewed assessment of their characters in light of their most recent actions，and so on.Thus，in contrast to the situation in the natural sciences，where success and failure have an unambiguous meaning，where we are allowed to conclude that what was false in the past will also be so in the future and what worked once will likely work again，and where we may thus successively acquire a growing stock of knowledge，in dealing with the problem of anticipating our fellow men’s actions，we can never rest on our past laurels but must always start again fresh and judge the applicability of our past knowledge anew，we can never possess a stock of knowledge that we may blindly rely upon in the future.

基于对过去的理解，基于对个性和理想类型的构建，以及对个人和群体的分类，我们的预测必然是假设性的，或者说，是试探性的预测。在赋予行动人某种个性时，我们试图减少其未来行为的不确定性。

Nothing in this—Mises’s—view regarding the nature of human history，past and future，is likely to strike anyone as new or revolutionary。Indeed，if it were not for the fact of the very different positivistic view of the matter，it would appear almost trivial and a selfevident truism.As Mises notes，

the methods of scientific inquiry [in the social sciences] are categorically not different from the procedures applied by every body in his daily mundane comportment。They are merely more refined and as far as possible purified of inconsistencies and contradictions.Understanding is not a method of procedure peculiar only to historians.It is practiced by infants as soon as they outgrow the merely vegetative stage of their first days and weeks.There is not conscious response of man to any stimuli that is not direct by understanding。[201]

米塞斯关于人类历史、过去和未来的本质的观点，没有任何内容会让人感到新颖或具有革命性。事实上，如果不是因为实证主义的观点与米塞斯的观点截然不同，它几乎是微不足道的，是不言而喻的真理。正如米塞斯所说，

科学探究的方法（在社会科学中）与每个人在日常行为中使用的程序毫无区别。它们只是更加精炼，并尽可能剔除了不一致和矛盾之处。理解并不是历史学家独有的程序方法，婴儿在脱离最初几天和几周的植物人阶段后就会使用这种方法。人类对任何刺激的有意识反应都离不开理解。

It is not entirely surprising，then，that Lachmann，too，while his methodological considerations （in distinct contrast to Mises’s） are largely unSystematic and marred by an abundance of metaphorical expression and a lack of analytical rigor，should at times appear to be in essential agreement with this commonsensical view as embraced by Mises.Lachmann，too，makes frequent reference to understanding，ideal types，and institutions.[202] Yet despite such apparent similarities，Mises and Lachmann reach completely different conclusions as regards the nature of human—entrepreneurial— uncertainty。Whereas for Mises the result of the method of understanding is moderate uncertainty，for Lachmann it is radical uncertainty。How is this to be explained？

因此，拉赫曼在方法论上的思考（与米塞斯形成鲜明对比）大多缺乏系统性，而且存在大量隐喻表达和分析不够严谨的问题，但他有时似乎与米塞斯的这一常识性观点基本一致，这并不完全令人惊讶。拉赫曼也经常提到理解、理想类型和制度。然而，尽管表面上看似相似，米塞斯和拉赫曼却对人的本质——富于企业家精神的——不确定性方面得出了完全不同的结论。

In putting the best possible—because it is the most consistent—face on Lachmann，the disagreement between his and Mises’s position may be said to boil down to one regarding a contingent—empirical—fact。There is agreement on the method to be employed； there is disagreement only on how successful this method actually is—remarkably so and most of the time，as Mises would contend，or insignificantly and only occasionally so，as would Lachmann.Instead of disagreeing on principle，on methodology，they only disagree on a matter of fact：whether the social world is，in fact，kaleidic or not。But what of the facts，then？ Although the empirical question of whether we inhabit a kaleidic world or not may appear to be of rather minor importance，given the fact that we must deal with it in any case and we have nothing but understanding available to us to do so，and although questions of this nature may easily degenerate into idle semantic quibbles such as whether a glass of water is half empty or half full，empirical questions—disagreements on matters of fact—are accessible to empirical research and can，in principle，be decided upon based on the observation of the facts.In the bright light of empirical facts，however，Lachmann’s theory of radical uncertainty fares no better than in the pale light of logic。So as to generate a radically uncertain world of kaleidic change，Lach mann must assume，as a matter of empirical fact，that individual actors do not possess any such thing as a character。Understanding，as has been explained，is always understanding of past actions.In order to be able to successfully predict future actions based on an understanding of past actions，it is necessary that one assume that the past and the future are somehow related—not in the sense that the past would determine the future，but rather in the sense that the past values and knowhow of an individual （which determined his past actions） shape and constrain his future values and knowhow （which determine his future actions）。Indeed，if this were not assumed to be the case and an individual’s past values and actions were viewed as completely unrelated to his future values and actions，the study of history would be entirely useless.We only study an individual’s past because we believe that this knowledge is valuable in helping us anticipate something regarding his future conduct。without this belief，the study of history must be regarded as a sheer waste of time.In Mises’s view，the link connecting an individual’s past with his future and the empirical reason for our concern for the study of history is the existence of individual char acters and personalities.It is the existence of a person’s character，chang ing though it may be over the course of time，that assures the continuity of change：patterned social change instead of kaleidic flux。Accordingly，only if individual actors were assumed to be completely disjointed person alities，such that my actions tomorrow were always entirely unrelated and unaffected by my actions today or yesterday，could Lachmann’s scenario of radical uncertainty ever become reality。While this would indeed be a nightmare if it ever existed，it can safely be said that it has no resemblance whatsoever either to us or to the world we inhabit。Indeed，it is difficult to imagine how a world of disjointed personalities could be reconciled even with human biology。Solely on account of our physical bodily nature— which is a contingent fact，but as long as we are alive a relatively stable contingency—we cannot possibly be quite like Lachmann thinks we are，or else we would quickly die out。

把最好的一面——因为这是最一致的一面——贴在拉赫曼脸上，他和米塞斯的立场之间的分歧可以归结为一个偶然的经验事实。在使用的方法上存在着一致意见；分歧只在于这种方法的实际成功程度——米塞斯认为，在大多数情况下是显著成功的；拉赫曼则认为，在极少数情况下是偶尔成功的。与其说他们在原则上、方法论上存在分歧，不如说他们在事实问题上存在分歧：社会世界事实上是否如万花筒一般。

As a matter of fact，actors，from the earliest stages of infancy on，dis play a personal character，they possess a personal identity and conceive of their past and future as forming a whole：their personal life history。We do not start building a house today and then，tomorrow，without any special reason，do something entirely unrelated.Rather，our past actions influence，circumscribe，and constrain our future actions.We do not always begin from scratch，but most of the time we continue what was already begun and planned as a part of a lengthy sequence of actions.And even if we abandon one such integrated plan，we typically adopt another one.otherwise，if there were no such continuity in our actions，it would be impossible to explain one of the most striking features of human life—the existence and continued employment of a stock of capital goods.To produce a capital good is to begin something stretching into the future，and to employ an existing capital good is to continue something begun in the past。If the future were indeed unrelated to the past，it should be expected that capital goods，insofar as they come into existence at all，will just as quickly be aban doned in the future as they may have been adopted in the past。However，while there exist some ruins of abandoned capital goods，most of yesterday’s capital goods are still employed today and tomorrow—which is empirical proof of the past’s continuing influence on the future.As the author of a book on capital，Lachmann of all people should have been able to recognize this，and this alone should have given him reason enough to discard his thesis of kaleidic change and radical uncertainty。

事实上，行动人从婴幼儿时期开始就表现出一种个性，他们拥有个人身份，并将自己的过去和未来视为一个整体：他们的个人生活史。我们并不是今天开始盖房子，或者明天，就在没有任何特殊原因的情况下做一些完全无关的事情。

Moreover，equally difficult for Lachmann to explain would be another fundamental feature of human history—the existence of enduring differences among various individuals in their ability to forecast the future； that is，not only the fact that I may be better able to predict the actions of A，B，and C，while you may be better able to predict those of D，E，and F，but also the fact that you and I，confronted with one and the same group of individuals，G，H，and J，may display lastingly different forecasting abilities.From Mises’s view these facts pose no problem.Different individuals do not，and cannot possibly know （understand） everyone’s past equally well。They know different individuals differently well，and accordingly，their forecasting ability should be expected to be different dependent on whose actions need to be predicted.Likewise，assuming that different individuals are concerned with forecasting the actions of the same individual or group of individuals，it should be expected that there will be Systematically—and hence enduringly—different success rates among these forecasters.For in Mises’s view，every prediction requires not only an understanding of the past but also a tentative judgment，influenced but not determined by the knowledge of the past，as to the underlying character structure of the individual actors concerned.As an essentially cognitive task involving different and complex intellectual operations，nothing should be less surprising than the fact that different individuals，with strikingly different talents in all other areas of intellectual endeavor，will also perform differently when it comes to predicting their fellow men.However，if an individual’s past and future were indeed unrelated，as Lachmann believes is the case，then everyone should be expected to predict everyone else’s behavior equally well （or badly）。A person with an understanding of an individual’s past actions should not be able to predict his future actions any more successfully than someone else not so acquainted with the individual in question.because the past is unconnected to the future，not knowing it cannot make a difference in our forecasting abilities.And since without our knowledge of past actions there is nothing left to go on to form a character judgment，we are all equally ignorant and without a rudder； hence，there also should be no lasting difference in our rate of success or failure.Successes and failures should be expected to be randomly distributed among actors and personal fortunes to dissipate as quickly as they are found.

此外，拉赫曼同样难以解释的是人类历史的另一个基本特征——不同的个体在预测未来的能力上存在着持久的差异；也就是说，不仅我能更好地预测

It is almost needless to say that none of this fits historical reality。Based on my long understanding of my wife，for instance，I can anticipate her actions and reactions in almost all foreseeable circumstances； and vice versa，she can predict me almost to perfection.There are few if any surprises，and probably no one else could predict us better than we can predict each other。Likewise，I can predict，with great precision and better than almost every body else，the behavior of my children，while they have （still） considerably more difficulty understanding me and my character。Similarly，I can anticipate better than almost anybody else the actions and reactions of many of my family and friends under a great variety of circumstances，and they，knowing me，can successfully predict many or even most of my reactions.There is nothing radical or kaleidic about the uncertainty involved.As well，I know quite a bit about the history of men and women，germans，Austrians，Turks，Americans，Italians，mexicans，Protestants，Catholics，Jews，Blacks，Asians，university professors，politicians，businessmen，private and public employees，and so on，and in many respects I can predict the behavior of the members of these groups very successfully，and certainly more successfully than the average person.Moreover，as far as predictions about the behav ior of one and the same （group of ） individual（s） by different predictors are concerned，even if all predictors have equal access to the record of past events and can base their prediction on an understanding of this past，they are most definitely not equally successful in their predictions.Most impor tantly，in the narrower field of capitalistentrepreneurship，where forecasters must estimate their present and current production costs and form a judgment regarding future consumer demand in order to successfully complete an anticipated exchange of present money against future money，and where there exists a set of objective criteria for success—profit and loss，continued operation and bankruptcy，and growth，stagnation，or decline of capi tal values—the degree of success among different individuals is strikingly different。While many of those who try，fail，and drop from the rank of a capitalistentrepreneur to become involved in less risky and intellectually demanding tasks，many others succeed to stay in business year after year，and some have succeeded in accumulating great fortunes during their life，and even to bring up heirs capable of preserving or enhancing their fortune beyond their own lifetime.This empirical fact，too，stands in open contra diction to the idea of kaleidic change and rather confirms the great cognitive value of the method of understanding （even more so in light of the fact that the superior predictive capability of the capitalistentrepreneurs simultaneously reduces the uncertainty facing all of their employees by providing them with a present income even if they themselves could not have correctly anticipated the future demand for their own line of work）。

毋庸讳言，这些都不符合历史现实。

certainly all of this—the predictive power of the method of under standing as manifested in the empirical facts of capital formation and maintenance，of successful everyday life entrepreneurship （forecasting of family，friends，colleagues，and acquaintances），and of enduring business successes—in conjunction with the apodictic certitude provided by praxeology and the wideranging practical certainty afforded by technology and insurance should be more than sufficient to dispel all talk about radical uncertainty and kaleidic social change as either contradictory and meaning less or patently false.

当然，所有这一切——理解方法的预测能力，体现在资本形成和维持的经验事实中，日常生活中成功的企业家精神（对家人、朋友、同事和熟人的预测），持久的商业成功——结合行动学提供的绝对确定性，以及技术和保险提供的广泛的实践确定性——应该足以消除所有关于彻底的不确定性和万花筒般的社会变革的言论，这些讨论要么是矛盾的，要么是无意义的，要么是明显错误的。

17 数字概率的局限性[203]

The Limits of Numerical Probability

both Frank H.Knight and Ludwig von Mises are recognized as founders of intellectual traditions：the Chicago School and the neoAustrian School of economics，respectively。During their lifetime，Knight and Mises were engaged in controversies regarding the nature of socialism and capital。[204] My focus here，however，will be on a Systematic yet rarely noted similarity in the works of Knight and Mises.In particular，both are representatives of the frequency interpretation of probability and share a similar view concerning the limitations of probability theory in economics and the social sciences generally。[205] in the following I will （1） briefly restate the principles of the frequency interpretation of probability；（2） show why Knight and Mises must be considered frequency theorists； and （3） discuss and evaluate the arguments provided by Knight and Mises against the possibility of apply ing probability theory in the area of economic forecasting （whether on the micro or the macro level）。

弗兰克·

I.

The principal founder and proponent of the frequency interpretation of probability is richard von Mises，Ludwig’s younger brother。[206] There is no reference in Knight to richard von Mises，and insofar as Knight’s work of primary interest here is concerned—his 1921 Risk，uncertainty，and Profit— nothing else can be expected （though Knight read german）。[207] More surprising is the fact that there is also no mention of richard von Mises and his frequency interpretation in Ludwig von Mises’s Systematic treatment of probability in his 1949 work Human action：A Treatise on Economics.[208] Nonetheless，I assume richard von Mises’s interpretation as the starting point in the following discussion.It will become apparent that Knight is groping toward the solution provided by richard von Mises，and that Lud wig von Mises was obviously familiar with his brother’s work and in his own work presents what is meant to be a refinement of the frequency interpreta tion provided by richard.

对概率的频率解释的主要创始人和支持者是路德维希的弟弟理查德

According to richard von Mises，probability must be defined and the range of applicability of probability theory be delineated thus：

It is possible to speak about probabilities only in reference to a properly defined collective.[209]
A collective [appropriate for the application of the theory of probability must fulfill] … two conditions：（i） the relative frequencies of particular attributes within the collective tend to fixed limits；（ii） these fixed limits are not affected by any place selection.That is to say，if we calculate the relative frequency of some attribute not in the original sequence，but in a partial set，selected according tosome fixed rule，then we require that the relative frequency so calculated should tend to the same limit as it does in the original set。[210]
The fulfillment of the condition （ii） will be described as the Principle of randomness or the Principle of the Impossibility of a Gambling System.[211]

理查德·冯·米塞斯认为，必须对概率进行定义，并划定概率论的适用范围：

只有在适当定义的集合中才有可能谈论概率。

For the purpose of this article，only three observations regarding Mises’s frequency interpretations are in order。First，there is Mises’s emphatic insis tence that the application of the term probability to single events，such as the “probability” of Mr。X dying in the course of the next year，for instance， is “utter nonsense.”[212] “The theory of probability can never lead to a definite statement concerning a single event。”[213] Second，Mises is equally insistent that the probabilities of the probability calculus are objective，empirical properties and magnitudes （rather than subjective beliefs or degrees of confidence）。They are based on experience，and further experience may lead to revised measurements or the reclassification of various singular events into various collectives.However，only in referring to objective probabilities can the probability calculus ever be of any practical use.[214] And third and by implication，Mises rejects categorically the notion of a priori probability。[215] No such thing as a priori probability exists.[216]

“In a problem of probability calculus，” according to richard von Mises，“the data as well as the results are probabilities.”[217] “From one or more well defined collectives，a new collective is derived.The purpose of the theory of probability is to calculate the distribution in the new collective from the known distribution （or distributions） in the initial ones.”[218] As in the case of algebra，“[t]here are four，and only four，ways of deriving a collective and all problems treated by the theory of probability can be reduced to a com bination of these four fundamental methods.”[219] new collectives are derived from known initial ones by means either of selection （unchanged distribution），mixing （addition rule），partition （division rule），and/or combination （multiplication rule）。

“在一个概率计算的问题中，”理查德·冯·米塞斯（

II.

As economists，Frank Knight and Ludwig von Mises come upon the subject of probability indirectly，in conjunction with the question concerning the source of entrepreneurial profits and losses.Why，Knight and Mises ask，do profits and losses not disappear as the result of entrepreneurial competition？ Why does competition not bring about a state of affairs where the sum of the prices paid for all input factors equals exactly the price of the output，such that the product sum can be apportioned perfectly among its contributing factors？[220] Knight and Mises both give the same answer：because of “uncertainty。” uncertainty concerning the future constellation of demand and supply is the ultimate and ineradicable source of entrepreneurial profit and loss.[221] And it is in conjunction with their attempt of explaining the nature of uncertainty，then，that both Knight and Mises introduce the concept of “risk，” as a contingency categorically distinct from uncertainty。[222]

作为经济学家，弗兰克

Explains Knight：

If all changes were to take place in accordance with invariable and universally known laws，they could be foreseen for an indef inite period in advance of their occurrence，and would not upset the perfect apportionment of product values among contributing agencies，and profit （or loss） would not arise.[223]

奈特解释道：

如果所有的变化都是按照不变的、众所周知的规律发生的，那么这些变化在发生之前就可以随时被预见到，而且不会破坏产品价值在各投入要素之间的完美分配，也就不会产生利润（或损失）。

However，perfect foresight need not involve the ability to forecast every singular event and the absence of any kind of contingency （or surprise） for profits and losses to disappear。As Knight explains：

[I]t is unnecessary to perfect，profitless imputation that particular occurrences be foreseeable，if only all the alternative possibilities are known and the probability of the occurrence of each can be accurately ascertained.Even though the business man could not know in advance the results of individual ventures，he could operate and base his competitive offers upon accurate foreknowledge of the future if quantitative knowledge of the probability of every possible outcome can be had.For by figuring on the basis of a large number of ventures （whether of his own business alone or in that of business in general） the losses could be converted into fixed costs.[224]

[Thus，for example，] the bursting of bottles does not introduce an uncertainty or hazard into the business of producing champagne； since in the operations of any producer a practically constant and known proportion of bottles burst，it does not especially matter even whether the proportion is large or small。The loss becomes a fixed cost。And even if a single producer does not deal with a sufficiently large number of cases of the contingency in question to secure constancy in its effects，the same result may easily be realized，through an organization taking in a large number of producers.This，of course，is the principle of insurance，as familiarly illustrated by the chance of fire loss.No one can say whether a particular building will burn，and most building owners do not operate on a sufficient scale to reduce the loss to constancy But as is well known，the effect of insurance is to extend this base to cover the operations of a large number of persons and convert the contingency into a fixed cost。[225]

然而，完美的预见性并不意味着能够预测每一个单一的事件，也不意味着没有任何偶然性（或意外）来消除盈亏。正如奈特所解释的：

如果所有的可能性都是已知的，并且每一种可能性的发生概率都能被准确地确定，那么就没有必要去完美地、无益地推测特定事件的发生是没有必要的。

with this definition of “empiricalstatistical probability” as “insurable” contingency or “risk，” Knight is in complete accordance with richard von Mises’s frequency interpretation.At times，he seems to deviate from Mises’s interpretation，as when he assumes also the possibility of a priori probability （in addition to empiricalstatistical probability）。But not only does Knight ascribe no importance to a priori probability in the conduct of business，his deviation turns out little more than a minor if unfortunate slip.[226] in any case，Knight deserves credit for strictly separating a priori probability from empiricalstatistical probability，which alone is of practical importance （and where a priori considerations play no role whatsoever），and in particular for excluding “risk” （insurable contingencies） as a possible source of profit and loss and delineating it strictly from “uncertainty，” as two categorically distinct sorts of contingency。

奈特将

Ludwig von Mises reaches the same conclusion.Yet writing four decades later，his treatment of the subject，contrary to that of Knight，is in full awareness of richard von Mises’s frequency interpretation.

路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）也得出了同样的结论。然而，与奈特相反，路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）在 40 年后撰写的文章中，对这一主题的处理完全符合理查德-冯-米塞斯（richard von Mises）的频率解释。

Ludwig von Mises first presents a general （wide） definition of probability：

A statement is probable if our knowledge concerning its content is deficient。We do not know everything which would be required for a definite decision between true and not true.But on the other hand，we do know something about it； we are in a position to say more than simply non liquet or ignoramus.[227]

路德维希·冯·米塞斯首先提出了概率的一般（广义）定义：

如果我们对一个陈述的内容知之甚少，那么这个陈述就是概率上可能的。我们并不了解明确判断真假所需的一切。但另一方面，我们确实对它有所了解；我们所能说的不仅仅是“不懂”或“无知”。

within this general category of probabilistic statements，Mises then dis tinguishes two categorically distinct subclasses.The first one—probability narrowly understood and permitting the application of the probability calculus—is termed “class probability （or frequency probability）。”

Class probability means：We know or assume to know，with regard to the problem concerned，everything about the behavior of a whole class of events or phenomena； but about the actual singular events or phenomena we know nothing but that they are elements of this class.[228]

在这一概率陈述的一般类别中，米塞斯又区分出两类截然不同的子类。第一类——狭义的概率，允许应用概率计算——被称为

with this definition of class probability，Ludwig von Mises shows himself in complete agreement with his brother。For him，too，there is no such thing as a priori probability。Nor is there such a thing as the probability of a singular event。Probability statements refer to “objective” probabilities of collectives （classes）。They are based on empirical observations.And they are corrigible by such observations.Yet at the same time Ludwig von Mises’s definition of class probability represents an ingenious simplification and refinement of richard’s frequency interpretation.on the one hand， in requiring that one know （or assume to know） everything regarding the behavior of the whole class，Ludwig von Mises circumvents the difficulties associated with richard’s notion of a limit and its application to necessarily finite sequences of events.on the other hand，in requiring of every singular event that nothing be known about it except that it is a member of a certain class，Ludwig von Mises eliminates the need for the “randomness” crite rion to be added to the definition of a collective suitable to treatment by the probability calculus.[229] Ludwig von Mises’s definition of class probability already entails a definition of randomness （and “logical homogeneity”）：to state that nothing is known about any particular event except its member ship in a joint （common） class of events is to say the same as that—as far as one knows—each particular event is logically “homogeneous” （as far as the risk under consideration is concerned） to every other event and/or that one knows of no law （and consequently no method of place selection） governing the sequence of particular events.[230]

路德维希·冯·米塞斯（

However，as pervasive as “risks” （insurable contingencies） are and as important as class or frequency probability accordingly may be，Ludwig von Mises concurs with Knight that risks are not the source of entrepreneurial profit and loss.To account for profit and loss another，different sort of con tingency （a different sort of “probability”） must be postulated.What，then，is the nature of this contingency that both Knight and Mises consider as falling outside the realm of phenomena tractable by the probability calculus and giving rise to entrepreneurial profit and loss？

然而，尽管 “风险”（可保险的意外事件）无处不在，相应的类或频率概率同样很重要，路德维希·冯·米塞斯同意奈特的观点，即风险不是企业盈亏的来源。为了解释利润和亏损，必须假设另一种不同的偶然性（一种不同的 “概率”）。那么，奈特和米塞斯都认为这种偶然性超出了概率计算所能处理的现象范围，那么导致企业盈亏的这种偶然性的本质又是什么呢？

III.

Knight terms this other sort of contingency “true uncertainty” and characterizes it thus：

The probability in which the student of business risk is inter ested is an estimate，。。。an estimate or intuitive judgment is somewhat like a probability judgment，but very different from either of the types of probability judgment already described [a priori and empiricalstatistical]。[231]

奈特将这另一种偶然性称为 “真正的不确定性”，并将其描述为：

研究商业风险的学生感兴趣的概率是一种估计……估计或直觉判断有点像概率判断，但与概率判断的任何一种类型都截然不同，但与上文所述的概率判断类型（先验的和经验统

The theoretical difference between the probability connected with an estimate and that involved in such phenomena as are dealt with by insurance is，however，of the greatest importance.Take as an illustration any typical business decision.A manufacturer is considering the advisability of making a large commitment in increasing the capacity of his works.He “figures” more or less on the proposition，taking account as well as possible of the various factors more or less susceptible of measurement，but the final result is an “estimate” of the probable outcome of any proposed course of action.What is the “probability” of error （strictly，of any assigned degree of error） in the judgment？ It is manifestly meaningless to speak of either calculating such a probability a priori or of determining it empirically by studying a large number of instances.The essential and outstanding fact is that the “instance” in question is so entirely unique that there are no others or not a sufficient number to make it possible to tabulate enough like it to form a basis for any inference of value about any real probability in the case we are interested in.The same obviously applies to most of conduct and not to business decisions alone.[232]

无论如何，与估算相关的概率与保险所处理的这类现象所涉及的概率之间的理论差异是最重要的。以任何典型的商业决策为例。

Business decisions deal with situations which are far too unique，generally speak ing，for any sort of statistical tabulation to have any value for guidance.The conception of an objectively measurable prob ability or chance is simply inapplicable.It is this third type of probability or uncertainty which has been neglected in economic theory，and which we propose to put in its rightful place … that higher form of uncertainty not susceptible to measure ment and hence elimination.It is this true uncertainty which by preventing the theoretically perfect outworking of the tenden cies of competition gives the characteristic form of “enterprise” to economic organization as a whole and accounts for the peculiar income of the entrepreneur。[233]

一般来说，商业决策所涉及的情况过于独特，任何统计表都无法提供任何指导价值。客观上可测量的概率或可能性的概念根本不适用。

Noteworthy about Knight’s argument is his emphasis on unique events.Indeed，if the probability calculus is applicable only to classes or collectives，then it follows logically that it cannot be applied to events which are mem bers of no class （or，as Ludwig von Mises would say，events that form a class by themselves） and are thus uniquE.However，Knight is less forthcoming as regards the immediately following question：What is it that makes certain events unique，such that they cannot be （or cannot be conceived as being） in a class with other events； and how do we identify and distinguish such events from events which can be classified？ [234]

奈特的论证值得注意的是他对独特事件的强调。事实上，如果概率计算只适用于类或集合，那么从逻辑上讲，它就不能适用于不属于任何类的事件（或者，正如路德维希·冯·米塞斯所说，事件本身就构成一个类），因此是独一无二的。然而，奈特并没有直接回答以下问题：是什么使某些事件具有独特性，以致于它们不能（或不能被认为是）与其他事件同属一类；我们如何识别和区分这类事件与可以分类的事件？

Ludwig von Mises，writing later and in recognition of his brother’s frequency interpretation，provides further clarification in this regard.According to Ludwig von Mises （and there is little doubt that Knight would have agreed with this），two categorically distinct types of empirical events exist：on the one hand，natural events or what might be called accidents，and on the other hand，human actions.Class （or risk） probability is applicable exclusively to the first type of event，i.e.，accidents； and it is impermissible to apply it to human action.Rather，human action is the source of “true，” non quantifiable （Knightian） uncertainty and responsible for the emergence of profit and loss.States Ludwig von Mises， there are two entirely different instances of probability； we may call them class probability （or frequency probability） and case probability （or the specific understanding of the sciences of human action）。[235] The field for the application of the former is the field of the natural sciences，entirely ruled by causality； the field for the application of the latter is the field of the sciences of human action，entirely ruled by teleology。[236]

路德维希·冯·米塞斯（

Unfortunately，in the relevant chapter VI of his magnum opus Ludwig von Mises is less than outspoken in explaining why human actions （choices） are intractable by probability theory （in the frequency interpretation）。His answer can be inferred，however。

遗憾的是，路德维希·冯·米塞斯在其巨著的相关第六章中没有直言不讳地解释为什么人的行动（选择）无法用概率论（频率解释）来解决。但是，他的答案是可以推断的。

The question is：Is it scientifically legitimate to assign quantitative probabilities to the performance of certain actions （whether by individuals or groups of individuals）？ Is there a numerical probability that I will watch basketball on TV tonight，that I will spend $5 on beer and $10 on red wine at Von’s grocery store on First Street today，that Hillary Clinton will be elected in 2008，that one million german tourists will spend 3 to 3.5 million Euros on about three million Bratwursts in Mallorca in 2007，that Linda will divorce george，that benbernanke will create 5 billion paper dollars next week，that more people will watch MTV than Fox next Christmas night？

问题是：为某些行动（无论是个人还是群体）的执行分配定量概率在科学上是否合法？？

For the frequency theorist，the answer to these questions is a clear No.To be sure，we constantly make predictions concerning actionevents such as these，but probability calculations do not—and legitimately cannot— play any role in these predictions.

对频率理论家来说，这些问题的答案显然是否定的。当然，我们经常会对类似的行动事件做出预测，但概率计算在这些预测中并不发挥作用，而且理所当然也不能发挥作用。

First of all，the frequency theorist will remind us that the application of the term probability to a single event—and all abovementioned action events are single events!—is，in richard von Mises’s words，“utter nonsense.” “The theory of probability can never lead to a definite statement concerning a single event。” “It is possible to speak about probabilities only in reference to a properly defined collective.” “The definition of probability 。。。is only concerned with ‘the probability of encountering a certain attribute in a given collective.’” [237]

首先，频率理论家会提醒我们，将“概率”一词应用于单个事件——所有上述行动事件都是单个事件

What，then，are the corresponding collectives or classes to which the above mentioned single events belong as members？ What，for instance，is the class to which the event “I watch basketball on TV tonight” belongs； what is the collective of which “one million german tourists spend 3 to 3.5 million Euros on about three million Bratwursts in Mallorca in 2007” is a member； and what is the appropriate collective for “Linda divorces george？” without a specified collective and a （assumedly） full count of its individual members and their various attributes no numerical probability statement is possible （or is，if made，arbitrary）。

那么，上述单个事件所属的相应集合或类又是什么呢？例如，

From a formallogical point of view，no difficulties arise in meeting such request。For every single event one （or more） corresponding class（es） can be defined.For instance，“I watch basketball on TV tonight” can be considered a member of the class “people watching/not watching basket ball on TV tonight” or “American males” doing so。Or it can be considered an element of the class “I watch basketball on TV nightly。” The one million german Bratwurst eaters on Mallorca can be considered a member of the class “annual per capita Bratwurst expenditure by german tourists on Mal lorca.” “Linda divorces george” can be an element of “females divorcing/ notdivorcing males，” or “Lindas divorcing/notdivorcing georges，” etc。

从形式逻辑的角度看，满足这一要求并不困难。每个事件都可以定义一个（或多个）对应的类。例如，

However，to have a welldefined—and actually counted and sur veyed—collective is only one of the requirements that must be fulfilled to allow the use of numerical probability statements.The second condi tion to be fulfilled is that of “randomness.” in richard von Mises’s words，“only such sequences of events or observations，which satisfy the require ments of complete lawlessness or ‘randomness’ [are true] collectives.” in order to employ the probability calculus，it must be impossible to devise “a method of selecting the elements so as to produce a fundamental change in the relative frequencies.”[238] “The limiting values of the relative frequencies in a collective must be independent of all possible place selections.”[239] Or as Ludwig von Mises expressed the same requirement：for every element of a class it must hold that nothing is known about its attributes under consid eration but that it is an element of this class （and that everything is known about the relative frequency of specified attributes for the class as a whole）。

然而，拥有一个明确界定的、经过实际统计和调查的集合只是使用数字概率说明所必须满足的条件之一。第二个必须满足的条件是

It is in connection with this randomness requirement where Ludwig von Mises （and presumably Knight） see insuperable difficulties in applying probability theory to human actions.true，formallogically for every single action a corresponding collective can be defined.However，ontologically human actions （whether of individuals or groups） cannot be grouped in “true” collectives but must be conceived as unique events.Why？ As Ludwig von Mises would presumably reply，the assumption that one know nothing about any particular event except its membership in a known class is false in the case of human actions； or，as richard von Mises would put it，in the case of human actions we know a “selection rule” the application of which leads to fundamental changes regarding the relative frequency （likelihood） of the attribute in question （thus ruling out the use of the probability calculus）。

IV.

The randomness （or homogeneity） assumption can be made visàvis events of the accident variety。For instance，we know nothing about the attribute of any particular bottle （will it break or not？） except the bottle’s membership in a class of bottles （of which we know the probability of bottles breaking or not）； and we know nothing about the attribute of any particular throw of a die （will it be a six or not？） except the throw’s membership in a class of dice throws （of which we know the probability of throwing sixes）。

随机性（或同质性）假设可以针对意外事件做出。例如，我们对某个瓶子的属性一无所知（它会不会碎裂），只知道它属于某一类瓶子（我们知道瓶子打碎与否的概率）；

In the case of human actions this assumption is incorrect，however。In the case of human actions，“we know，” writes Ludwig von Mises，“with regard to a particular event，some of the factors determin[ing] its outcome.”[240] Hence，insofar as we know more about a single event than merely its membership in a given class of events of which we know the frequency of certain attributes，we are，with regard to human actions，in a better position to make predictions than we are in the case of “accidents，” where nothing about particular events—one bottle’s vs.another’s breaking—is known.

就人的行动而言，这一假设是不正确的，无论如何。路德维希·冯·米塞斯写道，

Whereas natural events—accidents—are occurrences determined by generally，time and place invariantly—blindly and indiscriminately— effective forces within （and constrained by） a “natural environment，” we know actionevents to be occurrences determined by individually，at specific times and places held and effective value judgments，knowledge，and property （acting as a constraint）。That is，we know that human choices and actions result from individual （subjective and momentary） value judgments； that value judgments involve the ranking of valued ends and the presumed correct knowledge of how to reach these ends through some combination of means； and that the valuation of ends and the selection of means are constrained by the quantity and quality of property （possessions） at an individual human actor’s disposal。[241]

自然事件——意外——是由

Based on this general knowledge concerning the nature of human actions as opposed to accidents，then，we are in possession of a method which，according to richard von Mises’s frequency theory，we are most definitely not allowed to possess if the probability calculus is to be applicable： namely a method of “place selection.” We know of no rule how to distinguish one bottle from another as far as breakage is concerned （otherwise they would not be “classed” together）。However，for any presumed collective of actionevents （such as “men watch basketball on TV tonight” or “I watch basketball on TV nightly”） we do know of such a rule.We do know of a method of decomposing and dehomogenizing every conceivable action collective ultimately down to its individual elements （such as “American men，teenagers，I，you，Peter，Paul watch basketball” and “I watch basketball on Monday，Tuesday，Wednesday”）。This method of place selection—the possibility of devising a method of selecting the elements so as to produce a fundamental change in the relative frequencies of the attributes in ques tion—is called “verstehen” （understanding）。

基于这种关于人的行动的性质而非意外的常识，那么，我们就掌握了一种方法，根据理查德

Ludwig von Mises characterizes this method thus：verstehen

deals with the mental activities of men that determine their actions.It deals with the mental processes that result in a definite kind of behavior，with the reactions of the mind to the conditions of the individual’s environment。It deals with some thing invisible and intangible that cannot be perceived by the methods of the natural sciences.This specific understanding of the sciences of human action aims at establishing the facts that men attach a definite meaning to the state of their environment，that they value this state and，motivated by these judgments of value，resort to definite means in order to preserve or to attain a definite state of affairs different from that which would prevail if they abstained from any purposeful reaction.Understanding deals with judgments of value，with the choice of ends and of the means resorted to for the attainment of these ends，and with the valuation of the outcome of actions per formed.

The methods of scientific inquiry are categorically not different from the procedures applied by everybody in his daily mundane comportment。They are merely more refined and as far as possible purified of inconsistencies and contradictions.Understanding is not a method of procedure peculiar only to historians.It is practiced by infants as soon as they outgrow the merely vegetative stage of their first days and weeks…

The concept of understanding was first elaborated by phi losophers and historians who wanted to refute the positivists’ disparagement of the methods of history But the services understanding renders to man in throwing light on the past are only a preliminary stage in the endeavors to anticipate what may happen in the future.Understanding aims at anticipating future conditions as far as they depend on human ideas，valuations，and actions.[242]

路德维希·冯·米塞斯是这样描述这种方法的：

理解处理的是决定人的行动的心理活动。它研究的是导致某种特定行为的心理过程，以及心理对个人所处环境的条件的反应。

Unfortunately，in his characterization of the method of verstehen，Lud wig von Mises fails to expressly identify it as a method of place selection，which leaves his analysis of the categorical distinction between case and class probability in a less than satisfactory state.However，this shortcoming can be rectified by adding two closely related observations to his characterization of versteheN.

遗憾的是，路德维希·冯·米塞斯在描述 “理解”的方法时，没有明确指出它是一种位置选择的方法，这使得他对个案概率和类概率之间的分类区别的分析不太令人满意。然而，只要在他对 “理解”的描述中加入两个密切相关的观点，就可以弥补这一缺陷。

First，it must be added to Mises’s characterization that verstehen is reached，and possibly refined，by means of verbal communication （sym bolic interaction），whether actual or virtual，[243] with the entity exhibiting （or expected to exhibit） a certain behavior or attribute.From this two further elementary insights regarding the distinction between natural （accident） events and actionevents follow.

首先，必须在米塞斯的表述中补充一点，即理解是通过语言交流（符号互动）达成的，也可能是通过语言交流（符号互动）完善的，无论是实际的还是虚拟的，与表现出（或预期表现出）某种行为或属性的实体之间的交流。由此可见，关于自然（意外）事件和行动事件之间的区别，还有两个基本的见解。

on the one hand，it follows that we have an access to some entities：human actors，that we do not have to others such as dice，bottles，stones，or the sun.We can communicate with—and hence understand—the former，but not （with） the latter。Accordingly，we can answer questions concerning human actions that are simply unanswerable in the case of natural events.We do not know，and have no way of finding out，why dice，bottles，stones，or the sun behave the way they do。true，we can refer to natural laws in explaining their behavior。But we do not know why these laws are the way they are.They happen to be this way rather than that，and in this sense the behavior of dice，bottles，stones，and the sun is and forever remains unintelligible to us.In contrast，we do know，and have a method of finding out，why human actors behave in the way they do。Actors have reasons for acting the way they do，and we can understand these reasons，thus rendering their actions intelligible events （rather than mere “happenings”）。[244]

一方面，我们可以和行动人这样的实体沟通，但我们无法与诸如骰子、瓶子、石头或太阳之类的实体沟通。我们可以与前者交流，从而理解前者，但不能与后者交流，也无法理解后者。因此，我们可以回答与人的行动有关的问题，而这些问题在自然事件中是无法回答的。我们不知道，也无从知道，为什么骰子、瓶子、石头或太阳会有这样的行为。没错，我们可以参考自然规律来解释它们的行为。

on the other hand，whereas entities such as dice，bottles，stones，and the sun offer “equal access” to every observer，i.e.，every person is in a position of acquiring the same knowledge of，and reaching the same success in predicting their behavior，such equality is absent in the case of human actions.To be sure，as a matter of empirical fact one person might be more successful than another in predicting the behavior of dice，bottles，stones，and the sun.This may be because one observer possesses cognitive （including mathematical） abilities that another simply does not have or one person has made a new，hitherto unknown discovery。However，in principle，no obstacle stands in the way of anyone learning what another knows or has newly discovered about the behavior of such entities.All knowledge and every new discovery regarding them is public，open，and ready to be acquired by everyone.

另一方面，骰子、瓶子、石头和太阳等实体为每个观察者提供了

In distinct contrast，the access to human actors by means of verbal com munication is not equal and public but privileged and private.Each person has a privileged access to himself。That is，in principle each person is better equipped than anyone else in understanding and predicting his very own actions，and especially his immediately impending actions.By the same token，because every actor has privileged access to himself，the access to other actors—what is called Fremdverstehen or the understanding of “strangers”—is private.That is，each “other” or “stranger” may or may not communicate with someone else and reveal more or less about himself。Or put differently，human actors can reveal or keep secrets，and their investigators accordingly may know more or less about the behavior of this rather than that person，while entities such as dice，bottles，stones，and the sun have no secrets to hide from anyone.

与此形成鲜明对比的是，通过语言交流与行动人的接触不是平等和公开的，而是享有特权和私人性质的。每个人都有接触自己的特权。

Second，these insights regarding the cognitive accessibility of human actors versus noncommunicative entities immediately lead to the final and decisive conclusion：that verstehen via verbal communication represents a unique method of “individualization.” To be sure，in using a System of spatialtemporal coordinates we can always distinguish one die，bottle，or stone from another and likewise one stonethrowing event or one sunrise from another regarding the same stone or sun.But it is precisely our inability of using any other method of individualization that makes it possible to form “collectives” or “classes” of different stones and bottles and of different stone throws and sun rises of one and the same stone and sun.That is，only because we are unable to distinguish one die，bottle，or stone from another and one stone throw or sun rise from another，except through their location in space and time，are we in a position to say，in accordance with Ludwig von Mises’s definition of class probability，that everything is known about the relative frequency of specified attributes for a class as a whole and nothing is known about the behavior of a particular entity but that is a member of this class.

其次，这些关于行动人与非行动人在认知上的可及性的见解立即导致了最后的决定性结论：通过语言交流进行理解是一种独特的

In distinct contrast，in the case of human actors communication offers such other method of individualization.By means of verbal communica tion，we are in a position to precisely distinguish one actor from any other actor and one action of a given actor from any other following action of the same actor。That is，verbal communication represents a method of synchronic as well as diachronic individualization.

与此形成鲜明对比的是，交流为行动人提供了另一种个性化的方法。通过语言交际，我们可以准确地区分一个行动人和其他任何一个行动人，以及同一个行动人的某个行动和其他行动。也就是说，语言交流既是共时个性化的方法，也是历时个性化的方法。

In synchronic perspective，it is impossible to form any actor “collective” made up of Peter，Paul，John，Jim，etc。，because it is manifestly untrue to say that we know nothing about their particular actions but that they are the actions of men，American men or American teenage males，for instance，of which we know the relative frequency of some specified attribute such as buying a sixpack of beer today，for instance.We can communicate with Peter，Paul，John，and Jim，and thus find out about Peter’s value judgments，knowledge，and property constraints，Paul’s value judgments，knowledge，and property constraints，John’s，and Jim’s.Each of them is faced by his own property constraints and has his own reasons for acting the way he does.

在共时视角下，我们不可能形成任何由彼得，保罗，约翰，吉姆等人组成的行动人

Likewise，in diachronic perspective it is impossible to form any actor “collective” made up of me and my actions performed over time or of Peter and his actions，because it is also false to claim that I know nothing about my actions or Peter’s actions today，tomorrow，in one week，or one month from now but that they are my actions or Peter’s actions and I know every thing about the relative frequency of certain attributes within the class of all of my actions or all of Peter’s actions.To say so is untrue for a twofold reason.

同样，从历时的角度来看，不可能形成任何由我和我在一段时间内所做的行动或彼得和他的行动组成的行动人“集合”，因为声称我对今天、明天、一周或一个月后我的行动或彼得的行动一无所知也是错误的，但它们是我的行动或彼得的行动，我知道我的所有行动或彼得的所有行动中某些属性的相对频率。这种说法是不真实的，原因有二。

on the one hand，it is untrue because I know more about my actions or Peter’s actions today，tomorrow，in one week，and so on，than that they are my actions or Peter’s actions.I know that my and Peter’s actions today are the result of my and Peter’s present value judgments，knowledge，and property constraints，and that my and Peter’s actions tomorrow or in one week are the result of my and Peter’s future—tomorrow’s and next week’s— value judgments，knowledge，and property constraints.I know further that regardless of the outcome—success or failure—of my and Peter’s present actions，my and Peter’s future value judgments，knowledge，and property constraints will be changed as a result of our present actions，such that my and Peter’s future actions will be performed by a different me and a different Peter under different constraints.Moreover，I know that the change effected in me and in Peter and our circumstances as a result of our present actions cannot be predicted by us in advance but only be reconstructed after the event，thus requiring continuously renewed efforts of versteheN.[245]

一方面，这是不真实的，因为我对我的行动或彼得今天的行动，明天的行动，一周后的行动等等知道得比它们仅仅是我的行动或彼得的行动更多。

on the other hand and by the same token，we cannot say that we know nothing about the attributes of a particular event but everything about the relative frequency of the same attributes for the entire class of my and Peter’s actions，because the possible attributes of our actions constitute an “open” or “unending” class.For entities such as dice and bottles，for instance，we know all possible attributes.A throw of a die has six possible outcomes and a bottle can either break or not break。And it is only because the number of possible outcomes is thus “closed，” that the notion of a “sufficiently long” series of observations （richard von Mises） can assume any operational meaning。only because the number of possible attributes is definite can we reasonably claim that a series of observations has been “sufficiently long” for all attributes having had a chance of showing up and thus allowing us to cal culate the relative frequency of any one of them.However，if man can learn in unforeseeable ways and the potential attributes of his actions are open ended，then no series of observations can ever be considered “sufficiently long，” and hence，it becomes impossible to calculate the relative frequency of any given attribute within a class of events.

另一方面，出于同样的原因，我们也不能说我们对某一特定事件的属性一无所知，却对我和彼得的整个行动类别中相同属性的相对频率了如指掌，因为我们行动的可能属性构成了一个

V.结论

conclusion

This，then，brings us to our final conclusion.Frank H.Knight and Ludwig von Mises are entirely correct in insisting that the use of numerical prob abilities is impossible in our daily endeavors of predicting our own and our fellow men’s actions.As richard von Mises，the originator of the frequency interpretation of probability，has unambiguously stated：the application of the term probability to a single event is “utter nonsense.” It is possible to speak about numerical probabilities only in reference to a properly defined collective.But ontologically，no such collective exists as far as human actions are concerned.Each human action must be considered a unique event，constituting a class of its own.The method of verstehen through verbal communication represents a technique of synchronic as well as diachronic individualization.By means of verstehen each actor （and each group of actors） can be dehomogenized from any other actor （or group） and every given actor （or group of actors） today can be dehomogenized from the same actor （or the same group） tomorrow.Or in the words of richard von Mises，verstehen provides us with a “selection rule” which prohibits every use of “relative frequency” statements，because，by definition，relative （numerical） frequencies require a class made up of more than just one element。[246]

这就引出了我们最后的结论。

18 捍卫极致理性主义 [247]

in defense of Extreme rationalism

I. 诠释学和修辞学中关于相对主义与理性主义的主张

THE relativism OF HERmeneUTICS AND RHETORIC AND THE CLAIMS OF rationalism

For some time，the philosophy establishment has been under attack by the likes of Paul Feyerabend，Richard Rorty，Hans G.Gadamer，and Jacques Derrida.A movement of sorts that has already won over numerous members of the philosophy profession is steadily gaining ground，not only in such soft fields as literary criticism and sociology，but even in the hard natural sci ences.with Donald McCloskey’s The Rhetoric of Economics,[248] this movement is ready to invade economics.Yet，it is not only the orthodox，neoclassical Chicago economist McCloskey who preaches the new dispensation; there is also G。L。S.Shackle，and at the fringes of the Austrian school of economics are Ludwig Lachmann and the george Mason University hermeneuticians who lend support to the new creed.

有段时间，哲学基础受到了

However

is a desire for constraint—a desire to find “foundations” to which one might cling，frameworks beyond which one must not stray，objects which impose themselves，representations，which cannot be gainsaid.[251]

The dominating notion of epistemology is that to be rational

However

What Rorty terms hermeneutics

Rhetoric is the art of speaking。More broadly it is the study of how people persuadE.[254]

Rhetoric 。。。is the box of tools for persuasion taken together，available to persuaders good and bad.[255]

[Economics should learn its lesson from literary criticisM.] Literary criticism does not merely pass judgments of good or bad; in its more recent forms the question seems hardly to arise.Chiefly it is concerned with making readers see how poets and novelists accomplish their result。An economic criticism 。。。is not a way of passing judgment on economics.It is a way of showing how it accomplishes its result。It applies the devices of literary criticism to the literature of economics.[256]

[The categories truth and falsehood play no role in this endeavor。Scholars] pursue other things，but things that have only an incidental relation with truth.They do so not because they are inferior to philosophers in moral fiber but because they are human.truthpursuing is a poor theory of human motiva tion and nonoperational as a moral imperative.The human scientists pursue persuasiveness，prettiness，the resolution of puzzlement，the conquest of recalcitrant details，the feeling of a job well done，and the honor and income of office.The very idea of truth—with a capital T，something beyond what is merely persuasive to all concerned—is a fifth wheel。If we decide that the quantity theory of money or the marginal productivity theory of distribution is persuasive，interesting，useful，reasonable，appealing，acceptable，we do not also need to know that it is true.[There] are particular arguments, good or bad.After making them，there is no point in asking a last，summarizing question：“Well，is it true?” It’s whatever it is—persuasive，interesting，useful，and so fortH.There is no reason to search for a general quality called truth.[260]

Surely

Consider this

But then

Hence

Yet

Language

Talk

Thus

And there is more.For how can McCloskey or Rorty reconcile their view of science as mere talk with their own advocacy of a talkethic，an ethic described by McCloskey as follows：

Don’t lie [but how could we，if there were no such thing as objective truth？ H.H.H.]； pay attention； don’t sneer； cooper ate； don’t shout； let other people talk； be openminded； explain yourself when asked； don’t resort to violence and conspiracy in aid of your ideas.[265]

Why should we follow his advice of paying attention to talk and not resorting to violence，particularly in view of the fact that what is advocated here is talk of the sort where anything goes and where everything said is just as good a candidate for one’s attention as anything else？ It certainly is not evident that one should pay much attention to talk if that is what talk is all about! Moreover，it would be downright fatal to follow this ethic。For any viable human ethic must evidently allow people to do things other than talk，if only to have a single human survivor who could possibly have any ethical questions； McCloskey’s talkethic，however，gives us precisely such deadly advice of never to stop talking or stop listening to others talk。In addi tion，McCloskey himself and his fellow hermeneuticians must admit that they can have no objective ground for proposing their ethic anyway。For if there are no objective standards of truth，then it must also be the case that one’s ethical proposals cannot claim to be objectively justifiable either。[266] But what is wrong，then，with not being persuaded by all of this and，rather than listening further，hitting McCloskey on the head straightaway rather than waiting until he perishes from following his own prescription of endless talk？ Clearly，if McCloskey were right，nothing could be said to be objectively wrong with this.（In fact，would one not have to conclude that McCloskey could not even say that anything objective had happened？） He might not regard my act of aggression as a contribution to the conversation of man kind （though we know by now that he could not even objectively claim to know this to be the case），but if the talkethic cannot itself be grounded in something objective outside of talk，then if I happened to be persuaded of an ethic of aggression instead，and I ended our conversation once and for all with a preemptive strike，McCloskey could not find anything objectively wrong with this either。

Thus，it is not only intellectual permissiveness that is preached by her meneuticians and rhetoricians，it is total practical permissiveness as well— epistemological and，as the other side of the same coin，ethical relativism.[267]

Yet such relativism is impossible to follow and thus wrong in the most objec tive sense of being literally incompatible with our nature as actors.Just as it is impossible to say and mean to say that there is no such thing as objective truth without in so doing actually presupposing objective criteria for the application of terms，so is it impossible to actually advocate ethical relativ isM.because in order to advocate any ethical position whatsoever，one must be allowed to communicate rather than be coercively shut up and silenced，and thus，contrary to the relativist message itself，its messenger，in bringing it to us，must in fact presuppose the existence of objectively denned abso lute rights.More specifically，he must presuppose those norms of action as valid whose observance makes talk as a special form of cooperation between physically separate talkers possible，while they must also allow everybody to do things other than engage in endless talk； and whose validity must then be regarded as objective and absolute in that no one could possibly ever be alive and talkingly challenge them.[268]

II.

HERmeneUTICS veRSUS EMPIRICISM：rationalism againST both—ROUND I

McCloskey’s and Rorty’s general thesis then，the very thesis that brought them their notoriety，is dead wrong。In fact，McCloskey and Rorty can only do and say what they do because what they say is false.

There is certainly much left to be said about rationalism，the age old opponent of relativism.However，the perennial claims of rationalism remain unchallenged by this most modern，relativist attack：the claim that there exists a common ground on the basis of which objectively true propo sitions can be formulated； the claim that a rational ethic objectively founded in the nature of man as actors and talkers exists； and finally，the claim，only somewhat indirectly established in the previous argument and still to be substantiated，that one can know certain propositions to be objectively true a priori （that is，independent of contingent experiences） as they can be derived deductively from basic，axiomatic propositions whose truth can not be denied objectively without running into a practical contradiction，that is，without presupposing in the very act of denial what is supposedly denied （so that it would be literally impossible to undo the truth of these propositions）。[269]

with this fundamental criticism out of the way，what about McClos key’s pronouncements，if for the sake of argument we are willing to ignore that he cannot really claim to say anything？ It is not entirely surprising，as will be seen，that the general flaw of the book—its lack of argumentative rigor—also comes to bear here.

The very starting point of McCloskey’s argument is marked by a mis conception of the problem he faces.For in order to advance the thesis that economists should conceive of their jobs as keeping the conversation between economists going without ever claiming to say anything true （i.e.，without ever supposing that anyone might ever have a decisive，conversa tionstopping argument at his disposal），McCloskey would have to direct his argument against and refute the most extreme available opposition.He would have to choose as his target the claims of rationalism regarding the epistemological foundations and methodology of economics.And while only accounting for a small minority among today’s theoreticians of economics，there surely exist some such dogmatic，doctrinaire，extremist，abso lutist （or whatever other depreciating label one may choose） rationalists.[270] The foremost representatives of this persuasion are Ludwig von Mises and Murray N.Rothbard，who，within the general framework of a Kantian or，respectively，Aristotelian epistemology，conceive of economics as part of a pure theory of action and choice （praxeology）。[271] Lionel Robbins advances only slightly less uncompromising views，in particular in the first edition of his nature and Significance of Economic Science.[272] And from a very different position within the politicalideological spectrum are Martin Hollis and Edward J。nell，who in their Rational Economic man propound simi lar archrationalist claims regarding the logic of economics.[273] McCloskey would have to attack all of them，since they are the most radical conversa tion stoppers in that they all，despite some important differences，are com pletely uncompromising in insisting that economics not only can and does produce propositions that are objectively true and can be distinguished from propositions that are not，but，moreover，that some propositions of economics are grounded in incontestably true axioms or real （as contrasted with arbitrary，stipulative） definitions，and hence can be given an a priori justification.[274]

However，nowhere in his book does McCloskey attack these various representatives of an archrationalist methodology of economics，nor does he attack anyone else who falls into this camp.Nowhere in his book does he attack，much less refute，the very position that is the polar opposite of his.Robbins，Rothbard，Hollis，and nell are never mentioned in McCloskey’s text，nor do they appear in his bibliography。Nor does Mises’s name appear in the bibliography，but it is mentioned twice in the text in support of some of McCloskey’s own pronouncements.[275] Yet there is no reference to Mises’s extremist，rationalist position.Austrian methodology is only cited in pass ing and described in a way that would strike anyone only faintly familiar with this intellectual tradition as no more than a naive misrepresentation：“Austrian methodology says：The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of interactions among selfish individuals.use statistics gingerly if at all，for they are transitory figments.beware of remarks that do not accord with Austrian methodological precepts.”[276]

Rather than doing battle with his direct logical adversary，McCloskey chooses to establish his own relativist position through an attack on empir icismPositivism.But knocking down empiricismPositivism is no more than knocking down a straw man，in that from its downfall，absolutely nothing follows in support of McCloskey’s own claims.In fact，all of the previously mentioned archrationalists have leveled much harsher criticism against empiricismPositivism and still apparently did not think that in so doing they would commit themselves to relativism.on the contrary，it is their view that any criticism of empiricismPositivism，if it is one that has any intellectual weight at all，would have to vindicate the very claims of rationalism.Thus，and this is the fundamental misconstruction of his entire argument，McCloskey，given his objective，simply fires at the wrong target and，worse，does not seem to notice.

However，as much as empiricismPositivism may deserve to be intellec tually destroyed，McCloskey does not even succeed here.He begins with a description of empiricismPositivism or of economic modernism，as he terms the application of this philosophy to the field of economics，and lists its major precepts：[277] prediction is what ultimately counts in science； there is no objec tive truth without observations； only quantifiable observations are objective data； introspection is subjective and worthless； science is positive and does not deal with normative questions； explaining something positively means bring ing it under a general law； and a general law’s validity is forever hypothetical，requiring permanent testing against objective observational data.

There is little to quarrel with regarding this characterization of mod ernisM.Quite correctly，McCloskey also cites the most influential mod ern exponents of this creed：the Vienna Circle，analytical philosophy，and Popperianism in philosophy proper，[278] as well as such representative figures within the economics profession as T。W.Hutchison，Milton Friedman，and Mark Blaug。[279] And McCloskey is certainly correct，too，in identifying this modernist worldview as the current textbook orthodoxy。Nonetheless，from the outset，his understanding of empiricismPositivism is insufficient in that he fails to reconstruct the fundamental assumptions of modernism （i.e.，those assumptions that underlie its various precepts）。He neglects to assign them a specific place in a general，logically unified conceptual struc ture.He fails to clarify that the various specific modernist precepts flow essentially from the acceptance of one crucial assumption.The assumption，fundamental to modern empiricism，is that knowledge regarding reality，or empirical knowledge，must be verifiable or at least falsifiable by experience； that whatever is known by experience could have been otherwise，or，put differently，that nothing about reality could be known to be true a priori； that all a priori true statements are simply analytical statements that have no factual content，but are true by convention，representing merely tautologi cal information about the use and the transformation rules of signs； that all cognitively meaningful statements are either empirical or analytical，but never both； and hence that normative statements，because they are neither empirical nor analytical，cannot legitimately contain any claim to truth，but must be regarded instead as mere expressions of emotions，saying in effect no more than “wow” or “grr。”[280] And in failing to clarify this，McCloskey precipitates his subsequent failure to bring even empiricismPositivism，his chosen opponent，down.His attack is simply unSystematic，and it thereby necessarily misses its goal。

McCloskey’s first criticism is well targeted.He shows that contrary to the claims of Popper and his school in particular，following the advice of the empiricistfalsificationist philosophy would ultimately lead one to skepticism.Whenever a hypothetical law is empirically tested and found to be lacking，within the very framework of an empiricist methodology it is always possible to immunize one’s theory by denying the recalcitrant obser vations outright and declaring them illusory，by acknowledging them but ascribing their recalcitrance to measurement errors，or by postulating some unobserved，intervening variable，whose lack of control is to blame for the seemingly falsifying observations.Observes McCloskey：

Insulation from crucial test is the substance of most scientific disagreement。Economists and other scientists will complain to their fellows，“Your experiment was not properly controlled”； “You have not solved the identifiation problem”； “You have used an equilibrium （competitive，singleequation） model when a disequilibrium （monopolistic，500equation） model is rel evant” … There is no “falsification” going on.[281]

And，he remarks further，have we not known since Thomas Kuhn’s Struc ture of Scientific revolutions [282] that the actual history of natural science does not seem to come anything close to the Popperian illusion of science as a rational enterprise steadily advancing through a neverending process of successive falsification.“Falsification，near enough，has been falsified.”[283]

McCloskey also shows some understanding of the sociopsychology of modernist methodology：a philosophy such as empiricism，that starts with the assumption that nothing about reality can be known with certainty and hence everything is possible，and that has no place for anything such as objective a priori considerations； an epistemology，that is to say，that puts us under no constraints whatsoever when it comes to choosing our variables to be measured and determining the relation between such variables （except insofar as the chosen relation must fit the data），can be followed by almost everyone and almost everyone can justly feel that if this is what science is all about，he can be as good a scientist as anyone else.Anyone can measure whatever he feels like measuring，then with the help of a computer fit some curves or equations on his data material，and finally change or not change the curves or equations depending on new，incoming material and/or new hypotheses about measurement error or uncontrolled intervening variables.Empiricism is a methodology suited to the intellectually poor，hence its popularity。[284] Notes McCloskey：

Graduate students in the social sciences view courses in econo metrics，sociometrics，or psychometrics as courses in how to become applied economists，sociologists，or psychologists… The delusion is nourished by democracy，which partly explains its special prevalence in America.Everyone of normal intelli gence can after such a course decipher the output of the Statisti cal Package for Social Sciences.No elite culture is necessary，no longer subordination to Doktor Herr Professor，[285] no knowledge accumulated through middle age.[286]

Quite naturally，he sees all this as strong talk against modernist epis temology。And indeed，it might be enough to persuade someone to cease giving credence to modernism，and that would certainly be for the bet ter。But even if true，does it constitute proof of a Systematic flaw in the empiricistpositivist philosophy？ And does it constitute proof in the hands of a hermeneutician？

As regards this latter question，it must be noted that for McCloskey himself to understand his statements about modernism as a criticism of this philosophy should strike one as simply odd.For in his discussion of empir icismPositivism，he clearly blames this philosophy for allowing scientists to engage in some alltoopervasive intellectual permissiveness； for producing a science that advances nowhere but is a mere random walk of ideas through time to be understood only ex post by historical or sociological explana tion； and thereby for opening the floodgates to the invasion of scholarship by intellectual barbarians.Yet McCloskey wants to replace this permissive ness with an even greater one.He wants us to engage in talk，endless and unconstrained by any intellectual discipline whatsoever。Thus，instead of criticizing empiricismPositivism，should he not embrace it enthusiasti cally for already coming so very close indeed to his own relativist ideals？ If empiricism sounds ridiculous to McCloskey，his reason for this can only be that it is just not ridiculous enough，that empiricism is ridiculous because hermeneutics is even more so，and that pure nonsense must prevail over only partial nonsense.

Yet，apart from McCloskey’s own position，his arguments directed against modernism cannot count as amounting to anything。“So what，” the empiricist could reply。McCloskey has shown that following the modernist precepts leads to a peculiar form of relativism.Admittedly，some empiricists，most notably Popper and his school，have not and still do not recognize this.[287] McCloskey is right in pointing this out again.But then he must admit that this has also been realized by empiricists without causing them much intellectual paiN.Was it not Feyerabend who first and most forcefully drove the relativist message home to Popperianism？[288] And was not he himself a leader of this very school who simply drew the ultimate logical conclu sions of Popperianism？ [289] Empiricism cannot explain the process of scientific development as a rational enterprise.true enough.But it cannot account for it because the process is not rational。And what is wrong with this？ What is wrong with empiricism once it admits its own relativism？

McCloskey gives no answer to these questions.He does not advance any principled arguments that would prove empiricism to be a selfdefeat ing position.Nor does he challenge empiricism on the much more obvi ous empirical front。It would seem to be evident that at least empiricism’s claim of providing us with a correct epistemology of the natural sciences should，in view of the facts，be regarded as incorrect。For whatever the true state of affairs with respect to economics and the social sciences might be，with respect to the natural sciences it seems difficult to deny that hand in hand with their development went a steady，universally recognized process of technological advancement and improvement，and that this fact of tech nological progress can hardly be brought in line with the empiricist view of science as a relativistic，noncumulative enterprise.Empiricism then simply seems to have been empirically refuted as an appropriate methodology for the natural sciences.[290]

Yet such a refutation in no way supports McCloskey’s own position.For the existence of technological progress would have to stand just as much in the way of hermeneutical relativism as in that of empiricisM.[291] only a ratio nalist methodology of the natural sciences could account for such progress.only a methodology that begins with the recognition of the fact，as an undeniably true fact of our human nature as actors and talkers，that language in general and scientific theories in particular are ultimately grounded in a common，objective reality of action and cooperation can explain why such progress is possible without thereby having to deny some partial correctness of Kuhn and Feyerabend’s relativistic portrayals of the history of the natural sciences.

The relativistic impression is due to the fact that Kuhn and Feyerabend，typical of empiricists since Locke and Hume，ultimately misconceive of scientific theories as mere Systems of verbal propositions and Systematically ignore the foundation of these，or of any，propositions in a reality of action and interaction.[292] only if one regards observations and theories as being completely detached from action and cooperation，not only does any single theory become immunizable，but any two rival theories whose respective terms cannot be reduced to and defined in terms of each other must then appear completely incommensurable and no rational choice is possible.If statements are merely and exclusively verbal expressions hanging in mid air，what reason could there be for any one statement to ever give way to another？ Any one statement can perfectly well stand alongside any other one without ever being challenged—unless we simply decide otherwise for whatever arbitrary reason.It is this that Kuhn and Feyerabend demonstrate.But this does not affect the refutability of any one theory and the commen surability of rival theories on the entirely different level of applying these theories in the reality of action，of using them as instruments of action.on the level of mere words，theories may be irrefutable and incommensurable，but practically they can never be.In fact，one could not even state that any single theory was irrefutable or any two theories were incommensurable and in what respect，unless one were to presuppose a common categorical framework that could serve as a basis for such an assessment or compari son.And it is this practical refutability and commensurability of theories of natural science that explains the possibility of technological progress—even though it accounted for technological progress in quite a different manner than Popper’s failed attempt。[293]

Popper would have us throw out any theory that is contradicted by any fact，which，if at all possible，would leave us virtually emptyhanded，going nowhere.In recognizing the insoluble connection between theo retical knowledge （language） and actions，rationalism would instead deem such falsificationism，even if possible，as completely irrational。There is no situation conceivable in which it would be reasonable to throw away any theory—conceived of as a cognitive instrument of action—that had been successfully applied in a past situation but proves unsuccessful in a new application—unless one already had a more successful theory at hand.And to thus immunize a theory from experience is perfectly rational from the point of view of an actor。And it is just as rational for an actor to regard any two rivals，in their range of application overlapping theories t1 and t2 as incommensurable as long as there exists a single application in which t1 is more successful than t2 or vice versa.only if t1 can be as successfully applied as t2 to every single instance to which t2 is applicable but still has more and different applications than t2 can it ever be rational to discard t2。To discard it any earlier，because of unsuccessful applications or because t1 could in some or even in most situations have been applied more successfully，would from the point of view of a knowing actor not be progress but retrogression.And even if t2 is rationally discarded，progress is not achieved by falsifying it，as t2 would actually have had some successful applications that could never possibly be nullified by anything （in the future）。Instead，t1 would outcompete t2 in such a way that any further clinging to t2，though of course possible，would be possible only at the price of not being able to successfully do everything that an adherent of t1 could do who could successfully do as much and more than any proponent of t2。

Trivial as such an account of the possibility of progress （as well as retro gression） in the natural sciences may seem，it is incompatible with empiri cisM.In Systematically ignoring the fact that observations and theories are those of an actor，made and built in order to act successfully，empiricism has naturally deprived itself of the very criterion against which knowledge is continually tested and commensurated：the criterion of successfully or unsuccessfully reaching a set goal in applying knowledge in a given situ ation.[294] without the explicit recognition of the universal operativeness of the criterion of instrumental success，relativism was inescapable.However，such relativism would once more literally be impossible to adopt，because it is incompatible with our nature as acting talkers and knowers.relativ ism could not even meaningfully claim to deny the operativeness of this criterion，as this very denial would itself have to be an action that presup posed some objective standard of success.Rather，in each of our actions，we confirm rationalism’s claim （as regards the natural sciences） that one can objectively identify a range of applications for some knowledge and then test it for its success within this range，and，hence，that competing theories must be considered commensurable as regards such ranges of applications and success.

III.

HERmeneUTICS veRSUS EMPIRICISM：rationalism againST both—ROUND II

McCloskey’s first round against empiricism then is a complete failure.Nor is his second round of criticism any more successful。There，McCloskey takes issue with the modernists’ emphasis on prediction as the cornerstone of science.Though he does not deny the possibility of prediction in the natural sciences，he doubts its overwhelming importance.However，predic tion in economics，he claims，is impossible.“Predicting the economic future is，as Ludwig von Mises put it，‘beyond the power of any mortal man.’” [295]

In order to defend this thesis，we would expect him to establish two sep arate but related claims.First would be the claim that something is wrong with methodological monism—the program of an Einheitswissenschaft— and methodological dualism should be adopted.otherwise it makes no sense to say that predictions are possible in one field of inquiry but impossible in another。The second claim would be that on the basis of such a dualist position，it can be demonstrated why predictions are possible in one field but not in another。McCloskey does nothing of this sort。It entirely escapes his notice that his position visàvis modernism requires him to attack empiricism on account of its monism； that its monist stand makes it actually impossible for empiricism to explain how predictions，which allegedly constitute the very heart of the empiricist program，can conceiv ably be possible—and impossible for precisely the same reason that empiri cism could not account for the possibility of progress in natural science； and that a dualist position （which McCloskey would be required to take if he wanted to Systematically challenge modernism） would be incompat ible with hermeneutics—itself being a monist position，though a different sort than empiricism’s—and can again only be reconciled with a rationalist methodology，which alone can account for the possibility of the empiricist dream of predictions.

Empiricism is observational monism，stating that all our empirical knowledge is derived from observations and consists in interrelating these observations； and，further，that observations as well as relations have the permanent status of only being true hypothetically。This is the case in economics as well as in any other field concerned with empirical knowledge，and hence the problem of prediction must be the same everywhere.McClo skey does not answer this Systematic challenge.He does not present the conclusive refutation of such monism by pointing out that in claiming what empiricism claims，one in fact falsifies the content of one’s statement。For to claim what it claims，empiricism must actually presuppose that in addition to observations，meaningful objects exist—words tied to reality via coop eration—that，along with the relations among them，must be understood rather than observed.Hence the need for methodological dualisM.[296]

Nor does McCloskey notice the incompatibility of observational monism with the notion of prediction.The idea of prediction and causality （i.e.，that there are constant，timeinvariantly operating causes that allow one to project past observations regarding the relationship between variables into the future） is something （as empiricism since Hume has noticed） that has no observational basis and hence cannot be said to be justified （within the empiricist framework）。one cannot observe the connecting link between observations，except that they are somehow contingently related in time.And even if one could observe it，this observation would still not prove that such an observed connection was timeinvariant。Strictly speaking，within the framework of observational monism，it does not even make sense to place observations in objective time.[297] Rather，the observed relationships are those between data in the temporal order in which an observer happens to observe them （clearly something very different from our notion of being able to distinguish between a real，causally effective order and sequence of observations and the mere temporal order in which observations are made）。Hence，strictly speaking，according to empiricism，predictions are epistemo logically impossible.It is irrational to want to predict，because the very pos sibility of prediction cannot be rationally established.And this，then，is also the ultimate reason for empiricism’s skeptical stand regarding the possibility of scientific progress.For if one cannot rationally defend the very idea of causality，how can one expect anything from science but an array of incom mensurable observational statements？ Progress，as it is commonly under stood，is the advancement of predictive knowledge.But surely no such thing can be possible if prediction itself cannot be established as possible.[298]

McCloskey also does not confront the challenge of explaining how hermeneutics accounts for a dualism and the very possibility of prediction （if only in the natural sciences）。Nor could he have succeeded in this.For an argument such as dualism would establish that certain propositions can be said to be objectively true—in fact to be a priori true—and this would contradict the relativist message of hermeneutics.Yet as a monist position，hermeneutics cannot account for causality any more than empiricism caN.As an observational monism，empiricism would like to reduce all our empirical knowledge to observations and observations of contingent relations between observations，and it is therefore ultimately forced to abandon the idea of timeinvariantly operating causes.Hermeneutics would like to reduce it to a talkmonism； to talk disconnected to anything real outside of talk itself； to sequences of talk hanging in midair with no objective，talk constraining grounding whatsoever。For this reason，hermeneutics cannot account for causality。For in the absence of any common，objective standard，all talk is simply incommensurable，and no objective connection whatsoever can exist between any talk apart from the mere temporal order of talking。

both dualism and causality can only be explained by rationalism.rationalism begins with the insight that empiricism is selfrefuting，since it cannot actually state its own position without implicitly admitting that in addition to observations and contingent relations of observations，other meaningful things and relations （i.e.，words sustained through action and acquiring meaning in the course of such action） must also exist。Similarly，rationalism rejects hermeneutics as selfrefuting，because a talkmonism，too，could not be stated without implicitly admitting it as false in that it would have to presuppose the very existence of actions guided by observations，if only in order to sustain talk—thus falsifying the claim of talk ever being unconstrained by anything objective.And rationalism then concludes that the key to the problem of causality must lie in the recognition of the fact （ignored by both empiricism and hermeneutics） that observations as well as words are constrained by action，and that this can be established neither by observation nor by mere talk，but rather must be understood on account of our knowledge of action as the practical presupposition of any observation or talk as an a priori true fact of human nature.

It is from such a priori understanding of action that the idea of causal ity can indeed be derived.[299] Causality is not a category of observations.It is a category of action whose knowledge as an a priori feature of reality is rooted in our very understanding of our nature as actors.only because we are actors and our experiences are those of acting individuals can observations be conceived of as occurring objectively earlier or later and as being related to each other through timeinvariantly operating causes.[300] No one who did not know what it meant to act could ever experience events occur ring in real time and in invariant causal sequences.And no one’s knowledge of the meaning of action and causality could ever be said to be derived from contingent observational evidence，as the very fact of experiencing already presupposes action and causally interpreted observations.Every action is and must be understood as an interference with the observational world，made with the intent of diverting the “natural” course of events in order to produce （i.e.，to cause to come into being） a different，preferred state of affairs—of making things happen that otherwise would not happen—and thus presupposes the notions of events placed in objective time and of time invariantly operating causes.An actor can err with respect to his particular assumptions about which earlier interference produced which later result，and thus his interference might not actually turn out to be successful。But successful or not，any action，changed or unchanged in light of its success or failure，presupposes that there are constantly connected events in time，even if no particular cause for any particular event can ever be preknown to any actor at any time.In fact，attempting to disprove that observational events are governed by timeinvariantly operating causes would require one to show that some given event cannot be observed or produced based on some earlier interference.Yet trying to disprove this would again necessar ily presuppose that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the phenomenon under scrutiny could，in fact，be effected by taking appropriate action，and that the phenomenon must thus presumably be embedded in a network of constantly operating causes.Hence，rationalism concludes that the validity of the principle of causality cannot be falsified by taking any action，since any action would have to presuppose it。[301]

McCloskey notices none of this.And so it is no surprise that the argu ments raised in support of his claim regarding the impossibility of prediction in economics are off the mark，too。Though in themselves correct arguments，they simply do not constitute the impossibility theorem that is needed.

What McCloskey offers as proof，which he incidentally claims to be “more precise” than some earlier，related Austrian thoughts，[302] is the follow ing insight：“If economists could do [predict] better than business people，the economists would be rich.They are not。”[303] Hence，we should not trust people who claim to have information about future economic events.For if they really did have such knowledge，why would they not strike it rich，instead of telling us how to do it？[304] realistically，we should regard economic forecasters as providing information that，generally speaking，is economi cally worthless in that it tells us no more about future economic events than what concerned people on the average believe and expect anyway and have already accounted for in their present actions.[305]

Good enough.However，a much more succinct presentation than this can already be found in Mises.

There are no rules according to which the duration of the boom or of the following depression can be computed.And even if such rules were available they would be of no use to businessmen.What the individual busi nessman needs in order to avoid losses is knowledge about the date of the turning point at a time when other businessmen still believe that the crash is farther away than is really the case.Entrepreneurial judgment can not be bought on the market。The entrepreneurial idea that carries on and brings profit is precisely that idea which did not occur to the majority。It is not correct foresight as such that yields profits，but foresight better than that of the rest。[306]

Yet this，as Mises but not McCloskey knows，does not prove the impos sibility of causal predictions in economics.[307] All it proves is that differential profits can only emerge from differences in knowledge.The question is，how ever，if such knowledge—regardless of whether it is unequally distributed and thus allows for the possibility of differential profits and losses，or equally distributed and thus tends to only account for a uniform rate of return for the forecasters—is such that it could be expressed in a prediction formula that could legitimately make use of the assumption of timeinvariant causes and hence could be conceived of as a Systematically testable and improvable formula.

Surely McCloskey does not want to deny the possibility of prediction as such in economics.We constantly make such predictions.Moreover，while economic forecasters may not generally be rich and thus evidently may not know more than the rest of us，some of them are，and certainly there are some businessmen who are rich.Evidently，people not only can forecast，but can forecast correctly and successfully。The impossibility theorem cannot be meant to prove that no （successful） prediction whatsoever can be made in the field of economics，but rather only that a certain type of prediction is impossible here that is possible elsewhere.Yet the argument does not prove this.For we have no difficulties applying the idea of differential predictive knowledge and differential returns from forecasting to the field of the natural sciences， and still conceiving of them as gradually progressing and producing ever improved prediction formulaE.one naturalscience forecaster may know more than another and even stay ahead of the competition permanently，but this does not imply that his relative advantage is not one that could not possibly be expressed，at all times，in terms of a formula that uses predictive constants and is capable of Systematic improvement by means of successive testings.Why，then，should this be any different in the realm of economic forecasting？ Why can the rich businessman not have gained his position in the same way as the relatively more successful naturalscience forecaster？

This is what must be answered by the impossibility theoreM.on this，however，McCloskey is silent。Nor can an answer be formulated by a her meneuticiaN.For an impossibility theorem would be precisely the kind of conversationstopping argument that McCloskey claims to be nonexistent。To prove that economic forecasting is categorically different from natural science forecasting would only mean confirming the claims of rationalism.such proof would not have relativistic consequences regarding economic predictions as it may at first seem—such as to say that no Systematic mistake whatsoever could be made by an economic forecaster and that any economic forecast’s failure or success would thus be due entirely to bad or good luck。Instead，even if it were to show that there were indeed some ineradicable ele ment of luck in economic forecasting，making progress as it exists in tech nological forecasting impossible in the field of economics，at the same time such proof would establish the existence of a priori true propositions on the subject matter of economics，which would then Systematically constrain the range of possible predictions about future economic events and open up the possibility of predictions that were Systematically flawed in that they would be at variance with such fundamental，a priori valid knowledge.

And indeed，argues rationalism，economic predictions that would make use of the assumption of timeinvariantly operating causes must thus be considered Systematically flawed.[308] While every action presupposes causal ity，no actor can conceive of his actions as ever being predictable on the basis of constantly operating causes.Causality can only be assumed to exist out side of the field of human action，and economic predictions as predictions concerning future actions are impossible.This follows from the very mod ernism that McCloskey criticizes，incidentally proving this position a self refuting one once again.Empiricism claims that actions，just as any other phenomenon，can and must be explained by means of causal hypotheses that can be confirmed or falsified by experience.Now，if this were the case，empiricism would be forced to assume—contrary to its own doctrine that there is no a priori knowledge about reality—that timeinvariantly operat ing causes with respect to actions exist。one would not know a priori which particular event might be the cause of a particular action.Experience would have to reveal this.But in order to proceed in the way that empiricism wants us to proceed （i.e.，to relate different experiences regarding sequences of events as either confirming or falsifying each other and，if falsifying，then responding with a reformulation of the causal hypothesis），a constancy over time in the operation of causes as such must be presupposed.（without such an assumption，the different experiences would simply be unrelated，incom mensurable observations.[309]） However，if this were true and actions could indeed be conceived of as governed by timeinvariantly operating causes，what about explaining the explainers （i.e.，the persons who carry on the very process of creating hypotheses） of verification and falsification？ Evidently，in order to assimilate confirming or falsifying experiences—to replace old hypotheses with new ones—one must presumably be able to learn.How ever，if one is able to learn from experience，then one cannot know at any given time what one will know at a later time and how one will act based on this later knowledge.Rather，one can only reconstruct the causes of one’s actions after the event，as one can only explain one’s knowledge after one already possesses it。Thus，the empiricist methodology applied to the field of knowledge and action，which contains knowledge as its necessary ingredi ent，is simply contradictory—a logical absurdity。[310]

Moreover，it is plainly contradictory to argue that one could ever predict one’s knowledge and actions based on antecedent，constantly operating causes.For to argue so is not only absurd because it implies that one can know now what one will know in the future； it is also selfdefeating，because to do so would actually be saying that there was something that was not yet understood，but rather had to be learned about and examined as regards the acceptability of its validity claims，with as yet unknown results with respect to the outcome of this （either for our future knowledge，or for our and others’ knowledge about the knowledge of others）。

Thus，as McCloskey states，yet does not prove，causal empirical expla nations regarding knowledge and actions are indeed impossible.Whoever pretends，as empiricist economists invariably do，to be able to predict future knowledge and actions based on constantly operating antecedent variables is simply speaking nonsense.There are no such constants in the field of human action，as Mises insisted over and over again.Economic forecast ing is not and never can be a science，but will always be a Systematically unteachable art。Yet，and I shall return to this shortly，this does not mean that such forecasts would not be constrained by anything。While no particular action can ever be predicted scientifically，each and every prediction of future actions and the consequences of actions is constrained by our a priori knowledge of actions as such.

IV.

rationalism AND THE FOUNDATIonS OF EConOMICS

In the second round of its criticism of empiricismPositivism，hermeneu tics fails just as it failed in the first。And again it is philosophical rational ism—equally critical of hermeneutics and empiricism—that is vindicated.Yet McCloskey makes one more point worth mentioning，as he reminds us that modern hermeneutics is an outgrowth of the discipline of inter preting the Bible.[311] in line with this traditionalist orientation，the case for hermeneutics ultimately boils down to an uncritical appeal to and accep tance of authority。We are asked by McCloskey to embrace the new old creed because some authorities tell us to do so。In his view，empiricism is not wrong as such—as a matter of fact，there was a time when it was quite all right to follow empiricist advice.But that was when philosophical authori ties were all sold on empiricisM.In the meantime，empiricism is out of favor with the philosopher kings and only the practitioners of science still cling to it—not realizing that fashion has changed.It is high time，then，that we shift and follow the new trend setters.Writes McCloskey：“The argument that Hutchison，Samuelson，Friedman，Machlup，and their followers gave for adopting their metaphysics was an argument from authority，at the time correct，namely that this was what philosophers were saying。The trust in philosophy was a tactical error，for philosophy itself was changing as they spokE.”[312] And the same goes for the mathematization of economics.once it was good； now it is becoming bad.The winds of fashion change and we had better pay attention to this.“Economists before the reception of mathemat ics fell headlong。。。into confusions that a little mathematics would have cleared up.” Imagine，they

could not keep clear，for instance，the difference between a movement of an entire curve and a movement along a curve.But now，so long after the victory，one might ask whether the faith which supported it still serves a social function.one might ask whether the strident talk of Science in economics，which served well in bringing clarity and rigor to the field，has outlived its usefulness.[313]

Surely，this lives up again to truly relativistic form.Yet as we have seen，there is no reason in the world to accept such relativism.relativism is a selfcontradictory position.And just as it is impossible to defend the her meneutical relativism as the methodology of today，so is it impossible to defend the empiricismPositivism of yesterday。EmpiricismPositivism，too，is a selfdefeating doctrine，and not only because of its observational monism，which cannot be stated without implicitly admitting its false hood and accepting a dualism of observable and meaningful phenomena to be understood on account of our knowledge of action and cooperation.Empiricism’s fundamental distinction between analytical，empirical，and normative propositions is equally indefensible.What then is the status of the very proposition introducing this distinction？ Assuming that empiricist reasoning is correct，it must be either an analytical or an empirical proposition，or it must be an expression of emotions.If it is understood as analyti cal，then according to its own doctrine it is merely verbal quibble，saying nothing about anything real but rather only defining one sound or sign by another，and hence one would simply have to reply “so what？” The same response would be appropriate，if，instead，the basic empiricist proposition were taken to be an empirical one.For if this were so，it would not only have to be admitted that the propositions might well be wrong。More decisively， as an empirical proposition，the most it could state would be a historical fact and it would thus be entirely irrelevant in determining whether or not it would be impossible to ever produce either a priori true propositions that were not analytical or normative propositions that were not emotive.And finally，if the empiricist line of reasoning were assumed to be an emo tive argument，then according to its own pronouncements，it is cognitively meaningless and one would not have to pay any more attention to it than to a dog’s bark。Thus，one must again conclude that empiricismPositivism is an utter failure.If it were correct，its basic premise could not even be stated as a cognitively meaningful proposition； and if it could be so stated and empiricism were indeed making the proposition that we all along thought it did，then the analyticalempiricalnormative distinction would be proven false by the very proposition introducing it。[314]

How then，could it ever have been right to follow a false doctrine？ To conceive of economics，or more precisely of actions，as empiricism does，and accordingly to treat economic phenomena as observable variables，mea surable and tractable by mathematical reasoning，must have always been wrong。And the surge of Positivism in economics could never have added to clarity，but from the very beginning must have helped instead to introduce ever more falsehoods into the field.

There is empirical knowledge that is valid a priori。And such knowledge informs us that it has never been correct to represent relationships between economic phenomena in terms of equations containing the assumption of empirical causal constants，because to conceive of actions as being caused by and predictable on the basis of antecedent variables is contradictory。More over，the very same a priori knowledge reveals that it is at all times incorrect to conceive of economic variables as observable magnitudes.Rather，all cat egories of action must be understood as existing only as subjective interpre tations of observable events.The fact that knowledge and talk are those of an actor，and constrained by our nature as actors，cannot be observed，but rather must be understood.Nor can causality or objective time ever be sim ply observed，but our knowledge of it is based on our prior understanding of what it is to act。And so it is regarding the rest of the economic catego ries，as Mises above all has shown.There are no values to be observed，but things can be understood as valued only because of our prior knowledge of action.As a matter of fact，that there is such a thing as actions also cannot be observed，but must be understood.It cannot be observed that with every action，an actor pursues a goal and that whatever his goal，the fact that it is pursued by an actor reveals that he places a relatively higher value on it than on any other goal of action that he at the very start of his action could think of。Further，it can neither be observed that in order to achieve his most highly valued goal an actor must interfere （or decide not to interfere） at an earlier point in time to produce some later result，nor that such interferences invariably imply the employment of some scarce means （at least those of the actor’s body，its standing room，and the time absorbed by the interference）。It is unobservable （1） that these means must also have value for an actor— a value derived from that of the goal—because the actor must think their employment necessary in order to effectively achieve the goal and （2） that actions can only be performed sequentially，always involving the making of a choice （i.e.，taking up that course of action that at some given point in time promises the most highly valued result to the actor and excluding at the same time the pursuit of other，less highly valued goals）。It cannot be observed that as a consequence of having to choose and give preference to one goal over another—of not being able to realize all goals simultaneously—each and every action implies the incurrence of costs （i.e.，forsaking the value attached to the most highly valued alternative goal that cannot be realized or whose realization must be deferred because the means necessary to effect it are bound up in the production of another even more highly valued end）。

And lastly，it is unobservable that at its starting point，every goal of action must be considered （1） worth more to the actor than its costs and （2） capable of yielding a profit （i.e.，a result whose value is ranked higher than that of the forgone opportunities，and yet that every action is also invariably open to the possibility of a loss if an actor finds，in retrospect，that the actually achieved result—contrary to previous expectations—in fact has a lower value than the relinquished alternative would have had）。

All of these categories （values，ends，means，choice，preference，cost，profit and loss，time，and causality） are implied in the concept of action.That one is able to interpret experiences in such categories requires that one already knows what it means to act。No one who is not an actor could ever understand them，as they are not “given，” ready to be experienced，but experience is cast in these terms as it is constructed by an actor。And then to treat such concepts，as empiricismPositivism would，as things extending in space and allowing quantifiable measurements is missing the goal entirely。Whatever one might explain in following empiricist advice，it has nothing whatsoever to do with explaining actions and experiences cast in the catego ries of action.These categories are ineradicably subjective ones.And yet they represent empirical knowledge in that they are conceptual organizations of real events and occurrences.They are not merely verbal definitions； they are real definitions of real things and real observations.[315] Furthermore，they are not only empirical knowledge； contrary to all relativistic aspirations， they incorporate a priori valid empirical knowledge.For it would clearly be impossible to disprove their empirical validity，as the attempt to do so would itself be an action aimed at a goal，requiring means，excluding other courses of action，incurring costs，and subjecting the actor to the possibility of achieving or not achieving the desired goal and so making a profit or suffering a loss.The very possession of such knowledge can never be disputed，and the validity of these concepts can never be falsified by any contingent experience，since disputing or falsifying anything already presupposes its very existence.As a matter of fact，a situation in which these categories of action would cease to have a real existence could itself never be observed，as making an observation is in itself an action.

Economic reasoning has its foundations in this a priori knowledge of the meaning of action.[316] It concerns phenomena that，though existing objectively，cannot be subjected to physical measurements，but must be understood as conceptually distinct events.And it concerns phenomena that cannot be predicted based on constantly operating causes； and our predictive knowledge about such phenomena，accordingly，cannot be said to be constrained by contingent empirical laws （i.e.，laws that one would have to discover through a posteriori experiences）。Instead，it concerns objects and events that are constrained by the existence of a priori valid，logical，or praxeological laws and constraints （i.e.，laws whose validity is completely independent of any kind of a posteriori experience）。Economic reasoning consists of （1） an understanding of the categories of action and the meaning of a change in values，preferences，knowledge，means，cost，profit，or loss，and so on，（2） a description of a situation in which these categories assume specific meaning and definite individuals are described as actors，with definite things specified as their goals，means，profits，and costs，and （3） a logical deduction of the consequences which result from the introduction of some specified action in this situation，or of the consequences which result for an actor if this situation is changed in a specified way。Provided there is no flaw in the process of deduction，the conclusions that such reasoning yields are valid a priori because their validity would ultimately go back to the indisputable axiom of action.If the situation and the changes introduced into it are fiction or assumptions，then the conclusions are true a priori only of a possible world.If，on the other and，the situation and situational changes can be identified as real，perceived，and conceptualized as such by real actors，then the conclusions are a priori true propositions about the world as it really is.And such realistic conclusions，which are the econo mists’ main concern，act as logical constraints on our actual predictions of future economic events.They do not guarantee correct predictions—even if the empirical assumptions are indeed correct and the deductions are flaw less—because in reality，there can be all sorts of situational changes hap pening concurrently or following the explicitly introduced change in the actionworld data.And though they also affect the shape of things to come （and cancel，increase，decrease，accelerate，or decelerate effects stemming from other sources），such concurrent changes can in principle never be predicted or experimentally held constant，because to conceive of subjective knowledge （whose every change has an impact on action） as predictable on the basis of antecedent variables and as capable of being held constant is an outright absurdity。The experimenter who so wanted to hold it con stant would in fact have to presuppose that his knowledge，specifically his knowledge regarding the experiment’s outcome，could not be assumed to be constant over time.However，while they cannot render any specific future economic event certain or even predictable on the basis of a formula，such a priori conclusions nonetheless Systematically restrict the range of possibly correct predictions.Predictions that are not in line with such knowledge would be Systematically flawed and would lead to a Systematically increased number of forecasting errors—not in the sense that anyone who based his predictions on correct praxeological reasoning would necessarily have to be a better predictor of future economic events than someone who arrived at his predictions through logically flawed deliberations and chains of reason ing，but in the sense that in the long run，ceteris paribus，the first group of forecasters would average a better record than the second.

regarding any specific forecast，it is very possible to falter despite one’s correct identification of a situational change as described in terms of the a priori categories of action and one’s correct analysis of the praxeological consequences of such change，because one might err regarding one’s iden tification of other，accompanying changes.It is equally possible to arrive at a correct forecast in spite of the fact that one’s inferences drawn from one’s correct description of a situational change were praxeologically wrong，because other concurrent events might be of such a kind as to counteract such a wrong assessment of consequences.However，if it is assumed that，on the average，forecasters with or without a solid grasp of praxeological laws and constants are both equally well equipped to anticipate such other concurrent changes in the actionworld and to account for them in their predictions，then the group of forecasters that makes its predictions in rec ognition of and accordance with such laws will be more successful than that which does not。

As are all economic theorems，the law of demand （which causes empir icists as well as hermeneuticians considerable uneasiness because of its apo dictically assumed central position in economics） is an a priori true con straint on actual predictions regarding the consequences of certain actions.Empiricism tells us to conceive of it as an inprinciple falsifiable hypothesis about the consequences of price changes.Yet，if we accept this and empirically test the law，we frequently find that a price increase，for instance，goes hand in hand with an increase in the quantity demanded，or that a price decrease is accompanied by a reduced demand.The law holds sometimes and for some goods，but at other times，for the same or other goods，it does not。How then，concludes empiricism，can economists assign to this law the axiomatic position that it occupies in economic theory and build a complex network of thought based on it？ To do so must seem to an empiri cist to be nothing but bad metaphysics that needs to be expelled from the discipline as soon as possible in order to bring economics back onto the right track。[317]

Hermeneutics is no more successful in justifying the law of demand.McCloskey realizes that the empiricist case for the law is weak at best。Yet he believes it acceptable to stick with it—as，despite their professed empiri cism，most economists indeed do—because the law of demand is allegedly persuasive in light of other hermeneutical evidence.such supportive evi dence supposedly comes from “introspection，” from “thought experiments，” and from illustrative case stories； there is the persuasive fact that “business people” believe in the law，and “many wise economists”； the “symmetry of the law” makes it esthetically appealing； “mere definition” adds power； and “above all，there is analogy。That the Law of Demand is true for ice cream and movies，as no one would want to deny，makes it more persuasive also for gasoline.”[318] None of this，however，could make the law of demand any better founded and give it the authority it indeed seems to command.To be sure，introspection is the source of our knowledge of the law of demand.This particular law is no more founded in observations than are the laws of logic and mathematics.Yet introspections as such，or thought experiments，can no more establish the law of demand than can observational evidence.Introspective evidence，too，is nothing other than contingent experience.Here and now somebody arrives at this thought，and there and then some one else reaches the same or a different one.As McCloskey himself states，“if properly socialized in economics，” introspection and thought experimenta tion make the law highly persuasive.[319] But，mutatis mutandis，then，if one is not so socialized，introspection might render the law far less appealing。Then，however，introspection as such can hardly be said to lend any sys tematic support to it。In fact，to appeal to the economists’ introspective evidence would amount to a begging of the question，as it would have to be explained why one should accept this economic socialization or brainwash ing in the first place.In the same way，case stories or convictions of certain businessmen or wise economists are not proof of anything。Aesthetic criteria and mere definitions，too，have no epistemological value.And conclusions per analogiam are only conclusive if the analogy itself can be said to be correct—besides the fact that it would certainly not be impossible for someone to say that the law of demand sounds unpersuasive even for ice cream and movies.[320] Hence，hermeneutics offers nothing substantive to vindicate our belief in the law of demand.

And yet the law of demand is objectively true despite the fact that it is not based on contingent external or internal experiences.Rather，its founda tion lies in our introspective understanding of action as the practical pre supposition of our external as well as our internal experiences and in the recognition of the fact that this understanding must be considered episte mologically prior to any contingent act of understanding in that it could not possibly be falsified by it。The fact that in order to exchange successive units of a good A for successive units of a good B，the exchange ratio of A to B must fall follows from the law of marginal utility：as the supply of A decreases and the marginal utility of a unit of A increases，the supply of B increases and B’s marginal utility decreases，and hence successive units of A will become exchangeable for successive units of B only if counteracting these divergent changes in the valuation of As and Bs that follow each exchange，B becomes successively cheaper in terms of A.And as the founda tion of the law of demand，this law of marginal utility then follows directly from the undeniably true proposition that every actor always prefers what satisfies him more over what satisfies him less.[321] For then any increase in the supply of a homogeneous good （i.e.，a good whose units are considered to be interchangeable and of equal serviceability） by one additional unit can only be employed as a means for the attainment of a goal that is considered less valuable （or the removal of an uneasiness that is deemed less urgent） than the least valuable goal satisfied by means of a unit of such a good if the supply were one unit less.[322] And，as required of any a priori law and again independent of any contingent experiences，this law also precisely delineates its range of application and explains what possible occurrences cannot be considered exceptions or falsifying events.For one thing，the validity of the law of diminishing marginal utility is not at all affected by the fact that the utility of the marginal unit of some good can increase as well as decrease over time.If，for instance，a hitherto unknown use for a unit of some good is found that is considered more valuable than the least urgent present use of a unit of this good，the utility derived from the marginal employment would be higher now than previously。Yet despite such an increase in marginal utility，there is no question of such a thing as a law of increasing marginal utility。For not only would the actor whose supply of the good in question was unchanged and who realized such new employment have to give up some previously satisfied desire in order to satisfy another one； he would give up the less urgent one.Moreover，if with this new state of affairs regarding an actor’s knowledge about possible employments for units of some given good，its supply increases by an additional unit，its marginal utility would decrease as it would be employed to satisfy precisely that desire that previ ously had to be excluded from satisfaction because of its relatively lesser urgency。

Nor is it an exception to the law of diminishing marginal utility that an increase in the supply of a good from n to n+1 units can lead to an increase in the utility attached to one unit of this good if such a larger supply，considered and evaluated as a whole，can be employed for the satisfaction of a want deemed more valuable than the value attached to all the satisfaction that could be attained if the units of supply were each employed separately for the various goals that could be achieved by means of one individual unit of such good.[323] However，in such a case，the increase in supply would not be one of supplyunits regarded as equally serviceable，because the units simply would no longer be evaluated separately。Rather，in increasing the supply from n to n + 1，a different，largersizedunit good would be created that would be evaluated as such，and the law of diminishing marginal utility would then apply to this good in the same way as it applied to the smaller sized good in that the first unit of this good of size n + 1 would again be employed for the most urgent use to which a good of this size could be put， the second unit of supply of such sized good would be employed for the second most important goal to be satisfied by such sized good，and so on.

The law of demand then，as grounded in this a priori valid theorem，has never made the unqualified prediction that less of a good will be bought if its price rises.Rather，it states that this will be the case only ceteris paribus，i.e.，if no increase in the demand for the good in question occurs over time and if the increase in its supply does not effect a different，largersizedunit good and，mutatis mutandis，the demand for money does not decrease nor does its smaller supply effect separately evaluated smallersized money units.[324]

Since it is impossible to have a formula that allows one to predict whether or not such changes occur concurrently with the given rise in price （such changes being dependent on people’s future states of knowledge and future knowledge being in principle unpredictable based on constantly operating causes），such a priori knowledge then has a rather limited usefulness for one’s business of predicting the economic future.nevertheless it acts as a logical constraint on predictions in that of all forecasters who equally correctly guess that no such concurrent change will take place，only he who recognizes the law of demand will indeed make a correct prediction，while he whose convictions are at variance with the law will blunder。such is the logic of economic predictions and the function of praxeological reasoning。

Empiricism recommends the law of demand because it supposedly looks good—yet we can neither see it，nor would it survive empirical test ing。Hermeneutics，on the other hand，recommends it because it suppos edly sounds good—yet to some it sounds bad.And without some objective，extralinguistic criterion of distinguishing between good or bad，it is impossible to say more in support of the law of demand than somebody said so。

Austrians，as should be clear by now，have no reason to take either the old empiricist fashion or the new hermeneutical one very seriously。Instead，they should take more seriously than ever the position of extreme rational ism and of praxeology as espoused above all by the “doctrinaire” Mises，as unfashionable as such a stand might now be.

19 关于偏好与无差异的两点说明*

Two Notes on Preference and indifference

I. 关于经济学分析中的偏好与无差异的一点说明

A NOte on PreFErence AND inDIFFErence in EConOMIC ANALYSIS

In his celebrated article “Toward a reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” Murray Rothbard wrote that [i]ndifference can never be demonstrated by action.Quite the contrary。Every action necessarily signifies a choice，and every choice signifies a definite preference.Action specifically implies the contrary of indifference.If a person is really indifferent between two alternatives，then he cannot and will not choose between them.Indifference is therefore never relevant for action and cannot be demonstrated in action.[325]

This seems to be undeniable，and any attempt to explain why one chooses to do x rather than y with reference to indifference rather than preference strikes one as a logical absurdity，a “category mistake.” indeed，it seems to be a truth similar to the truth that no “constant” can ever be used to explain a “variable” and why any attempt to explain a variable outcome with reference to some constant conditions is likewise absurd.

这似乎是不可否认的，任何试图用无差异而非偏好来解释为什么一个人选择做

Nonetheless，Rothbard and Mises have been criticized by Nozick [326] and Caplan,[327] for inconsistency in admitting the concept of indifference into economic analysis after all，even if only indirectly。These criticisms have been answered by Block[328] and HülsmanN.[329] However，their answers，although largely correct，seem to bring less than full clarity to the matter。Setting out from Nozick’s criticism，I hope to remedy this deficiency here.

尽管如此，诺齐克和卡普兰还是批评了罗斯巴德和米塞斯，认为他们在经济分析中承认无差异概念是不一致的，哪怕只是间接的。布洛克和许尔斯曼对这些批评做出了回应。不过，他们的回答虽然大体正确，但似乎没有完全澄清这个问题。从诺齐克的批评出发，我希望在此弥补这一不足。

As correctly noted by Block,[330] aside from some rather confused and eas ily disposed of remarks，Nozick has but one challenging criticism of Rothbard’s and Mises’s verdict on indifference.He argues that their views are incompatible with their own formulation of the law of marginal utility。“Indeed,” writes Nozick,

the Austrian theorists need the notion of indifference to explain and mark off the notion of a commodity，and of a unit of a commodity。

…without the notion of indifference，and，hence，of an equiva lence class of things，we cannot have the notion of a commodity，or of a unit of a commodity; without the notion of a unit (“an inter changeable unit”) of a commodity，we have no way to state the law of (diminishing) marginal utility。[331]

正如布洛克所正确指出的那样，除了一些相当混乱和容易被处理的评论之外，诺齐克对罗斯巴德和米塞斯关于无差异的判断只提出了一个具有挑战性的批评。他认为，他们的观点与他们自己对边际效用定律的表述是不相容的。“的确如此，”诺齐克写道，

To further substantiate his claim，in an attached footnote Nozick pro vides quotations from Mises’s Human Action [332](1966) and Rothbard’s man，Economy，and State[333](1962)。He writes,

on p.122 [of Human Action] Mises says，“All parts—units—of the available stock are considered as equally useful and valuable if the problem of giving up one of them is raised.” Here，then，we do have indifference.Yet a choice will be made，perhaps at random.one particular object will be given up.Yet the person does not prefer giving up this one to giving up another one.[Similarly，Rothbard in man,Economy，and State，pp.18–19] writes，“in these examples，the units of the good have been interchangeable from the point of view of the actor。

Thus，any concrete pound of butter was evaluated in this case perfectly equal with any other pound of butter。”[334]

为了进一步证实他的观点，诺齐克在附注中引用了米塞斯的《人的行动》(1966)和罗斯巴德的《人、经济与国家》(1962)。他写道,

在《人的行动》第

”

Block’s answer to this challenge is this:

I think that this problem can be reconciled as follows.before the question of giving up one of the pounds of butter arose，they were all interchangeable units of one commodity，butter。They were all equally useful and valuable to the actor。—But then he decided to give up one pound.No longer did he hold，or can he be considered to have held，a homogeneous commodity consisting of butter pound units.Now there are really two commodities.Butter a，on the one hand，consisting of 99 onepound units，each (of the 99) equally valued，each interchangeable from the point of view of the actor with any of the other in the 99pound set; on the other hand，butter b，consisting of one pound of butter (the 72nd unit out of the original 100 butter units，the one，as it happens，that he chose to give up when he desired to sell off one of his pounds of butter)。In this case，butter a would be preferable to butter b，as shown by the fact that when push came to shove，butter b was jettisoned and butter a retained.—Alternatively，we may say that the person was “indifferent” between all 100 units of butter before and apart from any question of choice coming into the picture.But “indifference,” in this interpretation，existing only in the absence of human action，would not be a praxeological，or economic category，but a vague，psychological one.We can see，then，that with this interpretation，there will be no difficulty with regard to the law of diminishing marginal utility。For one thing，this is because we can have our homogeneity (apart from human action) as well as deny it (when choice takes place)。Thus，to the extent that homogeneous units of a commodity are required for the operation and application of this law，there is no problem.[335]

布洛克对这一挑战的回答是这样的：

我认为这个问题可以这样解决。

My dissatisfaction with Block’s solution to the challenge posed by Nozick is twofold.

我对布洛克解决诺齐克提出的挑战的解决方案有两点不满。

First，his interpretation of indifference as a “vague，psychological” cat egory seems off the mark。Instead，in accordance with Mises，it must be regarded as a rather precise epistemological category implied in the concept of a class of objects and involved in any operation of classification.“Quantity and quality,” explains Mises,

are categories of the external world.only indirectly do they acquire importance and meaning for action.because every thing can only produce a limited effect，some things are considered scarce and treated as means.because the effects which things are able to produce are different，acting man distinguishes various classes of things.because means of the same quantity and quality are apt always to produce the same quantity of an effect of the same quality，action does not differentiate between concrete definite quantities of homogeneous means.[336]

首先，他把无差异解释为一个

是外部世界的范畴，它们只是间接地获得了行动的重要性和意义。因为每种事物只能产生有限的效果，所以有些事物被认为是稀缺的，被当作手段。因为事物所能产生的效果是不同的，所以行动的人才会区分不同类别的事物。因为数量和质量相同的手段总是能够产生数量相同、质量相同的效果，所以行动不会区分同质手段的具体的确定数量。

However，if the formation of classes of objects has a realistic and objec tive foundation，as Mises emphasizes，then Block’s escape route appears implausible and ad hoc：before the choice the units of butter belonged to one class (they were homogeneous)，now，at the point of choice，they are suddenly members of different classes (they are heterogeneous)。In fact，they remain what they were then and what they are now：units of butter。

然而，如果物体类的形成具有米塞斯所强调的现实和客观基础，那么布洛克的逃避路径就显得难以置信和特别：在选择之前，各单位的黄油属于一个类（它们是同质的），而现在，在选择时，它们突然成为不同类的成员（它们是异质的）。事实上，它们仍然是当时和现在的样子：每个单位的黄油。

Block chooses this route because he believes that otherwise the claim might be doubted that actions must be explained with reference to preferences.However，this fear is unjustified.We can have our homogeneity (classes of objects) and still insist that only preferences can explain and are demonstrated in concrete choices.

布洛克之所以选择这条路径，是因为他认为，如果不这样做，人们就会怀疑

In order to explain this，it is useful to recall some elementary insights regarding the nature of action—insights that “Austrians” in particular should be familiar with.Actions，qua intentional behavior，have an external behaviorist and an internalmentalist aspect。To give a full and adequate description，both aspects must be taken into account。A quote from John Searle[337] should make this clear:

If we think about human action，… it is tempting to think that types of action or behavior can be identified with types of bodily move ments.But that is obviously wrong。For example，one and the same set of human bodily movements might constitute a dance，or signaling，or exercising，or testing one’s muscles，or none of the above.Further more，just as one and the same set of types of physical movements can constitute completely different kinds of actions，so one type of action can be performed by a vastly different number of types of physical movements.。。。Furthermore，another odd feature about actions which makes them different from events generally is that actions seem to have a preferred description.If I am going for a walk to Hyde Park，there are any number of other things that are happening in the course of my walk，but their descriptions do not describe my intentional actions，because in acting，what I am doing depends in large part on what I think I am doing。So for example，I am also moving in the general direction of Patagonia，shaking the hair on my head up and down，wearing out my shoes，and moving a lot of air molecules.However，none of these other descriptions seem to get at what is essential about this action，as the action it is.[338]

为了解释这一点，我们有必要回顾一下关于行动本质的一些基本观点——

如果我们思考人的行动，

before the backdrop of Searle’s observation regarding an action’s pre ferred description，we can now proceed to propose a simple yet elegant solu tion to Nozick’s challenge.Keep in mind that，in the above example，“going for a walk to Hyde park” and “moving in the general direction of Patagonia” are behaviorally identical phenomena，but the latter is not part of the pre ferred description though it might be under different circumstances.In his reply to Nozick，Block fails to provide the preferred description.

在塞尔关于行动偏好描述的观点的背景下，我们现在可以针对诺齐克的挑战提出一个简单而优雅的解决方案。请记住，在上面的例子中，

If the 100 pounds of butter are indeed homogeneous，and I give away one pound (be it in exchange for money，as a present，or for whatever other reason)，then it is simply not a part of my action that it is unit 72 that I give away (even though that may be a behaviorally correct description of what I do)，just as in the above case it is not a part of my action that I move in the general direction of Patagonia.Instead，the correct (preferred) description is that I give away a unit of butter，thus demonstrating that I prefer this dollar—or more likely a dollar—or maybe a “thank you” from my neighbor to a unit of butter。on the other hand，if it is part of the correct description of my action that it is the 72nd unit of butter that I give away (rather than any other)，then and only then are we dealing with heterogeneous pounds of butter (and my action then demonstrates that I prefer a dollar，that unit of butter or a “thank you” to this unit of butter)。

Other alleged puzzles concerning ice cream，sweaters，drowning chil dren，and Buridan’s ass can be solved in a likewise manner。

其他关于冰淇淋、毛衣、溺水儿童和布里丹之驴的所谓谜题也可以用同样的方法解决。

To say that I am indifferent to strawberry and vanilla ice cream is to say，for instance，that a correct description of my action should simply speak of ice cream or something cold and creamy。getting a strawberry ice cream in exchange for a dollar is then simply not a part of the description of my choice.Instead，my choice demonstrates that I prefer an ice cream or some thing cold and creamy to a dollar。on the other hand，if getting a strawberry ice cream is part of the correct description of my action，then it is absurd to say that I am indifferent between strawberry and vanilla icecream.

举例来说，说用一美元换取一个草莓冰淇淋，就根本不属于对我的选择的描述。相反，我的选择表明，比起一美元，我更偏好冰淇淋或其他冰凉的东西。另一方面，如果购买草莓冰淇淋是对我的行动的正确描述，那么说草莓冰淇淋和香草冰淇淋对我来说是无差异的就是荒谬的。

Similarly，if I am indifferent to blue and green sweaters，then my choice concerns simply a sweater，or a dark colored sweater; and getting a green (or blue) one is not part of the correct description of my action.Instead my choice demonstrates my preference of a sweater over a (or this) shirt or to something else.

同样，如果我对蓝色和绿色毛衣无差异，那么我的选择只涉及一件毛衣，或者一件深色毛衣；而获得一件绿色（或蓝色）毛衣并不是对我的行动的正确描述。相反，我的选择表明我偏好一件毛衣而不是一件（或这件）衬衫或其他东西。

Likewise，a mother who sees her equally loved sons Peter and Paul drown and who can only rescue one does not demonstrate that she loves Peter more than Paul if she rescues the former。Instead，she demonstrates that she prefers a (one) rescued child to none.on the other hand，if the correct (preferred) description is that she rescued Peter，then she was not indifferent as regards her sons.

同样，一位母亲看到她同样爱她的儿子彼得和保罗溺水，而她只能救一个，如果她救了彼得，这并不表明她爱彼得多于保罗。相反，她表明她偏好（一个）获救的孩子，而不是一个都不爱。另一方面，如果正确的（偏好的）描述是她救了彼得，那么她对她的儿子们并非一视同仁。

Lastly，consider Buridan’s ass standing between two identical and equi distant bales of hay。The ass is not indifferent and yet chooses one over the other，as Nozick would have it。Rather，it prefers a bale of hay (whether it is the left or the right one is simply not part of the preferred choice description)，and thus demonstrates its general preference of hay to death.

最后，请看布里丹的驴子站在两捆完全相同且距离相等的干草之间。驴子并不认为两捆干草是无差异的，它会选择其中一个而不是另一个，就像诺齐克所说的那样。相反，驴子偏好一捆干草

FURTHER NOteS on PreFErenceS AND inDIFFErence：REJOINDER TO BLOCK

II. 关于偏好和无差异的进一步说明:对布洛克的反驳[339]

In response to Block’s foregoing criticism of my previously published note on the subject of preference and indifference in economic analysis，I will first summarize our agreements.Then I will reconstruct our differences in the form of a fictive dialogue between Block and Hoppe to conclude that Block has failed to grasp my argument due to his amazing admission that “I do not give two hoots about whether or not we achieve a correct description of someone’s actions.”

为了回应布洛克对我之前发表的关于经济分析中的偏好和无差异这一主题说明的上述批评，我将首先总结我们之间的共识。然后，我将以布洛克和霍普之间虚构对话的形式重构我们之间的差异，从而得出结论：布洛克没有理解我的论点，他让人大跌眼镜地承认，“我对我们是否正确描述了某人的行动毫不关心。”

Assume that Block has several ten dollar notes and I have several sweat ers.We agree that it is possible and perfectly legitimate for Block to say that each of his notes is “perfectly substitutable” for any other，that they are “homogeneous” goods，or that one is “indifferent” toward one note visà vis any other。Whether or not this statement is true (or false) depends on Block’s perception.It is true if Block does indeed view each note as “equally serviceable” (given some defined goal or end) as compared to any other; and it is false if he considers them as not equally serviceable (in which case they are heterogeneous goods)。The same holds for Hoppe and his sweaters.

假设布洛克有几张十元美钞，而我有几件毛衣。我们同意，布洛克可以说他的每张美钞都 “完全可以替代 “其他任何一张美钞，它们是 “同质 “商品，或者对一个人来说，一张美钞和其他任何美钞都是”无差异的”。这种说法是否正确(或错误)，取决于布洛克的看法。如果布洛克确实认为每张美钞与其他美钞相比 “同等有用”（考虑到某个确定的目标或目的），那么以上说法就正确的；如果他认为它们并非”同等有用”（在这种情况下，它们是异质商品），那么以上说法就是错的。霍普和他的毛衣也是如此。

Second，we agree that every action，and more specifically，every inter personal exchange demonstrates，expresses，reveals or manifests a preference (or rather：opposite preferences)。

其次，我们同意，每一个行动，更具体地说，每一次人际交换，都证明，表达，揭示或体现了一种偏好（或者说：相反的偏好）。

Further，we agree that the law of marginal utility，i.e.，the proposition that as the supply of a homogeneous good increases (decreases) the marginal utility decreases (increases)，holds true.

此外，我们同意边际效用定律，即随着同质商品供应量的增加（减少），边际效用减少（增加）的命题是正确的。

Now to our differences：Assume that Block affirms that he considers each of his dollar notes as equally serviceable (as a supply of homogeneous notes)，and Hoppe likewise affirms that he considers each of his sweaters as perfectly substitutable for any other。Then an exchange of one tendollar note against one sweater takes place.How is this exchange to be analyzed?

现在来谈谈我们的分歧：假设布洛克认为他的每一张美钞都具有同等效用（作为同质美钞的供应），而霍普同样认为他的每件毛衣都完全可以替代任何其他毛衣。然后，一张10元美钞交换一件毛衣。如何分析这种交换呢？

Block：First，this exchange demonstrates that I prefer a sweater to a tendollar note and you prefer a note to a sweater。Second，it demon strates that I value one note less (the one that I actually give up) than the others (those that I keep) and that the same holds true for you and your sweaters—after all，it is one particular note that is being exchanged for one particular sweater and there must be a reason why it is this note and this sweater rather than that。

布洛克：首先，这次交换表明，我偏好一件毛衣而不是一张十元美钞，而你偏好一张十元美钞而不是一件毛衣。其次，它表明我对一张美钞（我实际放弃的那张）的评价低于其他纸币（我保留的那张），而你对你的毛衣也是如此评价——毕竟，这是一张特定的美钞在交换一件特定的毛衣，为什么是这张美钞和这件毛衣，而不是那张美钞和那件毛衣，这肯定是有原因的。

Hoppe：I agree with your first statement，but not with the second.In fact，with your second statement you become entangled in a logical contradiction，because on the one hand you have affirmed that you consider all of your notes as homogeneous and on the other hand you now affirm that they are not homogeneous (but you value one note less than another)。

Block：Admitted，this is a contradiction if you put the matter in this way。But I don’t put it thus.Rather，I say that I considered the notes as homogeneous before the action (exchange)，but later，at the moment of choice，I considered them as different or heterogeneous.Thereby the contradiction disappears.

布洛克：承认，如果你这样说，这就是一个矛盾。但我没有这样说。相反，我说，在行动（交换）之前，我认为美钞是同质的，但后来，在选择的那一刻，我认为它们是不同的或异质的。这样，矛盾就消失了。

Hoppe：What，however，if you say that you consider them to be homogeneous notes while (at the exact same moment when) the exchange takes place? Aren’t you then contradicting yourself? Aren’t you then saying simultaneously both：that your notes are homogeneous and that they are not homogeneous? Further：Assume that you affirmed the law of marginal utility while we exchanged a ten dollar note for a sweater and said “I herewith give up one of my equally serviceable notes in exchange for one of your sweaters and consequently the marginal utility of a ten dollar note for me is now higher than other wise would have been the case.” given what you have argued at the outset：that your exchange of a note for a sweater demonstrates，not only your preference of a sweater to a note，but also your preference of some notes (those you keep) over others (the one that you give up)—aren’t you then involved in a logical contradiction? Surely，not both statements can be true：your affirmation of the law of marginal utility and your particular description of the exchange.Isn’t your affirmation then falsified by your description of our exchange or vice versa?

Block：I must admit that I am running into difficulties here with my argument。But aren’t you running into similar difficulties with yours? First：How can you accept only the first part of my analysis but deny the second? After all，it cannot be denied that it is one particular note and one particular sweater that are being exchanged.And second：If you don’t accept the second part of my analysis，aren’t you then say ing in effect that indifference is and can be demonstrated by action? And how do you reconcile this with Murray Rothbard’s dictum (on which we agree) that “indifference can never be demonstrated by action”?

布洛克：我必须承认，我的论证在这里遇到了困难。但你的论证难道没有遇到类似的困难吗？第一：你怎么能只接受我分析的第一部分，却否认第二部分呢？毕竟，我们不能否认交换的是一张特定的美钞和一件特定的毛衣。第二：如果你不接受我的第二部分分析，那么你实际上不就是说，无差异是可以通过行动来证明的吗？你又是如何将这一点与默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）关于 “无差异永远无法通过行动来证明 “的论断（我们在这一点上达成了共识）相协调的呢？

Hoppe：First off，I am of course not saying that the second part of your analysis of our exchange is incorrect under all circumstances.If you had one note that you regarded as distinct (heterogeneous) from all of your other notes，and I had a sweater that I regarded as distinct from all of my other sweaters，then it would be entirely correct for you to say that our exchange demonstrated your preference of my sweater to this one particular note (as compared to all of your other notes)。But by assumption，this is not the situation we are supposed to analyze.Rather，the question is whether or not your analysis is correct if，as per assumption，you have affirmed that you consider all of your notes as nondistinct，homogeneous，and equally serviceable in the pursuit of some given end.

霍普：首先，我当然不是说你对我们交换意见的第二部分分析在任何情况下都是不正确的。如果你有一张美钞，你认为它与你所有其他的美钞都不同（异质），而我有一件毛衣，我认为它与我所有其他的毛衣都不同，那么你说我们的交换表明你偏好我的毛衣而不是这张美钞（与你所有其他的美钞相比），这完全正确。但根据假设，这并不是我们要分析的情况。相反，问题在于，如果根据假设，你认为你的所有美钞都是无差别的、同质的，并且在追求某个特定目的时同样有用，那么你的分析是否正确。

Now to your question：I reject the second part of your analysis，because it involves a contradiction，as I have just explained again.If you consider the notes as homogeneous，then the correct description of our exchange is that a—any one—note has been exchanged against a—any one—sweater (but not：this note against this sweater); and this logically implies that，in fact，it happens to be one particular note that is being exchanged against one particular sweater。So there is no problem regarding your first quarrel。

现在回答你的问题：我拒绝你分析的第二部分，因为它涉及一个矛盾，我刚才已经解释过了。如果你把美钞看成是同质的，那么对我们交换的正确描述就是：任何一张美钞都被用来交换任何一件毛衣（而不是：这张美钞被用来交换这件毛衣）；这在逻辑上意味着，事实上，恰好是一张特定的美钞被用来交换一件特定的毛衣。所以，关于你的第一个争论，是没有问题的。

Block：Yet how about the more serious second problem I have with your analysis?

布洛克:那么我对你的分析提出的第二个更严重的问题呢?

Hoppe：That problem is readily solved，too。

Not everything that behaviorally “happens” is the result of a choice (my original reference to Searle was intended to make precisely this point)。If I choose to walk from point A to B，for instance，this walk must begin (and end) with either my left foot or my right foot; that is，behaviorally，my walk can be described as either left rightleftright，and so on，or as rightleftrightleft，and so on.But while this or that particular sequence of steps may be the result of a deliberate choice on my part，it needs not be so (and it typically isn’t)。It may just “happen” to be this sequence rather than that with out me choosing either one (i.e.，demonstrating a preference of one lead leg over the other)。How do we determine what is the result of choice and what isn’t? Obviously，not by mere “observation.” Rather，we must inquire of the actor in order to reach a (correct) description of his action.Did he choose to put his left or his right foot down first or did it merely happen that it was one foot rather than the other? The answer depends on the correct description of the action in question; and what is or isn’t the correct description of the action depends on the perception and conceptualization of the action by its very actor：on his description of his goal and his means available to satisfy this goal。

霍普:这个问题也很容易解决。

并不是所有行为上 “发生 “的事情都是选择的结果（我最初提到塞尔正是为了说明这一点）。例如，如果我选择从 A 点走到 B 点，那么这次行走必须以左脚或右脚开始（和结束）；也就是说，在行为上，我的行走可以被描述为左-右-左-右，以此类推，也可以被描述为右-左-右-左，以此类推。但是，虽然这一连串或那一连串的步骤可能是我有意选择的结果，但不一定是这样（而且通常不是）。它可能只是 “碰巧 “是这一连串而不是那一连串，而我并没有选择其中的任何一个（即，显示出我偏好先出其中一只脚而不是另一只脚）。我们如何确定哪些是选择的结果，哪些不是呢？显然，不仅仅是通过单纯的 “观察”。相反，我们必须询问行动者，以便对其行动做出（正确的）描述。他是选择先放左脚还是先放右脚，还是只是碰巧放了一只脚而不是另一只脚？答案取决于对有关行动的正确描述；而对行动的正确描述或不正确描述取决于行动者对行动的感知和概念化：取决于他对自己的目标和为实现这一目标所采取的手段的描述。

This applies also to the case at hand.It is incorrect to infer，as you do，from the mere fact that one particular note is being exchanged against one particular sweater that this must be the result of a choice.

这也适用于目前的情况。像你所做的那样，仅凭某张美钞与某件毛衣交换这一事实，就推断这一定是选择的结果，那是不正确的。

It may well be a coincidence，and the choice was actually one of a— any one—note against a—any one—sweater。What is or isn’t the case depends on you，on your description of your action.And what is the description that you have given of your action? You have stated that you gave up one note viewed as equally serviceable to several other notes in exchange of a sweater。Yet to state this is to say that you did not choose between one note and another (notwithstanding the fact that one particular note must have been factually selected)。

这很可能是一个巧合，实际上是任意选择的一张美钞交换任意选择的一件毛衣。是或不是取决于你，取决于你对自己行动的描述。你对自己行动的描述是什么呢？你说你放弃了一张被认为与其他几张同样有用的美钞，以交换一件毛衣。然而，这样说就等于说，你没有在一张美钞和另一张美钞之间做出选择（尽管事实上一定选择了某一张美钞）。

Block：Yet how can you reconcile this analysis with Rothbard’s dictum?

布洛克：然而，你如何将这一分析与罗斯巴德的箴言相协调？

Hoppe：Quite easily; for this is how Rothbard continues his statement：“if a person is really indifferent between two alternatives，then he cannot and will not choose between them.”[340] Note that Rothbard does not say here that there is no such thing as indifference.To the contrary，his statement clearly implies that he thinks there is—only that if and insofar as there is indifference，then no choice is involved.

霍普：非常容易；因为罗斯巴德是这样继续他的论述的：”如果一个人真的认为两种选择无差异，那么他就不能也不会在两者之间做出选择。请注意，罗斯巴德在这里并没有说不存在无差异这种东西。相反，他的陈述清楚地暗示，他认为存在无差异，只是如果存在无差异，那么就不涉及选择。

This is exactly what I am saying：if you are indeed indifferent toward your notes，i.e.，if you believe each of them to be equally serviceable in the pursuit of some given end，then you do not choose between them; and that you do not choose，because you regard your supply of means as homogeneous，can even be verified.For if you are indeed indifferent，then you would be willing to allow me (or any third party) to select the note that you are willing to give up in exchange for a betterliked sweater; and this is to say，quite literally，that you did not choose between your notes.If a choice was made at all，it was a choice made by someone else.Insofar as you are concerned，your choice is one between a—any one—note and a sweater。

这正是我要说的：如果你确实认为你的美钞是无差异的，即，如果你认为它们中的每一张在追求某种特定目的时都同样有用，那么你就勿需在它们之间做出选择；而你不做选择，是因为你认为你的手段供应是同质的，这一点甚至可以得到验证。因为如果你确实认为无差异，那么你就会愿意让我（或任何第三方）选择你愿意放弃的美钞，以交换你更喜欢的毛衣；这就是说，正如字面所说一样，你并没有在你的美钞中做出选择。如果有选择的话，那也是别人的选择。就你而言，你只是在任意一张美钞和任意一件毛衣之间做出选择。

Block：So what，then，is the role of “indifference” in economic analysis?

布洛克：那么，”无差异 “在经济分析中的作用是什么？

Hoppe：Whenever we act，we employ means to achieve a valued end.This end is a state of affairs that the actor prefers to the actual (and impending) state of affairs.Both states of affairs，at the beginning of action and at its conclusion，are constellations of means (goods) at an actor’s disposal，describing the circumstances or conditions under which he must act。on the one hand，indifference is part of the description of such circumstances and conditions (the start and end points of action)。on the other hand，preferences (choices) explain the change in these circumstances that an actor wants to achieve through the disposal of means.Any complete analysis of action must involve both：a description of the start and endpoint of action as well as an explanation of the change occurring from one point to another due to preferencedemonstrating action.Both concepts，preference and indifference，are therefore necessary and complementary parts of every economic (praxeological) analysis.

霍普：无论何时我们采取行动，我们都是为了达到一个有价值的目的。行动人偏好这个目的甚于实际的(和即将发生的)事态。无论是行动开始时的状态还是行动结束时的状态，都是行动者可支配的手段（物品）的组合，描述了行动者必须采取行动的环境或条件。一方面，无差异是对这种环境和条件（行动的起点和终点）的描述的一部分。另一方面，偏好（选择）解释了行动者通过处置手段想要实现的对这些环境的改变。对行动的任何完整分析都必须同时涉及：对行动的起点和终点的描述，以及对由于偏好展示行动而从一点到另一点发生的变化的解释。因此，偏好和无差异这两个概念都是每一个经济学（行动学）分析的必要和互补部分。

To explain：The world we human actors must deal with is a world of means (goods)。More particularly，it is a world made up of heterogeneous goods.Not every good is suited to reach the same end.We do not inhabit a world made up of some “wonderdough” or “manna” that is equally wellsuited to satisfy every conceivable human end.Instead，some goods can satisfy some ends but not others (or not equally well)。on the other hand，we also do not live in a world made up exclusively and entirely of heterogeneous goods，such that each particular good can satisfy one and only one specific end.Rather：Our—the real—world is characterized by heterogene ity and homogeneity：by heterogeneous goods composed of multiple (enumerable and quantifiable) homogeneous units，such that each unit is capable of bringing about the same desired endeffect。

解释一下：我们行动人必须面对的世界是一个由手段（商品）组成的世界。更具体地说，这是一个由异质商品组成的世界。并非每种商品都适合达到同样的目的。我们并不是生活在一个由 “神奇面团 “或 “吗哪“（manna：古以色列人在经过荒野时所得的天赐食粮）组成的世界里，而这些东西同样同等地适合于满足所有可以想象的人类目的。相反，有些商品可以满足某些目的，但不能满足另一些目的（或不能同等地满足）。另一方面，我们也不是生活在一个完全由异质商品构成的世界中，以至于每种特定商品都只能满足一种特定目的。相反，我们的现实世界的特点是异质和同质：异质商品由多个（可数的和可量化的）同质单位组成，每个同质单位都能带来相同的预期效果。

Accordingly，every praxeological analysis must begin and end with “indifference” (homogeneity)。Every analysis must begin with a description of the startingpoint of action; and this involves a specification of the present supplyconstellation of homogeneous units of heterogeneous goods at an actor’s disposal。This is where indifference (homogeneity) first comes into play。Second，every analysis must then explain the change in this constellation that an actor wants to effect by disposing of (some of ) these goods in exchange for other more highly valued ones.Here preference enters the scene.Finally，at the conclusion of every analysis must be a description of the results of action (which are at the same time the initial conditions for the following action); and this description again must be about a (new and different) supply constellation of homogeneous units of heterogeneous goods (resulting in a new and different valuescale of the actor)。

因此，每一个行动学的分析都必须以 “无差异”（同质性）为起点和终点。每项分析都必须从描述行动的起点开始；而这就涉及到对行动者可支配的异质商品的同质单位的当前供应组合的说明。这就是无差异（同质性）首先发挥作用的地方。其次，每项分析都必须解释行动人希望通过处置（部分）这些商品来交换其他价值更高的商品，从而实现对这一组合的改变。偏好就在这里出现了。最后，每项分析的结论都必须是对行动结果的描述（这些结果同时也是后续行动的初始条件）；而这种描述又必须是关于异质商品的同质单位的（新的、不同的）供应组合（导致行动人新的、不同的评价序列）。

20 财产，因果关系与责任*

Property，Causality，and Liability

I.

Wherever there is scarcity of resources in relation to human demand，the possibility of conflict arises.The solution to such conflict is the assignment of private property rights—rights of exclusive control。All scarce resources must be owned privately in order to avoid otherwise inescapable conflicts.However，while the assignment of private property rights makes conflict free interaction possible，it does not assure it。The possibility of property rights violations exists，and if there are violations，then there must be rights of selfdefense and punishment as well as liability on the part of a wrong doer。[341]

All this holds true regardless of how and to whom such rights are assigned and who accordingly is or is not considered aggressor or victim in any given case.

We still remain in the realm of “positive” legal analysis when we consider what might be called a praxeological requirement of any System of assigning property rights.In order to make conflictfree interaction possible，every such System must take into account the fact that man does and must act。In other words，it must be an “operational” System.To accomplish this，based on the System adopted，human actors must be able to determine ex ante，at any moment in time，what they are and are not permitted to do。In order to determine this，there need be some “objective” borders，signs，and indicators of ownership and property as well as of wrongful invasion of said ownership and property。Similarly，when considering a case ex post，judges must have “objective” criteria of property and aggression to make a determination for or against a plaintiff。

当我们考虑任何产权分配制度的行动学要求时，我们仍然停留在 “实证的 “法律分析领域。为了使无冲突的相互作用成为可能，每一个这样的制度都必须考虑到这样一个事实，即人在行动，而且必须行动。换句话说，它必须是一个 “可操作的 “系统。要做到这一点，基于所采用的系统，行动人必须能够事先确定，无论任何时候，他们可以做什么，不可以做什么。为了确定这一点，需要存在所有权和财产以及对这些所有权和财产的不法侵犯的 “客观 “边界、标志和指标。同样，在事后审理案件时，法官必须有财产和侵犯的 “客观 “标准，以确定原告胜诉或败诉。

II.

In light of the technical requirements that every property rights System must meet，I will turn to an analysis of a specific—and explicitly normative— proposal of defining private property and property rights violations：the LockeanRothbardian solution.

鉴于每个产权制度都必须满足的技术要求，我将转而分析关于界定私有财产和侵犯产权行为的一个具体而明确的规范性建议：洛克-罗斯巴德解决方案。

In this intellectual tradition，property is defined as tangible，physical objects which have been “visibly” lifted out of the state of nature of unowned goods through acts of appropriation and production.Through mixing one’s labor with specific resources，objectively ascertainable borders of property are established and specific objects connected to particular individuals.There are indicators of owned (as compared to unowned) objects and of who owns them (and who does not)，for everyone to “read.” More over，the theory fulfills perfectly the requirement of being operational in that it traces all present property back to acts of “original appropriation” (up until which time there had only been “nature” or “unowned” resources)。Based on this theory，man could indeed have acted from the beginning of time.(In distinct contrast，any theory that makes the assignment of property rights dependent on a “contract” or agreement or on Statedeclared law [legislation] does not allow man to act from the beginning on，but only after the conclusion of said contract or the arrival of the State.Accordingly，any such theory must be regarded as “technically” deficient。)

However，here it is not so much the positive definition of property as the complementary negative definition of punishable offense that is of interest。Based on the fundamental stricture that just as all property is private so all crime must be private (committed by specific individuals against specific victims)，Rothbard has offered the following “strict liability theory” encompassing both criminal and tort law.[342] in every criminal or tort case,

evidence must be probative in demonstrating a strict causal chain of acts of invasion of person or property。Evidence must be constructed to demonstrate that aggressor A in fact initiated an overt physical act invading the person or property of victim B。[343]

What the plaintiff must prove，then，beyond a reasonable doubt is a strict causal connection between the defendant and his aggression against the plaintiff。He must prove，in short，that A actually “caused” an invasion of the person or property of B。To establish guilt and liability，strict causality of aggression leading to harm must meet the rigid test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt。Hunch，conjecture，plausibility，even mere probability are not enough. Statistical correlation…cannot establish causation.[344]

然而，在这里，我们感兴趣的与其说是财产的正面定义，不如说是与之相辅相成的应受惩罚的罪行的负面定义。基于所有财产都是私有的这一基本原则，所有犯罪也必须是私有的（由特定个人针对特定受害者实施），罗斯巴德提出了以下“严格责任理论”，涵盖了刑法和侵权法。在每一个刑事或侵权案件中，

证据必须具有证明力，以证明侵犯人身或财产行为的严格因果链。

那么，

one important aspect of this definition：the necessity of establishing causation，based on “individualized evidence” rather than mere probability (or preponderance of evidence) based on “statistical” evidence is accepted.This not withstanding，Rothbard’s proposal must be criticized as overly “objectivistic,” for it ignores important “subjective” conditions which must be combined with objective indicators to determine liability。“Overly” because Rothbard’s objectivism is not warranted by the nature of things nor is it in accord with his own definition of property and original appropriation which contains an important subjective element as well：appropriation implies intent。(Not every berry picking counts as an appropriation of the berry bush rather than merely the berry，and not every detour off the beaten path counts as homesteading，for instance.[345])

这一定义的一个重要方面是：必须根据

In contrast，here it is argued that not all physical invasions imply liabil ity and，more importantly，that some actions are liable even if no overt phys ical invasion occurs.In this argument Adolf Reinach’s illuminating analysis regarding the concept of causality in (Continental European) criminal law will be valuable.[346]

与此相反，本文认为并非所有的人身侵犯都意味着责任，更重要的是，即使没有发生公开的人身侵犯，某些行动也应承担责任。在这一论点中，阿道夫

III.

For Rothbard，it appears guilt or fault is established by proof of causation of harM.Reinach，on the other hand，emphasizes that causation and fault are independent elements，and both must be present in order to impose liability。Thus，he writes:

In the case of a man’s death，it is not sufficient that the death resulted from the action of an accountable (sane) person; as an additional requirement of a punishable offense，intent and deliberation (pre meditation) or intent without deliberation (negligence) or，as we can summarily say，fault must be present as well。Causation of success and fault are requirements of punishment。—Fault must always be found.[347]

However，faultless causation，which remains free of punishment，exists also。

对罗斯巴德来说，似乎有罪或过错是通过证明伤害的因果关系来确定的。另一方面，里纳奇（

在一个人死亡的情况下，仅仅是一个应负责的（精神健全的）人的行动造成了死亡是不够的；作为应受惩罚的罪行的附加要求，必须有故意和深思熟虑（预谋）或故意而没有预谋（疏忽），或者，我们可以概括地说，还必须有过失。成功的原因和过错是惩罚的要求。——过错始终必须要被找到。

Consider the following examples of harmcausation which do not imply liability due to a lack of fault。A drives on the road.B jumps from behind a tree onto the road and is killed.A has caused B’s death.Should A be held liable or should he go free? A invites B into his house.The house is struck by lightning，and B is injured.A (and his property) has caused B’s injury，for without A’s invitation B would have been elsewhere.Is A (or his insurer) liable to B or must B (or his insurer) bear the costs? A’s tree，struck by light ning，falls onto B’s property，injuring B。Is A (or his insurer) liable to B or must B (or his insurer) bear the costs? A and B go hunting together on B’s (or A’s) hunting ground.They approach a group of deer from opposite sides and open fire at the same time.A’s stray bullet injures B。Is A liable to B or must B assume this risk and the associated costs?

Rothbard would have likely agreed that A is not liable in these cases，and he would have pointed out that he had covered this under the heading of the “proper assumption of risk。” life involves an inescapable element of risk。It is incumbent on each individual to learn how to live with such risk and to insure himself against it。However，this implies admitting that the narrow causality criterion is inadequate.What needs to be added to Rothbard’s criterion would seem to be this：No one is liable for “accidents” involving his person and property。Instead，the risk of accidents and the insurance against them must be assumed individually (by each person and property owner for himself )。People can be held liable only for their actions，whether intentional or negligent (but not for accidents involving them)。Actions，however，involve both “objective” (external) and “subjective” (internal) elements.Hence，the exclusive inspection of physical events can never be considered sufficient in determining liability (there must be fault，too，and one can only speak of fault if an event is caused by an action)。

IV.

Now consider Reinach’s definition of actioncausality。An action of legal (penal) importance

is an event that cannot be cancelled without also canceling the effect，insofar as it is of legal importance.[348] … “Cause” of an event … is called among other things that condition which must be added to one element of a conceptual whole，so that in place of its second compo nent the event can be conceived of as having occurred.[349] …

To cause an event means to activate a condition of success; to intentionally cause an event means to activate a condition that brings about the success. To intentionally cause something thus means to activate a condition of success，willing that this condition—of course in conjunction with others—leads to the success.[350] …… The willing thereby must be conscious that he can contribute to the willed success [and] that success resulting from his “contribution” and other factors known to him is possible.[351] … His responsibility for negli gent behavior is similar。In this case the success is not desired; but I could and should have avoided it。Insofar as it is still something whose occurrence depended on me：it，too，in a special way is “mine.”[352]

In light of Reinach’s definitions，we return to Rothbard’s causality crite rion.While his criterion is，on the one hand，too wide in including acciden tal invasions among punishable offenses，on the other hand，it appears too narrow in determining liability。

根据里纳奇的定义，我们回到罗斯巴德的因果关系标准。一方面，他的标准过于宽泛，将意外入侵也纳入了应受惩罚的犯罪行为中；另一方面，在确定责任方面，他的标准又显得过于狭隘。

A few examples，taken from Reinach and slightly modified，illustrate the point。

摘自里纳奇并稍加修改的几个例子说明了这一点。

A，B’s superior，sends B into the woods，hoping that B will be struck by lightning。His hopes are fulfilled.

A是B的上级，把B送到树林里，希望B会被闪电击中。他的希望实现了。

Has A caused B’s death or injury? Should A be liable? with regard to causation，Reinach would answer yes：without A’s authorized order to B，B would not have been killed.However，Reinach would deny that A is liable，not because there is no causality，but because there is no intent or negligence on A’s part (there is just hope)。Rothbard also would hold A not liable，not because of lack of intent but because of lack of causality (verbal orders pre sumably do not count as causes，for they are not “physical” causes)。

A是否造成了B的死亡或伤害?A应该承担责任吗?关于因果关系，里纳奇的答案是肯定的:如果没有A对B的授权命令，B就不会被杀。然而，里纳奇会否认A有责任，不是因为没有因果关系，而是因为A没有故意或过失(仅仅是希望)。罗斯巴德也认为A不负有责任，不是因为缺乏意图，而是因为缺乏因果关系（口头命令推测起来不能算作原因，因为它们不是 “物理 “原因）。

Now let us change the scenario：A is able to calculate exactly when a par ticular tree will be hit by lightning。He sends B to this tree，and B is indeed hit。

现在让我们改变一下情景：A 能够准确地计算出某棵树何时会被闪电击中。他把 B 送到这棵树下，B 果然被击中了。

Reinach would find causality here in the same way as in the first case.What makes the two cases different and leads to liability in the second is intent understood as “willing with the objectively grounded consciousness of certitude.”[353] in the second case，A is liable because he caused the event with the objectively justified belief that his action，in cooperation with other factors，would lead to the desired result。In contrast，according to Rothbard’s criterion no causation exists in the second case just as none existed in the first (the externalphenomenal sequence of events in both cases is in fact the same)。Hence，Rothbard would have to let A go free in the second case just as in the first。

在这里，里纳奇会以与第一种情况相同的方式认定因果关系。这两种情况的不同之处在于，在第二种情况中，意图被理解为

How is this possible? Consider another example.A，B’s employer，orders B to come directly to him，knowing that halfway there is a concealed trap.B walks into the trap and is injured.Reinach would find A liable.Rothbard would let him go，because there is no “overt physical invasion” initiated by A.A merely says something (which in itself is clearly a noninvasive act) to B; and then “nature” takes its course with no further interference on A’s part。That is，entrapment，as an indirectly and by in itself noninvasive means effected physical harm，would have to remain free of punishment。

这怎么可能呢？再看一个例子。A是B的雇主，命令B直接来找他，他知道中途有一个暗藏的陷阱。B 走进陷阱并受了伤。里纳奇会认定A负有责任。罗斯巴德则会放他一马，因为A并没有发起 “明显的人身侵犯”。A只是对B说了一句话（这本身显然是一种非侵害性行为），然后 “自然 “就顺其自然了，A没有进一步的干涉。也就是说，陷阱作为一种间接的、本身是非侵害性的手段造成了人身伤害，必须不受惩罚。

This does not just stand in opposition to our moral intuition.More importantly，the exclusion of indirectly caused physical harm from the class of punishable offenses has no analogue in the positive theory of property and original appropriation.We have no trouble，for instance，conceiving of an “indirect” act of appropriation.A，B’s boss，orders B to clear a piece of previously unowned land and drill for oil。B finds oil。Thereby A，not B，becomes the owner of the oil (although A is only the indirect cause of the act of appropriation)。Accordingly，if A orders B to drill for oil，expecting that instead of finding oil B will fall into a trap at the given location，then A should be held responsible for this event as well。If not，why not?

Consider this sequence of cases：A wants B dead and tries to accomplish this through daily prayer。B indeed dies.In this case neither Reinach nor Rothbard would find liability and pre sumably for the same reason.No causality exists (only coincidence) and hence there is no liability on A’s part。

考虑这一连串的情况：A 希望 B 死，并试图通过每天祈祷来实现这一目标。B 果然死了。在这种情况下，里纳奇和罗斯巴德都不会认为A有责任，原因大概是一样的。不存在因果关系（只有巧合），因此 A 没有责任。

Now change the scenario：A prays for B’s death.B happens to see and hear this and，being superstitious and of extremely delicate physical disposition，dies of fear。

In this case，too，Reinach and Rothbard reach the same verdict，that A is not liable，but they do so for different reasons.Reinach would find that causality is given in the second case.B dies because A has prayed for his death.What is missing and thus exculpates A is intent (or negligence) with regard to the outcome.A wants to kill B by means of praying，which is sim ply and objectively ineffective as far as the outcome is concerned.A undertakes no other means than praying。B’s death is the result of a causal process that is incidental (accidental) to A’s actions.That is why A must go free.Rothbard，on the other hand，would let A go because causality is absent。A has performed no action that can be construed as being invasive of B’s person or property。

现在换一种情况：

Consider a second change in the scenario：A prays for B’s death.He knows of B’s superstition and weak physical condition，and he informs B of his attempt。B dies out of fear。

考虑场景中的第二个变化

Reinach would hold A liable in this case，whereas Rothbard would not。For Reinach in this case causality exists in precisely the same way as in the first。And indeed，phenomenally—as far as the outward appearance of things is concerned—the two cases are essentially the same.The only difference is A’s intentional saying to B what B had discovered accidentally in the first scenario。Liability，according to Reinach，results from the presence of intent or negligence.In the second case，in telling B，A acts，whether intentionally or negligently，to bring about B’s death.(Reinach would let A go only if A had not known anything about B’s medical condition.In that case，telling B might be insensitive or cruel。However，while the causal processes involved are exactly the same as under the previous scenario：whether A knows or does not know about B’s condition，B dies，A would nonetheless go free because neither intent nor negligence with regard to the outcome exists.) Rothbard，also consistent，would find that just as in the first so in the second case no causation exists.There is no overt physical invasion of B by A.A’s praying did not cause the death，and informing B in itself did not involve any physical invasion.Hence，A should go completely free.(Based on his causality criterion Rothbard would make no distinction between A knowing or not knowing about B’s condition.A is not liable in any case.)

在这种情况下，里纳奇会让 A 承担责任，而罗斯巴德则不会。在里纳奇看来，这种情况下因果关系的存在方式与第一种情况完全相同。事实上，就事物的外在表现而言，这两种情况本质上是相同的。罗斯巴德同样认为，第一种情况与第二种情况没有因果关系。

That A should not be held liable in any way，shape or form is not intui tively convincing。Why? What if A could in fact pray people dead，and B died as a result of his praying? There is no physicalcausal invasion，yet A has killed B。Should A still go free? Should he be allowed to pray dead whomsoever he wishes dead? More importantly and as indicated before，the exclusive emphasis on direct physical invasion has no analogue in the theory of appropriation.We do not exclude all “indirect” acts of appropriation as invalid per sE.one can become the owner of things one never touches，i.e.，without anything faintly resembling physical causation.Why should matters be different when it comes to aggressive rather than appropriative actions? Why should every “indirect” (covert) aggression (causation medi ated through words) be categorically excluded from possible liability? Surely，if A tells B that he wished C were dead，and B kills C，we would not hold A liable.But would we do the same if A paid B，or if A and B were members of an organized gang of which A were the gang’s leader，and B killed C? Similarly，if Clinton or Bush ordered their generals to kill Iraqis，the generals told their officers who told the soldiers，and the soldiers then killed as ordered，should only the soldiers be liable because they have “caused” the deaths，or，as we can hardly imagine Rothbard disagreeing should everyone from the president on down to the soldiers be held jointly and severally liable? But then intent matters.

A 更重要的是，如前所述，只强调直接的物理侵犯在占有理论中并不适用。我们并不排除所有

Finally，an example of failed attempt illustrates Rothbard’s criterion as too narrow.A wants to kill his wife，B。He buys deadly poison from the pharmacist，and regularly adds it to B’s tea.However，the pharmacist has made a mistake.He did not sell A poison but something entirely harmless.B dies in an unrelated car crasH.The pharmacist discovers his error and the entire case unravels.Should A be held liable or go free (B’s heirs are suing A)?

最后，一个失败的例子说明罗斯巴德的标准过于狭隘。A想杀死他的妻子B。他从药剂师那里买来致命的毒药，并定期加入到B的茶里。然而，药剂师犯了一个错误。他卖的不是毒药，而是完全无害的东西。B死于一场无关的车祸。药剂师发现了自己的错误，整个案件也就迎刃而解了。A应该被追究责任还是无罪释放(B的继承人正在起诉A)?

Reinach would find A liable.There is intent (and hence fault) and there is (failed) causality。A performs a series of actions that he believes to be and which objectively are suited to bringing about the desired result。It is only because of an incidental (accidental) causal event (the pharmacist’s error) that the result does not occur as desired.

Rothbard would have to let A go，because no causality as he defines it exists.In fact，as far as the external world is concerned，A has done no harm to B at all。His attempt to take B’s life was an allaround failure.(Rothbard himself clearly feels uncomfortable taking this position and comments：“even if the attempted crime created no invasion of property per se，if the attempted battery or murder became known to the victim，the resulting creation of fear in the victim would be prosecutable as an assault。So the attempted criminal (or tortfeasor) could not get away unscathed.”[354])

罗斯巴德不得不放过

again，the principal reason that this solution seems unsatisfactory is the lack of an analogue in the positive theory of property and appropriation.We do not require that an act of original appropriation (homestead ing) be successful in order to find that it has taken place and to deter mine ownership.For example，A clears the underbrush from a previously unowned piece of woodland in order to create a park。However，in doing so he accidentally burns down all trees.A’s action was unsuccessful。This is not the outcome he wanted.Is he nonetheless the owner of the burned forest? It seems so。However，if there are unsuccessful attempts of appropriation, which count nonetheless as acts of appropriation，why should there not also be unsuccessful attempts of aggression，which nonetheless count as aggression?

同样，这种解决方案似乎不令人满意的主要原因是在财产和占有的实证的理论中缺乏类似的东西。我们并不要求先占行为（宅基地）必须成功才能认定其发生并确定所有权。例如，A 为了建造一个公园，清除了一片以前无主林地上的灌木丛。然而，在此过程中，他不小心烧毁了所有的树木。A 的行动没有成功。这不是他想要的结果。他还是被烧毁森林的所有者吗？似乎是这样。但是，如果有不成功的占有企图，但仍然算作占有行为，为什么不应该有不成功的侵犯企图，但仍然算作侵犯行为呢？

V.

Clearly，while “objective” (external，observable) criteria must play an important role in the determination of ownership and aggression，such criteria are not sufficient。In particular，defining aggression “objectivistically” as “overt physical invasion” appears deficient because it excludes entrapment，incitement and failed attempts，for instance.Both the establishment of property rights and their violation spring from actions：acts of appropriation and expropriation.However，in addition to a physical appearance，actions also have an internal，subjective aspect。This aspect cannot be observed by our sense organs.Instead，it must be ascertained by means of understanding (verstehen)。The task of the judge cannot—by the nature of things—be reduced to a simple decision rule based on a quasimechanical model of causation.Judges must observe the facts and understand the actors and actions involved in order to determine fault and liability。

显然，虽然

第四辑知识分子及其历史

intellectuals and intellectual History

21 M·N.Rothbard：Economics，Science，and Liberty

21 罗斯巴德：经济学、科学和自由*

Murray N.Rothbard (1926–1995) has come to occupy a position of unique influence within the intellectual tradition Austrian economics for a combination of three central reasons.

默里-罗斯巴德（Murray N.Rothbard，1926-1995 年）在奥地利经济学的思想传统中具有独特的影响力，这主要有三个原因。

First，Rothbard is the latest representative of the mainstream within Austrianeconomics.[355] As in other intellectual traditions，various interconnected branches can be identified within the Austrian school of economics.Rothbard is the latest exponent of the main rationalist branch of the Austrian school，starting with the school’s founder，Carl menger，and continu ing with Eugen von BöhmBawerk，and Ludwig von Mises.Like menger，BöhmBawerk，and Mises，Rothbard is an outspoken rationalist and critic of all variants of social relativism：historicism，empiricism，Positivism，falsi ficationism，and skepticism.Like his acknowledged predecessors，Rothbard defends the view that economic laws not only exist，but more specifically that they are “exact” (menger) or “aprioristic” (Mises) laws.In contrast to the propositions of the (empirical) natural sciences，which must be con tinually tested against ever new data，and thus can never attain more than hypothetical validity，the propositions of economics concern necessary，nonhypothetical relations and assume apodictic validity。According to the Austrian mainstream，all economic laws can be derived deductively from a few elementary facts of nature and man (menger)，or from a single axiom (Mises)，i.e.，the proposition “man acts,” which one cannot dispute without running into a performative contradiction，and which is，thus，indisputably true，and a few empirical—and empirically testable—assumptions.Like his predecessors，Rothbard considers it neither necessary nor indeed possible to test economic propositions by studying data of experience.Experience can illustrate the validity of an economic theorem，but experience can never refute or falsify it，because ultimately its validity rests solely on the indis putable validity of the axiom of action，and on the validity (and correct exercise) of the rules of deductive reasoning and logical inference.Indeed，trying to “empirically test” an economic law involves a category mistake and is a sign of confusion.Further，like menger，BöhmBawerk，and Mises before him，Rothbard adheres firmly to epistemological and methodologi cal individualisM.only individuals act; consequently，all social phenomena must be explained—logically reconstructed—as the result of purposeful individual actions.Every “holistic” or “organicist” explanation must be categorically rejected as an unscientific pseudoexplanation.Likewise，every mechanistic explanation of social phenomena must be discarded as unscientific。Humans act under conditions of uncertainty。The idea of a social mechanic and equilibrium is useful only insofar as it enables us to grasp what actions are not，and in what respect they are fundamentally different and categorically distinct from the operations of machines and automatons.

首先，罗斯巴德是奥地利经济学主流的最新代表。与其他思想传统一样，奥地利经济学派中也有多个相互关联的分支。罗斯巴德是奥地利学派主要理性主义分支的最新代表人物，该学派的创始人是卡尔与自然科学（实证）命题不同的是，自然科学命题必须不断用新的数据进行检验，因此其有效性永远只能是假设性的。经济学的命题涉及必然的、非假设的关系，并假设绝对的有效性。

Second，Rothbard is the latest and most comprehensive Systembuilder within Austrian economics.only among rationalists does a constant desire for System and completeness exist。While they contributed much to its foun dation，neither menger nor BöhmBawerk accomplished this ultimate intellectual desideratuM.This feat was accomplished only by Mises，with the publication of his monumental Human Action.[356] “Here at last,” Rothbard wrote about Human Action，“was economics whole once more，once again an edifice.Not only that—here was a structure of economics with many of the components newly contributed by Professor Mises himself。” Since then，only Rothbard has accomplished a similar achievement with the publication of man，Economy，and State and its companion volume，Power and Market。[357] As it is modeled after Mises’s magnum opus，and even more comprehensive and complete，what Rothbard stated about Mises and Human Action can be said of himself and man，Economy，and State.In fact，no less of an authority than Mises himself did so in reviewing the book for the new individualist review.

其次，罗斯巴德是奥地利经济学中最新、最全面的体系构建者。无论是门格尔还是庞巴维克，虽然他们为体系的建立做出了巨大贡献，但都没有实现这一终极的思想理想。只有米塞斯完成了这一壮举，出版了他的不朽巨著《人的行动》。

Mises hailed Rothbard’s treatise

as an epochal contribution to the general science of human action，praxeology，and its practically most important and uptonow best elaborated part，economics.Henceforth all essential studies in these branches of knowledge will have to take full account of the theories and criticisms expounded by Dr。Rothbard.[358]

米塞斯称赞罗斯巴德的论文

是对关于人的行动的一般科学，即行动学及其最重要、迄今为止阐述得最详尽的部分——经济学的划时代贡献。今后，这些知识分支的所有重要研究都必须充分考虑罗斯巴德博士所阐述的理论和批评。

Today Mises

今天，米塞斯的《人的行动》和罗斯巴德的《人，经济，与国家》是奥地利学派的两大杰出成就。今天，无论是作为奥地利经济学的学生，还是作为其批评者，如果没有阅读和研究过《人的行动》和《人，经济，与国家》，就不能被认真对待。

Third，Rothbard is the latest and most Systematically political Austrian economist。Just as rationalism implies the desire for System and complete ness，so it implies political activisM.To rationalists，human beings are above all rational animals.Their actions，and the course of human history，are determined by ideas (rather than by blind evolutionary forces of spontane ous evolution and natural selection)。ideas can be true or false，but only true ideas “work” and result in success and progress，while false ideas lead to failure and decline.As the discoverer of true ideas and eradicator of false ones，the scholar assumes a crucial role in human history。Human progress is the result of the discovery of truth and the proliferation of true ideas— enlightenment—and is thus entirely in the scholar’s hands.The truth is inherently practical，and in recognizing an idea as true (or false)，a scholar cannot but want it to be implemented (or eradicated) immediately。For this reason，in addition to pursuing his scholarly ambitions，menger served as personal tutor to the Austrian crown prince Rudolf，and as an appointed lifemember of the Austrian House of Lords (Herrenhaus)。Similarly，Böhm Bawerk served three times as Austrian minister of finance，and was a life time member of the Herrenhaus.Likewise，Mises was the nationally promi nent chief economist of the Vienna Chamber of Commerce and advisor to many prominent figures during Austria’s first republic，and later，in the U.S.，he served as advisor to the National Association of manufacturers and numerous other organizations.only Mises went even further。Just as he was the first economic Systembuilder，so was he the first to give the Austrian activism Systematic expression by associating Austrian economics with radicalliberallibertarian political reform (as laid out in his liberalism of 1927)。only Rothbard，who likewise served in many advisory functions and as founder and academic director of several educational organizations，accomplished something comparable.Proceeding Systematically beyond even Mises，Rothbard accomplished—in his Ethics of Liberty[359]—to integrate (via the concept of private property) a valuefree Austrian economics and libertarian political philosophy (ethics) as two complementary branches of a grand unified social theory，thereby creating a radical—Austrolibertarian— philosophical movement。

第三，罗斯巴德是最近的、最系统的奥地利政治经济学家。正如理性主义意味着对系统性和完整性的渴望，它也意味着政治上的行动主义。在理性主义者看来，人类首先是理性的动物。他们的行动，以及人类历史的进程，都是由观念决定的（而不是由自发的演化和自然选择的盲目进化力量决定的）。观念可真可假，但只有正确的观念才 “，才会带来成功和进步，而错误的观念则会导致失败和衰落。作为正确观念的发现者和谬误观念的根除者，知识分子在人类历史中扮演着至关重要的角色。人类的进步是发现真理和传播正确观念——启蒙——的结果，因此完全掌握在知识分子手中。真理本质上是实践的，当一个知识分子认识到某种观念是真的（或假的）时，他恨不得希望立马将其付诸实施（或根除）。因此，除了追求学术抱负之外，门格尔还担任过奥地利王储鲁道夫的私人教师，并被任命为奥地利上议院（Herrenhaus）的终身议员。同样，庞巴维克曾三次担任奥地利财政部长，也是奥地利上议院的终身议员。类似的，米塞斯是维也纳商会全国知名的首席经济学家，也是奥地利第一个共和国时期许多知名人士的顾问，后来在美国，他还担任过全国制造商协会和许多其他组织的顾问。只有米塞斯走得更远。正如他是第一个经济体系的缔造者一样，他也是第一个将奥地利经济学与激进的自由主义和自由意志主义政治改革联系起来(如他在1927年的《自由主义》中所阐述的那样)，从而系统地表达了奥地利学派的行动主义。只有罗斯巴德（Rothbard）可以与之媲美，他同样担任过许多顾问职务，也是多个教育组织的创始人和学术负责人。罗斯巴德系统性地超越了米塞斯，他在《自由的伦理》中将价值无涉的奥地利经济学和自由意志主义政治哲学（伦理学）（通过私有财产概念）整合为一个大一统的社会理论的两个互补分支，从而开创了激进的奥地利自由意志主义哲学

In the area of theoretical economics，Rothbard contributed two major advances beyond the standards set by Mises’s Human Action.First，Rothbard provided Systematic clarification of the theory of marginal utility，and then advanced a new reconstruction of welfare economics and，entirely absent in Mises’s System，an economic theory of the state.

在理论经济学领域，罗斯巴德在米塞斯的《人的行动》所确立的标准之外，又取得了两项重大进步。首先，罗斯巴德系统地阐明了边际效用理论，然后提出了重建福利经济学，以及在米塞斯体系中完全缺失的国家经济理论。

Building on the foundations of a strictly ordinalist interpretation of marginal utility laid out by Mises as early as 1912 in his Theory of Money and Credit,[360] Rothbard explained that the word “marginal” in marginal utility does not refer to increments of utility (which would imply measurabil ity)，but rather to the utility of increments of goods (and thus has nothing to do with measurability)。The good to which utility is attached，and the increments in its size，can be described in physical terms.The good and its increments extend in space，and thus can be measured and counted as unitary quantitative additions.In distinct contrast，the utility attached to a physical good and its unitary physical increments is a purely intensive magnitudE.It does not extend in space，and hence is immeasurable and intractable by unitary counting and the rules of arithmetic。All attempts to construct a cardinal measure of utility are in vaiN.Qua intensive magni tude，utility can be treated only ordinally; that is，as a rank order on a one dimensional individual preference scale (and every economic phenome non，in particular monetary calculation and “objective” cost accounting，must ultimately be reducible to and explained as the simple outcome of ordinal individual rank order judgments)。Apart from their placement on onedimensional individual preference scales，no quantitative relationship between different goods and different quantities of the same good exists.In particular，no such thing as total utility—conceived of as the addition or integration of marginal utilities—exists.Rather，“total” utility is the mar ginal utility of a largersized quantity of a good，and，Rothbard explained,

there are，then two laws of utility，both following from the apodictic conditions of human action：first，that given the size of a unit of a good，the (marginal) utility of each unit decreases as the supply of units increases; second，that the (marginal) utility of a largersized unit is greater than the (marginal) utility of a smallersized unit。The first is the law of diminish ing marginal utility。The second has been called the law of increasing total utility。The relationship between the two laws and between the items considered in both is purely one of rank，i.e.，ordinal。[361]

早在 1912 年，米塞斯就在《货币与信用理论》中对边际效用进行了严格的序数主义解释，罗斯巴德在此基础上解释说，边际效用中的 “边际 “一词并不是指效用的增量（这意味着可计量性），而是指商品增量的效用（因此与可计量性无关）。可以用物理术语来描述附带效用的商品及其规模增量。商品及其增量在空间中延伸，因此可以作为单位数量的增量来测量和计算。与此形成鲜明对比的是，物理商品及其单位物理增量所附带的效用是一个纯粹的强度等级。它不在空间中延伸，因此是不可测量的，也是单位计数和算术规则所无法解决的。所有试图构建效用基数测量标准的尝试都是徒劳的。根据强度等级，效用只能被序数化处理，即作为一维个人偏好量表上的一个序数（每一种非经济表象，特别是货币计算和 “客观 “成本核算，最终都必须归结为并解释为个人判断的序数排序的简单结果）。除了它们在一维的个人偏好表的排序之外，不同商品和同种商品的不同数量之间并不存在定量关系。特别是，不存在被视为边际效用相加或整合的总效用。相反，”总 “效用是较大数量商品的边际效用。罗斯巴德解释道，

因此，有两条效用法则，它们都是从人的行动的绝对条件中得出的：

Graphically，Rothbard illustrated，the relationship can be represented thus:[362]

Ranks in value

3 eggs

2 eggs

1 egg

2^nd egg

3^rd egg

罗斯巴德用图表说明了这种关系：

价值排序

3 个蛋

2 个蛋

1 个蛋

第2 个蛋

第3 个蛋

The higher the ranking on this individual value scale for eggs，the higher the value.By the second law，3 eggs are valued more highly than 2，eggs and 2 eggs more highly than one.By the first law，the 2nd egg will be ranked below the first on the value scale，and the 3rd below the 2nd.No mathematical relationship exists between，for instance，the marginal utility of 3 eggs and the marginal utility of the 3rd egg except that the former is greater than the latter。

鸡蛋在这一单独的价值表上的排名越靠前，价值就越高。根据第二定律，3 个鸡蛋的价值高于 2 个鸡蛋，2 个鸡蛋的价值高于 1 个鸡蛋。根据第一定律，第二个鸡蛋的价值排名低于第一个，第三个鸡蛋的价值排名低于第二个。例如，3 个鸡蛋的边际效用和第 3 个鸡蛋的边际效用之间不存在数学关系，只是前者大于后者。

As Lionel Robbins，influenced by Wicksteed and Mises，had first brought home to mainstream economics，from the ordinal character of utility it follows logically that every interpersonal as well as intrapersonal com parison of utility must be regarded as impossible (unscientific)，and hence every social welfare proposal involving any such comparison is arbitrary。[363] While mainstream welfare economics was thrown into disarray upon full realization of this conclusion，Rothbard provided a radically new strictly ordinalist reconstruction of welfare economics based on the twin concepts of individual selfownership and demonstrated preference.[364]

正如莱昂内尔

Selfownership simply means this：every individual owns (controls) his own physical human body。“man’s nature,” explained Rothbard，“is a fusion of ‘spirit’ and matter。”[365] Every living human body is appropriated and controlled by a single independent (autonomous) conscious mind and will—a self or ego。Accordingly，as long as it is alive，we refer to a human body as a persona (rather than a corpus)。(Mainstream welfare economics also accepts the concept of selfownership，even if only implicitly，by virtue of the fact that it speaks of separate individual utility maximizers.) The concept of demonstrated preference is implied in that of selfownership.It simply means “that actual choice reveals，or demonstrates，a man’s preferences; that is，that his preferences are deducibile from what he has chosen in action.”[366] Every action involves a man’s purposeful use of his physical body，and thus demonstrates that he values this body as a good.Furthermore，in using it in one way rather than another，he simultaneously demonstrates with every action what he considers the most highly valued use of this good at the time of his acting。In accordance with the ordinal character of utility，actions reveal only the existential fact of preference orders and ranks.They do not reveal anything about the “differences” or “distances” of ranks or the “intensity” of preference，nor do they ever demonstrate “indifference.” indeed，both “differences” of rank and “indifference,” i.e.，valueequality，presuppose cardinal utility。

自我所有权简单地说就是：每个人都拥有（控制）自己的身体。罗斯巴德解释说，

Based on the concepts of selfownership and demonstrated preference，and in accordance with Pareto’s strictures concerning the possibility of meaningful ordinalist welfare statements，Rothbard deduced the follow ing set of propositions：If a man uses his body (“labor”) to extend his control over (appropriate) other naturegiven things (unowned “land”)，as he must if only in order to stand，this action demonstrates that such things are also goods for him.Hence，he must have gained in utility by appropriating them.At the same time，his action does not make anyone else worse off，because in appropriating previously unowned resources nothing is taken away from others.Others could have appropriated these resources，too，if they had considered them valuable.Yet，they demonstrably did not do so。Indeed，their failure to appropriate them demonstrates their preference for not appropriating them.Hence，they cannot possibly be said to have lost any utility on account of another’s appropriation.Proceeding from the basis of acts of original appropriation，any further act，whether of production or consumption，is equally Paretosuperior on demonstrated preference grounds，provided only that it does not affect the physical integrity of the resources appropriated or produced with appropriated means by others.The producerconsumer is better off，while everyone else is left in control of the same quantity of goods as before.As a result，no one can be said to be worse off。Finally，every voluntary exchange of goods proceeding from this basis is a Paretosuperior change as well，because it can only take place if both exchange parties expect to benefit from it，while the supply of goods controlled in action (owned) by others remains unchanged.

根据

Based on these propositions，Rothbard proceeded to advance an entirely new Austrian theory of the state.While every act of original appropriation，productionconsumption，and exchange (the free market) always and nec essarily increases social utility，no act of expropriation (the nonconsensual unilateral taking of goods from their original appropriator and producer consumer) can possibly do so。Obviously，this is true of all acts typically considered criminal，such as physical aggression，invasion，robbery，theft，and fraud.While the criminal controls a larger quantity of goods and is thus better off，his victim controls a correspondingly smaller quantity of goods and is made worse off; hence，no criminal act fulfills the Paretian strictures and can ever be said to increase social utility。While criminal acts are typi cally considered illegal and man is permitted to defend himself against them，the same conclusion about utility is true of all acts of government agents：“no act of government whatever can increase social utility。”[367] Yet，they are considered legal and one is not permitted to defend oneself against them.

基于这些论点，罗斯巴德提出了全新的奥地利学派的国家理论。基于这些论点，罗斯巴德提出了全新的奥地利学派的国家理论。虽然每一种先占，生产消费和交换（自由市场）的行为总是而且必然会增加社会效用，但任何征用行为（未经同意单方面从商品的先占者和生产者

Rothbard’s conclusion concerning the rejection of the institution of government on welfareeconomic grounds is based on the standard and noncontroversial definition of the state

as that organization which possesses either or both (in actual fact，almost always both) of the following characteristics：(a) it acquires its revenue by physical coercion (taxation); and (b) it achieves a compul sory monopoly of force and of ultimate decisionmaking power over a given territorial area.[368]

罗斯巴德关于以福利经济学为由否定政府制度的结论，是基于对国家的标准和无争议的定义而得出的

As for its first pillar，it is clear that government agents benefit from acts of taxation; otherwise，they would abstain from them.Just as clearly，the subjects of taxation—the original appropriators—producers of the goods taxed—can not be said to benefit from such acts; otherwise，they would pay the same quantity of goods voluntarily and no compulsion would be necessary。

至于它的第一个特征，很明显，政府人员从征税行为中获益，否则，他们就会放弃征税。同样清楚的是，不能说征税的主体——先占者——被征税商品的生产者——从征税行为中获益，否则，他们就会自愿缴纳相同数量的商品，也就没有必要使用强制手段了。

Similarly，it is clear that government agents gain in utility by achieving a territorial monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking (jurisdiction)。Most importantly，in doing so the question of whether taxes are justified or not becomes moot and is decided from the outset in favor of government。How ever，just as clearly，every subject of government’s ultimate decisionmaking power is thereby made worse off。By virtue of his acts of original appropriation and production，a man demonstrates his preference of exercising exclusive control (jurisdiction) over the appropriated and produced goods.Unless he abandons，sells，or voluntarily surrenders them to someone else (in which case this person would demonstrate his preference of gaining exclusive control over them)，he cannot possibly be said to have changed this evaluation.If，contrary to his demonstrated preference of not giving up his privately appropriated and produced goods，the state attains a ter ritorial monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking (jurisdiction)，this is only possible as the result of an act of expropriation.If the government is the ultimate decisionmaker，then by implication no single man has exclusive control over his own appropriated and produced goods.In effect，the state has assumed ownership of all goods appropriated and produced by “its” residents，and has reduced them to the rank of tenants.Whereas the government’s range of control is enlarged，every private owner’s range of control regarding his own appropriations and products，and their value，is corre spondingly reduced.Most importantly，as a tenant no one can exclude the government from access to his privately appropriated and produced goods; that is，everyone is left without means of physical defense visàvis possible government intervention or invasion.

同样，很明显，政府人员通过实现对最终决策（管辖权）的地域垄断而获得效用。最重要的是，这样一来，税收是否合理的问题就变得毫无意义，从一开始就决定了政府的利益。然而，同样明显的是，受政府最终决策权管辖的每一个主体都因此而变得更糟。

Consequently Rothbard concluded，if all government action rests on expropriation，and no expropriation can be said to increase social utility，then welfare economics must call for the abolition of the state.Scores of political philosophers and economists，from Thomas Hobbes to James Buchanan and the modern publicchoice economists，have attempted to escape from this conclusion by portraying the state as the outcome of con tracts，and hence，a voluntary and welfareenhancing institution.In reply to such endeavors，Rothbard agreed with Joseph Schumpeter that “the theory which construes taxes on the analogy of club dues or of purchase of services of，say，a doctor only proves how far removed this part of the social sciences is from scientific habits of mind.”[369] From Hobbes to Buchanan，statists had tried to overcome the apparent contradiction in the idea of a “voluntary” state equipped with compulsory judicial monopoly and the power to tax by recourse to the intellectual makeshift of “implicit” or “conceptual” agreements，contracts，or constitutions.Rothbard explained that all of these typically tortuous attempts ultimately only lead to the same inescapable conclusion：“implicit” and “conceptual” contracts are the very opposite of contracts，i.e.，no contracts.Hence，it is impossible to derive a welfareeconomic justification for the state.No one can possibly—demon strably—agree to permanently surrender jurisdiction over his person and private property to someone else unless he had sold or otherwise given all of his current possessions away and subsequently committed suicide; like wise no one who is alive，can possibly—demonstrably—enter a contract that permits someone else—his protector—to determine forever unilater ally，without the continued consent of the protected，the tribute that the protected must pay for his protection.

因此，罗斯巴德得出结论，如果政府的所有行动都依赖于征用，而任何征用都不能说是为了增加社会效用，那么福利经济学就必须呼吁废除国家。从托马斯

In particular，Rothbard scorned the idea of a “limited” protective state as selfcontradictory and incompatible with the promotion of social utility。Limited government always has the inherent tendency to become unlimited (totalitarian) government。given the principle of government—judicial monopoly and the power to tax—any notion of restraining government power and safeguarding individual life and property is illusory。Under monopolistic auspices，the price of justice and protection will rise and the quality of justice and protection will fall。A taxfunded protection agency is a contradiction in terms—an expropriating property protector—and will lead to more taxes and less protection.Even if a government limited its activities exclusively to the protection of preexisting property rights，the further question of how much security to produce would arise.Motivated (like everyone else) by selfinterest and the disutility of labor，but with the unique power to tax，a government agent’s answer will invariably be the same：to maximize expenditures on protection—and almost all of a nation’s wealth can conceivably be consumed by the cost of protection—and at the same time to minimize the production of protection.Moreover，a judicial monopoly will lead to a deterioration in the quality of justice and protec tion.If one can only appeal to government for justice，justice and protec tion will be perverted in favor of government，constitutions and supreme courts notwithstanding。Constitutions and supreme courts are government constitutions and courts，and whatever limitations to government action they might contain or find is determined by agents of the very institution under consideration.Predictably，the definition of property and protection will be altered and the range of jurisdiction expanded to the government’s advantage.

Instead，in accordance with the “one ethical judgment” that “even the most rigorously wertfrei economists have been willing to allow themselves … (of feeling) free to recommend any change or process that increases social utility under the Unanimity Rule,”[370] Rothbard reached the same anarchist conclusion as the Frenchbelgian economist Gustave de Molinari before him：defense，protection，and judicial services would therefore have to be supplied by people or firms who (a) gained their revenue voluntarily rather than by coercion，and (b) did not— as the State does—arrogate to themselves a compulsory monopoly of police or judicial protection.defense firms would have to be as

freely competitive and as noncoercive against noninvaders as are all other suppliers of goods and services on the free market。defense ser vices，like all other services，would be marketable and marketable only。[371]

相反，罗斯巴德根据

Every private property owner would be able to partake of the advan tages of the division of labor，and to seek better protection of his property than that afforded by selfdefense，through cooperation with other owners and their property。That is，everyone could buy from，sell to，or otherwise contract with anyone else concerning protective and judicial services，and he could at any time unilaterally discontinue any such cooperation with others and fall back on selfreliant defense or change his protective affiliations.

每个私有财产的所有者都可以分享劳动分工带来的好处，并通过与其他所有者及其财产的合作，为自己的财产寻求比防卫更好的安保。也就是说，每个人都可以向其他人购买、出售或以其他方式与其他人签订有关安保和司法服务的契约，而且他可以在任何时候单方面中止与其他人的任何此类合作，转而依靠自力更生进行防卫或改变他的安保的隶属关系。

Rothbard’s other major advance was in the theory of monopoly and com petition.Here too，Rothbard recalled the French tradition of radical laissez faire economics of JeanBaptiste Say and his followers (to which Molinari belonged)。Rothbard’s positive doctrine of competition and monopoly is plain and simple (as a theory should be)。Competition is defined as conduct within the framework of the described rules of Paretosuperior action：of original appropriation，productionconsumption，and voluntary exchange and contract。More specifically applied to entrepreneurial action，competi tion means the existence of unrestricted “free entry。” Every individual is at liberty to employ his own property in any way he sees fit，and to enter any line of production deemed profitable.As long as this freeentry condition is met，Rothbard concluded，all product prices and production costs tend to be minimum prices and minimum costs.In distinct contrast，monopoly and monopolistic competition are defined by the absence of free entry，i.e.，as the presence of exclusive privilege.The state，defined as the compulsory territorial monopolist of jurisdiction and protection，is thus the prototype of a monopoly。Every individual—except the agents of the state—is prohib ited from using his property for the production of selfdefense and justice，and thus from competing with the state.All other monopolies go back to this originary state monopoly of jurisdiction (legislation and regulation) as their ultimate sourcE.Every other monopoly involves “a grant of special privilege by the State，reserving a certain area of production to one particular individual or group.”[372] Entry into the area is legally restricted to other actual or potential producers，and this restriction is enforced by state police.As long as free entry is restricted or absent，concluded Rothbard，whether in the production of justice and security or that of any other good or service，product prices and production costs will be higher than otherwise，i.e.，too high.(Thus，to Rothbard the notion of government antimonopoly or anti trust policy was a contradictio in adjecto。Competition required instead the abolition of the state’s very own territorial monopoly of jurisdiction.)

罗斯巴德的另一大贡献是垄断和竞争理论。在这里，罗斯巴德也回顾了让·巴蒂斯特·萨伊与此形成鲜明对比的是，垄断和垄断竞争的定义是缺乏自由进入，即存在独占性特权。国家，被定义为管辖和安保的强制性领土垄断者，因此是垄断的原型。

Moreover，Rothbard refuted every alternative theory as nonsense，non operational，or false.It is nonsense，for instance，to define a monopolist as someone who has control over his price (a “pricesearcher”)。Every businessman has perfect control over his price (and no control at all over the quantity bought at that price by consumers)。Hence，under this definition，no one exists who is not a monopolist。Likewise，is it nonsense to define a monopolist as “the only seller of any given good,” for in an objective sense，every seller of every product is always the only seller of his own unique product (brand)。Thus，everyone is a monopolist with a onehundredpercent market share of one’s own product。Yet，this circumstance does not affect in the slightest that each entrepreneur must compete at all times with every other entrepreneur for consumer spending，regardless how unique or different one’s goods may be.on the other hand，in a subjective sense，no seller of anything can ever be established definitely as a monopolist。According to this interpretation，the term “given good” means “a good as defined by consumers.” Thus，the determination of whether or not the seller of some thing is its only seller，or of how large his marketshare is，depends on the consumers’ definition of what this good is; that is，on their classification of particular physical objects into various groups of homogeneous goods.Not only can such classifications continually change，but different consumers can classify the same physical objects differently。Hence，in this sense the term monopolist becomes practically useless and nonoperational，and all attempts to measure a product’s market share must be considered futile.

此外，罗斯巴德驳斥了所有的理论变体，认为它们都是无稽之谈，不具可操作性，或者是错误的。例如，将垄断者定义为能够控制自己价格的人（

Finally，Mises’s theory of monopoly price is untenable.Mises had argued that

monopoly is a prerequisite for the emergence of monopoly prices，but it is not the only prerequisite.There is a further condition required，namely a certain shape of the demand curve.The mere existence of monopoly does not mean anything in this regard.Not every price at which a monopolist sells a monopolized commodity is a monopoly price.Monopoly prices are only prices at which it is more advantageous for the monopolist to restrict the total amount to be sold than to expand its sales to the limit which a competitive market would allow.[373]

最后，米塞斯的垄断价格理论是站不住脚的。米塞斯认为

垄断是垄断价格出现的先决条件，但不是唯一的先决条件。还需要一个条件，即需求曲线的某种形状。在这方面，仅仅存在垄断并不意味着什么。垄断者出售垄断商品的价格并非都是垄断价格。垄断价格只是这样的价格，对垄断者来说，限制销售总量比将销售扩大到竞争市场所允许的限度更有利。

As Rothbard explained，this argument is fallacious.First off，it will have to be noted that every restrictive action must，by definition，have a complementary expansionary aspect。The factors of production，which the monopolist releases from employment in some production line A，do not simply disappear。Rather，they must be used otherwise：either for the production of another exchange good B，or for an expansion in the production of the consumer good of leisure for its owner。Thus，even if monopoly prices existed，this would have no negative welfare socialutility implications.From the monopolist’s act of not selling，it follows that he must believe himself to be better off keeping rather than selling his goods，and no one else is made worse off because of his act (because everyone else still controls the same quantity of goods as before)。Consequently，Mises’s monopoly price and the shape of the demand curve facing a monopolist cannot be operationally or conceptually distinguished from any other price and demand curve facing any other seller。

Production，explained Rothbard，precedes the sale of final products，and production costs must be incurred before consumers can demonstrate their preference for one’s products.Hence，it is nonsense，for instance，to define a monopoly price as a price above marginal cost (or of marginal revenue higher than marginal cost) because the cost curves on the one hand and the demand and revenue curves on the other do not exist simultaneously。

罗斯巴德解释说，生产先于最终产品的销售，生产成本必须在消费者表现出对产品的偏好之前产生。因此，将垄断价格定义为高于边际成本的价格（或边际收入高于边际成本的价格）是无稽之谈，因为，一方的成本曲线与另一方的需求和收入曲线并不同时存在。

The only curves that exist simultaneously with cost curves are entrepreneurially estimated future demand and revenue curves.However，in deciding on the quantity of goods to be produced，every producer will always set his output so as to maximize his expected money earnings，ceteris pari bus.That is，in the monetary calculations leading to his outputdecision，expected price and marginal revenue are never equal to marginal cost。No one will produce anything unless he expects its price to exceed its cost; and no one will expand his output，unless he expects marginal revenue to be higher than marginal cost。Thus，every entrepreneur assumes in his calcula tions that in the future he will be facing a downward sloping demand curve，with elastic and inelastic stretches.Likewise，at the subsequent point of sale，when all costs have been incurred by the producer and the only relevant demand is that of consumers for existing stocks of produced products，every entrepreneur will assume a downward sloping demand curve.That is，every entrepreneur will set his price at such a height that any price higher than the actually chosen one will encounter an elastic demand，and thus lead to lower sales revenues.

If the actually chosen sale price coincides with the original estimation，and if the market clears at this price，the entrepreneurial forecast has been correct。on the other hand，the actual demand can differ from the initial projection，and one or another type of entrepreneurial forecasting error may be revealed.At the point of sale，the entrepreneur can come to the conclusion that he mistakenly produced either “too little” or “too much.” in the first case，actual demand (prices and revenue) is higher than expected yet profits could have been still greater if production had been further expanded.The entrepreneur originally estimated demand beyond a specific outputpoint to be inelastic (such that a larger output would lead to lower total revenue)，while it is now revealed as being elastic beyond this point。In the second case，the actual demand (prices and revenue) is lower than expected.Losses could have been avoided if less had been produced.The entrepreneur estimated demand beyond a certain outputpoint to be elastic，such that a larger quantity could be sold for a higher total revenue，while it is now revealed as inelastic。

In any case，whether or not his original forecast was correct，every entrepreneur must subsequently make a new output decision.Under the assumption that they regard their past experience (present demand) as indicative of their future experience (demand)，three possible decisions exist。Entrepreneurs whose initial forecasts had been correct will produce the same quantity as before.Entrepreneurs who had initially produced “too little” will now produce a larger quantity，and entrepreneurs who had previously produced “too much” will restrict current sales and future pro duction.How，asked Rothbard，can this latter entrepreneurial response to earlier overproduction be distinguished from Mises’s alleged “monopoly price” situation? He answered that in fact it could not。

Is the higher price to be gained from such a cutback necessarily a “monopoly price”? Why could it not just as well be a movement from a subcompetitive price to a competitive price? in the real world，a demand curve is not simply “given” to a producer，but must be estimated and discovered.If a producer has produced too much in one period and，in order to earn more income，produces less in the next period，this is all that can be said about the action Thus，we cannot use “restriction of production” as the test of monopoly vs.competitive price.A movement from a subcompetitive to a competitive price also involves a “restriction” of production of this good，coupled，of course，with an expansion of production in other lines by the released factors.There is no way whatever to distinguish such a “restriction” and corollary expansion from the alleged “monopoly price” situation But if a concept has no possible grounding in reality，then it is an empty and illusory，and not a meaningful，concept。on the free market，there is no way of distinguishing a “monopoly price” from a “competitive price” or a “subcompetitive price” or of establishing any changes as movements from one to the other。No criteria can be found for making such distinctions.The concept of monopoly price as distinguished from competitive price is therefore untenable.We can only speak of the freemarket price.[374]

在任何情况下，无论最初的预测是否正确，每个企业家随后都必须做出新的产出决策。假设他们将过去的经验（当前需求）视为未来经验（需求）的参考，那么就存在三种可能的决策。最初预测正确的企业家将生产相同数量的产品。最初生产 “过少 “的企业家现在会大量生产，而先前生产 “过多 “的企业家则会限制当前的销售和未来的生产。罗斯巴德问道，后一种企业家对先前生产过剩的反应如何与米塞斯所谓的

从这种削减中获得的更高价格一定是

In addition to these major innovations，Rothbard contributed many new theoretical insights.Two examples will have to suffice here.For one，Rothbard utilized the wellknown Misesian argument concerning the impossibility of economic calculation (costaccounting) under socialism in order to demonstrate，even more generally，the impossibility of one big car tel on the free market。[375]

The free market placed definite limits on the size of the firm，i.e.，the limits of calculability on the market。In order to calculate the profits and losses of each branch，a firm must be able to refer its internal opera tions to external markets for each of the various factors and intermediate products.When any of these external markets disappear，because all are absorbed within the province of a single firm，calculability disappears，and there is no way for the firm rationally to allocate factors to that specific area.The more these limits are encroached upon，the greater and greater will be the sphere of irrationality，and the more difficult it will be to avoid losses.one big cartel would not be able rationally to allocate producers’ goods at all and hence could not avoid severe losses.Consequently，it could never really be established，and，if tried，would quickly break asunder。[376]

除了这些重大创新之外，罗斯巴德还提出了许多新的理论洞见。这里仅举两个例子就足够了。其一，罗斯巴德利用米塞斯关于社会主义下不可能进行经济计算（成本核算）的著名论点来证明，甚至更广泛地说，自由市场上不可能存在一个大卡特尔。

自由市场对企业规模有明确的限制，即市场的可计算性限制。为了计算每个分支机构的利润和亏损，企业必须能够将其内部业务与外部市场的各种要素和中间产品联系起来。当这些外部市场中的任何一个消失时，由于所有市场都被一家企业所吞并，可计算性也就消失了，企业也就无法合理地将要素分配到这一特定领域。这些界限越被突破，不合理的范围就越大，避免损失也就越困难。一个大卡特尔根本无法合理地分配生产者的产品，因此也就无法避免严重损失。因此，它不可能真正建立起来，而且，即使尝试建立，也会很快瓦解。

The second example，likewise inspired by Mises，is from the area of monetary theory。Mises，stimulated in turn by menger’s work，had demon strated that money qua medium of exchange must originate as a commodity money (such as gold)。Rothbard complemented Mises’s theory of the origin of money—his famous “regression theorem”—with a theory of the destruc tion or devolution of money by government，or what might be termed a “progression theoreM.” He demonstrated，most succinctly in his What Has Government Done to Our Money?,[377] the praxeologically necessary sequence of actions taken by government in order to achieve—as its ultimate goal— complete money counterfeiting autonomy。Having of necessity to begin with a marketprovided commodity money such as gold，a government will first monopolize the minting; next，it will monopolize the issue of money sub stitutes (titles to money，ready redeemable bank notes); subsequently，it will engage in fractional reserve banking and issue money substitutes in excess of actual money; and finally，as the inevitable result of the bank crisis (bank run) brought about by fractional reserve banking，it will suspend the redeemabil ity of its notes，cut the tie between paper (title) and money (gold)，confiscate all privately owned money，and institute a pure fiat money。

Yet，Rothbard’s achievements go far beyond his innovations in economic theory。They go far beyond even his accomplishment of integrating these innovations into a grand，comprehensive and unified System of Austrian economics.Although an economist by profession，Rothbard’s work encompasses also political philosophy (ethics) and history。Unlike the utilitarian Mises，who denied the possibility of rational ethics，Rothbard recognized the need for an ethical System to complement valuefree economics so as to make the case for the free market truly watertight。Drawing on the theory of natural rights，in particular on the work of John Locke，and on the genuinely American tradition of anarchistic thought of Lysander Spooner and benjamin Tucker，Rothbard developed a System of ethics based on the principles of selfownership and the original appropriation of unowned natural resources through homesteading。Any other proposal，he demon strated，either does not qualify as an ethical System applicable to everyone qua human being，or it is not viable，for following it would literally imply death while it requires a surviving proponent，and thus leads to performative contradictions.The former is the case with all proposals which imply granting A ownership over B and resources homesteaded by B，but not giving B the same right with respect to A.The latter is the case with all proposals advocating universal (communal) coownership of everyone and every thing by all，for then no one would be allowed to do anything with anything before he had everyone else’s consent to do whatever he wanted to do。And how could anyone consent to anything if he were not the exclusive (private) owner of his body? in The Ethics of Liberty，his second magnum opus，Rothbard deduced the entire corpus of liberallibertarian law—from the law of contracts to the theory of punishment—from these first axiomatic principles; and in his For a new Liberty,[378] he applied this ethical System to a diagnosis of the present age and the proposal，and economic analysis，of the political reforms necessary to achieve a free and prosperous commonwealth.

然而，罗斯巴德的成就远不止于他在经济理论上的创新，甚至远不止于他将这些创新整合成一个宏大、全面和统一的奥地利经济学体系。虽然罗斯巴德的职业是经济学家，但他的研究还包括政治哲学（伦理学）和历史。与否定理性伦理可能性的功利主义者米塞斯不同，罗斯巴德认识到需要一个伦理体系来补充价值无涉的经济学，从而使自由市场的论证真正无懈可击。罗斯巴德借鉴了自然权利理论，特别是约翰-洛克的著作，以及莱桑德-斯普纳和本杰明-塔克的真正的美国无政府主义思想传统，发展了一套基于自我所有权原则和通过建立家园对无主自然资源的先占的伦理体系。他指出，任何其他建议，要么不符合适用于每个人的伦理体系的条件，要么是不可行的，因为遵循它实际上意味着死亡，而它需要一个幸存的支持者，要么遵循它会导致述行性矛盾。前者适用于所有暗示给予A对B和B拥有的资源的所有权，但不给予B对A同样的权利的提议;后者适用于所有主张人人普遍(共同)拥有所有人和所有事物的提议，因为在得到其他人的同意之前，任何人都不被允许对任何事物做任何事情。如果一个人不是自己身体的排他性的(私人)所有者，他又怎么能同意任何事情呢?在他的第二部巨著《自由伦理学》中，罗斯巴德从这些最初的公理原则中推导出了整个自由意志主义的法律——从契约法到惩罚理论；在《为了新自由》一书中，他将这一伦理学体系应用于对当今时代的诊断和建议，以及为实现自由与繁荣的国度所必需的政治改革的经济分析。

Furthermore，although first and foremost a theoretician，Rothbard was also an accomplished historian，and his writing contains a wealth of empirical information rarely matched by any empiricist or historicist。In fact，it is Rothbard’s recognition of economics and political philosophy (ethics) as pure aprioristic theory，and of theoretical reasoning as logically anteceding and constraining every historical investigation，which makes his empirical scholarship superior to that of most orthodox historians，and has established him as one of the outstanding “revisionist” historians.Par ticularly noteworthy in the area of economic history is his book America’s Great Depression,[379] which applies the Mises-Hayek business cycle theory to explain the 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing economic depression.In political history，it is his fourvolume history of colonial America，Conceived in Liberty,[380] and in the field of intellectual history it is his post humously published monumental if uncompleted twovolume history of economic，social，and political thought，Economic Thought before Adam Smith and Classical Economics.[381] in these and other books and countless articles，Rothbard provided integrated economicsociologicalpolitical analyses of almost every critical episode in American history：from the Panic of 1819，the Jacksonian period，the War for Southern indepen dence，the Progressive era，World War I and Wilsonianism，Hoover，FDR and World War II，to reagonomics and ClintonianisM.with an eye for the minutest detail of history’s byways，time and again Rothbard chal lenged common wisdom and historical orthodoxy and provided his read ers with a vision of the process of history as a permanent struggle of good against evil：between truth and falsehood，and between forces of liberty and power elites exploiting and enriching themselves at the expense of others and covering their tracks through lies and deceptions.

此外，虽然罗斯巴德首先是一位理论家，但同时也是一位杰出的历史学家，他的著作中包含了丰富的实证信息，这是任何经验主义者或历史主义者都无法与之媲美的。事实上，正是罗斯巴德将经济学和政治哲学（伦理学）视为纯粹的先验理论，将理论推理视为每项历史研究的逻辑先导与制约，这使得他的实证学术研究优于大多数正统历史学家，并使他成为杰出的 “修正主义 “历史学家之一。在经济史领域，特别值得一提的是他的《美国大萧条》一书，该书运用米塞斯-海耶克商业周期理论解释了 1929 年的股市崩盘以及随之而来的经济大萧条。在政治史领域，他的四卷本《美国殖民史：孕育自由》（Conceived in Liberty）值得一提；在思想史领域，他的两卷本《亚当·斯密之前的经济思想和古典经济学》（Economic Thought before Adam Smith and Classical Economics）虽未完成，但已出版，堪称不朽之作。在这些著作和无数文章中，罗斯巴德对美国历史上几乎每一个重要事件都进行了经济学-社会学-政治学的综合分析：从 1819 年的大恐慌、杰克逊时期、南方独立战争、进步主义时代、第一次世界大战和威尔逊主义、胡佛主义、罗斯福主义和第二次世界大战，到里根经济学和克林顿主义。罗斯巴德对历史道路上最微小的细节有着敏锐的洞察力，他一次又一次地挑战常识和历史的正统观念，为读者提供了一种历史进程的愿景，即正义与邪恶的永恒之争：真理与谬误之间的斗争，自由力量与权力精英之间的斗争，权力精英以牺牲他人为代价来剥削和致富，并通过谎言和欺骗来掩盖痕迹。

These amazing scholarly achievements notwithstanding，Rothbard’s academic career，much like Mises’s，was hardly a success by conventional standards.The twentieth century has been the age of socialism and interven tionisM.Schools and universities are governmentfunded and government controlled institutions; hence，the most eminent appointments go either to socialists or interventionists，while “intransigent,” “dogmatic,” or “extremist” proponents of laissezfaire capitalism are excluded or relegated to the fringes of academia.Rothbard had no illusions in this regard，and never complained or appeared to be bitter about his academic fate.His influence did not rest on institutional powers，but solely on the power of his ideas and the force of logic。

尽管取得了这些令人惊叹的学术成就，但罗斯巴德的学术生涯与米塞斯的学术生涯一样，以传统的标准来看并不成功。20 世纪是社会主义和干预主义的时代。学校和大学都是由政府资助和控制的机构；因此，最显赫的位置不是被社会主义者就是被干预主义者所占据，而 “顽固不化”、”教条主义 “或 “极端主义 “的自由放任的资本主义的支持者则被排除在外，或被排挤到学术界的边缘。罗斯巴德对此并不抱任何幻想，他从未抱怨过自己的学术命运，也从未怨天尤人。他的影响力并不依赖于体制内的权力，而完全依赖于他的思想力量和逻辑力量。

Murray Rothbard was born and raised in new York City as the only child of immigrant parents.His father，a chemist，came from Poland and his mother from Russia.Upon winning a scholarship，Rothbard attended private schools and went on to study economics at Columbia University，where，in 1956，he received his PH.D.with a dissertation written under the economic historian Joseph Dorfman.For more than a decade beginning in 1949，Rothbard also participated in Mises’s private seminar at new York University。After working several years for various foundations，most nota bly the William Volker fund，Rothbard taught at the Brooklyn Polytechnic institute，an engineering school，from 1966 until 1986。From 1986 until his death，he was the S.J。Hall Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of nevada，Las vegas.As one of two economics professors at Brooklyn Polytechnic，Rothbard was member of a social science department，which fulfilled only a subservient function within the university。At Las vegas，the department of economics，housed in the university’s business college，did not offer a doctoral prograM.Thus，throughout his academic career Rothbard was prevented from claiming a single doctoral student as his own.

默里罗斯巴德出生并成长于纽约市，是移民家庭的独子。他的父亲是化学家，来自波兰，母亲来自俄罗斯。获得奖学金后，罗斯巴德就读于私立学校，随后进入哥伦比亚大学攻读经济学，并于 1956 年获得博士学位，论文师从经济史学家约瑟夫-多夫曼（Joseph Dorfman）。从 1949 年开始的十多年里，罗斯巴德还参加了米塞斯在纽约大学举办的私人研讨会。罗斯巴德曾在多个基金会工作多年，其中最著名的是威廉·沃尔克基金(William Volker fund)，之后1966年至1986年，他在布鲁克林理工学院(Brooklyn Polytechnic institute)任教。 1986 年至去世前，他是拉斯维加斯内华达大学的 S.J.Hall 特聘经济学教授。作为布鲁克林理工学院的两位经济学教授之一，罗斯巴德是社会科学系的一员，而社会科学系在大学中只起次要的作用。在拉斯维加斯，经济系设在大学的商学院内，不提供博士课程。因此，在罗斯巴德的学术生涯中，他无法将一名博士生视为自己的学生。

Rothbard’s fringe existence in academia did not prevent him from exerting intellectual influence or attracting students and disciples，however。Through the sheer flood of his publications and the unrivaled clarity of his writing，modeled after that of H.L。mencken，Rothbard became the creator and one of the principal agents of the contemporary libertarian movement，which in the course of three decades has grown from a handful of propo nents into a genuine mass movement (including but extending far beyond a party of this name，the Libertarian Party，to a wide and complex network of groups and associations on into the U.S.Congress and many state legisla tures)。Naturally，in the course of this development，Rothbard and his theo retical position did not remain unchallenged or undisputed.There were ups and downs in institutional alignments，coalitions，breaks，and realignments in his career。However，in association with the Center for Libertarian Stud ies，under Burton S.Blumert，and the Ludwig von Mises institute，under Llewellyn Rockwell，and as foundereditor of their scholarly flagships，the Journal of Libertarian Studies (1977) and the review of Austrian Econom ics (1987)，Rothbard has remained beyond his death without doubt the most important and highly respected intellectual authority within the entire libertarian movement，and to this day his rationalistaxiomaticdeductive Austrolibertarianism provides the intellectual benchmark in reference to which not only everyone and everything within libertarianism is defined，but increasingly everyone and everything in American politics.

然而，罗斯巴德在学术界的边缘地位并不妨碍他发挥思想影响力或吸引学生和追随者。罗斯巴德以门肯(h.l. menken)为榜样，凭借大量的出版物和无与伦比的清晰写作，成为当代自由意志主义运动的开创者和主要推动者之一。在30年的时间里，自由意志主义运动从少数支持者发展成为一场真正的群众运动(包括但远不止一个以此命名的政党——自由意志主义党，而是一个由团体和协会组成的广泛而复杂的网络，一直延伸到美国国会和许多州的立法机构）。当然，在这一发展过程中，罗斯巴德和他的理论立场并非不受质疑或无可争议。在他的职业生涯中，他经历了机构结盟、联盟、分裂和重组的起起伏伏。然而，与伯顿·s·布鲁默特（Burton S. Blumert）领导下的自由意志主义研究中心（Center for Libertarian Studies 和卢埃林·罗克韦尔（Llewellyn Rockwell）领导下的路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院合作，并作为他们的学术代表作《自由意志主义研究杂志》(1977年)和《奥地利经济学评论》(1987年)的创始编辑，罗斯巴德在他死后无疑仍然是整个自由意志主义运动中最重要、最受尊敬的知识权威。时至今日，他的理性主义公理演绎的的奥地利学派的自由意志主义不仅为服膺自由意志主义的每个人、每件事提供思想基准，而且也越来越多地为美国政治中的每个人、每件事提供思想基准。

22 Coming of age with Murray

22 在默里身边成长 *

I first met Murray Rothbard in the summer of 1985. I was then 35 and Murray was 59. For the next ten years， until Murray’s premature death in 1995， I would be associated with Murray， first in new York City and then in Las Vegas， at UNLV， in closer， more immediate and direct contact than anyone else， except his wife Joey， of course.

我第一次见到默里·罗斯巴德，是在1985年夏天。当时默里59岁，我35岁。在之后的十年里，直到1995年默里过早去世，我一直和他在一起。我们先是在纽约，然后在拉斯维加斯。在拉斯维加斯大学，我俩比任何人都有更密切、更直接的联系，当然除了他的妻子乔伊。

being almost as old now as Murray was at the time of his death I thought it appropriate to use this occasion to speak and reflect a bit on what I learned during my ten years with Murray.

现在，我已经和默里去世时差不多老了，我想利用这个合适的机会，谈谈和反思一下我在默里身边的十年里所学到的东西。

I was already an adult when I first met Murray， not just in the biological but also in the mental and intellectual sense， and yet， I only came of age while associated with him — and I want to talk about this experience.

当我初识默里时，我已成年，不仅仅在生理上，而且在精神和智力上都是如此。然而，我只有在和他交往后，才变得成熟——我想谈谈这段经历。

before I met Murray I had already completed my Ph.D. and attained the rank of a Privatdozent （a tenured but unpaid university professor）， the same rank incidentally that Ludwig von Mises once held in Vienna. Apart from my doctoral dissertation （Erkennen und Handeln），I had already completed two books. one （Kritik der kausal- wissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung）， that revealed me as a Misesian， and another， about to be published in the following year （Eigentum， Anarchie und Staat）， that revealed me as a Rothbardian. I had already read all of Mises’s and Rothbard’s theoretical works. （I had not yet read Murray’s voluminous journalistic work， however， which was essentially unavailable to me at the time.） Thus， it was not my personal encounter with Murray， then， that made me a Misesian and Rothbardian. Intellectually， I was already a Misesian and Rothbardian years before I ever met Mur- ray personally. And so， notwithstanding the fact that I am myself foremost a theoretician， I do not want to speak here about the grand Austro-libertarian intellectual edifice that Mises and， in his succession， Rothbard have handed down to us， or about my own small contributions to this system， but about my long personal experience with Murray： about the practical and existential lessons that I learned through my encounters with him and that turned me from an adult to a man who had come of age. I moved to new York City， because I considered Murray the greatest of all social theorists， certainly of the 20th century and possibly of all times， just as I considered Mises the greatest of all economists， and， with Mises hav ing long gone and out of the picture， I wanted to meet， get to know， and work with this man， Rothbard. I still hold this view concerning the greatness of Mises and Rothbard. Indeed， even more so today than 30 years ago. And since then， there has been no second Mises or Rothbard. Not even close， and we may have to wait for a long time for this to happen.

So I moved to NYC knowing Murray’s work， but knowing almost nothing about the man. Remember， this was 1985. I was still writing in longhand and then using a mechanical typewriter， acquainting myself with a computer for the first time only during the following year at UNLV. And Murray never used a computer but stayed with an electric typewriter until the end of his life. There were no cell phones， there were no emails， no internet， no Google， no Wikipedia， and no Youtube. At the beginning， even fax machines did not exist. My correspondence with Murray preceding my arrival in NYC， then， was by old， regular snail-mail. Murray expressed his enthusiasm about my wish to meet and work with him and immediately offered to enlist the help of Burton Blumert， and indeed， Burt then was of instrumental help in facilitating my move from Europe to the US. （The wonderful Burt Blumert， owner of Camino Coins， and founder of the original Center for Libertarian Studies that would ultimately be merged with the Mises Institute， was one of Murray’s dearest friends and confidants. He was also a great benefactor and dear friend to me.）

因为知道默里的成就，所以我搬到了纽约，但对这个人却几乎一无所知。我记得那是1985年。我还在用手写写作，后来使用机械打字机，直到在内华达大学拉斯维加斯分校（UNLV）的第二年，我才第一次接触到电脑。默里从未使用过电脑，直到他生命的尽头，一直都在使用电动打字机。没有手机，没有电子邮件，没有互联网，没有谷歌，没有维基百科，也没有Youtube。一开始，甚至连传真机都没有。在我到达纽约之前，我和默里的通信是用老旧的、普通的蜗牛邮件（snail-mail）。默里表达了希望与我见面，一起工作的热情，并且立即寻求伯顿·布鲁默特（Burton Blumert）的帮助，事实上，我从欧洲搬到美国的过程中，伯顿帮了我很大忙。（牛逼的伯特·布鲁默特是卡米诺币的所有者，也是自由意志主义研究中心最初的创始人，该中心最终与米塞斯研究院合并。他是默里最亲密的朋友和知己之一，他同样也是我的恩人和好朋友。）

I had seen some photos of Murray， I knew that he， like Mises， was Jewish， that he taught at Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute （subsequently renamed new York Polytechnic University and nowadays Polytechnic Institute of NYU）， that he was the editor of the much admired Journal of Lib ertarian Studies， and that he was closely associated， as its academic director， with the Ludwig von Mises Institute that Lew Rockwell had recently， 35 years ago， in 1982， founded. That was about it.

我曾经看过默里的一些照片，知道他和米塞斯一样，都是是犹太人。他在布鲁克林理工学院（Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute）（后来更名为纽约理工大学（ new York Polytechnic University），就是现在的纽约大学理工学院（Polytechnic Institute of NYU））任教，他是备受推崇的《自由意志主义研究杂志》（ Journal of Lib ertarian Studies，）的编辑。作为该杂志的学术负责人，他与路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院（Ludwig von Mises Institute）一直保持着密切的联系，该研究所是卢·罗克韦尔（Lew Rockwell）在35年前，也就是1982年创立的。我之前对默里的了解，就只有这么多。

And so， both unprepared， we met for the first time in Murray’s university office. Here was I， the ‘cool blonde from the north，’ to cite a popular advertisement for bitter tasting northern German beers， young， tall and athletic， somewhat unsociable， dry and with a dry sense of humour， and more on the blunt， sarcastic， and confrontational side. Perfect Wehrmacht-material， if you will. And there was Murray： the ‘big-city neurotic，’ to use the German title of Woody Allen’s comedic Annie Hall， a generation older， short and round， non-athletic， even clumsy （except for typing）， gregarious and hilarious， never moping but ever joyful， and， in his personal dealings （quite unlike in his writings）， always non-confrontational， well- tempered， or even tame. Not exactly Wehrmacht-material. Personality-wise， then， we could hardly have been more different. Indeed， we were quite an odd couple — and yet， we hit it off from the start.

就这样，默里和我第一次见面，就在默里的大学办公室里，我俩都没有做什么准备。当时我俩的差异很大。我自己嘛，就像德国北部苦啤酒的广告词，“来自北方的酷酷的金发郎”——年轻，高大，健壮，有点不合群，冷漠，带着一种冷峻的幽默感，当然也有直率、讽刺和对抗的一面。看看我像不像一个典型的德国军人坯子？而默里呢？他有点像伍迪·艾伦（Woody Allen）的喜剧《安妮·霍尔》（Annie Hall）的德语标签，是“大城市的神经质患者”。默里比我年长了一代，他又矮又胖，不擅长运动，甚至有些笨拙（除了打字）。他还爱好交际，善于搞笑，从不忧郁，永远乐呵呵。他在与人交往时总是客客气气，平易近人，甚至逆来顺受。他本人与他的作品大不一样，当然也完全不是当德军的料。的确，我们是相当奇怪的一对——然而，我们一见如故。

given the long， special relationship between Germans and Jews， especially during the 12-year period of National Socialist Party rule in Germany， from 1933–45， I， as a young German meeting an older Jew in America， had been afraid that this history might become a poten tial source of tension. Not so. Quite to the contrary.

众所周知，德国人和犹太人之间有长期而特殊的关系，尤其是在1933年至1945年国家社会党（National Socialist Party）统治德国的12年期间。我是一名年轻的德国人，默里是一位年长的犹太人，我和他在美国见面时，我一直担心这段历史有可能是造成我们关系紧张的潜在因素。然而，事实却恰恰相反。

On the subject of religion itself， there was general agreement. We were both agnostics， yet with a profound interest in the sociology of religion and quite similar views on comparative religion. Yet Murray greatly deep- ened my understanding of the role of religion in history through his unfortunately uncompleted great work， during the last decade of his life， on the history of economic thought.

关于宗教本身的问题，我俩的观点是一致的。我们都是不可知论者，但对宗教社会学有着浓厚的兴趣，关于比较宗教学的观点也非常相似。然而，默里在他生命的最后十年里，通过他那本未能完稿的伟大的经济思想史著作，极大地加深了我对宗教在历史中所起作用的理解。

Moreover， in our countless conversations， I learned from Murray about the importance of complementing Austro-libertarian theory with revisionist history in order to come up with a truly realistic assessment of historic events and global affairs. And it was I， then， as some one who had grown up in defeated and devastated post-WWII West Germany with the then （and still） ‘official history’ taught across all German schools and universities of （a） feeling guilty and ashamed of being German and German history and （b） believing that America and America’s democratic capitalism was ‘the greatest thing’ since or even before the invention of sliced bread， who had to revise his formerly still， despite all Austro-libertarian theory， rather naïve views about world affairs in general and US-American and German history in particular. As a matter of fact， Murray made me fundamentally change my rather rosy view of the US （despite Vietnam and all that） and helped me， for the first time， to feel consoled， content， and even happy about being German， and to develop a special concern for Germany and the fate of the German people.

此外，在我们无数次的交谈中，我从默里处看到了修正主义史学的重要性。我们为了对历史事件和全球事务做出真正现实的评价，需要用修正主义史学来补充奥地利自由意志主义理论。我是一个在二战战败后满目疮痍的西德长大的人，无论是我读大学的时代，还是现在，德国的大学都教授着这样的“官方历史”：（a）作为德国人对德国历史感到内疚和羞愧，（b）相信美国和美国的民主资本主义是自切片面包发明以来，甚至也是发明之前最伟大的东西。现在我不得不修改我以前的观点，尽管那是奥地利自由意志主义的理论。我过去对世界事务的看法，尤其是对美国和德国历史的看法，是幼稚的。遇到默里之前，尽管美国深陷越战的泥泞，我依然对美国有相当乐观的看法，但是默里彻底改变了我的观点，并帮助我第一次感到欣慰、满足，甚至为我是德国人感到高兴，并对德国和德国人民的命运产生了特别的关注。

To my initial surprise， then， — and ultimately my great and pleasant relief — Murray was quite a Germanophile. He knew and highly appreciated the German contributions to philosophy， mathematics， science， engineering， scholarly history， and literature. His beloved teacher Mises had originally written in German and was a product of German culture. Murray loved German music， he loved German baroque churches， he loved the Bavarian beergarden atmosphere and the from-church-to-beer- garden-we-go tradition. His wife Joey was of German ancestry， her maiden name being JoAnn Schumacher， and Joey was a member of the richard Wagner Society and a lifelong opera buff. As well， most of Murray’s friends that I would eventually meet turned out to be Germanophiles. Foremost among them Ralph Raico， the great historian of classical liberalism， whom I had hoped to see again at this occasion but who sadly left us forever almost a year ago now. I met Ralph only a few months after my arrival in NYC， at a party held at Murray’s apartment on the upper Westside. I immediately took to his caustic sar casm and over the years we developed a close friendship. Apart from our many meetings at various Mises Institute events， I still fondly remember in particular our extended joint travels in northern Italy and especially when， at a conference in Milano， sponsored by some friends and affiliates of the once （but no longer） secessionist Lega Nord， some self-proclaimed — who would have guessed that？! — “anti-fascist” demonstrators appeared in front of the conference hotel to denounce us， to our great amusement， as ‘libertari fascisti.’ Ralph was also the one who introduced me to the revisionist scholarship concerning WWI and WWII as well as the entire inter warperiod， and it was Ralph who taught me about the history of German liberalism and in particular its radical 19th century libertarian representatives that had been almost completely forgotten in contemporary Germany.

最初让我感到惊讶，而最终却让我感到欣喜与宽慰的是，默里是一个非常亲德的人。他了解并高度赞赏德国在哲学、数学、科学、工程学、学术历史和文学方面的贡献。他敬爱的老师米塞斯，作为德国文化的产物，最初是用德语写作的。默里喜欢德国音乐，喜欢德国巴洛克式教堂，同时他也喜欢巴伐利亚啤酒花园的风格和从教堂到啤酒花园的传统。他的妻子乔伊具有德国血统，娘家姓乔安·舒马赫，乔伊是理查德·瓦格纳协会的成员，一生都是歌剧迷。而且，我后来见到的默里的大多数朋友都是亲德派。其中最重要的是拉尔夫·雷科（Ralph Raico），一位伟大的古典自由主义的历史学家，我曾希望这次能再次见到他，但遗憾的是，他在大约一年前永远地离开了我们。到达纽约的几个月后，我在默里位于上西区的公寓举行的一次聚会上认识了拉尔夫。我立刻喜欢上了他那尖锐的讽刺，此后的多年，我们有了亲密的友谊。除了我们在米塞斯研究院举办的各种活动上的多次会面外，我至今仍对我们在意大利北部的长时间联合旅行记忆犹新，尤其是在米兰举行的一次会议上，那次会议是由曾经（但已不再）分裂主义的北方联盟（Lega Nord）的一些朋友和分支机构主办的，其中一些人自称是——谁能猜到呢？——“反法西斯”示威者出现在会议酒店前，谴责我们是“自由法西斯主义者”（‘libertari fascisti.’），这让我们感到啼笑皆非。拉尔夫还向我介绍了关于第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战，以及整个战争期间的修正主义学术。拉尔夫还教我了解德国自由主义的历史，尤其是19世纪激进的自由意志主义代表，这些代表在当代德国几乎被完全遗忘了。

Incidentally， Lew Rockwell， too， early on showed his Germanophile credentials. When we first met in NYC in the fall of 1985， he drove a Mercedes 190， he then went astray for a few years， driving an American-made pickup truck， but ultimately returned to the fold by driving a Mini Cooper， produced by BMW.

顺便说一句，卢·罗克韦尔（Lew Rockwell）也很早就亮明了亲德派的身份。1985年秋天，我们第一次在纽约见面时，他开着一辆奔驰190。后来他误入歧途几年，开了一辆美国制造的皮卡，但最终还是重回正道，开了一辆宝马生产的Mini Cooper。

But above all it was Murray who taught me never to trust official history， invariably written by the victors， but to conduct all historical research instead like a detective investigating a crime. Always， first and foremost and as a first approximation， follow the money in search of a motive. Who is to gain， whether in terms of money， real estate， or sheer power from this measure or that？ In most cases， answering this question will lead you directly to the very actor or group of actors responsible for the measure or policy under consideration. Simple as it is to ask this question， however， it is much more difficult and requires often arduous research to answer it， and to unearth， from under a huge smokescreen of seemingly high-minded rhetoric and pious propaganda， the hard facts and indicators — the money flows and welfare gains — to actually prove a crime and to identify and ‘out’ its perpetrators. Murray was a master in this， and that at a time when you did not have access to computers， the internet， and search machines such as Google. And to do this detective’s work， as I learned from Murray， you must go beyond official documents， the MSM， the big and famous names， the academic ‘stars，’ and the ‘prestigious’ journals — in short： everything and everyone deemed ‘respectable’ and ‘politi cally correct.’ You must also， and in particular， pay atten- tion to the work of outsiders， extremists， and outcasts， i.e.， to ‘disrespectable’ or ‘deplorable’ people and ‘obscure’ publication outlets that you are supposed to ignore or not even know about. To this day， I have heeded， and indeed relished following this advice. Anyone who could see my list of bookmarks of frequently visited websites would likely be surprised， and any establishmentarian or leftist in particular would likely be shocked and shudder in dis gust.

With this general perspective and outlook on things， revisionists such as Murray （and myself） are regularly charged， contemptuously， as some nutty conspiracy theorists. To this charge， Murray would typically respond： First， put bluntly and sarcastically， even if one were a certified paranoid this can not be taken as proof that no one was actually after you and your money. And second and more systematically： Conspiracies are less likely， of course， the larger the number of supposed conspirators. Also， it is naïve to assume the existence of just one big all- encompassing conspiracy run by one all-powerful group of conspirators. But conspiracies， often rival or even contradictory conspiracies， i.e.， confidential efforts of various groups of people acting in concert in the pursuit of some common goal， are indeed an ever-present feature of social reality. As any action， such conspiracies can succeed or they can fail and can lead to consequences that were un-intended by the conspirators. But realistically speaking， most if not all historical events are more or less exactly what some identifiable people or group of people acting in concert intended them to be. Indeed， to assume the opposite is to assume， incredibly， that history is nothing but a sequence of unintelligible accidents.

默里、我、我们这样的修正主义者，我们对历史有这样的总体看法和视角，因而总是被轻蔑地指责为是疯狂的阴谋论者。对于这些指责，默里的回应通常是这样的。第一，他说，就算一个人被证明是偏执狂，就没有人窥探他？就没人觊觎他的钱财？第二，他系统地分析阴谋的来源。如果大多数人搞阴谋，那还成什么阴谋？如果一个全能大神搞阴谋，搞一个包揽一切的大阴谋，这个人是不是也太天真了？当我们发现现实中总是有些事情是相互竞争甚至是相互矛盾的，顺着利益这条线索我们就可以发现这背后有可以识别的这一群人或那一群人。不同群体为了追求某种共同目标而努力采取一致的秘密行动，确实是社会现实中永远存在的一种特征。这样的一群人秘密行动，就是阴谋。当然，阴谋作为一种行动，可能成功，也可能事与愿违。如果我们不去考虑历史事件背后的利益相关者和他们的行为，历史就只能是一系列难以理解的杂乱事件的罗列。

Moreover， in learning from Murray about the necessity of complementing Austro-libertarian theory with revisionist history so as to gain a complete， realistic picture of the world and worldly affairs， I also received constant training from him in the art of prudent and judicious judgment and evaluation of people， actions， and events. Pure theory allows us to make rather clearcut judgments of true or false， right or wrong， and effective， leading to the goal intended， or ineffective. But many if not most actions and events provoking or eliciting our judgments do not fall into the category of matters that can be thusly evaluated. We are surrounded， or better still： encircled， by a class of people — politicians and stateagents — that， day-in and day-out， renders and enforces decisions that systematically impact and affect our property and consequently our entire conduct of life without our consent and even against our explicit protestation. In short： we are confronted by an elite of rulers， instead of， in contradistinction， an elite of agents. And confronted with politicians and political decisions， then， our judg- ment concerns the evaluation of， at best， second-bests. The question is not true or false， right or wrong， effective or ineffective. Rather， it is this： given that political decisions are per se false， wrong， and ineffective， which of these decisions is less false， wrong， and effective and comparatively closer to the truth， the right， and the good， and which person represents a lesser evil or a greater one than another. Such questions do not allow for a scientific answer， because answering them involves the comparative evaluation of countless immeasurable and incommensurable variables. And in any case， newly discovered facts about the past or future developments may well reveal any such judgment as mistaken. But the answer is also not arbitrary. What is true， right， and effective is given， as fix-points， and reasons must be supplied， whether based on logic or empirical evidence， for locating various second-bests as closer or more distant to such points. Rather， judgment-making in matters such as these is a difficult art， much like entrepreneurship is not a science but an art. And just as some people are good at entrepreneurship and others bad， indicated by monetary profits or losses， then， so are some people good at judging political events and actors and others bad， gaining or los ing in the reputation as wise and prudent judges.

此外，我从默里那里了解到有必要用修正主义的历史来补充奥地利自由意志主义理论，以获得一个完整的、现实的世界和世界事务的图景，同时，我还受到了思想与技艺训练，学会审慎且明智地判断和评价人与事。纯理论允许我们对真与假、对与错、达到预期目标有效或无效，做出相当明确的判断。但是，许多（如果不是大多数的话）引发或引出我们判断的行为和事件，并不属于可以这样评价的事物范畴。政客和国家代理人，就是这样的一群人，他们日复一日地包围着我们，对我们的抗议置若罔闻，再二再三地执行那些系统性地影响和损害我们的财产的行为，从而影响了我们的整个生活。简而言之：我们面对的是统治精英，而不是代理人精英。面对政客和政治决策，我们的判断最多只能是次优的评价。这不是一个真或假，对或错，有效或无效的问题。相反，这个问题应该这样思考：政客推行的政策本身就是错误的、有问题的、无效的，那么我们就只能做这样的最不坏的考量——哪个决策会错得少些，问题少些，效果相对好一些，这个政策就离真理、公正和善良相对不那么远；至于政客本人也同样，他的邪恶会因此多点或少点。这些问题不可能有科学的答案，因为回答这些问题，需要对无数无法测量和不可通约的变量进行比较评估。无论对于过去的事务的新认识，还是对未来发展的事实的评价，我们都可能出错。但是答案也不是武断的。那就是找到一个理论上真实、正确且有效的固定参考点，然后将各种次优选择以逻辑的或经验的证据，用来与固定参考点比较，才能判断它到底是离参考点近还是远。显然，在这类问题上做出判断是一门困难的艺术，就像创业不是一门科学而是一门艺术一样。正如有些人擅长创业，有些人不擅长（以金钱的盈亏来衡量）一样，有些人擅长判断政治事件和政治人物，而有些人则不擅长，他们通过明智和谨慎的判断来赢得或失去声誉。

Murray was of course not unfailing in his judgments. During the late 1960s and early 1970s， for instance， he misjudged the antiwar stand of the new Left as more principled than it really was， something that he after- wards readily admitted as a mistake. And I know of at least one， rather personal case， where Joey’s judgment was better and more on the mark than his. This notwithstand ing however， I have not encountered anyone of sounder， subsequently vindicated judgment than Murray.

With this I want to come to the second major lesson I learned during my long association with Murray. While the first lesson in revisionism concerned matters of practice and method， the second lesson concerned existential matters.

说到这里，我想谈谈在与默里的长期交往中学到的第二个重要教训。修正主义的第一课是关于实践和方法的问题，第二课是关于存在主义的问题。

before I met Murray， I knew of course that he was a radical outsider in a predominantly leftist-liberal aca demia and I expected （and was willing to accept for myself） that this would involve some sacrifices， i.e.， that one would have to pay a price for being a Rothbardian， not only， but also in terms of money. But I was quite surprised to realize how high this price was. I knew that Brooklyn Polytechnic was not a prestigious university， yet I expected Murray to occupy there a comfortable， well- paying post. Moreover， at the time I still fancied the US as a bastion and bulwark of free enterprise and consequently expected that Murray， as the foremost intellectual champion of capitalism and the personified antithesis to Marx， would be held in high esteem， if not in academia then cer tainly outside of it， in the world of commerce and busi ness， and accordingly be rewarded with a certain degree of affluence.

在认识默里之前我就明白，在以左翼自由主义为主的学术界，默里是一个激进的局外人，我自己也差不多会牺牲在学术圈的利益，不过我不在乎。换句话说，一个人要成为罗斯巴德主义者，不仅要付出代价，而且要付出金钱的代价。让我意外的是，这个代价的价格是如此之高。虽然我知道布鲁克林理工学院并不是一所著名的大学，但我仍希望默里能在那里找到一份舒适、待遇优厚的工作。那时我还仍然幻想美国是自由企业的堡垒，因此我期望，默里作为资本主义最重要的知识斗士，马克思化身的对立面，即使不是在学术界，也肯定会在学术界之外的商业和商业领域，受到高度尊重，并相应地获得一定程度的富裕。

In fact， at Brooklyn Polytechnic Murray occupied a small， grungy， and windowless office that he had to share with a history professor. In Germany， even research assistants enjoyed more comfortable surroundings， not to speak of full professors. Murray ranked among the lowest paid full professors at his school. Indeed， my Ger- man National Science Foundation grant at the time — a Heisenberg scholarship — turned out to be considerably higher than Murray’s university salary （something that I was too ashamed to reveal to him after I had discov- ered it）. And Murray’s apartment in manhattan， large and filled to the ceiling with books， was dark and run-down. Certainly nothing like the penthouse that I had imagined him to occupy. This situation improved significantly with his move in 1986， at age 60， to Las Vegas and UNLV. While my salary went down there as compared to my previous compensation， Murray’s went sharply up， but was still below $100，000， and he could afford to buy a roomy but spartan house. Even as the holder of an endowed chair at UNLV， however， Murray did not have command of any research assistants or a personal secretary.

事实上，在布鲁克林理工学院，默里只有一间又小又脏、且没有窗户的办公室，同时还不得不和一位历史教授共用。在德国，即使是研究助理也能享有更舒适的环境，更不用说全职教授了。在他的学校，默里是收入最低的全职教授之一。事实上，我当时得到的德国国家科学基金会资助——海森堡奖学金——比默里的大学薪水高得多（在我发现这件事后，我羞于向他透露）。默里在曼哈顿的公寓很大，里面堆满了书，但是却又黑又破旧，全然不像我想象中他住的顶层公寓。1986年，60岁的他搬到拉斯维加斯和UNLV后，这种情况得到了显著改善。虽然我的薪水与之前相比低了，默里的薪水却大幅提升，但仍低于10万美元，他有能力买一套宽敞但简朴的房子。然而，即使作为UNLV的特聘教授，默里也没有任何研究助理或私人秘书。

Yet Murray never complained or showed any bitterness or signs of envy but always plugged along joyfully and pushed ahead instead with his writings. This was a hard lesson for me to learn and I am still having difficulties following it at times.

然而，默里从来没有抱怨过，也没有表现出任何不满或嫉妒的迹象，他一直坚持写作，并且乐此不疲。这对我来说是很难学会的，很多时候，我仍然做不到这一点。

A propos， Joey and Murray once told me laughingly how， at the time when they were still dating， both had expected the other to be a good catch. Joey， because Mur ray was Jewish， and Murray， because Joey was gentile — only to then find out that they were both wrong in their expectations.

乔伊和默里曾经笑着告诉我，在他们还在约会的时候，他们都希望对方是一个好对象。乔伊对默里的期望满满，因为默里是犹太人；默里也对乔伊期望满满，因为乔伊是非犹太人——结果发现他们的期望都错了。

Moreover， despite his towering achievements as an intellectual champion of free market capitalism， Murray never won any Prizes， awards， or honours to speak of. That he did not win a Nobel Prize in economics was not surprising， of course. After all， the great Mises also did not win it. But in the US alone there existed dozens of institutions — think-tanks， foundations， business associ- ations， research centers， and universities — that professed their dedication to free markets and liberty， and yet none of them ever awarded Murray any significant Prize or honorary award， all the while they showered people with money and awards who had done little more than to suggest — “daringly” — some incremental reform such as， let’s say， lowering the marginal tax rate from 35 percent to 30 or cutting the budget of the EPA by some percent- age points， or who had simply expressed their “personal love” of “freedom” and “free enterprise” often， loudly， and emphatically enough.

None of this fazed Murray in the slightest. Indeed， he expected nothing else， for reasons that I still had to learn.

这一切，丝毫都没有让默里感到不安。的确，他对别的事完全不在意，至于原因，我还没有弄清楚。

What Murray realized and I still had to learn was that the most vociferous and ferocious rejection and opposition to Austro-libertarianism would not come from the traditional socialist Left， but rather from these very selfproclaimed “anti-socialist，” “limited government，” “minimal state，” “pro-private enterprise，” and “pro-freedom” outfits and their intellectual mouthpieces， and above all from what has become known as the beltway Libertar ians. They simply could not stomach the fact that Murray had demonstrated with plain logic that their doctrines were nothing but inconsistent intellectual clap-trap， and that they were all， to use Mises’s verdict vis-a-vis Milton Friedman and his company， a “bunch of socialists，” too， notwithstanding their vehement protestations to the contrary. For， as Murray argued， once you admitted the existence of a State， any State， defined as a territorial monopolist of ultimate decision-making in every case of conflict， including conflicts involving the State itself， then all private property had been effectively abolished， even if it remained provisionally， qua State-grant， nominally private， and had been replaced instead by a system of “collective” or rather State-property. State， any State， means socialism， defined as “the collective ownership of factors of production.” The institution of a State is praxeologically incompatible with private prop- erty and private property based enterprise. It is the very anti-thesis of private property， and any proponent of private property and private enterprise then must， as a matter of logic， be an anarchist. In this regard （as in many others） Murray was unwilling to compromise， or “intransigent，” as his detractors would say. because in theory， in thinking， compromise is impermissible. In everyday life， compromise is a permanent， and ubiquitous feature， of course. But in theory， compromise is the ultimate sin， a strict and absolute ‘no no.’ It is not permissible， for instance， to compromise between the two incompatible propositions that 1+1=2 or that 1+1=3 and accept that it is 2.5. Either some proposition is true or it is false. There can be no “meeting in the middle” of truth and falsehood. Here， regarding Murray’s uncompromising radicalism， a little anecdote told by Ralph Raico seems apropos.

默里已经意识到，而我仍然需要了解的是，对奥地利自由意志主义最激烈、最大声的拒绝和反对，不是来自传统的社会主义左派，而是来自这些自我标榜的“反社会主义”、“有限政府”、“最小国家”、“亲私营企业”和“亲自由”的机构及其知识分子喉舌，尤其是那些被称为“环城自由主义者”（the beltway Libertarians）的人。默里用清晰的逻辑证明了他们的学说只不过是前后矛盾的智力陷阱，这一点，他们根本无法接受。而且，米塞斯曾对米尔顿·弗里德曼（Milton Friedman）之流断言，说他们都是“一群社会主义者”，当然遭到他们的激烈反对。正如默里所说，如果你承认国家的存在，承认国家是拥有最终裁决权的领土垄断者，承认国家即使自己也是利益冲突一方时也有最终裁决权，那么私有财产权也就岌岌可危了。无论你有什么私有财产，那不过暂时保留的国家授予的名义上的私有财产。最终，私有财产会被集体财产制度，更确切的说是国家财产制度所替代。国家，任何国家，都意味着社会主义，被定义为“生产要素的集体所有制”。国家制度在行动学上与私有财产和以私有财产为基础的企业是不相容的。它是私有财产的对立面，因此，从逻辑上讲，任何私有财产和私有企业的支持者，都必须是无政府主义者。在这方面（正如在许多其他方面一样），默里不愿意妥协，或者用他的批评者话来说，他是“不妥协的”。因为在理论上，在思想上，妥协是不允许的。当然，在日常生活中，妥协是一个永久且普遍存在的特征。但从理论上讲，不是A就是非A，在这之间妥协是一种最大的恶。例如，不允许在1+1=2或1+1=3这两个不相容的命题之间妥协而接受它是2.5。某个命题不是为真就是为假。真理与谬误不可能“在中间相遇”。在这里，关于默里不妥协的激进主义，拉尔夫·雷科（Ralph Raico）讲的一件小轶事似乎很合适。

To quote Ralph：

Murray was someone special. I recognized that fact the first night I met him. It was after the Mises seminar； a buddy of mine and I had been invited to attend， and afterwards Murray suggested we have coffee and talk. My friend and I were dazzled by the great Mises， and Murray， naturally， was pleased to see our enthusiasm. He assured us that Mises was at least the greatest economist of the century， if not the whole history of economic thought. As far as politics went， though， Murray said， lowering his voice con- spiratorially： “Well， when it comes to poli tics， some of us consider Mises a member of the non-Communist Left.” Yes， it was easy to see we’d met someone very special.

引用拉尔夫的话：

默里是个特别的人，我第一次见到他的那晚就意识到了这一点。那是在米塞斯研讨会之后，我和我的一个朋友被邀请参加。此后，默里建议我们喝杯咖啡聊聊天。我和我的朋友被伟大的米塞斯迷得眼花缭乱，默里自然很高兴看到我们的热情。他向我们保证，米塞斯即使不是整个经济思想史上最伟大的经济学家，至少也是本世纪最伟大的经济学家。默里说，就政治而言，压低了自己的声音：“嗯，说到政治，我们中的一些人认为米塞斯是非共产主义左派的一员（the non-Communist Left）。”是的，很容易看出我们遇到了一个非常特别的人。

Unlike Murray， quite a few individuals who had learned essentially everything they ever knew from Murray， in particular his man， Economy and State， were will ing to make such intellectual compromises， and they were richly rewarded for their intellectual “flexibility” and “tolerance.” But that was not Murray! And consequently， he was （and still is） ignored， excluded， or denounced by the chieftains of the “limited-government-free-market- industry.” And he was essentially left without any institutional support， as a lone fighter， until the arrival of Lew Rockwell and the Mises Institute.

与默里不同，有相当一部分人基本上是从默里那里学到了他们所知道的一切，尤其是他的那本《人、经济与国家》，他们愿意做出这样的智力妥协，他们也因为智力上的“灵活性”和“宽容”得到了丰厚的回报。但默里不是这样的人!结果，他一直被“有限政府-自由市场-产业”的领袖们故意忽视、排斥或谴责，过去如此，现在依然如此。默里一直是一个孤独的斗士，基本上没有得到任何机构的支持，直到卢·罗克韦尔（Lew Rockwell）和米塞斯研究院的到来。

I experienced this Rothbard-phobia second- handedly， if you will. For as soon as word had gotten out that the new German arrival was Murray’s boy and also appeared rather “intransigent，” I found myself immedi- ately placed on the same blacklists with him. Thus， I had quickly learned a first important real-life lesson of what it means to be a Rothbardian.

不瞒你说，我亲身经历过罗斯巴德恐惧症（Rothbard-phobia）。“这个新来的德国人是默里的死忠粉，而且看起来相当刺头”。这样的消息一经传出，我立马发现自己和他一样，被列入了黑名单。因此，我很快就学到了第一堂重要的现实生活课，作为一个罗斯巴德主义者到底意味着什么。

Another lesson was in humility. Murray had a huge library， had read and digested an enormous amount of literature and was consequently a humble man. He was always reluctant and highly sceptical to assume or rec- ognize any “originality” claims. “originality” claims， he knew， are made most frequently by people with tiny libraries and little reading. In distinct contrast， Murray was highly generous in giving credit to others. And he was equally generous in giving advice to anyone asking. Indeed， on almost any conceivable subject， he was prepared， off the top of his head， to provide you with an extensive bibliography. As well， he encouraged any sign of productivity even among his lowliest students.

我学到的另一课是，谦卑。默里有一个巨大的图书馆，他阅读并消化了大量的文学作品，因此是个谦虚的人。他总是不情愿地、高度怀疑地假定或承认任何“独创性”的主张。他明白，所谓的“独创性”往往是那些图书馆很小、读书很少的人说出来的。与之形成鲜明对比的是，默里非常慷慨地赞扬别人。他也同样慷慨地给任何询问的人提供建议。事实上，在几乎任何你能想到的主题上，他都有所准备，可以不加思索地给你提供大量的参考书目。此外，他鼓励任何有创造力的思考，哪怕是他水平最低的学生。

While I always tried to follow this example， I could not bring myself to go quite as far as Murray did， how- ever. because I thought and still think that Murray’s humility was excessive， that he was humble almost to a fault. His students at Brooklyn Polytechnic， for instance， mostly engineering majors （or， as Murray described Mises’s students at NYU， “packaging majors”）， had no idea who he was， because he never mentioned his own works. They were genuinely surprised to find out from me who their jolly professor was when I substituted teaching Murray’s class while he was out of town. And at UNLV the situation was not much different. While I actively promoted him as his unofficial PR-agent， Murray continued in his self-deprecation. Although he had written on almost any imaginable subject in the social sciences， he would， when he suggested or assigned term papers to his students， mention his own related writings， if at all， only as some sort of afterthought or upon specific request.

虽然我一直努力以默里为榜样，但无论如何，我无法让自己做得像默里那样。因为我一直认为默里过于谦虚了，他的谦虚几乎低到了尘埃里。例如，他在布鲁克林理工学院（Brooklyn Polytechnic）的学生大多是工程专业的（或者，用默里的话说，米塞斯在纽约大学的学生是“包装专业的”），他们不知道他是谁，因为他从来没有提到过自己的作品。当我在默里出城时替他代课，他们从我那里得知他们那令人愉悦的教授是何方神圣时，他们真的很惊讶。在UNLV，情况并没有太大不同。当我积极推动他成为他的非官方公关经纪人时，默里继续他的自我贬低。尽管他写过几乎所有能想到的社会科学领域的文章，但只有当他向学生建议或布置学期论文时，他才会提到自己的相关文章，即使提到，也只是作为事后的观念或应特定的要求。

Yet Murray’s extreme modesty had also another， unfortunate effect. When we moved to Las Vegas in 1986， we had expected to turn UNLV into a bastion of Austrian economics. At the time， UNLV’s basketball team， the Runnin’ Rebels， under coach Jerry Tarkanian， were a national powerhouse， always slightly scandalous， but impossible to overlook. We had hoped to become the Runnin’ Rebels of economics at UNLV. Several students had transferred and enrolled at the university in anticipation of such a development. But these hopes were quickly disappointed. Already at our arrival at UNLV the composition of the economics department had significantly changed， and then majority rule， democracy， set in. To balance the Austrian influence， only one year later， the department majority decided， against our opposition， to hire a no-name Marxist. I urged Murray to use his position and reputation to interfere with the university’s higher-ups and prevent this appointment. Except for Jerry Tarkanian， Murray was the only nationally recog nized person at UNLV. He held the only endowed chair at the university. We knew the university’s president and provost socially and were on cordial terms with both of them. Accordingly， I believed that there was a realistic chance to overturn the department’s decision. But I could not persuade Murray of his own powers.

After this missed opportunity matters became worse. The department continued to hire anyone but an Austrian or Austrian sympathizer. Our students were maltreated and discriminated against. The department and the dean of the business college denied me tenure （which decision was overruled by the university’s provost and president， not least because of massive student protests and the intervention of several university donors）. The department chairman wrote an outrageous， nasty， and insulting annual evaluation of Murray’s professorial performance （upon which the university administration forced the chairman to resign from his position）. As a consequence， a second chance for us arose to turn matters around. Plans were developed and were discussed with the provost to split the department and establish a separate economics department in the College of Liberal Arts. This time Murray became involved. But the initial momentum to our advantage had been lost in the meantime， and after the first signs of resistance， Murray quickly resigned and gave up. He was not willing to take off his gloves， and our secessionist project soon fizzled out in defeat.

错失这个机会之后，事情变得更糟了。该系继续雇用除了奥地利学派或奥地利学派同情者以外的任何人。我们的学生又受到不公正对待和歧视。经济系和商学院院长拒绝授予我终身教职（因为大规模的学生抗议，再加上几位大学捐赠者的干预，该校教务长和校长否决了这个决定。）。系主任对默里的授课业绩写了一份令人发指的、恶毒的、侮辱性的年度评估报告（随后，大学行政部门迫使该系主任辞去了职务）。结果，我们有了第二次扭转局面的机会。他们制定了计划，并与教务长进行了讨论，打算把这个系分开，在文理学院建立一个独立的经济学系。这一次默里也参与了进来。但与此同时，我们失去了最初的优势，在最初的抵抗迹象出现后，默里很快就放弃了。他不愿意弄脏自己的手（ take off his gloves），于是我们的分离主义计划很快就以失败告终。

Only to quickly finish our UNLV saga： After Murray’s death in 1995， I continued working at UNLV for another decade in an increasingly hostile environment. The once protective university administration had changed， and I felt ever more unappreciated and out of place. Even my great popularity among students was used against me， as proof of the “danger” emanating from my teaching. In 2004， I became embroiled in a scandal. In a lecture I had hypothetically suggested that homosexuals， on average， and owing to their characteristic lack of children， had a comparatively higher degree of time preference， i.e.， of present-orientation. A cry-baby student complained， and the university’s affirmative action commissar immediately， as if he had only waited for this opportunity， initiated official proceedings against me， threatening severe punitive measures if I were not to instantly and publicly recant and apologize. “Intransigent” as I was， I refused to do so. And I am certain that it was only this steadfast refusal of mine to beg for forgiveness that， after a full year of administrative harassment， I ultimately emerged victorious from this battle with the thought police， and the university administration suffered an embarrassing defeat. A year later I resigned from my position and left UNLV and the US for good.

我们在拉斯维加斯大学的传奇故事很快迎来结局：默里在1995年去世后，尽管环境越来越恶劣，我在拉斯维加斯大学仍然继续工作了10年。曾经保护我的大学管理层已经改变了，我感到越来越不受重视，以及越来越格格不入了。有些人甚至利用我在学生中的声望来对付我，证明我的教学存在“危险”。2004年，我卷入了一桩丑闻。在一次演讲中，我假设同性恋者，特别是由于他们没有孩子，平均而言，有相对较高程度的时间偏好，即现在取向。一个小P孩学生向校方投诉，学校的平权运动委员立即对我提起了正式诉讼，仿佛他一直在等待这个机会一般，威胁说如果我不立即公开撤回并道歉，就会采取严厉的惩罚措施。我仍然不妥协，我拒绝撤回发言也拒绝道歉。我确信，正是由于我坚定地拒绝乞求原谅，在经历了整整一年的行政骚扰之后，与思想警察的战斗中我最终取得了胜利，而大学行政部门则遭遇了尴尬的失败。一年后，我辞去职位，永远离开了拉斯维加斯大学和美国。

Coming back to Murray： Naturally， I was disappointed about the developments at UNLV. But they did not have the slightest effect on our continued cooperation. Maybe Murray had been right and more realistic all along and it was I， who had suffered from too much youthful optimism？ And in any case， there was one more important lesson about the larger scheme of things that I still had to learn.

Whereas most people tend to become milder and more ‘tolerant’ in their views as they grow older， Murray grew increasingly more radical and less tolerant over time. Not in his personal dealings， as I already emphasized. In this regard Murray was and remained to the end a ‘softie，’ but in his speeches and writings. This radicalization and increasing ‘intransigence’ came in response to developments in the world of US politics at large and in particular within the “limited-government-free-market” industry and among the so-called libertarians assembled around Washington， DC’s beltway. There， everywhere， a slow yet systematic drift toward the Left and leftist ideas could be observed. A drift that ever since， up to this day， has only further gained in momentum and grown in strength. Constantly， new “rights” were ‘discovered’ and adopted in particular also by so-called libertarians. “Human rights” and “civil rights，” “women rights” and “gay rights，” the “right” not to be discriminated against， the “right” to free and unrestricted immigration， the “right” to a free lunch and free health care， and the “right” to be free of unpleasant speech and thought. Murray demolished all this allegedly “humanitarian” or， to use a German term， this “Gutmenschen” talk as intellectual rubbish in demonstrating that none of these supposed “rights” were compatible with private property rights. And that， as libertarians above all people should know， only private property rights， i.e.， the right of every person in the ownership of his physical body and the ownership of all external objects justly （peacefully） acquired by him， can be argumentatively defended as universal and compossible human rights. Everything except private property rights， then， Murray demonstrated again and again， are phony， non-universalizable rights. Every call for “human rights” other than private property rights is ultimately motivated by egalitarianism and as such represents a revolt against human nature.

Moreover， Murray moved still further to the right — in accordance with Erik von Kuehneldt-Leddihn’s dictum that “the right is right” — in pointing out that in order to establish， maintain， and defend a libertarian social order more is needed than the mere adherence to the non- aggression principle. The ideal of the left- or “modal”- libertarians， as Murray referred to them， of “live and let live as long as you don’t aggress against anyone else，” that sounds so appealing to adolescents in rebellion against parental authority and any social convention and control， may be sufficient for people living far apart and dealing and trading with each other only indirectly and from afar. But it is decidedly insufficient when it comes to people living in close proximity to each other， as neighbours and cohabitants of the same community. The peaceful cohabitation of neighbours and of people in regular direct contact with each other on some territory requires also a commonality of culture： of language， religion， custom， and convention. There can be peaceful co-existence of different cultures on distant， physically separated territories， but multi-culturalism， cultural heterogeneity， can not exist in one and the same place and territory without leading to diminishing social trust， increased conflict， and ultimately the destruction of anything resembling a libertarian social order.

此外，默里还进一步右转——与埃里克·冯·库涅尔特-莱迪恩（Erik von Kuehneldt-Leddihn）的名言“权利是正确的”相一致——他指出，为了建立、维持和捍卫一个自由意志主义的社会秩序，需要的不仅仅是坚持互不侵犯原则。正如默里所说，左派或“模态”自由意志主义者的理想是，“只要你不侵犯他人，就可各安其好而活”，这对反抗父母权威、反抗任何社会习俗和控制的青少年来说，听起来很有吸引力。对于那些生活在遥远的地方，彼此之间只能间接地、远距离地打交道和交易的人来说，同样也可能已经足够。但是，当涉及到作为邻居和同一社区的共同居者而彼此生活得很近时，这显然是不够的。邻居之间的和平共处，以及在某些领土上彼此经常直接接触的人们，也需要一种共同的文化：语言、宗教、习俗和惯例。不同的文化可以在遥远的、物理上分离的领土上和平共处，但多元文化主义、异质文化，不可能共存于同一个地方和同一块领土，这种共存不可能不导致社会信任的减少，也不可能不导致冲突的增加，最终会破坏任何类似自由意志主义社会秩序的东西。

If Murray had been ignored， neglected， or resented before by the usual suspects， now， with this stand against everything deemed “politically correct，” he was vilified and met with undisguised hatred. The by now only all- too-familiar litany of denunciatory terms followed： Murray was a reactionary， a racist， a sexist， an authoritarian， an elitist， a xenophobe， a fascist and， to top it all off， a self-hating Jewish Nazi.

如果说默里以前被人忽略、忽视或憎恨，那么现在，由于他反对一切被认为是“政治正确”的东西，他受到诋毁，同时也遭到毫不掩饰的仇恨。到目前为止，人们再熟悉不过的谴责词接踵而来：默里是一个反动派、一个种族主义者、一个性别歧视者、一个威权主义者、一个精英主义者、一个仇外者、一个法西斯主义者，最重要的是，他是一个自我憎恨的犹太纳粹。

Murray shrugged it all off. Indeed， he laughed about it. And indeed， to the consternation of the “smear bund，” as Murray referred to the united popular front of his “anti-fascist” detractors， his influence only grew and has continued to grow still further since his death. It may not be widely recognized， but without Murray there would be no Ron Paul as we know him — and I say this without wishing thereby to diminish or belittle Ron Paul’s own， personal role and extraordinary achievements in the slightest —， there would be no Ron Paul movement， and there would be no popular or， as the “smear bund” prefers to say， no “populist” libertarian agenda.

As for me， my own views radicalized， too， along with Murray’s. My Democracy： The God That Failed was the first major documentation of this intellectual development， and if anything， my radical intolerance regarding anything left-libertarian and “politically correct” has been growing still ever since. Almost needless to say that I， too， then have been awarded the same and even a few extra honorary titles by the “smear bund” as Murray （except for the self-hating Jewish stuff ）. Yet I had learned to shrug all of it off， too， as I had seen Murray do it， and as Ralph Raico had always encouraged and continued to advise me. In addition， remembering a popular German saying helped me： “viel Feind， viel Ehr.” And indeed， the ongoing success of my annual Property and Freedom Society conference-salon， now in its 12th year， held and conducted in a genuinely Rothbardian spirit， has demonstrated the utter failure of all defamation campaigns directed at me. If anything， they have helped rather than hindered me in attracting an ever larger circle of intellectual friends， affiliates， and supporters.

至于我，我自己的观点也和默里的一样激进。我的《民主：失败的上帝》是这一思想发展的第一个主要文本。如果说有什么不同的话，那就是我对任何左翼自由主义和“政治正确”的极端不容忍，从那以后就一直在增长。不用说，我也被“诽谤联盟”授予了与默里相同甚至更多的“荣誉头衔”（除了自我憎恨的犹太人）。然而，我也学会了对这一切不以为意，就像我看到默里所做的那样，就像拉尔夫·雷科一直鼓励并持续建议我那样。此外，记住一句流行的德国谚语对我也很有帮助：“再见，费恩，再见，厄尔。”（“viel Feind， viel Ehr。”）事实上，我的财产与自由社会年度会议沙龙（Property And Freedom Society conference-salon）获得了持续的成功，到现在已经是第12个年头了，它本着真正的罗斯巴德精神举办和组织。这一事实证明，所有针对我的诽谤活动都彻底失败了。如果说有什么不同的话，那就是它们帮助而不是阻碍了我吸引越来越多的知识分子朋友、附属机构和支持者。

I should add that during the last decade or so， under the wise and strict guidance of my lovely wife Gülçin， I have also made great strides in combining uncompromising intellectual radicalism with personal lovability， even though nature and natural disposition have prevented me from coming anywhere close to Murray in this regard.

还应该补充一点，过去的十年左右时间，在我可爱的妻子Gülçin明智和严格的指导下，在将不妥协的激进主义思想与个人的可爱相结合方面，我也取得了长足的进步，尽管在这方面，我的天性和性格使我无法与默里相提并论。

I have said far too little here about Lew， and I sincerely apologize. But this I must say： Lew， apart from Murray has been one of the most important people helping me become the man that I am today. And to Murray， who I am sure is watching us today from up high， I say： thank you Murray， you are my hero， “I shall not look upon his like again，” and I hope you are happy with your student. I always felt tremendous joy when you told me “great Hans， Attaboy，” and even if I can’t hear you right now， nothing would give me greater pleasure than if you said it again right now up there， where the kings of thought are gathered.

关于卢，我在这里说得太少了，我表示真诚的歉意。但我必须说：除了默里，卢是帮助我成为今日之我的最重要的人之一。同时，我相信此时此刻，默里一定在天上望着我们，我想对他说：谢谢你，默里，你是我的英雄，“我再也不会看到像你那样的人了”，我希望你对你的学生感到满意。当你对我说“伟大的汉斯，好样的”时，我总是感到无比的快乐。即使我现在已听不见你说话，但如果现在你出现在这里，在这个思想帝王聚集的地方，再说一遍那句话，我依然会感到非常高兴。

23 Hayek on Government and Social Evolution

23 哈耶克论政府与社会演化*

“As much market as possible，as much state as necessary。”

—Motto of the 1959 Godesbergprogram of germany’s Social Democratic Party

“尽可能多的市场，必要时尽可能多的国家。”

——1959年德国社会民主党哥德斯堡纲领的座右铭。

THESIS one

I. 主题一

Friedrich A.Hayek is generally known as a champion of the free market economy and an outspoken antisocialist； indeed，Hayek’s life was a noble，and mostly lonely struggle against a rising tide of statism and statist ideologies.These facts not withstanding，however：

Hayek’s view regarding the role of market and state cannot Systematically be distinguished from that of a modern social democrat； and
the immediate reason for Hayek’s social democratic views is his con tradictory，and hence nonsensical，definition of “freedom” and “coercion.” （Another，fundamental epistemological reason—Hayek’s selfcontradictory antirationalism—will be addressed in Thesis Two。）[382]

众所周知，弗里德里希·哈耶克（Friedrich a . hayek）是自由市场经济的拥护者和直言不讳的反社会主义者；事实上，哈耶克的一生是与日益高涨的国家主义和国家主义意识形态作斗争的崇高而孤独的一生。无论如何，这些事实是不容置疑的：

哈耶克关于市场和国家作用的观点无法与现代社会民主主义者的观点进行系统的区分；以及

12.哈耶克的社会民主主义观点的直接原因是他对 “自由 “和 “强制 “的定义自相矛盾，因此也是毫无意义的。（另一个认识论上的根本原因——哈耶克自相矛盾的反理性主义——将在主题二中讨论。）

on GOveRNmenT

II. 论政府

According to Hayek，government is “necessary” to fulfill the following tasks （and may acquire the means necessary to do so through taxation）[383]：Not merely for “law enforcement” and “defense against external enemies，” but “in an advanced society government ought to use its power of raising funds by taxation to provide a number of services which for various reasons can not be provided，or cannot be provided adequately，by the market。”[384] （Since at all times an infinite number of goods and services which a market does not provide exist，Hayek hands government a blank check。） Among these are “protection against violence，epidemics，or such natural forces as floods and avalanches，but also many of the amenities which make life in modern cities tolerable，most roads … the provision of standards of measure，and of many kinds of information ranging from land registers，maps and statistics to the certification of the quality of some goods or services offered in the market。”[385]Additional government functions are “the assurance of a certain minimum income for everyone”[386]； government should “distribute its expenditure over time in such a manner that it will step in when private investment flags”； [387] it should finance schools and research as well as enforce “building regulations，pure food laws，the certification of certain profes sions，the restrictions on the sale of certain dangerous goods （such as arms，explosives，poisons and drugs），as well as some safety and health regulations for the processes of production and the provision of such public institutions as theaters，sports grounds，etc。”； [388] and it should make use of the power of “eminent domain” to enhance the “public good.”[389]

哈耶克认为，政府 “有必要 “完成以下任务（并可通过税收获得完成这些任务的必要手段）：不仅仅是为了 “执法 “和 “抵御外敌”，而且 “在一个先进的社会中，政府应该利用其通过税收筹集资金的权力，提供一些由于各种原因市场无法提供或无法充分提供的服务”。（由于在任何时候都有无数的商品和服务是市场所不能提供的，所以哈耶克给了政府一张空白支票）。其中包括 “保护人们免受暴力、流行病或洪水和雪崩等自然力量的侵害，但也包括使现代城市生活变得舒适的许多便利设施，最重要的是道路……提供度量标准，以及从土地登记、地图和统计数据到市场上提供的某些商品或服务的质量认证等多种信息”。政府的其他职能还包括 “确保每个人都有一定的最低收入”；政府应 “在一段时间内分配其支出，以便在私人投资不景气时介入”；它应为学校和研究提供资金，并执行“建筑条例、纯净食品法、某些专业的认证、对某些危险品（如武器、爆炸物、毒药和毒品）销售的限制，以及一些生产过程的安全和健康条例，并提供诸如剧院、运动场等公共机构”；它应该利用“征用权”来增加“公共品”。

Moreover，he generally holds that “there is some reason to believe that with the increase in general wealth and of the density of population，the share of all needs that can be satisfied only by collective action will continue to grow.”[390]

此外，他还普遍认为，”有理由相信，随着总体财富和人口密度的增加，只能通过集体行动来满足的所有需求的份额将继续增长”。

In the Constitution of Liberty，Hayek wanted government to provide further for “monetary stability” （while he later on preferred a bizarre scheme for monetary denationalization）；[391] government should implement an exten sive System of compulsory insurance （“coercion intended to forestall greater coercion”）；[392] public，subsidized housing was a possible government task；[393] likewise，“city planning” and “zoning” were considered appropriate government functions provided that “the sum of the gains must exceed the sum of the losses”；[394] and lastly “the provision of amenities of or opportunities for recreation，or the preservation of natural beauty or of historical sites or places of scientific interest，natural parks，naturereservations，etc。，” were regarded as government tasks.[395]

在《自由宪法》中，哈耶克希望政府进一步保证 “货币稳定”（而他后来却倾向于一种奇怪的货币非国家化计划）；政府应实施广泛的强制保险制度（”强制是为了防止更大的强制”）；公共的住房补贴是一项可能的政府任务；同样，”城市规划 “和 “分区规划 “也被认为是适当的政府职能，条件是 “收益的总和必须超过损失的总和”；最后，“提供娱乐设施或娱乐机会，或保护自然美景、历史遗迹或科学名胜、自然花园、自然保护区等”也被视为政府的任务。

Moreover，Hayek insists we recognize that it is irrelevant how big government is or if and how fast it grows.What alone is important is that government actions fulfill certain formal requirements.“It is the character rather than the volume of government activity that is important。”[396] Taxes as such and the absolute height of taxation are not a problem for Hayek。Taxes—and likewise compulsory military service—lose their character as coercive measures，

if they are at least predictable and are enforced irrespective of how the individual would otherwise employ his energies； this deprives them largely of the evil nature of coercion.If the known necessity of paying a certain amount in taxes becomes the basis of all my plans，if a period of military service is a foreseeable part of my career，then I can follow a general plan of life of my own making and am as independent of the will of another person as men have learned to be in society。[397]

此外，哈耶克坚持认为，我们应该认识到，政府规模有多大、是否扩大以及扩大的速度有多快并不重要，唯一重要的是政府行为是否符合某些形式上的要求。”重要的是政府活动的性质而不是数量”。对哈耶克来说，税收本身和税收的绝对高度都不是问题。如果税收——同样还有义务兵役——至少是可预测的，

而且是在不考虑个人如何使用其能力的情况下实施的，那么它们就失去了作为强制措施的性质；这在很大程度上使它们失去了强制的邪恶性质。如果我所有的计划都以缴纳一定数额的税款为基础，如果一段时间的兵役是我职业生涯中可以预见的一部分，那么我就可以按照我自己制定的总体生活计划行事，就像人们在社会中学会的那样，不受他人意志的支配。

But please，it must be a proportional tax and general military service!

但是，一定要按比例交税，还要普遍服兵役!

In light of this terminological hocuspocus and the above cited list of legitimate government functions，the difference between Hayek and a modern social democrat boils down to the question whether or not the postal service should be privatized （Hayek says yes）。

鉴于这一术语的诡辩和上面所列举的合法政府职能，哈耶克和现代社会民主主义者之间的分歧归结为邮政服务是否应该私有化的问题（哈耶克说应该）。

on freedom AND COERCIon

III. 论自由与强制

The last quote in support of the previous thesis is at the same time confirma tion of the thesis that Hayek’s socialdemocratic theory of government finds its explanation in the absurdity of his definition of freedom and coercion.[398] Hayek defines freedom as the absence of coercion.However，contrary to a long tradition of classical liberal thought，he does not define coercion as the initiation or the threat of physical violence against another person or his legitimately—via original appropriation，production or exchange— acquired property。Instead，he offers a definition whose only merit is its fogginess.By coercion “we mean such control of the environment or cir cumstances of a person by another that，in order to avoid greater evil，he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another，”[399] or “coercion occurs when one man’s actions are made to serve another man’s will，not for his own but for the other’s purpose.”[400] freedom，by contrast，is “a state in which each can use his own knowledge [not：his own property] for his own purposes.”[401]

支持前一个论点的最后一句话同时也证实了哈耶克的社会民主主义政府理论在他对自由和强制的荒谬定义中找到了解释。哈耶克将自由定义为没有强制。然而，与古典自由主义思想的悠久传统相反，他并没有把强制定义为对他人或对其通过先占、生产或交换而合法获得的财产使用或威胁使用身体暴力。

This definition does not contain anything regarding actions，scarce goods and property。Rather，“coercion” refers to a specific configuration of subjective wills （or plans，thoughts and expectations）。Yet then it is useless for the following reason.First，it is useless as a guideline for actions （what am I allowed to do here and now if I do not want to commit a coercive act？），because in general I do not know the will or plans of others and in any case，to know all other wills completely would be impossible.Even if I wanted to，I could never be sure from the outset （ex ante） that what I was planning to do would not coerce anyone.Yet individuals obviously must be permitted to act “correctly” prior to knowing anything about the plans of others，and even if they knew literally nothing but their own plans.For this to be possible，however，the criterion employed to distinguish between “freedom” and “coercion” must be an objective one.It must refer to an event/nonevent that possesses a physical description （and over whose out come an actor must possess physical control）。Second，Hayek’s definition is also useless as a retrospective （ex post） criterion of justice （is the accusation of A against B justified； who is guilty and who isn’t？）。As long as A and B come to the same conclusion concerning innocence and guilt （including such questions as compensation and/or punishment），no problem arises for Hayek’s criterion.However，in the case of unanimity no criterion can ever fail。Hayek’s criterion fails miserably in those cases，though，for which it is intended：whenever plaintiff” and defendant do not agree，and still a verdict must be reached.Since Hayek’s definition does not contain any physical （intersubjectively ascertainable） criteria，his judgments are arbi trary。As mental predicates，Hayek’s categories of freedom and coercion are compatible with every real，physical state of affairs.They possess no power to make real distinctions.

这个定义并不包含任何有关行动、稀缺物品和财产的内容。相反，”强制 “指的是主观意愿（或计划、观念和期望）的具体内容。然而，由于以下原因，”强制 “是无用的。首先，作为行动指南它是无用的（如果我不想采取强制行为，我此时此地可以做什么？）因为一般来说，我不知道其他人的意愿或计划，而且，无论如何，要完全知道所有其他人的意愿是不可能的。即使我想知道，我也不可能从一开始（事先）就确定我打算做的事情不会胁迫任何人。然而，显然必须允许个人在了解他人的计划之前采取“正确”的行动，即使他们实际上除了自己的计划什么都不知道。要做到这一点，无论如何，区分 “自由 “与 “强制 “的标准必须是客观的。它必须是指具有物理描述的事件/非事件（行动人必须对其结果能够物理控制）。其次，哈耶克的定义作为追溯性（事后）的公正标准（A 对 B 的指控是否正当；谁有罪谁无罪？）也是无用的。只要 A 和 B 就无罪和有罪得出相同的结论（包括赔偿和/或惩罚等问题），所谓的哈耶克的标准问题就不会出现。然而，在意见一致的情况下，任何标准都不可能失效。哈耶克的标准在这样的情况下会惨遭失败：无论原告还是被告意见不一致，都必须做出判决。由于哈耶克的定义不包含任何物理（主体间可确定的）标准，他的判断是任意的、武断的。作为精神谓词，哈耶克的自由和强制范畴与每一种真实的、物理的事态是相容的。这两个词没有能力做出真实的区分。

Correspondingly confused and contradictory are Hayek’s attempts to apply his definitions：

in applying his definition，Hayek on the one hand reaches the conclusion that the initiation and threat of physical violence constitutes “coercion.” “The threat of force or violence is the most important form of coercion.”[402] “true coercion occurs when armed bands of conquerors make the subject people toil for them，when organized gangsters extort a levy for ‘protection’。”[403] on the other hand （witness the quotations above） he classifies acts of the initiation or threat of physical violence such as com pulsory military service or taxes as “noncoercive，” provided only that the victims of such aggression could have reliably expected and adjusted to it。

相应地，哈耶克在应用其定义时也出现了混乱和矛盾：

1.在运用他的定义时，哈耶克一方面得出结论，发起和威胁使用身体暴力构成 “强制”。”武力或暴力威胁是强制的最重要形式”。”当一群武装的征服者让国民为他们劳作，当有组织的匪徒勒索’保护费’时，才是真正的强制。另一方面（见上文引文），他将发起或威胁使用身体暴力的行为，如强制服兵役或征税，归类为 “非强制性 “行为，原因是这种侵犯的受害者能够可靠地预期并适应它。

on the one hand，Hayek identifies physical violence with “coercion.” on the other hand，he does not accept the absence of physical violence or damage as a criterion for “noncoercion.” “The threat of physical force is not the only way in which coercion can be exercised.”[404] Even if A has com mitted no physical aggression against B or his property，he may nonetheless be guilty of “coercion.” According to Hayek，this is the case whenever A is guilty of omitted help visàvis B，i.e.，whenever he has not provided B with goods or services of his （A’s），which B had expected from him and regarded as “crucial to my existence or preservation of what I most value.”[405] Hayek asserts that only a small number of cases actually fit this criterion：The owner of a mine in a mining town who decides to disemploy a worker allegedly “coerces”； and likewise it is supposedly “coercive” if the owner of the sole water supply in a desert is unwilling to sell this water，or if he refuses to sell it at a price which others deem “fair。” But it requires little imagination to recognize that Hayek’s criterion is in fact allencompassing。Any peaceful action a person may perform can be interpreted by others—and indeed any number of them—as constituting “coercion，” for every activity is at the same time always the omission of innumerable other possible actions，and every omission becomes “coercion” if a single person claims that the execution of the omission was “crucial to the preservation of what I most value.”
一方面，哈耶克将身体暴力等同于“强制”。另一方面，他不接受没有身体暴力或伤害作为“非强制”的标准。“武力威胁并不是行使胁迫的唯一方式。”即使A没有对B或其财产进行人身侵犯，他也可能犯有 “强制 “罪。哈耶克认为，只要A对B不提供帮助，即只要A没有向B提供他所期望的、B认为 “对我的生存或维护我最珍视的东西至关重要 “的物品或服务，就属于这种情况。哈耶克断言，只有少数情况实际上符合这一标准：一个矿业城镇的矿主决定解雇一名工人，据称是 “强制”；同样，如果一个沙漠中唯一水源的所有者不愿意出售这些水，或者如果他拒绝以其他人认为 “公平 “的价格出售这些水，据称也是 “强制”。但是，不需要多少想象力，我们就能认识到哈耶克的标准实际上是无所不包的。一个人可能采取的任何和平的行动都可能被其他人——实际上是任何数量的其他人——解释为构成“强制”，因为每一个行动同时总是会忽略无数其他可能的行动，如果一个人声称这种忽略 “对维护我最珍视的东西至关重要”，那么每一项忽略都会构成 “强制”。

Whenever cases of omitted help and physical violence are categorically identified as “coercion，” however，inescapable contradictions result。[406] If A’s omission constitutes “coercion” toward B，then B must possess the right to “defend” himself against A.B’s only “defense” would be that he could employ physical violence against A （to make A execute what he otherwise would avoid doing）—but then acts of physical violence could no longer be classified as “coercion”! Physical violence would be “defense.” in this case，“coercion” would be the peaceful refusal to engage in an exchange as well as the attempt to defend oneself against all forced （under the threat of violence executed） exchange.on the other hand，if physical violence were defined as “coercion，” then B would not be allowed to “defend” himself against an omissive A； and if B nonetheless attempted to do so，then the right to defense would rest with A—but in this case，omissions could not constitute “coercion.”

然而，当不提供帮助和身体暴力的情况都被归类为 “强制 “时，就会产生不可避免的矛盾。如果A的不作为构成了对B的“强制”，那么B必须拥有对A进行“安保”的权利。B唯一的“安保”就是他可以对A使用身体暴力（让A执行他本来不会做的事情）——但这样身体暴力行为就不能再被归类为“强制”了!身体暴力是“安保”。在这种情况下，“强制”将是和平地拒绝参与交换，并试图保护自己不受所有强迫（在暴力威胁下实施的）的交换。另一方面，如果身体暴力被定义为“强制”，那么B就不允许对不作为的A进行“安保”；如果B仍然试图这样做，那么安保权将属于A——但在这种情况下，不作为不能构成“强制”。

From these conceptual confusions stems Hayek’s absurd thesis of “the unavoidability of coercion” and his corresponding，equally absurd “justification” of government。“Coercion，however，cannot be altogether avoided because the only way to prevent it is by the threat of coercion.free society has met this problem by conferring the monopoly of coercion on the state and by attempting to limit this power of the state to instances where it is required to prevent coercion by private persons.”[407] According to both of Hayek’s definitions of “coercion，” this thesis is nonsensical。If omitted help represents “coercion，” then coercion in the sense of physical violence becomes necessary （not：unavoidable）。otherwise，if the initiation and threat of physical violence is defined as “coercion，” it can be avoided； first，because each person possesses control over whether or not he will physically attack another； and second，because every person is entitled to defend himself with all of his means against another’s physical attack。It is only unavoidable that so long as physical aggression exists，there will also be a need for physical defense.Yet the unavoidability of defensive violence has nothing to do with the alleged “unavoidability of coercion” （unless one confused the categorical difference between attack and defense and asserted that the threat of defending oneself in the event of an attack is the same kind of thing as the threat of attacking）。If physical violence is forbidden，then it follows that one is allowed to defend oneself against it。It is thus absurd to classify attack and defense under the same rubric of “coercion.” defense is to coercion as day is to night。
从这些概念混淆中，产生了哈耶克 “强制不可避免 “的荒谬论断，以及相应的，同样荒谬的政府 “正当性”。”强制，无论如何，是无法完全避免的，因为防止强制的唯一办法就是以强制相威胁。自由社会解决这一问题的办法是赋予国家强制的垄断权，并试图将国家的这一权力限制在需要它来防止私人强制的情况下”。根据哈耶克对 “强制 “的两个定义，这一论点是毫无意义的。如果忽略了帮助代表着 “强制”，那么身体暴力意义上的强制就成为必要的（而不是：不可避免的）。否则，如果身体暴力的发起和威胁被定义为 “强制”，那么它是可以避免的；首先，因为每个人都可以控制自己是否对他人进行身体攻击；其次，因为每个人都有权用自己的一切手段安保他人的身体攻击。只要存在人身攻击，就不可避免地需要进行人身安保。然而，安保性暴力的不可避免性与所谓的 “强制的不可避免性 “毫无关系（除非有人混淆了攻击与安保之间的绝对区别，断言在受到攻击时进行安保的威胁与攻击的威胁是同一种东西）。如果身体暴力是被禁止的，那么人们就可以对身体暴力进行安保。因此，把攻击和安保归为同一种 “强制 “是荒谬的。 “安保之于强制，犹如白昼之于黑夜

Yet from the unavoidability of defense no justification for a government monopoly of coercion follows.To the contrary。A government is by no means merely a “monopolist of defense” who helps private individuals avoid otherwise “unavoidable” defense expenditures （as a monopolist：inefficiently）。because it could otherwise provide no defense activities，the government’s monopoly of coercion includes in particular the right of the state to commit violence against private citizens and their complementary obligation not to defend themselves against government attacks.But what kind of justification for a government is this：that if a person surrenders unconditionally to an attacker he may save himself otherwise “unavoidable” defense expenditures？

然而，从安保的不可避免性中并不能证明政府垄断强制是正当的。恰恰相反。政府绝不仅仅是一个 “安保垄断者”，它帮助私人避免 “不可避免 “的安保开支。（作为垄断者：效率低下）。因为政府的强制垄断权尤其包括国家对公民个人实施暴力的权利，以及公民个人不对政府的攻击进行安保的补充义务，否则它就无法提供安保活动。但是，如果一个人无条件地向攻击者投降，他就可以为自己节省 “不可避免的 “安保开支，这对政府来说算哪门子正当理由呢？

THESIS TWO

IV. 主题二

The fundamental epistemological reason for Hayek’s nonsensical theory of government and coercion is to be found in Hayek’s Systematic antirationalis.

哈耶克关于政府和强制的荒谬理论，其认识论上的根本原因要从哈耶克的《系统反理性论》（Systematic antirationalis）中找到。

This antirationalism expresses itself first in the fact that Hayek rejects the idea of a cognitive ethic。Hayek is an ethical relativist （who，as already shown，does not even consider an unambiguous moral distinction between attack and defense to be possible）。
这种反理性主义首先表现在哈耶克拒绝接受认知伦理的观点。哈耶克是一个伦理相对主义者（如前所述，他甚至不认为在道德上明确区分攻击和安保是可能的）。
Second—in an even more dramatic fashion—Hayek’s antirationalism is expressed in his “theory of social evolution，” where purposeful action and selfinterest，trial，error and learning，force and freedom as well as state and market （society） have been Systematically eliminated as explanatory factors of social change and replaced with an obscure “spontaneity” and a collectivisticholisticorganizistic principle of “cultural group selection.” （Hayek’s citation of Carl menger as precursor of his own theory is false.menger would have ridiculed Hayek’s theory of evolution as mysticism.menger’s successor is not Hayek，but Ludwig von Mises and his “social rationalism.”[408]）
其次，哈耶克的反理性主义还表现在他的 “社会进化论 “中，在这一理论中，有目的的行动和自利，试验，试错和习得，暴力和自由，以及国家和市场（社会），都被系统地排除在社会变革的解释因素之外，取而代之的是一种模糊的“自发性”和“文化群体选择”的集体主义组织原则。（哈耶克引用卡尔-门格尔（Carl menger）作为自己理论的先驱是错误的。门格尔的继承者不是哈耶克，而是路德维希-冯-米塞斯和他的 “社会理性主义”。）

on ETHICS

V. 论伦理

“Moreover，if civilization has resulted from unwanted gradual changes in morality，then，reluctant as we may be to accept this，no universally valid System of ethics can ever be known to us.”[409] Furthermore，“Evolution can not be just。 Indeed，to insist that all future change is to be just would be to demand that evolution come to a halt。Evolution leads us ahead precisely in bringing about much that we could not intend or foresee，let alone prejudge for its moral properties.”[410] Or：“To pretend to know the desirable direction of progress seems to me to be the extreme of hubris.Guided progress would not be progress.”[411] （So much for the question whether or not Hayek can give any advice to the former communist countries of Eastern Europe：he suggests nothing but banking on “spontaneous evolution.”）

“此外，如果文明是道德的非欲求的渐变造成的，那么，尽管我们可能不愿意接受这一点，但我们永远不可能知道一个普遍有效的伦理体系”。 “此外，如果文明是道德的非欲求的渐变造成的，那么，尽管我们可能不愿意接受这一点，但我们永远不可能知道一个普遍有效的伦理体系”。此外，”演化不可能是公正的。事实上，如果坚持认为未来的所有变化都是公正的，那就等于要求停止演化。演化引领我们前进，正是因为它带来了许多我们无法预料或预见的东西，更不用说预先判断其道德属性了”。或：”在我看来，假装知道进步的理想方向是狂妄的极端。有指导的进步就不是进步。 ” （关于哈耶克能否给东欧前共产主义国家提供任何建议的问题就到此为止了：他只建议寄望于“自发演化”。）

It is characteristic of Hayek’s antirationalism that he does not prove this counterintuitive thesis，as is necessary。Indeed，he does not even attempt to make it plausible.

哈耶克的反理性主义的特点是，他没有证明这个反直觉的论点，而这是必要的。事实上，他甚至没有试图让它变得合理。

It is the same antirationalism that leads Hayek to state—often merely a few pages apart—something seemingly completely different （logical con sistency is not a necessary requirement for an antirationalist）。For instance，“Where there is no property there is no justice.”[412] And John Locke is quoted approvingly with a passage which could not possibly be more rationalist：

“Where there is no property there is no justice，” is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid：for the idea of property being a right to anything，and the idea to which the name injustice is given being the invasion or violation of that right； it is evident that these ideas being thus established，and these names annexed to them，I can as certainly know this proposition to be true as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones.[413]

正是这种反理性主义导致哈耶克经常在相隔几页的地方说出一些看似完全不同的话（逻辑一致性并不是反理性主义者的必要条件）。例如，”没有财产就没有公正”。约翰-洛克的一段话得到了赞许的引用，这段话很有理性主义色彩：

“哪里没有财产，哪里就没有公正”，这是一个与欧几里得中的任何论证一样确定的命题：因为财产的概念是对任何事物的权利，而被赋予非公正之名的概念是对这种权利的侵犯或违反；很明显，这些概念是这样确立的，而这些名称又是它们的附属物，我可以肯定地知道这个命题是真的，就像三角形三个角之和等于两个直角之和一样。

Lastly，it is characteristic of Hayek when only one page later，while one is still wondering how to square the Lockean idea of an Euclidean ethic with the thesis of the “impossibility” of an universally valid ethic，Hayek returns，in a sudden dialectic twist to his relativistic point of departure.“The institutions of property，as they exist at present，are hardly perfect； indeed，we can hardly yet say in what such perfection might consist。”[414] “Traditional concepts of property rights have in recent times been recognized as a modi fiable and very complex bundle whose most effective combinations have not yet been discovered in all areas.” in particular the investigations of the Chicago school （Coase，Demsetz，becker and others） “have opened new possibilities for future improvements in the legal framework of the market order。”

最后，哈耶克的特点是，仅在一页之后，当人们还在想如何将洛克的欧几里得伦理观念与普遍有效的伦理的 “不可能性 “这一论点相统一时，哈耶克又突然辩证地折回到了他的相对主义出发点。”目前存在的财产制度很难说是完美的；说实在的，我们还很难说，这样的完美究竟是什么东西。””传统的产权概念近来被认为是一个可修改的、非常复杂的集合体，其最有效的组合尚未在所有领域被发现。”特别是芝加哥学派（科斯、德姆塞茨、贝克尔等人）的研究 “为今后改进市场秩序的法律框架开辟了新的可能性”。

Hayek does not think it worth mentioning or he does not recognize，that the property theories of Locke and the Chicago school are incompatible.According to Locke，the principles of selfownership，original appropriation （homesteading），production and voluntary exchange are universally valid ethical norms.Locke’s theory of private property is a theory of justice，and Locke is an ethical absolutist。In contrast，the representatives of the Chicago school deny the possibility of a rational，universally valid ethic。There exists no justice in Chicago。Who owns what and who does not，and likewise who is the attacker and who the victim，is for Coase and colleagues not once and for all fixed and settled and does not depend on who has done what in the past。Instead，property titles are to be distributed among people，and with changing circumstances redistributed，in such a way that future economic efficiency is maximized.The person who is expected to make the most efficient use of a resource—as “measured” in terms of money—becomes its owner； he who will have to bear the lower monetary costs if he were to avoid the disputed activity is declared the attacker in a propertyrights dispute； and whenever in the course of time the roles of the most efficient user or the “least cost avoider” change from one person to another，property titles must be accordingly redistributed.[415]

哈耶克认为不值得一提，或者说他没有认识到，洛克的财产理论与芝加哥学派的财产理论是不相容的。洛克认为，自我所有权、先占（自耕农）、生产和自愿交换原则是普遍有效的伦理规范。洛克的私有财产理论是一种公正理论，洛克是一个伦理绝对主义者。与此相反，芝加哥学派的代表却否认存在一种理性的、普遍有效的伦理。芝加哥学派不言公正。对科斯及其同事来说，谁拥有什么，谁不拥有什么，谁是攻击者，谁是受害者，并不是一劳永逸的确定下来，也不取决于谁过去做了什么。相反，财产权应在人们之间分配，并随着情况的变化而重新分配，其分配方式应使未来的经济效益最大化。谁能最有效地利用资源——用货币来 “衡量”——谁就成为资源的所有者；谁如果避免从事有争议的活动，就必须承担较低的货币成本，谁就被宣布为产权纠纷中的攻击者；而且，只要随着时间的推移，最有效的使用者或 “最小成本的避免者 “的角色从一个人变成了另一个人，产权就必须相应地重新分配。

on SOCIAL EVOLUTIon

VI. 论社会演化

The mysticcollectivistic character of Hayek’s theory of spontaneous social evolution comes to light in passages such as these：

“In the process of cultural transmission，in which modes of conduct are passed on from generation to generation，a process of selection takes place，in which those modes of conduct prevail which lead to the forma tion of a more efficient order for the whole group，because such groups will prevail over others.”[416]

哈耶克的自发的社会演化理论的神秘主义-集体主义特征在诸如此类的段落中显露无遗：

“在文化传播的过程中，行为模式代代相传，选择的过程发生了，在这一过程中，那些能为整个群体建立更有效秩序的行为模式会占上风，因为这样的群体将优于其他群体。”

I.“In so far as such rules have prevailed because the group that adopted them was more successful，nobody need ever have known why that group was successful and why in consequence its rules became generally adopted.”[417]

“如果这些规则之所以盛行，是因为采用它们的群体更成功，那么没有人需要知道为什么这个群体会成功，以及为什么它的规则最终会被普遍采用。”

II.“Culture 。。。is a tradition of learnt rules of conduct which have never been ‘invented’ and whose function the acting individuals usually do not understand 。。。，the result of a process of winnowing and sifting，directed by the differential advantages gained by groups from practices adopted for some unknown and perhaps purely accidental reasons.”[418] “man did not adopt new rules of conduct because he was intelligent。He became intelligent by submitting to new rules of conduct。”[419] “We have never designed our economic System.We were not intelligent enough for that。We have tumbled into it and it has carried us to unforeseen heights and given rise to ambitions which may yet lead us to destroy it。”[420]

II.”文化……是一种传统的、习得的、从未’发明’过的行为规则，其功能通常不为行为个体所理解……，文化是一个筛选过程的结果，由群体出于某种未知的、也许纯属偶然的原因而采用的做法中获得的不同优势所引导。””人类并不是因为有了智慧才采用新的行为规则，而是因为服从新的行为规则才变得有智慧”。”我们从未设计过我们的经济体系，我们没有足够的智慧去设计它。我们跌入其中，它把我们带到了未曾预料的高度，并激起了我们的野心，这些野心可能会导致我们毁灭它。”

III.civilization “resulted not from human design or intention but spontaneously：it arose from unintentionally conforming to certain traditional and largely moral practices，many of which men tend to dislike，whose sig nificance they usually fail to understand，whose validity they cannot prove，and which have nonetheless fairly rapidly spread by means of an evolu tionary selection—the comparative increase of population and wealth—of those groups that happened to follow them.”[421] “Moral traditions outstrip the capacities of reason.”[422] “Mind is not a guide but a product of cultural evolution，and is based more on imitation than on insight or reason.”[423]

III.文明 “并非源于人类的设计或意图，而是自发产生的：它产生于无意中遵守某些传统的、主要是道德的习俗，其中许多习俗人们往往不喜欢，他们通常无法理解其意义，也无法证明其正确性，但这些习俗却通过演化选择——人口和财富的相对增长——在那些碰巧遵循这些习俗的群体中相当迅速地传播开来”。“道德传统超越了理性的能力。””心智不是一种指导，而是文化演化的产物，更多的是基于模仿，而不是基于洞察力或理性”。

Hayek’s theory，then，consists of these three propositions：

A person initially performs a spontaneous action without knowing why and for what purpose； and a person retains this practice for no reason—whether or not it has resulted in a success （for without purpose and goal there can be no success and no failure）。（Cultural mutation.）
The new practice is imitated by other group members—again with out any motive or reason.The proliferation of the practice comes to a halt once all group members have adopted it。（Cultural transmission.）
members of other groups do not imitate the practice.Those groups which spontaneously adopt and unconsciously imitate a bet ter moral practice will exhibit a comparatively higher population growth，greater wealth，or otherwise somehow “prevail。” （Cultural selection.）

哈耶克的理论由以下三个命题组成：

一个人在不知道原因和目的的情况下，最初采取了自发的行动；一个人毫无理由地保留了这种做法习俗——不管它是否取得了成功（因为没有目的和目标，就不会有成功和失败）。（文化突变）

2.新做法会被其他群体成员模仿——同样也没有任何动机或理由。一旦所有群体成员都采用了这种做法，这种做法的扩散就会停止。（文化传播）。

3.其他群体的成员不会模仿这种做法。那些自发采用并无意识模仿较好道德习俗的群体，将表现出相对较高的人口增长率、更多的财富，或以某种方式 “胜出”（文化选择）。

Hayek claims that this theory explains the evolution of private property，of the division of labor and of exchange，as well as of money and government。In fact，however，these practices and institutions provide perfect examples for demonstrating the theory’s entire absurdity （such that Hayek cannot help but contradict his own theory over and over again）。[424]

哈耶克声称这一理论解释了私有财产、劳动分工、交换以及货币和政府的演化。然而，事实上，这些实践和制度为证明该理论的整体荒谬性提供了完美的例证（以至于哈耶克不得不一次又一次地自相矛盾）。

CULTURAL MUTATIon

VII. 文化突变

Hayek’s theory of spontaneity may apply to vegetables （although it would even run into difficulties here because of Hayek’s explicitly assumed “Lamarckism”[425]），but it is definitely not applicable to human actors.Every action involves the purposeful employment of scarce means，and every actor can always distinguish between a successful and an unsuccessful action.The concept of an unconsciousspontaneous action à la Hayek is a contradictio in adjecto。Acting is always conscious and rational。Hence Hayek’s theory leads to an inescapable dilemma：If one applies Hayek’s theory to itself，then his own activity of writing books is nothing but a purposeless emanation regarding which the questions of true or false and of success or failure simply do not arise.Or Hayek’s writing represents a purposeful action.In this case his theory is obviously false，however，because in enlightening himself （and us） regarding the course of social evolution，Hayek no longer acts spontaneously but instead tries to shape social change consciously and rationally。

哈耶克的自发秩序理论可能适用于蔬菜（尽管由于哈耶克明确假定的 “拉马克主义”，它在这里甚至会遇到困难），但它绝对不适用于行动人。每个行动都涉及有目的地使用稀缺的手段，而每个行动人总能区分成功的行动和不成功的行动。哈耶克的 “无意识的自发行动 “概念是自相矛盾的。因此，哈耶克的理论导致了一个无法回避的困境：如果将哈耶克的理论应用于自身，那么他自己的著书立说行动不过是一种无目的的布朗运动，根本不存在真假和成败的问题。或者说，哈耶克的写作代表了一种有目的的行动。在这种情况下，他的理论显然是错误的，无论如何，因为在启迪他自己（以及我们）关于社会演化过程的过程中，哈耶克不再是自发行动，而是试图有意识地、理性地塑造社会变革。

regarding in particular the problem of the origin of private property； it is only necessary to insert into proposition （1） practices such as the original appropriation of a previously unowned good or the production of a capital good to immediately recognize its absurdity。Appropriation and capital goods production are purposeful activities.one engages in original appropriation and produces capital goods because one prefers more goods to less and recognizes the greater physical productivity of appropriated land and capitalist production.Even if the invention of a capital good such as，for example，a hammer or an axe，first happened by accident，the inventor still recognized for what purpose it was useful，and any repetition of the invented practice then occurred purposefully and with reason.

特别是关于私有财产的起源问题；只要在命题（1）中插入诸如先占先前的无主之物或生产资本品等做法，就会立即认识到它的荒谬性。占有和资本品生产都是有目的的活动。一个人之所以从事先占并生产资本财货，是因为他喜欢更多的财货而不是更少的财货，并且认识到占有土地和资本主义生产具有更高的物质生产力。即使锤子或斧头等资本品的发明最初是偶然的，但发明者仍然认识到了它的用途，而且任何重复发明的做法都是有目的、有理由的。

CULTURAL TRANSMISSIon

VIII. 文化传播

Equally absurd is Hayek’s theory of “spontaneous association” through unconscious imitation.The imitation of the practices of original appropriation and indirect，capitalist production by others is likewise motivated by the desire for greater personal wealth.It is a justified imitation.neither exter nal force，chance nor spontaneity are necessary to explain it。Nor are they required in order to then explain the emergence of the division of labor and interpersonal exchange.People recognize and have always recognized that division of labor and voluntary exchange lead to greater physical productivity than if one were to remain in selfsufficiency。[426] Likewise，for the origin of a monetary economy one must not wait for a spontaneous mutation.Under conditions of uncertainty，in any barter economy salesstoppages are bound to arise （whenever a double coincidence of wants is absent）。In this situation a person can nonetheless still increase his own wealth，if he recognizes that goods may be employed not only for personal use but also as a medium of exchange—for resale purposes—and if he then succeeds in acquiring a more marketable good in exchange for a less marketable one.The demand for a good qua medium of exchange further increases this good’s marketability。The practice will be imitated by others to solve their own sales problems，and in the course of a selfreinforcing process of imitation，sooner or later a single universal medium of exchange—a commodity money—will emerge，which is uniquely distinguished from all other goods in being the one with the highest degree of resaleability。[427]

同样荒谬的还有哈耶克通过无意识模仿产生 “自发联合 “的理论。模仿他人先占和间接交换的、资本主义生产的做法，同样是出于对更多个人财富的渴望。这是一种合理的模仿，不需要外力、偶然性或自发性来解释。为了解释劳动分工和人际交换的出现，也不需要借助外力、偶然性和自发性。人们认识到并一直认识到，劳动分工和自愿交换比自给自足能带来更高的物质生产率。同样，对于货币经济的起源，我们也不能等待一个自发的突变。在不确定的条件下，任何以物易物的经济都必然会出现交易中断（只要缺乏需求的双重巧合）。如果他认识到商品不仅可以自用，还可以作为交换媒介进行转售，如果他能成功地获得一种更适销的商品来交换一种较不适销的商品的话，那么在这种情况下，一个人仍然可以增加自己的财富。对一种商品作为交换媒介的需求进一步增加了这种商品的适销性。这种做法会被其他人模仿，以解决自己的销售问题，在自我强化的模仿过程中，迟早会出现一种单一的通用交换媒介——商品货币，它与所有其他商品的独特之处在于它具有最高程度的可转售性。

None of this is the result of chance.Everywhere，at the origin of private property，exchange and money，individual purpose，insight and selfinterested action are at work。

这一切都不是偶然的结果。在私有财产起源的任何一个地方，交换和货币、个人目的、洞察力和利己行动都在起作用。

Indeed，so patently wrong is his theory that Hayek frequently withdraws to a second，more moderate variation.According to this version，division of labor and exchange are “the unintended consequences of human action，” “the result of human action but not of human design.”[428] The process of human association may not proceed entirely unconsciously，but largely so。An actor may be able to recognize his personal gains from acts of appropriation，production，exchange and money—use—and insofar，the process of evolution may appear rational。However，an actor cannot recognize the indirect consequences of his actions （and it is allegedly these unconscious，unintended consequences for society as a whole which are decisive for the evolutionary success or failure of individual practices）。And since these con sequences cannot be known，the process of social evolution is ultimately irrational，[429] motivated not by true or false ideas and insights，but by a blind，unconsciously effective mechanism of group selection.

事实上，哈耶克的理论错得如此离谱，以至于他经常退而求其次，提出一种更为温和的变体。根据这一版本，劳动分工和交换是 “人的行动的非意图的后果”，”是人的行动的结果，而不是人的设计的结果”。人类交往的过程可能并非完全是无意识的，但在很大程度上是这样。行动人能够认识到自己从占有、生产、交换和货币使用等行动中获得的个人收益——在此范围内，演化过程可能看起来是理性的。然而，行动人无法认识到其行动的间接后果（据称，正是这些对整个社会的影响所产生的无意识的、非意图的后果对个人行为的进化成败起着决定性作用）。由于无法知道这些后果，社会演化过程最终是非理性的，其动机不是真实或虚假的观念和见解，而是一种盲目的、无意识的、有效的群体选择机制。

However，this variant also is contradictory and absurd.

然而，这一变体也是矛盾和荒谬的。

First，it is selfcontradictory to characterize actions by their unconscious indirect consequences and then，in the next breath，name these con sequences.If the indirect consequences can be named and described，they also can be intended.otherwise，if they are indeed unconscious，nothing can be said about them.Something about which one cannot say anything obviously cannot have an identifiable influence on anybody’s actions； nor can it be made responsible for the different evolutionary success of different groups.Thus，from the outset it is nonsensical to describe—as Hayek does—the task of a social theorist as that of explaining the “unintended patterns and regularities which we find to exist in human society。”[430] The task of the social theorist is to explain the direct as well as the indirect （not： the intentional and the unintentional） consequences of human actions and to thus contribute to a progressive rationalization of human action—an expansion of the knowledge of possible （intendable） goals and the mutual compatibility or incompatibility of various goals.[431]

首先，用无意识的间接后果来描述行动的特征，然后，在下一刻又命名这些后果，这是自相矛盾的。如果间接后果可以被命名和描述，那么它们也可以是有意的。否则，如果它们确实是无意识的，那就无话可说了。人们对其无从知晓的东西显然无法对任何人的行动产生可识别的影响，也无法让它对不同群体在进化过程中取得的不同成功负责。因此，像哈耶克那样把社会理论家的任务描述为解释 “我们发现存在于人类社会中的非意图的模式和规律性”，从一开始就是毫无意义的。社会理论家的任务是解释人的行动的直接后果和间接后果（不是：有意的和无意的），从而促进人的行动的逐步合理化——扩大对可能的（有意图的）目标以及各种目标之间相互兼容或不兼容的知识。

Secondly，the moderate variation also cannot explain the origin of division of labor，exchange and money。one can grant Hayek initially that it may be possible that a person who carries out an exchange or who acquires a medium of exchange for the very first time will thereby recognize only his own personal gain （but not the indirect，social consequences）。He may not know （and mankind at its beginnings certainly did not know） that as an exchanger and a money user he contributes ultimately to the development of a world market，integrated through a single，universally employed commodity money （historically，gold），to steady population growth，to an ever more expansive division of labor and continuously growing global economic wealth.Moreover，it is impossible in principle to predict today （or at any present time） the diversity，quantities，prices and personal distribution of future goods.But from this Hayek’s skeptic—antirationalist conclusion—that “guided progress is no progress，” that “we cannot prejudge the moral properties of evolutionary outcomes，” and that “we have never designed our economic System but have tumbled into it，and it may yet lead us to destruction”—does not follow.

其次，适度变异的理论也无法解释劳动分工、交换和货币的起源。我们可以承认哈耶克最初的观点，即一个人在第一次进行交换或获得交换媒介时，有可能只认识到自己的个人利益（而认识不到间接的社会后果）。他可能不知道（人类在诞生之初当然也不知道），作为一个交换者和货币使用者，他最终促进了世界市场的发展，通过单一的、普遍使用的商品货币（历史上是黄金）实现了世界市场的一体化，促进了人口的稳定增长，促进了分工的不断扩大和全球经济财富的持续增长。此外，今天（或任何时候）原则上不可能预测未来商品的多样性、数量、价格和个人分配。但是，哈耶克的怀疑论——反理性主义的结论——“被引导的进步不是进步”、”我们不能预先判断演化结果的道德属性”、”我们从未设计过我们的经济体系，而是跌入其中，它可能会把我们带向毁灭”——并非由此得出。

For even if a person does not immediately grasp the indirect social con sequences of his own actions，it is difficult to imagine how this ignorance could last for long。once repeated exchanges between specific traders occur，or once one sees one’s own practice of acquiring a medium of exchange copied by others，one begins to recognize that one’s own actions are not only onesided but mutually beneficial。Even if one were still unable to Systematically predict the development of future markets and the shape and composition of future wealth，then，with the nature of a bilateral exchange and a medium of exchange one would at the same time recognize the principle of interpersonal justice and of individual and universal economic progress：whatever results emerge from voluntary exchanges are just； and economic progress consists of the expansion of the division of labor based upon the recognition of private property and the universalization of the use of money and monetary calculation.Even if the division of labor，money and economic calculation become routine in the course of time，the recognition of the foundations of justice and economic efficiency never again completely disappears.once for whatever reason it comes to a complete breakdown of the division of labor （war） or the currency （hyperinflation），people will be reminded of it。Then they must not unconsciously await the further course of social evolution，their own extinction.Rather，they are capable of recognizing the breakdown as such and know （and have always known） how to begin Systematically anew.

因为，即使一个人没有立即意识到自己的行动所产生的间接社会后果，也很难想象这种无知会持续多久。一旦特定交易者之间发生了反复的交换，或者一旦人们看到自己获取交换媒介的做法被他人复制，人们就会开始认识到自己的行动不仅是单方面的，而且是互利的。即使人们仍然无法系统地预测未来市场的发展以及未来财富的形态和构成，那么，由于双边交换和交换媒介的性质，人们也会同时认识到人际公正原则以及个人和普遍经济进步的原则：自愿交换产生的任何结果都是公正的；经济进步包括在承认私有财产和普遍使用货币和货币计算的基础上扩大分工。即使劳动分工、货币和经济计算随着时间的推移变得司空见惯，人们对公正和经济效率基础的认识也永远不会完全消失。一旦由于某种原因导致分工（战争）或货币（恶性通货膨胀）彻底崩溃，人们就会想起它。那么，他们就不能无意识地等待社会演化的进一步发展，等待自己的灭亡。相反，他们有能力认识到这种崩溃，并知道（而且一直都知道）如何系统地重新开始。

Moreover，as the examples cited by Hayek of Carl menger and Ludwig von Mises clearly demonstrate，it must not even come to a catastrophe before one regains consciousness.As soon as one has comprehended the thoughts of these men，one can act in full understanding of the social consequences of one’s activities.The evolution does not proceed above the heads of the acting individuals but instead becomes a process of consciously planned and/or experienced social change.Each progression and each mishap in the process of economic integration can be identified and explained，and the conscious identification of mishaps in particular makes it possible that one may either consciously adjust to a catastrophe before it actually occurs or that a mistake will be consciously corrected （insofar as one possesses control over it）。

此外，正如哈耶克列举的卡尔-门格尔和路德维希-冯-米塞斯的例子所清楚表明的那样，在人们恢复意识之前，甚至不一定会发生大灾难。一旦人们理解了这些人的思想，就可以在完全了解自己的活动会产生的社会后果的情况下采取行动。演化并不在行动人的头脑中进行的，而是一个有意识地计划和/或经历的社会变革过程。经济一体化进程中的每一次进步和每一次失误都可以被识别和解释，尤其是对失误的有意识识别，使得人们有可能在灾难真正发生之前有意识地做出调整，或者有意识地纠正错误（只要人们能够控制它）。

Furthermore，just as people are not condemned to blindly tumble toward selfdestruction，they also must not remain passive and powerless visàvis a foreseen economic decline.Rather，at all times one can Systematically expand the range of controllable—and hence correctable—mistakes.For any institutionalized derailment in the process of economic integration and association—such as government expropriations，taxes，currency depreciations or trade restrictions—must have the approval of the majority of the public。without such support in public opinion，however reluctant it may be，their continued enforcement becomes impossible.Thus，in order to prevent a decline，no more—and no less—than a change in public opinion is necessary； and public opinion can be influenced at all times by ideas and ideologies.[432]

此外，正如人们并不是注定要盲目地走向自我毁灭一样，他们也必定不对对预见到的经济衰退保持被动和无能为力。相反，在任何时候，我们都可以有计划地扩大可控范围，从而纠正错误。因为在经济一体化和联合的过程中，任何制度化的越轨行为——如政府征用、税收、货币贬值或贸易限制——都必须得到大多数公众的认可。无论公众舆论多么不情愿，如果没有这种支持，这些措施都不可能继续实施。因此，为了防止衰退，除了改变公众舆论之外，别无其他选择；而公众舆论在任何时候都会受到思想和意识形态的影响。

Ironically，an unconscious economic decline is only possible if the majority of the public follows Hayek’s advice to act “spontaneously”—with out really knowing why—and free of “the extreme hubris of knowing the direction of progress.” one cannot act entirely without consciousness，of course.Yet in accordance with Hayek’s recommendation one pays attention exclusively to the direct and immediate causes and consequences of one’s actions and wealth.In contrast，knowledge and ideas regarding any indirect，to the naked eye invisible，causes and consequences are considered unimportant，arbitrary or even illusory。one participates routinely in the division of labor because one recognizes its direct advantage； and one recognizes the direct harm of taxes，currency depreciations and trade restrictions.However，one does not recognize that by participating in the division of labor，one at the same time indirectly advances the welfare of all other market participants literally to the last corner of the earth，and indeed that the higher the personal profit，the greater one’s contribution to the public good.Nor does one recognize that the direct harm done through government intervention to others，whether in the immediate neighborhood or at the other end of the world，always indirectly diminishes one’s own standard of living。Yet this ignorance has fatal consequences； for he who does not understand the indirect causes and consequences of his actions acts differently。He will either act as if the economic advantage or disadvantage of one person has nothing to do with that of another—and he will accordingly remain neutral or indifferent toward all government intervention which is directed against others.Or he may even act in the belief that one person’s gain can be another’s loss； and then he may even welcome government expropriation，taxes，currency devaluations or trade restrictions as means of bringing “restitution” to “unfair” losers （preferably oneself and one’s own kind）。As long as this intellectual attitude prevails in public opinion，a steady increase in government expropriation，taxes，inflation and trade restrictions，and the subsequent continuous economic decline，is indeed unavoidable.

具有讽刺意味的是，只有当大多数公众听从哈耶克的建议，”自发地 “行动——在不知道为什么的情况下——并且摆脱 “知道进步方向的极端自负”时，无意识的经济衰退才有可能发生。当然，一个人不可能完全无意识地行动。然而，根据哈耶克的建议，人们只会关注自己行动和财富的直接的和即时的原因和后果。与此相反，关于任何间接的、肉眼看不见的原因和后果的知识和观念都被认为是不重要的、武断的甚至是虚幻的。人们经常参与分工，因为人们认识到劳动分工的直接好处；人们认识到税收、货币贬值和贸易限制的直接危害。然而，人们并没有认识到，通过参与劳动分工，人们同时也间接地促进了所有其他市场参与者的福利，甚至延伸到地球的最后一个角落，事实上，个人利润越高，对公共利益的贡献就越大。人们也不会认识到，通过政府干预对他人造成的直接伤害，无论是近邻还是在世界的另一端，总是间接地降低了自己的生活水平。然而，这种无知会带来致命的后果；因为不了解自己行动的间接原因和后果的人，会采取不同的行动。他要么会表现得好像一个人的经济优势或劣势与另一个人的经济优势或劣势毫无关系——因此，他将对所有政府针对他人的一切干预保持中立或无动于衷。或者，他甚至会认为，一人之所得是另一人之所失；然后，他甚至会欢迎政府征用、征税、货币贬值或贸易限制，以此作为对 “遭受不公 “之损失者（最好是自己和自己的同类）进行 “补偿 “的手段。只要这种思想态度在公众舆论中占据主导地位，政府征用、税收、通货膨胀和贸易限制的持续增加，以及随之而来的经济持续衰退，确实是不可避免的。

However，Hayek’s advice is false and nonsensical。It is impossible to act unconsciously or knowingly to be ignorant。And even if the indirect social causes and consequences of one’s actions are unknown，they are still—with some delay and however mediated—effective.Thus，to know them is always and for everyone advantageous.The only beneficiary of Hayek’s recommendation to the contrary is government。only the representatives of state and government can have a personal interest in spreading a Hayekian consciousness （while they themselves recognize it as a “false consciousness”），because visàvis an ignorant public it becomes easier for government to grow.Yet the public at large outside the state apparatus has no interest in entertaining a false consciousness （and thus know less than its government）。It is personally advantageous to let one’s actions be guided by correct ideas，and accordingly one is always receptive to ideological enlightenment。knowledge is better than ignorance.And because it is better，it is at the same time infectious.However，as soon as the public is enlightened and a majority of it recognizes that everyone’s participation in an exchange economy simultaneously benefits all other market participants，and that every government intervention in the network of bilateral exchange relations，regardless where and against whom，represents an attack on one’s own wealth，an economic decline is no longer unavoidable.on the contrary，rather than remaining indifferent or even welcoming government intervention，the public will be unsupportive or even hostile to them.In such a climate of public opinion，instead of economic decline，a process of conscious social rationalization and continuously advancing economic integration will result。

然而，哈耶克的建议是错误的、无意义的。不可能无意识地行动，也不可能有意识地无知。而且，即使个人行动间接的社会因果是未知的，但它们仍然是有效的，并且无论如何调解，都会有一定的延迟。因此，了解它们对每个人都是有利的。哈耶克相反建议的唯一受益者是政府。只有国家和政府的代表对传播哈耶克意识有个人兴趣（他们自己也承认这是一种 “虚假意识”），因为相对于无知的公众，政府更容易发展壮大。然而，国家机器之外的广大公众对接受虚假意识毫无兴趣（因此比政府知道得更少）。让正确的观念指导自己的行动，对个人是有利的，因此人们总是乐于接受思想启迪。知识胜于无知。正因为它优于无知，所以它同时也具有感染力。然而，一旦公众受到启迪，其中大多数人认识到，每个人参与交换经济都会同时惠及所有其他市场参与者，而政府对双边交换关系网络的每一次干预，无论在哪里、针对谁，都是对自身财富的损害，经济衰退就不再不可避免。相反，公众不仅不会对政府的干预无动于衷，更加不会持欢迎的态度，反而会对政府的干预持不支持甚至敌视的态度。在这样的舆论环境下，经济非但不会衰退，反而会形成一个自觉的社会合理化和不断推进经济一体化的过程。

CULTURAL SEleCTIon

IX. 文化选择

According to Hayek，however，progress has nothing to do with enlightenment。As little as one is capable of recognizing the reasons for an economic decline，is progress due to insight。Just as one tumbles unconsciously and powerlessly into the abyss，so one stumbles blindly forward.It is not true or false ideas that determine the course of social evolution，but mystic fate.Progress occurs naturally，without any insight of the participating individuals，as one group with coincidentally better practices somehow “prevails” over another with worse practices.

然而，哈耶克认为，进步与启蒙无关。正如一个人很少能够认识到经济衰退的原因，进步也非源于洞见。正如一个人无意识地、无可奈何地跌入深渊，一个人也会盲目地蹒跚前行。决定社会演化进程的不是正误观念，而是神秘的命运。进步是自然而然的，不需要参与其中的个人有任何洞见，因为一个碰巧有更好实践的群体以某种方式“战胜”了另一个有更坏实践的群体。

Apart from the fact that this theory is incompatible with Hayek’s own repeated observation that cultural evolution proceeds faster than biological evolution，[433] it is false for two reasons.First，the theory contains assumptions，which make it inapplicable to human societies.Second，when it is nonetheless applied to them，the theory turns out empty and Hayek again reveals himself—intentionally or unintentionally—as a state apologist。

除了这一理论与哈耶克本人反复强调的文化演化快于生物演化的观点不符之外，它之所以是错误的还有两个原因。首先，该理论包含的假设使其不适用于人类社会。其次，当该理论被应用于人类社会时，其结果是空洞的，哈耶克再次有意无意地暴露了自己是一个国家辩护士。

To make his theory work，Hayek first must assume the existence of separated groups.Hayek introduces this assumption when he alleges that a new “spontaneous” practice will be blindly imitated within a group，but not （why not？） outside of it。If the practice were imitated universally and if，accordingly，there existed only one single group，cultural group selection would by definition be impossible.without some sort of competitor there can be no selection.Moreover，without selection，the concept of progress can no longer be employed meaningfully。All that can be stated regarding a “spontaneously”—without purpose or reason—generated and spontaneously universalized practice is this：that as long as it is practiced，it has not yet died out。

为了使他的理论行之有效，哈耶克首先必须假设存在分离的群体。当哈耶克宣称一种新的“自发”的做法会在一个群体内部被盲目模仿，而在群体之外却不会（为什么不呢？）时，他引入了这一假设。如果这种做法被普遍模仿，而且只有一个单一的群体存在，那么文化群体选择从定义上来说就是不可能的。没有竞争者，就没有选择。此外，没有选择，进步的概念就不再有意义。关于一种“自发地”——没有目的或理由——产生的、自发地普遍化的实践做法，我们所能说的就是：只要它被实践，它就还没有消亡。

However，the assumption of separated groups，which Hayek must introduce in order to rescue the concept of cultural progress （within his antirationalist theory of action and society），immediately produces a series of insurmountable problems for his theory。First，it follows that Hayek’s theory cannot be applied to the present。The present world is characterized by the fact that the practices of original appropriation and property，of capital goods production，exchange and monetary calculation are universally disseminated—no group in which these practices are completely unknown and absent exists—and that all of mankind is connected through a network of bilateral exchanges.In this regard，mankind is a single group.Whatever competition between different groups may then exist can have no relevance for these universal practices.Universal practices lie—as a constant—out side of any selection mechanism； and according to Hayek’s theory，no more could then be said for the justification of original appropriation，capital goods production，or division of labor and exchange than that such practices have not yet died out。

然而，哈耶克为了挽救文化进步的概念（在其反理性主义的行动与社会理论中），必须引入分离群体的假设，这立即给他的理论带来了一系列难以克服的问题。首先，哈耶克的理论无法适用于当下。当今世界的特点是，先占和财产、资本商品生产、交换和货币计算的做法普遍存在——没有一个群体是完全不知道或不存在这些做法的——全人类通过双边交换网络联系在一起。在这方面，人类是一个单一的群体。不同群体之间可能存在的任何竞争都与这些普遍做法无关。普遍的做法是——作为任何选择机制的不变的一面；根据哈耶克的理论，对于先占，资本品生产，或劳动分工和交换的正当性，除了这些做法尚未消亡之外，再无其他可言。

Hayek’s theory is also inapplicable to premodern or primitive societies.At this stage in human history，isolated groups existed.Yet even then，the practices of appropriation，production and exchange were universal。There existed no tribe，however primitive，that did not know and practice them.This fact does not cause any problems for a theory of action and society，which recognizes these practices as the result of rational，utilitymaximizing action.For such a theory，the fact is easily explainable：Each group comes to recognize independently the very same，universally valid rules.But for Hayek，this elementary fact constitutes a fundamental theoretical problem.For if appropriation，production，exchange and money are the result of spontaneous mutation，blind imitation，infection or mechanical trans mission，as Hayek claims，it becomes inexplicable—except by reference to chance—why each group，in complete isolation from all others，should come up with the exact same patterns of action.Following Hayek’s theory one should expect instead that mankind，at least at its beginnings，would have generated a variety of very different action and society mutants.In fact，if Hayek were correct，one would have to assume that in the beginning of mankind people would have adopted the practice of not appropriating，not producing and not exchanging as frequently as they adopted the opposite.Since this is obviously not the case Hayek would have to explain this anomaly。once he identified the obvious reason for this fact，however，that the adoption of the former practice leads to immediate death，[434] while the latter is an indispensable means for survival—he would have to acknowledge the existence of human rationality and contradict his own theory。

哈耶克的理论也不适用于前现代或原始社会。在人类历史的这一阶段，存在着孤立的群体。然而，即使在那个时候，占有、生产和交换的做法也是普遍存在的。没有一个部落，无论多么原始，不知道也不实践这些做法。这一事实并没有给行动和社会理论带来任何问题，该理论认为这些做法是理性的、效用最大化的行动的结果。对于这种理论来说，这一事实很容易解释：每个群体都会独立地认识到相同的、普遍有效的规则。但对哈耶克来说，这一基本事实构成了一个根本性的理论问题。因为，如果像哈耶克所说的那样，占有、生产、交换和货币是自发变异、盲目模仿、感染或机械传播的结果，那么，除了偶然性之外，就无法解释为什么每个群体在与其他群体完全隔离的情况下，会产生完全相同的行动模式。按照哈耶克的理论，我们应该想到，人类至少在其诞生之初，就已经产生了各种截然不同的行动和社会变种。事实上，如果哈耶克的理论是正确的，那么我们就必须假定，在人类起源之初，人们会采取不占有、不生产和不交换的做法，就像他们采取相反的做法一样频繁。既然事实显然并非如此，哈耶克必须对这一反常现象做出解释。一旦他发现了这一事实的明显原因，无论如何，即采用前一种做法会导致立即死亡，而采用后一种做法则是不可或缺的生存手段，他就不得不承认人类理性的存在，并与他自己的理论相矛盾。

Secondly，even regarding isolated groups Hayek’s theory of cultural group selection cannot explain how unconscious cultural progress could be possible.（His explanation of the concept of “prevailing” is accordingly vague.） Isolated groups—and even more so，groups connected by trade—do not compete against each other。The assumption，familiar from the theory of biological evolution，that different organisms are engaged in a zerosum competition for naturally limited resources cannot be applied to human societies，and hence any attempt to conclude backward from the survival of a phenomenon to its better adaptation （as it is，within limits，possible in biology） fails here.A group of persons isolated from all others，which follows the practices of appropriation，capital goods production and exchange does not thereby reduce the supply of goods of other groups.It enhances its own wealth without diminishing that of others.If it begins to trade with other groups，it even increases their wealth.between human groups，it is not competition，but selfreliant independence or mutually advantageous coop eration that exists.A mechanism of cultural selection thus cannot become effective here.[435]

其次，即使对于孤立的群体，哈耶克的文化群体选择理论也无法解释无意识的文化进步是如何可能的。（他对 “胜出 “概念的解释也相应地模糊）。孤立的群体——更有甚者，通过贸易联系在一起的群体——不会相互竞争。从生物演化理论中熟悉的假设，即不同的生物体对自然界有限的资源进行零和竞争，不能适用于人类社会，因此，任何试图从一种现象的生存倒推出其更好的适应性的结论（正如在有限范围内，在生物学中是可能的），在这里都是失败的。与所有其他群体隔绝的一个群体，如果遵循占有、资本品生产和交换的做法，并不会因此减少其他群体的商品供应。它增加了自己的财富，却没有减少其他群体的财富。如果它开始与其他群体进行贸易交换，它甚至会增加他们的财富。在人类群体之间，存在的不是零和竞争，而是自力更生的孤立或互利的合作。因此，文化选择机制在这里无法发挥作用。

Hayek，in his selfmade theoretical difficulties，nonetheless indicates several possibilities.“Prevailing” means either that one group becomes wealthier than another，that it displays a comparatively higher population growth，or that it militarily defeats and assimilates another one.Apart from the fact that these criteria are mutually incompatible—what is the case，for instance，if a more populous group is militarily defeated by a less populous one？—they all fail to explain progress.The apparently most plausible criterion—wealth—fails because the existence of groups with different wealth has no relevance for their survival or extinction.Two groups practice appropriation，production and exchange independently of each other。However， the members of both groups are neither biologically identical，nor is external nature （land） for both groups the same.From this it follows that the results of their actions—their wealth—will be different as well。This is the case for groups and individuals.For individuals，too，it holds that through the application of one and the same practice of appropriation，production and exchange，different wealth results.But then the inference from “greater wealth” to “better culture” is illegitimate.The richer person does not represent a better culture，and the poorer a worse one，but on the basis of one and the same culture one person becomes comparatively wealthier than another。Accordingly，no selection takes place.both rich and poor coexist—while as a result of their shared culture，the absolute wealth of rich and poor alike increases.

然而，哈耶克在其自创的理论难题中指出了几种可能性。所谓 “胜出”，要么是指一个群体比另一个群体富裕，要么是指一个群体的人口增长相对较快，要么是指一个群体在军事上打败并同化了另一个群体。除了这些标准互不相容这一事实之外——例如，如果一个人口较多的群体在军事上被一个人口较少的群体打败，情况会怎样？——它们都无法解释进步的原因。表面上看似最合理的标准——财富——失效了，因为财富不同的群体的存在与他们的生存或消亡无关。两个群体各自独立地进行占有、生产和交换。然而，两个群体的成员在生物学上并不完全相同，两个群体的外部自然（土地）也不相同。由此可见，他们行动的结果——他们的财富——也是不同的。群体和个人的情况都是如此。就个人而言，也是如此，它认为，通过采用相同的占有、生产和交换方式，会产生不同的财富。但是，从 “更多的财富 “到 “更好的文化 “的推论是不合法的。更富有的人并不代表更好的文化，更贫穷的人也不代表更差的文化，而是在同一种文化的基础上，一个人变得比另一个人相对更富有。因此，不存在选择。富人和穷人共存，同时由于他们的共同文化，富人和穷人的绝对财富都在增加。

Likewise，population size fails as a criterion for cultural selection.Group size，too，implies nothing concerning “better culture.” Everything that holds for individuals applies to groups as well。From the fact that a person has no biological offspring，it does not follow that he followed other worse practices while he was alive.Rather，different individuals acting on the basis of the same rules produce different numbers of offspring。Just as poor to rich，the childless does not stand in competition to those with children.They exist independently of one another or they cooperate with one another。And even if a group should become literally extinct or if an individual committed suicide，this still would not imply any cultural selection.For the surviving follow the very same rules of appropriation，production and exchange which the extinct followed while they were alive.

同样，人口规模也不能作为文化选择的标准。群体规模也并不能说明什么是 “更好的文化”。适用于个人的一切也适用于群体。从一个人没有亲生后代的事实中，并不能推断出他在世时遵循了其他更糟糕的做法。相反，根据相同规则行事的不同个体会繁衍不同数量的后代。正如穷人对富人一样，没有孩子的人并不与有孩子的人竞争。他们或独立存在，或相互合作。即使一个群体真的灭绝了，或者一个人自杀了，这也并不意味着任何文化选择。因为幸存下来的人所遵循的占有、生产和交换规则与灭绝者在世时遵循的规则完全相同。

The third criterion，the military conquest，succeeds in bringing groups out of a state of isolated independence or cooperation into one of zerosum competition.However，military success no more represents moral progress than a murder indicates the moral superiority of the murderer over his victim.Moreover，the occurrence of a conquest （or of a murder） does not affect the validity of universal rules，i.e.，those that neither the murderer nor the murdered can do without：In order to introduce a military conflict between groups，Hayek must first make the assumption that in at least one of these groups a new practice spontaneously springs up.Rather than following the practices of original appropriation，capital goods production and exchange，someone must have come up with the idea that one can also increase one’s personal wealth by forcibly expropriating appropriators，producers and exchangers.However，as soon as this practice is then，according to Hayek’s theory，blindly imitated by all other group members，a war of each against all would ensue.There would soon be nothing left that could still be expropriated，and all group members would die out—not because of a mechanism of cultural displacement or selection，but because of their own stupidity! Every person can independently appropriate，produce and exchange，but not everyone can expropriate appropriators，producers and exchangers.In order for expropriations to be possible，there must be people who continue to follow the practice of appropriation，production and exchange.The existence of a culture of expropriation requires the continued existence of a culture of appropriation，production and exchange.The former stands in a parasitic relationship to the latter。Then，however，military conquest cannot generate cultural progress.The conquerors do not repre sent a fundamentally different culture.Among themselves the conquerors must follow the same practice of appropriation，production and exchange，which was also followed by the conquered.And after the successful con quest，the conquerors must return to these traditional practices—either because all the conquered have died out or all booty has been consumed，or because one wishes to institutionalize one’s practice of expropriation and therefore needs an ongoing productive population （of conquered people）。

第三条标准，军事征服，成功地将各群体从孤立的独立或合作状态带入零和竞争状态。然而，军事上的成功并不代表道德上的进步，就像一桩谋杀案并不代表凶手在道德上优于受害者一样。此外，征服（或谋杀）的发生并不影响普遍规则的有效性，即那些谋杀者和被谋杀者都不能不遵守的规则：为了引入群体间的军事冲突，哈耶克必须首先假设，在这些群体中，至少有一个群体自发地产生了新的习俗做法。与其遵循先占、资本品生产和交换的做法，不如说是有人想出了一个主意，即通过强行剥夺、征用先占者、生产者和交换者，也可以增加个人财富。然而，根据哈耶克的理论，一旦这种做法被其他所有群体成员盲目效仿，一场彼此对抗的战争就会随之而来。很快就会没有什么东西还能被征用，所有群体成员都会死亡——不是因为文化迭代或选择机制，而是因为他们自身的愚蠢！每个人都可以独立地占有、生产和交换，但不是每个人都可以剥夺占有者、生产者和交换者。为了使征用、剥夺成为可能，必须有人继续遵循占有、生产和交换的做法。剥夺文化的存在需要占有、生产和交换文化的继续存在。前者寄生于后者。因此，无论如何，军事征服并不能带来文化进步。征服者并不代表一种根本不同的文化。征服者之间必须遵循被征服者同样遵循的占有、生产和交换的习俗做法。征服成功后，征服者必须恢复这些传统做法——要么是因为所有被征服者都已灭绝，要么是因为所有战利品都已消耗殆尽，要么是因为人们希望将自己的征用剥夺制度化，因此需要能够持续生产的人口（被征服者）。

However，as soon as Hayek’s theory is applied to this only conceivable case of cultural competition （rather than of independence or cooperation） in which a subgroup （the conquerors） follows a parasitic culture of expropriation while the rest of the group （the conquered） simultaneously appropriates，produces and exchanges，the result is an unabashed apology for government and state.

然而，一旦将哈耶克的理论应用于这种唯一可以想象的文化竞争（而非独立或合作）的情况，即一个亚群体（征服者）遵循一种征用剥夺的寄生文化，而群体的其他部分（被征服者）同时遵循占有、生产和交换，结果就是对政府和国家毫不掩饰的辩护。

This manifests itself first in the way in which Hayek’s theory explains the origin of a culture of expropriation.Just as the culture of appropriation，production and exchange is allegedly the result of an accidental mutation，so the practice of expropriation represents a “spontaneous” development。Just as appropriators，producers and exchangers do not understand the meaning of their activities，so the conquerors do not grasp the meaning of conquest。As appropriator’s，producers and exchangers recognize the immediate personal advantage of their activities，so the conquerors can recognize their personal gain from acts of expropriation.Yet as the participants in a market economy are then not capable of understanding that through their activities the wealth of all other participants is simultaneously increased，so the conquerors cannot know that through expropriations the wealth of the expropriated is reduced.Put bluntly：A group of murderers，robbers or slave hunters does not know that the murdered，robbed or enslaved suffer thereby from a loss.They follow their practices as innocently as the murdered，robbed and enslaved follow their different practices of appropriation，production and exchange.Expropriation，taxes or trade restrictions are just as much an expression of human spontaneity as are appropriation，production and trade.Every group of conquerors will thank Hayek for so much （mis）understanding!

这首先体现在哈耶克理论对征用剥夺文化起源的解释上。正如占有、生产和交换的文化据称是偶然变异的结果一样，征用剥夺的做法也是一种 “自发 “的发展。正如占有者、生产者和交换者不理解其活动的意义，征服者也不理解征服的意义。正如占有者、生产者和交换者认识到他们的活动能给他们带来直接的个人利益，征服者也能认识到他们从征用剥夺行为中获得的个人利益。然而，正如市场经济的参与者无法理解，通过他们的活动，所有其他参与者的财富会同时增加，征服者也无法理解，通过征收剥夺，被剥夺者的财富会减少。说白了就是：一群杀人犯、强盗或猎奴者并不知道被谋杀、被抢劫或被奴役的人因此蒙受了损失。他们就像被谋杀、被抢劫和被奴役的人一样，天真无邪地遵循着他们不同的占有、生产和交换方式。征用剥夺、税收或贸易限制与占有、生产和贸易一样，都是人类自发性的表现。每一群征服者都会因为对哈耶克的（错误）理解而对他感激不尽！

Second，Hayek’s theory fails just as lamentably in its attempt to explain the rise and fall of historical civilizations—and thereby once again yields absurd statist implications.Indeed，what more could a group of conquerors want to hear than that its own actions have nothing to do with the rise and decline of civilizations？ Yet it is precisely this that Hayek’s theory implies：For，according to Hayek，cultural progress is only possible，as long as one culture can somehow “prevail” over another。regarding the relation ship between a basic culture of appropriation and a parasitic subculture of expropriation，however，there can be no “prevailing。” The parasitic culture cannot prevail，yet as a subculture it can continue to operate as long as a basic culture of appropriation exists.Progress through group selection is impossible within this relationship； and according to Hayek，then，strictly speaking nothing can be stated at all regarding the further course of social evolution.because the members of the culture of appropriation supposedly do not comprehend that they promote the social welfare through their actions，and because the members of the expropriation culture are equally ignorant of the fact that their actions reduce the general welfare，spontaneous changes in the relative magnitude of both cultures may occur。Some times the culture of appropriation will attract more spontaneous adherents； at other times the culture of expropriation will。However，since there is no reason that such spontaneous changes，if they occur at all，should follow any specific，predictable，pattern，there is also no recognizable relationship between spontaneous cultural changes and the rise and fall of civilizations.Everything is chance.No explanation for the rise and the fall of the Roman civilization exists.Likewise，no comprehensible reason for the rise of Western Europe or the United States exists.such a rise could just as well have happened elsewhere—in india or Africa.Accordingly，it would be “extreme hubris，” for instance，to advise india or Africa from the standpoint of Western Europe； for this would imply—oh，how presumptuous—that one knew the direction of progress.

其次，哈耶克的理论在试图解释历史文明的兴衰方面同样令人遗憾地失败了，从而再次产生了荒谬的国家主义暗示。事实上，除了自己的行动与文明的兴衰无关之外，一群征服者还想听到什么呢？然而，哈耶克的理论恰恰暗示了这一点：因为，按照哈耶克的说法，只有一种文化能够以某种方式 “战胜 “另一种文化，文化进步才是可能的。然而，关于基本的占有文化与寄生的征用亚文化之间的关系，不可能有 “胜出”。寄生文化不可能胜出，但作为一种亚文化，只要基本的占有文化存在，它就可以继续运作。在这种关系中，通过群体选择取得进步是不可能的；而根据哈耶克的观点，严格地说，关于社会演化的进一步进程，根本就无话可说的。由于占有文化的成员不知道他们的行动促进了社会福利，而征用文化的成员同样不知道他们的行动减少了普遍福利，因此两种文化的相对规模可能会发生自发的变化。有时，占有文化会吸引更多的自发拥护者；有时，征用文化会吸引更多的自发拥护者。然而，既然这种自发的变化即使发生，也没有理由遵循任何特定的、可预测的模式，那么自发的文化变化与文明的兴衰之间也就没有可识别的关系。一切皆偶然。罗马文明的兴衰无法解释。同样，西欧和美国的崛起也没有任何可以理解的原因。这种崛起也可能发生在其他地方——印度或非洲。因此，举个例子，从西欧的角度向印度或非洲提出建议是 “极端狂妄 “的，因为这意味着——哦，多么自以为是——一个人居然知道进步的方向。

If this theory is rejected as empty，however，and it is pointed out that from the very description of the initial situation—the coexistence of a basic culture of appropriation and a parasitic subculture of expropriation—a fundamental law of social evolution follows，Hayek’s entire anti rationalist System once again breaks down.A relative expansion of the basic culture leads to higher social wealth and is the reason for the rise of civilizations； and a relative expansion of the parasitic subculture leads to lower wealth and is responsible for the fall of civilizations.Yet if one （any one） has grasped this plain and elementary relationship，then the origin and the relative changes in the magnitudes of both cultures can no longer be interpreted as a natural process.The explanation，familiar from biology，of a natural，selfregulated equilibration process—of spontaneously growing parasites，a weakening of the host，a consequent shrinking number of parasites，and finally the host’s recovery，etc。—cannot be applied to a situation where host and/or parasite are consciously aware of their respective roles as well as the relationship between them and are capable of choosing between these roles.A comprehended social evolution is no longer natural，but rational。So long as only the members of the parasitic culture understand the nature of the relationship，instead of a natural up and down of both cultures，a planned，steady growth of parasitism will ensue.The members of the parasitic subculture do not vacillate between first faring absolutely better and then absolutely worse.Rather，because of their insight into the relationship between the culture of appropriation and that of expropriation they can act in such a way—by not expanding their practices spontaneously，but instead consciously restraining them selves—that their own absolute wealth will always grow （or at least will never fall）。on the other hand，to the extent that the members of the basic culture understand the nature of the relationship between both cultures，not only the absolute wealth of the subculture will be threatened but its sheer existence will be endangered.For the members of a parasitic subculture always represent only a minority of the whole group.one hundred parasites can lead a comfortable life on the products of 1，000 hosts.Yet 1，000 parasites cannot live off 100 hosts.If，however，the members of the productive culture of appropriation always represent a majority of the population，then in the long run the greater physical strength is on their side as well。They can always physically defeat and destroy the parasites，and the continued existence of a subculture of appropriation is then not explained by its greater physicalmilitary power，but rather depends exclusively on the power of ideas.Government and state must find ideological support，which reaches far into the exploited population.without such support from the members of the basic culture，even the most brutal and seemingly invincible government immediately collapses （as most recently illustrated dramatically by the fall of the Soviet Union and the Communist governments of Eastern Europe）。

如果这一理论被视为空洞的理论而遭到否定，无论如何，如果有人指出，从对初始状况的描述——占有的基本文化和征用的寄生亚文化的共存——就可以得出社会演化的基本规律，那么哈耶克的整个反理性主义体系就会再次瓦解。基本文化的相对扩张导致社会财富的增加，是文明兴起的原因；而寄生亚文化的相对扩张导致财富的减少，是文明衰落的原因。然而，如果一个人（任何一个人）掌握了这一朴素而基本的关系，那么两种文化的起源和量级的相对变化就不能再被解释为一个自然过程了。生物学中常见的解释，即自然的、自我调节的平衡过程——寄生虫自发增长，宿主衰弱，寄生虫数量随之减少，最后宿主恢复等——无法适用于宿主和/或寄生虫有意识地意识到各自的角色以及它们之间的关系，并能够在这些角色之间做出选择的情况。被理解的社会演化不再是自然的，而是理性的。只要仅仅只有寄生文化的成员理解这种关系的本质，而不是两种文化的自然起起落落，一种有计划的、稳定的寄生的增长就会随之而来。寄生亚文化的成员不会在先好后坏之间徘徊。相反，由于他们对占有文化和征用文化之间关系的洞察力，他们的行为方式-——不是自发地扩大自己的做法，而是有意识地约束自己——使得他们自己的绝对财富始终保持增长（或至少不会下降）。另一方面，当基本文化的成员了解到两种文化之间关系的本质时，不仅亚文化的绝对财富会受到威胁，而且其存在也会受到威胁。因为寄生亚文化的成员永远只是整个群体中的少数。一百个寄生虫可以依靠一千个寄主的产品过上舒适的生活。可是1000 只寄生虫却无法依靠 100 只寄主生活。然而，如果生产性占有文化的成员总是占人口的大多数，那么从长远来看，更强大的力量也在他们一边。他们总能从物理上打败并消灭寄生虫，而占有亚文化的持续存在就不是因为它有更强的有形的军事力量，而是完全取决于思想观念的力量。政府和国家必须找到意识形态的支持，这种支持要深入到被剥削的人群当中。如果没有基本文化成员的这种支持，即使是最残暴、看似不可战胜的政府也会立即垮台（苏联和东欧共产主义政府的垮台就是最近的力证）。

The changes in the relative magnitude of the basic culture and the parasitic subculture that explain the rise and fall of civilizations are in turn explained by ideological changes.They do not occur spontaneously but are the result of conscious ideas and their dissemination.In a society in which a majority of the basic culture comprehends that each act of appropriation，production and exchange enhances the welfare of all other market participants，and that each act of expropriation，taxation or trade restriction instead，regardless against whom it is directed，lowers the welfare of all others，the parasitic culture of government and state will continuously die off and a rise of civilization will ensue.on the other hand，in a society，in which the majority of the basic culture does not understand the nature and relationship between basic and subculture，the parasitic expropriation culture will grow and with this a decline of civilization will ensue.[436]

解释文明兴衰的基本文化和寄生亚文化之间相对规模的变化，反过来又可以用意识形态的变化来解释。它们不是自发产生的，而是有意识的思想观念及其传播的结果。在一个社会中，如果大多数人的基本文化都能理解，每一种占有、生产和交换的行为，都会提高所有其他市场参与者的福利，而每一种征用剥夺、征税或贸易限制，无论针对的是谁，都会降低所有其他人的福利，那么政府和国家的寄生文化就会不断消亡，文明就会随之崛起。另一方面，在一个社会中，如果基础文化中的大多数人不了解基础文化与亚文化之间的性质和关系，那么寄生性的征用文化就会发展壮大，随之而来的就是文明的衰落。

Hayek，who wants to ban ideas and rationality from the explanation of history，must deny all this.Yet in proposing his own theory of unconscious cultural group selection，he too affirms the existence and effectiveness of ideas，and he too acknowledges—whether he is aware of this or not—that the course of social evolution is determined by ideas and their adoption.Hayek produces ideas and wants to influence the course of human history through ideas，too。However，Hayek’s ideas are false； and their proliferation would lead to the eclipse of Western civilization.

哈耶克想把思想观念和理性排除在历史解释之外，他必须否认这一切。然而，在提出他自己的无意识文化群体选择理论时，他也肯定了思想的存在和有效性，他也承认——不管他是否意识到——社会演化的进程是由思想观念及其采纳决定的。哈耶克制造观念，并希望通过观念影响人类历史的进程。然而，哈耶克的思想观念是错误的，它们的泛滥会导致西方文明的衰落。

conclusion

X. 结论

Friedrich Hayek is today acclaimed as one of the most important theoreti cians of the market economy and of classical liberalism.Far more than his earlier work in the field of economic theory，his later writings on political philosophy and social theory have contributed to his fame.It is these later writings that currently support and feed an extended，international Hayek dissertation industry。

今天，弗里德里希·哈耶克（Friedrich Hayek）被誉为市场经济和古典自由主义最重要的理论家之一。与他早期在经济理论领域的工作相比，他后来在政治哲学和社会理论方面的著作为他赢得了更多声誉。目前，正是这些晚期著作支撑和滋养了一个庞大的、国际性的哈耶克论文产业。

The preceding investigations demonstrate that Hayek’s excursions into the field of political and social theory must be considered a complete failure.Hayek begins with a selfcontradictory proposition and ends in absurdity：He denies the existence of human rationality or at least the possibility of rec ognizing all indirect causes and consequences of human action.He claims that the course of social evolution and the rise and fall of civilizations is incomprehensible，and that no one knows the direction of progress （only to explain progress then as the result of some unconscious process of cultural group selection）。He claims that no universally valid ethical standards exist，and that it is impossible to make an unambiguous moral distinction between an attack and a defense or between a peaceful refusal of exchange and a physically coerced exchange.And lastly，he claims that government— whose causes and consequences allegedly are as incomprehensible as those of the market—should take on （financed by taxes） all those tasks which the market does not provide （which anywhere outside of the Garden of Eden amounts to an infinite number of tasks）。

前面的研究表明，哈耶克在政治和社会理论领域的探索必须被视为彻底的失败。哈耶克以一个自相矛盾的命题开始，以荒谬结束：他否认人类理性的存在，或者至少否认人认识自身行动的所有间接原因和后果的可能性。他声称，社会演化和文明兴衰的过程是不可理解的，没有人知道进步的方向（只能把当时的进步解释为某种无意识的文化群体选择过程的结果）。他声称，不存在普遍有效的伦理标准，也不可能在攻击和自卫之间，或在和平拒绝交换和实际胁迫交换之间做出明确的道德区分。最后，他声称，政府——据称其原因和结果与市场一样难以理解——应该（通过税收资助）承担市场无法提供的所有任务（在伊甸园之外的任何地方，这都是无穷无尽的任务）。

Our investigations support the suspicion that Hayek’s fame has little to do with his importance as a social theorist，but rather with the fact that his theory poses no threat whatsoever to the currently dominating statist ideology of social democracy，and that a theory which is marked by contradiction， confusion and vagueness provides an unlimited reservoir for hermeneutical endeavors.

我们的研究证实了这样一种怀疑，即哈耶克的名气与其作为社会理论家的重要性无关，而是因为他的理论对目前占主导地位的社会民主主义国家主义意识形态没有构成任何威胁，而且一个充满矛盾、混乱和模糊的理论为诠释学的努力提供了一个无限的宝库。

He who searches for a champion of the market economy and of liberalism must look elsewhere.But he must look no farther than to Hayek’s teacher and mentor：the great and unsurpassed Ludwig von Mises.

寻找市场经济和自由主义捍卫者的人必须另觅他人。他必须把目光投向哈耶克的老师和导师：伟大而无与伦比的路德维希·冯·米塞斯。

24 The Western State as a Paradigm：learning from History

24 作为范例的西方国家：以史为鉴 *

If one decides to write on what to learn from the history of Western states，one must be convinced that there is something to be learned； and if one holds this to be the case，then one must reject two alternative views：the so called Whig theory of history and historicism.[437]

如果一个人决定撰写关于从西方国家的历史中学到什么的文章，他就必须确信有值得学习的东西；如果他认为这是事实，那么他就必须摒弃两种观点：所谓的辉格历史理论和历史决定论。

According to the Whig theory of history，mankind marches continuously forward.Human history is the record of progress.better ideas replace worse ones； still better ideas come along later； and so on，forever。If this is the case，nothing can be learned from history。All one can do is first identify the most progressive society and then imitate its rules and institutions.Pursuant to the Whig theory，the people of Eastern Europe and the Third World can do no better than to imitate the Western European and U.S.democratic welfare states.There is no need for anyone to study the distant past because，by assumption，no mistakes have ever occurred in history。Whatever happened later was an improvement on what occurred earlier； hence，there is never any reason to study anything but the most progressive society’s recent past，the most progressive of all ages.

按照辉格史观，人类不断向前发展。人类历史就是进步的记录。更好的思想取代了更差的思想，后来又出现了更好的思想，如此循环往复，直至永远。如果是这样的话，就无法从历史中吸取教训。我们所能做的就是首先找出最进步的社会，然后模仿其规则和制度。根据辉格理论，东欧和第三世界的人民只能模仿西欧和美国的民主福利国家。任何人都没有必要研究遥远的过去，因为根据假设，历史上从未发生过错误。后来发生的事情都是对之前发生的事情的改进；因此，除了研究最进步的社会的近期历史，即所有时代中最进步的历史之外，没有任何理由研究其他任何事情。

According to historicism，there is no such thing as a moral “right” or “wrong，” and all ethical judgments are subjective.Moreover，with the possible exception of the laws of logic，mathematics，and the natural sciences，no universal positive laws exist。Economics and sociology are only history，a chronicle of past actions and events，with no more to be learned from it than that “this is the way it was.”

根据历史决定论，不存在道德上的“对”或“错”，所有的伦理判断都是主观的。此外，除了逻辑、数学和自然科学的规律之外，不存在普遍的实证的规律。经济学和社会学只是历史，是过去行动和事件的编年史，除了“过去就是这样”之外，我们不能从中学到更多东西。

both of these views，the Whig theory of history and historicism，are unacceptable.In their stead，I assume that both ethical truths and non hypothetically true positive laws of economics and sociology exist。These assumptions make it possible to identify some fundamentally wrong turns in the history of the Western state.

辉格史观和历史决定论这两种观点都是不可接受的。取而代之的是，我假定经济学和社会学中既存在伦理真理，也存在非假定性的正确的绝对的法则。通过这些假设，我们可以找出西方国家历史上一些根本性的错误转折。

leSSon one：againST CENTRALIZATIon

第一课：反对中心化

A state is a territorial monopolist of force.It is an agency that may engage in continual，institutionalized property rights violations and the exploitation—through expropriation，taxation，and regulation—of private property owners.[438] Assuming no more than selfinterest on the part of governmental agents，every state （government） can be expected to make use of its monopoly and thus exhibit a tendency toward increased exploitation.on the one hand，this means increased internal exploitation （and not only via taxation）； on the other hand，it means territorial expansion.States will always try to enlarge their opportunities for exploitation.In doing so，they will come into conflict with other，competing states.The competition between states，qua territorial monopolists of compulsion，is by its very nature an eliminative contest。That is，there can only be one monopolist of exploitation in any given area； thus，competition between states can be expected to promote a tendency toward increased political centralization and ultimately one，single，world state.

国家是领土上的暴力垄断者。它是一个机构，可以通过征用、征税和管制等手段，持续、制度化地侵犯私人财产所有者的财产权并对其进行剥削。假设政府人员只考虑自身利益，那么每个国家（政府）都会利用其垄断地位，从而表现出增加剥削的趋势。一方面，这意味着增加内部剥削（不仅是通过税收）；另一方面，这意味着领土扩张。国家总是试图扩大自己的剥削机会。在此过程中，它们会与其他竞争国家发生冲突。国家作为强制的领土垄断者，它们之间的竞争，就其本质而言，是一种淘汰赛。也就是说，在任何特定地区都只能有一个剥削垄断者；因此，可以预见国家之间的竞争会促进政治集中化的趋势，最终形成一个单一的世界国家。

A glance at Western history suffices to illustrate the validity of this conclusion.At the beginning of this millennium，for instance，Europe consisted of thousands of independent political units.Now，only several dozen such units remain.To be sure，decentralizing forces also operated.There was the progressive disintegration of the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth century until after World War I and the establishment of modern Turkey。The ethnically heterogeneous Habsburg Empire was gradually dismembered from the time of its greatest expansion under Charles V，until it disappeared and modern Austria was founded in 1918。And only recently，before our very eyes，the former Soviet Empire disintegrated.However，the overriding tendency has been in the opposite direction.For instance，during the second half of the seventeenth century，germany consisted of some 234 countries，51 free cities，and 1，500 independent knightly manors.By the early nineteenth century，the total number of the three had fallen to below 50，and by 1871 unification had been achieved.The scenario in Italy was similar。Even small states have a history of expansion and centralization.Switzerland began in 1291 as a confederation of three independent cantonal states.By 1848，it was a single （federal） state with some two dozen cantonal provinces.

回顾一下西方历史就足以说明这一结论的正确性。例如，在本千年之初，欧洲由数千个独立的政治单位组成。现在，这样的单位只剩下几十个了。当然，去中心化的力量也在发挥作用。从 16 世纪到第一次世界大战后，奥斯曼帝国逐步解体，现代土耳其建立。从查理五世时期哈布斯堡帝国最辉煌的扩张时期开始，这个多民族的帝国逐渐被肢解，直到 1918 年它消失，现代奥地利成立。直到最近，前苏联帝国才在我们眼前解体。然而，压倒性的趋势却是相反的。例如，在 17 世纪下半叶，德国由大约 234 个国家、51 个自由城市和 1 500 个独立的骑士庄园组成。到 19 世纪初，三者的总数下降到 50 个以下，到 1871 年实现了统一。意大利的情况与此类似。即使是小国也有扩张和国家主义的历史。瑞士在 1291 年由三个独立的州合并而成。到 1848 年，瑞士成为一个拥有24个省的单一（联邦）国家。

Moreover，from a global perspective，mankind has come closer than ever before to the establishment of a world government。Even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union，the United States had attained hegemonic status over Western Europe （most notably West germany） and the Pacific rim countries （most notably Japan）。Several indications of the U.S. position are：the presence of American troops and military bases； the NATO and SEATO pacts； the roles of the American dollar as the ultimate inter national reserve currency and of the U.S.Federal reserve System as the “liquidity provider” of last resort for the entire Western banking System； and Americandominated institutions such as the international Monetary fund （IMF），the World Bank，and the recently established World trade Organization （WTO）。In addition，American hegemony has steadily fostered the political integration of Western Europe.with the establishment of a European Central Bank and a European Currency Unit （ECU），the European Community will likely be complete before the turn of the century。At the same time，with the north American free trade Agreement （NAFTA），a significant step toward the political integration of the American continent has been taken.In the absence of the Soviet Empire and its military threat， the U.S.has emerged as the world’s sole and undisputed military super power and its “top cop.”

此外，从全球角度看，人类比以往任何时候都更接近于建立一个世界政府。甚至在苏联解体之前，美国就已经取得了对西欧（主要是西德）和环太平洋国家（主要是日本）的霸权地位。美国立场的几个标志是：美国军队和军事基地的存在；北大西洋公约组织和东南亚条约组织；美元作为最终的国际储备货币和美国联邦储备系统作为整个西方银行体系最后的“流动性提供者”的角色；以及美国主导的机构，如国际货币基金组织（IMF）、世界银行和最近成立的世界贸易组织（WTO）。此外，美国的霸权也稳步促进了西欧的政治一体化。随着欧洲中央银行和欧洲货币单位（ECU）的建立，欧洲共同体很可能在世纪之交之前完成。与此同时，随着《北美自由贸易协定》（NAFTA）的签订，美洲大陆向政治一体化迈出了重要一步。在没有苏联帝国及其军事威胁的情况下，美国已成为世界上唯一的无可争议的军事超级大国和 “头号警察”。

According to the orthodox view，centralization is generally a “good” and progressive movement，whereas disintegration and secession，even if sometimes unavoidable，are anachronistic。It is assumed that larger political units—and，ultimately，a single world government—imply wider markets and，hence，increased wealth.Putative evidence for this is that economic prosperity has increased dramatically in the wake of centralization.How ever，rather than reflecting any truth，this orthodox view is more illustrative of the fact that history is typically written by its victors.neither correlation nor temporal coincidence proves causation.In fact，the relationship between economic prosperity and centralization is very different from and，indeed，almost the opposite of what orthodoxy alleges.[439]

根据正统观点，国家主义通常是 “好的 “和进步的运动，而分裂和脱离，即使有时不可避免，也是不合时宜的。人们假定，更大的政治单位——最终是单一的世界政府——意味着更广阔的市场和更多的财富。这一假定的证据是，在国家主义之后，经济繁荣程度显著提高。然而，与其说这种正统观点反映了真理，不如说它更能说明历史通常是由胜利者书写的这一事实。相关性和时间上的巧合都不能证明因果关系。事实上，经济繁荣与国家主义之间的关系与正统观点大相径庭，甚至几乎相反。

Political integration （centralization） and economic （market） integration are two completely different phenomena.Political integration involves the territorial expansion of a state’s power of taxation and property reg ulation.Economic integration is the extension of the interpersonal and interregional division of labor and market participation.In principle，in taxing and regulating private property owners and market income earners，all governments are counterproductive.They reduce market participation and the formation of wealth.once the existence of a government has been assumed，however，no direct relationship between territorial size and economic integration exists.Centralization can go hand in hand with either economic progress or retrogression.Progress results whenever a less taxing and regulating government expands its territory at the expense of a more exploitative one.If the reverse occurs，centralization implies economic dis integration and retrogression.

政治一体化（国家主义）和经济一体化（市场）是两种完全不同的现象。政治一体化涉及国家税收和财产管制权力的领土扩张。经济一体化则是人与人之间、地区与地区之间分工和市场参与的扩展。原则上，在对私人财产所有者和市场收入者征税和管制方面，所有政府都是适得其反的。它们减少了市场参与和财富的形成。然而，一旦假定存在政府，领土面积与经济一体化之间并不存在直接关系。国家主义可以与经济进步或倒退并存。当一个征税和管制较少的政府以牺牲一个剥削较多的政府为代价扩大其领土时，就会产生进步。反之，国家主义则意味着经济解体和倒退。

Yet，a highly important indirect relationship exists between size and economic integration.A central government ruling over largescale territories cannot come into existence ab ovo。Instead，all institutions with the power to tax and regulate owners of private property must start out small。Smallness contributes to moderation，however。A small government has many close competitors，and if it taxes and regulates its subjects visibly more than its competitors do theirs，it is bound to suffer from the emigration of labor and capital and a corresponding loss of future tax revenue.[440]

然而，规模与经济一体化之间存在着非常重要的间接关系。统治大片领土的中央政府不可能从一开始就存在。相反，所有有权力对私人财产所有者征税和管制的机构都必须从小规模开始。无论如何，”小 “有助于 “适度”。一个小政府会有许多势不两立的竞争对手，如果它对其国民的征税和管理明显多于其竞争对手，那么它必然会因劳动力和资本的外流以及未来税收的相应减少而遭受损失。

Contrary to orthodoxy，then，it is precisely the fact that Europe possessed a highly decentralized power structure composed of numerous independent political units that explains the origin of capitalism in the Western world.It is not by accident that capitalism first flourished under conditions of extreme political decentralization：in the northern Italian city states，in southern germany，and in the secessionist Low Countries （netherlands）。

与正统观点相反，欧洲拥有一个由众多独立政治单位组成的高度去中心化的权力结构，这正是资本主义起源于西方世界的原因。资本主义最初是在极度的政治去中心化的条件下蓬勃发展的：在意大利北部的城邦，在德国南部，以及在分离主义的低地国家（荷兰）。

The competition among small states for taxable subjects brings them into conflict with each other。As a result of interstate conflicts，drawn out over the course of centuries，a few states succeed in expanding their territories，while others are eliminated or incorporated.Which states win in this process depends on many factors，but，in the long run，the decisive factor is the relative amount of economic resources at a government’s disposal。In taxing and regulating，governments do not positively contribute to the creation of economic wealth.Instead，they parasitically draw on existing wealth.However，they can influence the amount of existing wealth negatively。

小国之间争夺课税对象的竞争使它们相互冲突。由于几个世纪以来的国家间冲突，一些国家成功地扩大了自己的领土，而另外一些国家则或被消灭或被兼并。在这一过程中，哪个国家胜出取决于很多因素，但从长远来看，决定性因素是政府可支配的经济资源的相对数量。在征税和管制方面，政府并没有为创造经济财富做出积极贡献。相反，它们寄生于现有的财富。然而，它们可以对现有财富的数量产生负面影响。

Other things being equal，the lower the tax and regulation burden imposed by a government on its domestic economy，the larger its population tends to grow （due to internal reasons as well as immigration），and the larger the amount of domestically produced wealth on which it can draw in its conflicts with neighboring competitors.For this reason，centralization is frequently progressive.Liberal states that tax and regulate their domestic economies little tend to defeat and expand their territories at the expense of nonliberal ones.This accounts for the outbreak of the industrial revolution in centralized England and France.It explains why，in the course of the nineteenth century，western Europe came to dominate the rest of the world，and why this colonialism was generally progressive.Furthermore，it explains the rise of the U.S.to the rank of superpower in the course of the twentieth century。

在其他条件相同的情况下，政府对国内经济施加的税收和管制负担越低，人口增长的趋势就越大（这既有国内原因，也有移民原因），并且在与邻国竞争对手的冲突中，它能够利用的国内生产财富的数量也越大。因此，国家主义往往是渐进的。对国内经济征税和管制较少的自由主义国家往往以牺牲非自由主义国家的利益为代价，打败并扩大其领土。这就是国家主义的英国和法国爆发工业革命的原因。它解释了为什么在十九世纪，西欧开始统治世界其他地区，以及为什么这种殖民主义总体上是进步的。此外，它还解释了美国在二十世纪崛起为超级大国的原因。

However，the further the process of more liberal governments defeating less liberal ones proceeds—that is，the larger the territories，the fewer and more distant the remaining competitors，and the more costly international migration—the lower becomes a government’s incentive to continue its domestic liberalism.As one approaches the limit of a one World state，all possibilities of voting with one’s feet against a government disappear。Wherever one goes，the same tax and regulation structure applies.relief from the threat of emigration removes a fundamental rein on the expansion of governmental power。This explains developments of the twentieth century：with World War I，and even more so with World War II，the U.S.attained hegemony over western Europe and became heir to its vast colonial empires.A decisive step in the direction of global unification was taken with the establishment of a pax Americana.Indeed，throughout the entire period，the U.S.，Western Europe，and most of the rest of the world have suffered from a steady and dramatic growth of government power，taxation，and regulatory expropriation.[441]

然而，自由度较高的政府击败自由度较低的政府的进程越深入——也就是说，领土越大，剩下的竞争者越少，相距也越远，国际移民的成本越高——政府继续推行国内自由主义的动力就越低。当一个国家接近世界大同的极限时，用脚投票反对政府的所有可能性都会消失。无论走到哪里，税收和管制体系都是一样的。移民威胁的解除从根本上解除了遏制政府权力扩张的控制。这就解释了 20 世纪的发展：随着第一次世界大战，尤其是第二次世界大战的爆发，美国取得了对西欧的霸权，并成为其庞大殖民帝国的继承者。随着“美国治下的和平”（pax Americana）的建立，朝着全球统一的方向迈出了决定性的一步。事实上，在整个这一时期，美国、西欧和世界其他大部分地区都遭受了政府权力、税收和管制征用的持续的、急剧的增长之苦。

In light of social and economic theory and history，then，a first lesson follows：a plea for secession.Initially，secession is nothing more than a shifting of control over nationalized wealth from a larger，central government to a smaller，regional one.Whether this will lead to more or less economic integration and prosperity depends largely on the new regional government’s policies.However，the sole fact of secession has a positive impact on production insofar as it reduces or eliminates “forced integration.”

根据社会和经济理论及历史，接下来的第一课是：要求分离。起初，分离只不过是将国有化财富的控制权从较大的中央政府转移到较小的地区政府。这是否会带来某种程度的经济一体化和繁荣，在很大程度上取决于新地区政府的政策。然而，分离的唯一事实是减少或消除 “强制一体化”，从而对生产产生积极影响。

As a result of centuries of centralization，hundreds of distinct cultures have been extirpated.The process of centralization has also led to the economic exploitation and cultural domination of one ethnic，linguistic，religious，or cultural group by another，for example，of the Irish，Scots，and Welsh by the English； the Slovenes and Croats by the Serbs； and the Estonians，Lithuanians，and Latvians by the Russians.forced integration，as illustrated by measures such as busing，affirmative action，and anti discrimination laws，invariably creates tension，hatred，and conflict。In contrast，voluntary separation leads to social harmony and peace.Under forced integration，any mistake can be blamed on a “foreign” group or cul ture and all success claimed as one’s own； hence，there is little or no reason for any culture to learn from another。Under a regime of “separate but equal，” one must face up to the realities of cultural diversity and of visibly different ranks of cultural advancement。If a secessionist people wishes to improve or maintain its position visàvis a competing one，nothing but discriminative learning will help.It must imitate，assimilate，and，if possible，improve upon the skills，traits，practices，and rules characteris tic of more advanced cultures，and it must avoid those characteristic of less advanced societies.Rather than promoting a downward leveling of cultures as under forced integration，secession stimulates a cooperative process of cultural selection and advancement。

由于几个世纪的国家主义，数以百计的独特文化被灭绝。国家主义的过程也导致了一个种族、语言、宗教或文化群体对另一个种族、语言、宗教或文化群体的经济剥削和文化统治，例如，爱尔兰人、苏格兰人和威尔士人被英国人统治；斯洛文尼亚人和克罗地亚人被塞尔维亚人统治；爱沙尼亚人、立陶宛人和拉脱维亚人被俄罗斯人统治。强制一体化，如校车、平权运动和反歧视法等措施，总会造成紧张、仇恨和冲突。相反，自愿分离则会带来社会和谐与和平。在强制一体化的情况下，任何错误都可以归咎于 “外来 “群体或文化，所有的成功都可以归功于自己；因此，任何文化都没有理由向另一种文化学习。

In particular，secession can also eliminate the immigration problem increasingly plaguing the countries of Western Europe as well as the U.S.Now，whenever a central government permits immigration，it allows for eigners to proceed—literally on governmentowned roads—to any of its residents’ doorsteps，regardless of whether these residents desire such prox imity to foreigners.“free immigration” is，to a large extent，forced integration.Secession solves this problem by letting smaller territories have their own admission standards to determine independently with whom they will associate at close range and with whom they prefer to cooperate from a distance.[442]

特别是，分离还可以消除日益困扰西欧和美国的移民问题。现在，只要中央政府允许移民，就会允许外国人在政府拥有的道路上走到任何居民的家门口，而不管这些居民是否愿意与外国人如此接近。”自由移民 “在很大程度上是强制一体化。分离可以解决这个问题，让小领土拥有自己的接纳标准，独立决定与谁近距离交往，与谁远距离合作。

Moreover，while everything else depends on the new regional government’s domestic policies and no direct relationship between size and economic integration exists，there is an important indirect connection.Just as political centralization ultimately tends to promote economic disintegration，so secession tends to advance integration and economic development。Seces sion always involves increased opportunities for interregional migration，so a secessionist government is immediately confronted with the specter of emigration.To avoid the loss of its most productive subjects，it comes under increased pressure to adopt comparatively liberal domestic policies by allowing more private property and imposing a lower tax and regulation burden than its neighbors.Ultimately，with as many territories as separate households，villages，or towns，the opportunities for economically motivated emigration are maximized，and government power over a domestic economy minimized.

此外，虽然其他一切都取决于新地区政府的国内政策，而且规模与经济一体化之间不存在直接关系，但存在重要的间接联系。正如政治集权最终倾向于促进经济解体一样，分离也倾向于促进一体化和经济发展。分离总是会增加地区间移民的机会，因此分离主义政府会立即面临移民的幽灵。为了避免失去最有生产力的国民，它面临着更大的压力，必须采取相对自由的国内政策，允许更多的私有财产，并施加比邻国更低的税收和管制负担。最终，在拥有与独立家庭、村庄或城镇一样多数量的领土的情况下，出于经济动机的移民机会就会最大化，而政府对国内经济的控制力就会最小化。

Moreover，the smaller the country，the greater will be the pressure to opt for free trade rather than protectionism.All government interference with foreign trade forcibly limits the range of mutually beneficial interterritorial exchanges and thus leads to relative impoverishment，at home as well as abroad.But the smaller a territory and its internal markets，the more dra matic this effect will be.A country the size of the U.S.，for instance，might attain comparatively high standards of living even if it renounced all foreign trade，provided it possessed an unrestricted internal capital and consumer goods market。In contrast，consider a single household as the conceivably smallest secessionist unit。By engaging in unrestricted free trade，even the smallest territory can be fully integrated into the world market and partake of every advantage of the division of labor； its owners could well become the wealthiest people on earth.The existence of a single wealthy individual anywhere is living proof of this.on the other hand，if the same house hold owners were to forego all interterritorial trade，abject poverty or death would result。Accordingly，the smaller a territory and its internal markets，the more likely it is that it will opt for free trade.

此外，国家越小，选择自由贸易而不是保护主义的呼声就越大。政府对外贸的一切干预都会强行限制领土间互利交流的范围，从而导致国内外的相对贫困。但是，一个地区及其内部市场越小，这种影响就越明显。例如，一个像美国这样大的国家，如果拥有不受限制的国内资本和消费品市场，即使放弃所有对外贸易，也可能达到相对较高的生活水平。与此相反，把单个家庭视为可以想象的最小的分离主义单位。通过不受限制的自由贸易，即使是最小的领土也能完全融入世界市场，享受分工带来的各种好处；其所有者完全可以成为世界上最富有的人。任何地方只要有一个富裕的人，就足以证明这一点。另一方面，如果同样的家庭所有者放弃所有领土间贸易，结果将是赤贫或死亡。因此，领土和国内市场越小，选择自由贸易的可能性就越大。

Secession also promotes monetary integration.The process of central ization has resulted in the formation of an international cartel，dominated by the American government，of managed trade and migration，ever more invasive and burdensome governments，globalized welfarewarfare statism，and stagnant or even declining standards of living。It has also resulted in monetary disintegration：the destruction of the former international com modity （gold） money standard and its replacement with a dollardom inated System of freely fluctuating government paper monies，that is，a global，U.S.led，governmental counterfeiting cartel。This System of freely fluctuating paper currencies is no monetary System at all。[443] It is a System of partial barter； it is detrimental to the purpose of money，to facilitate exchange.This becomes obvious once it is recognized that there is no spe cial economic significance attached to the way national borders are drawN.And，if one imagines a proliferation of ever smaller national territories，ultimately to the point where each household forms its own country，fiat paper currency stands revealed for the outright absurdity it is.For if every household were to issue its own paper currency，the world would be right back at barter。No one would accept anyone else’s paper，economic calcu lation would be impossible，and trade would come to a virtual standstill。From this theoretical insight it follows that secession，provided it proceeds far enough，will actually promote monetary integration.In a world of hundreds of thousands of Monacos，Andorras，San Marinos，Liechtensteins，Singapores，and Hong Kongs，each country would have to abandon fiat money，which has been responsible for the greatest global inflation in human history，and once again adopt an international commodity money System such as the gold standard.

分裂还促进了货币一体化。国家主义进程的结果是形成了一个由美国政府主导的国际卡特尔，贸易和移民受到管理，政府更具侵略性，民众负担也越来越重，福利战争国家主义全球化，生活水平停滞不前甚至下降。国家主义还导致了货币解体：摧毁了以前的国际商品（黄金）货币本位，取而代之的是以美元为主导的自由浮动的政府纸币体系，即一个以美国为首的全球性政府造假卡特尔。这种自由浮动的纸币体系根本不是货币体系。这是一种部分的物物交换制度；这有损于货币的目的，即促进交换。一旦认识到国界的划分方式并不具有特殊的经济意义，这一点就变得显而易见了。而且，如果我们想象国家领土越来越小，最终每个家庭都组成了自己的国家，那么法定纸币就会彻底暴露它的荒谬性。因为如果每家每户都发行自己的纸币，世界就会回到以物易物的状态。没有人会接受别人的纸币，经济计算也就无从谈起，贸易也会陷入停滞。根据这一理论见解，分离只要进行得足够深入，实际上就会促进货币一体化。在一个由成千上万的摩纳哥人、安道尔人、圣马力诺人、列支敦士登人、新加坡人和香港人组成的世界里，每个国家都必须放弃法定货币，法定货币是人类历史上最严重的全球通货膨胀的罪魁祸首，人们将再次采用金本位制等国际商品货币体系。

leSSon TWO：againST DEMOCRATIZATIon

第二课：反对民主化

besides the tendency toward political centralization，the history of the West ern states，and indeed of all states，has been characterized by another fun damental structural change：the transition from monarchical to democratic rule.In accordance with the rule that history is typically written by its victors，this change，too，is generally presented as a progressive development。However，in light of elementary economic theory，this interpretation also turns out to be largely unfounded，and the tendency toward democratiza tion must indeed be interpreted as reinforcing the tendency toward increased exploitation caused by political centralization.[444]

除了政治上国家主义的趋势之外，西方国家乃至所有国家的历史还具有另一个根本性的结构变化：从君主制向民主制的转变。根据 “历史通常由胜利者书写 “的规则，这一变化也通常被描述为一种进步。然而，根据基本的经济理论，这种解释在很大程度上也是没有根据的，民主化的趋势必须被解释为加剧了政治集权所导致的剥削加剧的趋势。

For most of its history，mankind，insofar as it was subject to any government control at all，was under monarchical rule.There were exceptions：Athenian democracy，Rome during its republican era until 31 B.C.，the republics of venice，Florence，and genoa during the renaissance period； the Swiss cantons since 1291，the United Provinces from 1648 until 1673，and England under Cromwell from 1649 until 1660。These were，however，rare occurrences in a world dominated by monarchies.with the exception of Switzerland，they were shortlived phenomena； and，constrained by monarchical surroundings，all older republics satisfied the openentry requirement of modern democracies only imperfectly。That is，suffrage and the right to exercise government functions were restricted to extremely small numbers of “nobles.” in Athens，for instance，only 15，000 to 20，000 people， out of a population of more than 400，000，possessed the right to vote and participate in government。

在人类历史的大部分时间里，只要是受到政府控制的，都处于君主统治之下。但也有例外：雅典民主制；公元前 31 年之前的罗马共和制；文艺复兴时期的威尼斯共和国、佛罗伦萨共和国和热那亚共和国；1291 年以来的瑞士各州；1648 年至 1673 年的联省；1649 年至 1660 年克伦威尔统治下的英格兰。然而，在君主制占统治地位的世界中，这些都是罕见的现象。除瑞士外，它们都是昙花一现的现象；而且，受君主制环境的限制，所有较早的共和政体都不能完全满足现代民主国家的开放准入要求。也就是说，选举权和行使政府职能的权利仅限于极少数 “贵族”。 “以雅典为例，在 40 多万人口中，只有 1.5 万到 2 万人拥有选举权和参政权。

The transition from monarchy to democracy did not begin until the French revolution，and it was only at the end of World War I that man kind truly left the monarchical age.The first assault of republicanism and the idea of popular sovereignty on the dominating monarchical principle was repelled with the military defeat of Napoleon and the Restoration of Bourbon rule in France.However，the democraticrepublican spirit of the French revolution left a permanent imprint。From the restoration of the monarchical order in 1815 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914，all across Europe popular political participation and representa tion was Systematically expanded.The franchise was successively widened everywhere，and the powers of popularly elected parliaments were gradu ally increased.

从君主制向民主制的转变从法国大革命才开始，直到第一次世界大战结束，人类才真正告别了君主制时代。拿破仑的军事失败和波旁王朝在法国的复辟，击退了共和主义和人民主权思想对君主统治原则的第一次进攻。然而，法国大革命的民主共和精神留下了永久的烙印。从 1815 年君主制秩序恢复到 1914 年第一次世界大战爆发，整个欧洲的民众政治参与和代表权得到了系统的扩大。各地的选举权不断扩大，民选议会的权力逐渐增强。

Although increasingly emasculated，the monarchical principle remained dominant until the cataclysmic events of World War I。before the war，only two republics existed in Europe：Switzerland and France.And，of all major European monarchies，only the United Kingdom could be classified as a parliamentary System，that is，one where the supreme power was vested in an elected parliament。only four years later，after the U.S.—where the democratic principle had triumphed with the destruc tion of the secessionist Confederacy by the centralist Union government—had entered the European war and decisively determined its out come，monarchies had all but disappeared，and Europeans had turned to democratic republicanism.[445]

尽管君主制日益衰弱，但在第一次世界大战之前，君主制一直占据主导地位。战前，欧洲只有两个共和国：瑞士和法国。而且，在欧洲所有主要君主制国家中，只有英国可以被归类为议会制，即最高权力属于民选议会。仅仅四年后，在美国——民主原则在国家主义的联邦政府摧毁了分裂主义的邦联后取得了胜利——加入欧洲战争，并决定性的终结战争之后，君主制几乎消失殆尽，欧洲人转向了民主共和制。

In Europe，the defeated Romanovs，Hohenzollerns，and Habsburgs had to abdicate or resign； and Russia，germany，and Austria became democratic republics with universal adult suffrage and parliamentary governments.Likewise，all of the newly created successor states—Poland，Finland，Esto nia，Latvia，Lithuania，Hungary，and Czechoslovakia （with the sole excep tion of Yugoslavia）—adopted democratic republican constitutions.In Turkey and Greece，the monarchies were overthrown.Even where monarchies remained nominally existent，as in Great Britain，Italy，Spain，belgium，the netherlands，and the Scandinavian countries，monarchs no longer exercised any governing power。Universal adult suffrage was introduced，and all government power was invested in parliaments and “public” officials.The democraticrepublican age，a new world order under the aegis of a dominating U.S.government，had begun.

在欧洲，战败的罗曼诺夫家族、霍亨索伦家族和哈布斯堡家族不得不退位或辞职；俄罗斯、德国和奥地利成为拥有成人普选权和议会政府的民主共和国。同样，所有新成立的继承国——波兰、芬兰、爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚、立陶宛、匈牙利和捷克斯洛伐克（南斯拉夫除外）——都采用了民主共和制宪法。在土耳其和希腊，君主制被推翻。即使在君主制名义上仍然存在的地方，如英国、意大利、西班牙、比利时、荷兰和斯堪的纳维亚国家，君主也不再行使任何统治权。实行成人普选，所有政府权力都赋予议会和 “公共 “官员。民主共和时代，一个由美国政府主导的新世界秩序开始了。

Interestingly，neither the proponents of democracy nor，more surpris ingly，the defenders of the ancien régime recognized the fundamental economic implications of this change.From the point of view of economics，the transition from monarchy to democracy was essentially a change from a System of privately owned government to one of “publicly” owned government。Elementary economic theory leads one to suspect that the conduct of government and the effects of government policy on civil society will differ Systematically depending on whether the government apparatus is owned privately or publicly。[446]

有趣的是，无论是民主的拥护者，还是（更令人惊讶的是）旧制度的捍卫者，都没有认识到这一变革对经济的根本影响。从经济学的角度来看，从君主制向民主制的转变本质上是从私有政府制度向 “公有 “政府制度的转变。基本的经济学理论让人怀疑，政府的行为和政府政策对公民社会的影响会因政府机构是私有还是公有而有系统性的不同。

The defining characteristic of private government ownership，as exem plified by a monarchy，is that the expropriated resources and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation are individually owned.The appropriated resources are added to the ruler’s private estate and treated as if they were a part of it，and the monopoly privilege of future expropriation is attached as a title to this estate and leads to an instant increase in its present value.Most importantly，as private owner of the government estate，the ruler is entitled to pass his possessions on to his personal heir，and he may personally employ or dismiss every administrator and employee of his estate.

君主制所体现的政府私有制的显著特点是，被征用的资源和未来征用的垄断特权都归个人所有。被征用的资源被纳入统治者的私有财产，并被视为财产的一部分，而未来征用的垄断特权则作为财产的所有权附加在财产上，并使其现值立即增加。最重要的是，作为政府财产的私人所有者，统治者有权将其财产传给其个人继承人，并可亲自雇用或解雇其财产的每一位管理者和雇员。

In contrast，with a publicly owned government，as exemplified by a democracy，the control over the government apparatus lies in the hands of a trustee or caretaker。The caretaker may use the apparatus to his personal advantage，but he does not own it。He cannot sell government resources and privately pocket the receipts，nor can he pass government possessions on to his personal heir。He owns the current use of government resources，but not their capital value.Moreover，while entrance into the position of a private owner of government is restricted by the owner’s personal discretion，entrance into the position of a caretakerruler is open.Anyone，in principle，can became the government’s caretaker。

相比之下，公有制政府，如民主国家，政府机构的控制权掌握在受托人或管理者手中。管理者可以利用政府机构为自己谋取私利，但他并不拥有政府机构。他不能出售政府资源并私吞收益，也不能将政府财产传给个人继承人。他拥有政府资源的当前使用权，但不拥有其资本价值。此外，进入政府私人所有者的职位受到所有者个人自由裁量权的限制，而进入看守统治者的职位则是开放的。原则上，任何人都可以成为政府的看管人。

From this，two interrelated predictions can be made.First，a private government owner will tend to have a Systematically longer planning horizon，that is，his degree of time preference will be lower。Accordingly，his degree of economic exploitation will tend to be less than that of a government caretaker。Second，subject to a higher degree of exploitation，the nongovernmental public will also be comparatively more presentoriented under a System of publicly owned government than under a regime of private government ownership.[447]

由此可以得出两个相互关联的预测。第一，私人政府所有者的规划期限往往较长，也就是说，他的时间偏好程度较低。因此，他的经济剥削程度往往低于政府管理者。第二，在剥削程度较高的情况下，民间公众在公有制政府体制下也会比在私人政府所有制体制下有更强的当前取向。

A private government owner will try to maximize his total wealth （the present value of his estate and his current income）。He will not want to increase his current income at the expense of a more than proportional drop in the present value of his assets，and，since acts of current income acqui sition invariably have repercussions on present asset values （reflecting the value of all anticipated asset earnings discounted by the rate of time preference），private ownership in and of itself leads to economic calculation and promotes farsightedness.This implies a distinct moderation with respect to the ruler’s incentive to exploit his monopoly privilege of expropriation，for acts of expropriation are，by their very nature，parasitic upon prior acts of production on the part of the nongovernmental public。Accordingly，a private government owner will want to avoid exploiting his subjects so heavily that he reduces his future earnings potential to such an extent that the present value of his estate （the country） actually falls.He will，of course，use his monopolistic privilege； he will not not exploit。As the government’s private owner，he realizes that it may be in his interest to draw moderately from a growing，increasingly productive and prosperous economy。

私人政府所有者会努力使其总财富（他财产的现值和当前收入）最大化。他不希望以资产现值超比例的下降为代价来增加当前收入，而且，由于获取当前收入的行为必然会对资产现值（反映所有预期资产收益的价值，以时间偏好率贴现）产生影响，私有制本身就会导致经济计算，并促进远见。这就意味着统治者利用其征用垄断特权的动机有明显的节制，因为征用行为就其本质而言，是寄生于民间公众先前的生产行动之上的。因此，政府的私人所有者会希望避免对其国民过度剥削，以免降低其未来的收益潜力，导致其财产（国家）的现值实际下降。他当然会利用他的垄断特权，他绝对不会不剥削。作为政府的私人所有者，他意识到适度地从一个日益增长的、生产力日益提高的、繁荣的经济中汲取财富可能符合他的利益。

Private ownership of government implies moderation and farsighted ness for yet another reason.All private property is，by definition，exclusive property。He who owns property is entitled to exclude everyone else from its use and enjoyment。only the king and，to a minor extent，his friends，employees，and business partners share in the enjoyment of expropriated resources and can thus lead a parasitic life.because of these restrictions regarding entrance into government，private government ownership stimulates the development of a clear class consciousness on the part of the nongovernmental public and promotes opposition and resistance to any expansion of the government’s exploitative power。There being an almost insurmountable barrier to upward mobility，solidarity among the ruled is strengthened，and the risk to the king of losing his legitimacy as the result of increased exploitation is heightened.

政府的私人所有权意味着节制和远见，这还有另一个原因。顾名思义，所有私有财产都是排他性的财产。拥有财产的人有权禁止其他人使用和享有财产。因此，只有君主及其小范围的好友、雇员和商业伙伴才能分享征用的资源，从而过上寄生生活。由于这些进入政府的限制，政府私有制刺激了民间公众形成明确的阶级意识，并促进了对政府剥削权力扩张的反对和抵制。由于存在一个几乎无法逾越的向上流动的障碍，被统治者之间的团结得到了加强，君主因剥削加剧而失去合法性的风险也随之增大。

In distinct contrast，the caretaker of a publicly owned government will not try to maximize total government wealth （capital values and current income），but will rather raise current income （regardless，and at the expense，of capital values）。Instead of maintaining or even enhancing the value of the government estate，its temporary caretaker will quickly use up as much of its resources as possible，for what he does not consume now，he may never be able to consume.A caretaker，as distinct from a king，has no interest in maintaining his country。For why should he not want to increase his exploi tation，if the advantage of a policy of moderation cannot be reaped privately，while the advantage of the opposite policy of increased exploitation can be so reaped？ To a caretaker，unlike to a private owner，moderation has only disadvantages and no advantages.

与此形成鲜明对比的是，公有制政府的管理者不会试图最大化政府的总财富（资本价值加当期收入），而是会提高当期收入（不管资本价值如何，并且不惜牺牲资本价值）。临时管理者非但不会维持甚或提高政府财产的价值，反而会尽快用掉尽可能多的资源，因为他现在不消费的东西，可能永远也消费不了。一个管理者，不同于一个君主，对维护自己的国家毫无兴趣。如果节制政策的好处不能归私人所有，而相反的增加剥削政策的好处却可以归私人所得，那么他为什么不想增加剥削呢？对管理者而言，与对私人所有者不同，节制只有坏处，没有好处。

with a publicly owned government，anyone can aspire to become a member of the ruling class or even the supreme power。The distinction between the rulers and the ruled as well as the class consciousness of the ruled become blurred.The illusion even arises that the distinction no longer exists，that no one is ruled by anyone while everyone rules himself。Accord ingly，public resistance against government power is Systematically weak ened.While exploitation before might have appeared plainly oppressive to the public，it seems much less so once anyone may freely enter the ranks of those who are at the receiving end.

有了公有制政府，任何人都可以追求成为统治阶级的一员，甚至成为最高权力者。统治者和被统治者之间的区别以及被统治者的阶级意识变得模糊不清。甚至会产生这样的错觉：这种区别已不复存在，没有人被任何人统治，而是每个人自己统治自己。因此，公众对政府权力的反抗被系统性地削弱了。以前的剥削对公众来说可能是明显的压迫，但一旦任何人都可以自由地加入受剥削者的行列，这种剥削压迫似乎就不那么明显了。

regarding the effect of government conduct on civil society，governmental violations of private property rights，whether in the form of taxation，inflation （counterfeiting），or regulation，have a twofold impact on individual time preferences.on the one hand，like crime，all government interfer ence with private property rights reduces someone else’s supply of present goods and thus raises his effective time preference rate.on the other hand，government offenses，unlike crime，simultaneously raise the time preference degree of actual and potential victims because they also imply a reduction in the supply of future goods （a reduced rate of return on investment）。because governmental property rights violations are continual，the actual and poten tial victims respond by associating a permanently higher risk with all future production and Systematically adjusting their expectations concerning the rate of return on all future investment downward.Therefore，by simultane ously reducing the supply of present and expected future goods，governmental property rights violations not only raise time preference rates （with given schedules） but also time preferences schedules.because private owner producers are，and see themselves as，defenseless against future victimization by government agents，their expected rate of return on productive，future oriented actions is uniformly reduced； accordingly，all actual and poten tial victims tend to become more presentoriented.[448] Furthermore，because the degree of exploitation is comparatively higher under a publicly owned government，this tendency toward present orientation will be significantly more pronounced than if government were privately owned.

关于政府行为对公民社会的影响，政府对私有产权的侵犯，无论是税收、通胀（伪造货币）还是管制，都会对个人的时间偏好产生双重影响。一方面，与犯罪一样，政府对私有产权的所有干预都会减少他人对当前商品的供给，从而提高他的有效时间偏好率。另一方面，与犯罪不同的是，政府的侵犯会同时提高实际和潜在受害者的时间偏好程度，因为它们也意味着未来物品供应的减少（投资回报率的降低）。由于政府对产权的侵犯是持续性的，实际和潜在受害者的反应是将所有未来生产的风险永久性地提高，并系统性地向下调整他们对所有未来投资回报率的预期。因此，通过同时减少当前和预期未来产品的供应，政府侵犯产权不仅会提高时间偏好率（给定时间表），还会抬高时间偏好表。因为私人所有的生产者是，并且认为他们自己是，对政府人员未来的伤害没有防御能力的，他们对生产性的、面向未来的行动的预期回报率是一致降低的；因此，所有实际的和潜在的受害者都倾向于变得更加注重当下。此外，由于公有制政府的剥削程度相对较高，因此与私有制政府相比，这种现时取向的趋势会愈发明显。

In light of these theoretical considerations，the end of World War I can be identified as the point in time at which private government own ership was completely replaced by public government ownership，and whence a Systematic tendency toward increased governmental exploitation and rising degrees of social presentorientedness could be expected to take off。Indeed，such has been the grand，underlying theme of Western history since 1918。

根据这些理论，第一次世界大战的结束可以确定为政府私有制被政府公有制完全取代的时间节点，从那时起，政府剥削加剧

和社会当下取向程度提高的系统性趋势可预见的起飞。事实上，这正是 1918 年以来西方历史的宏大主题。

regarding indicators of exploitation，there is no doubt that the taxes imposed on civil society increased during the monarchical age.However，throughout the entire period，the share of government revenue remained remarkably low.Economic historian Carlo M.Cipolla observes that “it is difficult to imagine that，apart from particular times and places [such as wars]，the public power ever managed to draw more than 5 to 8 percent of national product。” He goes on to note that this portion was not Systematically exceeded until the second half of the nineteenth century。[449] Even at the outbreak of World War I，total government expenditure as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product （GDP） typically had not risen above 10 percent and only rarely，as in the case of germany，exceeded 15 percent。In striking contrast，with the onset of the democraticrepublican age，total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP typically increased to between 20 and 30 percent in the course of the l920s and 1930s，and，by the mid1970s， had generally reached 50 percent。[450] Although total government employment increased during the monarchical age，until the very end of the nineteenth century，it rarely exceeded 3 percent of the total labor force.In contrast，by the mid1970s，government employment as a percentage of the total labor force had typically grown to close to 20 percent。[451]

关于剥削指标，毫无疑问，在君主时代，对民间社会征收的税收有所增加。然而，在整个时期，政府收入所占的比例仍然很低。经济史学家卡洛-西波拉（Carlo M.Cipolla）研究指出：“很难想象，除了特定的时间和地点（如战争），公共权力机构的收入曾超过国民生产总值的 5%至 8%。”他接着指出，直到 19 世纪下半叶，这一比例才被系统地超过。即使在第一次世界大战爆发时，政府总支出占国内生产总值（GDP）的百分比通常也没有超过 10%，只有在极少数情况下，如德国，超过了 15%。与此形成鲜明对比的是，随着民主共和时代的到来，政府总支出占国内生产总值的比例在 20 世纪 20 年代和 30 年代通常上升到 20%到 30%之间，而到了 70 年代中期，则普遍达到了 50%。虽然在君主制时代，直到 19 世纪末，政府总就业人数一直在增加，但很少超过总劳动力的 3%。相反，到 20 世纪 70 年代中期，政府就业人数占劳动力总数的比例通常已增长近至 20%。

The same pattern emerges from an examination of inflation and data on the money supply。The monarchical world was generally character ized by the existence of a commodity money，typically gold or silver。A commodity money standard makes it difficult，if not impossible，for a government to inflate the money supply； and monarchical rulers，hard as they tried，did not succeed in establishing lasting monopolies of pure fiat currencies，that is，of irredeemable government paper monies.Accord ingly，during the monarchical age the “level” of prices generally fell and the purchasing power of money increased，except during times of war or new gold discoveries.Various price indices for Britain，for instance，indicate that prices were substantially lower in 1760 than they had been a hundred years earlier； they were still lower in 1860 than they had been in 1760。Similarly，during the more than seventy years between 1845 and the end of World War I，the British money supply increased only about sixfold.Connected by an international gold standard，the development in other countries was similar。[452]

对通货膨胀和货币供应数据的研究也显示了同样的模式。君主制国家的一般特点是存在商品货币，通常是金银。商品货币本位制使得政府很难（如果不是不可能的话）膨胀货币供应量；君主制统治者虽然努力尝试，但并没有成功建立起对纯法定货币（即不可赎回的政府纸币）的持久垄断。因此，在君主制时代，价格 “水平 “普遍下降，货币购买力上升，除了战争时期或新发现黄金时期。例如，英国的各种物价指数表明，1760 年的物价大大低于 100 年前；1860 年的物价仍然低于 1760 年。同样，从 1845 年到第一次世界大战结束的七十多年间，英国的货币供应量只增长了约六倍。在国际金本位的联系下，其他国家的发展情况也类似。

After 1918，under conditions of democratic republicanism，the gold standard was first replaced by a spurious gold standard，the socalled gold exchange standard，which survived until 1971。Since then，for the first time in history，the entire world has adopted a pure fiat money System of freely fluctuating government paper currencies.Accordingly，rather than a gradual increase in the purchasing power of money，a seemingly perma nent secular tendency toward inflation and currency depreciation has come into existence.[453] The “level” of prices has practically always moved upward， especially since 1971，and，in the more than seventy years since 1918，the U.S.money supply，in a development with parallels throughout the world，has increased more than sixtyfold.[454]

1918 年后，在民主共和制的条件下，金本位制首先被一种伪金本位制（即所谓的金汇兑本位制）所取代，并一直延续到 1971 年。从那时起，整个世界有史以来第一次采用了由自由浮动的政府纸币组成的纯粹的法定货币体系。因此，货币购买力不是在逐步提高，而是出现了这一看似永久的长期的通货膨胀和货币贬值的趋势。价格的 “水平 “实际上一直在上升，特别是自 1971 年以来，从1918 年以来的 70 多年里，美国的货币供应量增加了 60 多倍，这一发展与世界各地的情况相似。

In addition to taxation and inflation （counterfeiting），a government can resort to debt in order to finance its current expenditures.As predicted by theory，kings were more moderate borrowers than were democratic republican caretakers.Throughout the monarchical age，government debts were essentially war debts，and，while the total debt tended to increase over time，monarchs typically reduced their debts during peacetime.In striking contrast，since the beginning of the democraticrepublican age，government debts typically increased in war and in peace，and，since the fateful events of 1971 when a pure fiat money regime facilitating the monetization of government debt came into being，they have literally skyrocketed.[455]

除了征税和通货膨胀（造假），政府还可以通过举债来为其日常开支提供资金。正如理论所预测的那样，与民主共和制的管理者相比，君主的借贷行为更为节制。在整个君主制时代，政府债务基本上都是战争债务，虽然债务总额会随着时间的推移而增加，但君主们通常会在和平时期减少债务。与此形成鲜明对比的是，自民主共和时代开始以来，无论战争还是和平时期，政府债务通常都会增加，而自1971年的灾难性事件，即促成政府债务货币化的纯粹法定货币制度诞生以来，政府债务更是直线上升。

The same tendency toward increased exploitation also becomes appar ent from examining government legislation and regulation.During the monarchical age，with a clearcut distinction between the ruler and the ruled，the king and his parliament were held to be under the law.[456] They applied preexisting law as judge or jury。They did not make law.To be sure，due to the king’s monopoly of administering the law，the price of law increased and its quality decreased.But as late as the beginning of the twentieth century，A.V.Dicey could still maintain that in Great Britain legislated law，as distinct from preexisting law，did not exist。[457]

通过研究政府立法和管制，我们也可以发现剥削加剧的趋势。在君主制时代，统治者和被统治者泾渭分明，君主及其议会都在法律之下。他们以法官或陪审团的身份运用既存的法律，而不是制定法律。他们并不制定法律。当然，由于君主垄断了法律的实施，法律的价格提高了，质量却下降了。但直到二十世纪初，A.V.Dicey 仍然坚持认为，在大不列颠，有别于已有法律的立法法律并不存在。

In striking contrast，under democracy，with the exercise of power shrouded in anonymity，presidents and parliaments quickly came to rise above the law.They became not only judge but legislator，the creator of “new” law.[458] in a development similar to the democratization of money，the democratization of law and law administration has led to a steadily growing flood of legislation.Presently，the number of legislative acts and regulations passed by parliaments in the course of a single year is in the tens of thousands，filling hundreds of thousands of pages，affecting all aspects of civil and commercial life，and resulting in a steady depreciation of all law and heightened legal uncertainty。As a typical example，the 1994 edition of the Code of Federal regulations，the annual compendium of all U.S.Federal Government regulations currently in effect，consists of a total of twohundredandone books，occupying about twentysix feet of library shelf space.The Code’s index alone is 754 pages.[459]

与此形成鲜明对比的是，在民主制度下，由于权力的行使是匿名的，总统和议会很快就凌驾于法律之上。他们不仅是法官，还是立法者，是 “新 “法律的创造者。与货币的民主化相似，法律和法律管理的民主化也导致了立法数量的持续泛滥。目前，各国议会在一年内通过的法案和管制多达数万项，长达数十万页，涉及民事和商业生活的方方面面，导致所有法律不断贬值，法律的不确定性加剧。一个典型的例子是，1994 年版的《联邦管制法典》，即美国联邦政府现行所有管制条例的年度汇编，总共有两百零一本书，占据了图书馆约二十六英尺的书架空间。仅法典索引就有 754 页。

regarding indicators of rising social time preference （present orientedness），history reveals an equally clear pattern.The most direct indicator of social time preference is the rate of interest。The interest rate is the ratio of the valuation of present goods as compared to future goods.A high interest rate implies more “present orientedness” and a low rate of interest implies more of a “future orientation.” Under normal conditions，that is，under the assumption of increasing standards of living and realmoney incomes，the interest rate can be expected to fall and ultimately approach，yet never quite reach，zero，for with rising real incomes，the marginal utility of present money falls relative to that of future money。Hence under the ceteris paribus assumption of a given time preference schedule，the interest rate must fall。

关于社会时间偏好（当前取向）上升的指标，历史揭示了同样清晰的模式。社会时间偏好最直接的指标是利率。利率是当前物品与未来物品的估值比率。高利率意味着更多的 “当前取向”，而低利率则意味着更多的 “未来取向”。在正常情况下，即在生活水平和实际收入不断提高的假设下，利率会下降，并最终接近但永远不会达到零，因为随着实际收入的增加，现在货币的边际效用相对于未来货币的边际效用会下降。因此，在给定时间偏好表的假设条件下，利率必定下降。

In fact，a tendency toward falling interest rates characterizes mankind’s suprasecular trend of development。In thirteenthcentury Europe，the lowest interest rate on “safe” longterm loans was 8 percent。In the fourteenth century，rates came down to about 5 percent。In the fifteenth century，they fell to 4 percent。In the seventeenth century they went down to 3 percent。And at the end of the nineteenth century，minimum interest rates had further declined to less than 2.5 percent。[460] This trend was by no means smootH.It was frequently interrupted，during times of wars and revolutions，by periods of rising interest rates.But the overriding tendency toward lower interest rates reflects mankind’s overall advance from barbarism to civilization.against this historical backdrop and in accordance with economic theory，it should be expected that twentiethcentury interest rates would have to be still lower than nineteenthcentury rates.only two possible explanations exist why this should not be the case.The first possibility is that twentiethcentury real incomes did not exceed nineteenthcentury income.This explanation can be safely ruled out on empirical grounds.only the second explanation remains.If real incomes are in fact higher but interest rates are not lower，then the ceteris paribus clause can no longer be assumed true.Rather，the time preference schedule must have shifted upward，that is，people on the average must have become more present oriented，which appears to be the case.

事实上，利率下降是人类超周期发展的趋势。在 13 世纪的欧洲，”安全 “长期贷款的最低利率为 8%。十四世纪，利率降至 5%左右；十五世纪，利率降至 4%；十七世纪，利率降至 3%。19世纪末，最低利率进一步下降到2.5%以下。这一趋势并非一帆风顺。在战争和革命时期，这一趋势经常被利率上升期打断。但是，降低利率的大趋势反映了人类从野蛮走向文明的总体进程。在这一历史背景下，根据经济理论，20 世纪的利率仍应低于 19 世纪的利率。为什么情况并非如此，只有两种可能的解释。第一种可能是 20 世纪的实际收入没有超过 19 世纪的收入。根据经验，可以肯定地排除这种解释，只剩下第二种解释。如果实际收入确实增加了，但利率却没有降低，那么就不能再假设 “其他条件相同 “为真了。相反，时间偏好表必须向上移动，也就是说，平均而言，人们必须更加现在取向，这似乎是事实。

An inspection of the lowest decennial average interest rates for the West ern world shows that interest rates during the entire postWorld War I era were never as low or lower than they had been during the second half of the nineteenth century。This conclusion does not change，even if one takes into account that modern interest rates，in particular since the 1970s，include a Systematic inflation premium.After adjusting recent nominal interest rates for inflation in order to yield an estimate of real interest rates，contemporary rates still appear to be significantly higher than those of one hundred years ago。on the average，minimum longterm interest rates in Europe and the U.S.nowadays seem to be well above 4 percent，and possibly as high as 5 percent，or above the interest rates of seventeenthcentury Europe and as high or higher than fifteenthcentury rates.[461]

对西方世界最低十年平均利率的研究表明，在整个第一次世界大战后的时期，利率从未像19世研究纪下半叶那样低或更低。即使考虑到现代利率（尤其是 1970 年代以来的利率）包含系统性通货膨胀溢价，这一结论也不会改变。在对最近的名义利率进行通货膨胀调整，以得出实际利率的估计值后，当代利率似乎仍然大大高于一百年前的利率。平均而言，欧洲和美国目前的最低长期利率似乎远高于 4%，甚至可能高达 5%，或高于 17 世纪欧洲的利率，甚至高于 15 世纪的利率。

Parallel to this development and reflecting a more specific aspect of the same underlying phenomenon of high or rising social time preferences，indicators of family disintegration have exhibited a Systematic increase.Until the end of the nineteenth century，the bulk of government spending went into financing the military。Welfare spending played almost no role.Insurance was considered to be in the province of individual responsibility，and poverty relief was seen as the task of voluntary charity。In contrast，as a reflection of the egalitarianism inherent in democracy，the late nineteenth century saw the beginning of the collectivization of individual responsibility。

与此同时，反映社会时间偏好较高或上升这一基本现象的一个更为具体的方面是，家庭解体的指标呈现出系统性的增长。直到 19 世纪末，政府支出的大部分都用于资助军事。福利支出几乎不占比重。保险被视为个人责任的范畴，而救济贫困则被视为自愿慈善的任务。与此相反，作为民主固有的平等主义的反映，19 世纪末个人责任开始集体化。

This has proceeded so far that the bulk of public spending nowadays is eaten up by welfare expenditures：by compulsory government “insurance” against illness，occupational injuries，old age，unemployment，and an everexpanding list of other “disabilities.”[462] Consequently，by increasingly relieving individuals of the responsibility of having to provide for their own health，safety，and old age，the range and the temporal horizon of private provisionary action have been Systematically reduced.In particular，the value of marriage，family，and children have fallen because they are less needed when one can fall back on “public” assistance.Since the onset of the democraticrepublican age，the birth rate in Western countries fell from 30 to 40 per 1，000 population to about 15 to 20。[463] At the same time，the rates of divorce，illegitimacy，single parenting，singledom，and abortion have steadily increased，while personal savings rates have begun to stagnate or even fall rather than rise proportional or overproportional to rising incomes.[464]

这种情况发展到今天，大部分公共开支都被福利支出所吞噬：政府强制为疾病、工伤、老年、失业以及不断扩大的其他 “残疾 “提供 “保险”。因此，通过越来越多地免除个人供养自己的健康、安全和老年生活的责任，私人供养行动的范围和时间跨度被系统性地缩小了。特别是，婚姻、家庭和子女的价值下降了，因为当人们可以依靠 “公共 “援助时，对他们的需求就减少了。自从进入民主共和时代以来，西方国家的出生率从每千人 30 到 40 人下降到大约 15 到 20 人。与此同时，离婚率、非婚生子率、单亲率、单身率和堕胎率稳步上升，而个人储蓄率开始停滞不前，甚至下降，而不是与收入增长成正比或超比例上升。

Moreover，as a consequence of the depreciation of law resulting from an unabating flood of legislation and the collectivization of responsibility effected by welfare policies，the rates of crimes of a serious nature，such as murder，assault，robbery，and theft，have likewise shown a Systematic upward tendency。In the “normal” course of events，that is，with rising standards of living，it can be expected that the protection against social disasters such as crime will undergo continual improvement，just as one would expect the protection against natural disasters to become progressively better。Indeed，throughout the Western world，this appears to have been the case by and large until recently when，during the second half of the twentieth century，crime rates began to climb steadily upward.[465]

此外，由于不断涌现的立法和福利政策造成的责任集体化导致法律贬值，谋杀、袭击、抢劫和盗窃等性质严重的犯罪率同样呈系统性上升趋势。在 “正常 “的情况下，即随着生活水平的不断提高，人们可以预期对犯罪等社会灾难的防范会不断改善，就像人们预期对自然灾害的防范会逐渐改善一样。事实上，在整个西方世界，这种情况似乎一直存在，直到最近，在 20 世纪下半叶，犯罪率开始稳步上升。

To be sure，there are a number of factors other than increased irresponsibility and shortsightedness brought on by legislation and public welfare that may contribute to crime.men commit more crimes than women，the young more than the old，blacks more than whites，and city dwellers more than villagers.There is，however，a Systematic relationship between high time preference and crime.Consequently，if the social degrees of time preference increase，the frequency of serious crime should rise，as in fact has happened.[466]

可以肯定的是，除了立法和公共福利带来的不负责任和短视行为的增加之外，还有许多因素可能会导致犯罪。男性的犯罪率高于女性，年轻人的犯罪率高于老年人，黑人的犯罪率高于白人，城市居民的犯罪率高于村民。然而，高时间偏好与犯罪之间存在系统性相关。因此，如果社会的时间偏好程度增加，严重犯罪的频率就会上升，而事实也恰好如此。

From the vantage point of elementary economic theory and in light of historical evidence，then，a second lesson follows：a plea for dedemocratization.

从基本经济理论的视角出发，结合历史证据，我们可以得出第二个结论：去民主化诉求。

such a plea is not one for a return to the ancien régime.The legitimacy of monarchical rule appears to have been irretrievably lost。Nor would such a return be a genuine solution，for monarchies，whatever their relative merits，do exploit and do squander the earnings of their subjects.Rather，the idea of democratic republicanism must be rendered laughable by identifying it as the source of steadily increased government exploitation and waste.More importantly，however，the idea of the positive alternative of a natural order must be spelled out and a strategy of how to actualize it must be outlined.[467]

这种诉求并不是要恢复旧制度。君主统治的合法性似乎已经无可挽回地丧失了。这种回归也不是真正的解决之道，因为君主政体，无论其相对优点如何，都会剥削和挥霍国民的收入。相反，民主共和主义的理念必须被认定为是荒唐可笑的，它是政府不断加剧剥削和浪费的根源。相反，民主共和主义的理念必须被认定为是荒唐可笑的，它是政府不断加剧剥削和浪费的根源。更重要的是，必须阐明自然秩序的积极的替代理念，并概述如何实现这一理念的策略。

on the one hand，this involves the insight that it is not exploitation，either monarchical or democratic，but private property，production，and voluntary exchange that are the ultimate sources of human civilization.on the other hand，in order to approach the goal of a nonexploitative social order，which we may call private property anarchy，the idea of majoritarianism should be turned against democratic rule itself。Under any form of government，even under democracy，the ruling class makes up only a small proportion of the total population.given this fact，it would appear possible to persuade a majority of the voters that it is adding insult to injury to let those living from other peoples’ taxes have a say in how high these taxes are.The majority of voters could decide，democratically，to take the right to vote away from all government employees and everyone who receives government benefits，whether they are welfare recipients or professors at statefunded universities.

一方面，这种观点认为，人类文明的最终源泉不是剥削，也不是君主制或民主制，而是私有财产、生产和自愿交换。另一方面，为了实现无剥削社会秩序的目标，我们可以将其称为私有财产无政府状态，多数主义的思想应该反对民主统治本身。在任何形式的政府中，即使是民主政府，统治阶级也只占总人口的一小部分。鉴于这一事实，似乎有可能说服大多数选民，让那些靠征收他人税款为生的人对这些税款的高低拥有发言权，这无异于雪上加霜。大多数选民可以民主决策，剥夺所有政府雇员和所有享受政府福利者的投票权，无论他们是福利领取者还是国家资助大学的教授。

Moreover，in conjunction with this strategy，it is necessary to recognize the overriding importance of secession.Secession always involves the breaking away of a smaller from a larger population.It is thus a vote against the consolidating tendency of democracy and majoritarianism.Provided that the process of secession results in small enough political units，it becomes possible for a few individuals，based on the popular recognition of their economic independence，outstanding professional achievement，morally impeccable personal life，superior judgment and taste，and courage，to rise to the rank of natural，voluntarily acknowledged authorities who lend legitimacy to the idea of a natural order of competing （nonmonopolistic） judges and overlapping jurisdictions.such a pattern exists even now in the arena of international trade and travel，which is a pure privatelaw society，and could be instituted more pervasively as the answer to monarchy and democracy。

此外，结合这一策略，有必要认识到分离的极端重要性。分离总是涉及从较多人口中分离出较少人口。因此，它是对民主和多数主义巩固趋势的反对票。只要分离过程产生了足够小的政治单位，少数人就有可能凭借其经济上的独立性、杰出的专业成就、道德上无可挑剔的个人生活、卓越的判断力和品味以及勇气，晋升为自然的、自愿承认的权威，为竞争性（非垄断性）法官和重叠管辖权的自然秩序提供合法性。这种模式甚至现在就存在于国际贸易和旅行领域，这是一个纯粹的私法社会，而且可以作为对君主制和民主制的回应，在更大范围内实行。

leSSon THreE：againST relativism （Positivism）

第三课：反对相对主义（实证主义）

There are no immutable laws of history。The events of the past were not inevitable，nor is our future written in stone.Rather，history as well the future course of events has been and will be determined by ideas，both true and false.The formation of states，the tendency toward political central ization，the transition from monarchical to democratic rule，as well as the resistance to governmental exploitation，the peaceful or violent overthrow of governments，secessionist movements，and the continued existence of a System of anarchical relations within the sphere of international politics and trade （the absence of a world government） were and are the result of chang ing and conflicting ideas，and the relative distribution and strength of these ideas in the minds of individuals.

历史没有永恒不变的法则。过去的事件并非不可避免，我们的未来也并非一成不变。恰恰相反，历史以及未来事件的进程已经并将由各种观念决定，这些观念有真有假。国家的形成，政治集中化的趋势，从君主制向民主制的过渡，以及对政府剥削的反抗，和平或暴力推翻政府，分离主义运动，以及国际政治和贸易领域无政府关系体系的持续存在（世界政府的缺失），过去和现在都是不断变化和相互冲突的观念和这些观念在个人头脑中的相对分布和力量的结果。

The history of the West，and the outstanding role of the Western world in human history，is intertwined with two uniquely Western intellectual contributions：Greek rationalism and Christianity。The West has come to incorporate Greek and Christian ideas，and then，as a result of the renais sance，reformation，Counterreformation，Enlightenment，and Romanti cism，the successive disintegration and devolution of their synthesis into the present ideology of Secular relativism （Positivism）。

西方的历史，以及西方世界在人类历史上的突出作用，与西方独有的两种思想贡献交织在一起：希腊理性主义和基督教。西方吸收了希腊和基督教的思想，然后经过文艺复兴、宗教改革、反宗教改革、启蒙运动和浪漫主义，它们的综合体相继解体并退化演变成现在的世俗相对主义（实证主义）的意识形态。

Classical Greek thought，culminating in the work of Aristotle，contrib uted a thorough rationalist attitude to the West：the view of man as a rational animal，the highest respect for logic and logical reasoning，a strong belief in the existence of natural law and the intelligibility of nature and man，and a firm realism and “thisworldliness.” However，as the byproduct of rationalism，Greece also produced Sophism，skepticism，and relativism.[468]

希腊古典思想以亚里士多德的著作为巅峰，为西方贡献了彻底的理性主义态度：将人视为理性动物，对逻辑和逻辑推理推崇备至，坚信自然法则的存在和自然与人类的可理解性，以及坚定的现实主义和 “现世性”。然而，作为理性主义的副产品，希腊也产生了诡辩主义、怀疑主义和相对主义。

Mainstream Christianity，after confused beginnings and numerous abortive schisms stemming from major inconsistencies and contradictions in the System of the Holy Scripture，adopted Greek thisworldliness （if only as a temporal，and transitory end）； it affirmed the genesis passage “be fruitful，and multiply，and replenish the earth； and subdue it； and have dominion over the fish of the sea，and over the fowl of the air，and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth”； and it adopted the Greeks’ high regard for rationality and a firm belief in the intelligibility of nature and man and in the possibility of human progress.Mainstream Christian ity made several other unique contributions.Even more than Greek pagan ism，Christian monotheism placed emphasis on logical consistency and on the idea of the universality of law and the unity of thought。In addition，in viewing each man as created in the divine image，Christianity gave the Greek idea of natural law a decisively individualistic turN.Natural human rights in particular became individual human rights，which applied equally to every human being and united all of mankind in a single oecumene.

主流基督教，在经历了混乱的开端和无数次因《圣经》体系中的重大矛盾和不一致而导致的失败分裂之后，采用了希腊式的现实性（即使只是作为一种暂时的、短暂的目的）；它肯定了创世纪的经文 “要多结果子，繁衍生息，使大地充满生机；征服大地，管理海里的鱼、空中的鸟、地上走动的一切生物”；它接受了希腊人的坚定信念：崇尚理性，坚信自然和人类的可理解性以及人类进步的可能性。主流基督教还做出了其他一些独特的贡献。与希腊异教相比，基督教一神论更加强调逻辑的一致性、法律的普遍性和思想的统一性。此外，基督教认为每个人都是按照神的形象创造的，这使希腊的自然法思想具有了决定性的个人主义色彩的转变。自然人权尤其成为个人人权，平等地适用于每一个人，并将全人类团结在一个统一的世界中。

Moreover，mainstream Christianity gradually freed itself of its largely cultist beginnings when the basic Christian unit was a sect，based on com munal or even communist property ownership and controlled by a cult leader or hierarchy of leaders.Influenced by its long contact with Rome and the Roman family and kinship System，mainstream Christianity accepted the individual family and the private household as the basic unit of civil life （and communal ownership was relegated to monasteries and monastic life）。Furthermore，the family provided the model of the Christian social order。Just as a hierarchical order existed in each family，so there was a hierarchical order within the Christian community of children，parents，priests，bishops，archbishops，cardinals，the pope，and finally the transcen dent God as the Father in heaveN.Likewise，regarding earthly affairs，soci ety was viewed as a quasifamilial hierarchy of free holders，knights，vassals，lords，and feudal kings，tied together by an elaborate System of kinship relations.And analogous to the supremacy of spiritual values in the family，the earthly power of lords and kings was held to be subordinate and sub ject to the ultimate，spiritualintellectual authority of priests，bishops，the pope，and，ultimately，God.

此外，当基督教的基本单位是一个教派时，主流基督教逐渐摆脱了最初的邪教色彩，它以公有制甚至共产制为基础，由邪教领袖或领袖阶层控制。受其与罗马的长期接触以及罗马家庭和亲属制度的影响，主流基督教接受个人家庭和私人住户作为公民生活的基本单位（公有制被归入修道院和修道生活）。此外，家庭提供了基督教社会秩序的典范。正如每个家庭中都存在等级秩序一样，基督教团体中也存在等级秩序，包括孩子、父母、牧师、主教、大主教、红衣主教、教皇，以及作为天父的超验上帝。同样，在世俗事务方面，社会被视为一个准家族等级制度，由自由人、骑士、封臣、领主和封建君主组成，由一套复杂的亲属关系网联系在一起。与精神价值在家庭中的至高无上地位类似，领主和君主的世俗权力被认为从属于并服从于牧师、主教、教皇以及上帝的终极精神和知识权威。

In effect，this combination of individualism，universalism，the family and kinship orientation，the acknowledgement of a multilayered social rank order and the recognition of the supremacy of the universal—supraterrito rial—Church over any particular lord or king shaped Christianity into a powerful ideological weapon against the growth of state power。[469] However，Christian doctrine as embodied in Scholastic philosophy suffered from an inescapable internal contradiction.Scholasticism did not succeed in bridg ing the gulf between belief and revealed dogma，on the one hand，and knowledge and intelligibility，on the other。Hence，its acceptance of rationalism was ultimately only conditional。[470] As a result of a series of ideologi cal challenges，the Scholastic System slowly disintegrated，and the ideological bulwark that it once provided against the encroachment of state power gradually eroded.

实际上，个人主义、普世主义、家庭和亲缘关系取向、对多层次社会等级秩序的承认，以及对普世教会高于任何特定领主或君主的至高无上地位的承认，将基督教塑造成一种强大的意识形态武器，以对抗国家权力的增长。然而，经院哲学所体现的基督教教义存在着无法回避的内在矛盾。经院哲学并没有成功地弥合信仰和启示教条与知识和可理解性之间的鸿沟。因此，它最终只是有条件地接受理性主义。在一系列意识形态挑战的作用下，”经院体系 “逐渐瓦解，它曾经抵御国家权力侵蚀的意识形态堡垒也逐渐受到侵蚀。

with the renaissance，Greek paganism and secularism returned to the ideological scene.Moral relativism spread，and ideologues of unlimited state power such as Machiavelli rose to prominence，preparing the intellectual ground for numerous local tyrants and despots.Attention shifted away from the sciences.mysticism flourished.increased emphasis was placed on the arts，and，as a reflection of the newly found “freedom from” religious and moral constraints，the arts became increasingly profane and sensual，as in the erotic paintings of Correggio and the writings of Boccaccio and Rabelais.[471]

随着文艺复兴的到来，希腊异教和世俗主义重新回到了意识形态领域。道德相对主义盛行，马基雅维利（Machiavelli）等主张无限国家权力的思想家崭露头角，为无数地方暴君和专制者奠定了思想基础。神秘主义盛行。艺术受到越来越多的重视，作为新发现的 “摆脱 “宗教和道德束缚的一种“自由”的反映，艺术变得越来越世俗和感性，如科雷乔的色情绘画以及薄伽丘和拉伯雷的著作。

In ideological reaction to these “decadent” tendencies，which had also affected the mainstream Church，the reformation brought a sharp return to religion.However，the new Protestant religiosity was decid edly reactionary：antirationalist and egalitarian.faith，held to be the sole path to salvation，was viewed as the foundation of Christianity，whereas that “harlot reason，” as Luther called it，was held in contempt。God’s will was considered unintelligible and irrational； the Augustinian doctrine of human predestination was revived； the fate of each person was held to be dependent upon the grace of God and His unfathomable decree.At the same time，the Bible was elevated to the rank of the highest religious authority，and the idea of a “universal priesthood，” based on everyone’s personal Bible reading and unmediated through the spiritual hierarchy of the Church，was promoted.Each person came to be viewed as an indepen dent and equal religious authority，subject only to his own conscience.The formerly established distinction between a secular life and an institution ally separate religious life of priests and monks was erased，and all of life was viewed as an exercise in Christian faith.[472]

这些 “颓废 “倾向也影响到了主流教会，宗教改革在意识形态上对这些倾向做出了反应，带来了宗教的急剧回归。然而，新教的宗教信仰带有明显的反理性主义和平等主义的反动色彩。信仰是唯一的救赎之路，被视为基督教的基础，而路德所称的 “妓女理性 “则受到蔑视。上帝的旨意被认为是不可理解和非理性的；奥古斯丁的人类宿命论复活了；每个人的命运都取决于上帝的恩典和他深不可测的旨意。与此同时，《圣经》被提升到最高宗教权威的地位，基于每个人对《圣经》的阅读，不受教会精神等级的影响，“普世祭司”的观念得到了推广。每个人都被视为独立、平等的宗教权威，只服从于自己的良心。过去世俗生活与牧师和僧侣的制度化的独立宗教生活之间的区别被抹去，所有的生活都被视为基督教信仰的实践。

As a result of antirationalism，the development of the sciences suffered，and literature and the arts declined.Even more momentous，how ever，were the effects of Protestant egalitarianisM.Not only did it lead to the destruction of the unity of the Church，but without any recognizable spiritual ranks，that is，with the democratization of religious authority，the Protestant movement quickly disintegrated into numerous branches.Long submerged strands of early Christianity，such as Millenarianism，Anabap tism，and communism，resurfaced.The proliferation of religious confes sions，cults，and sects，incompatible with each another but each grounded in the Holy Scripture as the highest authority and hermetically shielded from all rational inquiry，promoted social disintegration，mutual hostility，and finally warfare on a scale and of a brutality unsurpassed in the West until the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.[473] Moreover，in breaking up the unity of the Catholic Church and undermining the idea of a spiritual rank order，the Protestant revolution isolated and weakened the individual visàvis earthly rulers.The rulers，relieved of the countervailing authority of a universal Church and its hierarchy，eagerly exploited this opportunity for an expansion of state power by establishing numerous territorial Churches and by merging the secular and the ecclesiastic powers in their own hands.The Counterreformation duplicated within the remaining Catholic world what the reformation had accomplished for the Protestant world.Everywhere，formerly weak feudal kings became mighty，absolute mon archs.[474] in reaction to reformation and Counterreformation，then，the seventeenth and eighteenthcentury Enlightenment brought a decisive return of rationalism.But the rationalism of the Enlightenment suffered—and ultimately succumbed—because of two fundamental flaws.

反理性主义的结果是，科学发展受挫，文学和艺术衰落。新教平等主义的影响甚至更为巨大。它不仅破坏了教会的统一，而且在没有任何可识别的精神等级的情况下，即随着宗教权威的民主化，新教运动很快解体为众多分支。千禧年主义、再洗礼主义和共产主义等早期基督教中沉寂已久的派别重新浮出水面。宗教忏悔、邪教和教派的激增，它们之间彼此互不相容，但都以圣经为最高权威，并严密地摒弃了一切理性探究，加剧了社会解体与相互敌视，并最终引发了战争，其规模和残酷程度直到 19 世纪末和 20 世纪在西方都是空前的。此外，新教革命打破了天主教会的统一，破坏了精神等级秩序的观念，从而孤立和削弱了个人与世俗统治者的关系。统治者们摆脱了普世教会及其等级制度的对抗权威，急切地利用这一机会扩张国家权力，建立了许多地方教会，并将世俗权力和教会权力统一到自己手中。反宗教改革在残留的天主教世界复制了宗教改革在新教世界的成就。在所有地方，昔日软弱的封建君主变成了强大的专制君主。作为对宗教改革和反宗教改革的反叛，十七和十八世纪的启蒙运动带来了理性主义的决定性回归。但是，启蒙运动的理性主义由于两个根本性的缺陷而受挫并最终屈服。

on the one hand，in reaction to the religious fervor stirred by the reformation and the Counterreformation，the rationalism of the Enlightenment was significantly anticlerical and even antiChristian.on the other hand，influenced by the Protestantism，it was a decisively egalitarian rationalism.[475]

一方面，作为对宗教改革和反宗教改革所激起的宗教狂热的反叛，启蒙运动的理性主义具有明显的反宗教甚至反基督教色彩。另一方面，受新教的影响，它又是一种决定性的平等主义的理性主义。

The recognition of the supremacy and autonomy of reason and a renewed interest in the Stoic philosophy and late Scholasticism （Molina，Suarez，Mariana） led to the development of a new secular，purely rational natural rights doctrine centered on the notions of selfownership，private property，and contract：to Althusius，Grotius，Pufendorf，Locke，Thoma sius，and Wolff。The earthly ruler was seen as subject to the same universal and eternal principles of justice as everyone else，and a state either would derive its justification from a “contract” between private property owners or it could not be justified.[476] There remained significant differences as regards the precise meaning of “contract” （Did it bind only the original signers？ Could it be revoked？），but there can be little doubt that，under the grow ing ideological influence of the natural rights doctrine，the power of kings became increasingly constrained.[477]

对理性至高无上和自主性的承认，以及对斯多葛派哲学和晚期经院哲学（莫利纳、苏亚雷斯、马里亚纳）的重新关注，导致了一种新的世俗的、纯粹理性的自然权利学说的发展，其核心是自我所有权、私有财产和契约的概念。（包括：阿尔图修斯、格劳秀斯、普芬多夫、洛克、托马斯·修斯和沃尔夫。）世俗的统治者被视为与其他人一样受制于普遍而永恒的公正原则，国家的正当性要么来自私人财产所有者之间的 “契约”，要么就是不正当的。关于 “契约 “的确切含义（它是否只对最初的签署者有约束力？它是否可以被撤销？），仍然存在很大分歧，但毫无疑问的是，在自然权利学说日益高涨的意识形态影响下，君主的权力越来越受到限制。

However，owing to its anticlericalism （as in Voltaire，for instance） and its egalitarianism，which went as far as to deny all innate differences among human beings and believed all men to be equally capable of ratio nal thought （as in Helvetius and，under empiricist auspices，Locke，for instance），Enlightenment rationalism committed a fatal sociological error。It was blind to the fact that，in the real world，where men are not equal，its ideal of a purely contractual society based on the institution of private property could be maintained and defended against internal or external assault and invasion only if a society possessed a distinctly hierarchical structure，that is，a voluntarily acknowledged rank order of horizontally and vertically interconnected intermediary institutions and authorities； and that Christianity and the hierarchy of the Church would have to function as one of the more important of these intermediary authorities.[478] Misled by its anticlericalism and egalitarianism，Enlightenment rationalism furthered the tendency，begun with the Protestant revolution，of isolating the individual visàvis worldly rulers：of eliminating all intermediate authorities and subjecting each individual equally and directly to the sole authority of the state，thereby promoting the centralization of state power。

然而，启蒙理性主义由于其反宗教主义（如伏尔泰）和平等主义，甚至否认人与人之间的一切先天差异，认为所有人都具有同等的理性思维能力（如赫尔维蒂乌斯和秉持经验主义的洛克），犯下了致命的社会学错误。它无视了这样一个事实，即在现实世界中，人与人之间并不平等，只有当一个社会拥有明显的等级结构，即自愿承认的横向和纵向相互联系的中介机构和权威的等级秩序时，它理想的以私有财产制度为基础的纯契约社会才能得以维持，并抵御内部或外部的攻击和入侵；基督教和教会的等级制度必须作为这些中介机构中较为重要的中介权威之一发挥作用。启蒙理性主义被其反教权主义和平等主义所误导，进一步推动了新教革命所产生的将个人与世俗统治者隔离开来的趋势：消除所有中间权威，使每个人平等地、直接地服从于国家的唯一权威，从而促进了国家权力的集中。

The fundamental sociological error of this view was revealed by the events of the French revolution.When the absolute monarchy finally collapsed to the applause of almost all Enlightenment philosophers，nothing was left to fill the existing power vacuum.The authority and economic inde pendence of the Church was ruined，and all formerly existing feudal bonds and institutions were destroyed.Consequently，to the consternation of most of the Enlightenment，the revolution quickly degenerated into chaos，mob rule，terror，dictatorship，nationalist aggression，and，finally，the restoration of the ancien régime.

法国大革命揭示了这种观点在社会学上的根本错误。当绝对君主制最终在几乎所有启蒙哲学家的欢呼声中垮台时，没有任何东西可以填补现有的权力真空。教会的权威和经济独立性被摧毁了，所有以前存在的封建纽带和制度都被摧毁了。因此，令大多数启蒙运动者惊愕的是，革命很快陷入了混乱、暴民统治、恐怖、独裁统治、民族主义侵略，并最终恢复了旧制度。

As a result，the Enlightenment’s rationalist philosophy was thoroughly discredited.In reaction to the French revolution and the Enlightenment，and inspired by prerevolutionary writers such as JeanJacques Rousseau，Romanticism came to hold sway。[479] Natural law theory was thrown out。According to the Romantic world view，no absolutely and universally true human rights and social laws existed.History，rather than theory，became the center of attention.Each individual，each tribe，and each people was viewed as having its own unique history； and because no absolute standards of right and wrong existed，each history was held to be of equal worth （his torical relativism）。History was studied neither to pass judgment on the past nor to learn anything for the future，but solely to reveal the diver sity of mankind and human tradition （multiculturalism）。Devoid of any theory，history possessed no practical purpose or implication.It was studied for its own sake，with the sole purpose of “inner” intellectual enrichment。Likewise，each religion was seen to possess a right of its own：mysticism，Platonism，Buddhism，paganism，and deism no less than Christianity； and religiosity，too，was viewed as an entirely private affair，as a matter of “inner” choice without any practical implications.Instead of viewing knowledge and beliefs as tools of action，Romanticism considered them instruments of aesthetic or poetic expression，and the Romantic attitude toward the exter nal world of physical events was one of passive contemplation，quietism，withdrawal，resignation，or even fatalisM.The outside world was held to be unintelligible，driven by irrational or mystic forces，and ultimately of no concerN.The only matter of genuine importance was each person’s “inner” freedom of thought and imagination.

结果，启蒙运动的理性主义哲学彻底丧失了信誉。作为对法国大革命和启蒙运动的反动，受到前革命作家如让·雅克·卢梭的启发，浪漫主义开始占据主导地位。自然法理论被抛弃。根据浪漫主义的世界观，不存在绝对和普遍正确的人权和社会法律。历史而非理论成为人们关注的焦点。每个人、每个部落和每个民族都被视为有自己独特的历史；由于不存在绝对的是非标准，每段历史都被认为具有同等价值（历史相对主义）。研究历史既不是为了评判过去，也不是为了向未来学习什么，而只是为了揭示人类和人类传统的多样性（多元文化主义）。历史没有任何理论，没有任何实际目的和意义。研究历史只是为了研究自身，其唯一目的是丰富 “内心 “的知识。同样，每种宗教都被视为拥有自己的权利：神秘主义、柏拉图主义、佛教、异教和神教，正如基督教一样；宗教信仰也被视为完全私人的事情，是 “内心 “的选择，没有任何实际意义。浪漫主义不把知识和信仰视为行动的工具，而是把它们视为审美或诗意表达的工具，浪漫主义对外部世界的物理事件所持的态度是一种消极的沉思冥想、清静无为、沉默退缩、顺其自然，甚至是宿命论。人们认为外部世界是不可理解的，是由非理性或神秘力量驱动的，最终与己无关。唯一真正重要的是每个人思想和想象的“内在”自由。

Not surprisingly，the power of the state grew with the influence of Romanticism.[480] If history is viewed as the source and origin of “right，” then any state is undoubtedly “just”； and if state power increases，it cannot do so except by “historical right。” Accordingly，the state and the growth of state power should always be met with a contemplative attitude of resigned acceptance.What better message could a ruler want to hear？ Due to a gaping hole within the Romantic world view，however，its influence soon faded into the background，to be complemented and finally overshadowed by Positivism，the dominant philosophical paradigm of our age.

毫不奇怪，国家权力随着浪漫主义的影响而加强。如果将历史视为 “权利 “的源泉和起源，那么任何国家无疑都是 “公正的”；如果国家权力增长，那么除了 “历史的权利 “之外，它不可能加强。因此，对于国家和国家权力的增长，应该始终抱着一种听天由命的沉思冥想的姿态。统治者还能听到比这更好的消息吗？然而，由于浪漫主义世界观中存在巨大的漏洞，它的影响很快就消失在历史的背影后，随之就被我们这个时代占主导地位的哲学范式实证主义所补充并最终完全取代。

The romantic outlook suffered from the obvious defect that，even if one accepted it as plausible for the social world，it still could not account for the existence of the natural sciences and technology。Clearly，these did not derive their justification from history，and the study of nature and technol ogy （unlike that of society） was not disinterested and undertaken for its own sake.Rather，the natural sciences and technology apparently derived their justification from their present practical success.within this realm at least，identifiable progress existed，and it was definitely not the case that each his torical era or episode could be regarded as equally right and worthy。Positiv ism offered an attractive way out of these ideological difficulties.

浪漫主义观点有一个明显的缺陷，那就是即使人们认为它对社会世界而言是合理的，但它也无法解释自然科学和技术的存在。显然，自然科学和技术并不是从历史中获得合理性的，而且对自然和技术的研究（与对社会的研究不同）并不是无私的，也不是为了研究而研究。相反，自然科学和技术的合理性显然来自于它们目前实际的成功。至少在这一领域中，存在着可识别的进步，而绝对不是每个历史时代或历史事件都可以被视为同样正确和有价值。实证主义为解决这些意识形态难题提供了一条极具吸引力的途径。

Influenced by eighteenthcentury empiricism，in particular by Hume，nineteenth and twentiethcentury Positivism shared most of its antiration alist assumptions with the Romantics.Like the Romantics，but in sharp contrast to rationalist Enlightenment，the Positivists rejected the idea of a rational ethic and a natural rights theory。value judgments were viewed as arbitrary，a matter of personal taste，and incapable of rational justification.reason was not the master，but the slave of the passions.Natural rights the ory in particular was nothing but nonsensical metaphysics.Indeed，insofar as any difference existed between Romanticism and Positivism，it consisted of the fact that the moral relativism of the Positivists was apparently even more extreme and farreaching。Whereas the Romantics relativized religion，they still recognized the value of some religion； and，while the Romantics denied the existence of absolute values，they still valued history and tradi tion.In contrast，Positivism，in this respect very much like Enlightenment rationalism，was decidedly secularist （religion was held to be merely hocus pocus） and unhistorical （the past possessed no special value）。

受 18 世纪经验主义，特别是休谟的影响，19 世纪和 20 世纪的实证主义与浪漫派共享其大部分反理性主义的假设。与浪漫主义者一样，但与理性主义启蒙运动形成鲜明对比的是，实证主义者反对理性伦理和自然权利理论。价值判断被认为是武断的，是个人品味的问题，无法进行理性辩护。理性不是主宰，而是激情的奴隶。尤其是自然权利理论，不过是毫无意义的形而上学。事实上，如果说浪漫主义与实证主义有什么不同的话，那就是实证主义者的道德相对主义显然更加极端和深远。浪漫主义者将宗教相对化，但他们仍然承认某些宗教的价值；浪漫主义者否认绝对价值的存在，但他们仍然重视历史和传统。与此相反，实证主义在这方面与启蒙理性主义非常相似，具有明显的世俗主义色彩（认为宗教只是虚无缥缈的东西）和非历史主义色彩（认为过去没有特殊价值）。

Positivism shared with Romanticism the relativistic view that reason is incapable of recognizing any necessarily universal and immutable posi tive （causal） laws.Indeed，the denial of the very possibility of，in Kantian terminology，true synthetic a priori propositions is one of the cornerstones of Positivism.[481] According to Positivism，no such thing as nonhypotheti cally true positive （empirical） laws exists.In other words，nothing about reality can be known to be true a priori。Rather，all empirical，knowledge is hypothetical knowledge，and all nonhypothetical knowledge is analyti cal knowledge which contains no empirical information whatsoever but consists merely of arbitrary symbolic conventions and definitions.The only difference between the Positivist and the Romantic relativisms was a psy chological one.The Romantic’s relativism was that of an artist，that is，a poet，novelist，or historian，whose subject matter was the inner world of meaning，purpose，expression，and emotion.Accordingly，he tended to view individuals as different （unique），and he approached his subject matter in a passive mode to develop his private appreciation，empathy，or sympathy。

实证主义与浪漫主义一样，都持相对主义观点，认为理性不可能认识到任何必然普遍和永恒不变的实证的（因果）规律。事实上，用康德的术语来说，否定存在正确的先验综合命题的可能性，是实证主义的基石之一。根据实证主义，不存在非假定性的正确的实证（经验）规律。换句话说，现实中没有任何东西可以先验地知道是正确的。相反，所有经验知识都是假设的知识，而所有非假设知识都是分析知识，它们不包含任何经验信息，而仅仅由任意的符号约定和定义组成。实证主义与浪漫主义相对主义之间唯一的区别是心理上的区别。浪漫的相对主义是艺术家，是诗人、小说家或历史学家的相对主义，其主题是意义、目的、表达和情感的内在世界。因此，他倾向于将个人视为与众不同的（独特的），他以一种消极被动的方式来处理他的主题，以培养他个人的鉴赏力、同理心或同情心。

In contrast，the Positivist’s relativism was that of an engineer，an experi mental physicist，or a chemist。His subject matter was the external physical world of sensory data，and he tended to view individuals as identical （equal）。He approached his subject matter with an activist attitude，one of physical manipulation and interference.

与此相反，实证主义者的相对主义是工程师、实验物理学家或化学家的相对主义。他的研究对象是由感官数据组成的外部物理世界，他倾向于将个体视为相同（平等）的。他以一种积极的态度，一种物理操控和干预的态度来研究他的课题。

In fact，as can be seen from the Positivists’ conception of logic，it can not be claimed that Positivist relativism is even less relativistic。While the Romantics viewed logic and deductive reasoning as on a par with intuition and mythical revelation，the Positivists considered it as empty of all empirical content。However，due to its activistic （experimental） attitude，Positiv istic philosophy at least appeared to make room for the idea of a posteriori law—of trial and error，hypothetical conjecture，confirmation and refuta tion—and，hence，of the possibility of scientific progress （as manifested in the field of the natural sciences）。[482]

事实上，从实证主义者的逻辑概念中可以看出，实证主义的相对主义并不具有相对性。浪漫主义者把逻辑和演绎推理与直觉和神话启示相提并论，而实证主义者则认为逻辑和演绎推理没有任何经验内容。然而，由于其积极的（实验性的）态度，实证主义哲学至少似乎为后验法——试错、假定性猜想、证实和反驳——的思想留出了空间，从而为科学进步的可能性（如在自然科学领域的表现）留出了空间。

If the contemplative relativism of the Romantics had been good for the health of the state and the growth of state power，the growing influence of the activist relativism of the Positivists proved to be even better。According to Positivism，ethics is not a cognitive discipline.No normative statement has any better foundation than any other such statement。But then，what is wrong with everyone trying to enforce and impose on others whatever one wishes？ Surely nothing； everything goes.Ethics is reduced to the problem of what one “can get away with” doing。What better message could there be for those in power？ It is precisely what they want to hear：might is and makes right!

如果说浪漫主义者的沉思冥想的相对主义有利于国家的健康发展和国家权力的增长，那么实证主义者的积极的相对主义的影响则更大。根据实证主义，伦理学不是一门认知学科。任何规范性声明都没有比其他任何此类声明更好的基础。那么，每个人都想把自己想要的东西强加于人，这有什么错呢？当然没有错，一切皆有可能。伦理被简化为一个人 “可以逃脱 “做什么的问题。对于当权者来说，还有比这更好的消息吗？这正是他们想听到的：强权即公理！

Similarly，they will be thrilled about the message of Positivism as regards the social sciences.In the realm of the natural sciences，the Positivist doctrine is relatively harmless.It has not，nor could it have，fundamentally changed the course of the natural sciences.However，the same cannot be said about the social sciences.Under the growing influence of Positivism，economics in particular has been destroyed beyond recognition，and this once powerful ideological fortress against the encroachment of state power has been removed.[483]

同样，他们也会对实证主义在社会科学领域所传递的信息感到兴奋。在自然科学领域，实证主义学说相对无害。它没有，也不可能从根本上改变自然科学的进程。然而，社会科学却并非如此。在实证主义日益增长的影响下，尤其是经济学已被摧毁得面目全非，这个曾经抵御国家权力侵蚀的强大思想堡垒已经荡然无存。

From the Christian Middle ages through spanish Scholasticism to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of Enlightenment，parallel to and intertwined with the development of “normative” natural rights theory，a Systematic body of economic theory developed，culminating in the writings of Cantillon and Turgot。According to this intellectual tradition—carried on in the nineteenth century by Say，Senior，Cairnes，menger，and Böhm Bawerk，and in the twentieth century by Mises，Robbins，and Rothbard— economics was viewed as a “logic of action.” Starting with selfevident propositions and combining these with a few empirical and empirically testable assumptions，economics was conceived as an axiomaticdeductive science and economic theorems as propositions which were at the same time real istic and nonhypothetically or a priori true.[484] Consider，for instance，the following economic propositions：In every voluntary exchange，both part ners must expect to profit，they must evaluate the things to be exchanged as having unequal value，and they must have opposite preference orders.Or：Whenever an exchange is not voluntary，but coerced，such as highway robbery or taxation，one exchange party benefits at the expense of the other。Or：Whenever minimum wage laws are enforced that require wage rates to be higher than existing market wages，involuntary unemployment will result。Or：Whenever the quantity of money is increased while the demand for money remains unchanged，the purchasing power of money will fall。Or：Any supply of money is equally，“optimal，” such that no increase in the money supply can raise the overall standard of living （while it can have redistributive effects）。Or：Collective ownership of all factors of production makes cost accounting impossible，and hence leads to permanent misal locations.Or：Taxation of income producers，other things remaining the same，raises their effective rate of time preference，and hence leads to a lower output of goods produced.Apparently，these theorems contain knowledge about reality，and yet they do not seem to be hypothetical （empirically falsi fiable） propositions but rather true by definition.

从基督教中世纪到西班牙经院哲学，再到十七和十八世纪的启蒙运动，与 “规范性 “自然权利理论的发展平行并交织在一起，形成了一套系统的经济理论体系，在坎蒂隆（Cantillon）和杜尔哥（Turgot）的著作中达到顶峰。根据这一思想传统，经济学在 19 世纪由萨伊、西尼尔、凯尔恩斯、门格尔和庞巴维克继承，在 20 世纪由米塞斯、罗宾斯和罗斯巴德继承，被视为一种 “行动的逻辑”。从不证自明的命题出发，结合一些经验性的、可检验的假设，经济学被视为一门公理演绎科学，经济定理被视为既现实的和非假设的或先验正确的命题。例如，请思考以下经济学命题：在每一次自愿交换中，交换双方都必定期望获利，他们必定认为要交换的东西是不等价的，他们必定有相反的偏好排序。或者：每当交换不是自愿的，而是被迫的，如高速公路抢劫或征税，交换的一方受益而另一方受损。或者：无论何时执行最低工资法，要求工资率高于现有市场工资，都会导致非自愿失业。或者：当货币数量增加而货币需求不变时，货币的购买力就会下降。或者：任何货币供应量都是等效的，”最合适的”，因此，货币供应量的增加都不能提高总体生活水平（尽管它可以产生再分配效应）。或者：所有生产要素的集体所有制使成本核算成为不可能，从而导致永久性的错配。或者：在其他条件不变的情况下，对收入生产者征税会提高他们的有效时间偏好率，从而导致产品产量下降。显然，这些定理包含了关于现实的知识，但它们似乎并不是假设的（经验上可证伪的）命题，而是从定义上讲是正确的。

According to Positivism，however，this cannot be so。Insofar as these propositions claim to be empirically meaningful，they must by hypotheses，forever subject to empirical confirmation or falsification.one could for mulate the very opposite of the above propositions without thereby stating anything can be recognized from the outset，a priori，as false and nonsensecal。Experience will have to decide the matter。Thus，in assuming the Posi tivist doctrine，the highway robber，taxman，union official，or chairman of the Federal reserve Board would act legitimately，from a scientific point of view，in claiming that taxation benefits the taxed and increases produc tive output，minimum wage laws increase employment，and the creation of paper money generates allaround prosperity。As a good Positivist，one would have to admit that these are merely hypotheses.with the predicted effects being “beneficial，” however，they surely should be tested.After all，one would not close one’s eyes to new experience，and one would always be willing to react flexibly and open mindedly，contingent upon the outcome of such experience.Yet，if the outcome is not as hypothesized，and the robbed or taxed do not appear to benefit，employment actually decreases，or economic cycles rather than allaround prosperity ensue，one can always take recourse，“scientifically legitimate，” to the possibility of “immunizing” one’s hypotheses.For whatever empirical evidence one brings forward against them，as soon as one adopts Positivism，the robber’s or the taxman’s case is safe from decisive criticism，because any failure can always be ascribed to some as yet uncontrolled intervening variable.Not even the most perfectly conducted experiment could change this situation because it would never be possible to control all variables that might conceivably have some influ ence on the variable to be explained or the result to be produced.No matter what the charges brought against the robber，the taxman，or the chairman of the Federal reserve Board，Positivist philosophy will always allow each to preserve and rescue the “hard core” of his “research prograM.” Experience merely informs us that a particular experiment did not reach its goal，but it can never tell us if a slightly different experiment will produce any different results.Why，then，would the robber，the taxman，or the chairman of the Federal reserve Board not want to play down all apparently falsifying expe riences as merely accidental，so long as they can personally profit from con ducting their robbing，taxing，or moneycreating experiments？ Why would he not want to interpret all apparent falsifications as experiences that were produced by some unfortunately neglected circumstance and that would disappear or turn into their very opposite，revealing the “true” relationship between taxes，minimum wage laws，the creation of money，and prosperity，once these circumstances were controlled？ [485]

然而，根据实证主义，情况并非如此。只要这些命题声称具有经验意义，它们就必须是假说，就必须接受经验的证实或证伪。我们可以提出与上述命题恰恰相反的命题，但并不因此说明任何事情，我们从一开始就可以先验地认识到，这些命题是虚假的、无意义的。经验将决定一切。因此，无论是高速公路强盗、税务员、工会官员，还是联邦储备委员会主席，在假设实证主义学说时，都会从科学的角度出发，合法地宣称税收有利于被征税人并增加生产产出，最低工资法会增加就业，纸币的创造会带来全面繁荣。作为一名优秀的实证主义者，我们必须承认这些只是假设。然而，如果预测的效果是 “有益的”，那么它们肯定应该得到检验。毕竟，人们不会对新的经验视而不见，而且总是愿意根据这些经验的结果作出灵活和开放的反应。然而，如果结果并不像假设的那样，被抢劫者或被征税者似乎并没有受益，失业率实际上下降了，或者出现了经济周期而不是全面繁荣，人们总是可以求助于 “科学上合理的 “办法，对自己的假设进行 “免疫”。因为无论人们提出什么样的经验证据，只要采用实证主义，强盗或税务员的案例就不会受到决定性的批评，因为任何失败总是可以归因于某些尚未控制的干预变量。即使是最完美的实验也无法改变这种状况，因为它永远不可能控制所有可能对要解释的变量或要产生的结果有影响的变量。无论对强盗、税务员或联邦储备委员会主席提出怎样的指控，实证主义哲学总能让每个人维护和拯救其 “研究计划 “的 “核心”。经验只是告诉我们某项实验没有达到目的，但它永远无法告诉我们稍有不同的实验是否会产生不同的结果。那么，为什么强盗、税务员或联邦储备委员会主席不想把所有明显虚假的经验都说成是偶然的，只要他们能从他们的抢劫、征税或创造金钱的实验中获得个人利益呢？为什么他不想把所有明显的虚假现象解释为由某些不幸被忽视的情况造成的经验，而一旦这些情况得到控制，这些经验就会消失或变成它们的反面，揭示出税收、最低工资法、货币创造和繁荣之间的 “真实 “关系呢？

The attitude toward economics that Positivism fuels is that of a rel ativist social engineer whose motto is “nothing can be known with certainty to be impossible within the realm of social phenomena and there is nothing that one might not want to try out on one’s fellow men，so long as one keeps an open mind.” Not surprisingly，this message was quickly recognized by the powers that be as a mighty ideological weapon in the pursuit of their goal of increasing their control over civil society and of enriching themselves at the expense of others.Accordingly，lavish support was bestowed on the Positivist movement，and this movement returned the favor by destroying ethics and economics as the traditional bastions of social rationalism.It eradicated from public consciousness a vast body of knowledge that had once constituted a seemingly permanent part of the heritage of Western thought and civilization，paving the ideological ground of the twentieth century as the “age of unlimited social experimentation.”[486]

实证主义对经济学的态度是相对主义的社会工程师的态度，其座右铭是：”在社会现象的领域内，没有什么是不可能的，没有什么是人们不想在自己的同胞身上尝试的，只要人们保持开放的心态”。毫不奇怪，当权者很快就认识到，这一信息是他们实现加强对民间社会的控制和损人利己的目标的强大意识形态武器。因此，实证主义运动得到了慷慨的支持，而这一运动则通过摧毁作为社会理性主义传统堡垒的伦理学和经济学来回报这种支持。它从公众意识中抹去了一个庞大的知识体系，这个体系曾经是西方思想和文明传统中看似永恒的一部分，为20世纪的“无限社会实验时代”奠定了意识形态的基础。

In light of the history of Western philosophy，then，a third lesson follows：a plea for a return to rationalism.such a plea is neither a plea for a return to the Aristotelian Christian rationalism of Thomistic and Scholastic philosophy，nor a plea for a return to the peculiar rationalism of the Enlight enment。As the legitimacy of monarchical rule has waned，the same may be true for Christianity and the Christian ChurcH.In Nietzsche’s words，“Gott ist tot。” Nor would a return to the Christian past be desirable，for Christian rationalism was never more than conditional。Instead，it might be possible to embrace the rationalism expounded more than three centuries ago by Grotius.“Even the will of an omnipotent being，” wrote Grotius，“cannot change the principles of morality or abrogate those fundamental rights that are guaranteed by natural laws.These laws would maintain their objective validity even if we should assume—per impossible—that there is no God or that he does not care for human affairs.”[487]

从西方哲学史的角度来看，第三课是：呼吁回归理性主义。这种呼吁既不是呼吁回归托马斯哲学和经院哲学中亚里士多德式的基督教理性主义，也不是呼吁回归启蒙运动特有的理性主义。随着君主统治合法性的减弱，基督教和基督教会可能也是如此。用尼采的话说，”上帝已死”。回到基督教的过去也不可取，因为基督教的理性主义从来都是有条件的。相反，我们或许可以接受三个多世纪前格劳秀斯所阐述的理性主义。 “格劳秀斯写道：”即使是全能者的意志，也不能改变道德原则或废除自然法则所保障的基本权利。即使我们假设——但这是不可能的——没有上帝或上帝不关心人类事务，这些法则也会保持其客观有效性。

In contrast to Enlightenment rationalism，the rationalism to be restored will have to be unconditional and decidedly nonegalitarian.It must be a rationalism that recognizes，as a primordial fact，the existence of fundamen tal inequalities between human beings.This fact should be celebrated as the foundation of the division of labor and of human civilization.Furthermore，as a result of the diversity of human talents，in every society of any degree of complexity，a few individuals，owing to their superior achievements in terms of wealth，wisdom，bravery，or a combination thereof，will acquire the status of a “natural elite”； and，because of selective mating and marriage and the laws of civil and genetic inheritance，the status as a member of the natural elite will more likely than not be passed on within a relatively few families.It must also be openly acknowledged that the existence of social hierarchies and ranks of authority is not only logically compatible with the idea of the universality of ethical and economic law，but constitutes the sociological presupposition of their very recognition.[488]

与启蒙理性主义相比，要恢复的理性主义必须是无条件的、绝对非平等主义的。它必须是一种理性主义，承认人类之间存在着根本的不平等这一基本的事实。这一事实应作为劳动分工和人类文明的基础而受到赞扬。此外，由于人类才能的多样性，在任何复杂程度的社会中，都会有少数人由于在财富、智慧、勇气等方面取得了卓越的成就，或综合了这些方面的成就，而获得 “自然精英 “的地位；并且，由于择偶和婚姻，以及民事和遗传继承法，自然精英的地位更有可能在相对较少的家庭中传承下去。还必须公开承认，社会等级和权威等级的存在不仅在逻辑上与伦理和经济法则的普遍性相一致，而且构成了承认这些等级的社会学前提。

To maintain that no such thing as a rational ethic exists does not imply “tolerance” and “pluralism，” as champions of Positivism such as Milton Friedman falsely claim，and moral absolutism does not imply “intolerance” and “dictatorship.”[489] To the contrary，without absolute values “tolerance” and “pluralism” are just other arbitrary ideologies，and there is no reason to accept them rather than any others such as cannibalism and slavery。only if absolute values，such as a human right of selfownership exist，that is，only if “pluralism” or “tolerance” are not merely among a multitude of tolerable values，can pluralism and tolerance in fact be safeguarded.[490]

坚持认为不存在理性伦理并不意味着 “宽容 “和 “多元主义”，正如米尔顿-弗里德曼等实证主义的拥趸所妄称的那样，道德绝对主义也并不意味着 “不宽容 “和 “独裁”。相反，如果没有绝对的价值观，“宽容”和“多元主义”只是另一种武断的意识形态，我们没有理由接受它们而不接受其他意识形态，如同类相食和奴隶制。只有存在绝对的价值观，如自我所有权的人权，也就是说，只有 “多元主义 “或 “宽容 “不仅仅是众多可容忍的价值观的一种，多元主义和宽容才能真正得到保障。

Nor is it true，as Friedman suggests，that the Positivist view regarding all empirical knowledge as merely hypothetical implies intellectual “modesty，” whereas those holding the opposite view are guilty of intellectual “hubris.” It is the other way around.If all nonhypothetical knowledge is empirically meaningless and if analytic knowledge is all of nonhypothetical knowledge，then what about the status of this proposition？ If it is taken to be analytic，it is nothing but an arbitrary definition without any empirical content。Any other definition would be equally good （and empty）。If it is assumed to be empirically meaningful，it is a hypothesis according to which empirical knowledge is hypothetical knowledge and empirical tests are tests of hypothetical knowledge.Any other hypothesis or any other empirical tests or inference are then equally possible.Finally，if the proposition is taken to be empirically meaningful and yet apodictically，categorically，nonhypotheically，or a priori true，the Positivist doctrine turns out to be selfcontradictory nonsense.This is hardly modesty，but outright intellectual permissiveness!

也不是像弗里德曼所说的那样，实证主义认为所有经验知识都只是假设性的，这意味着知识上的 “谦虚”，而持相反观点的人则犯了知识上的 “狂妄”。事实恰恰相反。如果所有非假设知识在经验上都毫无意义，如果分析知识是所有非假设知识，那么这个命题的地位又如何呢？如果认为它是分析性的，那么它就只是一个没有任何经验内容的任意定义。任何其他定义都同样好（也同样空洞）。如果假定它具有经验意义，那么它就是一个假设，根据这个假设，经验知识就是假设性知识，经验检验就是对假设性知识的检验。任何其他假设或其他经验检验或推论都是同样可能的。最后，如果命题在经验上是有意义的，但又不容置疑地、绝对地、非假设地或先验地为真，那么实证主义学说就变成了自相矛盾的废话。这不是谦虚，而是彻头彻尾的智识上的放任！

In contrast，if the existence of nonhypothetical empirical knowledge is admitted，this does not imply that all or even most empirical knowledge is of this kind but only that one can distinguish between both types of empirical knowledge，and that this distinction and the delineation of two kinds of empirical questions and answers is itself a nonhypothetically true empirical distinction.Moreover，contrary to the Positivistic permissiveness of “nothing is certain” and “everything is possible” and its disregard or even contempt for the study of history，to assume the existence of nonhypothetical empirical knowledge implies basic intellectual modesty。For if nonhypothetical laws exist，such laws should be expected to be “old” truths discovered long ago。“newly” discovered nonhypothetical laws，while obviously not impossible，should be rare intellectual events，and the “newer” they appear，the more “suspect” should they be.Hence，the rationalist attitude is one of intellectual humility and respect for the history of thought （and of philosophy and economics in particular）。[491] Most nonhypothetical empirical knowledge can be expected to already exist and，at worst，stands in need of being rediscovered（rather than newly invented）。That is，in the realm of the nonhypotheti cal empirical sciences such as philosophy，logic，mathematics，ethics，and economics，scientific “progress” must be expected to be extremely slow and painstaking，and the “danger” is not so much that nothing new and better is added to the existing body of knowledge，as that an already existing body of knowledge is only incompletely relearned or forgotten.

相反，如果承认非假定性经验知识的存在，这并不意味着所有甚至大多数经验知识都是这种类型的，而只是意味着人们可以区分这两种类型的经验知识，并且这种区分以及对两种经验问题和答案的划分本身就是一种非假定性的正确的经验区分。此外，与实证主义对 “没有什么是确定的 “和 “一切皆有可能 “的放任，以及对历史研究的漠视甚至蔑视相反，假设存在非假定性的经验知识则意味着基本的智识谦虚。因为如果存在非假定性规律，那么这些规律应该是很久以前发现的 “古老 “真理。而 “新 “发现的非假定性规律，虽然显然不是不可能的，但应该是罕见的智识事件，而且越是 “新 “出现的，就越值得 “怀疑”。因此，理性主义的态度是一种智识上的谦逊和对思想史（尤其是哲学和经济学）的尊重。大多数非假定性的经验知识可以预期已经存在，最坏的情况是需要重新发现（而不是新发明）。也就是说，在哲学、逻辑学、数学、伦理学和经济学等非假设的经验科学领域，科学的 “进步 “必定是极其缓慢和艰苦的，”危险 “并不在于现有的知识体系中没有新的和更好的知识，而在于已经存在的知识体系只是被不完全地重新学习甚至遗忘。

In accordance with this fundamental intellectual humility，the ratio nalist answer to the Positivistic destruction of ethics （as nonscientific） and economics （as either empirically empty or else hypothetical），while appar ently largely forgotten or unlearned，is anything but “new，” and while it has surprisingly radical implications，these can hardly be characterized as “dictatorial” or “extremist。”[492]

与这种基本的智识上的谦虚相一致，理性主义对实证主义摧毁伦理学（认为其不科学）和经济学（认为其在经验上是空洞的，或者是假定的）的回答，虽显然在很大程度上已被遗忘或未被学习，但并不 “新”，虽然它具有令人惊讶的激进的意涵，但很难被定性为 “独裁 “或 “极端主义”。

Every person owns his own body as well as all naturegiven goods which he puts to use with the help of his body before anyone else does.This owner ship implies the right to employ these resources however one sees fit so long as one does not thereby uninvitedly change the physical integrity of another’s property or delimit another’s physical control over it without his consent。In particular，once a good has first been appropriated or homesteaded by mixing one’s labor with it （this being Locke’s phrase），then ownership of it can only be acquired by means of a voluntary （contractual） transfer of its property title from a previous to a later owner。These rights of a person are absolute.Any person’s infringement on them is subject to lawful prosecution by the victim of this infringement or his agent，and it is actionable in accordance with the principles of strict liability and the proportionality of punishment。

每个人都拥有自己的身体，以及大自然赋予他的所有物品，他先于他人运用自己的身体来使用这些物品。这种所有权意味着一个人有权以自己认为合适的方式使用这些资源，只要他不因此而擅自改变他人财产的物理完整性，或未经他人同意而限制他人对其财产的物理控制。特别是，一旦某种物品首先通过与人的劳动相混合而被占有或归属（这是洛克的用语），那么它的所有权就只能通过自愿（契约）转让的方式从先前的所有者手中转移到后来的所有者手中而获取。个人的这些权利是绝对的。任何人侵犯这些权利，都可以由被侵权人或者其代理人依法起诉，并按照严格责任原则和量刑相称原则予以起诉。

These ancient principles are not only intuitively just。Even children and primitives seem to have no trouble recognizing their truth.In fact，is it not plainly absurd to claim that a person should not be the owner of his body and those naturegiven goods that he had appropriated and produced before anyone else came along？ Who else，if not he，should be their owner？ More over，these principles can be “proven” to be indisputably，that is，nonhypothetically，true and valid.For if a person A were not the owner of his body and all goods originally appropriated，produced，or voluntarily acquired by him，there would only exist two alternatives.Either another person，B，must then be regarded as the owner of A and the goods appropriated，produced， or contractually acquired by A，or both parties，A and B，must be regarded as equal coowners of both bodies and goods.In the first case，A would be B’s slave and an object of exploitation.B owns A and the goods originally appropriated，produced，or acquired by A，but A does not own B and the goods homesteaded，produced，or acquired by B。with this rule，two dis tinct classes of people are created，viz.，exploiters （B） and exploited （A），to whom different “law” applies.Hence，this rule fails the “universalization test” and is from the outset disqualified as even a potential human ethic。In order to be able to claim a rule to be a “law，” it is necessary that such a rule be universally valid for everyone.

这些古老的原则不仅直观公正，就连儿童和原始人似乎也不难认识到它们的真谛。事实上，如果说一个人不应该拥有自己的身体和大自然赋予他的物品，而这些物品是他在别人出现之前就已经占有并生产出来的，这难道不荒谬吗？如果不是他，还有谁应该是它们的所有者呢？更重要的是，这些原则可以被 “证明 “为无可争议的，即非假设的，真实的和有效的。因为，如果一个人 A 不是他的身体和他先占、生产或自愿获得的所有物品的所有者，那么就只存在两种选择。因为，如果一个人A不是他的身体和他先占，生产，或自愿获得的所有物品的所有者，那么就只有两种选择：要么另一个人，B，必须被视为是A和其先占，生产，或契约获得的物品的所有者；要么双方，A和B，必须被视为身体和物品的平等的共同所有者。在第一种情况下，A 是 B 的奴隶，是被剥削的对象。B 拥有 A 和 A 先占，生产，或获得的物品，但 A 不拥有 B 和 B 占有，生产，或获得的物品。根据这一规则，就产生了两个不同的阶级，即剥削者（B）和被剥削者（A），他们适用不同的 “法律”。因此，这一规则没有通过 “普遍化检验”，甚至从一开始就没有资格成为潜在的人类伦理。为了能够宣称一条规则是 “法律”，这样一条规则必须对每个人都普遍有效。

In the second case of universal coownership，the requirement of equal rights for everyone is obviously fulfilled.However，this alternative suffers from another，literally fatal flaw，for each activity of a person requires the employ ment of scarce goods （at least the person’s body and its standing room）。Yet if all goods were collective property，then no one，at no time and no place，could ever do anything with anything unless he had every other coowner’s prior permission to do what he wanted to do。And how can one give such a permis sion if one is not even the sole owner of one’s own body （and vocal chords）？ If one were to follow this rule，mankind would die out instantly。Whatever this is，it is certainly not a human ethic。Thus，one is left with the initial principles of selfownership and first use first ownership （original appropriation，home steading）。They pass the universalization tests，that is，they hold for everyone equally，and they can at the same time assure the survival of mankind.They and only they are therefore nonhypothetically true ethical rules.

在普遍共同所有权的第二种情况下，显然满足了人人权利平等的要求。然而，这种选择有另一个致命的缺陷，因为一个人的每项活动都需要使用稀缺物品（至少是他的身体和站立的空间）。然而，如果所有物品都是集体财产，那么任何人，无论何时何地，都不能使用任何物品做任何事，除非他事先得到其他所有者的许可，才能做他想做的事。但是，如果一个人甚至不是自己身体（和声带）的唯一拥有者，又怎么能给予这样的许可呢？如果遵循这一规则，人类将立即灭亡。不管这是什么，这肯定不是人类伦理。因此，我们只剩下最初的自我所有权和先用先占原则（先占，耕作）。它们通过了普遍化的检验，即它们对每个人都是平等适用的，同时它们也能保证人类的生存。因此，只有它们才是非假定性的真正伦理规则。

Likewise，the rationalist answer to Positivist economics is old and clear。As long as persons act in accordance with the principles of selfownership and original appropriation，“social welfare” will invariably be “optimized.” A selfowning person’s original appropriation of unowned resources increases his welfare （at least ex ante），otherwise it would not have been carried out。At the same time，it makes no one worse off，because in appropriating them he takes nothing away from others.Obviously，others could have home steaded these resources，too，if only they had perceived them as scarce and valuable.Yet，they did not do so，which demonstrates that they attached no value to them whatsoever。Thus，they also cannot be said to have suffered a welfare loss on account of this act。Proceeding from this basis，any further act of production utilizing one’s body and homesteaded resources establishes ownership rights to the products created thereby，provided that it does not uninvitedly impair the physical integrity of the body and the resources homesteaded or produced with homesteaded goods by others.The producer gains utility and no one else loses utility。And finally，every vol untary exchange starting from this basis will take place only if both parties expect to benefit from it。The provision that only the first user of a good acquires ownership assures that productive efforts will be as high as possible at all times.And the provision that only the physical integrity of property is protected （and that a person is liable only for physical damage or restrictions upon others’ property） guarantees that every owner has a constant incentive to increase the value of his physical property （and to avoid value losses） by means of physically controlled and calculated actions.

同样，理性主义对实证主义经济学的回答也是古老而清晰的。只要人们按照自我所有和先占原则行事，”社会福利 “就会始终 “最优化”。一个拥有自主权的人对无主资源的先占增加了他的福利（至少是事前），否则他就不会这样做。与此同时，这并没有使任何人的境况变得更糟，因为在占有这些资源时，他并没有从其他人那里拿走任何东西。显然，如果其他人认识到这些资源是稀缺和宝贵的，他们也可以拥有这些资源。然而，他们没有这样做，这表明他们认为这些资源没有任何价值。因此，也不能说他们因这一行为而遭受了福利损失。在此基础上，任何利用自身身体和拓殖资源的进一步生产行动，都确立了对由此创造的产品的所有权，但前提是，该行为不得无故损害他人身体和他人拓殖资源的物理完整性，也不得无故损害他人用拓殖物品生产的资源的物理完整性。生产者获得效用，其他人不会失去效用。最后，只有在双方都期望从中受益的情况下，才会在此基础上进行自愿交换。只有物品的第一个使用者才能获得所有权，这一规定保证了生产效率在任何时候都尽可能高。而且，只有财产的物理完整性受到保护（一个人只对他人财产的有形损坏或限制负责）的规定，保证了每个所有者都有持续的动力，通过有形控制和计算的行动来增加其有形财产的价值（并避免价值损失）。

Any deviation from these principles implies a redistribution of property titles away from user producers and contractors of goods onto non users producers and noncontractors.The latter，the exploiters，increase their supply of goods，and thus enhance their welfare，at the expense of a corresponding loss of the wealth and welfare of the exploited.Hence，a lower state of “social welfare” will result。Among the exploited，there will be relatively less original appropriation of resources whose scarcity is recognized，less production of new goods，less maintenance of existing goods，and less mutually beneficial trading and contracting。And among the exploiters，this rule creates a permanent incentive for shortsightedness and wastefulness.For if one group of people is permitted to supplement its future income by means of the expropriation of goods appropriated，produced，or voluntarily acquired by others，its preference for current con sumption over saving （future consumption） will be Systematically strength ened，and the likelihood of misallocations，miscalculations，and economic losses will be permanently heightened.

对这些原则的任何偏离都意味着产权的重新分配，即从商品的使用者生产者和契约人转移到非使用者生产者和非契约人身上。后者，即剥削者，增加了他们的商品供应，从而提高了他们的福利，但代价是被剥削者的财富和福利的相应损失。因此，”社会福利 “水平会降低。在被剥削者中，对其稀缺性得到承认的资源的先占将相对减少，新商品的生产将减少，现有商品的维护将减少，互利贸易和契约也将减少。而在剥削者中，这一规则为目光短浅和铺张浪费提供了永久的动力。因为，如果允许一个群体通过征用他人占有、生产或自愿获得的商品来增加其未来收入，那么这个群体对当前消费而非储蓄（未来消费）的偏好就会得到系统性的加强，而分配不当、计算错误和经济损失的可能性就会永久性地增加。

once these old，rationalist principles of ethics and economics are redis covered under the Positivist rubble，and it is understood again that they are absolutely—nonhypothetically，apodictically，categorically，a priori—true，the tendencies toward centralization，democratization，and the growth of state power can be critically challenged.For in light of these principles，central governments all around the globe can be recognized for what they are：threats to justice and economic efficiency everywhere.without justice，these institutions are，as St。Augustine noted，nothing but bands of robbers.If，and only if，this recognition of states （governments） as fundamentally unjust and wasteful prevails in the court of public opinion，will the power of the central state devolve on to smaller and smaller territories，and make room for a System of ordered liberty。

一旦在实证主义的废墟下重新发现这些古老的、理性主义的伦理和经济学原则，并再次认识到它们是绝对的——非假说的、非虚构的、绝对的、先验的——正确，那么国家主义、民主化和国家权力增长的趋势就会受到批判性的挑战。根据这些原则，全球各地的中央政府都可以被认作是：对各地的公正和经济效率的威胁。没有公正，这些机构就像圣奥古斯丁指出的那样，只不过是一群强盗。当且仅当这种承认国家（政府）从根本上是不公正和浪费的观点在公众的舆论场中占据上风，中央政府的权力才会下放到越来越小的地区，从而为有序的自由制度创造空间。

25 The Libertarian Quest for a Grand Historical Narrative

25 自由意志主义对宏大历史叙事的探寻*

To historians is granted a talent that even the gods are denied—to alter what has already happened!

—David Irving

历史学家被赋予了一种连神都无法企及的才能——改变已经发生的事情！

——大卫-欧文

It is no secret that I am not a Hayekian.Still，I consider Hayek a great economist—not in the same league as Mises，but few if any economists are.Hayek’s fame in the public mind，however，has less to do with his economic writings but stems largely from his writings in political theory，and it is in this area that I consider him mostly deficient。Not even his System of defini tions here is internally consistent。His excursions into the field of epistemol ogy are quite ingenious，yet here he also falls short of the accomplishments of his teacher Mises.Nonetheless，owing to his wideranging interdisciplin ary oeuvre，which contains a treasure trove of keen insights into many issues，I consider Hayek one of the twentieth century’s outstanding intellectuals writing in the social sciences.

我不是一个哈耶克主义者，这不是什么秘密。尽管如此，我仍然认为哈耶克是一位伟大的经济学家——虽然他与米塞斯不是一个等级的，但很少有经济学家能与之相提并论。然而，哈耶克在公众心目中的声誉与他的经济学著作关系不大，而主要源于他的政治理论著作，我认为他在这一领域存在很大缺陷。甚至他的定义体系也不是内在一致的。他在认识论领域的探索颇具匠心，但在这方面的成就也不及他的老师米塞斯。尽管如此，由于哈耶克的跨学科作品范围广泛，其中包含了对许多问题的敏锐洞察力，我认为他是二十世纪社会科学领域杰出的知识分子之一。

As a reflection of this esteem，Hayek was also quoted in the program matic statement of the Property and freedom Society （PFS）：

We must make the building of a free society once more an intellectual adventure，a deed of courage.What we lack is a liberal Utopia，a pro gramme which seems neither a mere defence of things as they are nor a diluted kind of socialism，but a truly liberal radicalism which does not spare the susceptibilities of the mighty…which is not too severely practical and which does not confine itself to what appears today as politically possible.We need intellectual leaders who are prepared to resist the blandishments of power and influence and who are willing to work for an ideal，however small may be the prospects of its early realization.They must be men who are willing to stick to principles and to fight for their full realization，however remote.…Unless we can make the philosophical foundations of a free society once more a living intellectual issue，and its implementation a task which challenges the ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest minds，the prospects of freedom are indeed dark。But if we can regain that belief in the power of ideas which was the mark of liberalism at its best，the battle is not lost。

作为这种尊重的反映，哈耶克在财产与自由协会（PFS）的纲领性声明中也被引用：

我们必须让建设自由社会再次成为一种智识的冒险，一种勇敢的行动。我们缺乏的是一种自由主义的乌托邦，一种既不只是维护现状，也不只是淡化社会主义的方案，而是一种真正的自由激进主义，它不管是否触犯强制集团的敏感性……它不会过于注重实际，也不会局限于今天看来政治上可行的东西。我们需要能够抵制权势诱惑、愿意为理想而奋斗的知识分子领袖，无论理想早日实现的前景多么渺茫。他们必须是愿意坚持原则并为全面实现这些原则而奋斗的人，无论这些原则多么遥远。 ……除非我们能够使自由社会的哲学基础再次成为一个鲜活的思想问题，并使其实施成为一项挑战我们最活跃头脑的智慧和想象力的任务，否则自由的前景确实是黯淡的。但是，如果我们能够重拾对思想力量的信念，而这种信念曾是自由主义鼎盛时期的标志，那么这场战斗就不会失败。

Hayek of course did not follow his own advice，but ended up，in his political philosophy，with a mishmash full of internally inconsistent com promises.Yet this does not mean that his plea for an uncompromising intellectual radicalism，which has been the purpose and become the hallmark of the PFS，is not worthwhile or correct。

当然，哈耶克并没有听从自己的建议，而是最终在他的政治哲学中形成了一个充满内部不一致的妥协的混杂体。然而，这并不意味着他对不妥协的思想激进主义的诉求是不重要或不正确的，这种激进主义一直是PFS的宗旨和标志。

But this shall not be my topic here.Rather，I want to speak about another important，if you will complementary，insight of Hayek’s that can be found in the introduction he wrote for the collection of essays gath ered in Capitalism and the Historians.Here，Hayek makes the point that although uncompromising intellectual radicalism is necessary as a source of energy and inspiration for the leaders of a liberallibertarian movement，this is not sufficient to make for public appeal。because the general public is not used to or capable of abstract reasoning，high theory，and intellectual consis tency，but forms its political views and convictions on the basis of historical narratives，i.e.，of prevailing interpretations of past events，it is upon those who want to change things for a better，liberallibertarian future to chal lenge and correct such interpretations and propose and promote alternative，revisionist historical narratives.

但这并不是我的主题。相反，我想谈谈哈耶克的另一个重要观点，如果你愿意补充的话，这个观点可以在他为《资本主义与历史学家》的论文集所写的引言中找到。在这里，哈耶克指出，虽然不妥协的思想激进主义是自由-自由意志主义运动领袖的能量和灵感来源，但这不足以吸引公众。因为普通大众不习惯也没有能力进行抽象的推理、高深的理论和思想上的一致性，而是根据历史叙事，即对过去事件的普遍解释，形成自己的政治观点和信念。那些希望改变现状、创造美好未来的自由主义者有责任挑战和纠正这种解释，提出并推广另一种修正主义的历史叙述。

let me quote from Hayek to this effect：

While the events of the past are the source of the experience of the human race，their opinions are determined not by the objective facts but by the records and interpretations to which they have access.… Historical myths have perhaps played nearly as great a role in shaping opinion as historical facts.…The influence which the writers of history thus exercise on public opinion is probably more immediate and extensive than that of the political theorists who launch new ideas.It seems as though even such new ideas reach wider circles usually not in their abstract form but as the interpretations of particular events.The historian is in this respect at least one step nearer to direct power over public opinion than is the theorist。…Most people，when being told that their political convictions have been affected by particular views on economic history，will answer that they never have been interested in it and never have read a book on the subject。This，however，does not mean that they do not，with the rest，regard as established facts many of the legends which at one time or another have been given currency by writers on economic history。[493]

让我引用哈耶克的话来说明这一点：

历史事件当然是人类经验的源泉，然而，人们对历史事件的看法却并非取决于客观事实本身，而取决于他们所能接触到的关于历史的记录和解释。……在塑造舆论的过程中，历史神话所发挥的作用，也许与历史事实不相上下。……因此，历史记录者对于民意的影响，很可能比那些创造新理念的政治理论家的影响更持久、也更深刻。而那些获得社会广泛认可的新理念，似乎也通常不是比较抽象的理论，而是对具体事件的解释。就此而言，历史学家比起理论家来，对于民意的影响要更直接一些。……大多数人，当听到我们说，他们的政治信念曾经受到某种关于经济史的观点的影响的时候，作出的反应是：他们可从来都对经济史没有兴趣，也从来没有读过这门学科中的任何著作。不过，这却并不意味着他们没有附和别人，把某些经济史学家在这样那样的时候编织出来的神话奉为颠扑不破的事实。

The central theme of Capitalism and the Historians is the revision of the still popular myth that it was the System of free market capitalism，at the beginning of the socalled industrial revolution，around the early 1800s，which has been responsible for the economic misery that caused even little children to have to work for sixteen hours or more under atrocious conditions in mines or similarly uncomfortable workplaces，and that it was only due to the pressure of labor unions and government intervention in the economy by way of socalled social policy means and measures that this “inhumane” System of “capitalist exploitation” was gradually overcome and improved.

《资本主义与历史学家》一书的中心主题是对至今仍广为流传的神话的修正，这个神话认为，在19世纪初所谓的工业革命开始时，自由市场资本主义制度造成了经济苦难，甚至连小孩子都不得不在矿井或类似的恶劣的环境下工作 16 个小时或更长时间。正是由于工会的压力和政府通过所谓的社会政策手段和措施对经济进行干预的情况下，这种“不人道”的“资本主义剥削”制度才逐渐被克服和得到改善。

When first hearing this sad story，one would think that the immediate question coming to mind should be：Why would any parent subject his child to such a treatment and hand him over to some evil capitalist exploit ers？ Did these children have a jolly good time before，strolling around in meadows and fields，healthy and with red cheeks，picking flowers，eating apples off the trees，fishing and swimming in creeks，rivers，and lakes，playing with their toys and attentively listening to their grandparents’ tales？ in that case，what horrible people must these parents have been! merely asking these questions should be sufficient to realize that this story cannot be true.And in fact，as Hayek and his collaborators demonstrated，it is just about the opposite of the truth.

乍一听到这个悲惨的故事，人们会立刻想到：为什么会有父母让自己的孩子遭受这样的待遇，并把他交给邪恶的资本剥削者？难道这些孩子以前过得很快乐，在草地和田野上嬉戏，身体健康，面颊红润，采摘花朵，采食树上的苹果，在小溪、小河和湖里钓鱼、游泳，玩玩具，专心地听祖父母讲故事？如果是这样，这些父母该是多么可怕的人啊！只要提出这些问题，就足以让人意识到这个故事不可能是真的。事实上，正如哈耶克和他的合作者所证明的那样，事实恰恰与此相反。

Until the industrial revolution，England and the rest of the world，for thousands of years，had lived under Malthusian conditions.That is，the supply of consumer goods provided by nature and by human production through means of intermediate tools and producer goods was not sufficient to ensure the survival of a growing population.Population growth exceeded the growth of production and any increases in productivity； hence，not only in England，but everywhere，an “excess” of population regularly had to die off due to malnutrition，ill health，and ultimately starvation.It was only with and since the industrial revolution that this situation fundamentally changed and the Malthusian trap was successively overcome，first in Eng land，then in continental Europe and the European overseas dependencies，and finally also in much of the rest of the world，so as to allow not only for a steadily growing population，but one with continuously rising material standards of living。And this momentous achievement was the result of free market capitalism，or more precisely a combination and interplay of three factors.For one，the general security of private property； second，low time preference，i.e.，the ability and willingness of a growing number of people to delay immediate gratification so as to save for the future and accumulate an ever larger stock of capital goods； and third，the intelligence and ingenuity of a sufficient number of people to invent and engineer a steady stream of new productivityenhancing tools and machines.

在工业革命之前，英国和世界其他国家几千年来一直生活在马尔萨斯条件之下。也就是说，大自然以及人类通过中间工具和生产资料进行生产提供的消费品，不足以确保不断增长的人口的生存。人口增长超过了生产的增长和生产力的提高；因此，不仅在英国，在任何地方，”过剩 “的人口都会因营养不良、健康状况不佳以及最终的饥饿而死亡。只是随着工业革命的到来，这种情况才发生了根本性的变化，马尔萨斯陷阱才相继被打破，首先是在英格兰，然后是在欧洲大陆和欧洲海外属地，最后是在世界其他大部分地区，从而不仅使人口稳步增长，而且物质生活水平不断提高。这一重大成就是自由市场资本主义的结果，更确切地说，是三个因素相互结合、相互作用的结果。其一，私有财产的普遍保护；其二，低时间偏好，即越来越多的人有能力有意愿推迟眼前的满足，为未来储蓄，并积累越来越多的资本财货；其三，足够多的人拥有智慧和独创性，能够发明和制造出源源不断的提高生产力的新工具和机器。

The parents of the poor children，who handed them over to the “evil capitalists” during the industrial revolution were not bad parents，then，but like most parents everywhere who want the best for their children，they chose to do so，because they preferred their children alive，even if it was a miserable life，rather than dead.Contrary to still popular myth in leftist circles，then，capitalism did not cause misery，but literally saved countless millions of people from death by starvation and gradually lifted them from their previous state of abject poverty。Labor unions’ and governments’ so called social policies did not help in this regard，but hampered and retarded this process of gradual economic improvement，and were and still are responsible for countless numbers of unnecessary deaths.

在工业革命时期，那些把可怜的孩子交给 “邪恶的资本家 “的父母并不是不称职的父母，但就像世界各地大多数希望孩子过得最好的父母一样，他们选择了这样做，因为他们宁愿自己的孩子活着，哪怕是过着悲惨的生活，也不愿他们死去。与左派圈子里仍然流行的神话相反，资本主义并没有造成苦难，而是实实在在地拯救了无数濒临饿死之人，并使他们逐渐摆脱了以前的赤贫状态。在这方面，工会和政府的所谓社会政策并没有起到任何帮助，反而阻碍和延缓了经济逐步改善的进程，过去和现在都要为无数不必要的死亡负责。

There are many other related myths，equally or even more absurd，propagated by，to use Nicholas Taleb’s label，IYIs （intellectuals yet idiots） and widely believed by the general public：that you can legislate greater economic prosperity by simply passing minimum wage laws，or else that economic misery can be overcome by simply increasing monetary spend ing。—But why，then，not legislate hourly wage rates of $100 or $1000，and why，then，is india，for instance，still a poor country？ Are the ruling elites in india too dumb to know about this magic formula？ —Why，then，since everywhere nowadays governments can easily increase the quantity of paper money in practically unlimited amounts，is there still any poor person around？

用尼古拉斯·塔勒布（Nicholas Taleb）的话说，”IYIs”（白痴知识分子）散布了许多其他相关的、同样甚至更加荒谬的神话，并被大众广泛相信：只要通过最低工资法，就能通过立法实现更大的经济繁荣，或者只要增加货币支出，就能克服经济困境。——但是，为什么不立法规定时薪为 100 美元或 1000 美元，例如印度，为什么仍然是一个贫穷的国家？是否因为印度的统治精英太笨，以至于不知道这个神奇的处方？ ——那么，既然如今各地政府都可以轻而易举地无限量增加纸币数量，为什么还有穷人呢？

Nor are such faulty historical narratives restricted only to economic history。Rather，much of what we have learned as the established truth from our standard history books about World War I and World War II，about the American and the French revolutions，about Hitler，Churchill，FDR or Napoleon，and on and on and on，also turns out to be faulty history—facts mixed in，whether intentionally or not，with hefty doses of fiction，and fake.Important as the revision of all these myths is，however，the greatest challenge for libertarians，whether economic or otherwise，is to develop a grand historical narrative that is to counter and correct the socalled Whig theory of history that all ruling elites，everywhere and at all times，have tried to sell to the public：that is the view，that we live in the best of all times （and that they are the ones who will guarantee that this stays so） and that the grand sweep of history，notwithstanding some ups and downs，has been one of more or less steady progress.This Whig theory of history，despite some setbacks motivated in particular by the experiences of the two disastrous world wars during the first half of the twentieth century，has again become predominant in the public mind，as indicated by the success of such books as Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last man （1992） or，still more recently，Steven Pinker’s The better Angels of Our nature （2011） and Enlightenment Now （2018）。

这种错误的历史叙述并不仅限于经济史。相反，我们从标准历史书中了解到的关于第一次世界大战和第二次世界大战、关于美国革命和法国革命、关于希特勒、丘吉尔、罗斯福或拿破仑，以及其他诸如此类的既定事实，也被证明是错误的历史——事实中有意无意地掺杂了大量的虚构和伪造。对所有这些神话的修正固然重要，然而，自由意志主义者，无论是经济上的还是其他方面的，所面临的最大挑战是发展形成一种宏大的历史叙事，以反驳和纠正所谓的辉格历史理论。无论何时何地，所有的统治精英都试图向公众兜售这样一种观点，即我们生活在最好的时代（他们将确保这个时代一直如此），历史的长河尽管有起伏，但或多或少一直在稳步前进。辉格史观尽管在 20 世纪上半叶两次灾难性的世界大战中经历了一些挫折，但该理论如今再次在公众心目中占据主导地位，弗朗西斯·福山的《历史的终结和最后的人》（1992），以及最近史蒂文·平克的《人性中的善良天使》（2011）和《当下的启蒙》（2018）等著作的成功就是证明。

According to the proponents of this theory，what makes the present age so great and qualifies it as the best of all times is the combination of two factors：for one，never before in human history have technology and the natural sciences reached as high a level of development and have the average material living standards been as high as today—which appears essentially correct and which fact without doubt contributes greatly to the public appeal and acceptance of the Whig theory。Secondly，never before in history have people supposedly experienced as much freedom as today with the development of “liberal democracy” or “democratic capitalism”—which claim，despite its widespread popularity，I consider a historical myth.In fact，since the degree of freedom and of economic and technological development are indeed positively correlated，this leads me to the conclusion that average material living standards would have been even higher than they presently are if history only had taken a different course.

该理论的支持者认为，当今时代之所以如此伟大，并被誉为所有时代中最美好的时代，是两个因素的结合：其一，人类历史上从未有过像今天这样高水平的技术和自然科学发展，也从未有过像今天这样高水平的平均物质生活水平——这似乎基本上是正确的，而这一事实无疑极大地促进了辉格史观对公众的吸引力和接受度。其次，随着 “自由民主 “或 “民主资本主义 “的发展，历史上从未有过像今天这样的自由——尽管这种说法广为流传，但我认为这是一个历史神话。事实上，由于自由度与经济和技术发展确实呈正相关，这使我得出这样的结论：如果历史的轨迹不同，平均物质生活水平甚至会比现在更高。

But before offering an alternative，grand revisionist historical narrative and indicating where Pinker and his ilk go off the rails with their Whiggish world history，a few remarks on the history of science are in order。Until relatively recently，the belief in a steady growth of science，if nothing else，has never been much in doubt—until the early 1960s，with the historian of science Thomas Kuhn and his book The Structure of Scientific revolutions （1962）。Kuhn，in contrast to the orthodox Whigish view on the matter，portrayed the development of science not so much as a continuous march upward and into the light，but rather as a sequence of “paradigm shifts” that followed each other much like—directionless—one ladyfashion follows another。The book became a huge success and for quite some time Kuhn’s view became a widespread fashion in philosophical circles.Kuhn notwith standing，however，I still regard the traditional view concerning the development of science as essentially correct。The central error of Kuhn as well as of many philosophers of science—revealingly expressed again and again，for instance，by Sheldon Cooper，the super science nerd–theoretical physicist character in the hugely popular TV series The Big Bang Theory—lies in a fundamental misconception regarding the interrelation between science on the one hand and engineering or technology on the other。

但是，在提供另一种宏大的修正主义历史叙述，并指出平克及其同类人的辉格主义世界史的偏离之处之前，有必要先对科学史说几句。直到最近，科学稳步发展的信念，如果没有其他因素的话，从来没有受到太多的质疑——直到 20 世纪 60 年代初，科学史家托马斯-库恩（Thomas Kuhn）及其著作《科学革命的结构》（1962 年）问世。与正统辉格主义者的观点不同，库恩没有把科学的发展描绘成一个不断向上、走向光明的过程，而是描绘成一连串的 “范式转变”，就像——没有方向一样——一种女士时尚紧跟着另一种女士时尚。这本书获得了巨大成功，在相当长的一段时间里，库恩的观点在哲学界广为流传。尽管如此，我仍然认为关于科学发展的传统观点基本上是正确的。库恩以及许多科学哲学家的核心错误——例如，大受欢迎的电视连续剧《生活大爆炸》中的超级科学书呆子，理论物理学家谢尔顿-库珀（Sheldon Cooper）就一再暴露了这一错误——在于对科学与工程或技术之间相互关系的根本误解。

This is the popular misconception of science as coming before，having priority over，and assuming a higher rank and dignity visàvis engineering and technology as only secondary and inferior intellectual enterprises，i.e.，as mere “applied” science.In fact，however，matters are exactly the other way around.What comes methodologically first，and what makes science as we know it at all possible and at the same time provides its ultimate foundation，is human engineering and construction.Put plainly and bluntly：without such purposefully designed and constructed instruments as measuring rods，clocks，planes，rectangles，scales，counters，lenses，microscopes，telescopes，audiometers，thermometers，spectrometers，xray and ultrasound machines，particle accelerators，and on and on，no empirical and experimental science as we know it would be possible.

这是一种流行的误解，认为科学先于工程和技术，享有更高的地位和尊严，而工程和技术只是次要的、低级的智力活动，即仅仅是 “应用 “科学。事实上，情况恰恰相反。从方法论上讲，使我们所知的科学成为可能，并为其提供最终基础的，是人类的工程与建设。直截了当地说：没有特意设计和制造的仪器，如测量杆、钟表、扫描仪、矩形、秤、计数器、透镜、显微镜、望远镜、超声波仪、温度计、光谱仪、X射线和超声波机器、粒子加速器等等，就不可能有我们所知道的实证科学和实验科学。

Or to put it in the words of the great late german philosopherscientist Peter Janich：“Handwerk” comes before and provides the stable founda tion and groundwork of “Mundwerk。” Whatever controversies or quibbles scientists may have，they are always controversies and quibbles within a stable operational framework and reference System defined by a given state of technology。And in the field of human engineering，no one would ever throw out or “falsify” a working instrument until and unless he had another，better working instrument available.

或者用伟大的已故德国哲学家、科学家彼得·雅尼奇（Peter Janich）的话来说：”手工 “先于 “机械”，并为 “机械 “提供了稳定的基础、根基。无论科学家们有什么争议和争论，它们都是在特定技术状态所确定的稳定的操作框架和参照系统中的争议和争论。而在人类工程学领域，没有人会扔掉或 “伪造 “一个工作仪器，除非他有另一个更好的工作仪器可用。

Hence，it is engineering and advances in engineering that make sci ence and scientific progress possible and at the same time prevent from happening that which Karl Popper’s “falsificationist” philosophy of science that currently dominates intellectual public opinion must admit as “always possible”：not only scientific regression but even the complete breakdown of our entire System of knowledge due to the supposedly “always possible” falsification of even its seemingly most basic hypotheses.What prevents this nightmare from happening and what exposes both Kuhn’s relativism and Popper’s related falsificationism as involving an elementary methodological error is the existence of “Handwerk” and its methodical priority and primacy over the mere “Mundwerk” of science.[494]

因此，正是工程学和工程学的进步使科学和科学进步成为可能，同时也使卡尔-波普尔（Karl Popper）的 “证伪主义 “科学哲学（该哲学目前在知识界的舆论中占主导地位）所必须承认的 “永远可能 “的事情无法发生：不仅是科学的倒退，甚至是我们整个知识体系的彻底崩溃，因为即使是其看似最基本的假设也 “永远可能 “被证伪。阻止这一噩梦发生，并揭露库恩的相对主义和波普尔的相关证伪主义都涉及基本的方法论错误，是“手工工作”的存在，以及它在方法论上的优先和首要地位，而不仅仅是科学的“手工工作”。

with this out of the way，I can now turn to the fake part of the Whig theory of history—concerning social history。Although it is comparatively easy to diagnose technological progress，and along with this also scientific progress （progress occurs whenever we learn how to successfully accomplish some additional，quicker，or better result in our purposeful dealings with the nonhuman world of material objects，plants，and animals），it is significantly more difficult to define and diagnose social progress，i.e.，progress in inter personal dealings or mantoman interactions.

说完这些，我现在可以谈谈辉格史观中的 “伪历史 “部分——关于社会历史。尽管诊断科技进步和科学进步相对容易（每当我们学会如何在与物质世界、植物和动物等非人类世界的有目的交往中成功地取得更多，更快，或更好的结果时，进步就发生了），但要定义和诊断社会进步，即人际交往或人与人之间互动的进步，却要困难得多。

To do this，it is first necessary to define a model of social perfection that is in accordance with human nature，i.e.，of men as they really are，which can serve as a reference System to diagnose the relative proximity or distance of various historical events，periods，and developments to this ideal。And this definition of social perfection and social progress must be strictly separate，independent，and analytically distinct from the definition of techno logical and scientific growth and perfection （even if both progress or growth dimensions are empirically positively correlated）。Conceptually，that is，it must be allowed that there can be societies that are （near） perfect socially but technologically backward，as well as societies that are technologically highly advanced and yet socially backward.

要做到这一点，首先需要定义一个符合人性的社会完美模式，即人之为人，它可以作为一个参照系统，用来判断不同历史事件、历史时期和历史发展与这一理想的相对远近。而且，社会完善和社会进步的定义必须与科技增长和完善的定义严格分开、独立，并在分析上截然不同（即使这两个进步或增长维度在经验上呈正相关）。从概念上讲，即必须允许存在社会（接近）完美但技术落后的社会，以及技术高度发达但社会落后的社会。

For the libertarian，this ideal of social perfection is peace，i.e.，a normally tranquil and frictionless persontoperson interaction—and a peaceful res olution of occasional conflict—within the stable framework of private or several （mutually exclusive） property and property rights.I do not want to appeal only to libertarians with this，however，but to a potentially universal，or “catholic，” audience，because the same ideal of social perfection is essen tially also the one prescribed by the ten biblical commandments.

对自由意志主义者而言，社会完美的理想是和平，即在私人或若干（相互排斥的）财产和产权的稳定框架内，人与人之间正常的平静和无摩擦的互动，以及和平解决偶尔发生的冲突。无论如何，我并不想仅向自由意志主义者发出呼吁，而是要向潜在的普遍受众，或 “天主教 “受众发出呼吁，因为同样完美的社会理想本质上也是圣经十诫所规定的理想。

Setting the first four commandments aside，which refer to our relation to God as the one and only ultimate moral authority and final judge of our earthly conduct and the proper celebration of the Sabbath，the rest，refer ring to worldly affairs，display a deep and profoundly libertarian spirit。

撇开前四条诫命不谈，这四条诫命指的是我们与上帝的关系，上帝是唯一的终极道德权威，是我们世俗行为的最终审判者，也是安息日的适当庆祝活动，其余的诫命指的是世俗事务，显示了一种透彻而深刻的自由意志主义者精神。

Honor your father and your mother，as the LORD your God has commanded you，that your days may be long，and that it may be well with you in the land which the LORD your God is giving you。
You shall not murder。

III. You shall not commit adultery。

You shall not steal。
You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor。

You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife； and you shall not desire your neighbor’s house，his field，his male servant，his female servant，his ox，his donkey，or anything that is your neighbor’s.
当照耶和华你神所吩咐你的孝敬父母，使你的日子得以长久，并在耶和华你神所赐你的地上得福。
不可杀人。

III. 不可奸淫。

不可偷盗。
不可作假见证陷害你的邻舍。
不可觊觎邻舍的妻子，也不可觊觎邻舍的房屋、田地、仆婢、牛、驴，并他一切所有的，你都不可恋慕。

Some libertarians may argue that not all of these commandments have the same rank or status.They may point out，for instance，that the fifth and the seventh commandments are not on a par and of the same dignity as the sixth，eighth，and tenth commandments； that this may also be the case with commandment nine，prohibiting libel； or that desiring another’s wife or servant is not on a par with coveting his house or field.However，the ten Commandments do not say anything about the severity and suitable punishment of violations of its various commands.They proscribe all mentioned activities and desires，but they leave open the question of how severely any of them deserves to be punished.

一些自由意志主义者可能会争辩说，并非所有这些诫命都具有相同的等级或地位。他们可能会指出，例如，第五诫和第七诫与第六诫、第八诫和第十诫并不具有同等的地位和尊严；第九诫禁止诽谤也可能是这种情况；或者说，觊觎他人的妻子或仆人与觊觎他人的房屋或田地并不具有同等的地位。然而，十诫并没有提到违反其各种诫命的严重程度和适当惩罚。它们禁止所有提及的活动和欲望，但对于其中任何一项活动和欲望应受到何种程度的惩罚，却没有定论。

In this，the biblical commandments go above and beyond what many libertarians regard as sufficient for the establishment of a peaceful social order：the mere strict adherence to commandments six，eight，and ten.Yet this difference between a strict and rigid libertarianism and the ten biblical commandments does not imply any incompatibility between the two。both are in complete harmony if only a distinction is made between legal prohibitions on the one hand，expressed in commandments six，eight，and ten，violations of which may be punished by the exercise of physical violence，and extralegal or moral prohibitions on the other hand，expressed in commandments five，seven，and nine，violations of which may be punished only by means below the threshold of physical violence，such as social disapproval，discrimination，exclusion，or ostracism.Indeed，thus interpreted the full six mentioned commandments can be recognized as even an improvement over a strict and rigid libertarianism—given the common，shared goal of social perfection：of a stable，just，and peaceful social order。

在这一点上，《圣经》中的诫命超越了许多自由意志主义者所认为的足以建立和平社会秩序的诫命：即仅仅严格遵守第六、第八和第十条诫命。然而，严格、硬性的自由意志主义与圣经十诫之间的这种差异并不意味着两者之间有任何不相容之处。只要区分以下两种情况，二者是完全一致的：一是法律上的禁止，如第六、八和十条诫命，违反者将受到身体暴力的惩罚；另一方面，法外或道德上的禁止则体现在戒律五、七和九中，违反这些戒律只能通过非身体暴力的手段来惩罚，如社会不认可、歧视、排挤或排斥。事实上，考虑到社会完善的共同目标：稳定、公正、和平的社会秩序，对上述六条戒律的解释甚至可以被认为是对严格、硬性的自由意志主义的一种改进。

For surely any society of people who habitually disrespect their par ents and routinely mock the idea of natural ranks and hierarchies of social authority，which underlies the institution of the family； who poohpooh the institution of marriage and cavalierly regard adultery as inconsequential，faultless，or even liberating； or who habitually scoff at the idea of personal honor and honesty and routinely or even gleefully engage in libelous activity，i.e.，the practice of “bearing false witness against one’s neighbor”—any such society will quickly disintegrate into a group of people ceaselessly disturbed by social strife and conflict rather than enjoying enduring and lasting peace.

因为任何一个社会，如果人们习惯性地不尊重自己的父母，经常嘲弄作为家庭制度基础的自然等级和社会权威等级的观念；对婚姻制度嗤之以鼻，轻率地认为通奸无关紧要、没有过错，甚至是一种解放；或者习惯性地嘲笑个人荣誉和诚实的观念，经常甚至乐此不疲地从事诽谤活动，即 “对邻居作假见证”，任何这样的社会都会迅速解体，成为一个不断受到社会纷争和冲突困扰的群体，而不是享有持久的和平。

Taking this biblicallibertarian ideal of social perfection as a benchmark，then，the next step in our argument must be the diagnosis，i.e.，the comparative evaluation and ranking of various historical periods and developments regarding their relative proximity or distance to this ultimate，ideal goal。

以圣经自由意志主义的完美社会理想为基准，我们论证的下一步必须是诊断，即对各个历史时期和发展进行比较评估和排序，看它们与这一终极理想目标的相对接近程度或距离。

In this regard，immediately a first diagnosis concerning the contemporary world impresses itself。Even if we may grant that the dominant Western model of “liberal democracy” or “democratic capitalism” comes closer to the ideal than the models of social organization presently followed elsewhere，outside the socalled Western world，it still falls glaringly short of the ideal。Indeed，it explicitly and unequivocally contradicts and violates the “Catholic” biblical commandments，and the proponents and promoters of this model，then，manifestly （even if not admittedly） deny and oppose God’s will and turn out advocates of the devil instead.

在这方面，对当代世界的第一个诊断立即给我们留下了深刻的印象。即使我们承认西方占主导地位的 “自由民主 “或 “民主资本主义 “模式比所谓西方世界以外的其他地方目前遵循的社会组织模式更接近理想，但它仍然与理想相距甚远。事实上，它明确地、毫不含糊违背和违反了 “天主教 “的圣经诫命，而这种模式的支持者和推动者，就会明显地（即使不承认）否认和反对上帝的旨意，转而成为魔鬼的拥护者。

For one，even with the greatest intellectual contortions it is impossible to derive the institution of a state from these commandments.If no one may steal，murder，or desire another person’s property，then no institution that may steal，murder，and desire another person’s property can ever be permitted to come into existence.Yet like all other societies today，all present Western societies are societies with states，which may routinely steal （tax），murder （go to war），and covet other people’s property （legislate）。Moreover，in Western democratic state societies in particular，the moral sin of desiring another man’s property is not only not strictly and universally outlawed （but routinely put in practice），but this sin is actually promoted and “cultivated” to its utmost—devilish—extreme.with democratic elections installed as the centerpiece of social life，everyone is “liberated” from God’s commandment and made “free” to desire whatever he wants of the property of others and to express his immoral desires through regular anonymous votes.

其一，即使智力被最大的扭曲，也不可能从这些戒律中推导出国家制度。如果任何人都不得偷窃、谋杀或觊觎他人的财产，那么任何可以偷窃、谋杀或觊觎他人财产的机构都不可能存在。然而，与当今所有其他社会一样，目前的所有西方社会都是国家社会，国家可以经常性地偷窃（征税）、谋杀（战争）和觊觎他人财产（立法）。此外，特别是在西方民主国家社会中，觊觎他人财产的道德罪恶不仅没有被严格和普遍地取缔（而是经常被付诸实践），而且这种罪恶实际上得到了弘扬和 “培养”，达到了邪恶的极致。随着民主选举成为社会生活的核心，每个人都从上帝的戒律中 “解放 “出来，可以 “自由 “地对他人的财产产生任何欲望，并通过定期匿名投票来表达自己不道德的欲望。

Surely，this liberaldemocratic model of social organization cannot be the end of history，neither for a libertarian nor anyone taking the biblical commandments to heart。Indeed，Fukuyama’s （1992） claim to the contrary borders on the blasphemous.

当然，这种自由民主的社会组织模式不可能是历史的终结，无论是对自由意志主义者还是对任何将圣经诫命铭记于心的人来说都是如此。事实上，福山（1992 年）的说法近乎亵渎神明。

regardless of how disastrous the diagnosis of the contemporary world turns out to be，however，it might still be the case that the present state of affairs represents some sort of progress.It might not be the end of history，but it might be a closer approximation to the goal of social perfection than anything historically preceding it。To refute the Whig theory of history in its entirety，then，it is further necessary to identify some earlier （and thus，naturally，technologically less advanced） society that adhered more closely to the biblical commandments and came nearer to social perfection.And so as to carry any weight in public debate （in the battle of rival historical narratives），the counterexample in question should be a “big” one.That is，it should not be only a short time span in some tiny place，but a largescale and longlasting historical phenomenon.And for the same reason of potential popular appeal，the example should be connected，both geographically and genealogically，as a historical predecessor to the contemporary Western model of democratic state societies，and it should not lie too far in the dark and distant past。

无论对当代世界的诊断结果是多么灾难性，目前的状况都可能代表着某种进步。它可能不是历史的终结，但它可能比历史上的任何前例更接近社会完善的目标。要全面驳斥辉格史观，就必须进一步找出更早的（因此技术上自然不那么先进的）社会，它们更严格遵守《圣经》中的诫命，更接近社会的完美。要想在公众论证（对立的历史叙事之争）中占有一席之地，有关的反例应该是一个 “大的”反例。也就是说，它不应该只是某个小地方的一个短时段，而应该是一个大规模的、持久的历史现象。出于同样的潜在大众吸引力的原因，这个例子应该在地理上和谱系上与当代西方民主国家社会模式的历史前身相联系，它不应该停留在黑暗且遥远的过去。

In my own attempts at offering a revisionist account of Western history—in particular in my two books Democracy：The God That Failed （2001） and A Short History of man （2015）—I have identified the European Middle ages，or what is sometimes also and better referred to as Latin Christen dom—the roughly thousandyear period from the fall of Rome until the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century—as such an example.Not perfect in many ways，but closer to the ideal of social perfection than anything that followed it，and in particular closer than the present democratic order。

在我自己对西方历史进行修正主义描述的尝试中——尤其是在我的两本书《民主：失败的上帝》（Democracy：The God That Failed，2001 年）和《人类简史》（A Short History of man，2015 年）中——我将欧洲中世纪，或有时也被更好地称为拉丁基督教统治时期（Latin Christen dom）——即从罗马灭亡到十六世纪末或十七世纪初的大约一千年时期——确定为这样一个例子。它在许多方面并不完美，但比其后的任何制度都更接近社会完美的理想，尤其是比目前的民主秩序更接近理想。

Not surprisingly，this is also the very period in Western history that our current—godless—democratic rulers and their court historians have chosen to portray in the darkest of terms.In Greek and Roman society，they can see some “good” and value，even if it supposedly lags far behind the level of social advancement reached with the contemporary democratic social order。But the Middle ages are routinely portrayed as dark，cruel，and filled with superstition，best forgotten and ignored in all of standard history and historical narrative.

不足为奇的是，这也是我们当今无神论的民主统治者和他们的宫廷历史学家选择用最黑暗的术语描绘的西方历史时期。在希腊和罗马社会中，他们可以看到一些“好的东西”和优点，即使它被认为远远落后于当代民主社会秩序所达到的社会进步水平。但中世纪通常被描绘成黑暗、残酷、充满迷信的时代，在所有标准历史和历史叙事中最好被遗忘和忽略。

Why this particularly unfavorable treatment of the Middle ages？ because，as many historians，old and contemporary，have of course noticed too，the Middle ages represents a largescale and longlasting historical example of a stateless society and as such represents the polar opposite of the present，statist social order。Indeed，the Middle ages，notwithstanding its many imperfections，can be identified as a Godpleasing—a gottgefaellige—social order，whereas the present democratic state order，notwithstanding its numerous achievements，stands in constant violation of God’s commandments and must be identified as a satanic order。To answer the question，then，Satan and his earthly followers will of course go all out to make us ignore and forget about God and belittle，besmirch，and denigrate everything and anything that shows His hand.

为什么对中世纪特别不友好？因为，正如许多历史学家（古代和当代）也注意到的那样，中世纪是无国家社会的一个大规模和持久的历史范例，因此代表了与当前的国家主义社会秩序截然相反的一极。的确，尽管中世纪有许多不完美之处，但它可以被认为是一种取悦上帝的社会秩序，而现在的民主国家秩序，尽管取得了许多成就，却不断违反上帝的诫命，必须被认为是一种撒旦的邪恶秩序。要回答这个问题，撒旦和他在尘世的追随者当然会竭尽全力让我们忽视和忘记上帝，贬低、亵渎和诋毁上帝所做的一切。

This is all the more reason for any libertarian and Godpleasing “Catholic” to study and draw inspiration from this historical period of the European Middle ages—something，incidentally，made easier nowadays and likely to encounter little opposition from the powers that be and their increasingly rigorously enforced speech code of “political correctness，” because any such study has long since been relegated to the status of a nerdy，quaint，and exotic interest，far distant in time from the present and without any contemporary relevance.

因此，任何自由意志主义者和取悦上帝的 “天主教徒 “都更有理由研究欧洲中世纪这段历史，并从中汲取灵感——顺便说一句，这种研究如今变得更加容易，而且大概率不会遭到当权者及其日益严格执行的 “政治正确 “言论规则的反对，因为任何此类研究都早已沦为书呆子、老古董和奇异的兴趣，在时间上与现在相去甚远，与当代没有任何关联。

In standard （orthodox） history we are told，as a quasiaxiomatic truth，that the institution of the state is necessary and indispensable for the maintenance of social peace.The study of the Middle ages and Latin Christendom shows that this is untrue，a historical myth，and how，for a lengthy historical period，peace was successfully maintained without a state and thus without open renunciation of libertarian and biblical precepts.

标准的（正统的）历史告诉我们，作为一个准公理的真理，国家制度是维护社会和平所必需的，也是不可或缺的。对中世纪和拉丁基督宗教的研究表明，这是不真实的，是一个历史神话，而且，在漫长的历史时期，和平是如何在没有国家的情况下成功维持的，因而也没有公开放弃自由意志主义和圣经戒律。

Although many libertarians fancy an anarchic social order as a largely horizontal order without hierarchies and different ranks of authority—as “antiauthoritarian”—the medieval example of a stateless society teaches otherwise.peace was not maintained by the absence of hierarchies and ranks of authority，but by the absence of anything but social authority and ranks of social authority。Indeed，in contrast to the present order，which essentially recognizes only one authority，that of the state，the Middle ages were characterized by a great multitude of competing，cooperating，over lapping and hierarchically ordered ranks of social authority。There was the authority of the heads of family households and of various kinship groups.There were patrons，lords，overlords，feudal kings with their estates，their vassals，and the vassals of vassals.There were countless different and separate communities and towns，and a huge variety of religious，artistic，professional，and social orders，councils，assemblies，guilds，associations，and clubs，each with its own rules，hierarchies and rank orders.In addition，and of utmost importance，there were the authorities of the local priest，the more distant bishop，and of the Pope in Rome.

尽管许多自由意志主义者把无政府主义社会秩序想象成一种没有等级和不同权威等级的横向秩序——即“反威权主义”——但中世纪无国家社会的例子却告诉我们事实并非如此。和平并不是因为没有等级制度和权威等级，而是因为除了社会权威和社会权威等级之外什么都没有。事实上，与目前基本上只承认一种权威（即国家权威）的秩序相比，中世纪的特点是社会权威的等级森严，相互竞争，相互合作。这里有家庭户主和各种亲属团体的权威。这里有赞助人、领主、大领主、封建君主和他们的领地，他们的封臣，封臣的封臣。这里有无数不同的、独立的社区和城镇，还有种类繁多的宗教、艺术、专业和社会团体、委员会、集会、行会、协会和俱乐部，每一个都有自己的规则、等级和等级秩序。此外，最重要的是，还有当地牧师、较远的主教和罗马教皇的权威。

But no authority was absolute，and no one person or group of people held a monopoly on its position or rank of authority。The hierarchical feudal lordvassal relationship，for instance，was not indissoluble.It could be broken if either side violated the provisions of the fealty oaths they both had sworn to uphold.Nor was the relationship between lord and vassal a transitive one.That is，the lord of a vassal was not on account of his lordship also the lord of all his vassal’s vassals.Indeed，such vassals could be tied to a different lord，or they could，elsewhere and regarding other things，be lords themselves，which precluded any involvement in their affairs in question.It was thus near impossible for anyone to exercise any straight topdown authority and hence also immensely difficult in particular to raise and maintain a large standing army and engage in largescale or even continentwide war。That is，the phenomenon which we have come to regard as perfectly normal today，that a command that is directly binding on all of society is given from the top on down，from its highest ranks down to the lowliest，was absent in the Middle ages.Authority was widely dispersed，and any one person or position of authority was constrained and kept in check by another。Even feudal kings，bishops，and indeed even the Pope himself could be called upon and brought to justice by other competing authorities.

但任何权威都不是绝对的，没有一个人或一群人可以垄断其权威地位或等级。例如，等级森严的封建领主关系并非牢不可破。如果任何一方违反了双方宣誓遵守的封建誓言，这种关系就可能被打破。领主和封臣之间的关系也不是过渡关系。也就是说，一个封臣的领主并不因为其领主身份而成为其所有封臣的领主。事实上，这些封臣可以依附于不同的领主，也可以在其他地方，就其他事情而言，他们自己就是领主，这就排除了对他们相关事务的参与。因此，任何人几乎都不可能直接行使自上而下的权力，因此也就很难组建和维持一支庞大的常备军，也很难发动大规模甚至是整个大陆的战争。也就是说，我们今天认为非常正常的现象，即从上到下，从最高阶层到最低阶层，对整个社会具有直接约束力的命令，在中世纪是不存在的。权力广泛分散，任何一个人或一个权力地位都受到另一个人或另一个权力地位的制约和牵制。即使是封建君主、主教，甚至是教皇本人，也会受到其他竞争权威的传唤并被绳之以法。

“Feudal law” reflected this “hierarchicanarchic” social structure of the Middle ages.All of law was essentially private law （i.e.，law applying to persons and persontoperson interactions），all of litigation was between a personal defendant and a personal plaintiff，and punishment typically involved the payment of some specified material compensation by the offender to his victim or his lawful successor。However，this central characteristic of the Middle ages as a historical model of a private law society did not mean that feudal law was some sort of unitary，coherent，and consistent legal System.To the contrary，feudal law allowed for a great variety of locally and regionally different laws and customs，and the difference in the treatment of similar offenses in different localities could be quite drastic。Yet at the same time，with the Catholic Church and the Scholastic teachings of the natural law，there was an overarching institutional framework and moral reference sys tem in place to serve as a morally unifying force，constraining and moderat ing the range of variation between the laws of different localities.

“封建法律 “反映了中世纪这种 “等级森严 “的社会结构。所有的法律本质上都是私法（即适用于个人以及人与人之间互动的法律），所有的诉讼都是在个人被告和个人原告之间进行，而惩罚通常涉及犯罪者向其受害者或其合法继承人支付一些特定的物质赔偿。然而，中世纪作为私法社会历史典范的这一核心特征并不意味着封建法律是某种统一、连贯和一致的法律体系。恰恰相反，封建法律允许地方和区域性的不同法律和习俗的存在，而且不同地方对类似罪行的处理方式可能会有很大差异。与此同时，随着天主教会和经院哲学自然法学说的兴起，一个总体性的制度框架和道德参考体系已经成熟，成为一种道德统一的力量，制约和缓和不同地方法律之间的差异。

needless to say，there were many imperfections that future historians，to this day，would focus on and highlight so as to discredit the entire period.During the Middle ages，under the influence of Catholic Church，the institution of slavery，which had been a dominant feature of Greek and Roman society，had been increasingly discredited and pushed back to near extinction，but it had not entirely disappeared.As well，the institution of serfdom，from a moral point of view “better” than slavery but still not without moral blemish，was yet a widespread social phenomenon.Moreover，plenty of smallscale wars and feuds took place during the entire period.And as we are never allowed to forget：the punishments dished out in various law courts for various offenses here or there，were sometimes （for modern sensibilities，in any case） extreme，harsh，and cruel。A murderer might be hung or beheaded，quartered，burnt，boiled，or drowned.A thief might have his finger or hand cut off and a false witness his tongue torn out。An adulteress might be stoned，a rapist castrated，and a “witch” burnt。

毋庸置疑，这一时期有许多不完善之处，后来的历史学家至今仍会关注和强调这些不完善之处，从而抹黑整个时期。在中世纪，在天主教会的影响下，奴隶制这一希腊和罗马社会的主要特征日益受到质疑，并被推到濒临灭绝的边缘，但它并没有完全消失。此外，农奴制度从道德角度看比奴隶制 “更好”，但仍不乏道德瑕疵，依然是一种普遍的社会现象。此外，整个时期还发生了大量小规模的战争和世仇争斗。我们永远不会忘记：在各种法庭上，对这里或那里的各种犯罪行为的惩罚有时（就现代人的敏感性而言，无论如何）是极端、严厉和残酷的。一个杀人犯可能被绞死、砍头、肢解、烧死、水煮或淹死。小偷可能会被砍手指或剁手，假证人可能会被割掉舌头。通奸犯可能会被乱石砸死，强奸犯可能会被阉割，”女巫 “可能会被烧死。

It is these features in particular that we are told in standard history to associate with the Middle ages so as to arouse our moral indignation and feel elated about our own enlightened present。Even if all true，how ever，any such exclusive concentration on these features as a distinctive characteristic of the Middle ages is to miss the mark，or the wood for the trees.It takes accidents for nature and what is natural and normal。That is，it ignores，whether deliberately or not，the central characteristic of the entire period：the fact that it was a stateless social order with widely dispersed，hierarchically ordered，and rivaling centers of authority。And this focus then conveniently closes the eyes to the fact that the “excesses” of the Middle ages actually pale in comparison to those of the present democratic state order，for surely slavery and serfdom have not disappeared in the democratic world.Rather，some increasingly rare “private” slavery and serfdom have been replaced by a nearuniversal System of “public” tax slavery and serfdom.As well，wars have not disappeared，but only become of a larger scale.And as for excessive punishments and witch hunts，they have not gone away either。To the contrary，they have multiplied.Enemies of the state are tortured in the same old gruesome or even technically “refined” ways.Moreover，countless people who are not murderers，thieves，libelers，adulterers，or rapists，i.e.，people who live in complete accordance with the ten biblical commandments and once would have been left alone，are nonetheless routinely punished today，up to the level of lengthy incarceration or the loss of their entire property。Witches are no longer called that，but with just one sole authority in place，the “identification” of anyone as a “suspect of evildoing” or a “troublemaker” is greatly facilitated，and the number of people so identified has accordingly multiplied； and although such suspects are no longer burnt at the stake，they are routinely punished by up to lifelong economic deprivation，unemployment，poverty，or even starvation.And while the primary purpose of punishment was once restitution，i.e.，the offender had to compensate the victim，the primary purpose of punishment today is submission—the offender must compensate and satisfy not the victim，but the state （thus victimizing the victim twice）。

标准的历史告诉我们，正是要把这些特征与中世纪联系起来，以激起我们的道德义愤，并为我们开明的今天感到高兴。即使这些都是事实，但如果只把这些特征作为中世纪的显著特点，那就有失偏颇，或者说是 “只见树木，不见森林”。它把意外当作自然，而把自然和正常当作意外。也就是说，它有意无意地忽略了整个时期的核心特征：这是一种无国家的社会秩序，权力中心广泛分散、等级有序且相互对立。这种关注很容易让人忽视这样一个事实，即中世纪的“过度行为”与现在的民主国家秩序相比实际上是微不足道的，因为奴隶制和农奴制肯定没有在民主世界消失。相反，一些日益罕见的 “私人 “奴隶制和农奴制被几乎普遍的 “公共 “税收奴隶制和农奴制所取代。同样，战争并没有消失，并且规模扩大了。至于过度惩罚和猎巫，它们也没有消失。相反，它们成倍增加。对国家的敌人施以酷刑的方式一如既往，令人毛骨悚然，甚至在技术上变得 “精微 “。此外，无数不是杀人犯、小偷、诽谤者、通奸者或强奸犯的人，即完全遵守《圣经》十诫生活的人，在过去会被放任自流，但今天却经常受到惩罚，甚至长期监禁或失去全部财产。女巫不再被称为女巫，但由于只有一个权威机构，”认定 “任何人为 “犯罪嫌疑人”或 “麻烦制造者 “的工作大大便利，被这样认定的人数也相应地成倍增加；尽管这些嫌疑犯不再被烧死在火刑柱上，但他们通常会被处以终身的经济剥夺、失业、贫困甚至饥饿的惩罚。过去，惩罚的主要目的是恢复原状，即犯罪者必须赔偿受害者，而如今，惩罚的主要目的是服从——犯罪者必须赔偿和满足的不是受害者，而是国家（从而使受害者受害两次）。

with this we can state a first conclusion.The present democratic social order may be the technologically most advanced civilization，but it most certainly is not the most advanced socially。As measured by biblicalliber tarian standards of social perfection，it falls far behind the Middle ages.Indeed，as measured by those standards，the transition in European history from the anarchic medieval to the modern statist world is nothing less than the transition from a Godpleasing to a godless social order。

由此，我们可以得出第一个结论。当前的民主社会秩序可能是技术上最先进的文明，但肯定不是社会上最先进的文明。按照圣经自由意志主义社会的完美标准来衡量，它远远落后于中世纪。事实上，按照这些标准来衡量，欧洲历史上从无政府的中世纪到现代国家主义世界的过渡，无异于从上帝悦纳的社会秩序到亵渎上帝的社会秩序的过渡。

At various places，in the most condensed form in my essay From Aristocracy to Monarchy to Democracy （2014），I have analyzed and tried to reconstruct this process of decivilization，which has by now been going on for half a millennium，and to explain the calamitous and deleterious consequences and ramifications that it has had for the development of law and economics.I shall not repeat or recapitulate any of this here.Rather，I only want to shed some light on the principal strategy that all statists，from the late Middle ages on until today，have pursued to reach their statist ends，so as to also gain （if only indirectly） some insight into any possible counterstrategy that could lead us out of the current predicament。Not back to the Middle ages，of course，because too many permanent and irreversible changes have taken place since，both in regard to our mental and our material conditions and capacities，but to a new society that takes its cues from the study of the Middle ages and understands and knows of the principal reason for its demise.The strategy was dictated by the quasilibertarian，stateless medieval starting point，and it suggested itself “naturally，” first and foremost to the top ranks of social authority，in particular to feudal kings.In a nutshell，it boils down to this rule：instead of remaining a mere primus inter pares，you must become a solus primus，and to do this you must undermine，weaken，and ultimately eliminate all competing authorities and hierarchies of social authority。beginning at the highest levels of authority，with your most immediate competitors，and from there on down，ultimately，to the most elementary and decentralized level of social authority invested in the heads of individual family households，you （every statist） must use your own ini tial authority to undermine each and every rival authority and strip away its right to independently judge，discriminate，sentence，and punish within its own territorially limited realm of authority。

在不同的地方，在我的文章《从贵族制到君主制再到民主制》（2014 年）中，我曾以最简洁的形式分析并试图重构这一迄今已持续了半个世纪的去文明化进程，并解释它对法律和经济学的发展所造成的灾难性和有害的后果和影响。我不想在这里重复或重述这些内容。相反，我只想阐明从中世纪晚期至今，所有国家主义者为达到其国家主义目的而采取的主要策略，从而（即使只是间接地）使我们对任何可能的反策略有一些了解，这种策略可以带领我们走出当前的困境。当然，不是回到中世纪，因为从那时起，我们的精神和物质条件以及能力都发生了太多永久性的、不可逆转的变化，而是回到一个从中世纪的研究中汲取灵感，了解并认识到中世纪消亡的主要原因的新社会。这种策略是由准自由主义，即中世纪无国家主义的出发点所决定的，它 “自然而然 “地首先向社会权力的最高层，尤其是封建君主，提出了自己的建议。一言以蔽之，它归结为这条规则：你必须成为唯一的主宰者，而不是仅仅成为主宰者中的一员，要做到这一点，你必须破坏、削弱并最终消除所有竞争的权威和社会权威的等级制度。从最高级别的权威开始，从你最直接的竞争对手开始，一直到最基层、最分散的、由家庭户主掌管的社会权威，你（每一个国家主义者）都必须利用自己最初的权威来削弱每一个竞争对手的权威，剥夺其在自己的领土范围内独立审判、歧视、判决和惩罚的权利。

Kings other than you must no longer be allowed to freely determine who is another or the next king，who is to be included or excluded from the rank of kings，or who may come before them for justice and assistance.And likewise for all other levels of social authority，for noble lords and vassals as well as all separate local communities，orders，associations，and ultimately all individual family households.No one must be free to autonomously determine his own rules of admission and exclusion.That is，to determine who is supposed to be “in” or “out，” the conduct to expect of those who are “in” and want to remain in good standing，and what member conduct instead results in various sanctions，ranging from disapproval，censure，and fines to expulsion and corporal punishment。

不能再允许你以外的君主随意决定谁是另一个君主或下一个君主，谁被列入或排除在君主行列之外，或者谁可以到他们面前寻求公正和帮助。同样，所有其他级别的社会权力机构，无论是贵族领主和封臣，还是所有独立的地方社区、圣职、协会，以及最终的所有个体家庭，都是如此。任何人都不能自由自主地决定自己的接纳和排斥规则。这就是，决定谁应该 “加入 “或 “退出”，对那些 “加入 “并希望保持良好声誉的人的行动的期望，以及什么样的成员行为会导致各种制裁，从反对、谴责、罚款到驱逐和体罚。

And how to accomplish this and centralize and consolidate all authority in the hands of a single territorial monopolist，first an absolute monarch and subsequently a democratic state？ By enlisting the support of everyone resentful of not being included or promoted in some particular community，association，or social rank，or of being expelled from them and “unfairly” punished.against this “unfair discrimination” you，the state or wouldbe state，promise to get the excluded “victims” in and help them get a “fair” and “nondiscriminating” treatment in return for their binding commitment to and affiliation with you。on every level of social authority，whenever and wherever the opportunity arises，you encourage and promote “deviant behavior” and “deviants” and enlist their support in order to expand and strengthen your own authority at the expense of all others.

如何实现这一目标，并将所有权力集中和巩固在一个单一的领土垄断者手中？先是专制君主，然后是民主国家。那就是争取每个人的支持，因为他们对在某个社区、协会或社会等级中没有被接纳或晋升，或被驱逐出这些社区、协会或社会等级并受到 “不公平 “的惩罚心怀怨恨。针对这种 “不公平的歧视”，你，国家或未来的国家，承诺让被排除在外的 “受害者 “加入，并帮助他们获得 “公平 “和 “非歧视 “的待遇，以换取他们的投名状与顺服。在社会权威的各个层面，无论何时何地，只要有机会，你就会鼓动 “离经叛道的行为 “和 “离经叛道的人”，并争取他们的支持，以牺牲其他所有人的利益来扩大和加强自己的权威。

Accordingly，the principal counterstrategy of recivilization，then，must be a return to “normality” by means of decentralization.The process of territorial expansion that went hand in hand with the centralization of all authority in one monopolistic hand must be reversed.Each and every secessionist tendency and movement，then，should be supported and promoted，because with every territorial separation from the central state another separate and rival center of authority and adjudication is created.And the same tendency should be promoted within the framework of any newly created separate and independent territory and center of authority。That is，any voluntary membership organization，association，order，club，or even house hold within the new territory should be free to independently determine its own house rules，i.e.，its rules of inclusion，of sanctions，and of exclusion，so as to successively replace the current statist System of forced territorial and legal integration and uniformation with a natural，quasiorganic social order of voluntary territorial and legalcustomary association and dissociation.Moreover，as an important addition，in order to safeguard this order of increasingly decentralized centers，ranks，and hierarchies of natural social authority from internal corruption or external （foreign） attack，each newly （re）emerging social authority should be encouraged to build as wide as possible a network with similarly placed and likeminded authorities in other，“foreign” territories and jurisdictions for the purpose of mutual assistance in case of need.

因此，再文明化的主要对策必须是通过权力下放来恢复 “正常”。在领土扩张的同时，所有权力都集中在一个垄断者手中，这一过程必须扭转。那么，每一种分离主义倾向和运动都应得到支持和促进，因为每从中央国家分离出一块领土，就会产生另一个独立的、对立的权力和裁决中心。在任何新建立的独立领土和权力中心的框架内，都应促进同样的趋势。也就是说，新领土内的任何自愿会员组织、协会、社团、俱乐部甚至家庭都应该自由独立地确定自己的内部规则，即包容、制裁和排斥的规则，从而逐步取代当前强制领土和法律一体化和统一的国家主义体系，代之以一种自然的、类有机的、自愿的、按地域和法律习惯结社和离社的社会秩序。此外，作为一项重要的补充，为了保护这种由日益分散的中心、等级和自然社会权力等级组成的秩序，防止内部腐败或外部（外国）攻击，应鼓励每一个新（再）出现的社会权力机构与其他 “外国 “领土和管辖区的类似和志同道合的权力机构建立尽可能广泛的网络，以便在需要时相互援助。

with this I have reached a stage of conceptual analysis and of historical insight and background information that allows me，as my second task，to comment in some detail on the most recent attempt by Steven Pinker，with his book The better Angels of Our nature，[495] to give new impetus to the Whig theory of history，i.e.，the myth that human history has been a somewhat rocky but nonetheless steady march upward and into the light，and that we today，in the Western world，live，if not in the best of all possible worlds，in a world better than anything that came before.

在此基础上，我的概念分析以及历史的洞察和背景信息已经达到了一个阶段，这使我能够为我的第二项任务，对史蒂文-平克（Steven Pinker）最近试图通过他的《我们人性中的善良天使》（The better Angels of Our nature）一书为辉格史观（即 “人类历史的神话”）提供新动力的尝试进行一些详细的评论，这个神话就是，我们今天生活在西方世界，即使不是生活在最好的世界里，也是生活在一个比以前任何时候都要好的世界里。

The book，unsurprisingly，has been enthusiastically greeted by the rul ing elites and become a great commercial success，further boosted，undoubtedly，by Pinker’s status as a charismatic Harvard professor。In eight hundred pages of small print，Pinker assembles a huge mass of interesting pieces of information and interpretation concerning all sorts of things，but as far as the case he makes for some steady social progress culminating in the present，my verdict is entirely negative.Pinker may be an excellent psychologist，but he is out of his depth in the areas of philosophy，methodology，economics，and history，which all are required to pass sound judgment on the degree of social perfection of the various stages and longrun development of human history。In particular，his historical narratives frequently strike one as cherry picked and either missing the wood for the trees or vice versa，but more often the trees for the wood.[496]

不出所料，这本书受到了统治精英的热烈欢迎，并取得了巨大的商业成功，毫无疑问，平克作为一位魅力非凡的哈佛教授的地位进一步推动了这本书的成功。在八百多页的小字中，平克汇集了大量有趣的信息和对各种事物的解读，但对于他提出的社会稳步发展并最终达到今天的成就的观点，我的评价是完全否定的。平克也许是一位出色的心理学家，但他在哲学、方法论、经济学和历史学领域却显得力不从心，而这些领域都是对人类历史各个阶段和长期发展的社会完善程度做出正确判断所必需的。特别是，他的历史叙事常常让人觉得是偷梁换柱，要么只见树木不见森林，要么只见森林不见树木，但更多时候是只见树木不见森林。

There is plenty to complain about in the book，not least the fact that Pinker is less than careful in unambiguously defining his terms so as to avoid all internal inconsistency or equivocation.Here，however，I shall concentrate my criticism on only two central points：first，Pinker’s “measurement” or criterion of social progress—his explanandum —and then his explanation for the so “measured” phenomenon—his explanans.

书中有很多值得吐槽的地方，尤其是平克在定义自己的术语时不够谨慎，未能避免所有内在的不一致和模棱两可。在这里，无论如何，我只想集中批评两个核心要点：第一，平克对社会进步的 “衡量 “或标准——他的待解释目标（explanandum）——以及他对如此 “衡量 “的现象的解释——他的解释前提（explanans）。

Throughout his entire work，Pinker shows a remarkable hostility toward religion and hence it is hardly surprising that it does not cross his mind to use the biblical commandments （which，incidentally，he grossly misrepresents） as a benchmark for social perfection.Rather，his benchmark is “violence，” and social progress is defined as a reduction in violence.At first sight，this criterion does not seem too far away from the biblicallibertarian goal of peace.In fact，however，it turns out to be something quite different。His prime examples of violence are homicides and war casual ties.The book is filled with tables and statistics on these indicators of violence.Incredibly，however，Pinker does not make a categorical distinction between aggressive and defensive violence.In the biblical commandments，with their explicit recognition of the sanctity of private property，such a distinction is made.It makes a difference if violence is used to take another man’s property or if a man uses violence in defense of his property against an aggressor。Murder is a categorically different thing from the killing of someone in selfdefense.

在他的整部作品中，平克都表现出对宗教的敌意，因此，他没有想到用《圣经》中的诫命（巧合的是，他严重扭曲了这些诫命）作为社会完善的基准，这一点也不足为奇。相反，他的基准是 “暴力”，而社会进步的定义是减少暴力。乍一看，这一标准似乎与圣经自由意志主义的和平目标相去不远。事实上，无论如何，这都是截然不同的东西。他以谋杀和战争伤亡作为暴力的主要例子。书中充斥着关于这些暴力指标的表格和统计数据。然而，令人难以置信的是，平克并没有对侵犯性暴力和防御性暴力做出明确区分。《圣经》中的诫命明确承认私有财产神圣不可侵犯，做出了这样的区分。是使用暴力夺取他人的财产，还是为了保护自己的财产而对侵犯者使用暴力，这两者是不同的。谋杀与自卫杀人截然不同。

Not so for Pinker。

但平克却非如此。

Property and property rights do not Systematically figure in his analyses.Indeed，the terms do not even appear in the book’s thirtypage subject index。For Pinker，violence is violence，and the reduction of violence is progress，regardless of whether this reduction is the result of the successful suppression of a people by and visàvis another，conquering people，or the result of their own successful suppression of aggressors and conquerors.

在他的分析中，财产和产权并没有系统地出现。事实上，这些术语甚至没有出现在本书30页的主题索引中。在平克看来，暴力就是暴力，减少暴力就是进步，无论这种减少是一个民族成功镇压另一个民族、征服另一个民族的结果，还是他们自己成功镇压侵犯者和征服者的结果。

In Pinker’s world，a “stable” masterslave relationship is a sign of civilization，while a slave revolt accompanied by violence is a sign of decivilization.Likewise，a System of compulsory taxation—another term which like property is completely missing from the index （not coincidentally）—is an indicator of civilization regardless of the height of taxation，as long as it is simply stable，i.e.，as long as the mere threat of punishment by the tax authority is sufficient to achieve general compliance on the part of the taxed.Any tax revolt and resistance is to count as decivilization.one is peace and progress to Pinker，whereas the other is violence and regression.

在平克的世界里，”稳定 “的主奴关系是文明的标志，而伴随暴力的奴隶起义则是不文明的标志。同样，强制征税制度——另一个与财产一样在指数中完全缺失的术语（并非巧合）——也是文明的标志，无论征税的高低，只要它是简单稳定的，即只要税收当局仅仅威胁惩罚就足以使被征税人普遍遵守。任何反抗和抵制税收的行为都是不文明的。在平克看来，一种是和平与进步，另一种则是暴力与倒退。

Pinker does not follow his own logic to the bitter end，but this must be done to reveal the full depravity of his thought。According to him，a smoothly run concentration camp，for instance，guarded by armed men who do not murder the inmates and in fact prevent them from killing each other，but who supply them with “happiness drugs” to keep them quietly working for the benefit of the guards until their natural （nonviolent） deaths，is the perfect model of peace and social progress，while the violent over throw of the guards by the inmates is，well，violence and decivilization.

平克并没有完全按照自己的逻辑行事，但必须把他的逻辑贯彻到底才能揭示他思想的全部堕落。根据他的观点，一个平稳运行的集中营，例如，由武装人员看守，不杀害囚犯，事实上也防止他们自相残杀，但向他们提供 “快乐丸”，让他们为看守的利益而默默工作，直到自然（非暴力）死亡，是和平与社会进步的完美典范，而囚犯用暴力推翻看守，则是暴力与不文明。

Based on this depraved view of social progress that knows no property and property rights violations，but only counts the number of unnatural deaths，bodily injuries，and broken bones，it should be expected that Pinker’s evaluations of various historical episodes must yield some rather awkward or even grotesque conclusions，as in fact they do。In particular，it also explains how Pinker could misrepresent the present democratic age as the best of all times.

基于这样一种堕落的社会进步观，即不知道财产和财产权受到侵犯，而只计算非正常死亡、人身伤害和身体残缺的数量，因此，平克对各种历史事件的评价必然会得出一些相当尴尬甚至怪诞的结论，而事实上也确实如此。尤其是，这也解释了平克为什么会把当今的民主时代扭曲为最好的时代。

But is it，even on Pinker’s own terms？ Are we living today in the least violent of times？

但真的是这样吗，就连平克自己也这么认为吗？我们今天是生活在暴力最少的时代吗？

The answer is ambiguous.on the one hand there are wars，which throughout history have always been responsible for the largest number of casualties，far outweighing those resulting from “regular” smallscale inter personal violence.In this regard，as Pasquale Cirillo and Nicholas Taleb have shown in response to Pinker’s progression thesis，no statistically discernable trend can be established.According to Taleb，for the 600year period from about 1500 to today，for which we have relatively reliable data，no significant change to the frequency of war or the number of war casualties （always set in relation to the total population） can be made out。Indeed，if anything，there has been a slight uptick in warrelated violence with the spread of democracy （contrary to the proponents of the socalled democratic peace theory）。And as for the seventyyear period since the end of World War II，which Pinker identifies as exceptionally peaceful and warless，Taleb points out that wars and especially largescale wars are highly irregular and com paratively rare events and that an observation period of just seventy years，then，is far too short to serve as the basis for any farreaching conclusions.

答案是模棱两可的。一方面，纵观历史，战争造成的伤亡人数总是最多的，远远超过“常规的”小规模人际暴力造成的伤亡人数。在这方面，正如帕斯夸莱-西里洛（Pasquale Cirillo）和尼古拉斯-塔勒布（Nicholas Taleb）在回应平克的进步论时所指出的那样，在统计上无法确定任何可辨别的趋势。塔勒布认为，在我们拥有相对可靠数据的 1500 年到今天的 600 年间，战争频率和战争伤亡人数（总是与总人口相关）都没有发生显著变化。事实上，如果说有什么不同的话，那就是随着民主的普及，与战争有关的暴力事件反而略有增加（这与所谓的民主和平论的支持者恰恰相反）。至于自第二次世界大战结束后的七十年，平克认为这段时期异常和平，没有战争，塔勒布指出，战争，尤其是大规模战争，是非常不规则和相对罕见的事件，因此，仅仅七十年的观察期太短，不足以作为得出任何影响深远的结论的基础。

But，as John Gray （2015） has argued contra Pinker，even this assessment of “modern times” is likely too rosy a picture，because it tends to Systematically underestimate the number of warrelated casualties among noncombatants，i.e.，the number of civilians dying from various diseases spread through war or from longterm side effects of war such as “slow deaths” caused by economic deprivation and starvation.（The same danger of underestimation does not exist，at least not to the same extent，for the wars of the European Middle ages，because they were typically smallscale，territorially restricted events and involved a comparatively sharp distinction between and separation of combatants and noncombatants.）

但是，正如约翰·格雷（John Gray， 2015 年）与平克（Pinker）相左的观点所指出的，即使是这种对 “现代 “的评估也可能过于乐观，因为它往往系统性地低估了非战斗人员中与战争相关的伤亡人数，即死于战争传播的各种疾病的平民人数，或死于战争的长期副作用（如经济贫困和饥饿导致的 “缓慢死亡”）的平民人数。（欧洲中世纪的战争不存在同样的低估危险，至少在程度上不存在这种危险，因为这些战争通常规模较小，受地域限制，而且战斗人员和非战斗人员之间的区别和隔离相对较明显）。

on the other hand，there exists indeed plenty of empirical evidence to speak of a suprasecular trend toward a reduction in violence—not to be confused with a reduction ininfringements on property rights—as measured in particular by homicide rates （a homicide is a homicide regardless of who kills whom，why，or how）。In this extra or amoral sense，we can indeed speak of a “civilizing process，” as Pinker does and demonstrates in great detail。Pinker adopts this term from Norbert Elias and his book The Civilizing Process （1969），first published in german in 1939 and translated into English thirty years later。In this book，Elias describes and aims to explain the changes in everyday etiquette，from table manners to sexual mores，that occurred during the European Middle ages and since.Put briefly，this process can be described as the gradual transition from brutish，gross，crude，boorish，bearish，immodest and intemperate，etc。pp.，behavior to increasingly refined，controlled，considerate，modest and temperate，etc。pp.，human conduct。Taking his cues from Elias，Pinker merely generalizes and expands Elias’s civilizing thesis from human etiquette to all of everyday life and behavior—and in this，in my judgment，he is by and large successful。

另一方面，确实有大量经验证据表明，暴力——不要与侵犯财产权行为的减少相混淆——有减少的超大趋势，特别是以凶杀率来衡量（凶杀就是凶杀，无论谁杀了谁、为什么杀、如何杀）。在这种额外的或非道德的意义上，我们确实可以谈论 “文明化进程”，平克就是这样做的，并且非常详细地证明了这一点。平克从诺伯特·埃利亚斯（（Norbert Elias）及其《文明化进程》（（The Civilizing Process， 1969 年）一书中采用了这一术语，该书于 1939 年首次以德文出版，三十年后被翻译成英文。在这本书中，埃利亚斯描述并旨在解释欧洲中世纪及其后发生的日常礼仪变化，从餐桌礼仪到性观念。简而言之，这一过程可以被描述为从野蛮、粗暴、粗鲁、粗野、粗鄙、无礼和放纵等行为逐渐过渡到越来越文雅、克制、体贴、谦逊和有节制等行为的过程。平克从埃利亚斯那里得到启发，只是将埃利亚斯的文明论点从人类礼仪概括和扩展到所有日常生活和行为，在这一点上，我认为他基本上是成功的。

However，Pinker’s explanation for this extra or amoral form of social progress from brutish to increasingly refined behavior is fundamentally mistaken.What he identifies as the principal cause of this development，and I will come to his cause in a moment，has actually，if anything，retarded and distorted this development。That is，absent Pinker’s cause，there would have been not less but more （and a significantly different） refinement in human conduct。

然而，平克对这种从野蛮行为到日益文雅行为的额外或非道德形式的社会进步的解释从根本上说是错误的。他认为这一发展的主要原因，而我稍后将谈到他的原因，实际上，如果有的话，是阻碍和扭曲了这一发展。也就是说，如果没有平克的原因，人类行为的文雅程度将不是更少，而是更多（而且是明显不同的文雅）。

In fact，the grand，longrun historical tendency toward increasingly refined （or less brutish） behavior can be explained，simply enough，as the quasinatural byproduct of the widening and deepening of the division of labor in the course of economic and technological development。The development of increasingly more and different productivityenhancing tools and instruments proceeded hand in hand with the development and increasing differentiation of human crafts，skills，and talents.Put briefly，the importance of muscle power for economic success declined relative to the importance of brain power，physical finesse，and mental agility。More over，as I have tried to explain in my A Short History of man，especially under Malthusian conditions，which prevailed for most of human history，a Systematic premium for economic success and indeed human survival is placed on the progressive development and growth of human intelligence，of low time preference，impulse control，and patience （which personal characteristics are at least partially hereditary and thus passed on through subsequent generations）。

事实上，人们可以很简单地把行为日益文明（或不那么野蛮）这一宏大的、长期的历史趋势解释为经济和技术发展过程中劳动分工不断扩大和深化的准自然副产品。越来越多、越来越不同的提高生产力的工具和仪器的发展，是与人类手艺、技能和才能的发展和日益分化同步进行的。简而言之，相对于脑力、身体技巧和思维敏捷程度的重要性，肌肉力量对经济成功的重要性下降了。更重要的是，正如我在《人类简史》（A Short History of man）中试图解释的那样，特别是在马尔萨斯条件下，也就是在人类历史的大部分时间里，经济上的成功乃至人类的生存，系统性地依赖于人类智力的逐步发展和增长，以及低时间偏好、冲动控制和耐心（这些个人特征至少有部分遗传性，因此会代代相传）。

Pinker’s explanation for this tendency toward a progressive refinement of human conduct is a very different one，however。His explanation for this development is the institution of a State，i.e.，a territorial monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking； and he claims that the most decisive and allimportant step in the progressive refinement of human conduct has been the transition from a Stateless social order to a Statist society。And in this he is not entirely wrong—given that his definition of progressive refinement is an extra or amoral one.certainly，the institution of States，and more specifically of democratic States，is the principal cause of many central features and observations concerning our presentday human con duct and routines—except to notice that many or most of them have little or nothing to do with moral progress and stand in open contradiction to biblical commandments.As well，violence as defined by Pinker may indeed have gone down—except to notice that the exercise of violence has been so ‘refined’ and redefined under Stateauspices as to no longer fall under Pinker’s narrow definition of the term.“Witches，” for instance，are no longer violently burnt，but shipped off instead，seemingly peacefully，into psychiatric wards to be drugged and pacified by medical professionals； and neighbors are no longer robbed of their property violently，but，much ‘refined’ and apparently without any physical violence，presented with regularly recurring taxbills to be quasiautomatically paid per bank transfer into the accounts of the State.

平克对人类行为逐步完善这一趋势的解释却截然不同。他对这一发展的解释是国家制度，即最终决策的领土垄断者；他声称，人类行为逐步完善的最具决定性和最重要的一步是从无国家的社会秩序过渡到有国家的社会。在这一点上，他并没有完全错，因为他对逐步完善的定义是一个额外的或非道德的定义。当然，国家制度，更具体地说是民主国家制度，是我们当今人类行为和日常的许多核心特征和观察结果的主要原因——但要注意的是，其中许多或大多数与道德进步几乎毫无关系，而且与圣经诫命公然相悖。同样，平克定义的暴力可能确实减少了——但我们要注意的是，暴力的行使已经在国家安全下被重新定义且变得“高雅”，不再属于平克狭义定义的范畴。例如，”女巫 “不再被暴力烧死，而是被看似和平地送入精神病院，由专业医护人员服药安抚；邻居们的财产也不再被暴力掠夺，而是 “高雅”得多，而且显然没有任何身体暴力，而是被定期递交税单，每笔银行转账都准自动地被课税，然后存入国家账户。

The central cause for social progress and increasing social perfection that Pinker identifies，then—the instituting of a state—actually turns out to be a central force of decivilization，retarding and distorting the underlying civilizing process naturally set in motion by the deepening and widening of the division of labor in the course of economic development。The institution of the state may explain the refinement of violence in the course of time，but it is itself a constant source of violence，however refined，and the driving force for its expansion and intensification.The subtitle of Pinker’s book，Why Violence Has Declined，would lead most potential readers to expect an answer to a moral question or problem，because of the typically negative of the term violence.Yet as such the book’s title is an ingenious attempt at false and deceptive advertisement，because Pinker does nothing of the sort。Instead，he answers the very different question of how to “technically” or “scientistically” define violence so as to make the morally most depraved and violent institution of all appear as a peacemaker，or to make Satan look like an angel。

因此，平克所指出的社会进步和社会日益完善的核心原因——国家的建立——实际上是去文明化的核心力量，它阻碍并扭曲了在经济发展过程中分工的深化和扩大自然启动的潜在的文明化进程。国家制度可以解释暴力在时间长河中的精致化，但它本身却是暴力的持续来源，无论暴力如何精致，它都是暴力扩张和加剧的推动力。平克这本书的副标题 “暴力为何减少”（Why Violence Has Declined）会让大多数潜在读者以为书中回答了一个道德问题或难题，因为 “暴力 “一词通常是负面的。然而，这本书的标题是一个巧妙的虚假和欺骗性广告，因为平克没有做任何类似的事情。相反，他回答了一个截然不同的问题：如何 “技术性地 “或 “科学性地 “定义暴力，从而让道德上最堕落、最暴力的机构看起来像和平缔造者，或者让撒旦看起来像天使。

And how does he do this？ First，by throwing out logic and plain common sense and then fudging the data and historical narratives to fit his plain nonsensical basic premise.Pinker presents this basic premise in the form of a simple diagram in The better Angels of Our nature （p.35）。In any twoperson scenario，both parties may have a motive for violence，either as an aggressor，to prey on the other，or as a victim，to retaliate.Consequently，similarly to Hobbes，Pinker pictures this state of affairs as one of intermina ble violent conflict，as a bellum omnium contra omnes，a war of all against all。But miraculously，there is a cure to this problem，a third party，which Pinker calls a bystander，that acts as judge and assumes the role of a territorial monopolist of violence so as create lasting peace.But would this bystander not also be a potential predator？ And would his predatory motives not be even strengthened if he were the monopolist of violence and did not have to fear any retaliation from his victims？ Pinker does not address these rather obvious questions，let alone provide a Systematic answer to them.

他是如何做到这一点的呢？首先，他抛弃了逻辑和普通常识，然后伪造数据和历史叙事，以符合他那毫无道理的基本前提。平克在《我们人性中善良天使》（The better Angels of Our nature）一书（第35页）中以简单的图表形式展示了这一基本前提。在任何双人场景中，双方都可能有使用暴力的动机，既可以是侵犯者，对对方进行掠夺，也可以是受害者，对对方进行报复。因此，与霍布斯相似，平克将这种状态描绘成无休止的暴力冲突，是一场所有人反对所有人的战争。但神奇的是，有一种方法可以解决这个问题，那就是第三方，平克称之为 “旁观者”，它可以充当法官，扮演暴力的领土垄断者的角色，从而创造持久和平。但是，这个旁观者不也是潜在的掠夺者吗？如果他是暴力的垄断者，不必担心受害者的报复，他的掠夺动机会不会更加强烈？平克并没有回答这些显而易见的问题，更不用说给出系统性的答案。

Nor does he provide an answer to the question of why anyone would submit himself，without resistance，to any such bystanding monopolistic judge.Would no one recognize the potential danger for his own property from such an arrangement and put up resistance against its establishment？ To be sure，Pinker cannot cannot help noticing later on that empirically states qua territorial monopolists of violence did not emerge spontaneously or quasiorganically，but mafialike，as some sort of protection racket。Yet this observation does not lead him to revise or reject his fundamental thesis about the principal role of the state as a peacemaker，nor does it lead him to the recognition that many if not most of the civilizing achievements that he ascribes to the workings of the state are in fact the results of popular resistance against state power，whether active and violent or passive and nonviolent。Indeed，as mentioned before，Pinker classifies any violent resistance against the state as decivilization，which implies that the prior violence exercised by the state visàvis the resister must have been a civilizing and pacifying activity，not to be counted as violence at all。It is almost needless to say that such mental acrobatics inevitably lead to various contradictions from which Pinker can extricate himself only through more or less ingenious but always intellectually painful contortions.

他也没有回答为什么有人会屈服于这样一个旁观的垄断法官而不加反抗。难道没有人会认识到这种安排对自己财产的潜在危险，并对这种安排的建立进行抵抗吗？当然，平克后来不能不注意到，从经验上看，国家等同于领土上的暴力垄断者，并不是自发地或准有机地出现的，而是黑手党式的，作为某种保护伞出现的。然而，这种看法并没有使他修改或否定他关于国家作为和平缔造者的主要作用的基本论点，也没有使他认识到，他认为归功于国家运作的文明化成就，如果不是大多数的话，也有许多实际上是民众反抗国家权力的结果，无论是积极的暴力反抗，还是消极的非暴力反抗。事实上，如前所述，平克将任何针对国家的暴力反抗都归类为 “去文明化”，这意味着国家先前对反抗者实施的暴力必须是一种教化和安抚活动，而根本不能算作暴力。毋庸赘言，这种智力上的杂耍不可避免地会导致各种矛盾，平克只能通过或多或少的巧妙但总是令人痛苦的智力扭曲来摆脱这些矛盾。

Pinker’s identification of the state as the allimportant force in the process of civilization coincides，of course，perfectly well with the assessment of all state rulers everywhere，and it is essentially the very same lesson that we all have been taught in school and university to accept as a quasiaxiomatic truth.In particular，it is the same lesson taught by all contemporary “leading economists.” And yet it flatly contradicts one of the most elementary laws of economics：production under monopolistic conditions will lead to higher prices and lower quality of whatever is produced as compared to the production of the same product under competitive conditions，i.e.，under conditions of “free entry。” Most contemporary economists recognize this law，but they fail to apply it to the peculiar monopoly that is the state— most likely because most of them are employed by the state.But in fact it applies to the state as well，regardless of how one describes the specific product that it produces.If we describe the state，as Pinker does，as a ter ritorial monopolist of peacemaking，then peace will be more expensive and of lower quality。If we describe it as a monopolist of justice，then justice will be of higher cost and of lower quality。If we describe it as a monopolist of violence，violence will be more expensive and of worse quality。Or if we describe it，as I think best，as a territorial monopolist of expropriation charged with the task of property protection，then we will predictably get much expropriation，which benefits the monopolist，and little protection，which will be only costly for the state.In any case，the result is always the same，and Pinker’s central thesis concerning the civilizing effect of the institution of a state，then，must be rejected on logical grounds alone.

平克认为国家是文明进程中最重要的力量，这当然与世界各地所有国家统治者的自我评价不谋而合，而且基本上也是我们在学校和大学里被教导要接受的准公理真理。尤其是，这也是当代所有 “顶尖经济学家 “所教授的课程。然而，它却完全违背了经济学最基本的定律之一：与在竞争条件下，即在 “自由进入 “的条件下生产同样的产品相比，在垄断条件下生产的产品将导致更高的价格和更低的质量。大多数当代经济学家都认识到了这一定律，但他们却没有将其应用于国家这一特殊的垄断行业——很可能是因为他们中的大多数人都受雇于国家。但事实上，无论人们如何描述国家生产的具体产品，这一定律同样适用于国家。如果我们像平克那样，把国家描述为建立和平的领土垄断者，那么和平的成本就会更高，质量也会更低。如果我们把它说成是公平、公正的垄断者，那么公平、公正的成本会更高，质量会更低。如果我们把它描述为暴力垄断者，那么暴力的成本会更高，质量会更差。或者，如果我们把它描述为——我认为最好的描述——一个负责征用的领土垄断者，肩负着财产安保的任务，那么我们就会预见到大量的征用，这对垄断者有利，而很少的安保，这只会让国家付出高昂的代价。无论如何，结果总是一样的，因此平克关于国家制度的文明化效应的核心论点，仅从逻辑上就必须被否定。

What about Pinker’s empirical case，then？ Logic cannot be refuted by empirical data，but if one throws out logic one is bound to misinterpret empirical data.Pinker offers a huge number of empirical data，tables，and graphs of great interest。I have quarrels with some of them，but here I accept them all for the sake of argument。My criticism concerns solely his interpretation of these data.In fact，and as mentioned before，I can largely go along with his generalized Eliasthesis about a civilizing process from brutish to refined human conduct。Based on logic，however，I would interpret it differently。Whatever civilizing process there was，it did not occur because of the state，but in spite of or in resistance against the state； and whatever decivilizing process there was，it did not occur because of the absence of a state，but in spite of its absence，or as the late lingering effect of a prior （now dissolved） state and its earlier decivilizing tendencies.Post hoc does not imply propter hoc。

那么，平克的经验案例呢？经验数据无法反驳逻辑，但如果抛开逻辑，就必然会曲解经验数据。平克提供了大量令人感兴趣的经验数据、表格和图表。我对其中一些观点有异议，但为了论证起见，在此我全部接受。我的批评只涉及他对这些数据的解释。事实上，如前所述，我基本上同意他关于人类行为从野蛮到高雅的文明化过程的概括性论述。根据逻辑，无论如何，我会有不同的解释。无论文明化进程如何，它都不是因为有了国家才发生的，而是尽管有了国家或在反抗国家的过程中发生的；无论去文明化进程如何，它都不是因为没有国家才发生的，而是尽管没有国家，或者说，它是先前（现已解体）的国家及其先前的去文明化倾向的后期遗留影响。事后诸葛亮并不意味着先知先觉。

I will restrict my criticism to two central exhibits that Pinker offers in empirical support of his thesis，one concerning global affairs and another more regionally specific one that is most directly related to my earlier observations on European or Western history。

我的批评仅限于平克为实证支持其论点而提供的两个核心证据，一个是关于全球事务的，另一个是与我之前对欧洲或西方历史的观察最直接相关的更具地区针对性的证据。

The empirical support for the global progression thesis is summarized in two tables （pages 49 and 53）。The first is supposed to show the decline of war deaths （as percentage of population） from human prehistory to the present。For this Pinker distinguishes four historical stages：prehistory，huntergatherer societies，hunterhorticulturalist societies，and finally state societies.He then provides data to show that there was at best only a minimal improvement from the highly violent prehistoric era to the huntergatherer stage； that violence increased again with the introduction of horticulture and agriculture （as there was then more economic inequality and more to loot）； and that it finally dropped off sharply to a level never seen before in human history with the introduction of state societies.To further bolster his thesis，the second table compares the rate of death in warfare for “modern” nonstate societies （of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries） with equally “modern” state societies，supposedly demonstrating once more the civilizing effect of states.

两张表格（第 49 页和第 53 页）总结了全球进步论的经验支持。第一张表显示了从史前到现在战争死亡人数的下降（占人口的百分比）。为此，平克划分了四个历史阶段：史前社会、狩猎采集社会、狩猎园艺社会和国家社会。然后，他提供数据表明，从暴力严重的史前时代到狩猎采集阶段，暴力充其量只有很小的改善；随着园艺和农业的出现，暴力再次增加（因为那时经济更加不平等，需要掠夺的东西更多）；最后，随着国家社会的出现，暴力急剧下降到人类历史上从未见过的水平。为了进一步证明他的论点，第二个表格比较了 “现代 “非国家社会（19 世纪和 20 世纪）和同样 “现代 “的国家社会的战争死亡率，声称这再次证明了国家的文明化效用。

As said before，I shall not quibble about the numbers and estimates presented in these tables，except to note that any estimate concerning human prehistory and the far distant huntergathererhorticulturalist stage（s） of human history must be viewed with a good dose of skepticism.Archeo logical findings of broken skulls，for instance，can provide a basis for some reasonable estimate of violence at particular places and times，and you may then also scale up such estimates to the approximated total world population at the time to calculate the violent death rate for any given period.But what you cannot do，and what is for rather obvious technical reasons and at least until today nearly impossible to do，is show that your sample of violence data is a representative random sample，from which alone it would be legitimate to generalize specific findings to the population total。

如前所述，我不会对这些表格中的数字和估计值提出异议，但我要指出的是，任何有关人类史前史和遥远的人类历史狩猎采集园艺阶段的估计值都必须持一定的怀疑态度。例如，破碎的头骨的考古发现，可以为合理估计特定地点和时间的暴力事件提供依据，然后你还可以将这种估计放大到当时世界人口总数的近似值，从而计算出任何特定时期的暴力死亡率。但你无法做到的是，由于相当明显的技术原因，至少到今天为止几乎不可能做到的是，证明你的暴力数据样本是一个有代表性的随机样本，仅凭这个样本就可以合理地将特定结果推广到总人口中。

The central reason，however，why Pinker’s data fail to demonstrate what he wants to demonstrate is a different one.In his attempt to compare non state societies with state societies he is comparing what cannot be compared.His examples of nonstate societies，whether ancient or modern，refer almost exclusively to some obscure tribes outside of Europe （or in a few rare European cases to tribes living thousands of years prior to the Christian era）； and all of them have either literally died out or else left no lasting trace in history in that it is nearly impossible today to trace any one contemporary society back to them genealogically as their historical predecessor。In distinct contrast，all the examples of state societies are taken from Europe and the Western world，where such genealogical back tracing is easily possible for periods of hundreds or even thousands of years.Obviously，such a comparison can yield an unbiased conclusion only under the assumption that the only relevant factor distinguishing European or “Western” people from Pinker’s various tribesmen is the presence or absence of a state and that otherwise both peoples are the same，with the same physical and mental constitution and endowment。

然而，平克的数据未能证明他想要证明的东西，其核心原因是另一个问题。在他试图将非国家社会与国家社会进行比较时，他比较的是无法比较的东西。他所举的非国家社会的例子，无论是古代的还是现代的，几乎都是欧洲以外的一些不起眼的部落（或者在少数罕见的欧洲例子中，是生活在基督教时代之前几千年的部落）；而且所有这些部落要么真的消亡了，要么在历史上没有留下任何持久的痕迹，因为今天几乎不可能从族谱上追溯到任何一个当代社会的历史前身。与此形成鲜明对比的是，所有国家社会的例子都来自欧洲和西方世界，在这些地方，可以很容易地追溯到几百年甚至几千年前。显然，只有在这样的假设下，这种比较才能得出公正的结论：欧洲人或 “西方人 “与平克的各种部落成员之间的唯一相关区别因素是有无国家，除此之外，两个民族都是一样的，具有相同的生理和心理结构以及禀赋。

Pinker never explicitly states this assumption，crucial for his own case.Probably because it would cast some immediate doubt on the validity of his conclusion.And，indeed，as a matter of fact there have been countless empirical studies in the meantime，in many disciplines，that demonstrate the utter falsehood of this assumption.Substantial differences exist in the physical and mental makeup and endowments of different people.Europeans，or more generally “Westerners，” are decidedly not the same sort of people that Pinker’s tribesmen are—and with that his first “empirical proof ” of his progression thesis collapses.His proof is a nonstarter and proves nothing。

平克从未明确提出这一对他自己的论点至关重要的假设。可能是因为这会让人立即对他的结论的有效性产生怀疑。事实上，在此期间，许多学科已经有无数的实证研究证明了这一假设是完全错误的。不同人的生理和心理结构以及禀赋存在着巨大差异。欧洲人，或者更广义地说 “西方人”，与平克的部落成员显然不是同一类人。他的证明是不成立的，什么也证明不了。

In addition，Pinker misses the trees of humans for the global wood of mankind in another regard，for according to his own data there are also some nonstate societies，even if only a few，that equal or even surpass the level of peacefulness achieved in state societies.

此外，平克还在另一个方面因人类这个全球大森林而忽略了人类社会某些树木。因为根据平克自己的数据，也有一些非国家社会（即使只有少数几个）达到甚至超过了国家社会所达到的和平水平。

As a brief aside，Pinker might not even be aware of the fact that some sort of （false） human “equality” assumption is necessary to make his point，but he assumes it anyhow，again and again，if only implicitly or surreptitiously。Deep down，Pinker is an egalitarian，as is particularly evident from his outspoken sympathy for the “progress” brought about by the socalled civil rights movement and the “noble” Dr.Martin Luther King Jr。as well as nelson mandela，“one of history’s greatest statesmen” （notwithstanding both men’s wellknown communist connections）。Pinker is not an extreme （and extremely silly） egalitarian，of course.He makes distinctions between sexes，ages，races，and classes，and he is well aware of the unequal distribution of various human traits and talents within society—of intelligence，diligence，impulse control，sociability，etc。But as a politically correct “progressive，” he cannot bring himself to the recognition that the unequal distribution of these human traits and talents within society may be very different in different societies.

作为一个简短的题外话，平克可能根本没有意识到，为了表达他的观点，某种（虚假的）人类 “平等 “假设是必要的，但他还是一而再、再而三地假定了这一点，即使只是含蓄地或偷偷摸摸地假定。在内心深处，平克是一个平等主义者，这一点从他对所谓的民权运动和 “崇高的 “小马丁-路德-金博士以及”历史上最伟大的政治家之一纳尔逊-曼德拉”（尽管两人都与共产主义有千丝万缕的联系）所带来的 “进步 “的直言不讳的同情中尤为明显。当然，平克并不是一个极端的（也是极其愚蠢的）平等主义者。他对性别、年龄、种族和阶级进行了区分，他非常清楚人类的各种特征和才能——智力、勤奋、冲动控制、社交能力等——在社会中的分布是不平等的。但是，作为一个政治正确的“进步主义者”，他无法让自己认识到，在不同的社会中，这些人的特征和才能在社会中的不平等分配可能是非常不同的。

with Pinker’s first，global empirical “proof” rejected，what about his second，regional one？ Here，all data come from Europe and insofar the danger of comparing incompatibles is avoided.Pinker devotes some ten pages （pp.228–38） to this case，and the key information is condensed in a single graph （p.230） depicting the “Rate of death in Conflicts in Greater Europe，1400–2000。” If anything，however，this graph demonstrates the opposite of Pinker’s progress thesis.What it shows is that the longest period of （relative） peacefulness and low levels of violence was the almost two hundred years from 1400 until the very end of the sixteenth century。Yet this period falls precisely within the longer period of the European Middle ages （and marks its end），and the Middle ages，as I have argued before，are a prime example of a stateless social order。（Interestingly，Pinker concurs with this assessment of medieval Europe as stateless，but he then fails to see that it implies，according to his own data，an empirical refutation of his thesis.）

既然平克的第一个全球经验性 “证明 “被否定了，那么他的第二个地区性 “证明 “呢？在这里，所有数据都来自欧洲，因此避免了比较不相容者的风险。平克用了大约十页的篇幅（第 228-238 页）来讨论这个案例，并将关键信息浓缩在一张图表中（第 230 页），描绘了 “1400-2000 年大欧洲冲突中的死亡率”。无论如何，这张图所展示的情况与平克的进步论恰恰相反。它表明，从 1400 年到 16 世纪末的近 200 年间，是（相对）和平与暴力程度较低的最长时期。然而，这一时期恰恰属于欧洲中世纪的较长时期（并标志着中世纪的结束），而中世纪，正如我之前所论证的，是无国家社会秩序的最好例证（有趣的是，平克同意欧洲中世纪是无国家的这一评价，但他随后却未能看到，根据他自己的数据，这意味着对其论点的经验性反驳）。

And it gets worse for Pinker’s case.According to the same graph，the following historical period，from the late sixteenth century to the present，is characterized by three huge spikes in the level of violence.The first spike，from the late sixteenth century until the Westphalian peace in 1648， is largely associated with the Thirty Years’ War； the second，from the late eighteenth century until 1815 and somewhat less steep than the first，is associated with the French revolution and the Napoleonic Wars； and the third and greatest spike，from 1914–45，is associated with the twentieth century’s two world wars.As well，for all intermediate periods the level of violence remained well above that of medieval times，a level that was only reached again three centuries later，during the period from 1815–1914 and again during the post–World War II era.All in all，then，the record for post medieval Europe in terms of violence appears rather depressive.And yet the entire period，from the late sixteenth century until today，is the era of states，which Pinker considers the driving forces of a “civilizing process.”

根据同一张图表，从 16 世纪晚期至今的历史时期中，暴力程度出现了三次大幅飙升。第一个高峰期，从 16 世纪晚期到 1648 年威斯特法伦和平时期，主要与三十年战争有关；第二个高峰期，从 18 世纪晚期到 1815 年，比第一个高峰期稍缓，与法国大革命和拿破仑战争有关；第三个也是最大的高峰期，从 1914 年到 1945 年，与 20 世纪的两次世界大战有关。此外，在所有中间时期，暴力水平都远高于中世纪，直到三个世纪后的 1815-1914 年和二战后时期才再次达到这一水平。总而言之，中世纪后欧洲的暴力记录似乎相当令人沮丧。然而，从 16 世纪晚期到今天，整个时期都是国家的时代，平克认为国家是 “文明化进程 “的推动力。

Pinker associates the first drastic spike in violence with religion and the “Wars of religion.” in fact，however，they were wars to make states.Feudal kings and princes aspiring to the rank of absolute ruler made war to bring increasingly larger contiguous territories under their supreme control。In this，they took advantage of the recent split within Latin Christendom between Catholics and Protestants，and it was they who actually invented the term “Wars of religion”—if only to deceive and hide their real purpose of state making，which had little if anything to do with religion.The second spike marks the turning point from monarchic to democratic states and was the result of Napoleonic France using war in the attempt to establish hegemony over all of continental Europe.And the third and most drastic spike in the level of violence marks the beginning of the era of full fledged democracy and is the result of Britain and the USA going to war to establish world hegemony。

平克将暴力的第一次急剧上升与宗教和 “宗教战争 “联系在一起。”事实上，无论如何，这些战争都是为了建立国家。封建王朝的君主和王子们渴望成为绝对统治者，他们发动战争是为了将越来越大的毗连领土置于自己的最高控制之下。在这方面，他们利用了最近拉丁基督教内部天主教和新教之间的分裂，正是他们实际上发明了 “宗教战争 “一词——如果只是为了欺骗和掩盖他们建立国家的真正目的的话，这与宗教几乎没有任何关系。第二个高峰标志着从君主制国家到民主制国家的转折点，是拿破仑时期的法国利用战争企图在整个欧洲大陆建立霸权的结果。第三个也是暴力程度最剧烈的高峰标志着全面民主时代的开始，是英国和美国为建立世界霸权而发动战争的结果。

In his interpretation of these data，Pinker tries to make the best out of （for him） a rather desperate looking case.For one，he points out with the help of a second graph （p.229），that throughout the entire period the number of violent conflicts declined as the number of states fell due to territorial consolidation and centralization.A greater number of small scale wars with few casualties was replaced with a smaller number of large scale wars with many casualties.This does not appear much like progress，however，especially if it is kept in mind that the rate of death in conflicts actually increased over the entire statist era，even if the number of violent conflicts declined.To rescue his progress thesis，then，Pinker advances two auxiliary arguments.First，he claims that the more lethal character of （less frequent） modern wars has nothing to do with states per se or with their territorial expansion and consolidation，but is instead the quasiaccidental result of advances in military technology （a thesis that he elsewhere rejects when he states that the development of technology is essentially “neutral” to the level of violence）。And secondly，to add more weight to his thesis about the decline in the frequency of war （but not，to emphasize again，the decline of the warrelated death rate!），he points out that the process of political centralization，i.e.，the increasingly smaller number of states with increasingly larger territories was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in civil or intrastate war，and hence represents a real civilizing gain （and not just an accounting trick）。Essentially，according to Pinker，with each political centralization，and ultimately the establishment of a world state，the likelihood of war declines and ultimately disappears，along with a parallel decline in and disappearance of civil war。In short：states civilize and a world state civilizes best。Or in reverse：each secession decivilizes and complete freedom of secession decivilizes most。

在对这些数据的解读中，平克（Pinker）试图从（对他而言）一个看起来相当绝望的案例中找出最好的答案。首先，他借助第二张图表（第229页）指出，在整个时期，由于领土兼并和国家主义，国家数量减少，暴力冲突的数量也随之减少。少量伤亡人数多的大规模战争取代了大量伤亡人数少的小规模战争。然而，这看起来并不像进步，尤其是如果我们记住，在整个国家主义时代，即使暴力冲突的数量有所减少，但冲突中的死亡率实际上却在上升。为了挽救他的进步论，平克提出了两个辅助论点。首先，他声称现代战争（不那么频繁）的致命性与国家本身或其领土扩张和巩固无关，而是军事技术进步的偶然结果（他在其他地方驳斥了这一论点，他说技术发展对暴力程度基本上是 “中性的”）。其次，为了增加他关于战争频率下降的论点的分量（但不是，为了再次强调与战争有关的死亡率的下降！），他指出，政治国家主义的过程，即国家数量越来越少而领土面积越来越大的过程，并没有伴随着内战或国内战争的相应增加，因此是一种真正的文明的进步（而不仅仅是一种会计戏法）。平克认为，从根本上说，随着每一次政治集权，以及最终世界大国的建立，战争的可能性就会下降并最终消失，与此同时，内战也会下降并消失。简而言之：国家文明化，世界大国文明化程度最高。或者反过来说：每一次分离都会去文明化，而完全的分离自由则是最不文明。

Economic logic （praxeology） dictates a very different interpretation of all this，however。States are not spontaneous voluntary associations.They are the result of war。And the existence of states increases the likelihood of further wars，because under statist conditions the cost of war making must no longer be borne privately，but can at least partially be externalized onto innocent third parties.That the number of wars then declines as the number of states falls and that there can be no interstate war once the number of States has been reduced to a single world state is not much more than a definitional truth.Even if less frequent，however，the further advanced the process of political centralization and territorial consolidation，i.e.，the closer to the ultimate statist goal of a world state，the more lethal such wars will become.

无论如何，经济逻辑（行动学）对这一切给出了截然不同的解释。国家不是自发的自愿组织，它们是战争的结果。国家的存在增加了进一步战争的可能性，因为在国家主义条件下，发动战争的成本不再由私人承担，而是至少可以部分地外部化，转嫁给无辜的第三方。战争的数量随着国家数量的减少而减少，一旦国家数量减少到一个单一的世界国家，就不会再有国家间的战争，这只不过是一个定义上的真理。即使战争次数减少了，但政治集权和领土巩固的进程越深入，即越接近世界大国这一国家主义的终极目标，战争的杀伤力就越大。

Nor can the institution of a world state deliver what Pinker promises.true，there can then be no interstate wars，by definition.For the sake of argument，we may even concede that the frequency and the casualty rate of internal，civil wars may decline as well （although the empirical evidence for this appears increasingly doubtful）。In any case，however，what can be safely predicted about the consequences of a world state is this：with the removal of all interstate competition，i.e.，with the replacement of a multitude of different territorial jurisdictions with different laws，customs，and tax and regulation structures by a single worldwide uniform jurisdiction，any possibility of voting with one’s feet against a state and its laws is removed as well。Hence，a fundamentally important constraint on the growth and expansion of state power is gone，and the cost of the production of justice （or whatever it is that the state claims to produce） will accordingly rise to unprecedented heights，while its quality will reach a new low.There may or may not be less of the broken bones–type violence a la Pinker，but in any case there will be more “refined” violence，i.e.，property rights violations that do not count as violence to Pinker，than ever before； and the worldstate society，then，will look more like the stable concentration camp scenario mentioned earlier than anything resembling a free，convivial social order。

世界国家制度也无法实现平克的承诺。诚然，根据定义，这样就不会有国家间的战争。为了论证起见，我们甚至可以承认，国内内战的频率和伤亡率也可能会下降（尽管这方面的经验证据似乎越来越令人怀疑）。无论如何，我们可以有把握地预测世界国家的后果是：由于消除了所有国家间的竞争，即由一个单一的全球统一的司法管辖区取代了拥有不同法律、海关、税收和管制结构的众多不同的领土管辖区，任何用脚投票反对一个国家及其法律的可能性也被消除了。因此，对国家权力增长和扩张的一个根本重要的制约消失了，公平、公正（或国家声称要生产的任何东西）的生产成本将相应地上升到前所未有的高度，而其质量将降至一个新的低点。平克所说的 “骨折式 “暴力可能会减少，但无论如何，”精致 “暴力，即对平克来说不算暴力的侵犯财产权的行为，会比以往任何时候都多；届时，世界国家社会将更像前面提到的稳定的集中营，而不是类似自由、可持续的社会秩序。

Stripped down to its bare bones Pinker’s central argument amounts to a string of logical absurdities：according to him，tribal societies somehow “merge” to form small states and small states successively “coalesce” into increasingly larger states.If this “merging” and “coalescing” were，as the terms insinuate，a spontaneous and voluntary matter，however，the result，by definition，would not be a state but an anarchic social order composed of and governed by free membership associations.If，on the other hand，this “merging” and “coalescing” results instead in a state，it cannot be a spontaneous and voluntary matter but must，of logical necessity，involve violence and war （in that any territorial monopolization necessitates the violently enforced prohibition of “free entry”）。But how，then，can anyone such as Pinker，who wants to reduce violence and war to a minimum and possibly eliminate it entirely，prefer a social System，any System，that necessitates the exercise of violence and war to a System that does not do so？ Answer：only in throwing out all of logic and claiming that the relationship between the state and violence and war is not a logically necessary one，but a merely contingent，empirical relationship instead—that just as it is indeed an entirely empirical matter whether or not you or I commit violence and go to war，so it is also a purely contingent，empirical matter whether or not a state commits violence and goes to war。

平克的中心论点是一连串逻辑上的谬误：在他看来，部落社会通过某种方式 “合并 “成小国，小国又相继 “凝聚 “成越来越大的国家。如果这种 “合并 “和 “凝聚 “正如这些术语所暗示的那样，是一种自发和自愿的行为，那么，根据定义，其结果就不是一个国家，而是一种由自由成员协会组成和管理的无政府社会秩序。另一方面，如果这种 “合并 “和 “凝聚 “的结果是一个国家，那么它就不可能是一个自发和自愿的事情，而一定在逻辑上必然涉及暴力和战争（因为任何领土垄断都必须以暴力手段强制禁止 “自由进入”）。但是，像平克这样希望把暴力和战争减少到最低程度，甚至完全消除暴力和战争的人，怎么会选择一个必须使用暴力和战争的社会制度，而不是一个不需要使用暴力和战争的制度呢？答：只有抛开所有逻辑，声称国家与暴力和战争之间的关系不是逻辑上的必然关系，而只是一种偶然的、经验上的关系——正如你或我是否实施暴力和发动战争确实是一个完全经验上的问题一样，国家是否实施暴力和发动战争也是一个纯粹偶然的、经验上的问题。

Thus，according to Pinker，World War II with all its atrocities，for instance，had essentially nothing to do with the institution of states but was a historical fluke，owing to the evildoings of a single，deranged individual，Adolf Hitler。Indeed，unbelievably and seemingly without blushing （although that is admittedly difficult to tell from a written text） Pinker approvingly quotes historian John Keegan saying that “only one European really wanted war—Adolf Hitler。”

因此，平克认为，第二次世界大战的种种暴行，比如说，本质上与国家体制无关，而是历史的意外，是由一个疯狂的人——阿道夫-希特勒——的罪恶行为造成的。事实上，令人难以置信的是，平克似乎毫不羞愧地引用了历史学家约翰·基根（John Keegan）的名言：”只有一个欧洲人真正想要战争——阿道夫·希特勒。”

Question：But how much evil can a single，deranged individual do with out the institution of a centralized state？ How much evil could Hitler have done within the framework of a stateless society such as those of the Middle ages？ Would he have become a great lord，a king，a bishop，or a Pope？

问：但是，如果没有国家主义的国家体制，一个疯狂的个人能做多少坏事？在中世纪那样的无国家社会框架内，希特勒能做多少坏事？他会成为伟大的领主、君主、主教或教皇吗？

Indeed，how much evil could he have done even within the framework of a thousand ministates，such as Liechtenstein，Monaco，or Singapore？ Answer：not much，and certainly nothing comparable to the evils associated with World War II。“No Hitler，no Churchill，no Roosevelt，or no Stalin，then no war，” as Pinker would have it，holds not，then，but rather：“no highly centralized state，then no Hitler，Churchill，Roosevelt，or StaliN.” remove the state，and they may have become a Jack the Ripper，a Charles Ponzi，or even harmless people，but not the massmurdering monsters that we know them to have been.Institute the state，and you create，attract，and breed monsters.

事实上，即使在列支敦士登、摩纳哥或新加坡等一千个微型国家的框架内，他又能做多少坏事呢？答案：不多，当然肯定也无法与第二次世界大战的罪恶相提并论。平克所说的 “没有希特勒，没有丘吉尔，没有罗斯福，或者没有斯大林，就没有战争”，不是 “没有希特勒，没有丘吉尔，没有罗斯福，或者没有斯大林，就没有战争”，而是 “没有高度集中的国家，就没有希特勒，没有丘吉尔，没有罗斯福，或者没有斯大林。如果 “取消国家”，他们可能会变成开膛手杰克、查尔斯-庞兹，甚至是无害的人，但不会像我们所知道的那样成为大屠杀的怪物。建立国家，就会创造、吸引和滋生怪物。

In sum，then，Pinker’s attempt to rescue the Whig theory of history and demonstrate that we live in the best of all worlds turns out an utter failure.Indeed，one may even say that his book and its great commercial success is itself empirical proof of the contrary。

总之，平克试图拯救辉格史观，证明我们生活在最好的世界中，但他的努力彻底失败了。事实上，我们甚至可以说，他的书及其巨大的商业成功本身就是相反的经验证明。

Autobiographical

第五辑自传

26 interview with The Daily bell

26贝尔日报的访谈*

I inTRODUCTIon

I. 简介

Dr.HansHermann Hoppe，born in 1949 in Peine，West germany，studied philosophy，sociology，economics，history and statistics at the University of the Saarland，in Saarbrücken，the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University，in Frankfurt am Main，and at the University of Michigan，in Ann Arbor。He received his doctorate （Philosophy，1974，under Jürgen Habermas） and his “Habilitation” degree （Foundations of Sociology and Economics，1981） both from the Goethe University in Frankfurt。

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普博士 1949 年出生于西德佩恩，曾在萨尔布吕肯的萨尔州大学、美因河畔法兰克福的约翰·沃尔夫冈·歌德大学大学和安娜堡的密歇根大学学习哲学、社会学、历史学和统计学。他在法兰克福歌德大学获得博士学位（哲学，1974 年，师从哈贝马斯）和 “荣誉 “学位（社会学和经济学基础，1981 年）。

In 1985 Hoppe moved to new York City to work with Murray N.Rothbard （1926–1995），the most prominent American student of the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises （1881–1973）。In 1986 Hoppe followed Rothbard to the University of nevada，Las vegas，where he served as Professor of Economics until his retirement in 2008。After Rothbard’s death，Hoppe also served for many years as editor of the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics and of the interdisciplinary Journal for Libertarian Studies.Hoppe is a Distinguished Fellow of the Ludwig von Mises institute，in Auburn，Alabama，and founder and president of the Property and freedom Society。He currently lives with his wife Dr.Gülçin Imre，a fellow economist，in Istanbul，Turkey。

1985 年，霍普来到纽约，与默里-罗斯巴德（1926-1995 年）共事，罗斯巴德是奥地利经济学家路德维希-冯-米塞斯（1881-1973 年）在美国最著名的学生。1986 年，霍普跟随罗斯巴德来到拉斯维加斯内华达大学，担任经济学教授，直到 2008 年退休。罗斯巴德去世后，霍普还担任了多年《奥地利经济学季刊》和跨学科的《自由意志主义者研究期刊》的编辑。霍普是阿拉巴马州奥本市路德维希-冯-米塞斯研究院的杰出研究员，也是财产与自由学会的创始人和主席。他目前与妻子、经济学家 Gülçin Imre 博士住在土耳其伊斯坦布尔。

Hoppe is the author of eight books—the best known of which is Democracy：The God That Failed—and more than 150 articles in books，scholarly journals and magazines of opinion.As an internationally prominent Austrian School economist and libertarian philosopher，he has lectured all over the world and his writings have been translated into more than twenty languages.

霍普著有八部著作，其中最著名的是《民主：失败的上帝》（Democracy：The God That Failed），并在书籍、学术期刊和舆论杂志上发表了 150 多篇文章。作为国际知名的奥地利学派经济学家和自由意志主义者，他曾在世界各地演讲，其著作被翻译成二十多种语言。

In 2006 Hoppe was awarded the Gary S.Schlarbaum Prize for life time Achievement in the Cause of Liberty，and in 2009 he received the Franz Čuhel memorial Prize from the University of Economics in PraguE.At the occasion of his 60th birthday，in 2009，a Festschrift was published in his honor：Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Stephan Kinsella （eds.），Property，freedom and Society：Essays in Honor of HansHermann Hoppe.Hoppe’s personal website is wwW.HansHoppe.com.There the bulk of his scholarly and popular writings as well as many public lecture recordings are electronically available.

2006 年，霍普荣获加里-施拉尔鲍姆自由事业终身成就奖；2009 年，他荣获普拉固经济大学弗朗茨-丘赫尔纪念奖。2009 年，在他 60 岁生日之际，为他出版了一本纪念文集：许尔斯曼和金塞拉（主编）《财产、自由与社会：纪念汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普的论文》。霍普的个人网站是 www.HansHoppe.com。他的大部分学术著作和通俗读物以及许多公开演讲录音都有电子版。

interview

II. 访谈

Daily bell：please answer these questions as our readers were not already aware of your fine work and considered opinions.let’s jump right in.Why is democracy “the God that failed”？

贝尔日报：请回答这些问题，因为我们的读者还不了解你的优秀作品和深思熟虑的观点。让我们直入正题。为什么说民主是 “失败的上帝”？

HansHermann Hoppe：The traditional，premodern stateform is that of a （absolute） monarchy。The democratic movement was directed against kings and the classes of hereditary nobles.Monarchy was criticized as being incompatible with the basic principle of “equality before the law.” It rested on privilege and was unfair and exploitative.Democracy was supposed to be the way out。In opening participation and entry into stategovernment to everyone on equal terms，so the advocates of democracy claimed，equality before the law would become reality and true freedom would reign.But this is all a big error。

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普（HansHermann Hoppe）：传统的、前现代的国家形式是（绝对）君主制。民主运动的矛头直指君主和世袭贵族阶层。君主制被批判为不符合 “法律面前人人平等 “的基本原则。它建立在特权之上，是不公平的、剥削性的。民主被认为是出路。民主的倡导者声称，在平等的条件下，每个人都可以参与和进入国家政府，法律面前人人平等将成为现实，真正的自由将占据统治地位。但这都是大错特错。

true，under democracy everyone can become king，so to speak，not only a privileged circle of people.Thus，in a democracy no personal privileges exist。However，functional privileges and privileged functions exist。Public officials，if they act in an official capacity，are governed and protected by “public law” and thereby occupy a privileged position visàvis persons acting under the mere authority of “private law.” in particular，public officials are permitted to finance or subsidize their own activities through taxes.That is，they are permitted to engage in，and live off，what in private dealings between private law subjects is prohibited and considered “theft” and “stolen loot。” Thus，privilege and legal discrimination—and the distinction between rulers and subjects—will not disappear under democracy。

诚然，在民主制度下，可以说每个人都有机会成王，而不仅仅是特权圈层。因此，在民主制度下不存在私人特权。但是，职能特权和特权职能是存在的。公职人员如果以官方身份行事，则受 “公法 “管辖和保护，因此相对于仅依据 “私法 “行事的人而言，他们享有特权地位。”特别是，公职人员可以通过税收资助或补贴自己的活动。这就是说，他们可以从事并依靠在私法主体之间的私人交易中被禁止并被视为 “盗窃 “和 “赃物 “的行为来生活。因此，特权和法律歧视——以及统治者和国民之间的区别——在民主制度下不会消失。

Even worse：Under monarchy，the distinction between rulers and ruled is clear。I know，for instance，that I will never become king，and because of that I will tend to resist the king’s attempts to raise taxes.Under democracy，the distinction between rulers and ruled becomes blurred.The illusion can arise “that we all rule ourselves，” and the resistance against increased taxation is accordingly diminished.I might end up on the receiving end：as a taxrecipient rather than a taxpayer，and thus view taxation more favorably。

更糟糕的是：在君主制下，统治者和被统治者之间的区别非常明显。例如，我知道我永远不会成为君主，因此我倾向于抵制君主增加税收的企图。在民主制度下，统治者和被统治者之间的区别变得模糊。人们会产生 “我们都在统治自己 “的错觉，对税收增加的抵制也会相应减弱。我可能最终成为收税人：作为受税人而不是纳税人，从而对税收有更多的好感。

And moreover：As a hereditary monopolist，a king regards the territory and the people under his rule as his personal property and engages in the monopolistic exploitation of this “property。” Under democracy，monopoly and monopolistic exploitation do not disappear。Rather，what happens is this：instead of a king and a nobility who regard the country as their private property，a temporary and interchangeable care taker is put in monopolistic charge of the country。The caretaker does not own the country，but as long as he is in office he is permitted to use it to his and his protégés’ advantage.He owns its current use—usu fruct—but not its capital stock。This does not eliminate exploitation.To the contrary，it makes exploitation less calculating and carried out with little or no regard to the capital stock。Exploitation becomes short sighted and capital consumption will be Systematically promoted.

此外，作为世袭垄断者，君主视其统治下的领土和人民为个人财产，并对这一 “财产 “进行垄断性剥削。在民主制度下，垄断和垄断性剥削并没有消失。相反，情况是这样的：不是君主和贵族将国家视为自己的私有财产，而是由一个临时的、可互换的看守者垄断国家。看守者并不拥有这个国家，但只要他在任，他就可以利用这个国家为他和他的同僚谋利。他拥有国家当前的使用权（usu fruct），但不拥有国家的资本存量。这并没有消除剥削。恰恰相反，它使剥削变得不那么斤斤计较，在进行剥削时很少或根本不考虑资本存量。剥削变得短视，资本消费将得到系统性的促进。

DB：If democracy has failed what would you put in its place？ What is the ideal society？ Anarchocapitalism？

贝尔日报：如果民主失败了，你会用什么来代替它？理想社会是什么？无政府资本主义吗？

HHH：I prefer the term “private law society。” in a private law society every individual and institution is subject to one and the same set of laws.No public law granting privileges to specific persons or functions exists in this society。There is only private law （and private property），equally applicable to each and everyone.No one is permitted to acquire property by means other than through original appropriation of previously unowned things，through production，or through voluntary exchange，and no one possesses a privilege to tax and expropriate.Moreover，no one is permitted to prohibit anyone else from using his property in order to enter any line of production he wishes and compete against whomever he pleases.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：我更喜欢 “私法社会 “这个词，”在私法社会中，每个人和每个机构都要遵守同一套法律。在这个社会中，不存在赋予特定个人或职能以特权的公法。只有私法（和私有财产），平等地适用于每一个人。除了通过生产，或通过自愿交换，或对以前不属于自己的东西进行先占之外，任何人都不得以其他方式获得财产，任何人都没有征税和征用的特权。此外，任何人都不得禁止他人使用自己的财产，以便进入他所希望的任何生产领域，与他所希望的任何人竞争。

DB：How would law and order be provided in this society？ How would your ideal justice System work？

贝尔日报：在这个社会中如何维持法律和秩序？你理想中的司法系统是如何运作的？

HHH：In a private law society the production of law and order—of security—would be undertaken by freely financed individuals and agencies competing for a voluntarily paying （or notpaying） clientele—just as the production of all other goods and services.How this System would work can be best understood in contrast to the workings of the present，alltoofamiliar statist System.If one wanted to summarize in one word the decisive difference—and advantage—of a competitive security industry as compared to the current statist practice，it would be：contract。

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：在一个私法社会中，法律和秩序——安保——的生产将由资金自由的个人和机构承担，他们争夺自愿付费（或不付费）的客户，就像生产所有其他商品和服务一样。要想更好地理解这一体系的运作方式，就必须与我们所熟知的国家主义体系进行对比。如果要用一个词来概括竞争性安保行业与当前国家主义做法的决定性区别和优势，那就是：契约。

The state operates in a legal vacuum.There exists no contract between the state and its citizens.It is not contractually fixed，what is actually owned by whom，and what，accordingly，is to be protected.It is not fixed，what service the state is to provide，what is to happen if the state fails in its duty，nor what the price is that the “customer” of such “service” must pay。Rather，the state unilaterally fixes the rules of the game and can change them，per legislation，during the game.Obviously，such behavior is inconceivable for freely financed security providers.Just imagine a security provider，whether police，insurer or arbitrator，whose offer consisted in something like this：I will not contractually guarantee you anything。I will not tell you what I oblige myself to do if，according to your opinion，I do not fulfill my service to you—but in any case，I reserve the right to unilaterally determine the price that you must pay me for such undefined service.Any such security provider would immediately disappear from the market due to a complete lack of customers.

国家在法律真空中运作。国家与公民之间不存在任何契约。契约没有规定，什么东西实际上归谁所有，什么东西据此应受到保护。国家应提供什么服务，如果国家失职会发生什么，或者这种 “服务 “的 “客户 “必须支付的价格是多少，这些都不是固定的。相反，国家单方面制定游戏规则，并可在游戏过程中通过立法改变规则。显然，这种行为对于自由出资的安保供应商来说是不可想象的。试想一下，无论是警察、保险商还是仲裁者，安保提供者的提议都是这样的：我不会在契约中向你保证任何事情。我不会告诉你，如果根据你的意见，我没有履行对你的服务，我有义务做什么——但在任何情况下，我保留单方面决定你必须为这种未定义的服务向我支付价格的权利。任何这样的安保供应商都会因为完全缺乏客户而立即从市场上消失。

Each private，freely financed security producer must instead offer its prospective clients a contract。And these contracts must，in order to appear acceptable to voluntarily paying consumers，contain clear property descriptions as well as clearly defined mutual services and obligations.Each party to a contract，for the duration or until the fulfillment of the contract，would be bound by its terms and conditions； and every change of terms or conditions would require the unanimous consent of all parties concerned.

相反，每个私营的、自由出资的安保生产商必须向其潜在客户提供一份契约。这些契约必须包含清晰的财产说明以及明确界定的相互服务和义务，才能被自愿付费的消费者接受。契约的每一方，在契约有效期内或契约履行结束之前，都将受到契约条款和条件的约束；条款或条件的任何变更都必须得到有关各方的一致同意。

Specifically，in order to appear acceptable to security buyers，these contracts must contain provisions about what will be done in the case of a conflict or dispute between the protector or insurer and his own protected or insured clients as well as in the case of a conflict between different protectors or insurers and their respective clients.And in this regard only one mutually agreeable solution exists：in these cases the conflicting parties contractually agree to arbitration by a mutually trusted but independent third party。And as for this third party：it，too，is freely financed and stands in competition with other arbitrators or arbitration agencies.Its clients，i.e.，the insurers and the insured，expect of it，that it come up with a verdict that is recognized as fair and just by all sides.only arbitrators capable of forming such judgments will succeed in the arbitration market。Arbitrators incapable of this and viewed as biased or partial will disappear from the market。

具体而言，为了让安保买方接受，这些契约必须包含在保护者或保险公司与其自己的受保护或被保险客户之间发生冲突或争议的情况下，以及在不同的保护者或保险公司与其各自的客户之间发生冲突的情况下将如何处理的条款。在这方面，只有一个双方都同意的解决方案：在这些情况下，冲突各方通过契约同意由一个相互信任但独立的第三方进行仲裁。至于这个第三方：它也是自由出资的，并与其他仲裁者或仲裁机构竞争。它的客户，即保险公司和被保险公司，希望它做出各方都认可的公平公正的裁决。只有能够做出这种裁决的仲裁者才能在仲裁市场上取得成功。无法做到这一点并被视为有偏见或偏袒一方的仲裁者将从市场上消失。

DB：Are you denying，then，that we need the state to defend us？

贝尔日报：那么，你是在否认，我们需要国家来保卫我们？

HHH：Indeed.The state does not defend us； rather，the state aggresses against us and it uses our confiscated property to defend itself。The standard definition of the state is this：the state is an agency characterized by two unique，logically connected features.First，the state is an agency that exercises a territorial monopoly of ultimate decisionmaking。That is，the state is the ultimate arbiter and judge in every case of conflict，including conflicts involving itself and its agents.There is no appeal above and beyond the state.Second，the state is an agency that exercises a territorial monopoly of taxation.That is，it is an agency that can uni laterally fix the price that its subjects must pay for the state’s service as ultimate judge.Based on this institutional setup you can safely predict the consequences.First，instead of preventing and resolving conflict，a monopolist of ultimate decisionmaking will cause and provoke conflict in order to settle it to its own advantage.That is，the state does not recognize and protect existing law，but it perverts law through legislation.contradiction number one：the state is a lawbreaking law protector。Second，instead of defending and protecting anyone or anything，a monopolist of taxation will invariably strive to maximize his expenditures on protection and at the same time minimize the actual production of protection.The more money the state can spend and the less it must work for this money，the better off it is.contradiction number two：the state is an expropriating property protector。

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：的确，国家并不保护我们，相反，国家侵犯我们，并用我们被没收的财产来保护自身。国家的标准定义是这样的：国家是一个具有两个独特的、逻辑上相互关联的特征的机构。首先，国家是一个在领土上行使最终决策垄断权的机构。也就是说，国家是所有冲突的最终仲裁者和法官，包括涉及国家本身及其代理人的冲突。没有超越国家的上诉。其次，国家是一个在领土范围内垄断税收的机构。也就是说，它是一个可以单方面确定其国民必须为国家作为终极法官的服务支付的价格的机构。基于这种制度设置，你可以有把握地预测其后果。首先，拥有最终决策权的垄断者不仅不会预防和解决冲突，相反会为了自己的利益而制造和挑起冲突。也就是说，国家不承认和保护现有的法律，而是通过立法篡改法律。矛盾一：国家是违法的法律保护者。其次，一个税收垄断者不会去捍卫和保护任何人或任何事，而是会努力使安保支出最大化，同时使实际的安保生产最小化。国家能花的钱越多，为这些钱付出的努力越少，国家就越富裕。矛盾之二：国家是剥夺征用财产的保护者。

DB：Are there any good laws and regulations？

贝尔日报：是否有好的法律法规？

HHH：Yes.There are a few，simple good laws that almost everyone intui tively recognizes and acknowledges and that can also be demonstrated to be “true” and “good” laws.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：是的。有几条简单的好的法律，几乎每个人都能直观地认识并承认，而且也可以被证明是 “真 “和 “好 “的法律。

First：If there were no interpersonal conflicts and we all lived in perfect harmony there would be no need for any law or norm.It is the purpose of laws or norms to help avoid otherwise unavoidable conflict。only laws that achieve this can be called good laws.A law that generates conflict rather than help avoid it is contrary to the purpose of laws，i.e.，bad，dysfunctional or perverted law.

第一：如果没有人与人之间的冲突，我们都生活在完美的和谐之中，那么就不需要任何法律或规范。法律或规范的目的是帮助避免不可避免的冲突。只有达到这一目的的法律才能被称为良法。导致冲突而不是帮助避免冲突的法律违背了法律的宗旨，是坏法律、失灵的法律或变态的法律。

Second：Conflicts are possible only if and insofar as goods are scarce.People clash，because they want to use one and the same good in different，incompatible ways.Either I win and get my way or you win and get your way。We cannot both be “winners.” in the case of scarce goods，then，we need rules or laws helping us decide between rival，conflicting claims.In contrast，goods that are “free，” i.e.，goods that exist in superabundance，that are inexhaustible or infinitely reproducible，are not and cannot be a source of conflict。Whenever I use a nonscarce good it does not in the slightest diminish the supply of this good available to you。I can do with it what I want and you can do with it what you want at the same time.There is no loser。We are both winners； and hence，as far as nonscarce goods are concerned，there is never any need for laws.

第二：只有在商品稀缺的情况下，冲突才有可能发生。人们之所以发生冲突，是因为他们想以不同的、互不相容的方式使用同一种商品。要么我赢，按我的方式行事，要么你赢，按你的方式行事。我们不可能都是 “赢家”。在商品稀缺的情况下，我们需要规则或法律来帮助我们在对立、冲突的主张之间做出判决。相反，”免费 “的商品，即大量存在的商品，取之不尽、用之不竭或可无限再生的商品，不是也不可能成为冲突的根源。每当我使用一种非稀缺商品时，它丝毫不会减少你可获得的这种商品的供应量。我可以用它做我想做的事，同时你也可以用它做你想做的事。没有输家。我们都是赢家；因此，就非稀缺商品而言，根本不需要法律。

Third：All conflict concerning scarce goods，then，can be avoided if only every good is privately owned，i.e.，exclusively controlled by one speci fied individual（s） rather than another，and it is always clear which thing is owned，and by whom，and which is not。And in order to avoid all possible conflict from the beginning of mankind on，it is only necessary to have a rule regulating the first，original appropriation of previously unowned，naturegiven goods as private property。In sum then，there are essentially three “good laws” that assure conflictfree interaction or “eternal peace”：（a） he who first appropriates something previously unowned is its exclusive owner （as the first appropriator he cannot have come into conflict with anyone else as everyone else appeared on the scene only later）；（b） he who produces something with his body and homesteaded goods is owner of his product，provided he does not thereby damage the physical integrity of others’ property； and （c） he who acquires something from a previous or earlier owner by means of voluntary exchange，i.e.，an exchange that is deemed mutually beneficial，is its owner。

第三：如果每种商品都归私人所有，即完全由某个（些）特定的个人而不是另一个（些）特定的个人排他性地控制，并且总是很清楚哪种商品归谁所有，哪种商品不归谁所有，那么，所有与稀缺商品有关的冲突都可以避免。为了避免从人类一开始就可能发生的一切冲突，只需制定一项规则，规范对以前不属于自己的，自然赋予的物品作为私有财产的先占。总之，基本上有三条 “良法 “可以确保无冲突的互动或 “永恒的和平”：（a）谁先占有以前未曾拥有的东西，谁就是它的唯一拥有者（作为第一个占有者，他不可能与其他人发生冲突，因为其他人都是后来才出现的）；（b）用自己的身体和拓殖物品生产某物的人是其产品的所有者，只要他不损害他人财产的物理完整性；（c）通过自愿交换，即互惠互利的交换，从先前或更早的所有者那里获得物品的人是其所有者。

DB：How，then，does one define freedom？ As the absence of state coercion？

贝尔日报：那么，人们如何定义自由呢？因为没有国家强制？

HHH：A society is free，if every person is recognized as the exclusive owner of his own （scarce） physical body，if everyone is free to appropriate or “homestead” previously unowned things as private property，if every one is free to use his body and his homesteaded goods to produce what ever he wants to produce （without thereby damaging the physical integrity of other people’s property），and if everyone is free to contract with others regarding their respective properties in any way deemed mutually beneficial。Any interference with this constitutes an act of aggression，and a society is unfree to the extent of such aggressions.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：一个社会是自由的，如果每个人都被承认是自己（稀缺的）身体的排他性所有者，如果每个人都可以自由地将以前未被占有的东西占为己有或 “拓殖 “为私有财产，如果每个人都可以自由地使用自己的身体和拓殖的物品来生产自己想生产的东西（而不会因此损害他人财产的物理完整性），如果每个人都可以自由地与他人就各自的财产以任何双方都认为有益的方式签订契约。任何对此的干涉都是一种侵犯行为，一个社会的不自由程度取决于这种侵略的程度。

DB：Where do you stand on copyright？ Do you believe that intellectual property doesn’t exist as Kinsella has proposed？

贝尔日报：你对版权持何立场？你是否认同金塞拉的知识产权并不存在的提法？

HHH：I agree with my friend Kinsella，that the idea of intellectual property rights is not just wrong and confused but dangerous.And I have already touched upon why this is so。ideas—recipes，formulas，statements，arguments，algorithms，theorems，melodies，patterns，rhythms，images，etc。—are certainly goods （insofar as they are good，not bad，recipes，etc。），but they are not scarce goods.once thought and expressed，they are free，inexhaustible goods.I whistle a melody or write down a poem，you hear the melody or read the poem and reproduce or copy it。In doing so you have not taken anything away from me.I can whistle and write as before.In fact，the entire world can copy me and yet nothing is taken from me.（If I didn’t want anyone to copy my ideas I only have to keep them to myself and never express them.）

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：我同意我的朋友金塞拉的观点，知识产权的概念不仅是错误和混乱的，而且是危险的。我已经谈到了为什么会这样。观念——配方，公式，说法，论证，算法，定理，歌曲，模式，节奏，图像，等等——当然是商品（只要它们是好的，而不是坏的，诸如配方等等），但它们不是稀缺商品。一旦想到并表达出来，它们就是免费的，是取之不尽用之不竭的商品。我吹出一段旋律或写下一首诗，你们听到了旋律或读到了诗，并复制或抄袭了它。你们这样做并没有夺走我的任何东西。我可以像以前一样吹口哨和写作。事实上，全世界都可以复制我，但我什么也没有被夺走。（如果我不想让别人抄袭我的观念，我只需要把它们藏在心里，永远不表达出来）。

Now imagine I had been granted a property right in my melody or poem such that I could prohibit you from copying it or demanding a royalty from you if you do。First：Doesn’t that imply，absurdly，that I，in turn，must pay royalties to the person （or his heirs） who invented whistling and writing，and further on to those，who invented sound making and language，and so on？ Second：in preventing you from or making you pay for whistling my melody or reciting my poem，I am actually made a （partial） owner of you：of your physical body，your vocal chords，your paper，your pencil，etc。，because you did not use anything but your own property when you copied me.If you can no longer copy me，then，this means that I，the intellectual property owner，have expropriated you and your “real” property。Which shows：intellectual property rights and real property rights are incompatible， and the promotion of intellectual property must be seen as a most dangerous attack on the idea of “real” property （in scarce goods）。

现在设想一下，我对我的旋律或诗歌享有财产权，我可以禁止你复制它，如果你复制了，我还可以向你索要版税。首先：这是否意味着，我反过来必须向发明口哨和写作的人（或其继承人）支付版税，进而再向那些发明声音和语言的人支付版税？其次，在阻止你吹我的旋律或朗诵我的诗歌或让你为此付费时，我实际上成了你的（部分）所有者：你的身体、你的声带、你的纸张、你的铅笔，等等，因为当你模仿我的时候，除了你自己的财产，你没有使用任何东西。如果你不能再复制我了，那么，这就意味着我，即知识产权所有者，已经征用了你和你的 “真实 “财产。这表明：知识产权和实际财产权是不相容的，推广知识产权必须被视为对 “实际 “财产（稀缺商品）观念的最危险的攻击。

DB：We have suggested that if people want to enforce generational copy right that they do so on their own，taking on the expense and attempt ing through various means to confront copyright violators with their own resources.This would put the onus of enforcement on the pocket book of the individual。Is this a viable solution—to let the market itself decide these issues？

贝尔日报：我们曾建议，如果人们想要实施世代版权，他们可以自己来实施，承担费用，并尝试通过各种方式利用自己的资源来对抗版权侵犯者。这将使个人承担起维权的责任。让市场自己来决定这些问题，这是否是一个可行的解决方案？

HHH：That would go a long way in the right direction.better still：more and more courts in more and more countries，especially countries out side the orbit of the U.S.dominated Western government cartel，would make it clear that they don’t hear cases of copyright and patent violations any longer and regard such complaints as a ruse of big Western governmentconnected firms，such as pharmaceutical companies，for instance，to enrich themselves at the expense of other people.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：这将是一个正确的方向。更好的办法是：越来越多国家的法院，尤其是美国主导的西方政府卡特尔联盟之外的国家的法院，应明确表示不再审理侵犯版权和专利的案件，并将此类投诉视为与西方政府有关联的大公司（例如制药公司）以牺牲他人利益为代价敛财的伎俩。

DB：What do you think of Ragnar redbeard’s Might Is Right？

贝尔日报：你如何看待红胡子拉格纳《强权即公理》？

HHH：You can give two very different interpretations to this statement。I see no difficulty with the first one.It is：I know the difference between “might” and “right” and，as a matter of empirical fact，might is in fact frequently right。Most if not all of “public law，” for instance，is might masquerading as right。The second interpretation is：I don’t know the difference between “might” and “right，” because there is no difference.Might is right and right is might。This interpretation is selfcontradic tory。because if you wanted to defend this statement as a true statement in an argument with someone else you are in fact recognizing your opponent’s property right in his own body。You do not aggress against him in order to bring him to the correct insight。You allow him to come to the correct insight on his own.That is，you admit，at least implicitly，that you do know the difference between right and wrong。otherwise there would be no purpose in arguing。The same，incidentally，is true for Hobbes’s famous dictum that one man is another man’s wolf。In claiming this statement to be true，you actually prove it to be false.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：你可以对这句话做出两种截然不同的解释。我认为第一种解释没有问题。它是：我知道 “强权 “和 “公理 “的区别，而且，作为一个经验事实，强权实际上经常是公理。例如，大多数（如果不是全部的话）”公法 “都可能伪装成公理。第二种解释是：我不知道 “强权 “和 “公理 “有什么区别，因为没有区别。强权就是公理，公理就是强权。这种解释是自相矛盾的。因为如果你想在与别人的争论中把这句话当作真理来辩护，你实际上就是承认了对方对自己身体的财产权。你不是为了让他获得正确的见解而对他进行攻击。你允许他自己得出正确的见解。也就是说，你承认，至少是隐含地承认，你知道对与错的区别。否则，争论就没有意义了。巧合的是，霍布斯的名言 “人对人是狼 “也是如此。你声称这句话是真的，实际上证明了它是假的。

DB：It has been suggested that the only way to reorganize society is via a return to the clans and tribes that characterized Homo sapiens communities for tens of thousands of years？ Is it possible that as part of this devolution，clan or tribal justice could be reemphasized？

贝尔日报：有人认为，重组社会的唯一途径是回归数万年来作为智人社区特征的氏族和部落？作为这种演变的一部分，氏族或部落公正是否有可能得到重新强调？

HHH：I don’t think that we，in the Western world，can go back to clans and tribes.The modern，democratic state has destroyed clans and tribes and their hierarchical structures，because they stood in the way of the state’s drive toward absolute power。with clans and tribes gone，we must try it with the model of a private law society that I have described.But wherever traditional，hierarchical clan and tribe structures still exist，they should be supported and attempts to “modernize” “archaic” justice Systems along Western lines should be viewed with utmost suspicion.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：我认为，在西方世界，我们不可能回到氏族和部落。现代民主国家摧毁了氏族和部落及其等级结构，因为它们阻碍了国家对绝对权力的追求。随着氏族和部落的消失，我们必须尝试我所描述的私法社会模式。但是，只要传统的、等级森严的氏族和部落结构依然存在，我们就应该支持它们，而对于试图按照西方的思路将 “古老的 “司法制度 “现代化 “的做法，我们应该抱有极大的怀疑。

DB：You have also written extensively on money and monetary affairs.Is a gold standard necessary for a free society？

贝尔日报：你还撰写了大量关于货币和货币事务的文章。金本位制是自由社会的必需吗？

HHH：In a free society，the market would produce money，as all other goods and services.There would be no such thing as money in a world that was perfectly certain and predictable.But in a world with unpredictable contingencies people come to value goods also on account of their marketability or salability，i.e.，as media of exchange.And since a more easily and widely salable good is preferable to a less easily and widely salable good as a medium of exchange，there is an inevitable tendency in the market for a single commodity to finally emerge that differs from all others in being the most easily and widely salable commodity of all。This commodity is called money。As the most easily salable good of all it provides its owner with the best humanly possible protection against uncertainty in that it can be employed for the instant satisfaction of the widest range of possible needs.Economic theory has nothing to say as to what commodity will acquire the status of money。Historically，it happened to be gold.But if the physical makeup of our world would have been different or is to become different from what it is now，some other commodity would have become or might become money。The market will decide.In any case，there is no need for government to get involved in any of this.The market has provided and will provide some moneycommodity，and the production of that commodity，whatever it is，is subject to the same forces of supply and demand as the production of everything else.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：在自由社会中，市场会像生产其他商品和服务一样生产货币。在一个完全确定和可预测的世界里，不存在货币这种东西。但在一个充满不可预测的偶然性的世界里，人们也会因为商品的适销性或可销售性（即作为交换媒介）而对其进行估价。既然一种更容易和更广泛销售的商品比一种不那么容易和不那么广泛销售的商品更适合作为交换媒介，那么市场上就不可避免地会最终出现一种商品，它不同于其他所有商品，是所有商品中最容易和最广泛销售的商品。这种商品就是货币。作为所有商品中最容易出售的商品，它为其所有者提供了人类所能提供的最好的保护，使其免受不确定性的影响，因为它可以用来即时满足最广泛的可能需求。至于什么商品会成为货币，经济学理论并无定论。从历史上看，它恰好是黄金。但是，如果我们世界的物质构成与现在不同，或者将与现在不同，那么其他商品就会成为或可能成为货币。这将由市场来决定。无论如何，政府都没有必要介入其中。市场已经并将继续提供某种货币商品，而这种商品的生产，无论它是什么，都与其他商品的生产一样，受制于同样的供求关系的力量。

DB：How about the freebanking paradigm？ Is private fractional banking ever to be tolerated or is it a crime？ Who is to put people in jail for private fractional banking？

贝尔日报：自由银行模式如何？是容忍私营的部准银行还是将其视为犯罪？谁会因为私营的部准银行业务而把人送进监狱？

HHH：Assume gold is money。In a free society you have free competition in gold mining，you have free competition in gold minting，and you have freely competing banks.The banks offer various financial services：of money safekeeping，clearing services，and the service of mediating between savers and borrowerinvestors.Each bank issues its own brand of “notes” or “certificates” documenting the various transactions and resulting contractual relations between bank and client。These banknotes are freely tradable.So far so good.Controversial among free bankers is only the status of fractional reserve deposit banking and bank notes.let’s say A deposits 10 ounces of gold with a bank and receives a note （a money substitute） redeemable at par on demand.Based on A’s deposit，then，the bank makes a loan to C of 9 ounces of gold and issues a note to this effect，again redeemable at par on demand.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：假设黄金是货币。在自由社会中，黄金开采业有自由竞争，黄金铸造业有自由竞争，银行也有自由竞争。银行提供各种金融服务：货币存管、清算服务以及储蓄者和借款投资者之间的中介服务。每家银行都发行自己品牌的 “银行券 “或 “凭证”，记录银行与客户之间的各种交易和由此产生的契约关系。这些银行券可以自由买卖。到目前为止还不错。关于自由银行有争议的只是部分准备金存款银行和银行券的地位。假设 A 在银行存入 10 盎司黄金，并收到一张可按面值赎回的银行券（货币替代品）。基于 A 的存款，银行贷款给 C 9 盎司黄金，并为此发行了一张票据，同样可以按面值见票赎回。

Should this be permitted？ I don’t think so。For there are now two people，A and C，who are the exclusive owner of one and the same quantity of money。A logical impossibility。Or put differently，there are only 10 ounces of gold，but A is given title to 10 ounces and C holds title to 9 ounces.That is，there are more property titles than there is property。Obviously this constitutes fraud，and in all areas except money，courts have also considered such a practice fraud and punished the offenders.on the other hand，there is no problem if the bank tells A that it will pay interest on his deposit，invest it，for instance，in a money market mutual fund made up of highly liquid shortterm financial papers，and make its best efforts to redeem A’s shares in that investment fund on demand in a fixed quantity of money。such shares may well be very popular and many people may put their money into them instead of into regular deposit accounts.But as shares of investment funds they would never function as money。They would never be the most easily and widely salable commodity of all。

这应该被允许吗？我认为不应该。因为现在有两个人，A 和 C，他们各自占有相同数量的钱。这在逻辑上是不可能的。或者换一种说法，黄金只有 10 盎司，但 A 拥有 10 盎司，C 拥有 9 盎司。也就是说，产权多于财产。很明显，这构成了欺诈，在货币以外的所有领域，法院也认为这种做法是欺诈，并处罚违法者。另一方面，如果银行告诉 A，它将为他的存款支付利息，将其投资，例如，投资于由高流动性短期金融票据组成的货币市场共同基金，并尽最大努力按需以固定数量赎回A在该投资基金中的股份，则没有问题。这些股票很可能很受欢迎，许多人可能会把钱存入这些股票而不是普通存款账户。但是，作为投资基金的股票，它们永远不会起到货币的作用。它们永远不会成为最容易和最广泛销售的商品。

DB：Where do you stand on the current central banking paradigm？ Is central banking as it is currently constituted the central disaster of our time？

贝尔日报：你如何看待当前的中央银行模式？目前的中央银行制度是我们这个时代的核心灾难吗？

HHH：Central banks are certainly one of the greatest mischiefmakers of our time.They，and in particular the Fed，have been responsible for destroying the gold standard，which has always been an obstacle to inflationary policies，and replacing it，since 1971，with a pure paper money standard （fiat money）。Since then，central banks can create money virtually out of thin air。More paper money cannot make a society richer，of course—it is just more printed paper。otherwise，why is it that there are still poor countries and poor people around？ But more money makes its monopolistic producer （the central bank） and its earliest recipients （the government and big，governmentconnected banks and their major clients） richer at the expense of making the money’s late and latest receivers poorer。

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：中央银行无疑是我们这个时代最大的作恶者之一。他们，尤其是美联储，要为摧毁金本位制负责，金本位制度一直是通胀政策的阻碍，自 1971 年以后，就用纯粹的纸币本位制（法币）取代了金本位制。从那以后，中央银行几乎可以凭空创造货币。纸币越多，社会当然不会越富裕——只不过是纸张印得越多而已。否则，为什么还会有贫穷的国家和贫穷的人民？但是，更多的货币会让垄断性的生产者（中央银行）和最早的接受者（政府和与政府有联系的大银行及其主要客户）变得更富有，而代价是让货币的后用者和最晚的接受者变得更加贫穷。

Thanks to the central bank’s unlimited money printing power，governments can run ever higher budget deficits and pile up ever more debt to finance otherwise impossible wars，hot and cold，abroad and at home，and engage in an endless stream of otherwise unthinkable boondoggles and adventures.Thanks to the central bank，most “monetary experts” and “leading macroeconomists” can，by putting them on the payroll，be turned into government propagandists “explaining，” like alchemists，how stones （paper） can be turned into bread （wealth）。Thanks to the central bank，interest rates can be artificially lowered all the way down to zero，channeling credit into less and least creditworthy projects and hands （and crowding out worthy projects and hands），and causing ever greater investment bubblebooms，followed by ever more spectacular busts.And thanks to the central bank，we are confronted with a dramatically increasing threat of an impending hyperinflation when the chicken finally comes home to roost and the piper must be paid.

由于中央银行拥有无限的印钞权，各国政府可以不断提高预算赤字，积累更多债务，为原本不可能的战争（无论冷战还是热战，无论在国外还是在国内）提供资金，并从事无穷无尽的、难以想象的无用之事和冒险活动。由于中央银行的存在，大多数 “货币专家 “和 “主要的宏观经济学家 “都可以像炼金术士一样，成为政府的肉喇叭，”解释 “如何将石头（纸张）变成面包（财富）。由于中央银行的存在，利率可以被人为地一路降至零，将信贷引导到更少、更不值得信赖的项目和手中（并挤出值得信贷的项目和手中），导致越来越大的投资泡沫，随之而来的是越来越惊人的萧条。由于中央银行的存在，我们面临着日益加剧的恶性通货膨胀迫在眉睫的威胁，到那时，恶有恶报，报应不爽。

DB：We have often pointed out that the Seven Hills of Rome were initially independent societies just like the Italian citystates during the renaissance and the 13 colonies of the U.S.republic。It seems great empires start as individual communities where people can leave one community if they are oppressed and go nearby to start afresh.What is the driving force behind this process of centralization？ What are the building blocks of Empire？

贝尔日报：我们经常指出，罗马七山最初是独立的社会，就像文艺复兴时期的意大利城邦和美国的 13 个殖民地一样。伟大的帝国似乎都是从单个社区开始的，人们在受到压迫时可以离开一个社区，到附近重新开始。这种国家主义过程背后的驱动力是什么？帝国的基石是什么？

HHH：All states must begin small。That makes it easy for people to run away。Yet states are by nature aggressive，as I have already explained.They can externalize the cost of aggression onto others，i.e.，hapless taxpayers.They don’t like to see productive people run away and try to capture them by expanding their territory。The more productive people the state controls，the better off it will be.In this expansionist desire，they run into opposition by other states.There can be only one monopolist of ultimate jurisdiction and taxation in any given territory。That is，the competition between different states is eliminative.Either A wins and controls a territory，or B。Who wins？ At least in the long run，that state will win—and take over another’s territory or establish hegemony over it and force it to pay tribute—that can parasitically draw on the comparatively more productive economy。That is，other things being the same，internally more “liberal” states （in the classic European sense of “liberal”） will tend to win over less “liberal，” i.e.，illiberal or oppressive states.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：所有国家都必须从小事做起。这使得人们很容易用脚投票。然而，正如我已经解释过的，国家本质上是具有侵犯性的。它们可以将侵犯的成本外部化，转嫁到他人身上，那些倒霉催的纳税人身上。他们不喜欢看到有生产力的人逃跑，并试图通过扩大地盘来俘获他们。国家控制的有生产力的人口越多，国家就越富裕。在这种扩张欲望的驱使下，他们遭到了其他国家的反对。在任何特定领土上，最终的管辖权和税收垄断者只能有一个。也就是说，不同国家之间的竞争是淘汰性的。要么 A 胜出从而控制一个地区，要么 B获胜出控制一个地区。那么谁会胜出呢？至少从长远来看，这样的国家会胜出——占领他国领土，或建立霸权，迫使他国向其进贡——它可以寄生于生产力相对较高的经济体。也就是说，在其他条件相同的情况下，内部”自由 “程度较高的国家（欧洲传统意义上的 “自由 “国家）往往会战胜 “自由 “程度较低的国家，即那些不自由或压迫性国家。

Looking only at modern history，we can so explain first the rise of liberal Great Britain to the rank of the foremost world Empire and then，subsequently，that of the liberal U.S.And we can understand a seeming paradox：why it is，that internally liberal imperial powers like the U.S.tend to be more aggressive and belligerent in their foreign policy than internally oppressive powers，such as the former Soviet Union.The liberal U.S.Empire was sure to win with its foreign wars and military adventures，while the oppressive Soviet Union was afraid that it might lose.

只看近代史，我们就能解释为什么自由主义的英国首先崛起为世界第一帝国，接着是随后的自由主义的美国。我们可以理解一个看似矛盾的现象：为什么像美国这样的帝国主义强国，内部自由主义，而在外交政策上往往比内部压迫性大国（如前苏联）更具侵略性和好战性。自由主义的美帝肯定会在对外战争和军事冒险中获胜，而压迫性的苏联则担心自己会失败。

But empirebuilding also bears the seeds of its own destruction.The closer a state comes to the ultimate goal of world domination and oneworld government，the less reason is there to maintain its internal liberalism and do instead what all states are inclined to do anyway，i.e.，to crack down and increase their exploitation of whatever productive people are still left。Consequently，with no additional tributaries avail able and domestic productivity stagnating or falling，the Empire’s internal policies of bread and circuses can no longer be maintained.economic crisis hits，and an impending economic meltdown will stimulate decentralizing tendencies，separatist and secessionist movements，and lead to the breakup of Empire.We have seen this happen with Great Britain，and we are seeing it now，with the U.S.and its Empire apparently on its last legs.

但帝国崛起也埋下了自我毁灭的种子。一个国家越是接近称霸世界和建立世界政府的终极目标，就越没有理由维持其内部的自由主义，而是去做所有国家都倾向于做的事情，即打击和增加对剩余生产力人口的剥削。因此，由于没有额外的朝贡可用，加之国内生产力停滞不前或下降，帝国内部的面包和马戏政策将无法再维持。经济危机来袭，迫在眉睫的经济崩溃将刺激分权倾向，分裂主义和分离主义运动，导致帝国解体。我们已经看到这种情况发生在英国，现在我们也看到了，美利坚和它的帝国显然已经走到了尽头。

There is also an important monetary side to this process.The dominant Empire typically provides the leading international reserve currency，first Britain with the pound sterling and then the U.S.with the dollar。with the dollar used as reserve currency by foreign central banks，the U.S.can run a permanent “deficit without tears.” That is，the U.S.must not pay for its steady excesses of imports over exports，as it is normal between “equal” partners，in having to ship increasingly more exports abroad （exports paying for imports）。Rather：Instead of using their export earnings to buy American goods for domestic consumption，foreign governments and their central banks，as a sign of their vassal status visàvis a dominant U.S.，use their paper dollar reserves to buy up U.S.government bonds to help Americans to continue consuming beyond their means.

这一过程还有一个重要的货币方面。占主导地位的帝国通常会提供主要的国际储备货币，首先是英国的英镑，然后是美国的美元。由于美元被外国中央银行用作储备货币，美国可以长期 “无泪赤字”。也就是说，美国不能像 “平等 “伙伴之间的正常情况那样，必须为其持续增长的贸易逆差付出代价，将越来越多地向外出口（出口支付进口）。相反，外国政府及其中央银行不是利用出口收入购买美国商品供国内消费，而是利用纸面美元储备购买美国政府债券，帮助美国人继续超前消费，这表明他们占主导地位的美国的附庸。

I do not know enough about China to understand why it is using its huge dollar reserves to buy up U.S.government bonds.After all，China is not supposed to be a part of the U.S.Empire.Maybe its rulers have read too many American economics textbooks and now believe in alchemy，too。But if only China would dump its U.S.treasuries and accumulate gold reserves instead，that would be the end of the U.S.Empire and the dollar as we know it。

我对中国还不够了解，不知道它为什么要动用巨额美元储备来购买美国政府债券。毕竟，中国不应该是美帝国的一部分。也许中国的统治者读了太多的美国经济学教科书，现在也相信炼金术了。但是，只要中国抛售美国国债，转而积累黄金储备，那将是我们所知的美帝和美元的末日。

DB：Is it possible that a shadow of impossibly wealthy families located in the City of London is partially responsible for all this？ Do these families and their enablers seek world government by elites？ Is it a conspiracy？ Do you see the world in these terms：as a struggle between the centralizing impulses of elites and the more democratic impulses of the rest of society？

贝尔日报：位于伦敦金融城（City of London）的一群富可敌国的家族是否可能对这一切负有部分责任？这些家族及其支持者是否在寻求由精英组成世界政府？这是一个阴谋吗？你是否从这些角度来看待这个世界：精英们的集权冲动与社会其他人的民主冲动之间的斗争？

HHH：I’m not sure if conspiracy is still the right word，because in the mean time，thanks to people such as Carroll Quigley，for instance，much is known about what is going on.In any case，it is certainly true that there are such impossibly rich families，sitting in London，new York City，tel Aviv and elsewhere，who have recognized the immense potential for personal enrichment in the process of state and empirebuilding。The heads of big banking houses played a key role in the founding of the Fed，because they realized that central banking would allow their own banks to inflate and expand credit on top of money and credit created by the central bank，and that a “lender of last resort” was instrumental in allowing them to reap private profits as long as things would go well and to socialize costs if they wouldn’t。

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：我不确定用 “阴谋 “这个词是否合适，因为与此同时，由于卡罗尔-奎格利（Carroll Quigley）等人的努力，人们已经对发生的事情有了很多了解。无论如何，伦敦、纽约、特拉维夫和其他地方确实存在着这样一些富得流油的家族，他们认识到了在国家和帝国建设过程中个人致富的巨大潜力。大银行的首脑们在美联储的成立过程中扮演了关键角色，因为他们意识到，中央银行将允许他们自己的银行在中央银行创造的货币和信用的基础上膨胀和扩大信用，而 “最后贷款人 “则有助于让他们在顺利时获得私人利润，在不顺利时将成本社会化。

They realized that the classical gold standard stood as a natural impediment to inflation and credit expansion，and so they helped set up first a phony gold standard （the gold exchange standard） and then，after 1971，a pure fiat money regime.They realized that a System of freely fluctuating national fiat currencies was still imperfect as far as inflationist desires are concerned，in that the supremacy of the dollar could be threatened by other，competing currencies such as a strong german Mark，for instance； and in order to reduce and weaken this competition they supported “monetary integration” schemes such as the creation of a European Central Bank （ECB） and the Euro。

他们意识到，传统金本位制是通货膨胀和信贷扩张的天然障碍，因此他们先是帮助建立了一个虚假的金本位制（金汇兑本位制），然后在 1971 年之后建立了一个纯粹的法定货币制度。他们意识到，就通货膨胀主义者的愿望而言，自由浮动的国家法定货币体系仍不完善，因为美元的霸主地位可能受到其他竞争货币的威胁，例如强势的德国马克；为了减少和削弱这种竞争，他们支持 “货币一体化 “计划，如创建欧洲中央银行（ECB）和欧元。

And they realized that their ultimate dream of unlimited counterfeiting power would come true，if only they succeeded in creating a U.S.dominated world central bank issuing a world paper currency such as the bancor or the phoenix； and so they helped set up and finance a multitude of organizations such as the Council on Foreign relations，the Trilateral Commission，the Bilderberg Group，etc。，that promote this goal。As well，leading industrialists recognized the tremendous profits to be made from stategranted monopolies，from state subsidies，and from exclusive costplus contracts in freeing or shielding them from competition，and so they，too，have allied themselves to and “infiltrated” the state.

他们意识到，只要成功建立一个由美国主导的世界中央银行，发行一种世界纸币，如班克币（bancor）或凤凰币（phoenix），他们无限伪造货币的终极梦想就能实现；因此，他们帮助建立并资助了许多组织，如外交关系委员会、三边委员会、比尔德伯格集团等，以促进这一目标的实现。同样，最主要的实业家们也认识到，从国家授予的垄断中，从国家补贴中，从免除或保护他们免受竞争的独家成本保利契约中，可以获得巨大的利润，因此，他们也与国家结盟，并 “渗透 “到国家内部。

There are “accidents” in history，and there are carefully planned actions that bring about consequences which are unintended and unanticipated.But history is not just a sequence of accidents and surprises.Most of it is designed and intended.Not by common folks，of course，but by the power elites in control of the state apparatus.If one wants to prevent history from running its present，foreseeable course to unprecedented economic disaster，then，it is indeed imperative to arouse public indignation by exposing，relentlessly，the evil motives and machinations of these power elites，not just of those working within the state apparatus，but in particular also of those staying outside，behind the scenes and pulling the strings.

历史中有 “意外”，也有精心策划的行动带来了意料之外的后果。但历史并不只是一连串的意外和惊喜。大部分历史都是预先设计，有意为之。当然，不是普通人，而是控制国家机器的权力精英们。如果我们想要阻止历史沿着目前可预见的道路走向空前的经济灾难，那么，必须无情地揭露这些权力精英的邪恶动机和阴谋诡计，以此来激起公众的愤慨，此事势在必行，这些权力精英不仅包括那些在国家体制内工作人员，而且还包括那些站在体制外和幕后操纵的人。

DB：It has been our contention that just as the Gutenberg press blew up existing social structures in its day，so the internet is doing that today。We believe the internet may be ushering in a new renaissance after the Dark age of the twentieth century。Agree？ Disagree？

贝尔日报：我们一直认为，正如古腾堡印刷术在当时摧毁了现有的社会结构一样，今天的互联网也在这样做。我们相信，在经历了二十世纪的黑暗时代之后，互联网可能会迎来新的文化复兴。你赞同还是反对这个说法呢？

HHH：It is certainly true that both inventions revolutionized society and greatly improved our lives.It is difficult to imagine what it would be to go back to the preinternet age or the preGutenberg era.I am skeptical，however，if technological revolutions in and of themselves also bring about moral progress and an advance toward greater freedom.I am more inclined to think that technology and technological advances are “neutral” in this regard.The internet can be used to unearth and spread the truth as much as to spread lies and confusion.It has given us unheard of possibilities to evade and undermine our enemy the state， but it has also given the state unheard of possibilities of spying on us and ruining us.We are richer today，with the internet，than we were，let’s say，in 1900，without it （and we are richer not because of the state but in spite of it）。But I would emphatically deny that we are freer today than we were in 1900。Quite to the contrary。

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：确实，这两项发明都给社会带来了革命性的变化，并且极大地改善了我们的生活。很难想象回到前互联网时代或前古腾堡时代会是什么样子。然而，我对技术革命本身是否会带来道德进步和更大的自由持怀疑态度。在这方面，我更倾向于认为技术和技术进步是 “中性的 “。互联网既可以用来挖掘和传播真相，也可以用来传播谎言和混淆视听。它给了我们前所未有的可能性来规避和削弱我们的敌人——国家，但它也给了国家前所未有的可能性来监视我们并毁掉我们。比方说，有了互联网，我们今天比没有互联网的1900年更富有（我们之所以更富有，不是因为有国家，而是尽管有国家，我们依然更富有）。但我坚决否认，我们今天比1900年更自由。事实恰恰相反。

DB：Any final thoughts？ Can you tell us what you are working on now？ Any books or websites you would like to recommend？

贝尔日报：最后还有什么想说的吗？能告诉我们你现在在做什么吗？有什么想推荐的书籍或网站吗？

HHH：I once deviated from my principle not to speak about my work until it was done.I have regretted this deviation.It was a mistake that I won’t repeat。As for books，I recommend above all reading the major works of my two masters，Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard，not just once，but repeatedly from time to time.Their work is still unsurpassed and will remain so for a long time to come.As for websites，I go most regularly to mises.org and to lewrockwell。coM.As for other sites：I have been called an extremist，a reactionary，a revisionist，an elitist，a supremacist，a racist，a homophobe，an antiSemite，a rightwinger，a theocrat，a godless cynic，a fascist and，of course，a must for every german，a Nazi。So，it should be expected that I have a foible for politically “incorrect” sites that every “modern，” “decent，” “civilized，” “tolerant，” and “enlightened” man is supposed to ignore and avoid.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：我曾一度偏离了在作品完成之前不谈论作品的原则。我为这一偏离感到后悔。这是一个错误，我不会再犯。至于书籍，我首先推荐阅读我的两位导师，路德维希-冯-米塞斯和默里-罗斯巴德的主要作品，不是只读一次，而是不时地反复阅读。他们的著作至今仍是无与伦比的，而且在未来很长一段时间内仍将如此。至于网站，我最经常访问的是 mises.org 和 lewrockwell.com。

DB：Thank you for your time in answering these questions.It has been a special honor to address them to you in the context of your remarkable work。

贝尔日报：感谢你抽出时间回答这些问题。能就你杰出的工作内容向你讨教以上这些问题，我感到特别荣幸。

HHH：You’re welcome.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普：不客气。

conclusion

III. 结论

What a great interview.We say this immodestly because with some exceptions （freebanking and money competition being notable ones），Dr.Hans Hermann Hoppe，one of the finest libertarian thinkers and educators in the world today，actually seemed to agree with some of what has been pro posed in these modest pages for several years.Don’t take our word for it。reread the interview if you wish.To have someone of Dr.Hoppe’s caliber of mind endorse and elaborate on fundamental perceptions such as we have advanced on occasion is incredibly affirming and even （we don’t mind admitting） intellectually satisfying。

这真是一次精彩的访谈。我们可以不谦虚地说，因为除了一些例外情况（自由银行和货币竞争是值得注意的例外情况），汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普博士是当世最优秀的自由意志主义思想家和教育家之一，实际上，他似乎同意几年来我们在这篇不起眼的文章中提出的一些观点。不要只听我们这么说。如果你愿意，可以重读这篇访谈。霍普博士这样才智卓绝之士能够认可并详细阐述我们偶尔提出的基本观点，是令人难以置信的肯定，甚至（我们不介意承认）在智识上也是令人满意的。

on a less frivolous note，what comes across in the interview is that Dr.Hoppe is one of those peculiar individuals who，having glimpsed truth not available to most people，is unable by temperament to temporize about its validity。one sees this characteristic reflected in the work and narratives of Murray Rothbard and Ludwig von Mises to name two brilliant thinkers that come to mind.The inability to avoid the conclusions （or to shy away from voicing them） developed from one’s belief System is a telltale sign of intellectual courage and even，we submit，greatness.

说点不那么无聊的话，从访谈中可以看出，霍普博士是一个很特别的人，他窥见了大多数人无法窥见的真理，但他的性格使他无法曲学阿世，这一点，我们同样可以从默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）和路德维希-冯-米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）这两位杰出思想家的作品和叙述中看到。直面从自己的信仰体系中得出的结论（或并不羞于说出这些结论）是知识分子的勇气，甚至我们认为是伟大的标志。

It is indeed rare to have the privilege of conducting a dialogue with a truly clarified intellect，someone in fact with a mercilessly resonant frame of reference.If you read the interview closely，you can actually see （or hear） the disciplined approach with which Dr Hoppe approaches the issues on which he comments.Each position is developed rationally and each conclusion evolves relentlessly from evidence adumbrated.

能够与一个真正清晰的智者进行对话，事实上，是与一个不感情用事且能产生共鸣的参照系的人进行对话，确实是少有的荣幸。如果你仔细阅读访谈内容，就会发现（或听到）霍普博士以严谨的态度对待他所评论的问题。每一个立场都是理性地提出来的，每一个结论都是冷静地从简略提及的证据中演变而来。

We won’t write much more because like a great musical composition，this interview in our view is best appreciated on its own.Our clumsy commentary probably only detracts from its muscularity and elegant austerity。Of course，you may not appreciate our efforts，dear reader，but please acknowledge the courtesy，wisdom and intellectual courage of one of the world’s profound freemarket thinkers，Dr HansHermann Hoppe.

我们不再多写了，因为我们认为，就像一首伟大的音乐作品一样，这篇访谈最好是欣赏它本身。我们笨拙的评论可能只会减弱它的力度和优雅的朴实感。当然，亲爱的读者，你可能并不欣赏我们的努力，但请认可世界上这位深刻的自由市场思想家汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普博士的礼貌、智慧与思想勇气。

27 interview with Philosophie Magazine

27 《哲学》杂志的访谈*

inTRODUCTIon

I. 简介

A few months ago，a French journalist，Mr.Nicolas Cori，approached me with the request for an interview on the subject of taxation，to be published in the French monthly Philosophie Magazine，in the context of current “tax reform” debates in France.

几个月前，一位法国记者尼古拉斯-科里（Nicolas Cori）先生向我提出采访要求，希望我在法国《哲学》杂志月刊上，结合法国当前的 “税制改革 “论证，就税收问题发表一篇文章。

I agreed to the interview，it was conducted by email in English，Mr.Cori produced a French translation，my friend Dr.Nikolay gertchev checked and corrected his translation，and I then sent the authorized translation to Mr.Cori。Since then，more than a month ago，and despite repeated promptings，I have not heard from Mr.Cori。I can only speculate as for the reasons of his silence.Most likely，he did not get permission from his superiors to publish the interview，and he does not possess the courtesy and courage to tell me.

我同意接受采访，采访是通过电子邮件用英语进行的，科里先生提供了法文译文，我的朋友 Nikolay gertchev 博士核对并更正了他的译文，然后我将授权译文发给了科里先生。从那以后，一个多月过去了，尽管我一再催促，但一直没有收到科里先生的回音。我只能猜测他保持沉默的原因：很有可能是他没有得到上级的许可发表这次采访，而且他也缺乏勇气礼貌地告知我此事。

Interview

II. 访谈

Nicolas Cori：Are taxes consistent with individual freedom and property rights？ Is there a level of taxation where it is no more consistent？

科里：税收是否符合个人自由和财产权利？有哪种程度的税收是不一致的？

HansHermann Hoppe：No.Taxes are never，at no level of taxation，consistent with individual freedom and property rights.Taxes are theft。The thieves—the state and its agents and allies—try their very best to conceal this fact，of course，but there is simply no way around it。Obviously，taxes are not normal，voluntary payments for goods and services，because you are not allowed to stop such payments if you are not satisfied with the product。You are not punished if you do no longer buy renault cars or Chanel perfume，but you are thrown into jail if you stop paying for government schools or universities or for Mr.Sarkozy and his pomp.Nor is it possible to construe taxes as normal rentpayments，as they are made by a renter to his landlord.because the French state is not the landlord of all of France and all Frenchmen.To be the landlord，the French state would have to be able to prove two things：first，that the state，and no one else，owns every inch of France，and second，that it has a rental contract with every single Frenchman concerning the use，and the price for this use，of its property。No state—not the French，not the german，not the U.S.American or any other state—can prove this.They have no documents to this effect and they cannot present any rental contract。Thus，there is only one conclusion：taxation is theft and robbery by which one segment of the population，the ruling class，enriches itself at the expense of another，the ruled.

霍普：不是。无论任何水平的税收，从来都不符合个人自由和财产权。税收就是盗窃。窃贼——国家及其代理人和盟友——竭力掩盖这一事实，当然，这也是没有办法的办法。显然，税收不是正常的、自愿的商品和服务付款，因为如果你对产品不满意，你不能停止这种付款。如果你不再购买雷诺（renault）汽车或香奈儿（Chanel）香水，你不会受到惩罚，但如果你不再为公立学校、大学或萨科齐和他的奢华买单，你就会被关进监狱。也不可能把税收理解为正常的租金支付，就像租房者向房东支付租金一样。因为法国政府不是全法国和所有法国人的房东。要成为房东，法国政府必须能够证明两件事：第一，法国政府，而不是其他人，拥有法国的每一寸土地；第二，法国政府与每一个法国人都签订了关于使用其财产以及使用价格的租赁契约。没有一个国家——法国、德国、美国或任何其他国家——能够证明这一点。他们没有这方面的文件，也无法出示任何租房契约。因此，结论只有一个：税收是偷窃和抢劫，一部分人，即统治阶级，通过税收以牺牲另一部分人，即被统治者为代价来致富。

NC：Is it wrong not to pay taxes？

科里：不纳税是错的吗？

HHH：No.given that taxes are theft，i.e.，a moral “wrong，” it cannot be wrong to refuse to pay thieves or to lie to them regarding one’s taxable income or assets.This does not mean that it is prudent or wise to do so and not to pay taxes—after all the state is the “coldest of all monsters，” as Nietzsche has put it，and it can ruin your life or even destroy you if you do not obey its commands.But there can be no question that it is just not to pay taxes.

霍普：没有错。既然税收是一种偷窃行为，是一种道德上的 “错误”，那么拒绝向小偷交税或在个人应纳税收入或资产方面向小偷撒谎就不可能是错误的。这并不意味着这样做和不纳税是谨慎或明智的——毕竟，正如尼采所说，国家是 “最冷酷的怪物”，如果你不服从它的命令，它就会毁掉你的生活，甚至毁灭你。但毫无疑问，不纳税是正当的。

NC：How do we know that a tax is fair？ Are there any criteria？ Is a progres sive tax better than a flat tax？

科里：我们如何知道一项税收是公平的？有什么标准吗？累进税比统一税更好吗？

HHH：We know that no tax is fair，whether progressive or flat and proportional。How can theft and robbery be fair？ The “best” tax is always the lowest tax—yet even the lowest tax is still a tax。The “best，” because lowest，tax is a head or poll tax，where every person pays the same absolute amount of taxes.Since even the poorest person must be able to pay this amount，such a tax must be low.But even a head tax is still theft，and there is nothing “fair” about it。A head tax does not treat everyone equally and install “equality before the law.” For something happens with the tax revenue.The salaries of all state employees and dependents （like pensioners and welfare recipients） are paid out of tax revenue，for instance.Accordingly，state employees and dependents pay no taxes at all。Rather，their entire netincome （after payment of their head tax） comes out of taxpayments and they are thus （on net） taxconsumers living off income and wealth stolen from others：the tax producers.What is fair about one group of people living parasitically on，and at the expense of，another group of people？

霍普：我们知道，没有一种税是公平的，无论是累进税还是统一税和比例税。盗窃和抢劫怎么会公平呢？最好的 “税总是最低的税，但即使最低的税也仍然是税。“ 最好的 “税，因为最低的税是人头税或按人征收的税，每个人缴纳的绝对税额相同。因为即使是最穷的人也必须有能力支付这笔钱，所以税收必须很低。但即使是人头税，它也是一种偷窃行为，没有任何 “公平 “可言。人头税并没有平等对待每个人，也没有实现“法律面前人人平等”。因为税收会发生变化。例如，所有国家雇员和家属（如养老金领取者和福利领取者）的工资都由税收支付。因此，国家雇员和家属无需缴纳任何税款。相反，他们的全部净收入（在缴纳人头税后）都来自税收，因此他们是（净）税收消费者，依靠从他人（即税收生产者）那里窃取的收入和财富生活。一群人寄生在另一群人身上并以他们为代价，这公平吗？

NC：Do all philosophers agree？

科里：所有哲学家都同意吗？

HHH：No，they don’t。But that is hardly surprising。Almost all professional philosophers nowadays are taxconsumers.They do not produce any goods or services that they sell on the market to voluntarily buying or notbuying philosophyconsumers.As a matter of fact，as judged by actual consumer demand，the work of most contemporary philosophers must be considered worthless.Rather：nearly all philosophers today are paid out of taxes.They live off money stolen or confiscated from others.If your livelihood depends on taxes you will likely not oppose the insti tution of taxation on principled grounds.Of course this is not necessar ily the case.Our “consciousness” is not determined by our “Sein，” à la Marx。However，any such opposition is not very likely。Indeed，as most “intellectuals，” philosophers typically suffer from an overinflated ego。They believe to do work of great importance and resent the fact that “society” does not compensate them accordingly。Hence，if the issue of taxation is not simply ignored by them，philosophers have been at the forefront of coming up with tortured attempts of justifying taxes—of masquerading theft as something “good”—and in particular their own，taxfunded philosopher salaries.

霍普：不，他们不同意。但这并不奇怪。现在几乎所有的职业哲学家都是税收消费者。他们不生产任何商品或服务，也不在市场上出售给自愿购买或不购买哲学的消费者。事实上，从消费者的实际需求来看，大多数当代哲学家的工作都是毫无价值的。相反，当今几乎所有哲学家的报酬都来自税收。他们靠偷别人的钱或没收别人的钱生活。如果你的生计依赖于税收，那么你很可能不会基于原则性理由反对征税。当然，情况未必如此。我们的 “意识 “并不是由马克思所说的 “存在 “决定的。然而，任何这样的反对都不太可能。事实上，与大多数 “知识分子 “一样，哲学家通常都有过度膨胀的自我。他们认为自己所做的工作非常重要，并怨恨 “社会 “没有给予他们相应的补偿。因此，如果税收问题不是被他们简单地忽视，哲学家们已经站在了为税收辩护的最前沿——把盗窃伪装成“好”的东西——特别是他们自己的、由税收资助的哲学家的工资。

NC：Should philosophers consider the economic efficiency of taxation methods，simultaneously with its ethical values？

科里：哲学家是否应该同时考虑税收方法的经济效率和伦理价值？

HHH：In order to speak of an action as “efficient，” it is necessary that we first define a purpose，i.e.，a goal or an end.Something can be judged as efficient or inefficient only in light of a goal that is assumed as given.It is the task of economists and socalled “positive economics” to determine，which measures are effective （or ineffective） in bringing about a given end.For instance，if you want to bring about mass unemployment，then economics tells you that it is efficient to raise minimum wages to，let us say，100 Euros per hour。on the other hand，if it is your goal to minimize unemployment，then economics informs you that all mini mum wage laws should be abolished.But economists qua economists have nothing to say about the permissibility or desirability of the goals in question.This is the task of the philosopher：to determine which goals are just and permissible and which goals are not。（The economist then informs the philosopher which means are efficient or inefficient，in order to reach such justifiable goals.）

霍普：要把一个行动说成是 “有效率的”，我们必须首先确定一个目的，即目标或目的。只有根据假定目标，才能判断某件事情是有效率还是无效率。经济学家和所谓的 “实证经济学 “的任务就是确定哪些措施在实现既定目标方面是有效的（或无效的）。例如，如果你想造成大规模失业，那么经济学告诉你，把最低工资提高到每小时 100 欧元是有效的。另一方面，如果你的目标是将失业率降到最低，那么经济学告诉你，应该废除所有的最低工资法。但是，经济学家本身对有关目标的可允许性或可取性并无发言权。这是哲学家的任务：确定哪些目标是公正和可允许的，哪些目标是不公正的，是不被允许的。（然后，经济学家告诉哲学家，为了实现这些合理的目标，哪些手段是有效的，哪些手段是无效的）。

But as I already indicated：the philosophy profession simply has not done its job。Philosophers give plenty of advice about what to do or not to do，of course，but their advice carries little or no intellectual weight。In almost all cases，it is mere opinion：expression of personal tastes，nothing more.If you implore about the “theory of justice，” from which their recommendations supposedly follow，they have no such theory。They can offer only some adhoc collection of personal value judgments，which typically does not even fulfill the requirement of internal consistency。

但是，正如我已经指出的那样：哲学界根本没有做好自己的工作。当然，哲学家们给出了很多关于该做什么或不该做什么的建议，但他们的建议几乎没有任何智识份量。几乎在所有情况下，他们的建议都只是个人观点的表达，仅此而已。如果你恳求他们提出所谓的建议所依据的 “公正理论”，他们根本就没有这样的理论。他们只能提供一些临时收集的个人价值判断，这些判断通常甚至不符合内部一致性的要求。

Any theory of justice worth its salt must recognize first the most fundamental fact of human life：the scarcity of goods，i.e.，the absence of superabundance.For only because of scarcity is it possible that people can have conflicts with each other：I want to do x with a given，scarce resource，and you want to do y with the very same resource.without conflicts，there would be no need for rules or norms； and the purpose of norms then is conflictavoidance.In the absence of a prestabilized harmony of all interests，conflicts can be avoided only if all scarce resources are owned privately，i.e.，by one identifiable owner rather than，and at the exclusion of，another。And in order to avoid conflict from the beginning of mankind on，so to speak，any theory of justice must begin with a norm regulating the first，original appropriation of scarce resources as private property。

任何有价值的公正理论都必须首先承认人类生活中最基本的事实：物品的稀缺性，即不存在超级的丰富性。因为只有在稀缺的情况下，人们之间才有可能发生冲突：我想用某种稀缺的资源做 x 事件，而你想用同样的资源做 y 事件。如果没有冲突，就不需要规则或规范；而规范的目的就是避免冲突。在缺乏所有利益的预稳定和谐的情况下，只有当所有稀缺资源都归私人所有，即归一个可识别的所有者所有，而不是归另一个所有者所有，同时排他性独家所有，冲突才能避免。可以说，为了避免从人类诞生之初就开始的冲突，任何公正理论都必须从规范作为私有财产的稀缺资源的先占开始。

Most of contemporary （political） philosophy seems to be unaware of any of this.Indeed，I often have the impression that not even the fact of scarcity itself is recognized or fully comprehended.

大多数当代（政治）哲学似乎都没有意识到这一点。事实上，我经常有这样的印象，即人们甚至没有认识到或充分理解稀缺这一事实本身。

NC：What，then，should be the goal of tax policy？ redistribution？ Equality？ To diminish poverty？

科里：那么，税收政策的目标应该是什么呢？再分配？平等？还是减少贫困？

HHH：If taxes are theft，then，from the point of view of justice，there should be no taxes and no tax policy at all。Every discussion about the goals of tax policy and tax reform is a discussion among thieves or advocates of theft，who do not care about justice.They care about theft。There is debate and dispute among them about who should be taxed and how high and what is to be done with the taxes，i.e.，who should get how much of the stolen loot。But all thieves and all beneficiaries of theft tend to agree on one thing：the greater the amount of loot and the lower the cost of collecting it，the better are things for them.In fact，this is what all Western democracies practice today：to choose tax rates and forms of taxation，which maximize tax revenue.All current discussions about tax reform，in France，in germany，in the U.S.and elsewhere：discussions about whether certain forms of taxes such as wealth and inheritance taxes should be introduced or abolished，whether income should be taxed progressively or proportionally，whether capital gains should be taxed as income or not，whether or not indirect taxes such as the VAT should be substituted for direct taxes，etc。，etc。，and whether the rates of these taxes then should be raised or cut—they are never discussions about justice.They are not motivated by any principled opposition to taxation，but by the desire to make taxation more efficient，i.e.，to maximize tax revenue.Every tax reform that is not，at a minimum，“revenue neutral，” is considered a failure.And only reforms that increase tax revenue are deemed a “success.”

霍普：如果税收是盗窃，那么从公正的角度来看，就不应该有税收，也不应该有税收政策。每一次关于税收政策和税收改革目标的讨论，都是窃贼或主张偷窃的人之间的讨论，他们并不关心公正。他们只关心盗窃。他们争论和争议的焦点是谁应该被征税，税率该多高，以及如何处理这些税款，即谁应该从偷来的赃物中分得多少。但是，所有的窃贼和窃贼的受益者都有一个共识：赃物越多，征税成本越低，对他们越有利。事实上，这也是当今所有西方民主国家的做法：选择税率和税收形式，使税收最大化。在法国、德国、美国和其他地方，目前所有关于税制改革的讨论：讨论是否应该开征或取消某些形式的税，如财富税和遗产税，是否应该对收入按比例或累进征税，是否应该将资本利得作为收入征税，是否应该用增值税等间接税来取代直接税，等等，以及是否应该提高或降低这些税的税率——它们从来都不是关于公正的讨论。它们的动机不是原则上反对征税，而是希望提高税收效率，即最大限度地增加税收收入。每一次税收改革，如果不是至少是 “税收中性 “的，就会被认为是失败的，而只有增加税收的改革才会被认为是 “成功的”。

I must ask again：How can anyone consider this “fair”？ Of course，from the point of view of taxconsumers this is all “good.” But from the viewpoint of taxproducers，i.e.，of those who actually pay taxes，it is certainly not “good，” but “worse than bad.”

我必须再问：怎么会有人认为这是 “公平 “的呢？当然，从税收消费者的角度来看，这一切都是 “好的”。但从税收生产者的角度来看，即从实际纳税人的角度来看，这肯定不是 “好”，而是 “比坏还坏”。

one last remark on the economic effects of taxation：Every tax is a redistribution of wealth and income.Wealth and income is forcibly taken from their owners and producers and transferred to people who did not own this wealth and did not produce this income.The future accumulation of wealth and the production of income are thus discouraged and the confiscation and consumption of existing wealth and income is encouraged.As a result，society will be poorer。And as for the effect of the eternally popular，egalitarian proposal of taxing the “rich” to give to the “poor” in particular：such a scheme does not reduce or alleviate poverty but，quite to the contrary，it increases poverty。It reduces the incentive to stay or become rich and be pro ductive，and it increases the incentive to stay or become poor and be unproductive.

关于税收的经济影响的最后一点意见：每一种税收都是财富和收入的再分配。财富和收入被强行从其所有者和生产者手中夺走，并转移给那些并不拥有这些财富和并不生产这些收入的人。因此，未来财富的积累和收入的生产受到阻碍，现有财富和收入的没收和消费受到鼓励。结果，社会将变得更加贫穷。至于一直流行的，特别是向 “富人 “征税以救济 “穷人 “的人道主义建议的效果：这种计划不会减少或减轻贫困，恰恰相反，它会增加贫困。它降低了人们保持或变得富有并从事生产的积极性，增加了人们维持或变得贫穷并不从事生产的动机。

NC：Should rich people be treated differently than poor people？

科里：富人应该和穷人区别对待吗？

HHH：Every person，rich or poor，should be treated the same before the law.There are rich people，who are rich without having defrauded or stolen from anyone.They are rich，because they have worked hard，they have saved diligently，they have been productive，and they have shown entrepreneurial ingenuity，often for several familygenerations.such people should not only be left alone，but they should be praised as heroes.And there are rich people，mostly from the class of political leaders in control of the stateapparatus and from the stateconnected elites of banking and big business，who are rich，because they have been directly engaged in，or indirectly benefitted from，confiscation，theft，trickery and fraud.such people should not be left alone，but instead be condemned and despised as gangsters.The same applies to poor people.There are poor people，who are honest people，and therefore should be left alone.They may not be heroes，but they deserve our respect。And there are poor people who are crooks，and who should be treated as crooks，regardless of their “poverty。”

霍普：无论贫富，法律面前人人平等。有些富人，他们并没有欺诈或偷窃任何人，但却很富有。他们之所以富有，是因为他们勤奋工作、勤俭节约、富有成效，而且还表现出了企业家的聪明才智，他们的家族往往几代同堂。这样的人不仅不应该被冷落，还应该被当作英雄来赞美。有些富人，主要是控制国家机器的政治领袖阶层以及与国家有联系的银行和大企业精英，他们之所以富有，是因为他们直接参与或间接受益于没收、盗窃、诡计和欺诈。对这些人不能听之任之，而应将其视为流氓加以谴责和鄙视。这同样适用于穷人。穷人也是如此。有些穷人，他们是诚实的人，因此不应该骚扰他们。他们可能不是英雄，但值得我们尊重。有些穷人是骗子，不管他们 “贫穷 “与否，都应该被当作骗子对待。

28 This Crazy World

28 这个疯狂的世界*

We live in the age of the American Empire.This Empire may be crumbling，but for the foreseeable future it will last，not only because of its military might but，more importantly，because of its ideological power。For the American Empire has accomplished something truly remarkable：that its core beliefs are internalized in the minds of most people as intellectual taboos.To be sure，all governments rest on aggressive violence and the U.S.government is no exception.It，too，does not hesitate to crush anyone resisting its legislative whims.However，the U.S.government needs astonishingly little actual violence to achieve submission to its commands，because the overwhelming majority of the population and in particular of the opinion molding intellectuals has adopted the value and beliefSystem that under lies the American Empire as its very own.

我们生活在美利坚帝国的时代。这个帝国可能正在崩溃，但在可预见的未来，它将继续存在，这不仅是因为它的军事实力，更重要的是它的意识形态力量。因为美利坚帝国已经取得了令人瞩目的成就：它的核心理念在大多数人的头脑中已经内化为思想禁忌。诚然，所有政府都依赖于侵犯性暴力，美国政府也不例外，它也会毫不犹豫地镇压任何反抗其立法意志的人。然而，美国政府几乎不需要实际的暴力来实现对其命令的服从，因为绝大多数人，尤其是作为舆论塑造者的公知们已经将美帝的价值观和信仰体系奉为圭臬。

According to the official，U.S.approved belief System，we are all intelligent and reasonable people confronted with the same hard reality and committed to the facts and the truth.true enough，even at the center of the American Empire，in the U.S.，people do not live in the best of all possible worlds.There are still many defects to be fixed.However，with the American System of democratic government，mankind has definitely found the perfect institutional framework allowing for continuous progress on the way toward an ever more perfect world； and if only the American System of democracy is adopted on a worldwide scale，the path to perfection is everywhere clear and open.

根据美国官方认可的信仰体系，我们都是聪明而理智的人，都面对着同样严峻的现实，并致力于事实和真相。诚然，即使在美利坚帝国的中心——美国本土，人们也并非生活在最美好的世界里。还有许多缺陷有待弥补。但是，有了美国的民主政府制度，人类无疑找到了一个完美的制度框架，使人类在通往一个更加完美的世界的道路上不断进步；只要美国的民主制度在世界范围内得到采用，通往完美的道路就会畅通无阻。

The only truly legitimate form of government is democracy。Any other form of government is inferior。There exist monarchies，dictatorships and theocracies，and there exist feudal landlords and warlords； and since any government is to be preferred to no government at all，democratic governments must，out of necessity，at times cooperate with other，nondemocratic governments.Ultimately，however，all governments must be changed according to the American ideal，because only democracy allows for peaceful change and continuous progress.

唯一真正合法的政府形式是民主。任何其他形式的政府都是次等的。有君主制、独裁制和神权制，也有封建地主和军阀；既然任何政府都比没有政府好，那么民主政府出于必要，有时必须与其他非民主政府合作。无论如何，所有政府最终都必须按照美国的理想进行变革，因为只有民主才能实现和平变革和不断进步。

Democratic governments such as the U.S.and its European allies are inherently peaceful and do not wage war against each other。If they must wage war at all，their wars are wars of defense against aggressive nondemocratic regimes，i.e.，just wars.Thus，all countries and territories currently occupied by American troops or those of its European allies have been guilty of aggression，and their occupation by foreign troops is an act of selfdefense and of liberation on the part of the democratic West。The aggressiveness of the Islamic world in particular is proven by the very fact that large parts of it are under AmericanWestern occupation and more areas still are provoking such liberating occupation.

美国及其欧洲盟国等民主政府本质上是和平的，不会相互发动战争。如果它们必须发动战争，它们的战争也是针对侵略性的非民主政权的安保战争，是公正的战争。因此，目前被美国军队或其欧洲盟国军队占领的所有国家和领土都犯有侵略罪，外国军队对它们的占领是民主西方的自卫和解放行为。伊斯兰世界的侵略性尤其可以从以下事实得到证明，它的大部分地区处于美国西方的占领之下，还有更多地区仍在挑战这种解放性的占领。

Democratic governments are of the people，by the people and for the people.In democracies no one rules over anyone，but the people rule them selves and are hence free.Taxes are contributions and payments for ser vices rendered by government； and taxevaders are accordingly thieves，who take without paying。Harboring fugitive thieves is then an act of aggression against the people from whom they try to flee.

民主政府是民有、民治、民享的政府。在民主政体中，没有人统治任何人，而是人民自己统治自己，因此是自由的。税收是对政府所提供服务的贡献和支付；因此，逃税者就是小偷，他们只拿不付。窝藏逃亡的小偷是对他们试图逃离的人的一种侵犯行为。

Private property，markets and profitmaking are good and useful institutions，but democratic government must see to it，through proper legislation，that private property and profits are acquired and used in a socially responsible way and that markets function efficiently。Moreover，markets and profitmotivated business cannot produce public goods and thus satisfy social needs，and they cannot take care of the truly needy。Social needs and the needy can be taken care of only by government。Government alone，through the funding of public goods and support given to the needy，can enhance the public welfare and reduce if not eliminate the neediness and number of the needy。

私有财产、市场和营利是良好和有用的制度，但民主政府必须通过适当的立法，确保以对社会负责的方式获取和使用私有财产和利润，确保市场有效运作。此外，市场和以营利为目的的企业无法生产公共商品，从而满足社会需求，也无法照顾到真正有需要的人。只有政府才能满足社会需求和照顾有需要的人。有政府通过对公共商品的资助和对有需要的人的支持，才能提高公共福利，即使不能消除贫困，也可以减少贫困人口的数量。

In particular，government social policy must control the private vice of greed and profiteering。Greed and profiteering were also the root cause of the present economic crisis.reckless financiers created an irrational exuberance in the public that has finally foundered on reality。The market manifestly failed，and only government stood ready to save the situation； and only government，through proper regulation and supervision of the banking industry and financial markets，can prevent anything like this from ever happening again.Banks and businesses went bankrupt。But governments and their central banks stood tall and protected savers’ money and workers’ jobs.

特别是，政府的社会政策必须控制贪婪和牟取暴利的私人恶习。贪婪和牟取暴利也是当前经济危机的根本原因。鲁莽的不计后果的金融家在公众中制造了非理性的繁荣，而这种繁荣最终在现实中崩溃。市场显然失灵了，只有政府时刻准备着挽救局面；也只有政府，通过对银行业和金融市场进行适当的监管和监督，才能防止类似的事情再次发生。但政府及其中央银行挺身而出，保护了储蓄者的资金和工人的工作。

Advised by the best and bestpaid economists in the world，governments have discovered the cause of the crisis and determined that to get out of the current economic mess people must both consume more and invest more.Every penny hoarded under the mattress is a penny withheld from present consumption and investment and so diminishes future consumption and investment。In a recession，under all circumstances and above all，spending must be increased； and if the people do not spend enough of their money，then government must do it for them with its money。wisely，governments are equipped to do so，because their central banks can produce all necessary liquidity。If billions of dollars or Euros will not do it，trillions will； and if trillions still fail to do the trick then quadrillions surely will。only massive government spending can avert an otherwise unavoidable economic meltdown.Unemployment in particular is the result of underconsumption：of people not having enough money to buy consumer goods； and it must be cured by giving them higher money wages or higher unemployment benefits.

在全世界最优秀、薪酬最高的经济学家的建议下，政府已经找到了危机的根源，并决心要摆脱当前的经济困境，人们必须既要增加消费又要增加投资。囤积在床底下的每一分钱，都是从当前的消费和投资中所扣留的每一分钱，因此减少了未来的消费和投资。在经济衰退时，在任何情况下，最重要的是，必须增加支出；如果人们花的钱不够多，那么政府就必须用自己的钱替他们花。明智的是，各国政府都有能力这样做，因为它们的中央银行可以提供所有必要的流动性。如果数十亿美元或欧元不能解决问题，那么数万亿美元就可以；如果数万亿美元仍然不能解决问题，那么千万亿美元肯定可以。只有大规模的政府支出才能避免不可避免的经济崩溃。失业尤其是消费不足的结果：人们没有足够的钱购买消费品；必须通过给他们更高的货币工资或更高的失业救济金来解决这一问题。

once the current economic crisis has been solved，governments can and must again turn to the truly pressing among the remaining problems confronting mankind：the elimination of all unfair discrimination as the ultimate desideratum of democratic egalitarianism，and the control of the global environment and in particular the world climate.

一旦当前的经济危机得到解决，各国政府就可以而且必须再次转向人类所面临的其余问题中真正紧迫的问题：消除一切不公平的歧视，这是民主平等主义的终极愿望，以及控制全球环境，特别是世界气候。

Essentially，all humans are equal。Differences are only apparent，skin deep and insignificant：some people are white，some brown，and some black； some are tall，and others are short； some are male and some female； some speak English and others Polish or Chinese； some have cancer or AIDS and others don’t。These are accidental human characteristics.Some people hap pen to have them and others not。However，from such accidental differences only trivial consequences follow，such that the tall can reach higher up，that only women can bear children or that some people will die sooner than others.But accidental differences such as these have no Systematic bearing on mental traits，such as motivational energy，timepreference or intellectual prowess，and as such they are without explanatory power concerning economic and social success：in particular income and professional status and position.mental traits have no physical，biological or ethnic basis and are infinitely malleable.Everyone，except for a few pathological cases，is like everyone else in this regard，and every people，throughout history，have made an equal contribution to civilization.Seemingly apparent differences are solely the result of different external circumstances and training opportunities.If properly situated and trained，everyone is capable of the same achievements.All income and achievement differences between Whites，Asians and Blacks，women and men，Latinos，Anglos and Thais，and Hin dus，Protestants and Moslems would vanish.Whites could be brought up to compete on a par with Blacks for the highest Prizes in the NBA，in the 100 meter sprint and in longdistance running，and Blacks could compete with Whites and Asians in math，chess and engineering。If it is found instead that the representation and distribution of various accidental groups in various social positions of income，wealth or professional status is unequal，then this shows unjustified discrimination； and such discrimination must be rectified by appropriate affirmative action programs，by which the discriminators must compensate the unjustly discriminated.

从本质上讲，人人平等。人与人之间的差异只是表面的、肤浅的、微不足道的：有的人是白人，有的人是棕色人种，有的人是黑人；有的人个子高，有的人个子矮；有的人是男性，有的人是女性；有的人说英语，有的人说波兰语或汉语；有的人得了癌症或艾滋病，有的人没有。这些都是人类的偶然特征。有些人碰巧具有这些特征，有些人则没有。然而，这种偶然的差异只会产生微不足道的后果，比如高个子可以爬得更高，只有女人才能生孩子，或者有些人比其他人死得更早。但是，诸如此类的偶然差异对如动机能量、时间偏好或智力水平等心理特征，并没有系统性的影响，因此，它们对经济和社会成功，特别是收入和职业地位和职位，没有解释力。心理特征没有生理、生物或种族基础，具有无限的可塑性。除了少数病态的人之外，每个人在这方面都和其他人一样，每个民族在历史上都对文明做出了同等的贡献。看似明显的差异完全是外部环境和培养机会不同造成的。如果条件和培训得当，每个人都能取得同样的成就。白人、亚洲人和黑人、女性和男性、拉美人、英国人和泰国人、印度教徒、新教徒和穆斯林之间的所有收入和成就差异都会消失。白人可以在 NBA、100 米短跑和长跑中与黑人平等竞争最高奖项，黑人可以在数学、国际象棋和工程方面与白人和亚洲人竞争。如果发现各种意外群体在收入、财富或职业地位等各种社会地位上的代表性和分布不平等，那么这就表明存在不合理的歧视；必须通过适当的平权运动方案来纠正这种歧视，歧视者必须通过这些方案对不公正的受歧视者进行补偿。

There is just one possible exception from this general principle of human equality and the evil of discrimination.For，beyond any reasonable doubt，there was one crime in history，committed by one particular people against one particular other people，that is incomparable to any other crime.It cannot be ruled out that this uniquely criminal disposition on the part of one people has genetic roots； and insofar as this possibility cannot be ruled out，it is only fair that the collectively guilty must continue to compensate the collective victims.

在人类平等和歧视之恶这一普遍原则之外，只有一个可能的例外。因为，毋庸置疑，历史上有一种罪行，是由一个特定的民族对另一个特定的民族犯下的，是其他任何罪行都无法比拟的。不能排除一个民族这种独特的犯罪倾向有其遗传根源；既然不能排除这种可能性，那么集体有罪者必须继续赔偿集体受害者，这才是公平的。

Hand in hand with the efforts to eradicate the evil of discrimination，democratic governments must tackle the fundamental task of overcoming the excessive human particularism—the individualism，the localism，provincialism，regionalism and nationalism—ingrained still in the minds of most people and promote instead the ideal of universalism and of the Universal man and the interests of humanity as such.The necessity of this policy is demonstrated most dramatically by the dangers of global climate change.As the result of countless selfish acts，the unregulated production and consumption of various nonrenewable sources of energy，the whole globe is threatened by unimaginable catastrophes：of tidal waves，sharply and suddenly rising sea levels and the emergence of momentous ecological imbalances and instabilities.only through worldwide concerted government action，and ultimately the establishment of some supranational worldgovernment，and through minute，scientifically validated and world wide administered and enforced behavioral regulations of all production and consumption activities can these lifethreatening dangers be averted.

在携手努力消除歧视之恶的同时，民主政府必须解决的根本任务是克服大多数人头脑中仍然根深蒂固的过度的人类特殊主义——个人主义、地方主义、狭隘地方观念、区域主义、地区主义和民族主义——并转而弘扬普世主义的理想、世界公民以及整个人类的利益。全球气候变化的危险最能说明这一政策的必要性。由于无数自私的行为，即无节制地生产和消费各种不可再生能源，全球正面临着难以想象的灾难性威胁：潮汐、海平面急剧突然上升、出现巨大的生态失衡和不稳定。只有通过世界范围内协调一致的政府行动，并最终建立一个超国家的世界政府，以及通过对所有生产和消费活动进行细致的、经过科学验证的、全球范围的管理和强制执行的行为规范，才能避免这些危及生命的危险。

gemeinwohl （public welfare） geht vor （comes before） Eigenwohl （private welfare）—this，above all，is what the problem of climate change demonstrates，and it is up to government to finally put this principle into action.

gemeinwohl （公共福利） geht vor （优先于） Eigenwohl （私人福利）——这首先是气候变化问题所表明的，而政府应最终将这一原则付诸行动。

The PFS—and most certainly I，personally—consider all of this just crazy：as utter nonsense and dangerous nonsense at that。Yet this is essentially what we can hear and read day in and day out in the mainstream media and what is proclaimed by every respectable expert and eminence.only few people can see through the entire charade and even less have the courage to speak up against it。It is the purpose of the PFS and its meetings to assemble such people，to frontally attack the entire craziness and the ruling class perpetrating it on us—and to have fun doing it，at least while we are still permitted to have fun.

财产与自由学会（PFS）——当然也包括我本人——都一致认为所有这些都是疯狂的：完全是无稽之谈，而且是危险的无稽之谈。然而，这就是我们在主流媒体上日复一日听到和读到的内容，也是每一位受人尊敬的专家和杰出之士所宣称的内容。只有极少数人能看穿整个骗局，甚至更少的人有勇气站出来反对它。财产与自由学会（PFS）及其会议的目的就是召集这样的人，正面攻击整个疯狂的局面以及对我们施加这种疯狂的统治阶级——并且在这样做的时候享受乐趣，至少在我们仍然被允许享受乐趣的时候。

29 My life on the Right

29 我的右派生涯*

When I first envisioned the idea of this Society，more than 10 years ago and then still a society without a name，I had direct experience with only two other Societies from which to learn.

十多年前，当我第一次萌生成立这个协会的观念时，它还是一个没有名称的协会，我只有其他两个协会的直接经验可以借鉴。

My first experience was with the Mont Pelerin Society，which Friedrich Hayek had founded in 1947。

我的第一次经历是在弗里德里希·哈耶克于1947年创立的朝圣山学会。

During the 1990s，I was three times invited as a speaker to Mont Pelerin Society meetings in Cannes，Cape Town，and Barcelona.Each time，with papers attacking democracy and egalitarianism，defending monarchies versus democracies，eviscerating the classicalliberal idea of a minimalstate as selfcontradictory，and propagating a stateless，anarchocapitalist natural order，my appearance was considered somewhat scandalous：too irreverent，too confrontational，and too sensational。

20 世纪 90 年代，我曾三次应邀在戛纳、开普敦和巴塞罗那举行的朝圣山学会会议上发言。每次，我都发表论文，抨击民主和平等主义，捍卫君主制而不是民主制。我驳斥古典自由主义关于最小国家的观点是自相矛盾的，并宣传一种无国家的、无政府的、资本主义的自然秩序。我的出现被认为是一桩丑闻：太不敬、太具对抗性且太耸人听闻。

Whatever the function of the Mont Pelerin Society may have been in the immediate aftermath of WWII，at the time of my encounter with it，I did not find it particularly to my liking。

无论朝圣山学会在二战刚结束时的作用是什么，在我接触它的时候，我并不觉得它特别合我的胃口。

To be sure，I met many bright and interesting people.But essentially，Mont Pelerin Society meetings were junkets for “free market” and “limited government” thinktank and foundation staffers，their various professorial affiliates and protégés，and the principal donorfinanciers of it all，mostly from the U.S.，and more specifically from Washington，D.C。Characteristically，Ed Feulner，longtime president of the Heritage Foundation，the major GOP thinktank and intellectual shill to the welfarewarfare state politics of every republican government administration，from reagan to Bush，Jr，is a former Mont Pelerin Society president and，more significantly，has been its longtime treasurer。

当然，我遇到了很多聪明有趣的人。但从根本上说，朝圣山学会的会议是 “自由市场 “和 “有限政府 “的智库及基金会的工作人员，包括他们各种各样的专业的附属机构和门徒，以及所有这一切的主要资助者（他们大多来自美国，更具体地说来自华盛顿特区）举办的公费旅游。很有特点的是，埃德·福纳（Ed Feulner），传统基金会（Heritage Foundation）的长期主席，这个主要的共和党智囊以及从里根到小布什每一届共和党政府执政的福利战争国家政治的知识托儿，他曾是朝圣山学会的主席，更重要的是，他长期担任该协会的财务主管。

There had been skepticism concerning the Mont Pelerin Society from the beginning。Ludwig von Mises，Hayek’s teacher and friend，had expressed severe doubt concerning his plan simply in view of Hayek’s initial invitees：how could a society filled with certified stateinterventionists promote the goal of a free and prosperous commonwealth？

从一开始，人们就对朝圣山学会持怀疑态度。哈耶克的老师和朋友路德维希-冯-米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）仅从哈耶克最初的邀请者来看，就对他的计划表示了极大的怀疑：一个充斥着公认的国家干预主义者的协会，怎么可能促进一个自由和繁荣的国度的目标呢？

Despite his initial reservations，however，Mises became a founding member of the Mont Pelerin Society。Yet his prediction turned out correct。Famously，at an early Mont Pelerin Society meeting，Mises would walk out denouncing speakers and panelists as a bunch of socialists.

尽管最初有所保留，但米塞斯还是成为了朝圣山学会的创始成员之一。然而，事实证明他的预测是正确的。一个著名的段子是，在朝圣山学会早期的一次会议上，米塞斯站出来谴责发言者和小组成员是一群社会主义者。

Essentially，this was also my first impression when I came in contact with the Mont Pelerin Society and this impression has been confirmed since.The Mont Pelerin Society is a society in which every rightwing social democrat can feel at home.true，occasionally a few strange birds are invited to speak，but the meetings are dominated and the range of accept able discourse is delineated by certified stateinterventionists：by the heads of governmentfunded or connected foundations and think tanks，by central bank payrollees，papermoney enthusiasts，and assorted international educrats and researchocrats in and out of government。No discussion in the hallowed halls of the Mont Pelerin Society of U.S.imperialism or the Bush war crimes，for instance，or of the financial crimes committed by the Federal reserve Bank—and no discussion of any sensitive race issue，of course.

从根本上说，这也是我接触朝圣山学会时的第一印象，而这一印象在后来也得到了证实。朝圣山学会是一个让每个右翼社会民主主义者都能感到宾至如归的学会。诚然，偶尔也会有一些怪鸟应邀发言，但会议的主导者和可接受的言论范围都是经过认证的国家干预者、政府资助或有关联的基金会和智库负责人、央行雇员、纸币爱好者以及政府内外的各类国际教育官僚和研究人员。在朝圣山学会的神圣殿堂里，不讨论美帝国主义或布什的战争罪行，例如美联储犯下的金融罪行，当然也不讨论任何敏感的种族问题。

Not all of this can be blamed on Hayek，needless to say。He had increasingly lost control of the Mont Pelerin Society already long before his death in 1992。

毋庸置疑，这并不能全部归咎于哈耶克。早在他于 1992 年去世之前，他就已经日益失去了对朝圣山学会的控制。

But then：Hayek did have much to do with what the Mont Pelerin Society had become.For，as Mises could have known already then，and as would become apparent at last in 1960，with the publication of Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty，Hayek himself was a proven interventionist。In the third part of this famous book，Hayek had laid out a plan for a “free” society so riddled with interventionist designs that every moderate socialdemocrat—of the Scandinaviangerman variety—could easily subscribe.When，at the occasion of Hayek’s 80th birthday in 1979，the socialdemocratic thenChancel lor of West germany，Helmut Schmidt，sent Hayek a congratulatory note proclaiming “we are all Hayekians now，” this was not an empty phrasE.It was true，and Schmidt meant it。

但是，哈耶克确实与朝圣山学会的发展有很大关系。因为，米塞斯当时就知道，随着哈耶克的《自由宪章》的出版，哈耶克本人也是一个得到认证的干预主义者。在这本名著的第三部分，哈耶克提出了一个 “自由 “社会的计划，其中充满了干预主义的设计，以至于每一个温和的社会民主主义者——斯堪的纳维亚半岛的德国人——都很乐意接受这个计划。1979 年，在哈耶克 80 岁生日之际，时任西德总理的社会民主党人赫尔穆特-施密特（Helmut Schmidt）给哈耶克发了一封贺信，宣称 “我们现在都是哈耶克主义者”，这可不是一句空话。这是真的，施密特是认真的。

What I came to realize，then，was this：the deplorable development— as judged from a classicliberal vantage point—of the Mont Pelerin Society was not an accident。Rather，it was the necessary consequence of a fundamental theoretical flaw committed not only by Hayek but，ultimately，also by Mises，with his idea of a minimal state.

后来，我意识到：从古典自由主义的角度来看，朝圣山学会的可悲发展并非偶然。相反，它不仅是哈耶克，最终也是米塞斯，以及他的最小政府思想所犯下的根本理论缺陷的必然结果。

This flaw did not merely afflict the Mont Pelerin Society。It afflicted the entire “limited government” thinktank industry that had sprung up as its offspring since the 1960s throughout the Western，U.S.dominated world，and for which the Mont Pelerin Society had assumed the function of an “International。”

这一缺陷不仅困扰着朝圣山学会。自20世纪60年代以来，整个“有限政府”的智库行业在美国主导的西方世界如雨后春笋般涌现，朝圣山学会为此承担了一个“国际”智库的职能。

The goal of “limited”—or “constitutional”—government，which Fried rich Hayek，Milton Friedman，James Buchanan and other Mont Pelerin Society grandees had tried to promote and that every “free market” think tank today proclaims as its goal，is an impossible goal，much as it is an impossible goal to try squaring the circle.You cannot first establish a territorial monopoly of law and order and then expect that this monopolist will not make use of this awesome privilege of legislating in its own favor。Likewise：You cannot establish a territorial monopoly of paper money production and expect the monopolist not to use its power of printing up ever more money。

弗里德里希-哈耶克、米尔顿-弗里德曼、詹姆斯-布坎南和其他朝圣山学会的大人物们曾试图提倡的 “有限”——或 “宪政”——政府的目标，以及今天每一个 “自由市场 “智库宣称的目标，都是一个不可能实现的目标，就像试图画一个圆形的方一样无法实现。你不能先建立起对法律和秩序的领土垄断，然后再指望这个垄断者不会利用这一令人敬畏的特权来制定有利于自己的法律。同样：你不能先建立起纸币生产的领土垄断，然后指望垄断者不会利用其印制更多钞票的权力。

Limiting the power of the state，once it has been granted a territorial monopoly of legislation，is impossible，a selfcontradictory goal。To believe that it is possible to limit government power—other than by subjecting it to competition，i.e.，by not allowing monopoly privileges of any kind to arise in the first place—is to assume that the nature of man changes as the result of the establishment of government （very much like the miraculous transformation of man that socialists believe to happen with the onset of socialism）。

限制国家权力，一旦它获得了立法的领土垄断权，就是不可能的，这是一个自相矛盾的目标。认为限制政府权力是可能的——而不是让它接受竞争，即首先不允许出现任何形式的垄断特权——就是假定人的本性会随着政府的建立而改变（正如社会主义者认为随着社会主义的到来，人会发生奇迹般的转变一样）。

That is the whole thing：limited government，is an illusory goal。To believe it to be possible is to believe in miracles.

这就是问题的全部：有限政府是一个虚幻的目标。相信它是可能的就是相信奇迹。

The strategy of Hayek and of the Mont Pelerin Society，then，had to fail。Instead of helping to reform—liberalize—the （Western） State，as they intended （or pretended？） to do，the Mont Pelerin Society and the international “limited government” thinktank industry would become an integral part of a continuously expanding welfarewarfare state System.

因此，哈耶克和朝圣山学会的战略注定要失败。朝圣山学会和国际 “有限政府 “的智库行业非但不能像他们计划（或者家装？）的那样帮助改革——自由化（西方）国家，反而会成为不断扩大的福利战争国家体系的组成部分。

Indicators for this verdict abound：The typical location of the think tanks is in or near the capital city，most prominently Washington，D.C。，because their principal addressee is the central government。They react to measures and announcements of government，and they suggest and make proposals to government。Most contacts of thinktankers outside their own institution are with politicians，government bureaucrats，lobbyists，and assorted staffers and assistants.Along with connected journalists，these are also the regular attendees of their conferences，briefings，receptions and cocktail parties.There is a steady exchange of personnel between think tanks and governments.And the leaders of the limitedgovernment industry are frequently themselves prominent members of the power elite and the ruling class.

这种判断的指标很多：这些智库的典型地点是在首都或首都附近，最突出的是华盛顿特区，因为它们的主要对象是中央政府。他们对政府的措施和公告做出反应，并向政府提出建议和提案。智库在其机构之外的大多数接触对象都是政治家、政府官员、说客以及各类工作人员和助理。除了有联系的记者，这些人也是他们的会议、简报会、招待会和鸡尾酒会的常客。智库与政府之间的人员往来也很稳定。而有限政府部门的领导者本身往往就是权力精英和统治阶级的重要成员。

Most indicative of all：for decades，the limited government movement has been a growth industry。Its annual expenditures currently run in the hundreds of millions of dollars，and billions of dollars likely have been spent in total。All the while，government expenditures never and nowhere fell，not even once，but instead always and uninterruptedly increased to ever more dizzying heights.

最有代表性的是：几十年来，有限政府运动一直是一个增长型产业。目前，它的年度支出都在数亿美元左右，总支出可能已达数十亿美元。在此期间，政府开支从未减少过，甚至一次也没有减少过，反而一直在不间断地增加，达到了令人眼花缭乱的高度。

And yet，this glaring failure of the industry to deliver the promised good of limited government is not punished but，perversely，rewarded with still more ample funds.The more the think tanks fail，the more money they get。

然而，该行业在实现有限政府的承诺方面的明显失败不仅没有受到惩罚，反而得到了更多资金的奖励。智库越失败，获得的资金就越多。

The State and the freemarket thinktank industry thus live in perfect harmony with each other。They grow together，in tandeM.

因此，国家与自由市场的智库行业和谐共存。它们共同成长，相得益彰。

For limited government advocates such as Hayek and the entire free market thinktank industry，this is an embarrassment。They must try to explain it away somehow，as accidental or coincidental。And they typically do so，simply enough，by arguing that without their continued funding and operations matters would be even worse.

对于哈耶克等有限政府的倡导者和整个自由市场智库行业来说，这是一种尴尬。他们必须想方设法将其解释为偶然或巧合。他们通常会这样做，很显然他们会诡辩，如果没有他们的持续资助和运作，情况会更糟。

Thus excused，then，the industry continues on as before，undisturbed by any fact or event past or future.

有了这样的借口，行业就能一如既往地发展下去，不受任何过去或未来的事实或事件的干扰。

But the embarrassing facts are not accidental or coincidental and could have been Systematically predicted—if only one had better understood the nature of the state，and did not believe in miracles.

但这些令人尴尬的事实并非偶然或巧合，而是可以系统地预测到的——只要人们对国家的本质有更好的了解，而不是相信奇迹。

As a territorial monopolist of legislation and the moneyprinting press，the State has a natural tendency to grow：to use its “fiat” laws and “fiat” money to gain increasing control of society and social institutions.with “fiat laws，” the State has the unique power of threatening and punishing or incentivizing and rewarding whatever it pleases.And with its “fiat money，” it can buy up support，bribe，and corrupt more easily than anyone else.

作为立法和印钞机的领土垄断者，国家有一种自然的增长趋势：利用其 “法定 “法律和 “法定 “货币对社会和社会机构进行越来越多的控制。有了 “法定法律“，国家就拥有了独一无二的权力，可以随心所欲地威胁、惩罚、激励和奖励任何人。

有了 “法定货币”，国家可以比任何人都更容易地收买支持、贿赂和腐败。

certainly，an extraordinary institution such as this will have the means at its disposal，legal and financial，to deal with the challenge posed by a limited government industry。Historically，the State has successfully dealt with far more formidable opponents—like organized religion，for instance!

当然，像这样一个非同寻常的机构，在法律和财政上都有能力应对有限的政府行业所带来的挑战。从历史上看，国家曾成功地对付过更强大的对手——例如，有组织的宗教！

Unlike the Church or churches，however，the limited government industry is conveniently located and concentrated at or near the center of State power，and the industry’s entire raison d’être is to talk and have access to the State.That is what its donorfinanciers typically expect。

然而，与教会或教堂不同的是，有限政府行业位于并集中在国家权力中心或靠近国家权力中心的位置，而该行业存在的全部理由就是与国家对话并与之接触。这也正是其出资人通常所期望的。

Yet so much the easier，then，was it for the State to target and effectively control this industry。The State only had to set up its own bureaucracy in charge of freemarket relations and lure the limitedgovernment NGOs （nongovernment organizations） with conferences，invitations，sponsor ships，grants，money and employment prospects.without having to resort to threats，these measures alone were sufficient to ensure compliance on the part of the freemarket thinktank industry and its associated intellectuals.The market demand for intellectual services is low and fickle and hence intellectuals can be bought up cheaply!

然而，国家要瞄准并有效控制这一行业却容易得多。国家只需建立自己的官僚机构，负责自由市场关系，并通过会议、邀请、赞助、补助金、金钱和就业前景来吸引有限政府的非政府组织（非政府组织）。这些措施本身就足以确保自由市场智库行业及其相关知识分子遵守规定。市场对知识分子服务的需求量小且不稳定，因此可以廉价地收买知识分子！

Moreover，through its cooperation with the freemarket industry，the State could enhance its own legitimacy and intellectual respectability as an “economically enlightened，” institution—and thus open up still further room for State growth.

此外，通过与自由市场产业的合作，国家可以提高自身作为一个 “经济开明 “机构的合法性和知识界的尊重，从而为国家的发展开辟更广阔的空间。

Essentially，as with all socalled NGOs，the State managed to trans form the limitedgovernment industry into just another vehicle for its own aggrandizement。

从根本上说，就像所有所谓的非政府组织一样，国家设法将有限政府行业转变为另一个自我膨胀的工具。

What I learned from my experience with the Mont Pelerin Society，then，was that an entirely different strategy had to be chosen if one wanted to limit the power of the State.For socialists or socialdemocrats，it is perfectly rational to talk and seek access to the State and to try “marching through its institutions，” because the left wants to increase the power of the State.That is，the left wants what the State is disposed to do anyway，by virtue of its nature as a territorial monopolist of law and order。

我在朝圣山学会的经历告诉我，如果想限制国家权力，就必须选择完全不同的策略。对于社会主义者或社会民主主义者来说，谈论和寻求进入政府，并尝试 “游走在国家机构中 “是完全合理的，因为左派想要增加国家的权力。也就是说，左派想要的恰恰是国家无论如何都会做的事情，因为国家是法律和秩序的领土垄断者。

But the same strategy is inefficient or even counterproductive if one wants to roll the power of the State back—regardless of whether one wants to roll it back completely and establish a stateless natural order or roll it back only “sharply” or “drastically” to some “glorious” or “golden” status quo ante.In any case，this goal can only be reached if，instead of talking and seeking access to the State，the State is openly ignored，avoided and disavowed； and its agents and propagandists are explicitly excluded from one’s proceedings.To talk to the State and include its agents and propagandists is to lend legitimacy and strength to it。To ostentatiously ignore，avoid and disavow it and to exclude its agents and propagandists as undesirable is to withdraw consent from the State and to weaken its legitimacy。

但是，如果我们想削减国家权力——无论我们是想彻底削减国家权力，建立无政府的自然秩序，还是只想 “大幅 “或 “急剧 “削减国家权力，使之回到某种 “光荣 “或 “黄金 “的原状，那么，同样的策略都是低效的，甚至会适得其反。无论如何，要实现这一目标，就必须公开无视、回避和否认国家，明确将其代理人和宣传者排除在自己的活动之外，而不是与国家对话和寻求与国家接触的机会。与国家对话，并将其代理人和宣传人员纳入其中，就是赋予它合法性和力量。公然忽视、回避和否认国家，并将其代理人和宣传者视为不受欢迎的人而加以排斥，就是收回对国家的同意并削弱其合法性。

In sharp contrast to the Mont Pelerin Society and its multiple offspring，which wanted to reform and liberalize the welfarewarfare state System from within—pursuing a “Systemimmanent” strategy of change，as Marxists would say—and which failed precisely for this reason and was instead co opted by the State as part of the political establishment，my envisioned society，the Property and freedom Society，was to pursue a “Systemtran scending” strategy。That is，it would try to reform，and ultimately revolutionize，the ever more invasive welfarewarfare State System from the out side，through the creation of an antistatist counterculture that could attract a steadily growing number of defectors—of intellectuals，educated laymen and even the muchcited “man on the street”—away from the dominant State culture and institutions.The Property and freedom Society was to be the international spearhead，the avantgarde，of this intellectual countercul ture.

与朝圣山学会及其多个后继者形成鲜明对比的是，他们希望从内部改革福利战争国家体系并使之自由化——正如马克思主义者所说的追求一种 “制度内在 “的变革战略——而正是由于这个原因，该学会失败了，反而被国家作为政治体制的一部分所吸收，我所设想的协会，即财产与自由协会，追求的是一种 “制度超越 “战略。

Central to this counterculture was this insight into the perversity of the institution of a State：a territorial monopolist of law and order that can make and change laws in its own favor does not and cannot，without assuming miracles，protect the life and property of its subjects （clients）； but is and always will be a permanent danger to them—the sure road to serfdom and tyranny。

这种反主流文化的核心是对国家体制的反常性的洞察：法律和秩序的领土垄断者可以根据自己的利益制定和修改法律，除非出现奇迹，就不会也不可能保护其国民（客户）的生命和财产；但对他们来说，领土垄断者现在是而且永远是对他们的永久威胁——通往奴役和暴政的必由之路。

Based on this insight，then，the Property and freedom Society was to have a twofold goal。

基于这一认识，财产与自由协会应具有双重目标。

on the one hand，positively，it was to explain and elucidate the legal，economic，cognitive and cultural requirements and features of a free，state less natural order。

一方面，它积极地解释和阐明了一种自由的无政府的自然秩序”的法律、经济、认知和文化要求及特征。

on the other hand，negatively，it was to unmask the State and showcase it for what it really is：an institution run by gangs of murderers，plunderers and thieves，surrounded by willing executioners，propagandists，sycophants，crooks，liars，clowns，charlatans，dupes and useful idiots—an institution that dirties and taints everything it touches.

另一方面，从消极的角度来看，这是为了揭露国家的真面目，展示它的真实本质：一个由一群杀人犯、掠夺者和小偷所管理的机构，周围是心甘情愿的刽子手、宣传者、谄媚者、恶棍、说谎者、小丑、江湖骗子、被愚弄者和有用的白痴——一个玷污和污染它所触及的一切的机构。

For purposes of full disclosure I must add this：at the urging of my friend Jesús Huerta de Soto，who had been inducted at a very young age into the Mont Pelerin Society by Hayek personally，I reluctantly applied for membership sometime in the mid1990s.besides Huerta de Soto，the late Arthur Seldon，who was then honorary president of the Mont Pelerin Society，had endorsed my membership.Nonetheless，I was turned down— and，as I must admit，deservedly so，because I simply did not fit into such a society。

为了全面披露信息，我必须补充一点：在我的朋友赫苏斯-韦尔塔-德索托（Jesús Huerta de Soto）的怂恿下，我在20世纪90年代中期的某个时候勉强申请加入朝圣山学会。除了韦尔塔-德-索托之外，已故的阿瑟-塞尔登（时任朝圣山学会名誉会长）也同意我入会。尽管如此，我还是被拒绝了——我必须承认，这是理所应当的，因为我根本不适合这样一个协会。

From reliable sources I have been told that it was，in particular，leonard Liggio，a former friend of Murray Rothbard’s，who must have realized this and most vigorously opposed my membership； seconded，from the ger man contingent of Mont Pelerin Society movers and shakers，by Christian WatriN.both Liggio and Watrin would later become Mont Pelerin Society presidents.

可靠的消息来源告诉我，默里-罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）的前朋友利吉奥（leonard Liggio）一定意识到了这一点，并极力反对我加入；克里斯蒂安-瓦特林（Christian Watrin）是朝圣山学会德国分部的推动者和摇旗呐喊者，他也反对我加入朝圣山学会。利吉奥和瓦特林后来都成为了朝圣山学会的会长。

My second experience with intellectual societies was with the John Ran dolph Club [JRC]，which had been founded in 1989 by libertarian Murray Rothbard and conservative Thomas Fleming。

我第二次的知识分子社团经历是在约翰-伦道夫俱乐部（JRC），该俱乐部由自由意志主义者默里-罗斯巴德和保守主义的托马斯-弗莱明于 1989 年创建。

From the outset，this society was far more to my liking。For a while，I played a leading role in the John Randolph Club。But I also played a prominent part in its breakup that occurred shortly after Rothbard’s death in 1995，and that essentially resulted in the exit of the Rothbardian wing of the society。

从一开始，这个社团就更合我的胃口。有一段时间，我是约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的主角。但在 1995 年罗斯巴德逝世后不久，俱乐部解散，罗斯巴德派退出俱乐部，我也在其中发挥了重要作用。

Nonetheless，I look back to those early John Randolph Club years with fond memories.So it is no surprise that quite a few of my old John Randolph Club comrades have also appeared here in Bodrum，at Property and free dom Society meetings：Peter Brimelow，Tom DiLorenzo，Paul Gottfried，Walter Block，Justin Raimondo，Yuri Maltsev，David Gordon.In addition，I should mention my friend Joe Sobran，who had wanted to appear at our inaugural meeting but couldn’t attend because of ill health.

尽管如此，回想起早年在约翰·伦道夫俱乐部的日子，我还是充满了美好的回忆。因此，我的一些约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的老战友也出现在博德鲁姆，出现在财产和自由协协会的会议上，也就不足为奇了：彼得-布里梅洛（Peter Brimelow）、汤姆-迪洛伦佐（Tom DiLorenzo）、保罗-戈特弗里德（Paul Gottfried）、沃尔特-布洛克（Walter Block）、贾斯汀-雷蒙多（Justin Raimondo）、尤里-马尔采夫（Yuri Maltsev）、大卫-戈登（David Gordon）。此外，我还要提到我的朋友乔-索布兰（Joe Sobran），他本想参加我们的成立大会，但因身体不适未能出席。

In contrast to the “international” Mont Pelerin Society，the John Ran dolph Club was an “American” Society。This did not mean that the JRC was more provincial，however。To the contrary。Not only had the JRC numerous “foreign” members，but also，whereas the Mont Pelerin Society was domi nated by professional economists，the John Randolph Club represented a much broader，interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary spectrum of intellectual interests and endeavors.

与 “国际性 “的朝圣山学会相比，约翰-伦道夫俱乐部是一个 “美国性 “的学会。这并不意味着约翰-伦道夫俱乐部更偏狭，事实恰恰相反。约翰-伦道夫俱乐部不仅拥有众多 “外国 “会员，而且，与朝圣山学会由专业经济学家主导的情况相比，约翰-伦道夫俱乐部代表了更广泛的、跨学科和跨领域的知识兴趣和努力。

on the average，foreign language proficiency among John Randolph Clubers ranked well above that encountered in Mont Pelerin Society circles.In its habits and ways，the Mont Pelerin Society was multicultural，egalitarian and nondiscriminating，while it was highly restrictive and intolerant regarding the range of permissible subjects and intellectual taboos.In sharp contrast，the JRC was a decidedly bourgeois，antiegalitarian and discriminating society，but at the same time a society far more open and tolerant intellectually，without any taboosubjects.

平均而言，约翰-伦道夫俱乐部会员的外语水平远远高于朝圣山学会会员。从习惯和方式上看，朝圣山学会是多元文化的、平等主义和非歧视性的，同时它对允许的主题和知识禁忌的范围有很强的限制性和不宽容性。与此形成鲜明对比的是，约翰-伦道夫俱乐部（JRC）是一个明显的资产阶级学会，是一个反平等主义和歧视的学会，但同时也是一个在知识上更加开放和宽容的学会，没有任何禁忌话题。

In addition，whereas Mont Pelerin Society meetings were large and impersonal—they could exceed 500 participants—John Randolph Club meetings had rarely more than 150 attendees and were small and intimate.I liked all of these aspects of the John Randolph Club。（I didn’t much care for the venues of its meetings：typically some business hotel in the outskirts of a major city。In this regard，Mont Pelerin Society meetings had clearly more to offer—although for a stiff price.）

此外，朝圣山学会的会议规模大，不够人性化，与会者可能超过 500 人，而约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的会议与会者很少超过 150 人，规模小，气氛亲切。我喜欢约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的所有这些方面（我不太喜欢它的会议地点：通常是大城市郊区的某个商务酒店。在这方面，朝圣山学会的会议显然更有吸引力——尽管价格不菲）。

But，as I indicated，not all was well with the John Randolph Club，and my encounter with it also taught me a few lessons on what not to imitate.

但是，正如我所说，约翰-伦道夫俱乐部并非一切顺利，我的遭遇也给我上了几堂课，让我知道什么是不应该模仿的。

The breakup of the John Randolph Club shortly after Rothbard’s death had partly personal reasons.Tom Fleming，the surviving principal of the Club，is，to put it diplomatically，a difficult man，as everyone who has dealt with him can testify。In addition，there were organizational quarrels.The meetings of the John Randolph Club were organized annually alternating by the Center for Libertarian Studies，which represented Murray Rothbard and his men，and by the Rockford institute，which represented Thomas Fleming and his.This arrangement had perhaps unavoidably led to various charges of freeloading。Ultimately，however，the breakup had more fundamental reasons.

约翰-伦道夫俱乐部在罗斯巴德去世后不久解散，部分原因是出于个人原因。汤姆-弗莱明（Tom Fleming）是约翰-伦道夫俱乐部幸存的负责人，说得委婉一点，他是个很难相处的人，每个与他打过交道的人都可以证明这一点。此外，还有组织内部的争吵。约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的会议每年由自由意志主义研究中心（the Center for Libertarian Studies）和洛克福德研究所（the Rockford institute）轮流组织，前者代表默里-罗斯巴德和他的追随者，后者代表托马斯-弗莱明和他的追随者。这种安排也许不可避免地导致了各种吃白食的指控。然而，最终的解体有更本质的原因。

The John Randolph Club was a coalition of two distinct groups of intellectuals.on the one hand was a group of anarchocapitalist Austrolibertar ians，led by Rothbard，mostly of economists but also philosophers，lawyers，historians and sociologists （mostly of a more analyticaltheoretical bend of mind）。I was a member of this group.on the other hand was a group of writers associated with the conservative monthly Chronicles：A Magazine of American Culture and its editor，Tom Fleming。Paul Gottfried was a member of that group.The conservative group did not have any economist of note and generally displayed a more empirical bend of mind.Apart from historians and sociologists，it included in particular also men of letters：philologists，literary writers，and cultural critics.

约翰-伦道夫俱乐部是由两个不同的知识分子群体组成的联盟。一方面是以罗斯巴德为首的无政府资本主义的奥地利自由意志主义者团体，主要由经济学家组成，但也有哲学家、律师、历史学家和社会学家（大多倾向于分析理论）。我有幸忝列其中。另一方面，与保守主义月刊《编年史：美国文化杂志》（Chronicles：A Magazine of American Culture）及其编辑汤姆-弗莱明（Tom Fleming）有关的一群作家。保罗-戈特弗里德（Paul Gottfried）是该团体的成员之一。保守主义中没有任何著名的经济学家，普遍表现出更多的经验主义倾向。除了历史学家和社会学家外，它尤其还包括一众文人：语言学家、文学作家和文化评论家。

on the libertarian side，the cooperation with conservatives was motivated by the insight that while libertarianism may be logically compatible with many cultures，sociologically it requires a conservative，bourgeois core culture.The decision to form an intellectual alliance with conservatives then involved for the libertarians a double break with “Establishment libertarianism” as represented，for instance，by the Washington，D.C。，“free market” Cato institute.

在自由意志主义一方，与保守主义合作的动机是，虽然自由意志主义在逻辑上可能与许多文化兼容，但在社会学上，它需要一种保守的、布尔乔亚式的核心文化。因此，自由意志主义者决定与保守主义结成思想联盟，是与华盛顿特区 “自由市场 “卡托研究所等所代表的 “建制自由意志主义 “的双重决裂。

This establishment libertarianism was not only theoretically in error，with its commitment to the impossible goal of limited government （and centralized government at that）：it was also sociologically flawed，with its antibourgeois—indeed，adolescent—socalled “cosmopolitan” cultural message：of multiculturalism and egalitarianism，of “respect no authority，” of “live and let live，” of hedonism and libertinism.

这种建制自由意志主义不仅在理论上是错误的，因为它致力于实现有限政府（而且还是国家主义政府）这一不可能实现的目标，而且在社会学上也是有缺陷的，因为它所传递的文化信息是反资产阶级的，甚至是青少年所谓的 “世界主义”：多元文化主义和平等主义、”不尊重权威”、“各安其好而活”、享乐主义和放荡主义。

The antiestablishment Austrolibertarians sought to learn more from the conservative side about the cultural requirements of a free and prosperous commonwealth.And by and large they did and learned their lesson.At least，I think that I did.

反建制的奥地利自由意志主义者试图从保守主义那里学到更多关于自由和繁荣的国度的文化要求。总的来说，他们做到了，并吸取了教训。至少，我认为我做到了。

For the conservative side of the alliance，the cooperation with the Austrian anarchocapitalists signified a complete break with the socalled neoconservative movement that had come to dominate organized conservatism in the US and which was represented，for instance，by such Washington，D.C。think tanks as the American Enterprise institute and the Heritage Foundation.The paleoconservatives，as they came to be known，opposed the neoconservative goal of a highly and increasingly centralized，“economically efficient” welfarewarfare State as incompatible with the traditional conservative core values of private property，of family and family house holds，and of local communities and their protection.There were some points of contention between the paleocons and the libertarians：on the issues of abortion and immigration and on the definition and necessity of government。But these differences could be accommodated in agreeing that their resolution must not be attempted on the level of the central state or even some supranational institution such as the UN，but always on the smallest level of social organization：on the level of families and of local communities.

对于联盟中的保守主义来说，与奥地利学派无政府资本主义者的合作标志着与所谓的新保守主义运动的彻底决裂，新保守主义运动在美国有组织的保守主义中占据主导地位，华盛顿特区的美国企业研究所和传统基金会等智库就是新保守主义运动的代表。那些后来被称为“旧保守主义”的人反对新保守主义那种高度且日益集权、“经济高效”的福利战争国家的目标，认为这与传统保守主义的核心价值观——私有财产、家庭和家庭住户以及地方社区及其保护——格格不入。在堕胎和移民问题上，以及在政府的定义和必要性问题上，旧保守主义和自由意志主义之间存在着一些争议点。但这些分歧是可以调和的，因为他们一致认为，解决这些分歧的尝试不应该是在中央政府的层面上，甚至不应该是在某些超国家机构（如联合国）的层面上，而应该是在最小的社会组织层面上：在家庭和地方社区的层面上。

For the paleo cons，secession from a central State was not a taboo，and for the Austrolibertarians secession had the status of a natural human right （while establishment libertarians typically treat it as a taboo subject）； hence，cooperation was possible.Moreover，the cooperation with the Austrolibertarians was to afford the conservatives the opportunity of learning sound （Austrian school） economics，which was an acknowledged gap and weakness in their intellectual armor，especially visàvis their neoconservative opponents.However，with some notable exceptions the conservative group failed to live up to these expectations.

对于旧保守主义者来说，脱离国家主义国家并不是禁忌，而对于奥地利学派自由意志主义者来说，脱离国家主义国家具有天赋人权的地位（而建制派自由意志主义者通常将其视为禁忌话题）；因此，合作是可能的。此外，与奥地利学派自由意志主义的合作为保守主义提供了学习健全的（奥地利学派）经济学的机会，而这正是他们智识铠甲上公认的缺陷和弱点，尤其是相对于他们的新保守主义对手而言。然而，除了一些明显的例外情况，保守主义未能实现这些期望。

This，then，was the ultimate reason for the breakup of the libertarian conservative alliance accomplished with the John Randolph Club：that while the libertarians were willing to learn their cultural lesson the conser vatives did not want to learn their economics.

由约翰·伦道夫俱乐部组成的自由意志主义保守主义联盟解体的最终原因：自由意志主义者愿意学习保守主义的文化课，而保守主义却不愿学习自由意志主义的经济学。

This verdict，and the consequent lesson，was not immediately clear，of course.It was driven home only in the course of the events.In the case of the John Randolph Club，the event had a name.It was Patrick Buchanan，TV personality，commentator，syndicated columnist，bestselling book author，including serious works on revisionist history，a very charismatic man，witty and with great personal charm，but also a man with a deep and lasting involvement in republican Party politics，first as a Nixon speechwriter and then as White House Director of Communications under Ronald reagan.Pat Buchanan did not participate directly in the John Randolph Club，but he had personal ties to several of its leading members （on both sides of the Club but especially to the Chronicles group，which included some of his closest advisors） and he was considered a prominent part of the countercultural movement represented by the John Randolph Club。In 1992，Buchanan challenged thensitting president george Bush for the GOP presidential nomination.（He would do so again in 1996，challenging Senator Bob Dole for the republican nomination，and in 2000 he would run as the presidential candidate for the reform Party。） Buchanan’s challenge was impressive at first，nearly upsetting Bush in the new Hampshire primary，and it initially caused considerable enthusiasm in John Randolph Club circles.However，in the course of Buchanan’s campaign and in reaction to it open dissent between the two John Randolph Club camps broke out as regards the “correct” strategy。

当然，这一定论以及随之而来的教训当时并非一目了然。只是在事件的发展过程中，人们才明白了这一点。就约翰-伦道夫俱乐部而言，事件是有名字的。他是帕特里克-布坎南（Patrick Buchanan），电视名人，评论员，联合专栏作家，畅销书作者，其中包括一些关于修正主义历史的严肃作品，诙谐幽默，个人魅力十足，但他同时也长期深入参与共和党的政治活动，先是担任尼克松的演讲稿撰写人，后在罗纳德-里根手下担任白宫通讯主任。帕特-布坎南没有直接参与约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的活动，但他与该俱乐部的几位主要成员（俱乐部的双方成员，尤其是编年史小组成员，其中包括他最亲密的几位顾问）都有私人关系，他被认为是约翰-伦道夫俱乐部所代表的反文化运动的杰出代表。 1992 年，布坎南向时任总统乔治-布什（George Bush）发起挑战，角逐共和党总统候选人提名。（他在 1996 年再次挑战参议员鲍勃-多尔（Bob Dole）获得共和党提名，并在 2000 年作为改革党的总统候选人参选）。布坎南的挑战起初给人留下了深刻印象，在新罕布什尔州的初选中几乎击败了布什，最初在约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的圈子里引起了相当大的反响。然而，在布坎南的竞选过程中，约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的两个阵营就何为”正确的 “策略问题上爆发了公开的分歧。

Buchanan pursued a populist “America First” campaign.He wanted to talk and appeal to the socalled Middle Americans，who felt betrayed and dispossessed by the political elites of both parties.After the collapse of communism and the end of the cold war，Buchanan wanted to bring all American troops back home，dissolve NATO，leave the UN，and conduct a noninterventionist foreign policy （which his neoconservative enemies smeared as “isolationist”）。He wanted to cut all but economic ties to Israel in particular，and he openly criticized the “unAmerican” influence of the organized JewishAmerican lobby，something that takes considerable courage in contemporary America.

布坎南推行民粹主义的 “美国优先 “运动。他希望与那些感到被两党政治精英背叛和剥夺的所谓中产阶级美国人对话，并向他们发出呼吁。在共产主义崩溃和冷战结束后，布坎南希望让所有美国军队回国，解散北约，离开联合国，并奉行不干涉主义外交政策（他的新保守主义敌人将其污蔑为 “孤立主义”）。他希望切断与以色列的所有联系，尤其是经济联系，并公开批评有组织的犹太裔美国人游说团体的 “非美国式 “影响，这在当代美国需要相当大的勇气。

He wanted to eliminate all “affirmative action，” nondiscrimination and quota laws that had pervaded all aspects of American life，and which were essentially antiwhite and especially antiwhitemale laws.In particular，he promised to end the nondiscriminatory immigration policy that had resulted in the mass immigration of lowclass thirdworld people and the attendant forced integration or，euphemistically，“multiculturalism.” Fur ther，he wanted to end the entire “cultural rot” coming out of Washington D.C by closing down the federal Department of Education and a multi tude of other federal indoctrination agencies.

他希望取消所有 “平权运动”、非歧视和配额法律，这些法律充斥着美国生活的方方面面，本质上是反白人，尤其是反白人女性的法律。特别是，他承诺结束非歧视性的移民政策，因为这种政策导致了第三世界底层人民的大规模移民以及随之而来的强制一体化，或者委婉地说，”多元文化主义”。此外，他还想通过关闭联邦教育部和其他众多的联邦教育机构来结束华盛顿特区的整个 “文化腐朽”。

But instead of emphasizing these widely popular “rightist” cultural concerns，Buchanan，in the course of his campaign，increasingly intoned other，economic matters and concerns，all the while his knowledge of economics was rather skimpy。

但是，布坎南在竞选过程中并没有强调这些广受欢迎的 “右派 “文化问题，而是越来越多地强调其他经济问题和关切，而他的经济学知识却相当匮乏。

Concentrating on what he was worst at，then，he increasingly advocated a “leftist” economic program of economic and social nationalism.He advocated tariffs to protect “essential” American industries and save American jobs from “unfair” foreign competition，and he proposed to “protect” Middle Americans by safeguarding and even expanding the already existing welfareState programs of minimum wage laws，unemployment insurance，Social Security，medicaid and medicare.

于是，他专注于自己最不擅长的领域，越来越多地倡导一种经济和社会民族主义的“左派”经济计划。他主张通过征收关税来保护“必要的”美国产业，并将美国的就业机会从“不公平的”外国竞争中拯救出来，他还提议通过维护甚至扩大现有的最低工资法、失业保险、社会保障、医疗补助和医疗保险等福利国家计划来“保护”美国中产阶级。

When I explained，in a speech before the club，that Buchanan’s rightist cultural and leftisteconomic program was theoretically inconsistent and that his strategy must consequently fail to reach its own goal，that you can not return America to cultural sanity and strengthen its families and communities and at the same time maintain the institutional pillars that are the central cause for the cultural malaise，that protectionist tariffs cannot make Americans more prosperous，but less，and that a program of economic nationalism must alienate the intellectually and culturally indispensible bourgeoisie while attracting the （for us and our purposes） “useless” proletariat，it almost came to an éclat。The conservative group was up in arms about this critique of one of its heroes.

当我在俱乐部的一次演讲中解释说，布坎南的右派文化和左派经济计划在理论上是不一致的，因此他的策略必然无法达到其自身目标，即你不可能在让美国回归文化理智并巩固其家庭和社区的同时，还维持那些正是造成文化萎靡的核心制度支柱，保护主义关税不能让美国人更繁荣，而是更不繁荣，以及一个经济民族主义计划必然会疏远在智识和文化上不可或缺的资产阶级，同时吸引（对我们和我们的目的而言）“无用的”无产阶级时，这几乎引发了一场激烈争吵。保守主义因我对其英雄之一的这种批评引发了轩然大波。

I had hoped that，notwithstanding feelings of friendship or personal loyalty，after some time of reflection reason would prevail，especially after it had become clear by the ensuing events that Buchanan’s strategy had also failed numerically，at the polls.I thought that the John Randolph Club conservatives would sooner or later come to realize that my critique of Buchanan was an “immanent” critique； that is，that I had not criticized or distanced myself from the goal of the John Randolph Club，and presumably also Buchanan’s，of a conservative cultural counterrevolution，but that，based on elementary economic reasons，I had simply found the means—the strategy—chosen by Buchanan to accomplish this goal unsuitable and ineffective.But nothing happened.There was no attempt to refute my arguments.Nor was there any sign that one was willing to express some intellectual distance to Buchanan and his program.

我曾希望，尽管有友谊或个人忠诚之情，但经过一段时间的反思，理智会占上风，特别是在随后发生的事件清楚地表明，布坎南的策略在民意调查中也失败了。我以为约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的保守派迟早会意识到，我对布坎南的批评是一种 “内在 “的批评；也就是说，我并没有批评或疏远约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的目标，大概也是布坎南的目标，同时也是保守主义的文化反革命的目标，而是基于基本的经济原因，认为布坎南为实现这一目标而选择的手段——策略——是不合适的和无效的。但事情却非如此。没有人试图反驳我的论点。也没有任何迹象表明，有人愿意与布坎南及其计划保持一定的思想距离。

From this experience I learned a twofold lesson.First，a lesson that I had already come away with from my encounter with the Mont Pelerin Society was reinforced：do not put your trust in politicians and do not get distracted by politics.Buchanan，notwithstanding his many appealing personal qualities，was still at heart a politician who believed in government，above all，as a means of effecting social change.Second and more generally，however，I learned that it is impossible to have a lasting intellectual association with people who are either unwilling or incapable of grasping the principles of economics.Economics—the logic of action—is the queen of the social sciences.It is by no means sufficient for an understanding of social reality，but it is necessary and indispensible.without a solid grasp of economic principles，say on the level of Henry Hazlitt’s Economics in one lesson，one is bound to commit serious blunders of historical explanation and interpretation.

从这次经历中，我汲取了双重教训。首先，我从朝圣山学会学到的教训得到了巩固：不要相信政客，也不要被政治所干扰。尽管布坎南有许多吸引人的个人品质，但他本质上仍然是一位信任政府的政客，最重要的是，他相信政府是实现社会变革的一种手段。其次，更广泛地说，我认识到，与不愿意或无法掌握经济学原理的人进行持久的思想交流是不可能的。经济学——行动的逻辑——是社会科学的女皇。它绝不是理解社会现实的充分条件，但却是必要和不可或缺的。如果没有对经济学原理的扎实掌握，比如没有达到亨利·黑兹利特（Henry Hazlitt）《一课经济学》的水平，就必然会在历史解释和诠释方面犯下严重的错误。

Thus，I concluded that the Property and freedom Society not only had to exclude all politicians and government agents and propagandists as objects of ridicule and contempt，as emperors without clothes and the butt of all jokes rather than objects of admiration and emulation，but it also had to exclude all economic ignoramuses.

因此，我得出结论，财产与自由学会不仅要将所有政客、政府人员和其鼓吹手排除在外，将其视为嘲笑和蔑视的对象，视为不穿衣服的皇帝和所有笑话的笑柄，而不是钦佩和效仿的对象，而且还要将所有经济学的无知者排除在外。

When the John Randolph Club broke apart，this did not mean that the ideas that had inspired its formation had died out or did no longer find an audience.In fact，in the U.S.，a think tank dedicated to the same ideas and ideals had grown up.The Ludwig von Mises institute，founded in 1982 by lew Rockwell，with Murray Rothbard as its academic head，had started out as just another limited government think tank—although Rothbard and all other leading Mises institute associates were anarchocapitalist Austrians.Yet by the mid1990s—and I pride myself in having played an important role in this development—lew Rockwell had transformed the institute，significantly located far away from Washington，D.C，in provincial Auburn，Alabama，into the very first and only freemarket think tank that had openly renounced the goal of limited government as impossible and come out instead as an unabashed advocate of anarchocapitalism，deviating thereby from a narrow，“literal” interpretation of its name sake and yet staying true to his spirit in pursuing the rigorous，Misesian praxeological method to its ultimate conclusion.This move was financially costly at first，but under Rockwell’s brilliant intellectual entrepreneurship it had eventually become an enormous success，easily outcompeting its far richer “limitedgovernment libertarian” rivals such as the Cato institute in terms of reach and influence.Moreover，in addition to the Mises institute，which focused more narrowly on economic matters，and in the wake of the disappointing experience with the John Randolph Club and its breakup，lew Rockwell had set up，in 1999，an antistate，antiwar，promarket website— lewRockwell。com—that added an interdisciplinary，cultural dimension to the Austrolibertarian enterprise and proved to be even more popular，laying the intellectual groundwork for the present Ron Paul movement。

约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的解体，并不意味着激发其成立的思想已经消亡或不再有听众。事实上，在美国，一个致力于相同理念和理想的智库已经成长起来。路德维希-冯-米塞斯研究院（Ludwig von Mises institute）成立于 1982 年，由卢·罗克韦尔（Lew Rockwell）创立，默里·罗斯巴德（Murray Rothbard）担任学术负责人，虽然罗斯巴德和米塞斯研究院的其他主要成员都是无政府资本主义的奥地利学派，但米塞斯研究院起初只是另一个有限政府的智库。然而到了 20 世纪 90 年代中期——我为自己在这一发展过程中发挥了重要作用而感到自豪——卢·罗克韦尔改变了研究院的面貌。罗克韦尔将远离华盛顿、位于阿拉巴马州奥本省的研究院改造成了第一个也是唯一一个自由市场的智库，公开宣布有限政府的目标是不可能实现的，转而公开倡导无政府资本主义，从而偏离了对其名称的狭隘的、”字面 “解释，但仍秉承了米塞斯的精神，将米塞斯的严谨的行动学方法贯彻到底。此举起初耗资巨大，但在罗克韦尔杰出的知识企业家精神的推动下，它最终取得了巨大成功，在影响力和覆盖面上远远超过了卡托研究所等财力雄厚的一众”有限政府自由意志主义 “对手。此外，除了米塞斯研究院更严密地关注经济问题之外，在约翰-伦道夫俱乐部令人失望的经历及其解体之后，卢·罗克韦尔在1999年建立了一个反国家、反战争、挺市场的网站——lewRockwell.com——该网站为奥地利学派自由意志主义事业增添了跨学科、文化层面的内容，并被证明更受欢迎，为现在的荣-保罗运动奠定了思想基础。

The Property and freedom Society was not supposed to compete with the Mises institute or lewRockwell.com.It was not supposed to be a think tank or another publication outlet。Rather，it was to complement their and other efforts by adding yet another important component to the development of an antistatist intellectual counterculture.What had disappeared with the breakup of the original John Randolph Club was an intellectual Society dedicated to the cause.Yet every intellectual movement requires a network of personal acquaintances，of friends and comrades in arms to be successful，and for such a network to be established and grow，a regular meeting place，a society，is needed.The Property and freedom Society was supposed to be this society。

财产与自由协会不应该与米塞斯研究院或 lewRockwell.com 竞争。它不应该成为一个智库或另一个出版渠道。相反，它是对上述机构和其他机构努力的补充，为反国家主义的知识分子反文化的发展增添了另一个重要组成部分。随着最初的约翰-伦道夫俱乐部的解散，一个致力于这一事业的知识分子社团也随之消失了。然而，每一次思想运动都需要一个由熟人、朋友和战友组成的网络才能成功，而要建立和发展这样一个网络，就需要一个定期的聚会场所，一个社团。财产与自由学会应该就是这样一个社团。

I wanted to create a place where likeminded people from around the world could gather regularly in mutual encouragement and in the enjoyment of unrivalled and uncensored intellectual radicalism.The society was supposed to be international and interdisciplinary，bourgeois，by invitation only，exclusive and elitist：for the few “elect，” who can see through the smokescreen put up by our ruling classes of criminals，crooks，charlatans，and clowns.

我想创建一个地方，让世界各地志同道合的人能够定期聚集在一起，相互激励，享受无与伦比、毋须审查的思想激进主义。这个社团应该是国际性的、跨学科的、布尔乔亚式的、只接受邀请的、排他性的、精英式的：为少数 “被选中者 “服务，他们能够看穿由罪犯、恶棍、骗子和小丑组成的统治阶级所设置的烟幕。

After our first meeting，5 years ago，here at the Karia Princess，my plan became more specific still。Inspired by the charm of the place and its beautiful garden，I decided to adopt the model of a salon for the Property and freedom Society and its meetings.The dictionary defines a salon as “a gathering of intellectual，social，political，and cultural elites under the roof of an inspiring hostess or host，partly to amuse one another and partly to refine their taste and increase their knowledge through conversation.” Take the “political” out of this definition—and there you have it，what I have tried to accomplish for the last few years，together with Gülcin，my wife and fellow Misesian，without whose support none of this would be possible：to be hostess and host to a grand and extended annual salon，and to make it，with your help，the most attractive and illustrious salon there is.

5 年前，在卡里亚公主酒店举行了第一次会议之后，我的计划变得更加具体。受此地的魅力和美丽花园的启发，我决定为财产与自由学会及其会议采用沙龙模式。字典中对沙龙的定义是：”知识、社会、政治和文化精英们在令人鼓舞的女所有者或男所有者的主持下聚会，一方面是为了互相娱乐，另一方面是为了通过交谈提高品位和增长知识”。把“政治”从这个定义中去掉——然后你就明白了，这就是我在过去几年里一直试图与我的妻子古尔钦（她也是一位米塞斯主义者）一起完成的事情，没有她的支持，这一切都不可能实现：成为一个盛大且延续的年度沙龙的女所有者和男所有者，并在你们的帮助下，使它成为最有吸引力和最杰出的沙龙。

I hope—and indeed I am confident—that this，our fifth meeting，will mark another step forward toward this end.

我希望——事实上我也深信不疑——我们的第五次会晤将标志着朝着这一目标又迈进了一步。

30 My Path to the Austrian School of Economics

30 我的奥派经济学之路*

Nowadays，it’s not uncommon for people as young as twenty or thirty to feel they have to share their memories with the world.Even at an advanced age，I prefer not to talk publicly about personal things and experiences in my life，but to reserve this for private conversations.

如今，二三十岁的年轻人就觉得必须与世人分享自己的回忆，这并不少见。即使年事已高，我也不愿意公开谈论个人私事和生活经历，而是将其保留在私人谈话中。

But on the occasion of this event I would like to tell you something about my intellectual development：about my development from a child of his time，who through his encounter with Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian school of economics became an intellectual exotic—some would say a dangerous madman—apparently from a different time.And to this end a little biographical background is appropriate.

但借此机会，我想向大家介绍一下我的思想发展历程：自孩提以来，经历了所处那个时代的发展，通过与路德维希-冯-米塞斯和奥地利经济学派的接触，成为了一个显然来自不同时代的知识分子中的异类——有人会说是一个危险的疯子。为此，有必要介绍一下我的生平背景。

I was born in 1949 in postwar germany，the same year that Ludwig von Mises’s magnum opus Human action was published，which I was to discover almost thirty years later，and which had a decisive influence on my intellectual development，and which today，on this occasion，is to be presented for the first time translated into german.

我于 1949 年出生在战后的德国，同年，路德维希-冯-米塞斯的巨著《人的行动》出版了，将近三十年后我才发现此书，它对我的智识发展产生了决定性的影响，此时此地，它首度以德文译版呈现。

My parents were both refugees from the area of the former german Democratic republic （GDR），who after the war had ended up in a small village in Lower Saxony，West germany。My father was a selfemployed master tailor—among many other things，a common feature I have with Roland Baader，whose father was also a master tailor—who after having been a prisoner of war did not return to his Sovietoccupied hometown.The family of my mother，who was later to become a primary school teacher，had been expropriated by the Soviets in 1946 as socalled eastelbian Junkers and had been driven out of their homes and farms，carrying nothing more than their backpacks.Until our move to the nearby district town，seven years after my birth，we lived in great poverty，with an outhouse outside the tiny workshop apartment。But as a boy I didn’t really notice that。on the contrary，I remember my first years as a little village boy as a very happy time.Since the early fifties my family，thanks to the enormous hard work of my parents and their lifelong practiced resolute and disciplined thriftiness，experienced an economic upswing year after year。

我的父母都是来自前德意志民主共和国（GDR）地区的难民，战后流落到西德下萨克森州（Lower Saxony，West germany）的一个小村庄。我的父亲是一名自营职业的裁缝师傅——抛开其它的许多方面，这是我与罗兰-巴德尔（Roland Baader，德国经济学家，哈耶克的学生）的共同之处，他的父亲也是一名裁缝师傅——他在成为战俘后没有返回被苏联占领的家乡。我的母亲，后来成了一名小学教师。她的家庭1946年被视为所谓东埃尔比安容克（eastelbian Junkers），财产遭苏联没收他们被赶出了拓殖和农场，除了背包以外一无所有。在我出生七年后，我家搬到附近的区镇之前，全家一直生活在极度贫困之中，狭小的工作间兼寓所之外，只有一间外屋。但是，作为一个孩子，我并没有注意到这一点。相反，在我的记忆中，我作为一个乡村小男孩的最初几年是非常幸福的。从 50 年代初开始，由于我父母的辛勤劳动和他们毕生奉行的刚毅、节俭的生活方式，我家的经济状况逐年好转。

The local edition of the Hannoversche Allgemeine was read regularly in my parents’ house and every Monday Der Spiegel magazine fluttered into the house.There were also a number of books，classical literature like that of lessing，Goethe，Schiller，Kleist and Fontane，and modern literature like that of Thomas and Heinrich mann，Max Frisch，Böll and Grass.There were also a few works on german，European，and ancient history，as well as various reference works and atlases.My parents were eager readers them selves and always encouraged me to read，whereby history always fascinated me more than literature （and this has remained so to this day）。We did not have a television until I was sixteen or seventeen years old.But my parents were not intellectuals who could have guided me in my reading，disciplined me or sharpened my judgment。And I would pass the same judgment on my grammar school teachers，almost all of whom came from the war and prewar generation.The history lessons at school strengthened my interest in studying history，the biology lessons drew my attention to Konrad Lorenz and ethology，and the religious instruction given by a Protestant theologian awakened my interest in philosophy for the first time.

我父母家经常阅读当地版的《汉诺威汇报》，每周一《明镜周刊》也会飘进家里。此外，家里还有许多书籍，古典文学如莱辛、歌德、席勒、克莱斯特和冯塔纳，现代文学如托马斯和海因里希·曼、马克斯·弗里施、波尔和格拉斯。还有一些关于德国、欧洲和古代历史的著作，以及各种参考著作和地图集。我的父母都是热心的读者，他们总是鼓励我读书，而历史总是比文学更让我着迷（直到现在也是如此）。直到我十六七岁时，家里才有了电视。但我的父母不是知识分子，他们无法在我阅读时指导我、训练我、提高我的判断力。我对文法学校的老师也有同样的评价，他们几乎都是来自战争和战前的一代。学校的历史课增强了我学习历史的兴趣，生物课引起了我对康拉德-洛伦兹（Konrad Lorenz）和动物行动学的关注，而一位新教神学家的宗教教育则第一次唤起了我对哲学的兴趣。

It was however not least this burgeoning interest in philosophical questions that also led to my increasing intellectual dissatisfaction and disorientation.many of the answers and explanations I received for my questions seemed arbitrary，more opinion than knowledge，contradictory or inconsistent。Where did these contradictions and disputes come from，on the basis of which criteria could they possibly be resolved and decided，or was there perhaps no clear answer to certain questions？ Above all，however，I missed something like an intellectual Systematization，an overall view of all things and connections，and it was especially this need and the search for a solution that made me—initially and for some years—a typical child of my time：the time of student rebellion，which began in the late 1960s，during my final two school years，and reached its peak in 1968，the year in which I began my university studies，and whose spiritual products were later to be called the 68 generation.

然而，我对哲学问题的兴趣日渐浓厚，这也导致我在智识上的日益不满和迷失方向。我得到的许多答案和解释似乎都是武断的，更多的是观点而不是知识，相互矛盾、前后不一。这些矛盾和争端从何而来？根据哪些标准可以解决和决定这些问题？或者某些问题可能没有明确的答案？然而，最重要的是，我错过了一些东西，比如智识的系统化，对一切事物及联系的整体看法，尤其是这种需求和对解决方案的探索，使我最初和后来几年成为我那个时代的一个典型的孩子。学生反叛期，始于20世纪60年代末，也就是我中学的最后两个学年，1968年，我开始进入大学学习，这一年的学生反叛运动达到了顶峰，其精神产物后来被称为 “68一代”。

Inspired by the leading figures of the student rebellion，I first began to study Marx and then the theorists of the new left，the socalled cultural Marxists of the Frankfurt School：Marcuse，Fromm，Horkheimer，Adorno，Habermas，etc。，assuming I would find an answer to my questions from them.I became （temporarily） a socialist，albeit not a follower of the “real existing socialism” as practiced in the former GDR，which I knew from my own experience from regular visits of relatives and whose miserable，pitiful economy of scarcity and its proletarian leaders disgusted me.Instead，I became a follower of，as it was called，“humane democratic socialism，” led by a supposedly wise elite of philosophers.And so it came to pass that Jür gen Habermas，at that time the rising young star of the new left and today the high priest of social democratic statism and politically correct virtue signalling，became my most important first philosophy teacher and dissertation supervisor。In 1974，the year of my PhD，my socialist phase was of course already over，and my dissertation on an epistemological topic—a critique of empiricism—had nothing to do with socialism or the “left。”

受学生反叛运动领军人物的启发，我首先开始学习马克思，然后学习新左派理论家，即法兰克福学派所谓的文化马克思主义者：马尔库塞、弗洛姆、霍克海默、阿多尔诺、哈贝马斯等，我以为我能从他们那里找到问题的答案。我（暂时）成为了一名社会主义者，尽管不是前东德实行的“真正存在的社会主义”的追随者，我是通过定期探亲的亲身经历了解到东德的，那里悲惨、可怜的经济匮乏和无产阶级领导人令我厌恶。相反，我成了所谓 “人道的民主社会主义 “的追随者，由一群所谓睿智的精英哲学家领导。就这样，尤尔根-哈贝马斯（Jür gen Habermas），这位当时冉冉升起的新左派明星，如今已是社会民主国家主义和政治正确美德宣言的大祭司，成为了我最重要的第一位哲学老师和论文导师。1974 年，也就是我攻读博士学位的那一年，我的社会主义生涯当然已经结束，而我的论文是关于认识论的——对经验主义的批判——与社会主义或 “左派 “毫无关系。

My short leftist phase was followed by an equally short “moderate” phasE.Instead of the Frankfurt School，my intellectual curiosity was now increasingly focused on the Viennese School。More specifically：to the so called Viennese circle around Moritz Schlick，and even more specifically to Karl Popper’s philosophy，which is located at the edge of this circle of logical positivists.The core of Popper’s philosophy，which to this day is probably the most widespread and influential worldview，especially in the nonacademicaca demic field，is the following double thesis：All statements about reality are of a hypothetical nature，i.e.，they can be refuted or falsified by experience.Conversely，all nonhypothetical，a priori or apodictic statements，i.e.，statements which in principle are not exposed to falsification，are statements without reference to reality。

我短暂的左派阶段之后，是同样短暂的 “温和 “阶段。与法兰克福学派相比，我的求知欲当时越来越集中于维也纳学派。更确切地说，是以莫里茨-施利克（Moritz Schlick）为中心的所谓维也纳圈子，甚至更确切地说，是位于这个逻辑实证主义圈子边缘的卡尔-波普尔（Karl Popper）哲学。波普尔哲学的核心，可能是迄今为止最广泛和最有影响力的世界观，尤其是在非学术领域，它有以下两个论点：所有关于现实的陈述都是假设性的，即它们可以被经验反驳或证伪。反之，所有非假设性的、先验的或确定的陈述，即原则上不可能被证伪的陈述，都是与现实无涉的陈述。

I was by no means prepared to accept the universality of this thesis.（By the way：Is this a hypothetical or an apodictic statement？） Even while working on my doctoral dissertation，I came across Paul Lorenzen and the socalled Erlangen School，which made the validity of the Popper thesis appear highly doubtful，especially in the field of natural sciences.Isn’t it necessary to first collect and measure data and carry out controlled experiments in order to test a hypothesis regarding causal connections？ Doesn’t the knowledge regarding the construction of measuring instruments and the performance of controlled experiments come methodically before the hypothesis test？ And doesn’t the falsifiability of hypotheses owe itself to the nonfalsifiability of the construction of measuring instruments and the methodology of experimenting？

我绝不准备接受这一论点的普遍性。（顺便问一句：这是一个假设性的陈述还是一个确定性的陈述？）甚至在撰写博士论文时，我还遇到了保罗·洛伦岑（Paul Lorenzen）和所谓的埃尔兰根学派（Erlangen School），这让波普尔理论的有效性显得非常可疑，尤其是在自然科学领域。为了检验有关因果关系的假设，是否有必要先行收集和测量数据并进行对照实验？难道关于测量仪器构造和受控实验执行的知识，不是在假设检验之前，就已系统地得出了吗？假设的可证伪性，难道其本身不是多亏了测量仪器构造和实验方法的不可证伪性？

Today I consider the importance of these questions to be greater than I did then，but this is not the place or the opportunity to pursue this subject （or any higher philosophy at all）。Then （as now），my main interest was in the social sciences，and as far as that is concerned，I was to a large extent initially willing to follow Popper。Like Popper，I thought that social science statements were generally hypothetical，in principle falsifiable “ifthen” statements，and that practical social research must be，as Popper put it，“piece meal social engineering。” one must always test one’s hypotheses before either proving them for the time being （but never definitively） or falsifying and revising them.Nonfalsifiable statements，on the other hand，especially those that relate to reality，i.e.，about real objects，do not exist in the social sciences.

我如今要比当时更深刻地认识到这些问题的重要性，但这个场合或机会，不适于研究这一课题（或任何更深层次的哲学）。当时（和现在一样），我的主要兴趣是社会科学，就这一点而言，我起初在很大程度上愿意追随波普尔。和波普尔一样，我认为社会科学的陈述通常是假设性的，原则上是可证伪的“如果…那么…”句式的陈述，而实际的社会研究，如波普尔所说，必须是“零星的社会工程”。我们必须总是先检验自己的假设，然后才能暂时证明这些假设（但绝不是最终证明），或对其进行证伪和修正。另一方面，社会科学中不存在不可证伪的陈述，尤其是那些与现实相关的陈述，即关于现实对象的陈述。

Today I consider this thesis of Popper’s，apparently so tolerant and open to experience，not only to be wrong，but I also consider it to be downright disastrous or even dangerous.

今天，我认为波普尔的这一表面上对经验如此宽容和开放的论断不仅是错误的，而且是彻头彻尾的灾难，甚至是极度危险的。

First，a small example from everyday experience to demonstrate their error。No one will want to expose the statement “a person cannot be in two different places at the same time” to falsification.Instead，we accept it as an “apodictic” or “a priori” true statement。And yet it undoubtedly has a reference to reality，as every fan of crime thrillers knows.For if Mr。meier was stabbed to death in Vienna on January 1，2019，and Mr。Müller was in new York at that time，then Mr。Müller cannot be considered a murderer in this case：not only hypothetically not，but clearly and categorically not。This statement forms the basis of the socalled alibi principle，which repeatedly provides us with infallible help in everyday life.

首先，举一个日常生活中的小例子来证明他们的错误。没有人会想让 “一个人不可能同时出现在两个不同的地方 “这句话被证伪。相反，我们将其视为 “绝对的 “或 “先验的 “真实命题。然而，这无疑与现实有关联，每个惊悚犯罪小说迷都知道这一点。因为如果迈尔先生于2019年1月1日在维也纳被刺死，而当时米勒先生在纽约，那么米勒先生就不能被认为是本案的凶手：不仅是假设不是，而且是明确和断然不是。这一说法构成了所谓的不在场证明原则的基础，它在日常生活中多次为我们提供了无懈可击的帮助。

My complete break with Popperism came about while working on my habilitation thesis on the foundations of sociology and economics.on the one hand，it became clear to me that when explaining human action one cannot in principle do without the categories of choice，purpose or goal，means，success or failure，whereas natural events and natural processes “are as they are” and must be explained causally，without any reference to choice，goal，means，success or failure.on the other hand，less obvious and of incomparably far greater significance，it became clear to me that the sciences of human action contain a segment：the economy （in contrast to history and sociology），in which one can very well make apodictic statements and judgments，in such a way that one does not have to test something in order to know how it ends，but where one knows the result from the outset，a priori，and is able to predict it with certainty。

我是在撰写关于社会学和经济学基础的资格论文时与波普尔主义彻底决裂的。一方面，我清楚地认识到，在解释人的行动时，原则上离不开选择、目的或目标、手段、成功或失败等范畴，而自然事件和自然过程 “本来就是如此”，必须用因果关系来解释，而不涉及任何选择、目标、手段、成功或失败。另一方面，虽然不那么明显，但却具有无与伦比的重大意义，我清楚地认识到，人的行动科学包含一个部分：经济学（与历史学和社会学相对），在这个部分中，人们可以很好地做出绝对的陈述和判断，在这种方式下，人们不必为了知道事情的结局而去检验它，而是从一开始就先验地知道结果，并且能够肯定地预测它。

While studying economics I came across statements such as the quan tity theory of money，according to which an increase in the money supply leads to a reduction in purchasing power per monetary unit。For me it was obvious that this statement is a logically true statement，which cannot be falsified by any “empirical data，” and nevertheless a statement with a clear reference to reality，about real things.But wherever I looked in contemporary literature，whether on the left by Paul Samuelson or on the right by Milton Friedman，the entire guild of economists was，to put it bluntly，in love with the Viennese philosophy of logical Positivism or Popperism，according to which such apodictically true real statements are impossible or scientifically inadmissible.For them，this statement was instead either a mere tautology，a definition of words made up of other words （without any reference to reality），or a hypothesis to be tested that could be empirically falsified.

在学习经济学的过程中，我接触到了诸如货币数量论之类的说法，根据该理论，货币供应量的增加会导致单位货币购买力的下降。对我来说，这显然是一个逻辑上真实的陈述，任何 “经验数据 “都无法证伪，而且这是一个明确指向现实、关于真实事物的陈述。但我遍阅当代文献，无论是左派的保罗-萨缪尔森（Paul Samuelson），还是右派的米尔顿-弗里德曼（Milton Friedman），整个经济学界，坦率地说，都钟情于维也纳的逻辑实证主义或波普尔主义哲学，根据这种哲学，这种绝对的真实陈述是不可能的，或者在科学上是不允许的。对他们来说，这种说法要么只是同义反复、套套逻辑，是由其他词语所组成的词语定义（不涉及任何现实），要么是一种有待检验的假设，可以被经验所证伪。

However，the intellectual tension and irritation which initially arose from this apparent discrepancy quickly dissipated to my full satisfaction.on winding paths I had finally come across Mises’s Human action in my studies—in the library of the University of Michigan.Mises not only con firmed my judgment about the logical character of central economic statements，he also presented a whole System of apodictic or a priori statements （his socalled praxeology） and explained the errors and disastrous consequences of the positivist philosophy of Viennese provenance，the central protagonists of which he，as their contemporary，was intimately familiar with.

然而，最初由于这种明显的差异引起的思想上的紧张和恼怒很快就烟消云散了，我对此非常满意。在曲折的求学之道上，在密歇根大学的图书馆里，我终于看到了米塞斯的《人的行动》。米塞斯不仅巩固了我对经济学核心论述的逻辑特征的判断，还提出了一整套绝对的或先验的论述体系（他所谓的行动学），并解释了源自维也纳的实证主义哲学的错误和灾难性后果。作为他们的同时代人，他非常熟悉这一哲学流派。

The discovery of Mises and，immediately afterwards，that of his American students，in particular of Murray Rothbard，brought me，on the one hand，a great intellectual relief—here was finally the longawaited inte grated，coherent overview of all things，an architectonic of human knowledge!—on the other hand，however，it also brought with it much anger and disappointment and led to an increasing alienation from the academic university business and prevailing public opinion.

米塞斯的发现，以及紧随其后的他的美国学生，尤其是默里罗斯巴德的发现，一方面给我带来了强效的智识解药——终于有了期待已久的对所有事物的综合、连贯的概述，一个人类知识的架构!然而，另一方面，它也带来了许多愤怒和失望，并导致与大学的学术业务和主流舆论的日益疏远。

This ambivalent development—increasing intellectual certainty on the one hand coupled with increased social alienation on the other—can be illustrated and explained on the basis of a small list of examples of apodictic or quasiapodictic statements，as brought to light by the MisesRothbard School—the socalled Austrolibertarians.For each of the following examples，a more detailed explanation exists as to how far the statement in question is not a falsifiable statement in Popper’s sense，but I simply trust here that this circumstance is always immediately，intuitively understandable，and that in any case the concentrated power of the various examples is sufficient to recognize that one by no means has to try and tolerate everything in order to know how it ends （and also how it definitely does not end）。

米塞斯-罗斯巴德学派——即所谓的奥地利自由意志主义——揭示了这种矛盾的发展——一方面是知识的确定性不断增强，另一方面是社会的异化不断加剧——我们可以通过小部分绝对或准绝对陈述的例子来加以说明和解释。对于下面的每一个例子，我们都可以更详细地解释在多大程度上有关陈述不是波普尔意义上的可证伪陈述，但我在此仅表示相信，这种情况总是立竿见影、直观易懂的，且无论如何，各种示例聚集起来的力量都足以让我们认识到，我们决不需要为了知道结局如何（以及结局肯定不会如何）而去尝试和容忍一切。

Thus，for example，the previously mentioned quantity theory leads to the statement that it is impossible to increase social prosperity by increasing the money supply。How else should one explain that despite the existing possibility of any amount of increase in paper money，poverty continues to exist in some places，unchanged？ An increase in the amount of money can only ever lead to a redistribution of a given stock of welfare goods.It favors the first and early recipients of the new，additional money at the expense of the last and late users.

例如，前面提到的货币数量论可以推导出这样一个结论，即不可能通过增加货币供应量来增加社会繁荣。否则，如何解释尽管存在纸币有可能增加的情况下，一些地方的贫困却依然存在，并且没有改变呢？货币量的增加只能导致既定福利财货存量的再分配。它有利于最先和较早获得新货币的人，而牺牲了最后和较晚使用货币的人。

let me continue with a whole battery of statements of similar，i.e.，apo dictic or quasiapodictic，quality。

让我继续列举一系列类似绝对的或准绝对性质的陈述。

Human action is the conscious pursuit with scarce resources of goals regarded as valuable.

人的行动就是利用稀缺资源有意识地追求被视为有价值的目标。

No one can deliberately not act。

没有人可以故意不行动。

Every action strives to increase the subjective wellbeing of the actor。

每个行动都旨在提升行动人的主观幸福感。

A larger quantity of a good is always preferred to a smaller quantity of the same good.

对于同一种财货，人总是偏好更多数量而非更少数量。

The earlier attainment of a given goal by given means is preferred to its later attainment。

借助给定的手段，人总是偏好早一些而不是晚一些达到给定的目标。

Production must always precede consumption.

生产必定始终先于消费。

only those who save—spend less than they earn—can increase their prosperity permanently （unless they steal）。

只有那些储蓄的人——花的比挣的少——才能永久增加他们的财富（除非他们偷窃）。

What is consumed today cannot be consumed again tomorrow.

今天已经消费掉的东西，明天不可能再消费。

Price fixings above the market price，such as minimum wages，lead to unsalable surpluses，i.e.，to forced unemployment。

定价高于市场价格，如最低工资，导致无法出清的剩余，即强迫性失业。

Pricefixing below the market price，such as rent ceilings，leads to short ages and a persistent shortage of rented housing。

定价低于市场价格，如租金上限，导致租房短缺和持续短缺。

without private ownership of production factors—in classical socialism—there can be no factor prices and without factor prices an economic calculation is impossible.

在经典社会主义中，没有生产要素私有制，就不可能有要素价格；没有要素价格，就不可能有经济计算。

Taxes—compulsory charges—are a burden on income producers and/ or property owners and reduce production and capital formation.

税收——强制性收费——是收入生产者和/或财产所有者的负担，会减少生产和资本形成。

No form of taxation is compatible with the principle of equality before the law，because any taxation involves the creation of two unequal classes of persons with conflicting interests：those of the （net） taxpayer on the one hand，for whom taxes are a burden one seeks to reduce，and on the other hand the class of net recipients or rather consumers of tax，for whom taxes qua source of income are a delight that one seeks instead to increase as much as possible.

任何形式的征税都不符合法律面前人人平等的原则，因为任何征税都会产生两类利益冲突的人，一类是（净）纳税人，对他们来说，税收是一种负担，他们希望减轻这种负担；另一类是净收税人，或者说是税收消费者，对他们来说，税收作为收入来源是一种享受，他们希望尽可能地增加这种享受。

Democracy—majority rule—is incompatible with private property— individual property and selfdetermination—and leads to creeping socialism，i.e.，to ongoing redistribution and the progressive erosion of all private property rights.

民主——多数决原则——与私有财产——个人财产和自决——不相容，并导致社会主义的蔓延，即持续的再分配和逐步侵蚀所有私有财产权。

Whatever is subsidized by taxes，such as lounging about or doing things for which there is no profitable customer demand，is further encouraged and strengthened by the subsidy。

由税收补贴的任何东西，如闲逛或做一些缺少盈利性顾客需求的事情，都会受到补贴的进一步鼓励和加强。

Whoever is not personally liable for the repayment and redemption of socalled public debts incurred by him or with his participation，as is the case today with all politicians and parliamentarians，will frivolously and without hesitation take up debts for his own present advantage and to the detriment of an impersonal future public。

谁不承担偿还和赎回由他本人或在他参与下产生的所谓公共债务的个人责任，就像今天所有的政客和国会议员一样，谁就会轻率地、毫不犹豫地为自己当前的利益举债，而损害的是非人格化的未来公众的利益。

Whoever controls a territorial money printing monopoly enforced by state power，like all socalled central banks，will also make use of this privi lege and，even if an increase in the amount of money can never increase social prosperity as a whole，but can only redistribute it，will still print more and more new money for his own benefit and that of his direct affiliates and closest business partners.

无论谁控制着由国家权力强制实施的印钞的领土垄断权，就像所有所谓的中央银行一样，他就会会利用这一特权，即使货币量的增加永远无法提高整个社会的繁荣程度，而只能对其进行再分配，他也会为了自己及其直接关联方和最亲密商业伙伴的利益，印制越来越多的新钞票。

And finally，there’s this：whoever or whichever institution has a territo rial monopoly on the use of force and jurisdiction，as actually claimed by all states，will also make use of it。i.e.，he will not only exert violence himself，but he will also declare his exertion of violence to be lawful by virtue of his ultimate legal representative.And in all conflicts and disputes of a private person with representatives of this institution （the state） no inde pendent，neutral third party decides on good and evil，or about the guilt and innocence of the opponents，but always and invariably an employee，i.e.，a dependent representative，one of the two conflict parties （the state） itself，with a corresponding，reliably predictable partisan，“statesupporting” result。

最后，还有这一点：无论谁或哪个机构拥有了武力使用和司法管辖的领土垄断权，就像所有国家都声称的那样，他也会使用这种垄断权，也就是说，凭借他最后的合法代表性，他不仅会亲自施暴，而且会宣布他的施暴行为是合法的。而在私人与这一机构（国家）的代表的所有冲突和争端中，没有独立、中立的第三方来裁决是非善恶或双方有罪无罪，始终只有一家受雇者，也就是非独立的代表，冲突双方之一（国家）本身，带来相应的、稳妥可预测的一边倒的、“国家支持”的结果。

The list of such apodictic or quasiapodictic statements could easily be continued，but it should be long enough to see what kind of consequences arise from this ensemble of elementary insights of social science.

诸如此类绝对的或准绝对的陈述可以轻而易举地继续列举下去，但以上这份清单应该长到足以看出这种社会科学基本见解的集合会产生什么样的后果了。

Obviously，these insights are in blatant conflict with social reality。In this reality there are monopolies of violence，monopolies of money print ing，taxes，taxpayers and tax consumers，taxsubsidized idleness and use lessness，majority rule （democracy），public debt，politicians and parliamen tarians exempt from liability，capital consumption （consumption without saving），redistribution of property，minimum wages and maximum rents.And what’s more，all these acts and institutions are not subject to constant criticisM.on the contrary，they are，almost monotonously and from all quarters，presented and praised as selfevident，correct，good and wise.

显然，这些见解与社会现实是公然冲突的。在这个现实中，存在着暴力垄断、印钞垄断、税收、纳税人和税收消费者、税收补贴下的闲杂无益之徒、多数决原则（民主）、公共债务、豁免责任的政客与国会议员、资本消费（没有储蓄的消费）、财产再分配、最低工资和最高租金。更重要的是，所有这些行为和制度都没有受到持续的批评。相反，它们几乎是千篇一律地从各个方面被吹捧为不言而喻的、正确的、美好的和明智的。

The consequence of these insights and their comparison with social reality should be clear。To put it colloquially：one is—and I myself was—at first simply flabbergasted.It became increasingly clear to me what blatant madness prevails in the present world.And I was flabbergasted at the time and effort it had taken me to arrive at this in fact obvious insight。

这些见解及其与社会现实的对比所产生的反差应该是一目了然的。通俗地说：起初，一个人——连我自己也是——大吃一惊。我越来越清楚地认识到，当今世界充斥着怎样一种公然的疯狂。我震惊于自己居然花了那么多时间和精力才得出这个事实上显而易见的结论。

And there were obviously two reasons for this insanity。one was simply human stupidity。Although the ends one supposedly pursued might have been wellmeaning，one was mistaken in the choice of means.It was stupid，for example，to try to fight unemployment with minimum wages or hous ing shortages with rent caps.It was stupid to expect more general prosperity from an increase in the money supply or more economic growth from an expansion of credit （without increased savings）。It was stupid to introduce democracy as a means to protect property。And it was also stupid to expect a reduction in violence or even justice，i.e.，impartial conflict resolution，from the establishment of a monopolist on the use of force and the judiciary （i.e.，a state）； because taxes，i.e.，the threat and use of force，and partisanship in conflict resolution are essential characteristics of any state.

这种疯狂显然有两个原因。其一是人类的愚蠢。尽管人们所谓追求的目的可能是善意的，但在手段的选择上却是错误的。例如，试图用最低工资来解决失业问题，或用租金上限来解决住房短缺问题，皆是愚蠢的。指望通过增加货币供应量来实现更普遍的繁荣，或者通过扩张信贷（而非增加储蓄）来实现更多的经济增长，同样都是愚蠢的。把民主作为保护财产的手段是愚蠢的。指望通过建立一个武力使用和司法管辖的垄断机构（即国家）来减少暴力，甚至实现公正，也是愚蠢的；因为税收，即武力的威胁和使用，以及解决冲突中的一边倒是任何国家的基本特征。

But it was by no means （and unfortunately） only stupidity or ignorance that was responsible for the rule of madness.There was also deliberate deception，lies and fraud.There were also liars and deceivers who knew all this.They knew that the aforementioned measures and institutions could not，and could never，lead to the benevolent results hoped for by their simpler contemporaries，who nevertheless or precisely because of that propagated and supported them vigorously，because they themselves and their friends and followers could profit from them—even if only at the expense and to the chagrin of others.And，of course，it became immediately clear to me who the people and circles who were these crooks and their minions，were.And another thing I understood through my studies of Mises and his school of thought：the reason for the popularity and the affectionate pro motion of Popperism especially in these circles.For it is not only this phi losophy that allows any insane assertion to be considered hypothetically possible and any nonsense to be tried out。on the contrary，it also allows，quite contrary to its alleged receptivity and openness to experience，the protection of any nonsense with cheap excuses against refutation.If minimum wages do not reduce unemployment or poverty，it is because they are not high enough.If money or credit expansion does not lead to increased prosperity，it is because it is too small。If socialism leads to impoverish ment instead of prosperity，it is only because it was executed by the wrong people，or because climate change or some other “intervening variable” has intervened，etc。，etc。

但是，造成疯狂统治的绝不仅仅是愚蠢或无知（不幸的是）。还有蓄意的欺骗、谎言和欺诈。还有一些撒谎者和诈骗犯对这一切洞若观火。他们知道，上述措施和制度不可能，也永远不可能带来他们同时代的淳朴的人所希望的美好结果，尽管如此或正是因为如此，他们才大力宣传和支持这些措施和制度，因为他们自己以及他们的朋友和追随者可以从中获利——即使只有牺牲他人的利益，或让他人感到痛苦为代价。当然，我马上就明白了这些骗子及其帮凶，是哪些人和哪些圈子。通过对米塞斯及其学派的研究，我还明白了另一件事：波普尔主义之所以尤其在这些圈子里大受欢迎，得到极力推崇，其原因就在于此。因为不仅在于这种哲学允许任何疯狂的断言被认为是假设可能的，而且允许任何无稽之谈被尝试。恰恰相反，它还允许以廉价的借口保护任何无稽之谈，以避免遭到反驳，这与它所谓的对经验的接受能力和对经验的开放性完全背道而驰。如果最低工资不能减少失业或贫困，那是因为它还不够高。如果货币或信贷扩张没有带来繁荣，那是因为它规模太小了。如果社会主义导致贫困而非繁荣，那只是因为执行社会主义的人不对，或者因为气候变化或其他 “干扰变量 “的介入，等等。

However，as already indicated，all this knowledge and understanding and the inner peace，satisfaction and yes，joy，which one，which I，experienced through my encounter with Mises’s work，also had its price.For once you have understood your Mises and learned to see the world with Austrian eyes，you will quickly notice，at least if you admit to it，that in many respects you are quite lonely and isolated.

然而，如前所述，我在接触米塞斯的作品时体验到的，所有这些知识、理解、内心的平静、满足，当然还有快乐，也是有其代价的。因为一旦你理解了你的米塞斯，学会了用奥派眼光看世界，你很快就会发现，至少如果你承认这一点的话，在许多方面你是相当孤独与寂寞的。

Not only was one faced with the opposition of all （these） political crooks，but also of large sections of their various minions，especially the entire，almost exclusively taxfinanced academicuniversity establishment，which I tried to find a way into。An academic career was difficult，if not impossible，and it took considerable courage，willingness to fight，and sac rifice not to resign or give up.In germany—let alone Austria—I was at that time out on a limb。I therefore decided to move to America.And so Mises became not only an intellectual but also a personal role model for me.

一个人不仅要面对所有（这些）政治骗子的敌对，还要面对他们的各色仆从爪牙的敌对，特别是整个几乎完全由税收资助的大学学术机构的敌对，而我正试图进入这些机构。学术生涯即使不是不可能的，但肯定是困难的，它需要相当大的勇气、抗争的意愿和不服从、不放弃的牺牲精神。在德国——更不用说在奥地利——我当时是孤军奋战。因此，米塞斯不仅是我智识上的榜样，也是我个人的榜样。

Mises had been denied a regular academic career in Austria and，after the National Socialists seized power，was forced to emigrate to the US.Even there，in the heartland of capitalism，it was difficult for him to gain a foothold.But his courage and will to fight were unbroken and he managed to make his work increasingly heard and to raise a new generation of stu dents，especially the brilliant Murray Rothbard.Rothbard，too，had been obstructed throughout his life，and his academic career had been rather bumpy。But it was Rothbard who now took me under his wing in the United States，helped me to obtain a professorship and in particular con nected me with the Ludwig von Mises institute，founded by lew Rockwell in 1982 and inspired by him，Rothbard，as academic director。

米塞斯在奥地利无法获得正常的学术生涯，在国家社会主义者夺取政权后，他被迫移居美国。即使在那里，在资本主义的中心地带，他依然很难站稳脚跟。但他的勇气和斗志没有被磨灭，他设法让自己的作品被越来越多的人听到，并培养了新一代的学生，尤其是才华横溢的默里罗斯巴德。罗斯巴德也是如此，他的一生命运多舛，其学术生涯亦是相当坎坷。但现在在美国，是罗斯巴德把我护佑在他的羽翼之下，帮助我获得了一个教授职位，特别是把我和路德维希-冯-米塞斯研究院联系在一起，该研究所由卢·罗克韦尔受罗斯巴德的启发于1982年创办，并由罗斯巴德担任学术主任。

It is，essentially，thanks to the work of the Mises institute，with which I have remained closely connected from its humble beginnings to the present day，and which，under the direction of the incomparable lew Rockwell，has grown into an institution with worldwide appeal and connections，that an event like this one can once again take place in Austria today。Thanks to his work，the names and works of Mises and Rothbard are much better known today than they were during their lifetimes.In fact，there is no country in the world where there are no Misesians or Rothbardians.My own writings are now also available in more than thirty languages.And it is certainly also an indicator of the progress that the Austrian school has since made，when an audience of 1，500 attended a lecture that I recently gave，in Moscow of all places，and a few hundred more even had to be turned away due to lack of space.

从根本上说，正是由于米塞斯研究院的工作，从其草创初直到现在，我与该研究院都一直保持着密切的联系，而且在无与伦比的卢-罗克韦尔的领导下，该研究院已经发展成为一个具有全球吸引力和联系的机构，像这样的活动今天才能够再次在奥地利举行。多亏了他的努力，米塞斯和罗斯巴德的名字和作品今天比他们生前更广为人知。事实上，世界上没有一个国家没有米塞斯主义者或罗斯巴德主义者。我自己的著作现在也被翻译成三十多种语言。这当然也是奥地利学派进展的标志，最近，我在莫斯科举办了一场讲座，有 1500 名听众到场聆听，甚至还有几百名听众因座位不够而被拒之门外。

In spite of this undeniable progress，one cannot，of course，hide the fact that the Misesian Austrian school still represents an intellectual outsider position.Indeed，especially as an “Austrian” one has every reason to be pes simistic about the further development of the Western world，at least in the short and medium term.For we are currently living through a period in which the normal madness，which I have already mentioned，is once more intensified by the crazy doctrine of political correctness and the pathologi cal，quasireligious climate mania of infantile socalled climate protectors，confronted with whom one often no longer knows whether to simply howl and cry，or instead crack up laughing。

尽管取得了这些不可否认的进步，但我们当然不能掩盖这个事实，即米塞斯主义的奥地利学派仍然代表着知识界的局外人立场。事实上，尤其是作为一名 “奥派”，我们完全有理由对西方世界的进一步发展感到悲观，至少在短期和中期必然如此。因为我们目前所历的时世，我提到过的常态化的疯狂错乱，由于政治正确的疯狂教义，病态的、幼稚的所谓气候保护者的类宗教气候狂热而再次加剧，面对这些疯子，一个人常常无所适从，是干脆嚎啕大哭，还是开怀大笑。

However，today there is no more stopping the Mises School。And when the truth finally wins out，because only what is true can also work smoothly in the long run，then the hour of the Austrian school of economics will have come.

然而，今天再没有什么能够阻止米塞斯学派了。当真理最终胜出，因为从长远看，只有真实的东西才能顺畅地运转，届时，奥地利学派的时刻也将随之到来。

¡venceremos!

我们必胜！

31 The inDepth interview

31 深度访谈*

Jeff Deist：Your recent talk in Vienna mentioned growing up happy but poor，the son of East german parents who had been driven west during the Cold War by the Soviets.Can you elaborate on the lasting impact their experience had on you，in terms of how you view state power and its attendant evils？ Are you in some ways still influenced by their “eastern” roots？

杰夫-德伊斯特：你最近在维也纳的演讲中提到了快乐但贫穷的成长过程，你的父母是东德人，在冷战期间被苏联驱逐到西德。你能否详细谈谈他们的经历对你产生的持久影响，以及你如何看待国家权力和伴随而来的罪恶？你是否在某些方面仍然受到他们 “东方 “根源的影响？

HansHermann Hoppe：The fact that my parents were both refugees，end ing up in the West by the accident of WWII，driven away and separated from their original homes in Sovietoccupied East germany，played a huge role in our family life.In particular the expropriation of my mother’s family and its expulsion from house and home by the Soviets，in 1946，as socalled EastElbean Junkers，was a constantly recurring topic at home and assumed even more importance after the collapse，in 1989，of East germany and the following german “reunification.” My mother，as many other victims of communist expropriations，then sought and hoped for the restitution of her property—in which case I would have been set for life.However，as I already knew and correctly predicted by then，this was not going to happen.There was to be no justice.But my parents were shocked and outraged.

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普（HansHermann Hoppe）：我的父母都是难民，由于二战的原因来到西方，在被苏联占领的东德被赶出拓殖，与家人分离，这对我们的家庭生活产生了巨大的影响。特别是 1946 年，我母亲的拓殖被苏联人征用随后并赶出拓殖，成了所谓的 “东埃尔比安容克”（East Elbean Junkers），这些在我家是一个经常出现的话题，1989 年东德解体和随后的德国 “统一 “之后，这个话题变得更加重要。我的母亲和许多其他被共产党没收财产的受害者一样，寻求并希望归还她的财产——如果这样，那我的生活就有了保障。然而，正如我当时已经知道并正确预测的那样，这是不可能的。公正不彰。但我的父母感到震惊和愤怒。

The numerous trips we took to visit various relatives in East germany confirmed my parents’ judgment of the Soviet System.Short ages，waiting lines，empty stores，inferior products，and lousy services.All around controls，spies，and informants.Everywhere grey ugliness and decay。A prison wall built around the whole country to prevent anyone from escaping。And commieproles droning on endlessly about the great successes achieved under their leadership.

我们多次去东德探亲，证实了我父母对苏联体制的判断。物资短缺、排队等候、商店空空如也、产品低劣、服务糟糕。到处都是管制、间谍和告密者。随处可见的灰色的丑陋和腐朽。监狱围墙环绕着整个国家，以防止任何人逃跑。还有那些喋喋不休地唠叨着在他们领导下取得的伟大成就的共产党官僚们。

Yet as a little boy and a teenager I did not understand the reason for all this mischief and misery。Indeed，the East german experience did little if anything to shake my own leftist convictions at the time.East germany，I thought，was just the wrong type of socialism，with the wrong people at the helm.

然而，作为一个小男孩和青少年，我并不理解所有这些灾难与困苦的缘由。事实上，东德的经历并没有动摇我当时的左派信念。我认为，东德只是一种错误的社会主义，由错误的人掌舵。

Apart from their anticommunism，my parents，as most people of their generation，were highly guarded or even timid regarding political pronouncements.germany had lost a devastating war，and the ger man population was subjected to a Systematic，Americanled reeduca tion campaign，a Charakterwaesche （characterwash），as I was to realize only many years later，of truly enormous proportions，which involved a complete rewriting of history from the victor’s viewpoint，essentially portraying germans as congenital villains.This made it all the more difficult to finally discover the fundamental importance of private property rights and the evil of statism and socalled public property。

除了反共之外，我的父母和他们那一代的大多数人一样，对政治言论非常谨慎，甚至有些胆怯。德国输掉了一场毁灭性的战争，德国人遭受了一场系统的、由美国人主导的再教育运动，即 “洗脑”运动（Charakterwaesche），多年后我才意识到这场运动的规模之大，它包括从胜利者的角度彻底改写历史，基本上是将德国人描绘成先天的恶棍。这使得最终发现私有产权的根本重要性以及国家主义和所谓公有财产的邪恶变得更加困难。

As far as any genuine “eastern” influences are concerned，I am skeptical。Far more important in any case was the fact that my parents were impoverished refugees who eagerly wanted to recover from their losses，get ahead in life，and instill their own will to succeed also in their children.（In fact，empirical studies later on demonstrated the com paratively greater professional success of refugee children as compared to their nonrefugee peers.） However，in the german context you may count my Protestant—Lutheran—upbringing and the character traits typically associated with it，i.e.，the “Protestant ethic，” as described by Max Weber，as somehow easterN.

至于任何真正的 “东方 “影响，我持怀疑态度。无论如何，更重要的是，我的父母都是贫困的难民，他们迫切希望挽回损失，在生活中出人头地，并将自己的成功心愿也灌输给子女。（事实上，后来的实证研究表明，与非难民儿童相比，难民儿童在职业上取得了更大的成功）。不过，在德国背景下，我的新教-路德教教养以及与之相关的典型性格特征，即马克斯-韦伯（Max Weber）所描述的 “新教伦理”，在某种程度上是东方的。

JD：You also mentioned your time at university，studying philosophy under the direction of leftwing critical theorist Jürgen Habermas.Although your political philosophy differs radically from his，discuss his influence on you and your development of “Austrian” class analysis.Is he purely a malign figure，or can we learn from him？

杰夫：你还提到了你在大学期间师从左翼批判理论家尤尔根-哈贝马斯学习哲学的经历。尽管你的政治哲学与哈贝马斯大相径庭，但请谈谈他对你的影响以及你对 “奥派 “阶级分析的发展。他纯粹是一个邪恶的人物，还是我们可以向他学习？

HHH：Looking back，I can certainly say that Habermas has been a largely malign figure.He became germany’s most famous and influential intellectual，and as such played an important role in germany’s gradual but steady move leftward，both economically and culturally。Indeed，he can be regarded as the high priest of historical and political correctness，of social democracy，and of political centralization.

霍普：回首过去，我可以肯定地说，哈贝马斯在很大程度上是一个邪恶之人。他是德国最著名、最具影响力的知识分子，因此在德国经济和文化逐步向左转的过程中发挥了重要作用。事实上，他可以被视为历史和政治正确、社会民主和政治集权的大祭司。

Nonetheless，my relationship with Habermas，while not close，was cordial，and I learned quite a bit from him，especially from his earlier works such as Erkenntnis und interesse （knowledge and interest）。（Since the late 1970s I essentially stopped following his work，as it was increasingly tedious and murky。） in any case，it was Habermas who introduced me to the AngloSaxon tradition of analytic philosophy and the philosophy of language.He helped me understand “methodological dualism，” i.e.，that the study of objects with which we can communicate （and communicative action） requires different methods than those appro priate for the study of noncommunicative objects （and instrumen tal action）。And contra all empiricist and relativist claims，Habermas always defended the notion of some sort of synthetic a priori truths.

尽管如此，我与哈贝马斯的关系虽然并不亲密，但却很融洽，我从他那里学到了很多东西，尤其是他早期的作品，如《知识与兴趣》（Erkenntnis und interesse）。（自 20 世纪 70 年代末以来，我基本上不再关注他的作品，因为这些作品越来越乏味和晦涩。）无论如何，是哈贝马斯把我带入了盎格鲁撒克逊分析哲学和语言哲学的传统。他帮助我理解了 “方法论的二元论”，即研究我们可以交流的对象（以及交流行为）所需的方法与研究非交流对象（以及工具行为）所需的方法不同。与所有经验主义和相对主义者的主张相反，哈贝马斯始终捍卫某种先验综合真理的概念。

As far as my work on class analysis and the theory of history is concerned，however，it owes nothing to Habermas，who had actually little interest in economics and political economy，but instead to my earlier study of Marx。I wrote the original paper on the subject for a Mises institute conference on Marx，and I tried to show how，by only substituting “state” for “business firms” and “taxes” for “wages，” Marx’s exploitation theory and his theory of history would make perfect sense.

就我在阶级分析和历史理论方面的工作而言，这完全与哈贝马斯无关，他实际上对经济学和政治经济学兴趣不大，而应归功于我早期对马克思的研究。我为米塞斯研究院关于马克思的一次研讨会撰写了关于这一主题的原始论文，我试图说明，只要用 “国家 “代替 “商业公司”，用 “税收 “代替 “工资”，马克思的剥削理论和他的历史理论就会完全自洽。

JD：Your speech titled “Coming of age with Murray” in new York City two years ago reveals much about your personal relationship with the late Murray N.Rothbard.In fact you moved to new York primarily to work with him.Looking back，are you glad to have left germany for America？ Would your career and work look very different had you remained at a European university？

杰夫：两年前，你在纽约发表了题为 “跟随默里成长 “的演讲，演讲中透露了你与已故的默里-罗斯巴德（Murray N.Rothbard）的个人关系。事实上，你搬到纽约主要是为了与他共事。回首往事，你是否庆幸离开德国前往美国？如果你留在欧洲的大学，你的事业和工作会有很大不同吗？

HHH：Oh yes，that move was about the best and most important decision I ever made.given my views at the time，i.e.，my MisesianRothbardian outlook，an academic career in germany，even if not entirely impossible，would have been extremely difficult，even with stellar academic credentials.I might have become depressed and given up.certainly，without constant encouragement such as I would receive from Rothbard in America，I would have written less and then mostly in german，which no one but germans read.

霍普：是的，那次搬家是我做出的最好也是最重要的决定。鉴于我当时的观点，即我的米塞斯-罗斯巴德主义观点，在德国从事学术工作，即使不是完全不可能，也是极其困难的，即使我拥有一流的学术资历。我可能会变得沮丧从而放弃。当然，如果没有罗斯巴德在美国对我的不断鼓励，我的文章会写得更少，而且主要是德文，除了德国人，没人会读德文。

In the meantime，thanks to the growing influence and worldwide internet presence of the Ludwig von Mises institute in Auburn，the situation has significantly changed.It is still difficult，but nowadays you can also have a successful academic career in Europe even as an Austrian （but you will have to write in English）。

与此同时，由于奥本的路德维希-冯-米塞斯研究院的影响力不断扩大，以及遍布全球的互联网，情况发生了重大变化。尽管仍然困难重重，但如今即使是一个奥地利人，也可以在欧洲拥有成功的学术生涯（但你必须用英语写作）。

JD：Rothbard remains relevant and controversial today。Why is he so consis tently misunderstood？ given your long history with him，both in new York and at UNLV，what do his critics fail to grasp？ Was he warm and convivial as his supporters contend，or acerbic and mercurial as per his detractors？ Does his work in social theory overshadow his work as an economist？

杰夫：罗斯巴德至今仍具有现实意义和争议性。为什么他总是被误解？鉴于你与他在纽约和 UNLV 的长期交往，批评他的人没有理解他的什么？他是像支持者所说的那样热情好客，还是像诋毁者所说的那样尖刻多变？他的社会理论工作是否掩盖了他作为经济学家的工作？

HHH：Rothbard was a genius of the first order。He ranks among the great est economists，but he was not and did not want to be a mere economist。He was also a great philosopher，sociologist，and historian，and as such became the creator of a grand，integrated intellectual System.Anyone familiar with Rothbard’s entire oeuvre can only stand in awe before his achievement。But there also lies the problem.The sheer volume and the interdisciplinary character of Rothbard’s work makes it difficult for anyone but the most dedicated and talented student to give a full and fair account of his work。Moreover，especially economics，the centerpiece of Rothbard’s System，is a rather dry，technical field with very limited sex appeal。much easier，then，for the envious，lazy，and talentless to engage in nitpicking。And easier still not to talk about Rothbard’s scholarly work at all，but reduce him to the libertarian activist （that he also was，if only in his spare time and for his own amusement）。

霍普：罗斯巴德是第一流的天才，他跻身于最伟大的经济学家之列，但他不是也不想成为一个单纯的经济学家。他还是一位伟大的哲学家、社会学家和历史学家，并因此成为一个宏大、完整的知识体系的创造者。任何熟悉罗斯巴德全部作品的人，在他的成就面前都只能肃然起敬。但问题也在于此。罗斯巴德的著作数量庞大，而且具有跨学科的特点，因此除了最敬业、最有天赋的学生之外，很难有人能够全面、公正地介绍他的著作。此外，尤其是罗斯巴德体系的核心——经济学，是一个相当枯燥的技术性领域，吸引力非常有限。因此，对于那些羡慕嫉妒恨、懒惰无才的人来说，显然吹毛求疵要容易得多。更容易的是，根本不谈罗斯巴德的学术著作，而是把他贬低为自由意志主义活动家（他也是，但只是在业余时间为了自娱自乐）。

As far as Rothbard the man is concerned there is something to both seemingly contradictory statements about his personality。You certainly did not want to become the target of one of Rothbard’s many writ ten missives.As a writer，Rothbard could be merciless and devastat ing，ready to go in for the argumentative kill。on the other hand，as a person，in social gatherings，he was a softy：warm，convivial，charming，and entertaining。

就罗斯巴德个人而言，关于他的个性的两种看似矛盾的说法都有道理。你肯定不希望成为罗斯巴德众多书写的目标。作为一名作家，罗斯巴德可以毫不留情、摧枯拉朽，随时准备在争论中大开杀戒。另一方面，作为一个人，在社交场合，他又是一个温柔的人：热情、活泼、有魅力、让人如沐春风。

JD：Rothbard frequently defended you and your work，charging critics with “Hoppephobia.” What did this mean to you as a young scholar？ Why does loyalty and gratitude seem so scarce in academia generally，and in libertarian circles？

杰夫：罗斯巴德经常为你和你的作品辩护，指责批评者患有 “霍普恐惧症”。作为一名年轻学者，这对你来说意味着什么？为什么在学术界，以及在自由意志主义圈子里，忠诚和感激显得如此稀缺？

HHH：If you write and take a clear and unambiguous stand on highly contentious issues，you should expect some heat。otherwise，if you don’t like the heat，stay out of the kitchen.given what I wrote or said in public （or the way I said or wrote it），I knew that I would be a con troversial figure； and as a young man I took a good deal of delight from provocation and vigorous intellectual debate.Nonetheless，I had no idea how downright personal，nasty，and even defamatory and libelous some critics and criticisms could get。In such situations，then，Rothbard’s coming forward in my defense was a welcome relief and gave me a great boost of confidence.After some years in academia，however，I developed quite a thick skin and learned that many a critic and criticism were not worth my attention and best ignored.

霍普：如果你在极具争议的问题上撰文并采取清晰明确的立场，你应该预料到会受到一些攻击。否则，如果你不喜欢热度，那就远离厨房。鉴于我在公开场合所写或所说的话（或我说或写的方式），我知道我会成为一个有争议的人物；作为一个年轻人，我从挑衅和激烈的思想论证中获得了很多乐趣。然而，我不知道有些批评和指责会变成人身攻击，极其肮脏下流，甚至是恶意诽谤和无耻中伤。在这种情况下，罗斯巴德站出来为我辩护，让我如释重负，信心倍增。然而，在学术界工作了几年之后，我的脸皮变得越来越厚，并认识到许多批评和指责都不值得我在意，最好一笑哂之。

As for loyalty and gratitude，it is necessary that a person recognizes and admits that he owes something to another person； that this other person has done something of value for him that deserves to be acknowledged.I tend to agree with your assessment of academia and certain libertarian circles as ranking rather low in this regard.And in both cases I suspect the prevalence of egalitarian ideas to be responsible for this outcome.The typical or “modal” libertarian，as described by Rothbard，is an egalitarian，respectnoauthority guy，with little knowledge of history and world affairs.He fancies himself to have come up with everything he has and knows on his own，as a selfmade man，and as such thinks that he owes no one any gratitude or special respect。

至于忠诚和感激，一个人必须认识到并承认他欠了另一个人一些东西，这个人对他做了一些有价值的事情，值得肯定。我倾向于同意你对学术界和某些自由意志主义圈子的评价，认为它们在这方面的排名相当靠后。在这两种情况下，我都怀疑平均主义思想的盛行是造成这种结果的原因。典型的或 “模态 “的自由意志主义，正如罗斯巴德所描述的，是一种平等主义，不尊重权威，对历史和世事知之甚少。他认为自己所拥有和知道的一切都是自己想出来的，是一个自食其力的人，因此他认为自己不欠任何人任何感激或特别的尊重。

The egalitarianism of academia，or more precisely that part of it that is principally concerned with writing and speaking （rather than doing，such as engineering，for instance），is of a different kind.let’s call this group the intellectuals.Intellectuals generally suffer from an inflated ego。They consider intellectual work and hence themselves as more important than mundane or manual work and workers.In their eyes，then，the fact that they are all subsidized today and kept financially afloat by nonintellectuals is only how things should be anyhow.No need to be thankful for what is selfunderstood，as far as they are concerned.In this regard，intellectuals are elitists.Visàvis each other，how ever，they are typically egalitarians.They all equally write and speak，and who is to say that this writing is better or more original than that。true enough，their salaries and their standing in academia may be quite different。However，such differences are solely the result of bureaucratic procedures and criteria that have nothing to do with truth or beauty。Nor does popularity matter as far as truth and beauty are concerned.No need，then，for an intellectual to ever feel less of an intellectual than anyone else.

学术界的平等主义，或者更确切地说，学术界中主要关注写作和演讲（而不是实践，例如工程学）的那部分人，是另一种平等主义。让我们把这部分人称为知识分子。知识分子通常容易自我膨胀。他们认为智力工作以及因此他们自己比平凡的或体力的工作及工人更为重要。那么在他们眼中，他们如今都受到补贴并且靠非知识分子在经济上维持生计这一事实，无论如何也只是事情本来就该有的样子。就他们而言，对于自认为理所当然之事自然无需感恩。在这方面，知识分子是精英主义者。然而，相对于彼此，他们通常又是平等主义者。他们都同样在写作和说话，谁又能说这篇比那篇写得更好或更有创意呢？的确，他们的薪水和学术地位可能大相径庭。然而，这种差异完全是官僚程序和标准造成的结果，与真善美无关。就真与美而言，人气也无关紧要。因此，知识分子无需觉得自己比其他人更不像个知识分子。

JD：You mention sharing with Rothbard a profound interest in religion and the sociology of various faiths despite being an agnostic。Have you changed your perspective on Christianity and its influence on the West？ Is the postChristian West going to be a nasty and tribal place，contra the assurances of secularists？

杰夫：你提到与罗斯巴德一样，尽管你是一个不可知论者，但却对宗教和各种信仰的社会学有着浓厚的兴趣。你是否改变了对基督教及其对西方影响的看法？后基督教时代的西方会是一个肮脏和部落化的地方吗？

HHH：Whether you are a believer or not，there is no way of denying that religion has played a hugely important role in human history and that it is the West，i.e.，the part of the world shaped by Latin Christendom in particular，that has surpassed all other world regions both in terms of its material as well as its cultural achievements，and that among its superior cultural achievements in particular is also the idea of natural human rights and human freedom.The Christian notion that each person is created in the image of God contributed to the uniquely Western tradition of individualism and was instrumental in abolishing，at long last，the institution of slavery within the Christian orbit （all the while it lingered on outside the West，even until today）。And the institutional separation and jealous competition for social recognition and authority in the West between the Christian church and its hierarchy of popes，cardinals，bishops，and priests，on the one hand，and all worldly power with its hierarchy of emperors，kings，nobles，and heads of households on the other contributed greatly to the uniquely Western tradition of limited （as opposed to absolutist） government。

无论你信教与否，都无法否认宗教在人类历史上发挥了极其重要的作用，而西方，即特别是拉丁基督宗教所塑造的世界部分，在物质和文化成就上都超越了世界上所有其他地区，特别是在其卓越的文化成就中还包括天赋人权和人类自由的思想观念。基督教认为每个人都是按照上帝的形象创造的，这一观念促成了西方独特的个人主义传统，并有助于在基督教范围内最终废除了奴隶制（与此同时，奴隶制却在西方之外苟延残喘，甚至一直延续至今）。一方面，在西方，基督教会及其教皇、红衣主教、主教和牧师的等级制度，与另一方面所有世俗权力及其皇帝、君主、贵族和户主（一家之主）的等级制度之间的制度性分离以及对社会认可和权威的嫉妒性竞争，极大地促进了西方独特的有限（与专制相对）政府的传统。

This happy，powerlimiting arrangement began to crumble already in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with the Protestant reforma tion and the Counterreformation following。Today，the various Chris tian churches are essentially appendices of the state.As such they pro mote even the mass importation of people of rival faiths into formerly Christian lands，thus further undermining whatever authority they may still possess in public opinion and strengthening at the same time the power of the allsecular，postChristian state.

这种幸运的、限制权力的安排在十六和十七世纪随着新教改革和随后的反改革开始瓦解。今天，各种基督教会基本上都是国家的附庸。因此，它们甚至推动将敌对信仰的人大量引入以前的基督教国家，从而进一步削弱了它们在公众舆论中可能仍然拥有的权威，同时加强了全世俗化的后基督教国家的权力。

JD：Democracy：The God That Failed remains perhaps your bestknown and most controversial book。nearly twenty years later，give us your thoughts on the book’s legacy。Are you happy with its notoriety and impact，or do you wish your work on socialism，property，and ethics was better appreciated？

杰夫：《民主：失败的上帝》可能仍然是你最著名、最具争议性的作品。近二十年过去了，请谈谈你对这本书后续的看法。你是否对这本书的知名度和影响力感到满意，或者你是否希望自己在社会主义、财产和伦理方面的工作能得到更好的评价？

HHH：Indeed，of all of my major writings Democracy has been the best seller，and it is no exaggeration to say that the book in the meantime has exerted some notable influence in helping desanctify the institution of democracy （majority rule） in public opinion.Naturally，I am quite happy about this.The book has a certain “sex appeal，” if you will。It is interdisciplinary and not too technical，and it offers some new，original，and provocative theoretical theses and insights，combined with alterna tive，revisionist historical vistas and perspectives.It may be the only major work of mine a person reads and associates with my name.But then，I always hope，there may also be other people to whom it opens the door to some other，possibly more important if less sexy，works of mine.

霍普：事实上，在我所有的主要著作中，《民主》是最畅销的，可以毫不夸张地说，这本书在帮助公众舆论中使民主（多数决制度）制度去神圣化方面发挥了一些显著的影响。当然，我对此感到非常高兴。可以说，这本书具有某种 “吸引力”。该书跨学科，技术性不强，提供了一些新颖的、原创的、挑衅性的理论论点和见解，并结合了另类的、修正主义的历史视野和观点。这可能是人们读到我的作品并将其与我的名字联系在一起的唯一一部重要著作。但话说回来，我一直希望，对其他人来说，它也可能为他们打开通向我的其他一些可能更重要但不那么有吸引力的作品的大门。

JD：both your fans and critics seized on a passage in Democracy arguing that individuals with goals and lifestyles at odds with a libertarian social order would be “physically removed” from that community。Since then you have clarified how this phrase functions as an adjective，not a verb。In other words，people at odds with the agreedupon terms of a private community simply should live elsewhere，just as one town is physically separate from a nearby town.What are your thoughts about the con troversy today？

杰夫：你的拥趸和批评者都抓住了《民主》一书中的一段话，认为那些目标和生活方式与自由意志主义者的社会秩序相悖的人将被 “物理清除 “出这个社会。此后，你澄清了这个短语作为形容词而非动词的作用。换句话说，与私人社区商定的条款相抵触的人应该迁往别处，就像一个城镇与附近的城镇实际分开一样。你对今天的争议有什么看法？

HHH：This harks back to your earlier question concerning Hoppephobia.The whole affair，most likely initiated by one of the usual leftlibertarian suspects from the DC beltway，was a deliberate attempt to smear and malign me personally and with that also the program of a realistic or rightlibertarianism first outlined in the book。

霍普：这又回到了你之前提出的关于霍普恐惧症的问题。整个事件很可能是由华盛顿特区环城公路的左翼自由意志主义者发起的，他们蓄意抹黑和诋毁我个人，同时也抹黑和诋毁我在书中首次概述的现实主义或右翼自由主义纲领。

Essentially，I did not say anything more controversial or scandalous in the short passage than that anyone insisting on wearing a bathing suit on a nude beach may be expelled from this beach （but be free to look for another one），just as anyone insisting on nudity may be expelled from a formal dinner party （but be free to look for another party）。In my exam ple，however，it was not nudes but homosexuals that figured.I wrote that in a covenant established for the purpose of protecting family and kin，people openly displaying and habitually promoting homosexuality may be expelled and compelled to look for another place to live.But in some “woke” circles，mentioning homosexuality and expulsion in one and the same sentence apparently leads to intellectual blankout and a loss of all reading comprehension.

从根本上说，在这一小段文字中，我并没有说什么更具争议性或耸人听闻的话，只是说任何坚持在裸体海滩上穿泳衣的人都可能被逐出这个海滩（但可以自由地寻找另一个海滩），就像任何坚持裸体的人都可能被逐出正式的晚宴（但可以自由地寻找另一个宴会）一样。不过，在我的例子中，出现的不是裸体，而是同性恋。我写道，在一个以保护家庭和亲属为目的而建立的公约中，公开展示和习惯性宣扬同性恋的人可能会被驱逐，并被迫另觅住处。但在某些 “觉醒 “的圈子里，在同一句话中提到同性恋和驱逐，显然会导致大脑短路和所有阅读理解能力的丧失。

Ultimately，the entire smear campaign failed and even backfired，only increasing my own popularity and the influence of the book。

最终，整个抹黑运动失败了，甚至适得其反，反而提高了我自身的知名度和这本书的影响力。

JD：At your Property and freedom conference in Turkey you have spoken on the process of “decivilization，” whereby positive law overtakes natural law under the domination of a monopolized state actor。property rights and adjudication of conflicts fall under the grasp of this monopoly power。We like your conception of the opposite：a social order emerging from “justice principles，” taking the form of a private law society—entirely voluntary—more in harmony with simple natural order。It sounds better and more reasonable than anarchism to ordinary people! Are anarchocapitalism and resulting private “covenant com munities” actually far less radical than commonly thought？ Are they in fact outgrowths of natural law concepts that many people already accept？

杰夫：在土耳其举行的财产与自由学会的会议上，你谈到了 “去文明化 “进程，即在垄断国家行动人的主导下，实在法取代了自然法。产权和冲突的裁决都在这种垄断权力的掌控之下。我们喜欢你提出的相反概念：一种从 “公正原则 “中产生的社会秩序，其形式为私法社会——完全自愿原则——与朴素简明的自然秩序更加和谐融洽！对普通人来说，这听起来比无政府主义更好、更合理！是否无政府资本主义和由此产生的私人 “盟约社区 “实际上远没有人们想象的那么激进？它们实际上是许多人已经接受的自然法概念的产物吗？

HHH：Indeed，yes，and yes again.Even if it appears to be little more than a shift in semantics，for the reasons you mention I have long preferred the terms “privatelaw society” and “natural order” to “anarchocapitalisM.” because everyone is familiar with the basics of private law.From our everyday lives，we know what property is and implies and how it is acquired and transferred （and how not）。As well，we know what an exchange，an agreement，and a contract are （and what is not to count as such）。There is nothing difficult or especially demanding about the natural law of property and contract。Indeed，in many small villages people live by these laws，without the presence or pressure of any out side government police or judge.There is selfpolicing。Yet whoever polices is subject to the same rules as everyone else.And if need be，in the case of conflict，there is selfarbitration and selfadjudication.But whoever acts as judge or arbiter，too，is subject to natural private law.

霍普：的确，是的，完全没错。即使这看起来只是语义上的变化，但由于你提到的原因，我长期以来更喜欢 “私法社会 “和 “自然秩序 “这两个词，而不是 “无政府资本主义”。因为每个人都熟悉私法的基本原理。在日常生活中，我们知道什么是财产、财产意味着什么、财产如何获取和转让（以及如何不能获取和转让）。此外，我们还知道什么是交换、协议和契约（以及什么不能算作交换、协议和契约）。关于财产和契约的自然法并不困难，也没有什么特别的要求。事实上，在许多小村庄里，人们遵循这些法律生活，没有任何政府警察或法官的存在或压力。这就是自治。然而，无论谁来管理，都必须遵守与其他人相同的规则。必要时，在发生冲突的情况下，可以进行自我仲裁和自我裁决。但无论谁担任法官或仲裁者，也都要遵守自然私法。

The emergence of a natural order ruled by private law，then，is not difficult to explaiN.What is difficult to explain is the emergence of a state.Why should there be anyone，any institution，not subject to private law？ Why should there be someone who can make laws？ Why should there be an institution that can exempt itself from the rules applied to everyone else？ Why should there be some policemen who cannot violate the law or some judges who cannot break the law？ Why，indeed，should there be any ultimate and final judge，exempt from any and all prosecution？ certainly，all of this cannot be the result of an agreement or contract，because no one in his right mind would sign on to a contract which stipulated that in any conflict that might arise between you and me，you will always have the final word.

那么，由私法统治的自然秩序的出现就不难解释了。难以解释的是国家的出现。为什么会有不受私法约束的人和机构？为什么要有能够制定法律的人？为什么要有一个机构可以使自己不受适用于其他所有人的规则的约束？为什么有些警察不能违法，有些法官不能违法？事实上，为什么要有最终和最后的法官，可以免于任何所有的起诉？当然，所有这一切都不可能是协议或契约的结果，因为任何一个头脑正常的人都不会签署这样一份契约，规定在你我之间无论出现何种冲突时，你永远拥有最终话事权。

JD： let’s turn to immigration.You propose contractual admission of immi grants，with sponsors （or immigrants themselves） funding a bond or liability insurance to pay for any criminal or civil cost imposed on exist ing taxpayers.Immigrants remain in their new home conditionally for an initial period，subject to revocation of admission for contractual violations.They do not receive “welfare”； citizenship and voting rights come much later。You refer to this System as satisfying the “full cost principle.” in many ways this is far more “open” than open borders proposals，because it requires no checkpoints or intake centers or vast border police agencies.It uses contracts and market forces to shape immigration，rather than political machinations.This seems far more humane and practical，yet you are assailed as antiimmigration.What explains this？

杰夫：让我们来谈谈移民问题。你建议以契约的方式接纳移民，由担保人（或移民本人）出资购买保证金或责任保险，以支付现有纳税人承担的任何刑事或民事费用。移民在新家有条件地逗留一段时间，如果违反契约则会被取消入境资格。他们不享受 “福利”；公民权和选举权要很晚才有。你称这一制度符合 “完全成本原则”。在许多方面，这比开放边境的建议要 “开放 “得多，因为它不需要检查站、收容中心或庞大的边境警察机构。它利用契约和市场力量来影响移民，而不是政治阴谋。这似乎更加人道和实用，但你却被抨击为反移民。这该如何解释？

HHH：As already touched upon，in some circles the mere mention of two words in one sentence—this time “immigration” and “restriction”—is sufficient to trigger a blankout。No need to read any further and try to comprehend.First homophobe，then xenophobe.In fact，I have never met a serious advocate of “no immigration，period!” Nor have I ever taken a stand that could be described as antiimmigration.Instead I have always argued for the commonsensical approach of selective immigration.

霍普：正如前面所提到的，在某些圈子里，仅仅在一句话中提到两个词——这次是“移民”和“限制”——就足以引发一片脑筋短路。不必再读，也不必试图理解。先是恐同，后是仇外。事实上，我从未见过一个认真主张“禁止移民，句号!”的人。我也从未采取过可以被称为反移民的立场。相反，我一直主张有选择地移民这一符合常识的做法。

ideally，with all pieces of land and everything on them privately owned，there would be a huge variety of entrance requirements，i.e.，of degrees，respectively，of openness and closedness.I have described this，for instance，in my piece “Natural Order，the State，and the immigration problem.” Airports，roads，shopping malls，hotels，etc。，would be rather open，whereas residential associations，private retreats，clubs，etc。，might be almost completely closed.In any case，however，all migra tion would be by invitation and invariably the full cost principle would apply。Either the inviting host or the invited guest or both jointly would have to pay the full cost associated with the guest’s presence.No cost could be shifted and externalized onto third parties，and the inviter and/or invitee would be held liable for any and all damage resulting from the invitation to the property of others.

在理想的情况下，如果所有土地和土地上的一切都归私人所有，就会有各种各样的准入条件，表示了开放和封闭的程度。例如，我曾在文章《自然秩序、国家和移民问题》”中对此进行过描述。机场、道路、购物中心、酒店等等，都是相当开放的，而住宅区、私人会所、俱乐部等等，则几乎是完全封闭的。在任何情况下，无论如何，所有移民都是应邀移民，并一律适用完全成本原则。邀请的所有者或受邀的客人或双方共同，都必须支付与客人的到来相关的全部成本。任何成本都不得转嫁和外化给第三方，邀请者和/或被邀请者将对此一邀请行为给他人财产造成的任何及所有损失负责。

If and as long as there is a state with socalled public property in place，as happens to be the case in today’s world，then the best one may hope for is an immigration policy that tries to approach this ideal of a natural order。You have mentioned some possible measures in this regard.But to advocate，under current conditions，the adoption of a “free immigration” policy—every foreigner can come in and move and stay around the entire country，no questions asked—is certainly no way to achieve this goal。To the contrary，it would make forced integration and costshifting ubiquitous，and quickly end in disaster。only people devoid of all common sense could possibly advocate any such policy。

如果并且只要存在一个拥有所谓的公有财产的国家，碰巧就像当今世界的情况一样，那么人们所希望的最好办法就是移民政策能够努力接近这种自然秩序的理想。你刚才提到了一些可行的措施。但是，在目前的条件下，主张采取 “自由移民 “政策——每个外国人都可以进来，在整个国家流动和逗留，没有任何问题——肯定不是实现这一目标的途径。恰恰相反，这将使强制一体化和成本转嫁无处不在，并很快导致灾难。只有毫无常识的人才会主张、支持这样的政策。

JD：In your exchanges with Walter Block about immigration，he argues that all government property ought to be subject to open homesteading by immigrants.Your response is often characterized as “taxpayers should own taxpayerfunded public goods.” But in fact your argument applies only in the context of Block’s argument，to disprove the notion that public property should be viewed as “unowned.” If we must have public property，state agents at least ought to act as trustees of that property on behalf of the taxpayers who fund it。Accurate？

杰夫：在你与沃尔特-布洛克（Walter Block）就移民问题进行的交流中，他认为所有政府财产都应由移民公开拓殖占有。你的回应通常被描述为 “纳税人应该拥有纳税人资助的公共商品”。但事实上，你的论点只适用于布洛克的论点，即推翻公有财产应被视为 “无主 “的观点。如果我们必须拥有公有财产，那么国家代理人至少应该作为受托人，代表出资的纳税人管理这些财产。是否如此？

HHH：Accurate.let me only add that in today’s world the sometimes mentioned “wilderness” of mountaintops，swamps，tundra，etc。，is no longer truly wild and thus ready to be homesteaded.There is no inch left on earth today that is not claimed to be the “property” of some government。Whatever wilderness there is，then，it is wilderness that has been barred and prevented by some government，i.e.，with taxpayer funds，from being homesteaded by private parties （most likely by neighboring property owners）。If anyone，it is domestic taxpayers who are the legiti mate owners of such wilderness.

霍普：确实如此。我只想补充一点，在当今世界，不时提到的山川、沼泽、冻土带等 “荒野 “已不再是真正的荒野，因而也不再是随时可以开垦拓殖。如今，地球上没有一寸土地不是政府的 “财产”。那么，不管有多少荒野，都是被某些政府，即用纳税人的钱，禁止和阻止私人团体（很可能是邻近的所有者）开垦拓殖的荒野。如果说有谁是这种荒野的合法所有者，那就是国内纳税人。

And quite apart from this，even if some wilderness were opened for homesteading，it would be neighboring，domestic residents，who had been most immediately and directly barred from doing so before，who should have the first shot at homesteading，well before any distant foreigner。

除此以外，即使开放一些荒地供人们开垦拓殖，也应该是邻近的、国内的居民，他们以前曾被最直接地禁止这样做，他们应该比任何遥远的外国人更早获得开垦拓殖土地的机会。

JD：Hoppean argumentation ethics remains a subject of rigorous debate，most recently between （economist） Robert Murphy and （legal theorist） Stephan Kinsella.How important is a purely logical justification for human liberty，as opposed to Rothbard’s normative natural law argu ments or Mises’s utilitarianism？ Is the shared human experience of physical personhood the best starting point for arguments against the initiation of violence，i.e.，arguments against the state？

杰夫：霍普论证伦理学仍然是一个激烈争论的主题，最近在（经济学家）罗伯特-墨菲（Robert Murphy）和（法律理论家）斯蒂芬-金塞拉（Stephan Kinsella）之间展开了争论。相对于罗斯巴德的规范自然法论证或米塞斯的功利主义，人类自由的纯逻辑论证有多重要？对于反对暴力来源的论点，即反对国家的论点，人类共同的人身体验是否是最好的出发点？

HHH：There are some questions that can be answered definitively by the performance of a simple experiment。For many others that is not possible.Sometimes we are satisfied with answers that sound plausible or appear convincing on intuitive grounds.But to the curious mind，some questions are of such great importance as to ask for more than just plausibility or intuition.

霍普：有些问题通过简单的实验就能得到明确的答案。但对许多其他问题来说，这是不可能的。有时，我们会满足于那些听起来似是而非或凭直觉就能令人信服的答案。但是，对于好奇脑袋来说，有些问题非常重要，以至于需要的不仅仅是感觉有理或直觉有理。

Transcendental arguments are designed to satisfy this desire for more，i.e.，for logical certainty or ultimate justification.They are answers to the skeptic who denies that there is any such thing as ulti mate justification and a priori truths.They try to establish，by means of selfreflection，what the skeptic must already presuppose as given and true simply in order to be the skeptic that he is，i.e.，to make his skepticism possible.one has reached certainty about something，then，if one can show that even a skeptic must admit to it，if only in order to meaningfully express his very own doubt。

先验论证就是为了更好地满足人们的这种渴望，寻求逻辑上的确定性或终极证成。怀疑论者否认存在终极证成和先验真理，先验论证就是对怀疑论者的回答。他们试图通过自我反思来确定，怀疑论者仅仅为了成为他所是的那个怀疑论者，即让他的怀疑论成为可能，就必然已经预设了既定且真实的东西。也就是说，如果一个人能够表明即使是怀疑论者也必须承认某件事，哪怕只是为了有意义地表达他自己的怀疑，那么这个人就已经对某件事达到了确定性。

The ethics of argumentation is the answer to the ethical relativist，i.e.，to any one person claiming—as a proponent visàvis an opponent in argumentation—that there is no such thing as a rational or objective ethics.

论证伦理学是对伦理相对主义者的回答，即对任何一个人——作为论证的正反双方——声称不存在理性或客观伦理学的回答。

In response to the relativist proponent it is essentially pointed out that by virtue of his own engagement in argumentation he has already effectively rejected his own thesis，because argumentation is an activity，a special，conflictfree form of interaction between a proponent and an opponent with the specific purpose of clarifying and possibly coming to a mutual agreement concerning some rival truth claims.As such，it presupposes the acceptance as valid of such norms or rules of human conduct as make argumentation itself possible.And it is impossible，then，to argue against and deny the validity of such norms without thereby running into a performative or dialectic contradiction.

在回应相对主义的支持者时，关键要点明的是，凭借他自己参与论证这一行为，他实际上已经有效地否定了他自己的论点，因为论证是一种活动，是支持者和反对者之间一种特殊的、无冲突的互动形式，其特定目的是澄清并可能就一些对立的真理主张达成相互一致。因此，论证的前提是接受人类行为规范或规则的有效性，而这些规范或规则使论证本身成为可能。因此，反对和否认这些规则的有效性而不陷入践言冲突或辩证性矛盾是不可能的。

The praxeological presuppositions of argumentation，then，are twofold—and we all know them from personal experience more generally also as the conditions and requirements of peace and peaceful interactions：first，each person is entitled to exclusive control or owner ship of his physical body （that he and only he can control directly，at will） so as to act independently of others and come to a conclusion on his own.And secondly，for the same reason of mutually independent standing or autonomy，both proponent and opponent must be entitled to their respective prior possessions，i.e.，the exclusive control of all other，external means of action appropriated indirectly by them prior to and independent of one another。

那么，论证的行动学前提有两个方面——我们都从个人经验中更普遍地了解到它们，也是和平与和平交往的条件和要求：第一，每个人都有权排他性地控制或拥有自己的身体（他且只有他能够直接控制，随意控制），从而独立于他人行事，独自得出结论。其次，出于相互独立的地位或自主权的同样原因，赞成者和反对者都必须有权拥有各自的先占财产，即对他们在彼此之前和彼此独立的情况下间接占有的所有其他外部行动手段的排他性控制权。

Rothbard immediately accepted my proof。In fact，he hailed it as a major breakthrougH.As for the various criticisms I have encountered，I have not been impressed，to put it mildly。

罗斯巴德立即接受了我的证明。事实上，他称赞这是一个重大突破。至于我所遇到的各种批评，委婉地说，我并没有被说服。

JD：Are you generally optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the West？ Do you think sclerotic，bureaucratic states will yield to happier and more decentralized political arrangements？ Or do you think Washing ton，DC，Brussels，et al。will repeat the terrible mistakes of the twentieth century：aggressive foreign policy，unrestrained central banking，and political globalism？

杰夫：拓你对西方的未来普遍持乐观还是悲观态度？拓你认为僵化、官僚化的国家会屈服于更合适、更去中心化的政治安排吗？或者拓你认为华盛顿特区、布鲁塞尔等地是否会重蹈 20 世纪的覆辙：侵略性外交政策、不受约束的中央银行和政治全球主义？

HHH：In the short and medium run，I am pessimistic。true，our living standards have gone up and technological progress allows us to do things not long ago thought impossible，but at the same time the coercive powers of the state have continuously expanded，and private property rights and personal freedom have been correspondingly diminished.The process of political and monetary centralization has proceeded unabated.Central banks create more money and credit out of thin air than ever before.Government debt and obligations have risen to exor bitant heights，so as to make some future default a virtual certainty。All the while taxes and regulations have brought economic growth to a standstill。It is clear，then，that a severe economic meltdown is in the making。

霍普：从短期和中期来看，我是悲观的。诚然，我们的生活水平提高了，技术进步使我们能够做一些不久前还认为不可能做到的事情，但与此同时，国家的强制性权力不断扩大，私有财产权和个人自由相应减少。政治和货币集权进程有增无减。央行凭空创造的货币和信贷比以往任何时候都多。政府债务和承付款项已上升到极高的水平，以至于未来的违约几乎已成定局。与此同时，各种税收和管制使得经济增长停滞不前。显然，一场严重的经济崩溃正在酝酿之中。

At the same time，throughout most Western countries the popula tions have been thoroughly dehomogenized by immigration policies favoring multiculturalisM.And migration into the West by nonWest erners has been massively increased still as a fallout of the endless US wars and military adventures in the Middle East and elsewhere.Most Western countries now contain within their own native cultures large pockets and clusters of people of not just different，but rival and even hostile cultures.

与此同时，在大多数西方国家，由于移民政策倾向于多元文化主义，人口已经彻底去同质化。由于美国在中东和其他地区无休止的战争和军事冒险，非西方人向西方国家的移民仍在大量增加。现在，大多数西方国家的本土文化中都有大量不同文化背景的人聚居在一起，甚至是敌对文化背景的人聚居在一起。

Combined with a major economic crisis，this makes for an explo sive mixture，the ingredients of a civil war。

叠加严重的经济危机，这是一种爆炸性的混合物，是内战的成因。

It is amazing how the ruling elites have so far managed to keep the show running。But there can be no doubt that the day of reckoning must eventually come，and when it does I see two likely scenarios of how to escape the danger of civil war。The first one is the strong man variant，an authoritarian regime that tries to hold all things together by means of centralized，dictatorial powers.And the second variant is that of decentralization：of secession，separation，and disaggregation so as to approach the ideal of a natural order。Naturally，the second variant is the one favored by libertarians （and recommended by Mises）。Yet to make this variant win，libertarians have to prepare the ground.The public must be educated about the economic and social advantages of small，competing political units，and it is necessary to find and nurture potential charismatic leaders for the various decentralist and secession ist causes.

令人惊讶的是，统治精英们至今仍在设法维持这场狂欢。但毫无疑问，清算之日终将到来，而当清算之日来临之时，我认为有两种可能的情况可以摆脱内战的危险。第一种是强人变体模式，即独裁政权试图通过国家主义和专制权力来控制一切。第二种变体模式是去中心化：脱离、分离和解体，以接近自然秩序的理想。自然，第二种变体模式是自由意志主义者所青睐的（也是米塞斯所推荐的）。然而，要使这一变体模式获胜，自由意志主义者必须做好准备。必须让公众了解小规模、相互竞争的政治单位在经济和社会方面的优势，还必须为各种去中心化理论和分离主义事业寻找和培养潜在的魅力型领导人。

JD：Finally，how does living in Turkey affect your perspective？ Are old notions of East and West breaking down，and should we consider looking East for allies in the fight for civilization and property？

杰夫：最后，生活在土耳其会如何影响你的观点？旧有的东西方观念是否正在瓦解，我们是否应该考虑在争取文明和财产的斗争中向东方寻求盟友？

HHH：As mentioned before and emphasized also by Mises，the idea of liberty is originally a Western idea，created by white Western males，and although it has lost some strength there，it is still most prominent and widespread in the West。That does not mean that it is restricted to the West or only accessible to Western minds，however。

霍普：正如米塞斯之前提到并强调的，自由思想最初是西方的思想，由西方白人男性创造，虽然在西方日渐式微，但在西方仍然最为突出和普遍。但这并不意味着它仅限于西方，也不意味着只有西方人才能理解它。

If there is anything I have learned from living in various countries and from my many travels，it is that there exists far more sociocultural variety and variance on earth than the typical Westerner might imag ine：not just the variety of different countries，but even more so the regional and local variations within each country。Almost everywhere you can find a few libertarians or classical liberals，and you should look out for them wherever they are，of course.But just as we must learn in our private dealings with other individuals how to distinguish between potential converts on the one hand and hopeless cases on the other，so as not to waste our time and effort to no end，so，and for the same reason，we must also learn in our search for allies how to distinguish between hopeful，less hopeful，or even hopeless countries，regions，and localities.And we must realistically recognize that different places offer hugely different and unequal prospects and potential in this regard.

如果说我在各国的旅居生涯中学到了什么的话，那就是地球上存在的社会文化多样性和差异性远远超出了典型西方人的想象：不仅是不同国家的多样性，而且更多的是每个国家内部的地区性和地方性差异。几乎在任何一个地方，你都能找到一些自由意志主义者或古典自由主义者，当然，无论他们在哪里，你都应该留意他们。但是，正如我们在与他人私下打交道时必须学会如何一方面区分潜在的可转变者，另一方面区分无可救药者的情况，以免无端地浪费我们的时间和精力，因此，出于同样的原因，在寻找盟友时，我们也必须学会如何区分有希望的、希望较小的，甚至是没有希望的国家、地区和地方。我们必须实事求是地认识到，不同的地方在这方面提供了极其不同且不平等的前景和潜力。

Afterword by Stephan Kinsella

后记 *

斯蒂芬-金塞拉

The book you hold in your hands—or that resides in memory bits on your digital device—provides a perfect illustration of the power of Austroliber tarian ideas.Brainpower and genius alone are not enough to provide sound social analysis.one also needs a coherent understanding of economics，in particular of MisesianAustrian praxeologybased economics.And one needs a coherent and realistic understanding of politics and the state—which is to say，antistate libertarianism.

你手中的这本书——或者你的数码设备上的内存中的这本书——完美地诠释了奥派自由意志主义思想的力量。要进行合理的社会分析，仅凭脑力和天才是不够的。我们还需要对经济学，尤其是以米塞斯-奥派行动学为基础的经济学有连贯一致的理解。此外，我们还需要对政治和国家有一个连贯而现实的理解——也就是说，要有反国家主义的自由意志主义。

We all encounter and learn from brilliant thinkers，but there is often something missing。This is usually because they are insufficiently aware of the true predatorial nature of the state and the role it has played in the history of human society。Or there are，to put it kindly，gaps in their knowledge of economics.How many times have you read a brilliant thinker only to see them err on a crucial issue because of some mainstream economic or statist assumption？ It is a frustrating experience.

我们都会遇到杰出的思想家，并向他们学习，但往往会有所欠缺。这通常是因为他们对国家真正的掠夺性本质及其在人类社会历史中所扮演的角色认识不足。有多少次，当你读到一位杰出的思想家的文章时，却发现他们在某个关键问题上因为某些主流经济学或国家主义的假设而犯错？这是一种令人沮丧的经历。

So genius is not enough.But it helps.After all，the problems and issues at hand are not easy。Great intellect，combined with a realistic，sober view of politics and economics，and with a passion for truth，can achieve great things：a clarifying vision of the nature of the institutions of society。Dr.Hoppe was perfectly placed by the currents of fate to become today’s lead ing libertarian social theorist，which is to say：today’s leading social theorist。Professor Hoppe’s genius is evident in the razorsharp clarity and pre cision of his words and arguments，and his command of philosophy and economics and related fields such as history，sociology，and the philosophy of science.His formal education originated in his studies at the University of Saarland in Saarbrücken，the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main，and at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor，which included a PhD in philosophy under the famous European philosopher Jür gen Habermas and a prestigious “Habilitation” degree on the Foundations of Sociology and Economics.

因此，光有天才是不够的。但它是有帮助的。毕竟，当前的问题和议题并不简单。伟大的智慧，加上对政治和经济现实、冷静的看法，以及对真理的热情，可以成就伟大的事业：对社会制度的本质有清晰的认识。霍普博士在命运的洪流中完美地成为了当今最主要的自由意志主义者社会理论家，也就是说：当今最主要的社会理论家。霍普教授的天才表现在他的言辞和论点极其清晰准确，对哲学、经济学以及历史学、社会学和科学哲学等相关领域的精通。他曾在萨尔布吕肯的萨尔大学、美因河畔法兰克福的约翰-沃尔夫冈-歌德大学和安娜堡的密歇根大学接受正规教育，其中包括在欧洲著名哲学家尤尔根-哈贝马斯门下获得哲学博士学位，以及社会学和经济学基础方面的著名 “荣誉 “学位。

But Professor Hoppe’s real education was autodidactic。First，as a main stream leftwinger，his eyes were opened by the Austrian economist Eugen von BöhmBawerk’s critique of Marxism.Later，after encountering and then rejecting the logical Positivism of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school，he discovered Mises and his unique approacH.As he wrote in an interview in the Austrian Economics newsletter：

Independently，I had concluded that economic laws were a priori and discoverable through deduction.Then I stumbled on Mises’s Human action.That was the first time I found someone who had the same view； not only that，he had already worked out the entire System.From that point on，I was a Misesian.[497]

但霍普教授的真正教育是自学式的。首先，作为一名主流左翼人士，奥地利经济学家欧根-冯-庞巴维克（Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk）对马克思主义的批判让他大开眼界。后来，在遇到并拒绝了米尔顿-弗里德曼和芝加哥学派的逻辑实证主义之后，他发现了米塞斯及其独特的方法。正如他在接受《奥地利经济学通讯》的一次采访中写道的那样：

我独立地得出结论，经济规律是先验的的，可以通过演绎发现。后来，我偶然读到了米塞斯的《人的行动》。这是我第一次发现有人持有相同的观点，不仅如此，他还推导出了整个体系。从那时起，我就成了一名米塞斯主义者。

And then，naturally，he discovered the work of Murray N.Rothbard （1926–1995），the most prominent American student of Mises and the fountainhead of the modern libertarian movement。（See also the discus sion of these matters in cH.30 of the current volume，”My Path to Austrian Economics”， pp.545–54）。In the mid1980s Hoppe moved to the United States to study under，collaborate，and work with Rothbard.Since these days he has produced a cornucopia of political and economic insights，con tained in his books：Handeln und Erkennen （1976），Kritik der kausalwissen schaftlichen Sozialforschung （1983），Eigentum，Anarchie，und Staat （1987），his magnum opus A Theory of socialism and Capitalism （1989），The economics and Ethics of Private Property （1993，enlarged 2nd edition 2006），Democracy：The God that Failed （2001），and The myth of National defense （editor，2003）。His works have been translated into at least 23 languages，not counting EnglisH.[498]

随后，他自然而然地发现了默里-罗斯巴德（1926-1995）的研究成果，他是米塞斯在美国最杰出的学生，也是现代自由意志主义者运动的先驱（参见本卷第30页，《我的奥派经济学之路》，第545-54页）。20 世纪 80 年代中期，霍普移居美国，师从罗斯巴德并与之合作。此后，他发表了大量政治和经济方面的真知灼见，这些著作包括：《行动与认识》（1976 年）、《对因果科学社会研究的批判》（1983 年），《财产、无政府状态与国家》（1987 年），他的代表作《社会主义和资本主义理论》（1989），《私有财产的经济学和伦理学》（1993，2006 年增订第二版），《民主：失败的上帝》（2001），以及《国防的神话》（主编，2003）。他的作品至少被翻译成 23 种语言，其中不包括英语。

But the point here is not to provide an encomium to the contributions of a single man.That has been done already，in the Festschrift Property，freedom，and Society：ssays in Honor of HansHermann Hoppe （Mises institute，2009）。Rather，it is to recognize the power of the anarchoAustrianlibertarian intellectual framework，which we see realized in the work of Professor Hoppe.

但这里的重点并不是赞扬一个人的贡献。在《财产、自由和社会：纪念汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普》（米塞斯研究院，2009年）一书中已经有这样的论述。在霍普教授的著作中，我们看到了无政府奥派自由意志主义思想框架的力量。

many scholars influenced by Mises and Austrian economics give prax eology—Mises’s a priori logic of action—lip service.But more so than any other living thinker，Hoppe actually applies praxeology，one of the most powerful modes of scientific analysis yet discovered.It permeates his writ ing。His reasoning is rooted in it。Hoppe swims in the plasma of praxeolo gy。[499] It informs all aspects of his theoretical edifice：not only economic theory and applications，but political theory，ethics，and epistemology。

许多受米塞斯和奥地利经济学影响的学者对行动学——米塞斯的先验行动逻辑——叶公好龙。但与其他任何在世的思想家相比，霍普更善于应用行动学，这是迄今为止发现的最强大的科学分析模式之一。它贯穿于他的著作中。他的推理根植于此。霍普畅游在行动学海洋中。它贯穿于他理论大厦的方方面面：不仅包括经济理论和应用，还包括政治理论、伦理学和认识论。

The power of the Austrolibertarian framework is that it opens up new vistas of understanding in the social sciences.It permits clarity and under standing where before there was muddy water。Professor Hoppe is the best exemplar to date of this methodological approach； his System improves upon that even of his masters，Mises and Rothbard，if only because he has stood on their shoulders.But still。read this book，and others，like A Theory of socialism and Capitalism （TSC） and The Economics and Ethics of Private Property （EEPP），and you will see something special about Hoppe’s work。It is crystal clear，for one thing； what he means is never in doubt。It is rigorous，and Systematic，and integrated.It is based on a coherent，realistic，and ratio nal view of the world and of human interpersonal relations.It is obviously motivated by a passion for truth and justice.

奥派自由意志主义框架的力量在于，它为理解社会科学开辟了新的视野。它让以前浑浊的水变得清晰明了。霍普教授是迄今为止使用这种方法论的最佳典范；他的体系甚至比他的导师——米塞斯和罗斯巴德——的体系更完善，这仅仅是因为他站在了他们的肩膀上。但是。读一读这本书，再读一读《社会主义与资本主义理论》（TSC）和《私有财产的经济学与伦理学》（EEPP）等其他著作，你就会发现霍普著作的特别之处。首先，霍普的著作清晰明了，表达毋庸置疑。严谨、系统、综合。它基于对世界和人际关系的连贯、现实和理性的看法。这显然是出于对真理和公正的热爱

And we see this in The Great Fiction，a magnificent collection of essays informed by this same spirit and approacH.This book contains some of my favorite Hoppean essays，for example，“The Ethics and Economics of Private Property” （cH.2），“Of Common，Public，and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization” （cH.5，first published in my journal Libertarian Papers），“on certainty and uncertainty” （cH.16），“The private Production of defense” （cH.14），“In defense of Extreme rationalism” （cH.18，a good counterpart to Rothbard’s classic “In defense of ‘Extreme Apriorism’”），[500] and “Property，Causality，and Liability” （cH.20，which I saw Hoppe present at the symposium on Reinach and Rothbard at the Mises institute in March 2001）。The current，expanded edition contains five addi tional chapters with a treasure trove of material such as the delicious skewer ing of Steven Pinker in cH.25，“The Libertarian Quest for a Grand Histori cal Narrative” （itself somewhat reminiscent of Hoppe’s biting criticism of Robert Nozick’s “razzledazzle，” in comparison to Rothbard’s Systematic and elaborated arguments approach to political philosophy）。[501]

我们在《伟大的虚构》中看到了这一点，这是一本以同样的精神和方法收录的宏伟论文集。这本书收录了一些我最喜欢的霍普的论文，例如，《私有财产的伦理学与经济学》（第二章），《关于共有、公共、私有财产以及全面私有化的基本原理》（第五章，首次发表于我的期刊《自由主义论文》），《论确定性与不确定性》（第十六章），《安保的私人生产》（第十四章），《为极致理性主义辩护》（第十八章，与罗斯巴德的经典著作《捍卫极端先验论》相得益彰），以及《财产、因果关系和责任》（第二十章，我看到霍普在 2001 年 3 月米塞斯研究院举行的关于里纳奇和罗斯巴德的研讨会上发表了这篇论文）。目前的增订版增加了额外的五章，其中包含大量宝贵的资料，如第 25 章《自由意志主义者对宏大历史叙事的探寻》中对史蒂文-平克（Steven Pinker）的精彩嘲讽（与罗斯巴德（Rothbard）系统而详尽的政治哲学论证方法相比，霍普对罗伯特-诺齐克（Robert Nozick）的 “眼花缭乱（razzledazzle） “的尖锐批评让人有些回味）。

let me highlight a few examples of Professor Hoppe’s application of Austrian praxeology and the libertarianrealist understanding of the state to various issues，in The Great Fiction and in his other writings.We may note first his careful attention to rigorous，essentialist definitions.For example，Hoppe recognizes that while socialism typically refers to state or collective ownership of the means of production，its essence is the “institutionalized interference with or aggression against private property and private property claims” （TSC，2）。In other words，any public or institutionalized aggression is inherently socialistic，and gives rise to the problems that accompany standard central planning。Indeed，as Hoppe elsewhere notes，“Societies are not simply capitalist or socialist。Indeed，all existing societies are socialist to some extent。” （TSC，10） The state is always socialistic，and socialism always implies a state.

我想强调一下，在《伟大的虚构》及其他著作中，霍普教授将奥派行动学和自由意志主义的现实主义对国家的理解应用于各种问题。首先，我们可以注意到他对严格的、本质主义的定义的小心谨慎的关注。例如，霍普认识到，虽然社会主义通常是指生产资料的国家或集体所有制，但其本质是 “对私有财产和私有财产主张的制度化干预或侵犯”（《社会主义和资本主义理论》TSC，第二章）。换句话说，任何公共的或制度化的侵犯行为本质上都是社会主义的，都会产生与标准的中央计划相伴而生的问题。事实上，正如霍普在其他地方指出的，”社会不是纯粹的资本主义或纯粹的纯社会主义。事实上，所有现存社会都是某种程度的社会主义社会（《社会主义和资本主义理论》TSC，10）。国家就是社会主义，社会主义就是国家。

As a counterpart to his essentialist definition of socialism，Hoppe’s definition of the state gets straight to the heart of the matter：

let me begin with the definition of a state.What must an agent be able to do to qualify as a state？ This agent must be able to insist that all conflicts among the inhabitants of a given territory be brought to him for ultimate decisionmaking or be subject to his final review.In particular，this agent must be able to insist that all conflicts involving him be adjudicated by him or his agent。And implied in the power to exclude all others from acting as ultimate judge，as the second defin ing characteristic of a state，is the agent’s power to tax：to unilaterally determine the price that justice seekers must pay for his services.

Based on this definition of a state，it is easy to understand why a desire to control a state might exist。For whoever is a monopolist of final arbitration within a given territory can make laws.And he who can legislate can also tax。Surely，this is an enviable position.[p.3]

与他对社会主义的本质主义定义相对应，霍普对国家的定义直指问题的核心：

让我从国家的定义开始。一个代理人必须能够做什么才能有资格被视为一个国家呢？这一代理人必须能够坚持要求将某一领土上的居民之间的所有冲突提交给他作最后裁决，或者接受他的最终审查。特别是，这个代理人必须能够坚持所有涉及他的冲突都由他或他的代理人来裁决。作为国家的第二个定义特征，排除所有其他人担任最终法官的权力隐含着代理人的征税权：单方面决定寻求公正者必须为代理人的服务支付的价格。

根据国家的这一定义，就不难理解为什么会存在控制国家的愿望。因为谁垄断了特定领土内的最终裁决权，谁就能制定法律。谁能立法，谁就能征税。很显然，这是一个令人羡慕的角色。（第三页）

once you see the state in these clear terms，its nature becomes clear。As Hoppe elaborates in TGF，the state has to coopt the intellectuals to maintain the illusion—the fiction—that it is necessary and good.

一旦你用这些清晰的术语来看待国家，它的本质就一目了然了。正如霍普在《伟大的虚构》一书中所阐述的，国家必须笼络知识分子，以维持一种假象——虚构——即国家是必要的、好的。

Among Professor Hoppe’s signal contributions to political theory is his recognition of the crucial importance of scarcity in political philosophy。without scarcity，there would be no social or economic problem to solve.“A conflict is only possible if goods are scarce.only then will there arise the need to formulate rules that make orderly—conflictfree—social cooperation possible.” （p.9； cH.19 et pass.） This also gives rise to his crucial insight that property rights are rights to control physical resources，and thus are rights only to the physical integrity of these goods—not to the “value” of these resources.As he writes：

property ownership means the exclusive control of a particular person over specific physical objects and spaces.Conversely，property rights invasion means the uninvited physical damage or diminution of things and territories owned by other persons.In contrast，a widely held view holds that the damage or diminution of the value （or price） of someone’s property also constitutes a punishable offensE.[p.15]

霍普教授对政治理论的重大贡献之一，是他认识到稀缺性在政治哲学中的极端重要性。没有稀缺性，就没有需要解决的社会或经济问题。”只有当物品稀缺时，冲突才有可能发生。只有这时，才有必要制定规则，使有序的——无冲突的——社会合作成为可能”。（第 9 页；第十九章及其它各处）。这也引出了他的重要见解，即财产权是控制物理资源的权利，因此只是对这些物品的物理完整性的权利，而不是对这些资源的 “价值 “的权利。他写到：

财产所有权是指某一具体的个人对特定实物和空间的排他性控制权。反之，对财产权利的侵犯则是指对他人所有的物品和领土造成未经邀请的物理损害或减损。相反，一种广泛接受的观点认为，损害或降低他人财产的价值（或价格）也构成应受惩罚的犯罪行为。（第十五页）

The significance of this insight can hardly be overstated，as the falla cious view of property rights in “value” underpins a host of confused ideas，including intellectual property，which Hoppe also rightly，and explicitly，rejects （p.509）。

这一见解的意义无论怎样强调都不为过，因为 “价值 “产权的荒谬观点支撑着一系列混乱的思想，包括知识产权，而霍普也旗帜鲜明地反对这些观点（第509页）。

Hoppe’s notion of scarcity，interpersonal conflict，and the need for property allocation norms builds on Mises’s praxeological understanding of human action as employing necessarily scarce means to causally achieve one’s chosen ends.The ends one chooses and the means one decides to employ to causally bring about one’s ends are guided by one’s knowledge； scarce means are employed that are causally believed to help accomplish the desired goal。The means，being scarce，rivalrous，can only be used by one agent and thus，property norms are necessary to permit social cooperation.But the infor mation or ideas that guide the actor’s selection of ends and knowledge of causal laws to permit him to determine what means to choose，need not be owned—indeed，cannot be owned—as information is nonscarce.

… The idea of intellectual property rights is not just wrong and confused but dangerous.And I have already touched upon why this is so。ideas—recipes，formulas，statements，arguments，algorithms，theorems，melodies，patterns，rhythms，images，etc。—are certainly goods （insofar as they are good，not bad，recipes，etc。），but they are not scarce goods.once thought and expressed，they are free，inex haustible goods.I whistle a melody or write down a poem，you hear the melody or read the poem and reproduce or copy it。In doing so you have not taken anything away from me.I can whistle and write as before.In fact，the entire world can copy me and yet nothing is taken from me.（If I didn’t want anyone to copy my ideas I only have to keep them to myself and never express them.）

Now imagine I had been granted a property right in my melody or poem such that I could prohibit you from copying it or demand ing a royalty from you if you do。First：Doesn’t that imply，absurdly，that I，in turn，must pay royalties to the person （or his heirs） who invented whistling and writing，and further on to those，who invented soundmaking and language，and so on？ Second：In pre venting you from or making you pay for whistling my melody or reciting my poem，I am actually made a （partial） owner of you：of your physical body，your vocal chords，your paper，your pencil，etc。because you did not use anything but your own property when you copied me.If you can no longer copy me，then，this means that I，the intellectual property owner，have expropriated you and your “real” property。Which shows：intellectual property rights and real property rights are incompatible，and the promotion of intellectual property must be seen as a most dangerous attack on the idea of “real” property （in scarce goods）。[p.509]

霍普的稀缺性概念、人际冲突和财产界定规范的必要性，建立在米塞斯关于人的行动的行动学理解之上，即人的行动是运用必然稀缺的手段来有因果地实现自己选择的目的。一个人所选择的目的和决定采用实现目的的手段都是以他的知识为指导的；所采用的稀缺手段在因果关系上被认为有助于实现预期目标。稀缺的、竞争性的手段只能由一个主体使用，因此，财产规范是社会合作的必要条件。但是，指导行动人选择目的的信息或观念，以及让行动人决定选择何种手段的因果关系的知识，却不需要被占有——事实上，也不可能被占有——因为信息是非稀缺的。

This passage provides a sparkling example of the power of a consistent application of Misesian praxeology and Hoppe’s insights into the crucial role of scarcity in the institution of property in addressing the social problem of conflict。By an almost pure application of praxeological reasoning，Hoppe realized as far back as 1988，before the internet，before socalled “intellectual property” was on the libertarian radar，that IP was incompatible with the property rights that were aimed at solving the problem of conflict among actors in the use of scarce resources.[502] This is a brilliant demonstration of the power of praxeologically informed social analysis.

这段话提供了一个生动的例子，说明了在解决冲突这一社会问题时，如何一以贯之地运用米塞斯的行动学以及霍普对稀缺性在财产制度中的关键作用的洞察力。通过近乎纯粹的行动学推理，霍普早在 1988 年，在互联网出现之前，在所谓的 “知识产权 “进入自由意志主义的视野之前，就意识到知识产权与旨在解决稀缺资源使用过程中行动人之间冲突问题的产权是不相容的。这充分展示了行动学社会分析的力量。

By focusing on human action，Hoppe is able to see that the scarce means employed in action need to be owned，but that the very nature of this need implies a Lockeanstyle property assignment rule is the only one that can be justified.First，any property norm must always answer the ques tion of who now may use a given iteM.The norm cannot depend on some future event，for otherwise the resource may not be used or there would be no conflictavoiding norm for the present。As Hoppe explains：

What is the purpose of norms？ The avoidance of conflict regarding the use of scarce physical things.Conflictgenerating norms contra dict the very purpose of norms.Yet with regard to the purpose of conflict avoidance，no alternative to private property and original appropriation exists.In the absence of prestabilized harmony among actors，conflict can only be prevented if all goods are always in the private ownership of specific individuals and it is always clear who owns what and who does not。Also，conflicts can only be avoided from the very beginning of mankind if private property is acquired by acts of original appropriation （instead of by mere declarations or words of latecomers）。[p.15]

通过关注人的行动，霍普能够看到，行动中使用的稀缺手段需要被占有，但这种需要的本质意味着洛克式的财产分配规则是唯一合理的规则。首先，任何财产规范必须始终回答谁现在可以使用某一物品的问题。首先，任何财产规范都必须始终回答谁现在可以使用某一特定资源的问题。规范不能依赖于某些未来事件，否则该资源就不可能被使用，也就不存在避免冲突的当前规范。霍普解释道：

规范的目的是什么？避免在使用稀缺的实物方面发生冲突。

产生冲突的规范与规范的目的相悖。然而，就避免冲突的目的而言，除了私有财产和先占之外，别无选择。在行动人之间没有预先稳定的和谐关系的情况下，只有当所有物品始终属于特定个人的私有财产，而且谁拥有什么、谁不拥有什么始终明确无误时，才能避免冲突。此外，只有当私有财产是通过先占行动（而不是仅仅通过后到者的声明或红口白牙）获得时，才能从人类诞生之初就避免冲突。

The emphasis on latecomers seems trivial but it is of immense signifi cance.For if a latecomer has a better or equal claim to a given resource than someone who had it earlier，no property is secure，and we are in a might makesright situation，not one in which there are applicable norms designed to permit productive，conflictfree use of scarce means.This leads Hoppe to emphasize the importance of the priorlater distinction：that it matters，as between two claimants for a given resource，who had it first：“every property right has a history （temporal genesis）” [p.17]。By an almost Misesian mone taryregressiontheorem–like analysis，Hoppe uses these insights to validate the central insight of Lockean libertarian homesteading：that the first user of a resource has a better claim than anyone else：

All property must go back，then，directly or indirectly，through a chain of mutually beneficial and hence likewise conflictfree propertytitle transfers，to original appropriators and acts of original appropriation.[p.87]

对后到者的强调似乎微不足道，但却意义重大。因为如果后到者比先行者对某一资源有更好或同等的权利要求，那么任何财产都是不安全的，我们就处于一种 “强权即公理 “的境况，而不是一种有适用性规范，允许生产性地、无冲突地使用稀缺资源的境况。这导致霍普强调了 “先来”与 “后到 “之间的区别的重要性：在对某一资源的两个权利要求者之间，谁先拥有该资源很重要：”每一项财产权都有其历史（时间起源）”[第17页]。通过近似于米塞斯货币回溯定理般的分析，霍普利用这些见解验证了洛克式自由意志主义拓殖的核心观点：即资源的第一个使用者比其他人优先拥有权利的要求：

所有财产都必须追溯，然后，直接或间接地，通过一连串互惠互利的、因此同样也是无冲突的财产权转让，追溯到先占者和先占行动。

The above provides only a sampling of the profound insights and understanding that are possible with an Austrolibertarian foundation— especially when combined with the searing and honest intellect of a thinker like Professor Hoppe.

上述内容只是在奥派自由意志主义的基础上可能产生的深刻洞见和认识的一部分，尤其是在与霍普教授这样的思想家的敏锐和诚实的智慧相结合的情况下。

Index

略。

The Mises institute，founded in 1982，is a teaching and research center for the study of Austrian economics，libertarian and classical liberal political theory，and peaceful international relations.In support of the school of thought represented by Ludwig von Mises，Murray N.Rothbard，Henry Hazlitt，and F。A.Hayek，we publish books and journals，sponsor student and professional conferences，and provide online education.Mises.org is a vast resource of free material for anyone in the world interested in these ideas.For we seek a radical shift in the intellectual climate，away from statism and toward a private property order。

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[1] originally published by Libertarian Alliance in 2008。

最初由自由意志主义联盟于2008年出版。

[2] 见下文第五节。

[3] See Murray N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State （1962； repr。Auburn，Ala。：Mises Institute，1993）； idem，Power and Market （1970； repr。，Kansas City：Sheed An drews and Mcmeel，1977）； idem，The Ethics of Liberty （1982； repr。，new York：new York University Press，1998）； idem，Egalitarianism as a revolt against nature and Other Essays （1974； repr。，Auburn，Ala。：Mises Institute，2000）； idem，The Logic of action，2 vols。（Cheltenham，U。K。：Edward Elgar，1997）。

见默里·N·罗斯巴德的《人、经济与国家》（1962 年；再版于阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，1993 年）；同上，《权力与市场》（1970 年；再版于堪萨斯城：希德·安德鲁斯和麦克米尔出版社，1977 年）；同上，《自由的伦理》（1982 年；再版于纽约：纽约大学出版社，1998 年）；同上，《平等主义是对自然的反叛及其他论文》（1974 年；再版于阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，2000 年）；同上，《行动的逻辑》，两卷本（英国切尔滕纳姆：爱德华·埃尔加出版社，1997 年）。

[4] See also HansHermann Hoppe，A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism （Boston：Kluwer Academic Publishers，1989）； idem，The Economics and Ethics of Private Property （Boston：Kluwer Academic Publishers，1993）。

也可参见汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普的《社会主义和资本主义理论》（波士顿：克卢威尔学术出版社，1989 年）；同上，《私有财产的经济学与伦理学》（波士顿：克卢威尔学术出版社，1993 年）。

[5] Note the “natural law” character of the proposed solution to the problem of social order—that private property and its acquisition through acts of original appropriation are not mere conventions but necessary institutions （in accordance with man’s nature as a rational animal）。A convention serves a purpose，and an alternative to a convention exists。For instance，the Latin alphabet serves the purpose of written communication。It has an alternative，the Cyrillic alphabet。Hence，we call it a convention。What is the purpose of norms？ The avoidance of conflict regarding the use of scarce physical things。Conflictgenerating norms contradict the very purpose of norms。Yet with regard to the purpose of conflict avoidance，no alternative to private property and original appropriation exists。In the absence of prestabilized harmony among actors，conflict can only be prevented if all goods are always in the private ownership of specific individuals and it is always clear who owns what and who does not。Also，conflicts can only be avoided from the very beginning of mankind if private property is acquired by acts of original appropriation （instead of by mere declarations or words of latecomers）。

注意到所提出的社会秩序问题解决方案的 “自然法 ”特征——即私有财产和通过先占行动获得私有财产不仅仅是约定俗成的，而是必要的制度（符合人类作为理性动物的本性）。约定俗成是有目的的，而且存在约定俗成的替代品。例如，拉丁字母用于书面交流。它有一个替代选择，即西里尔字母。因此，我们称之为约定俗成。规范的目的是什么？避免在使用稀缺物品方面发生冲突。产生冲突的规范与规范的目的相矛盾。然而，就避免冲突的目的而言，除了私有财产和先占之外，不存在其他选择。在行动人之间没有预先稳定的和谐关系的情况下，只有当所有物品始终属于特定个人的私有财产，并且始终明确谁拥有什么，谁不拥有什么，才能避免冲突。此外，只有当私有财产是通过先占行动（而不是仅仅通过声明或后到者的言辞）获得时，才能从人类诞生之初就避免冲突。

[6] While no one could act if everyone owned the value of his property，it is practically possible that one person or group，A，owns the value of his property and can determine what another person or group，B，may or may not do with the things under their control。This，however，means that B “owns” neither the value nor the physical integrity of the things under his control； that is，B and his property are actually owned by A。This rule can be implemented，but it does not qualify as a human ethic。Instead，it is a twoclass system of exploiting Übermensch and exploited Untermensch。

如果每个人都拥有自己财产的价值，那么没有人能采取行动，但在现实中有可能的是，一个人或一个群体（A）不仅拥有自己财产的价值，并且能够决定对另一个人或一个群体（B）所控制的事物做什么或不做什么。如果这样，这意味着B既不“拥有”他所控制的事物的价值，也不“拥有”其物理完整性；也就是说，B和他的财产实际上属于A。这条规则可以实施，但它不符合人类伦理。相反，这是由两个阶级组成的社会体系，剥削阶级和被剥削的下层社会阶级。

[7] While no one could act if everyone owned the value of his property，it is practically possible that one person or group，A，owns the value of his property and can determine what another person or group，B，may or may not do with the things under their control。This，however，means that B “owns” neither the value nor the physical integrity of the things under his control； that is，B and his property are actually owned by A。This rule can be implemented，but it does not qualify as a human ethic。Instead，it is a twoclass system of exploiting Übermensch and exploited Untermensch。

[8] For details see Murray N.Rothbard，Economic Thought before Adam Smith：An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought，vol。1 （Aldershot，U。K。：Edward Elgar，1995）； also Tom bethell，The Noblest Triumph：Property and Prosperity through the ages （new York：St。Martin’s Press，1998）。

有关详细信息，请参阅默里罗斯巴德，《亚当·斯密以前的经济思想：奥地利学派视角下的经济思想史（第一卷）》（英国奥尔德肖特：爱德华・埃尔加出版社，1995 年）；还有汤姆・贝瑟尔的《最高贵的胜利：历代的财产与繁荣》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1998 年）。

[9] Aristotle，Politics （Oxford：Clarendon Press，1946），1261b。

亚里士多德，《政治学》（牛津：克拉伦登出版社，1946），1261页。

[10] Ibid.，1263a。

同上，1263a。

[11] Ibid.，1263b。

同上，1263 b。

[12] See Ronald Coase，The firm，the Market，and the Law （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1988）； Harold Demsetz，ownership，Control，and the firm （Oxford：Basil Blackwell，1988）； richard Posner，The Economics of Justice （Cambridge，Mass。：Harvard University Press，1981）。

参见罗纳德·科斯的《企业、市场与法律》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1988 年）；哈罗德·德姆塞茨的《所有权、控制与企业》（牛津：巴兹尔·布莱克韦尔出版社，1988 年）；理查德·波斯纳的《公正的经济学》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：哈佛大学出版社，1981 年）。

[13] Posner，The Economics of Justice，p.74：“an act of injustice （is defined） as an act that reduces the wealth of society。”

波斯纳，《公正的经济学》，第 74 页：“不公正的行动（被定义为）一种减少社会财富的行动。”

[14] Ronald Coase，“The problem of Social Cost，” in idem，The firm，the Market，and the Law，p.96。The moral perversity of this claim is best illustrated by applying it to the case of A rap ing B。According to Coase，A is not supposed to be restrained。Rather，“we are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature。” In preventing A from raping B，harm is inflicted on A because he can no longer rape freely。The real question is：Should A be allowed to rape B，or should B be allowed to prohibit A from raping him/her？ “The problem is to avoid the more serious harm。”

罗纳德·科斯，《社会成本问题》，载于其《企业、市场与法律》，第96页。将这一主张应用于A强奸B的案例中，可以最好地说明这种主张在道德上的荒谬性。根据科斯的观点，不应该限制A。相反，“我们正在处理一个具有相互性质的问题”。在阻止A强奸B时，会对A造成伤害，因为他不能再自由地强奸了。真正的问题是：应该允许A强奸B，还是应该允许B禁止A强奸他/她？“问题在于避免更严重的伤害”。

[15] See also Walter Block，“Coase and Demsetz on Private Property Rights，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 1，no。2 （1977）； idem，“Ethics，Efficiency，Coasian Property Rights，and Psychic Income：A reply to Harold Demsetz，” review of Austrian Economics 8，no。2 （1995）； idem，“Private Property Rights，Erroneous Interpretations，Morality and Eco nomics，” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 3，no。1 （2000）； Gary north，The Coase Theorem：A Study in Epistemology （Tyler，tex。：Institute for Christian Economics，1992）； idem，“Undermining Property Rights：Coase and becker，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 16，no。4 （2002）。

另见沃尔特·布洛克，《科斯与德姆塞茨论私有产权》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》1977 年第 1 卷第 2 期；同上，《伦理、效率、科斯产权与精神收入：对哈罗德·德姆塞茨的回应》，《奥地利经济学评论》1995 年第 8 卷第 2 期；同上，《私有产权、错误解释、道德与经济学》，《奥地利经济学季刊》2000 年第 3 卷第 1 期；加里·诺斯，《科斯定理：一项认识论研究》（得克萨斯州泰勒：基督教经济学研究所，1992 年）；同上，《破坏产权：科斯与贝克尔》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》2002 年第 16 卷第 4 期。）

[16] Posner，The Economics of Justice，pp.70–71，admits this with captivating frank ness：“Absolute rights play an important role in the economic theory of the law But when transaction costs are prohibitive，the recognition of absolute rights is inefficient… [P]roperty rights，although absolute，（are） contingent on transaction costs and sub servient or instrumental to the goal of wealth maximization。”

波斯纳，《公正的经济学》，70-71页，以迷人的坦率承认了这一点：“绝对权利在法律的经济理论中发挥着重要作用，但当交易成本过高时，对绝对权利的承认会导致低效……产权虽然是绝对的，但取决于交易成本，财富最大化的目标是次要的或辅助的。”

* Previously unpublished.reprinted in Hoppe，A Short History of man：Progress and Decline （Auburn，Ala.：Mises Institute，2015）。

以前未发表，转载于霍普的《人类兴衰简史》（奥本，阿拉巴马），米塞斯研究院，2015）。

[17] 参见下文Nicholas Wade， before the Dawn （new York： Penguin Press， 2006）.（中文版参见尼古拉斯·韦德《黎明之前：基因技术颠覆人类进化史》，陈华译，电子工业出版社2015年3月第1版）

[18] See the following：Nicholas Wade，before the Dawn （new York：Penguin Press，2006）。

参见以下内容：尼古拉斯·韦德，《黎明之前》（纽约：企鹅出版社，2006 年）。

[19] Luigi Luca CavalliSforza，genes，Peoples，and languages （berkeley：University of California Press，2000），p.93，dates the origin of language at around 100，000 years ago； but given the archeological evidence cited above，the later，more recent date of only 50，000 years ago appears more likely。

路易吉·卢卡·卡瓦利-斯福尔扎，《基因、民族与语言》（伯克利：加利福尼亚大学出版社，2000 年），第 93 页，将语言的起源时间确定为大约 10 万年前；但考虑到上文引用的考古学证据，更晚一些、距今仅 5 万年的时间似乎更有可能。

[20] Ibid.，p.92。

同上，第 92 页。

[21] Wade，before the Dawn，pp.8，58； CavalliSforza’s estimate is significantly higher：50，000。（genes，Peoples，and languages，p.50）。

韦德，《黎明之前》，第 8、58 页；卡瓦利-斯福尔扎的估计要高得多：5 万年。（《基因、民族与语言》，第 50 页）。

[22] CavalliSforza，genes，Peoples，and languages，p.30。

《基因、民族与语言》，第30页。

[23] The egalitarianism of huntergatherer societies should not be overemphasized or ideal ized，however。These societies were also characterized by pronounced hierarchical features.Not unlike what is known from the animal kingdom，men ranked above and dominated women.Often women were “taken” and treated by men like goods of the “outer” world are taken and treated：appropriated，stolen，used，abused，and traded.Children ranked below adults.Moreover，hierarchies existed among both male and the female members of society，down from the reigning alphamale and female to the lowliest member of society。Status fights occurred，and whoever did not accept the established rankorder faced severe punishment。The losers in the fights for higher status were threatened with injury，even death and，at the very best，expulsion from the tribe.In a word：even if tribal life provided for a comfortable standard of living in terms of abundant food and leisure it was anything but comfortable in terms of today’s much cherished “individual autonomy。” To the contrary，life in the tribal household meant discipline，order and submission.

然而，狩猎采集者社会的平等主义不应该被过分强调或理想化。这些社会也具有明显的等级特征。不同于动物王国的情形，男性地位高于女性，可以支配她们。男人像对待“外部”世界的物品一样处理和对待女人：可以强占、偷盗、使用、虐待和交易。儿童的地位低于成人。此外，社会中的男性和女性成员之间都存在着等级制度，从居于统治地位的男性首领和女性一直到社会中最卑微的成员延展而下。发生地位之争时，任何不接受既定等级秩序的人都将面临严厉的惩罚。争取更高地位的失败者受到伤害甚至死亡威胁，被驱逐出部落就是最好的结果了。总而言之：即使部落生活在丰富的食物和休闲方面提供了一种舒适的生活水平，但从今天备受珍视的“个人自主权”角度看，它一点也不舒适。相反，部落家庭的生活意味着纪律、秩序和服从。

[24] See richard lee and I。De Vore，eds.，man the Hunter （Chicago：Aldine，1968）； Marvin Harris，Cannibals and Kings：The origins of Cultures （new York：Vintage Books，1977），esp.chap.2。

参见richard lee and I De Vore主编。《猎人》（芝加哥：阿尔丁出版社，1968）；马文·哈里斯，《食人族和君主：文化的起源》（纽约：古着图书，1977），第2章。

[25] Harris，Cannibals and Kings，p.19f。

哈里斯：《食人族和君主》，第19页。

[26] This statement refers only to the huntergatherer life during periods of peace，however。on the high incidence of warfare and unnatural causes of death，see below.

然而，这种说法只指和平时期的狩猎采集生活。关于战争和非自然死亡的高发生率，见下文。

[27] Thus，for instance，writes Harris：“In all of France during the late stone age there were probably no more than 20，000 and possibly as few as 1，600 human beings.” （Can nibals and Kings，p.18）

因此，例如哈里斯写道：“在整个法国的旧石器时代晚期，可能不超过两万人，甚至可能只有1600人。”（《食人族与君主》，第18页）。

[28] See Wade，before the Dawn，chap.8，and pp.150–54； also Lawrence H.Keeley，War before civilization （new York：Oxford University Press，1996）。

参见韦德的《黎明之前》第八章以及第150至154页；还有劳伦斯·H·基利的《文明之前的战争》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1996年）。

[29] Keeley，War before civilization，p.33； Wade，before the Dawn，p.151 f。

基利，《文明之前的战争》，第 33 页；韦德，《黎明之前》，第 151 页及以下。

[30] Napoleon Chagnon，“Life Histories，Blood revenge，and Warfare in a Tribal Population，” Science 239 （1988）：pp.985–92。

拿破仑·查冈，《一个部落人口中的生活史、血仇与战争》，《科学》1988 年第 239 期，第 985 – 992 页。

[31] See also Steven leBlanc，Constant Battles （new York：St。Martin’s Press，2003）。

另见史蒂文·勒布朗，《持续的战争》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，2003 年）。

[32] See Wade，before the Dawn，pp.154–58。

Contrasting the ferocity of primitive vs.modern men，Wade，following Keeley，notes （before the Dawn，p.152）：When primitive warriors “met the troops of civilized Societies in open battle，they regularly defeated them despite the vast disparity in weaponry。In the Indian wars，the U.S.Army ‘usually suffered severe defeats’ when caught in the open，such as by the Seminoles in 1834，and at the battle of Little BighorN.In 1879 the British army in South Africa，equipped with artillery and Gatling guns was convincingly defeated by Zulus armed mostly with spears and oxhide shields at the battles of Isandl wana，Myer’s Drift and Hlobane.The French were sent off by the Tuareg of the Sahara in the 1890s.The state armies prevailed in the end only through larger manpower and attritional campaigns，not by superior fighting skill。”

参见韦德《黎明之前》第 154 至 158 页。

韦德在基利之后，对比了原始人和现代人的凶猛程度，并指出（《黎明之前》第 152 页）：当原始战士 “在公开战斗中与文明社会的军队相遇时，尽管武器装备存在巨大差距，前者却经常击败后者。在印第安战争中，美军在野战中 “通常会遭受惨败”，如 1834 年的塞米诺尔人之战和小比格霍尔之战。1879 年，在南非，装备有大炮和加特林机枪的英国军队在伊散德尔瓦纳、迈耶漂流地和赫洛班战役中被主要装备长矛和牛皮盾牌的祖鲁人令人信服地击败。19 世纪 90 年代，法国人被撒哈拉的图阿雷格人击退。国家军队最终只是通过更多的人力和消耗战获胜，而不是凭借卓越的战斗技能。”

[33] Ludwig von Mises，Human action：A Treatise on Economics （Chicago：regnery，1966），p.144。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《人的行动：经济学专论》（芝加哥：雷格里，1966 年），第 144 页。

[34] Indirectly，this insight into the irreconcilable antagonism between the members of different tribes within the framework of huntergatherer societies also provides a first clue as to the requirements for peaceful cooperation among men.In order for members of different tribes to view each other not as enemies but as potential col laborators，there must be genuine production of consumer goods （above and beyond the mere appropriation of naturegiven consumer goods）。At least，as a very minimum requirement，there must be production of consumer goods in the sense of the storage of surplus goods （of saving for future consumption）。For only if man thus adds some thing to nature which otherwise，without his deliberate effort，would not exist at all，can there be a reason for one man to spare another man’s life for his own good （for his own selfish motives and to his own advantage）。To be sure，as proponents of the thesis that it is civilization，which breeds war，are fond to point out，the very fact that one man has added something to the supply of naturegiven goods might also provide a reason for another man to engage in aggression：to rob him of his product。But there is available for another）。Moreover，insofar as a man adds something to the total supply of available goods there exists also a reason for another man to not interfere with his activity but let him continue，and to benefit from him and his activity by engaging in mutually beneficial trade with him and hence，as a consequence，ultimately develop sympathetic feelings toward his fellow man.Thus，while civilization does not eliminate man’s aggressive impulses it can and did diminish and attenuate them.

在狩猎采集社会的框架内，不同部落成员之间存在着不可调和的对立，这一点间接地为人类和平合作的要求提供了第一条线索。为了让不同部落的成员不把对方视为敌人，而是视为潜在的合作者，就必须有真正的消费品生产（不仅仅是对自然赋予的消费品的占有）。因为只有当人这样为自然界增添了某种东西，而这种东西如果没有人的刻意努力，是根本不会存在的，才有理由让一个人为了自己的利益（为了自己的自私动机和自己的利益）而不惜牺牲另一个人的生命。当然，正如 “是文明滋生了战争 ”这一论点的支持者们喜欢指出的那样，一个人给自然赋予的物品的供应增加了一些东西，这一事实也可能成为另一个人进行侵犯的理由：抢夺他的产品。但还有另一个人可以使用）。此外，只要一个人增加了可用物品的总供应量，另一个人就有理由不干涉他的活动，而让他继续下去，并通过与他进行互利贸易，从他和他的活动中获益，从而最终对他的同伴产生同情之情。因此，虽然文明并不能消除人类的侵犯冲动，但它能够而且确实减少和削弱了这种冲动。

[35] Actually，the last great warming period，also called an interglacial period，had al ready ended about 120，000 years ago。During this period，i.e.，more than 120，000 years ago，hippopotamuses had lived in the Rhine and the Thames and northern Europe had something of an “African appearance.” From then on，glaciers moved steadily further southward and the sea level eventually fell by more than 100 meters.The Thames and the Elbe became tributaries of the Rhine，before it streamed first into the north Sea and from there into the Atlantic。See Josef H.reichholf，Eine kurze Naturgeschichte des letz ten Jahrtausends （Frankfurt/M.：Fischer，2007），p.15 f。When this period ended，quite suddenly，about 12，000 years ago，the glaciers rapidly retreated and the sea level rose，not by millimeters per year but very quickly in an almost floodlike fashion.Within a very brief period England and Ireland，which had previously been connected to the European continent，became islands.The Baltic Sea and much of the contemporary north Sea came thus into existence.Likewise，most of today’s Persian Gulf dates from about this time.Ibid.，p.49 f。

实际上，上一个大暖期，也被称为间冰期，大约在12万年前就已经结束了。在这个时期，即12万多年前，河马曾生活在莱茵河和泰晤士河中，北欧有几分“非洲风貌”。从那时起，冰川稳步向南推进，海平面最终下降了100多米。在泰晤士河和易北河成为莱茵河的支流之前，莱茵河先流入北海，再从那里流入大西洋。参见约瑟夫·H·赖希霍夫《上个千年的自然简史》（法兰克福：菲舍尔出版社，2007年），第15页及以下。大约在12000年前，这个时期非常突然地结束了，冰川迅速消退，海平面上升，不是每年以毫米为单位上升，而是以一种近乎洪水般的速度非常迅速地上升。在很短的时间内，此前与欧洲大陆相连的英格兰和爱尔兰变成了岛屿。波罗的海和当今北海的大部分地区由此形成。同样，今天的波斯湾大部分地区也大约形成于这个时期。同上，第49页及以下。

[36] For further details see Wade，before the Dawn，chap.5； also Jared Diamond，guns，germs，and Steel：The Fates of Human Societies （new York：Norton，1997），chap.1。

欲知更多详情，请参见韦德的《黎明之前》第五章；还有贾雷德·戴蒙德的《枪炮、病菌与钢铁：人类社会的命运》（纽约：诺顿出版社，1997 年）第一章。

[37] See CavalliSforza，genes，Peoples，and languages，p.94。

参见卡瓦利-斯福尔扎的《基因、民族与语言》，第94页。

[38] Ibid.，pp.20–25。

同上，第20-25页。

[39] See Wade，before the Dawn，pp.96–99。

参见韦德的《黎明之前》，第96至99页。

[40] merrit Ruhlen，The origin of language：Tracing the Evolution of the Mother Tongue （new York：Wiley，1994）。

梅里特·鲁伦，《语言的起源：追溯母语的演变》（纽约：威利出版社，1994 年）。

[41] See CavalliSforza，genes，Peoples，and languages，chap.5，esp.p.144，for a table showing the correlation between genetic and linguistic families and trees of descent。See also Luigi Luca CavalliSforza and Francesco CavalliSforza，The Great Human Diasporas：The History of Diversity and Evolution （Cambridge：Perseus Books，1995），chap.7； Wade，before the Dawn，chap.10，pp.102ff。

参见卡瓦利-斯福尔扎的《基因、民族与语言》第五章，特别是第144页，其中有一个表格展示了遗传家族和语言家族以及世系树之间的相关性。另见路易吉·卢卡·卡瓦利-斯福尔扎和弗朗西斯科·卡瓦利-斯福尔扎的《人类大迁徙：多样性与进化的历史》（剑桥：珀尔修斯图书，1995年）第七章；韦德的《黎明之前》第十章，第102页及以下。

[42] During the present Holocene period temperatures continued to show significant variations，however。About 10，000 years ago，after a warming period of thousands of years，temperatures reached the present level。Several times thereafter，temperatures rose significantly above this level （by up to 2 degrees Celsius）：8，000 to 6，800 years ago，6，000 to 5，500 years ago，5，000 to 4，000 years ago，2，500 to 2，000 years ago，and again from the 10th to the 14th century，during the socalled medieval warming period.As well，several periods with significantly lower than present temperatures existed：9，000 to 8，000 years ago，6，800 to 6，000 years ago，4，000 to 2，500 years ago，from the 2nd to the 8th century and again from the 14th until the mid19th century，the socalled Little ice age.See reichholf，Eine kurze Naturgeschichte des letzten Jahrtausends，p.27。

然而，在当前的全新世时期，气温继续呈现出显著变化。大约一万年前，经过数千年的温暖期后，气温达到了目前的水平。此后有几次，气温显著高于这个水平（高达2摄氏度）：8000至6800年前、6000至5500年前、5000至4000年前、2500至2000年前，以及从10世纪到14世纪，即所谓的中世纪温暖期。同样，也存在几个气温明显低于目前水平的时期：9000至8000年前、6800至6000年前、4000至2500年前、从2世纪到8世纪，以及从14世纪一直到19世纪中叶，即所谓的小冰河期。参见赖希霍夫《上个千年的自然简史》，第27页。

[43] Ibid.，p.23f。

同上，第23页及以下。

[44] Mises，Human action，p.167。

米塞斯，《人的行动》，第167页。

[45] Ibid.

同上。

[46] Empirically，it appears that the “magic number，” i.e.，the optimum population size for a huntergatherer society，was somewhere between 50 to 100 people for a ter ritory of about 50 to 100 square miles （one person per square mile）。At around this combination point，all advantages offered by the division of labor were exhausted.If the population size increased beyond this “magic” number，average living standards became increasingly endangered and this threat grew still more if neighboring tribes，due to their own internal population growth，increased their territorial incursions，thus further diminishing the naturegiven supply of goods available to the members of the first tribe.Internal as well as external population pressure then called for a solution to an increasingly urgent problem：namely sheer survival。

[47] See Mises，Human action，pp.127–31； idem，Socialism：An Economic and So ciological Analysis （Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty Classics，1981），pp.174–75； also Hans Hermann Hoppe，Kritik der sozialwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung。Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung von Soziologie und Ökonomie （Opladen：Westdeutscher verlag，1985），pp.59–64。

参见米塞斯《人的行动》，第127至131页；同上，《社会主义：经济与社会学分析》（印第安纳波利斯，印第安纳州：自由经典出版社，1981年），第174至175页；还有汉斯·赫尔曼·霍普《对社会科学的社会研究之批判：社会学与经济学基础研究》（奥普拉登：西德出版社，1985年），第59至64页。

[48] in fact，overhunting and animal extinction played a fateful role especially in the Americas，which were only occupied after the invention of bow and arrow.While the Americas originally exhibited pretty much the same fauna as the Eurasian continent—after all，for thousands of years animals could move from one continent to another across the beringian land bridge—by the time of the European rediscovery of America some 500 years ago all large domesticable mammals （except for the llama in South America） had been hunted to extinction.Likewise，it appears now that the entire megafauna that once inhabited Australia were hunted to extinction （except for the red kangaroo）。It seems that this event occurred around 40，000 years ago，only a few thou sand years after man had first arrived in Australia，and even without the help of bow and arrow，only with very primitive weapons and the help of fires used for the trapping of animals.See on this Diamond，guns，germs，and Steel，pp.42 ff。

事实上，过度捕猎和动物灭绝起了决定性的作用，尤其是在美洲，因为美洲是在弓箭发明之后才被占领的。虽然美洲最初的动物群与欧亚大陆基本相同——毕竟，数千年来，动物可以通过白令陆桥从一个大陆迁移到另一个大陆——但在大约 500 年前欧洲人重新发现美洲时，所有可驯养的大型哺乳动物（除了南美洲的羊驼）都已被猎杀殆尽。同样，现在看来，曾经栖息在澳大利亚的所有巨型动物都被猎杀殆尽（除了红袋鼠）。这一事件似乎发生在距今约 4 万年前，也就是人类首次到达澳大利亚的几千年后，而且当时还没有弓箭，只有非常原始的武器和火用来捕猎动物。关于这一点，参见戴蒙德的《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》，第 42 页及以下。

[49] While the changes brought about by the “neolithic revolution” allowed for a significantly higher sustainable population size，the Malthusian problem was bound to eventually arise again，and the seemingly ultimate solution to the problem was only reached with the socalled industrial revolution that began in Europe at the end of the 17th century。

虽然 “新石器时代革命”带来的变化使得可持续的人口规模大大增加，但马尔萨斯问题最终必然会再次出现，而这个问题的最终解决似乎是随着17世纪末欧洲开始的所谓“工业革命”才得以实现。参见下一章“从马尔萨斯陷阱到工业革命：关于社会进化的反思”。

[50] See also Michael H.Hart，Understanding Human History （Augusta，Ga.：Wash ington Summit Publishers，2007），pp.139 ff。

另见迈克尔·H·哈特《理解人类历史》（佐治亚州奥古斯塔：华盛顿峰会出版社，2007 年），第 139 页及以下。

[51] See on this distinction Murray N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State （Los An geles：Nash，1970），chap.1。

关于这种区分，可参见默里·N·罗斯巴德的《人、经济与国家》（洛杉矶：纳什出版社，1970 年）第一章。

[52] Carl menger，Principles of Economics （1871； repr。，Grove City：Libertarian Press，1994），p.52。

卡尔・门格尔，《经济学原理》（1871 年；再版。，格罗夫市：自由意志主义出版社，1994 年），第 52 页。

[53] Ludwig von Mises，Human action，p.92。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《人的行动》，第92页。

[54] See also HansHermann Hoppe，Eigentum，Anarchie und Staat。Studien zur Theo rie des Kapitalismus （leipzig：manuscriptum，2005 [1987]），chap.4，esp.pp.106 ff.

另见汉斯·赫尔曼·霍普《财产、无政府与国家：资本主义理论研究》（莱比锡：手稿出版社，2005 年[1987 年]），第四章，特别是第 106 页及以下。

[55] Hart，Understanding Human History，p.162。

哈特，《理解人类历史》，第162页。

[56] It has been estimated that with the appropriation of land and the corresponding change from a huntergatherer existence to that of agriculturists gardeners and animal husbandry，a population size ten to one hundred times larger than before could be sus tained on the same amount of land.

据估计，随着土地的占用以及相应地从狩猎采集者的生存方式转变为农民、园丁和畜牧业者的生存方式，在同样数量的土地上能够维持的人口规模是以前的十到一百倍。

[57] Diamond，guns，germs，and Steel，pp.100，167。

戴蒙德，《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》，第100页、167页。

[58] Wade，before the Dawn，pp.109–13。

韦德，《黎明之前》，第109至113页。

[59] incidentally，genetic analyses have revealed that all present dogs，including those in the Americas，stem most likely from a single litter to be located somewhere in East Asia.That is，it appears that the domestication of the dog did not occur independently at various places but at a single place from where it spread outward to ultimately en compass the entire globe.

顺便说一下，基因分析表明，目前所有的狗，包括美洲的狗，极有可能都源自东亚某个地方的一窝小狗。也就是说，狗的驯化似乎并非在多个地方独立发生，而是在一个地方发生后向外传播，最终覆盖了整个地球。

[60] See Helmut Schoeck，Envy：A Theory of Social behavior （new York：Harcourt，Brace and World，1970）。

参见赫尔穆特·舍克《嫉妒：一种社会行为理论》（纽约：哈考特、布雷斯与世界出版社，1970 年）。

[61] See Konrad Lorenz，man meets Dog （1954； repr。，new York：Routledge，2002）。

参见康拉德·洛伦茨《人与狗》（1954 年；再版，纽约：劳特利奇出版社，2002 年）。

[62] remarkably，even today，with the availability of highly sophisticated electronic alarm Systems，it remains barking dogs，which offer the most effective protection against burglary。

值得注意的是，即使在电子报警系统非常先进的今天，狗吠声仍然是最有效的防盗手段。

[63] See Diamond，guns，germs，and Steel，chap.9，esp.pp.168–75。

参见戴蒙德《枪炮、病菌与钢铁》第九章，特别是第168至175页。

[64] Essay on the Principle of Population，chap.10。

《关于人口原理的论文》，第十章。

[65] See on this Friedrich Engels，Der Ursprung der Familie，des Privateigentums und des Staates，in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels，Werke，Vol.21 （1884； repr。，berlin：Dietz verlag，1972）。

关于这一点，参见弗里德里希・恩格斯《家庭、私有制和国家的起源》，载于《马克思恩格斯文集》第 21 卷（1884 年；再版，柏林：迪茨出版社，1972 年）。

[66] Ibid.，p.38f。“men lived in polygamy and their women simultaneously in poly andry，and their children were considered as belonging to all of them.Each woman belonged to every man and each man to every woman.”

incidentally，socialist authors such as Friedrich Engels did not merely describe but glorified this institution，very much like they glorified the already mentioned institution of “primitive communism.” indeed，socialists typically recognized，quite correctly，the joint emergence of private property and the institution of the family，and they thought （and hoped） that both institutions—private property in the means of production，including land，and the （monogamous） family—would ultimately disappear again with the establishment of a future socialist society characterized by plenty （plen titude） of wealth and free love.Thus，after an arduous if necessary historical detour characterized by misery，exploitation and male sexual domination，mankind would at long last return—on a higher level—to the very institutions characteristic of its own prehistoric “golden age.” Under socialism，monogamous marriage was to disappear along with private property。Choice in love would become free again.men and women would unite and separate as they pleased.And in all of this，as socialist August bebel wrote in his，at the time （in the 1880s and 1890s），enormously popular book Die Frau und der Sozialismus，socialism would not create anything really new，but only “recreate on a higher level of culture and under new social forms what was universally valid on a more primitive cultural level and before private ownership dominated society。” bebel，Die Frau und der Sozialismus （Stuttgart，1879），p.343； see also Mises，Socialism，p.87。

同上，第38页及以下。“男人过着一夫多妻制的生活，他们的女人同时过着一妻多夫制的生活，他们的孩子被认为属于他们所有人。每个女人属于每个男人，每个男人也属于每个女人。”

顺便说一下，像弗里德里希·恩格斯这样的社会主义作者不仅描述了这种制度，还美化了它，就像他们美化前面提到的“原始共产主义”制度一样。事实上，社会主义者通常非常正确地认识到私有财产和家庭制度是共同出现的，并且他们认为（并希望）这两种制度——生产资料包括土地的私有制以及（一夫一妻制的）家庭——最终会随着以财富充裕和自由恋爱为特征的未来社会主义社会的建立而再次消失。因此，在经历了一段艰难但必要的、以苦难、剥削和男性性统治为特征的历史弯路之后，人类最终将——在更高的层面上——回归到其史前“黄金时代”特有的制度。在社会主义制度下，一夫一妻制的婚姻将随着私有财产一起消失。爱情的选择将再次变得自由。男人和女人可以随心所欲地结合和分离。在这一切中，正如社会主义者奥古斯特·倍倍尔在他当时（19世纪80年代和90年代）非常受欢迎的书《妇女与社会主义》中所写的那样，社会主义不会创造任何真正新的东西，而只是“在更高的文化层面上，以新的社会形式重新创造在更原始的文化层面上普遍有效的东西，以及在私有制统治社会之前的东西”。倍倍尔，《妇女与社会主义》（斯图加特，1879年），第343页；另见米塞斯，《社会主义》，第87页。

[67] Mises，Socialism，p.175。

米塞斯，《社会主义》，第175页。

[68] Essay on the Principle of Population，chap.10。

《关于人口原理的论文》，第 10 章。

[69] Rationally motivated as the institution of the family was，the transition from a regime of “free love” to one of family life did not come without costs，and the associated benefits and costs were different for men and women.

Surely，from the male’s point of view it was advantageous to have every woman acces sible for sexual gratification.In addition，this greatly improved his chances of reproduc tive success.By having children with as many women as possible the likelihood of his genes being passed on into future generations was increased.And this was accomplished seemingly without any cost to him if the responsibility of raising children to maturity could be externalized onto society at large.In contrast，if sexual access was restricted to just one woman （in the case of monogamy） or a few women （in the case of polygamy） his chances of sexual gratification and of reproductive success were diminished.More over，men now had to weigh and compare the pros （benefits） and cons （costs） of sex and procreation—something they previously did not have to do。on the other hand，also primitive men could not fail to notice，at least eventually，that even under a regime of free love the chances of sexual gratification and reproductive success were by no means equal。Some males—the stronger and more attractive alpha males—had much better chances than others.In fact，as every animal breeder knows，just one male is sufficient to keep all females constantly impregnated.Thus，free love effectively meant that very few males “had” most of the women，and especially most of the attractive and repro ductively most appealing women，and fathered most of the offspring，while most of the males had the dubious obligation of helping to bring up other men’s children.Surely，even the dimmest recognition of this fact must have posed a permanent threat to any intratribal solidarity and especially to any intermale solidarity that was called for，for instance，in the defense against rival tribes； and this threat must have grown ever more intense the farther the population exceeded its optimum size.In contrast，the institution of a monogamous family and to a somewhat lesser degree also of a polygamous family offered to each male a somewhat equal chance of reproductive success and thus created a much greater incentive for every male to engage and invest in cooperative behavior。

Matters are significantly different from the female point of vieW.After all，it is women who must bear the risk of pregnancy associated with sexual intercourse.It is they who are particularly vulnerable during pregnancy and following childbirth.Moreover，it is women who have a unique natural tie to children； for while there can be always some doubt as to paternity no doubt is possible as far as maternity is concerned.Every woman knows who her children are and who the children of other women are.In light of these natural facts the principal advantage of a regime of free love from a female point of view becomes apparent。because of the greater risk and investment associated with sex for women，women tend to be more selective as far as their mating partner is concerned.Thus，in order to increase the likelihood of their own reproductive success，they exhibit a strong preference for mating partners who appear healthy，vigorous，attractive，bright，etc。，i.e.，in a word，for alpha males.And because males are less choosy in their selection of sex objects，under a System of free love even the least attractive females can realistically expect to be able to mate occasionally with some of the most attractive males and hence possibly pass their “superior” genes on to one’s own offspring。

Obviously，this advantage disappears as soon as the institution of the family replaces a regime of free love.Each woman is now supposed to try her reproductive luck with just one or maybe a few sets of male genes，and in the great majority of cases these genes do not rank among the very best。What did women get out of marriage，then？ very little，it would seem，as long as the population was at or around its optimum size and the life of the huntergatherer tribe was characterized by comfort and plenty。This had to change，however，as soon as the population grew beyond this point。The more the population exceeded its optimum size the more intense grew the competition for the limited food supplies.Whatever interfemale solidarity existed before increasingly weakened now.Naturally，each woman was interested in assuring her own reproductive success and helping her own children reach maturity and thus came into conflict with every other woman and her children.Even killing another woman’s child in order to further the prospect of survival for one’s own children was increasingly considered an option in this situation.（Incidentally，the same sort of interfemale competition for reproductive success still prevails to some extent within the framework of polygamous relationships and explains some of the peculiar instabilities and tensions inherent in such relationships.） in this situation，each woman （and her kids） is in increasing need for personal protection.But who would be willing to provide such protection？ Most children have the same father—from among the few alpha males endowed with more thanequal chances of procreation—but they have different mothers.Accordingly，the protection of one woman and her children from another cannot be expected to come from the children’s father，because the father is very often the same one.Nor can it be expected to come from another male； for why should a male offer personal sup port and protection to a woman who entertained sexual relations with other men and whose children were fathered by other men，especially if this offspring threatened his own standard of living？ A woman could only secure personal protection from a man if she forewent all of the advantages of free love and promised instead to grant her sexual favors exclusively to him and thus managed to assure him also that her children were always his as well。

Distinctly male and female perspectives exist not only as far as the very establish ment of the institution of the family is concerned but also regarding the importance of marital fidelity in maintaining its stability。The difference between male and female calculations in this regard has its reason in the natural fact that，at least until the very recent development of reliable genetic paternity tests，a child’s mother was always known in a way—with a degree of certainty—that was unavailable and unattainable for the child’s father。As folkwisdom has it：mother’s baby，father’s maybe.This fact，again quite “naturally，” had to lead to significantly different—asymmetric—expecta tions regarding appropriate （and inappropriate） male and female marital conduct。Of course，in order to assure the stability of the institution of the family any form of marital infidelity had to be socially disapproved； but disapproval had to be far more pronounced and the possible sanctions far more severe in the case of female infidel ity than in the case of male infidelity。While this may appear “unfair，” it was in fact quite rational and in accordance with the “nature of things，” because female infidelity involved a far greater risk for betrayed husbands than male infidelity involved for betrayed wives.A wife’s infidelity can be the first step leading to a divorce from her husband just as a husband’s infidelity can be the first step leading to a divorce from his wifE.In this regard，the situation is the same （symmetric） in both cases and the “sin” committed is equally grave.However，if and insofar as marital infidelity does not lead to divorce，the “sin” committed by a woman must be considered far graver than that committed by a man.because extramarital sexual affairs may lead to pregnancies，and if a soimpregnated woman then stays with her husband，the real danger arises that she might be tempted to present her illegitimate offspring to her husband as his own，thus deceiving him to support another man’s child.No such danger exists in the opposite case：no man can submit his illegitimate offspring to his wife without her knowing the truth of the matter。Hence，the far greater social stigma attached to female as compared to male infidelity。（Incidentally—and also quite rationally—in the case of male infidelity a similar distinction is made：the offence is considered more severe if a man has an affair with a married woman than with an unmarried one； for in the former case he becomes a potential accomplice to a further female act of deception whereas in the latter case he does not。Accordingly，in recognition of this distinction and so as to accommodate the rather indiscriminate male sexdrive，prostitution has become a nearuniversal social institution.）

尽管家庭制度有其合理性，但从 “自由恋爱 “制度过渡到家庭生活制度并不是没有代价的，而且相关的好处和代价对男性和女性都是不同的。

当然，从男性的角度来看，让每个女人都能得到性满足是有好处的。此外，这也大大提高了他生殖成功的机会。通过与尽可能多的女人生孩子，他的基因被传给后代的可能性就会增加。而且，如果抚养孩子长大成人的责任可以外化到整个社会的话，这对他来说似乎是没有任何代价的。相反，如果性生活只限于一个女人（在一夫一妻制的情况下）或几个女人（在一夫多妻制的情况下），他获得性满足和生殖成功的机会就会减少。此外，男人现在不得不权衡和比较性和生育的利（好处）和弊（代价）——这是他们以前不需要做的。另一方面，原始人也不可能不注意到，至少最终会注意到，即使在自由恋爱的制度下，性满足和生殖成功的机会也绝不是平等的。一些雄性——更强壮和更有吸引力的雄性——比其他雄性有更好的机会。事实上，每个动物饲养者都知道，只要有一只雄性就足以让所有雌性不断受孕。对我们来说，自由恋爱实际上意味着极少数男性“拥有”大多数女性，特别是大多数性吸引力和生殖能力都最强的女性，并成为大部分后代的父亲，而大多数男性则承担着帮助抚养其他男性的孩子的可疑义务。当然，即使是对这一事实最模糊的认识，也会对任何部落内部的团结，特别是对任何男性之间的团结构成永久的威胁，例如，在对抗敌对部落时所需要的团结；当人口数量远远超过其最佳规模时，这种威胁必定会变得越来越强烈。相比之下，一夫一妻制家庭的制度以及在较小程度上一夫多妻制家庭的制度，为每个男性提供了在某种程度上平等的生殖成功的机会，从而为每个男性参与和投资于合作行动创造了更大的激励。

从女性的观点来看，事情有很大的不同。毕竟，女性必须承担与性交相关的怀孕风险，她们在怀孕期间和分娩后特别容易受到伤害。此外，妇女与儿童有着独特的天然联系；因为尽管对父子关系总会有一些疑问，但就母性而言，不可能有疑问。每个妇女都知道谁是自己的孩子，谁是其他妇女的孩子。根据这些自然事实，从女性的观点来看，自由恋爱制度的主要优势就变得显而易见了。由于对女性来说，与性相关的风险和投资更大，因此女性在选择交配对象时更有选择性。为了增加自己生殖成功的可能性，他们对那些看起来健康、有活力、有吸引力、聪明等的交配伙伴表现出强烈的偏好，一句话说，也就是偏好阿尔法男。因为男性在选择性对象时不那么挑剔，在自由恋爱的制度下，即使是最不吸引人的女性也可以现实地期望能够偶尔与一些最有吸引力的男性交配，从而可能将他们的“优越”基因传递给自己的下一代。显然，一旦家庭制度取代了自由恋爱制度，这种优势就消失了。现在，每个女性都应该用一套或几套男性基因来试试自己的生殖运气，而在绝大多数情况下，这些基因并不在最佳基因之列。那么，女人从婚姻中得到了什么？只要人口达到或接近其最佳规模，狩猎采集部落的生活以舒适和富足为特征，（她们从婚姻中得到的）似乎就很少。然而，一旦人口增长超过这一点，这种情况就必须改变。人口越是超过其最佳规模，对有限食物供应的竞争就越激烈。以前存在的女性之间的团结，现在越来越弱了。自然，每个妇女都想确保自己的生育成功，并帮助自己的孩子长大成人，因此会与其他妇女及其孩子发生冲突。在这种情况下，甚至杀害另一名妇女的孩子以增加自己孩子的生存机会也被越来越多的人认为是一种选择。（顺带一提，在一夫多妻制关系的框架内，同样的女性之间为生殖成功的竞争在某种程度上仍然盛行，这解释了这种关系中固有的一些特殊的不稳定性和紧张关系）。在这种情况下，每个女人（和她的孩子）都越来越需要个人保护。但谁愿意提供这种保护呢？大多数孩子都有同一个父亲——来自少数被赋予超过平等的生育机会的阿尔法男性——但他们有不同的母亲。因此，不能指望孩子的父亲来保护一个妇女和她的孩子免受另一个妇女和孩子的伤害，因为父亲往往是同一个人。也不能指望从另一个男人那里得到保护；因为一个男人为什么要向一个与其他男人发生性关系、孩子由其他男人抚养的女人提供个人支持和保护，特别是当这种情况威胁到他自己的生活水平时？一个女人只有在放弃所有自由恋爱的好处，而承诺将她的性好处只给他，从而设法向他保证她的孩子也总是他的，才能从一个男人那里获得个人保护。

男性和女性的不同观点不仅存在于家庭制度的建立本身，而且还存在于婚姻忠诚在维持家庭稳定的重要性方面。男性和女性在这方面计算的差异有其自然事实的原因：至少在最近发展出可靠的基因亲子鉴定之前，孩子的母亲总是以某种方式——具有一定程度的确定性——为人所知；对孩子的父亲来说（孩子是否亲生）是无从知晓的。正如民间智慧所说：母亲的孩子，父亲的也许。这个事实，同样非常“自然地”，必然导致对适当（和不适当）男性和女性婚姻行动的显著不同的——不对称的——期望。当然，为了确保家庭制度的稳定，任何形式的婚姻不忠都是不被社会认可的。但是，与男性不忠的情况相比，女性不忠的情况下，反对的声音要大得多，可能的制裁也要严厉得多。虽然这可能看起来“不公平”，但事实上这是相当合理的，并且符合“事物的本质”，因为女性出轨给被背叛的丈夫带来的风险远远大于男性出轨给被背叛的妻子带来的风险。妻子的不忠可能是导致与丈夫离婚的第一步，正如丈夫的不忠可能是导致与妻子离婚的第一步一样。在这方面，这两种情况是相同的（对称的），所犯的“罪”也同样严重。然而，如果婚姻不忠没有导致离婚，那么妇女所犯的“罪”必须被认为比男人所犯的严重得多。因为婚外性关系可能导致怀孕，如果一个因此怀孕的女人随后和她的丈夫在一起，真正的危险就出现了，她可能会试图把她的私生子呈现给她的丈夫作为自己的孩子，从而欺骗他去抚养另一个男人的孩子。在相反的情况下就不存在这种危险：没有一个男人可以在妻子不知道真相的情况下把他的非婚生子女交给她。因此，与男性不忠相比，女性更容易受到社会指责。（顺便说一句——也是相当合理的——在男性不忠的情况下，也有类似的区别：如果一个男人与一个已婚女人有暧昧关系，那么这种不忠被认为比与一个未婚女人有暧昧关系更严重；因为在前一种情况下，他会成为女性进一步欺骗行动的潜在帮凶，而在后一种情况下，他不会。因此，认识到这种区别，也为了适应男性泛滥的性欲，卖淫已经成为一种几乎普遍的社会制度。）

[70] Mises，Socialism，p.282。

米塞斯，《社会主义》，第282页。

[71] Based on archeological records，the speed of this diffusion process has been esti mated at about one kilometer per year on land （and somewhat higher along coastlines and river valleys）。See CavalliSforza，genes，Peoples，and languages，p.102。

根据考古记录，这种扩散过程的速度在陆地上估计约为每年一千米（在海岸线和河谷沿线速度稍高一些）。参见卡瓦利-斯福尔扎《基因、民族与语言》，第102页。

[72] See for instance ibid.，pp.101–13； CavalliSforza and CavalliSforza，The Great Human Diasporas，chap.6，esp.pp.144 ff。

例如，参见同上，第101至113页；卡瓦利-斯福尔扎和卡瓦利-斯福尔扎所著《人类大迁徙》，第六章，特别是第144页及以后内容。

[73] More than 10，000 years ago already some earlyneolithic settlements，such as Çatalhöyük in presentday Turkey，for instance，reached an estimated size of 4，000– 5，000 inhabitants.Findings made at such sites include sanctuaries à la Stonehenge （alas，more than 6，000 years older!），spacious houses built of stone and with elaborate wall paintings，megalith columns with animal reliefs，sculptures，carvings with writinglike symbols，ornaments，stonevessels with elaborate decorations，stone daggers，mirrors made from obsidian （a volcanic stone），bone needles，arrow heads，mill stones，jugs and vases made of stone and clay，rings and chains made from colorful stones，even the beginning of metalworks.

一万多年前，一些早期的新石器时代居住区，如今天土耳其的恰塔霍裕克（Çatalhöyük），就已经达到了约 4,000 至 5,000 人的规模！）、用石头建造的宽敞房屋和精美的壁画、刻有动物浮雕的巨石柱、刻有文字的象形文字、带有精美装饰的石制坟墓、石制匕首、用黑曜石（一种火山石）制成的镜子、骨针、箭头、磨石、用石头和粘土制成的壶和花瓶、用彩色石头制成的戒指和链条，甚至还有金属制品的雏形。

[74] See Colin McEvedy and richard Jones，Atlas of World Population History （Har mondsworth，U.K.：Penguin Books，1978）。

参见科林·麦克伊韦迪和理查德·琼斯所著《世界人口历史地图集》（英国哈蒙兹沃思：企鹅图书，1978 年）。

* Previously unpublished.reprinted in Hoppe，A Short History of man：Progress and Decline （Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，2015）。

以前未发表过。转载于霍普的《人类简史：进步与衰落》（阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，2015 年）。

[75] Ludwig von Mises，Human action：A Treatise on Economics （Chicago：regnery，1966），p.667。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《人的行动：经济学专论》（芝加哥：雷格里出版社，1966 年），第 667 页。

[76] Ibid.，p.672。

同上，第672页。

[77] Colin McEvedy and richard Jones，Atlas of World Population History （Harmond sworth，U.K.：Penguin Books，1978），p.342。

科林·麦克伊韦迪和理查德·琼斯，《世界人口历史地图集》（英国哈蒙兹沃思：企鹅图书，1978 年），第 342 页。

[78] Ibid.，p.344。

同上，第344页。

[79] Gregory Clark，Farewell to Alms：A Brief Economic History of the World （Princeton，N.J。：Princeton University Press，2007），p.2。

格雷戈里·克拉克，《告别施舍：世界经济简史》（美国新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，2007 年），第 2 页。

[80] Mises，Human action，pp.617–23。

米塞斯《人的行动》，第617-623页。

[81] Rothbard，“left and Right，” in idem，egalitarianism as a revolt against nature and Other Essays （Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，2000）。

罗斯巴德，《左与右》，载于同一作者的《平等主义是对自然的反叛及其他论文》（阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，2000 年）。

[82] When Tahiti was rediscovered by Europeans in 1767，some 1，000 or possibly 2，000 years after it had been first settled by Austronesian farmers，its population was estimated at 50，000 （today，180，000）。According to all accounts，the Tahitians lived paradisiacal lives.real income per capita was high，not least because of highly favor able climatic conditions in the Polynesian islands.Tahitian men could not keep their pants up either，but in order to maintain their high standard of living，the Tahitians practiced a most rigorous and ruthless form of population control，involving infanticide and deadly warfare.The place was paradise，but a paradise only for the living。Yet all the while Tahitians were still living in the Stone age.Their tool kit had remained es sentially unchanged since their first arrival on the island（s）。There had been no further capital accumulation，and real income per capita，even if high due to favorable external circumstances，had remained stagnant。

当塔希提岛在1767年被欧洲人重新发现时，距离南岛农民第一次在这里定居已经过去了大约1000年或2000年，其人口估计为50000人（今天为180000人）。根据所有的描述，塔西提人过着天堂般的生活。人均实际收入很高，这主要是因为波利尼西亚群岛的气候条件非常有利。塔希提男人也不能保持穿着他们的裤子，但是为了维持他们的高生活水平，塔希提人实行了一种最为严格和残酷的人口控制方式，包括杀婴和致命的战争。这个地方是天堂，但只是活着的人的天堂。然而，与此同时，塔希提人仍然生活在石器时代。自从他们第一次抵达该岛以来，他们的工具基本上没有变化。没有进一步的资本积累，人均实际收入即使由于有利的外部环境而很高，仍然停滞不前。

[83] See Michael H.Hart，Understanding Human History：An Analysis including the Effects of geography and Differential Evolution （Augusta，Ga.：Washington Summit Pub lishers，2007）。

参见迈克尔·H·哈特所著《理解人类历史：包括地理和差异进化影响的分析》（佐治亚州奥古斯塔：华盛顿峰会出版社，2007 年）。

[84] See also Arnold gehlen，man （new York：Columbia University Press，1988）。

另见阿诺德·格伦所著《人》（纽约：哥伦比亚大学出版社，1988 年）。

[85] See also Hart，Understanding Human History； Clark，Farewell to Alms，chap.6； and richard Lynn，Dysgenics：genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations （Ulster：Ul ster institute for Social research，2011），chap.2。

另见哈特的《理解人类历史》；克拉克的《告别施舍：世界经济简史》第六章；以及理查德·林恩的《劣生学：现代人口中的遗传退化》（阿尔斯特：阿尔斯特社会研究所，2011 年）第二章。

[86] See on the following Josef H.reichholf，Stabile Ungleichgewichte：Die Ökolo gie der Zukunft （Frankfurt：Suhrkamp，2008）； also Carroll Quigley，The Evolution of civilizations：An introduction to Historical Analysis （Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty Classics，1979），chap.6。

关于以下内容可参见约瑟夫·H·赖希霍夫所著《稳定的不平衡：未来的生态学》（法兰克福：苏尔坎普出版社，2008 年）；也可参见卡罗尔·奎格利所著《文明的演进：历史分析导论》（印第安纳波利斯，印第安纳州：自由经典出版社，1979 年）第六章。

[87] See richard Lynn and Tatu Vanhanen，IQ and Global inequality （Augusta，Ga.：Washington Summit Publishers，2006）； richard Lynn，The Global bell Curve：Race，IQ and inequality Worldwide （Augusta，Ga.：Washington Summit Publishers，2008）； idem，Race Differences in intelligence：An Evolutionary Analysis （Augusta Ga.：Washington Sum mit Publishers，2008）。

参见理查德·林恩和塔图·范汉宁所著《智商与全球不平等》（佐治亚州奥古斯塔：华盛顿峰会出版社，2006 年）；理查德·林恩所著《全球钟形曲线：全球范围内的种族、智商与不平等》（佐治亚州奥古斯塔：华盛顿峰会出版社，2008 年）；同一作者所著《种族智力差异：进化分析》（佐治亚州奥古斯塔：华盛顿峰会出版社，2008 年）。

[88] Lynn，Dysgenics.

林恩，《劣生学》。

* originally published in Libertarian Papers 3，No.2 （2011）。

原刊于《自由意志主义》第3期第2期（2011）。

[89] See the Wikipedia entry for “Cockaigne，” http：//eN.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cockaigne.

参见维基百科上关于“Cockaigne”的条目http：//eN.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cockaigne。

[90] See the Wikipedia entry for “Nomenklatura，” http：//eN.wikipedia.org/wiki/No menklatura.

请参阅维基百科上的“Nomenklatura”条目http：//eN.wikipedia.org/wiki/No menklatura。

* originally published in the Journal of Libertarian Studies 16，No.1 （2002）。

原刊于《自由意志主义研究杂志》16期第1期（2002）。

[91] Ludwig von Mises，Human action：A Treatise on Economics （Auburn，Ala.：Ludwig von Mises institute，1998），p.144。“within the frame of social cooperation，” Mises explains，there can emerge between members of society feelings of sympathy and friend ship and a sense of belonging together。These feelings are the source of man’s most delightful and most sublime experiences.However，they are not，as some have asserted，the agents that have brought about social relationships.They are fruits of social cooperation，they thrive only within its frame； they did not precede the establishment of social relations and are not the seed from which they spring。

路德维希・冯・米塞斯，《人的行动：经济学专论》（阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希・冯・米塞斯研究院，1998 年），第 144 页。米塞斯解释说，社会成员之间可以产生同情、友谊和共同归属感，这些情感是人类最愉快、最崇高的体验的源泉，但它们并不像某些人所说的那样，是促成社会关系的因素。它们是社会合作的成果，只有在社会合作的框架内才能茁壮成长；它们并非先于社会关系的建立而存在，也不是社会关系产生的种子。

[92] As regards the family，Mises explains，the mutual sexual attraction between male and female is inherent in man’s ani mal nature and independent of any thinking and theorizing。It is permissible to call it original，vegetative，instinctive，or mysterious.However，neither cohabitation，nor what precedes it and follows，generates social cooperation and societal modes of lifE.The animals too join together in mating，but they have not developed social relations.

至于家庭，米塞斯解释说，男性和女性之间的相互的性吸引是人类本性中固有的，独立于任何思考和理论。我们可以称它为原始的、植物性的、本能的或神秘的。然而，无论是同居，还是同居之前和之后，都不会产生社会合作和社会生活模式。动物也会交配，但它们没有发展出社会关系。

Family life is not merely a product of sexual intercourse.It is by no means natural and necessary that parents and children live together in the way they do in the family。The mating relation need not result in a family organization.The human family is an outcome of thinking，planning，and acting。（Human action，p.167）

家庭生活不仅仅是性交的产物。父母和孩子，他们以家庭的方式生活在一起，这绝不是自然的，也不是必然的。交配关系不一定导致家族组织。人类家庭是思考、计划和行动的结果。（人的行动，p.167）

[93] See on this also Spencer H.MacCallum，The Art of Community （menlo Park，Ca lif。：Institute for Humane Studies，1970）。

关于这一点也可参见斯宾塞·H·麦卡勒姆所著《社区的艺术》（加利福尼亚州门洛帕克：人道研究所，1970 年）。

[94] Mises notes in this regard that even if such a thing as a natural and inborn hatred between various races existed，it would not render social cooperation futile.Social cooperation has nothing to do with personal love or with a general commandment to love one another。They cooperate because this best serves their own interests.neither love nor charity nor any other sympathetic sentiments but rightly understood selfishness is what originally impelled man to adjust himself to the requirements of society，to respect the rights and freedoms of his fellow men and to substitute peaceful cooperation for enmity and conflict。（Human action，p.168）

在这方面，米塞斯注意到，即使不同种族之间存在着一种自然的、与生俱来的仇恨，它也不会使社会合作变得无用。社会合作与个人的爱或彼此相爱的一般戒律无关。他们合作是因为这最符合他们自己的利益。最初促使人类调整自己以适应社会的要求，尊重他人的权利和自由，以和平合作取代敌意与冲突，不是爱、不是慈善、也不是任何其他的同情心，而是正确理解的私利。（《人的行动》，p.168）

[95] See also HansHermann Hoppe，Democracy：The God That Failed—The Economics and Politics of Monarchy，Democracy，and Natural Order （new Brunswick，N.J。：Transac tion Publishers，2001），esp.chap.9。

另见汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普所著《民主：失败的上帝——君主制、民主制与自然秩序的经济学与政治学》（新泽西州新不伦瑞克：Transaction Publishers，2001 年），尤其是第九章。

on the significance of race and ethnicity，and especially on “genetic similarity and dissimilarity” as a source of attraction and repulsion see J。Phillippe Rushton，Race，Evolution，and behavior （new Brunswick，N.J。：Transaction Publishers，1995）； idem，“geneCulture，Coevolution，and genetic Similarity Theory：Implications for ideology，Ethnic nepotism，and geopolitics，” Politics and the Life Sciences 4 （1986）； and Michael levin，Why Race Matters （Westport，ConN.：Praeger，1997）。

关于种族和民族的重要性，尤其是关于 “基因相似性和差异性” 作为吸引和排斥的根源，可参阅 J. 菲利普・拉什顿所著《种族、进化与行为》（新泽西州新不伦瑞克：Transaction Publishers，1995 年）；同一作者的《基因 — 文化协同进化与基因相似性理论：对意识形态、种族裙带关系和地缘政治的影响》，《政治与生命科学》第 4 期（1986 年）；以及迈克尔・莱文所著《为什么种族问题很重要》（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特：普雷格出版社，1997 年）。

[96] on the law and economics of “affirmative action” and discrimination，see richard A.Epstein，Forbidden Grounds （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1992）； Walter Block and Michael Walker，eds.，Discrimination，Affirmative action，and Equal Opportunity （Vancouver，B.C.：Fraser institute，1982）。

关于“平权运动”和歧视的法律和经济学，见理查德·A·爱泼斯坦，《禁地》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1992）；沃尔特·布洛克和迈克尔·沃克编，《歧视、平权运动和机会均等》（温哥华，不列颠哥伦比亚省：弗雷泽研究所，1982）。

[97] Empirically，man’s demand for ethnocultural homogeneity in residential areas finds expression in two important institutional developments.on one hand，demand is accommodated by the development of proprietary communities—“gated” or “restric tive” communities or covenants—owned by a founderdeveloper and leased to follower tenants.Here，from the outset，the owner imposes his own standards of community ad mission and membership conduct。The followertenants，in associating with the owner，agree to abide by this codE.Of course，any such code restricts a person’s range of permissible choices （as compared to the range available outside a proprietary community）。By the same token，though，the code protects each community member from various forms of external disturbances.Presumably，in residing where they do community members demonstrate that they prefer the added “protection” offered by the code over its added “restrictiveness.”

从经验上看，人类对居住区民族文化同质性的需求表现在两个重要的制度发展中。一方面，私有社区的发展满足了需求——“封闭式”或“限制性”社区或契约——由创始开发商拥有，并出租给后续租户。在这里，从一开始，所有者自我强加了自己的社区使命和成员行动标准。后来的租户，在与所有者联系时，必须同意遵守本守则。当然，任何这样的条例都会限制一个人可选择的范围（与私有社区之外的可用范围相比）。出于同样的原因，条例保护每个社区成员免受各种形式的外部干扰。据推测，在他们居住的地方，社区成员表明他们更喜欢条例提供的附加“保护”，而不是附加的“限制”。

on the other hand，in communities of multiple independent proprietors，the de mand for ethnocultural homogeneity finds expression in the institution of insurance （mutual or capitalbased）。The essence of insurance is the grouping of individual risks into a pool （or class） of risks.However，in order to be so grouped，each individual risk must be “homogeneous” as regards the risk under consideration to every other individ ual risk within the same class.“Heterogeneous” risks either cannot be insured or must be insured separately （in different pools，jointly with other homogeneous risks，and at different prices）。Ethnocultural homogeneity of neighborhoods，then，is simply a device for making insurance against external threats and interferences possible and thus lowering the cost of residential property protection.Homogeneity facilitates mutual property insurance.Capitalbased insurers will charge lower premiums for clusters of homogeneous territories （while at the same time revealing the different ranks in cultural development of various ethnocultures，as reflected in the pricespread of the premium charged at different locations）。

另一方面，在由多个独立所有者组成的社区中，对民族文化同质性的需求表现在保险制度（相互保险或资本保险）上。保险的本质是将单个风险组合成一个风险池（或类）。但是，为了进行这样的分组，每一个单独的风险就其所考虑的风险与同一类别内的每一个其他单独的风险而言，必须是“同质的”。“异质”风险要么不能投保，要么必须单独投保（在不同的保险池中，与其他同质风险共同投保，并以不同的价格投保）。因此，社区的民族文化同质性仅仅是一种手段，可以防止外部威胁和干扰，从而降低住宅财产保护的成本。同质性有利于相互的财产保险。以资本为基础的保险公司将对同质地区的集群收取较低的保费（同时揭示了不同民族文化在文化发展中的不同等级，这反映在不同地区收取的保费的价格差异上）。

[98] Mass migration，in contrast to smallscale individual migration of skilled laborers in pursuit of a more productive environment，is entirely a statemade phenomenon （see also section IV below）。Most typically，mass migration is the outcome of interstate war fare，state resettlement programs，group expulsion，or general economic destructionisM.

大规模移民与技术工人为追求更有生产力的环境而进行的小规模个人移民相比，完全是一种人为现象（又见下文第四节）。最典型的是，大规模移民是国家间战争、国家重新安置计划、群体驱逐或普遍经济破坏的结果。

[99] See Murray N.Rothbard，For a new Liberty （new York：Macmillan，1978），esp.chap.3； Murray N.Rothbard，The Ethics of Liberty （new York：new York University Press，1998），esp.part III； HansHermann Hoppe，A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism （Boston：Kluwer Academic Publishers，1989）； also Franz Oppenheimer，The State （new York：Vanguard Press，1914）。

参见默里・N. 罗斯巴德：《为了新自由》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1978 年），特别是第 3 章；默里・N. 罗斯巴德：《自由的伦理》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1998 年），特别是第三部分；汉斯 – 赫尔曼・霍普：《社会主义与资本主义理论》（波士顿：克吕韦尔学术出版社，1989 年）；还有弗朗茨・奥本海默：《国家》（纽约：先锋出版社，19914 年）。

[100] See Hoppe，Democracy：The God That Failed； idem，Natural Elites，Intellectuals，and the State，pamphlet （Auburn，Ala.：Ludwig von Mises institute，1995）； Murray N.Rothbard，For a new Liberty，esp.chap.7； idem，Education：free and Compulsory （Au burn，Ala.：Ludwig von Mises institute，1999）。

参见霍普《民主：失败的上帝》；同一作者的《自然精英、知识分子与国家》，小册子（阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，1995年）；默里·N.罗斯巴德：《为了新的自由》，特别是第7章；同一作者的《教育：自由与强制》（阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，1999年）。

[101] on the fallacies of the theory of public goods see Murray N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State （Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，1993），pp.883–90； Hoppe，A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism，chap.10； on roads in particular see Walter Block，“Public Goods and Externalities：The case of Roads，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 7，no.1 （1983）。

关于公共商品理论的谬误，见默里·罗斯巴德，《人、经济与国家》（阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，1993），第883 -890页；霍普《社会主义与资本主义理论》，第10章；特别是关于道路问题，可参阅沃尔特・布洛克的《公共物品与外部性：道路案例》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第 7 卷第 1 期（1983 年）。

[102] Even the famed roadways of ancient Rome were typically regarded as a plague （rather than an advantage） because they were essentially military rather than trade routes.See Max Weber，Soziologie，Weltgeschichtliche Analysen，Politik （Stuttgart：Kroen er，1964），p.4。

就连古罗马著名的道路通常也被视作一种祸患（而非优势），因为它们本质上是军事要道而非贸易路线。参见马克斯·韦伯：《社会学、世界历史分析、政治》（斯图加特：克勒纳出版社，1964年），第4页。

[103] See also Edward Banfield，The Unheavenly City revisited （Boston：Little，Brown，1974）。

另见爱德华·班菲尔德，《重访非天堂之城》（波士顿：利特尔，布朗出版社，1974年）。

[104] on the practical impossibility of democracy （majority rule） in multiethnic states，see Ludwig von Mises，Nation，State，and Economy （new York：new York University Press，1983）。

论在多民族国家实行民主（多数人统治）的实际不可能性，见路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《民族、国家和经济》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1983年）。

[105] See also Murray N.Rothbard，“Marshall，Civil Rights and the Courts，” in Llewellyn H.Rockwell，Jr.，ed.，The Irrepressible Rothbard （Burlingame，Calif.：Center for Libertarian Studies，2000），pp.370–77； Michael levin，“The President as Social Engineer，” in John V.Denson，ed.，reassessing the Presidency （Auburn，Ala.：Mises in stitute，2001），pp.651–66。

另见默里·N.罗斯巴德的《马歇尔、公民权利与法院》，收录于小卢埃林·H.罗克韦尔编的《不屈不挠的罗斯巴德》（加利福尼亚州伯灵格姆：自由意志主义研究中心，2000年），第370 – 377页；迈克尔·莱文的《作为社会工程师的总统》，收录于约翰·V.丹森编的《重新评估总统职位》（阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，2001年），第651 – 666页。

[106] “If every piece of land in a country were owned by some person，group or corpo ration，” elaborates Murray N.Rothbard，this would mean that no immigrant could enter unless invited to enter and allowed to rent or purchase property。A totally privatized country would be as closed as the particular inhabitants and property owners desire.It seems clear，then，that the regime of open borders that exists de facto in the U.S.really amounts to a compulsory opening by the central state，the state in charge of all streets and public land areas，and does not genuinely reflect the wishes of the proprietors.（“Nations by Consent：Decomposing the NationState，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 11，No.2 （1994）：7）on U.S. immigration，see Peter Brimelow，Alien Nation：Common sense about Amer ica’s immigration Disaster （new York：Random House，1995）； george J。Borjas，Friends or Strangers：The Impact of Immigrants on the U.S.Economy （new York：Basic Books，1990）； idem，Heaven’s Door：immigration Policy and the American Economy （Princeton，N.J。：Princeton University Press，1999）.

默里・N. 罗斯巴德详细阐述道：“如果一个国家的每一块土地都归某些个人、团体或公司所有，” 这就意味着，除非受到邀请并被允许租用或购买房产，否则任何移民都无法进入。一个完全私有化的国家将会像其特定居民和土地所有者所期望的那样对外封闭。那么，很明显，美国事实上存在的开放边境制度实际上相当于中央政府（掌控着所有街道和公共土地区域的政府）强制开放边境，而并非真实反映了土地所有者们的意愿。（《基于同意的国家：剖析民族国家》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》11 卷第 2 期（1994 年）：7 页）关于美国的移民问题，可参阅彼得・布里梅洛的《异族国度：关于美国移民灾难的常识》（纽约：兰登书屋，1995 年）；乔治・J. 博尔哈斯的《朋友还是陌生人：移民对美国经济的影响》（纽约：基础图书公司，1990 年）；同一作者的《天堂之门：移民政策与美国经济》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1999 年）。

[107] Typically，it is easier for a certified “political” mass murderer，such as a socialist dictator，for instance，who has been overthrown by another，to gain entrance into West ern countries than it is for the （his） “true” victims.

典型的情况是，一个被证明是“政治”的大屠杀者，比如被另一个人推翻的社会主义独裁者，比他的“真正”受害者更容易进入西方国家。

While he who qualifies as a victim changes with the political winds，a relative con stant in Western asylum policy is the preference for Jewish immigration （at the ex clusion of nonJews）。In the U.S.，for instance，it has been a longstanding tradition that Jews from the former Soviet Union qualify as “victims，” while regular Russians or Ukrainians do not。Not to be outdone，germany currently accepts every Russian Jew who desires entrance，but excludes as nonvictims all other Russians.Consequently，the demand for german asylum among Russian “Jews，” twothirds of whom are supported entirely through “public” welfare，has risen to such a level that the Central Committee of Jews in germany demanded of the german government （successfully） that appli cants be “tested” for Jewishness.Essentially，the test is the same as that employed by the National Socialists in the infamous Nuremberg Race Laws of 1934 （while it is used to the opposite effect），which in turn was based on the official （selfacknowledged） reli gious strictures of orthodox JudaisM.Incidentally，Israel，which defines itself as “a Jewish State，” practically prohibits all immigration by nonJews （while allowing any Jew from anywhere，under the Law of return，to enter Israel with full citizenship rights）。Ninety two percent of Israel’s land is stateowned and regulated by the Jewish National Fund.According to its regulations，the right to reside，to open a business，and frequently also to work on this land is prohibited to anyone except Jews.While Jews may rent from nonJews，nonJews are prohibited from renting from Jews.See Israel Shahak，Jewish History，Jewish religion （London：Pluto Press，1994），esp.chap.1。

虽然有资格成为受害者的人随着政治风向的变化而变化，但西方庇护政策中相对不变的是对犹太移民的偏好（不包括非犹太人）。例如，在美国，将来自前苏联的犹太人视为“受害者”是一个长期的传统，而普通的俄罗斯人或乌克兰人则不是。不甘落后的是，德国目前接受所有希望入境的俄罗斯犹太人，但将所有其他俄罗斯人排除在非受害者之外。因此，俄罗斯“犹太人”（其中三分之二完全由“公共”福利支持）对德国庇护的需求已经上升到这样一个水平，以至于德国犹太人中央委员会（Central Committee of Jews）要求德国政府（成功地）对申请人进行“犹太性测试”。从本质上讲，这种测试与纳粹在1934年臭名昭著的纽伦堡种族法中使用的测试是一样的（尽管它被用于相反的效果），后者反过来又基于正统犹太教的官方（自我认知的）宗教限制。顺便说一句，自称为“犹太国家”的以色列实际上禁止所有非犹太人移民（同时根据《回归法》，允许任何地方的犹太人以完全的公民权进入以色列）。以色列92%的土地是国有的，由犹太国家基金管理。根据其规定，除了犹太人之外，任何人都不得在这片土地上居住、经商和工作。虽然犹太人可以从非犹太人那里租房，但非犹太人却不能从犹太人那里租房。参见Israel Shahak，《犹太历史，犹太宗教》（伦敦：Pluto出版社，1994），第1章。

[108] See also Robert A.Nisbet，Community and Power （new York：Oxford University Press，1962）； idem，Conservatism （Minneapolis：University of Minnesota Press，1986）。

另见罗伯特·A.尼斯比特：《社区与权力》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1962年）；同一作者的《保守主义》（明尼阿波利斯：明尼苏达大学出版社，1986年）。

[109] For a summary presentation of the neoconservative worldview，see Francis Fuku yama，The End of History and the Last man （new York：Avon Books，1993）； for a critical assessment of the neoconservatives and their agenda，see Paul Gottfried，The Conservative Movement （new York：Twayne Publishers，1993）； idem，After liberalism （Princeton，N.J.：Princeton University Press，1999）。For a brilliant literary treatment of the subject of mass immigration and the Western welfare state，see Jean Raspail，The Camp of the Saints （new York：Charles Scribner’s Sons，1975）。

关于新保守主义世界观的概要介绍，可参阅弗朗西斯·福山的《历史的终结及最后的人》（纽约：埃文图书公司，1993年）；关于对新保守主义者及其议题的批判性评估，可参阅保罗·戈特弗里德的《保守主义运动》（纽约：特韦恩出版社，1993年）；同一作者的《自由主义之后》（新泽西州普林斯顿：普林斯顿大学出版社，1999年）。关于大规模移民与西方福利国家这一主题的精彩的文学描述，可参阅让·拉斯帕伊的《圣徒营》（纽约：查尔斯·斯克里布纳之子出版社，1975年）。

[110] See，for instance，Walter Block，“A Libertarian case for free immigration，” Jour nal of Libertarian Studies 13，no.2 （1998）。

例如，可参阅沃尔特·布洛克的《自由移民的自由意志主义辩护》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第13卷第2期（1998年）。

[111] Peter Brimelow，Alien Nation，pp.124–27，has provided some recent evidence for the thesis that no multicultural state，and especially no democratic one，has ever worked peacefully for very long。Working back from the present，here is the evidence：Eritrea，ruled by Ethiopia since 1952，splits off in 1993； Czechoslovakia，founded in 1918，splits into Czech and Slovak ethnic components in 1993； the Soviet Union of 1917 splits into multiple ethnic components in 1991，and many of these components are threatened with further ethnic fragmentation； Yugoslavia，founded in 1918，splits into several eth nic components in 1991，and further breakup is still under way； lebanon，founded in 1920，has effectively partitioned Christians and Muslims （under Syrian domination） since 1975； Cyprus，independent since 1960，effectively partitions Greek and Turkish territories in 1974； Pakistan，independent since 1947，ethnically distinct Bangladesh splits off in 1971； Malaysia，independent since 1963，Chinese dominated Singapore is expelled in 1965。The list goes on with still unresolved cases：India and the Sikhs and Kashmiris； Sri Lanka and the Tamils； Turkey，Iraq and Iran and the Kurds； Sudan and Chad and the Arabs versus Blacks； Nigeria and the Ibos； Ulster and the Protestants versus the Catholics； belgium and the Flemish versus the Walloons； Italy and the german speaking South Tyrolians； Canada and the French versus the English； Zimbabwe and South Africa and Blacks versus Whites.

彼得·布里梅洛，《异族》，124-27页，以下论点提供了一些最新证据：没有一个多元文化国家，尤其是没有一个民主国家，能够长期和平维持。现在来看，证据如下：厄立特里亚自1952年起由埃塞俄比亚统治，1993年分裂；捷克斯洛伐克成立于1918年，1993年分裂为捷克和斯洛伐克两个民族；1917年的苏联在1991年分裂为多个民族组成部分，其中许多组成部分面临着进一步的民族分裂的威胁；1918年成立的南斯拉夫在1991年分裂为几个民族组成部分，进一步的分裂仍在进行中；黎巴嫩成立于1920年，自1975年以来，实际上已经将基督徒和穆斯林（在叙利亚统治下）分开；1960年独立的塞浦路斯在1974年实际上分割了希腊和土耳其的领土；1947年独立的巴基斯坦，1971年民族分裂的孟加拉国；1963年独立的马来西亚，1965年被华人统治的新加坡驱逐出境。还有很多悬而未决的问题：印度、锡克教徒和克什米尔人；斯里兰卡和泰米尔人；土耳其、伊拉克、伊朗和库尔德人；苏丹，乍得，阿拉伯人对抗黑人；尼日利亚和伊博群岛；阿尔斯特和新教徒对抗天主教徒；比利时和佛兰德人对抗瓦隆人；意大利和讲德语的南蒂罗尔人；加拿大和法国对抗英国；津巴布韦和南非，黑人对白人。

Yet，is not Switzerland，with an assemblage of germans，French，Italians，and Ro mansh an exception？ Hardly。All essential powers in Switzerland，in particular those determining educational and cultural matters （schools），are concentrated in the hands of the cantons rather than in those of the central government。And almost all of the twentysix cantons and halfcantons are ethnoculturally homogeneous.Seventeen can tons are almost exclusively german； four cantons are almost exclusively French； and one canton is predominantly ItaliaN.only three cantons are bilingual，the Swiss ethno cultural balance has been essentially stable，and there is only a limited amount of inter cultural cantonal migration.Even given these favorable circumstances，Switzerland did experience an unsuccessful，violently suppressed war of secession，the Sonderbundskrieg of 1847。Furthermore，the creation of the new，breakaway Frenchspeaking canton of Jura from the predominantly german canton of berne in 1979 was preceded by years of terrorist activity。

然而，拥有德国人、法国人、意大利人和罗马尼亚人的瑞士难道不是一个例外吗？几乎没有。瑞士的所有基本权力，特别是决定教育和文化事务（学校）的权力，都集中在各州手中，而不是中央政府手中。而且几乎所有的26个州和半州在种族文化上都是同质的。17罐几乎全是德国的；四个州几乎完全是法语区；其中一个州以意大利人为主。只有三个州使用双语，瑞士民族文化平衡基本稳定，跨文化移民数量有限。即使有了这些有利的条件，瑞士也经历了一场失败的、被暴力镇压的分裂战争，即1847年的联邦战争。此外，1979年，讲法语的汝拉州从以德语为主的伯尔尼州分离出来，在此之前，恐怖主义活动已经持续了多年。

[112] See，for instance，Block，“A Libertarian case for free immigration.”

例如，请看布洛克的《自由移民的自由意志主义辩护》。

[113] against many leftlibertarian openborder enthusiasts，it is incorrect to infer from the fact that an immigrant has found someone willing to employ him that his presence on a given territory must henceforth be considered “invited.” Strictly speaking，this conclusion is true only if the employer also assumes the full costs associated with the importation of his immigrantemployeE.This is the case under the muchmaligned ar rangement of a “factory town” owned and operated by a proprietor。Here，the full cost of employment，the cost of housing，healthcare，and all other amenities associated with the immigrant’s presence，is paid for by the proprietor。No one else’s property is involved in the immigrantworker settlement。less perfectly （and increasingly less so），this full costprinciple of immigration is realized in Swiss immigration policy。In Switzerland immigration matters are decided on the local rather than federal government level，by the local ownerresident community in which the immigrant wants to reside.These owners are interested that the immigrant’s presence in their community increase rather than decrease their property values.In places as attractive as Switzerland，this typically means that the immigrant （or his employer） is expected to buy his way into a commu nity，which often requires multimilliondollar donations.

Unfortunately，welfare states are not operated like factory towns or even Swiss com munities.Under welfarestate conditions the immigrant employer must pay only a small fraction of the full costs associated with the immigrant’s presence.He is permitted to socialize （externalize） a substantial part of such costs onto other property owners.Equipped with a work permit，the immigrant is allowed to make free use of every public facility：roads，parks，hospitals，schools，and no landlord，businessman，or private as sociation is permitted to discriminate against him as regards housing，employment，ac commodation，and association.That is，the immigrant comes invited with a substantial fringe benefits package paid for not （or only partially） by the immigrant employer （who allegedly has extended the invitation），but by other domestic proprietors as taxpayers who had no say in the invitation whatsoever。This is not an “invitation，” as commonly understood.This is an imposition.It is like inviting immigrant workers to renovate one’s own house while feeding them from other people’s refrigerators.Consequently，because the cost of importing immigrant workers is lowered，more employerspon sored immigrants will arrive than otherwise.Moreover，the character of the immigrant changes，too。While Swiss communities choose wellheeled，highly valueproductive im migrants，whose presence enhances communal property values all around，employers under democratic welfarestate conditions are permitted by state law to externalize their employment costs on others and tend to import increasingly cheap，lowskilled and low valueproductive immigrants，regardless of their effect on allaround communal property values.

与许多开放边境的左翼自由意志主义狂热者相反，从移民找到了愿意雇用他这一事实中推断他在特定领土上的出现从此必须被视为“被邀请”是不正确的。严格地说，这个结论只有在雇主也承担了与引进他的移民雇员有关的全部成本的情况下才成立。这种情况是在一个所有者拥有并经营的“工厂小镇”这种饱受诟病的管理模式下发生的。在这里，所有的雇佣成本，住房成本，医疗成本，以及与移民相关的所有其他便利设施，都由所有者支付。移民工人的安置不涉及其他人的财产。在瑞士的移民政策中，这一移民的完全成本原则得到了实现，但不太完美（而且越来越不完美）。在瑞士，移民事务由地方政府而不是联邦政府决定，由移民想要居住的当地所有者和居民社区决定。这些所有者感兴趣的是，移民在他们社区的存在会增加而不是减少他们的房产价值。在像瑞士这样有吸引力的地方，这通常意味着移民（或他的雇主）需要花钱进入一个社区，这通常需要数百万美元的捐款。

不幸的是，福利国家的运作方式与工业城镇甚至瑞士社区都不一样。在福利国家条件下，移民雇主只需支付与移民居留相关的全部费用的一小部分。他被允许将这些成本的很大一部分社会化（外部化）到其他财产所有者身上。移民有了工作许可证，就可以免费使用一切公共设施：道路、花园、医院、学校，不允许房东、商人或私人社团在住房、就业、住宿和结社方面歧视移民。也就是说，被邀请的移民会获得大量的附加福利，而不是（或只是部分）由移民雇主（据称是他们延长了邀请）支付，而是由其他作为纳税人的国内所有者支付，他们在邀请中没有任何发言权。这不是通常理解的“邀请”。这是拼版。这就像邀请移民工人装修自己的房子，同时用别人的冰箱喂他们一样。因此，由于进口移民工人的成本降低，将会有更多雇主资助的移民到达。此外，移民的性格也发生了变化。瑞士社区选择富有的、高价值生产力的移民，他们的存在提高了周围公有财产的价值，而国家法律允许民主福利国家条件下的雇主将其雇佣成本转嫁给他人，并倾向于进口越来越廉价、低技能和低价值生产力的移民，而不管他们对整体公有财产价值的影响。

Theoretically bankrupt，the leftlibertarian openborder stance can be understood only psychologically。one source can be found in the Randian upbringing of many leftlibertarians.Big businessmenentrepreneurs are portrayed as “heroes” and，accord ing to Ayn Rand in one of her more ridiculous statements，are viewed as the welfare state’s “most severely persecuted minority。” in this view （and untainted by any historical knowledge or experience），what can possibly be wrong with a businessman hiring an immigrant worker？ in fact，as every historian knows，big businessmen are among the worst sinners against private property rights and the law of the market。Among other things，in an unholy alliance with the central state they have acquired the privilege of importing immigrant workers at other people’s expense （just as they have acquired the privilege of exporting capital to other countries and being bailed out by taxpayers and the military when such investments turn sour）。

左翼自由意志主义开放边境的立场在理论上早已破产的，只能从心理上加以理解。其中一个原因可以从许多左翼自由主义者的蓝地式教育中找到。大企业家被描绘成“英雄”，根据安·兰德（Ayn Rand）在她的一个更荒谬的声明中所说，他们被视为福利国家中“受迫害最严重的少数族裔”。从这个角度来看（不受任何历史知识或经验的影响），一个商人雇佣一个移民工人有什么错呢？事实上，每一位历史学家都知道，大商人是违反私有产权和市场规律的最严重的罪人之一。除此之外，在与中央国家的邪恶联盟中，他们获得了以牺牲他人为代价引进移民工人的特权（就像他们获得了向其他国家输出资本的特权一样，当这些投资出现问题时，他们得到了纳税人和军方的救助）。

A second motive for the openborder enthusiasm among contemporary leftliber tarians is their egalitarianisM.They were initially drawn to libertarianism as juveniles because of its “antiauthoritarianism” （trust no authority） and seeming “tolerance，” in particular toward “alternative”—nonbourgeois—lifestyles.As adults，they have been arrested in this phase of mental development。They express special “sensitivity” in every manner of discrimination and are not inhibited in using the power of the central state to impose nondiscrimination or “civil rights” statutes on society。Consequently，by prohibiting other property owners from discrimination as they see fit，they are allowed to live at others’ expense.They can indulge in their “alternative” lifestyle without hav ing to pay the “normal” price for such conduct，i.e.，discrimination and exclusion.To legitimize this course of action，they insist that one lifestyle is as good and acceptable as another。This leads first to multiculturalism，then to cultural relativism，and finally to “open borders.” See further on this Hoppe，Democracy：The God That Failed，esp.chap.10。

当代左翼自由主义者热衷于开放边境的第二个动机来自他们的平等主义。他们最初在青少年时期就被自由意志主义所吸引，因为它的“反权威主义”（不相信权威）和表面上的“宽容”，特别是对“另类”——非资产阶级的生活方式。作为成年人，他们已经在这一智力发展阶段停滞了。他们对每一种歧视方式都表现出特殊的“敏感性”，并且不受限制地利用中央国家的权力对社会施加非歧视或“公民权利”法规。因此，通过禁止其他财产所有者以他们认为合适的方式进行歧视，他们被允许以他人为代价生活。他们可以享受自己的“另类”生活方式，而不必为这种行动付出“正常”的代价。歧视和排斥。为了使这种行动合法化，他们坚持认为一种生活方式和另一种生活方式一样好，一样可以接受。这首先导致了多元文化主义，然后是文化相对主义，最后是“开放边境”。详见《民主：失败的上帝》，尤其是第10章。

[114] It should be emphasized that the distributed property shares must be tradable in order to constitute genuine private property。on the one hand，the tradability of shares makes it possible that people can cashin （sell） their property。Not everyone has the pa tience and is willing to assume the risk associated with the ownership of capital goods.on the other hand，by the same token tradability makes it possible that the shares can be bought and put to productive use by capitalistentrepreneurs who do have the requi site patience and are willing to assume the associated risk （of profit and loss）。

应当强调的是，分配的财产份额必须是可交易的，才能构成真正的私有财产。一方面，股票的可交易性使人们可以变现（出售）他们的财产。并非所有人都有耐心并愿意承担与资本货物所有权相关的风险。另一方面，出于同样的原因，可交易性使得股票可以被具有必要耐心且愿意承担相关风险（利润和损失）的资本主义企业家购买并投入生产使用。

[115] It should be emphasized that the distributed property shares must be tradable in order to constitute genuine private property。on the one hand，the tradability of shares makes it possible that people can cashin （sell） their property。Not everyone has the pa tience and is willing to assume the risk associated with the ownership of capital goods.on the other hand，by the same token tradability makes it possible that the shares can be bought and put to productive use by capitalistentrepreneurs who do have the requi site patience and are willing to assume the associated risk （of profit and loss）。

* originally published in Journal of Libertarian Studies 13，No.2 （1998）。

原刊于《自由意志主义研究杂志》第13卷第2期（1998）。

* Previously unpublished.This was the Mises Memorial Lecture presented at the 2015 Austrian Economics Research Conference in Auburn，Alabama，on March 14。

以前未发表的。这是3月14日在阿拉巴马州奥本举行的2015奥地利经济研究会议上发表的米塞斯纪念演讲。

* Previously published as chapter four of Democracy：The God That Failed （new Bruns wick，N.J。：Transaction Publishers，2001）。

此前曾作为《民主：失败的上帝》（新不伦瑞克，新泽西州：交易出版社，2001年）的第四章发表。

[116] The combined population of China and India is around 2。2 billion （of a current world population of about 6 billion）。By contrast，the combined population of western Europe and north America is approximately 700 million.

中国和印度的人口总和约为 2.2 亿（目前世界人口约为 60 亿）。相比之下，西欧和北美的人口总和约为 7 亿。

[117] During the midnineteenth century the average lifeexpectancy in western Europe and north America was approximately forty years.At that time，apart from being re stricted exclusively to males as well as by significant minimum property requirements，the franchise was restricted by a minimum age requirement of typically twentyfive years （in some places such as the United Kingdom and Sweden the requirement was as low as twentyone years，and in others such as France and Denmark it was as high as thirty years）。Nowadays，while the average lifeexpectancy in western Europe and north America has risen to well above seventy years，the franchise extends everywhere to males and females，all property requirements have been abolished，and the minimum voting age has been generally lowered to eighteen years.If the original “maturity” requirements had been maintained，the minimum age should have been raised instead：from on the average twentyfive years to about fifty years!

19 世纪中叶，西欧和北美的平均预期寿命约为 40 岁。当时，除了仅男性以及重要的最低财产要求外，选举权还受到一般为 25 岁的最低年龄要求的限制（在一些地方，如联合王国和瑞典，这一要求低至 21 岁，而在其他国家，如法国和丹麦，则高达 30 岁）。如今，虽然西欧和北美的平均预期寿命已大大提高到 70 岁以上，但选举权的范围扩大到男性和女性，所有财产要求都已取消，最低投票年龄普遍降低到 18 岁。如果维持原来的“成熟”要求，那么最低年龄反而应该提高：从平均 25 岁提高到大约 50 岁！

[118] As a rough indicator of this tendency one may want to relate successive expansions of the electorate during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to the rise of the socialist and socialdemocratic voter turnout （and the parallel decline of classical liberal parties）。A few examples will have to suffice herE.（1） Germany：For the years 1871，1903，and 1919，the total number of votes cast was 4。1，9。5，and 30。5 million respec tively； the socialist voter turnout was 3，32，and 46 percent respectively； the liberal voter turnout was 46，22，and 23 percent respectively。（2） Italy：For the years 1895，1913，and 1919，the total number of votes was 1。3，5。1，and 5。8 million respectively； the socialist voter turnout was 7，18，and 32 percent respectively； the liberal voter turnout was 80，56，and 35 percent respectively。（3） United Kingdom：For the years 1906 and 1918，the total number of votes was 7。3，and 21。4 million respectively； the socialist voter turnout was 5 and 21 percent respectively； the liberal voter turnout was 49，and 25 percent respectively。（4） Sweden：For the years 1905，1911，and 1921，the total number of votes cast was 0。2，0。6，and 1。7 million respectively； the socialist voter turnout was 9，28，and 36 percent respectively； the liberal voter turn out was 45，40，and 19 percent respec tively。（5） Netherlands：For the years 1888，1905，and 1922，the total votes cast was 0。3，0。8，and 3。3 million respectively； the socialist voter turnout was 3，17，and 27 percent respectively； the liberal voter turnout was 40，28，and 9 percent respectively。

作为这个趋势的粗略指标，人们可能会想把十九世纪末二十世纪初选举人资格的持续扩展与社会主义和社会民主主义的选民投票人数增加（和古典自由主义政党同步衰落）联系起来。这里举几个例子就够了。

（1）德国：1871 年、1903 年和 1919 年，投票总数分别为 410 万、和 3050 万；社会主义选民投票率分别为 3％，32％和 46％；自由派选民投票率分别为 46％，22％和 23％。

（2）意大利：18951913 年和 1919 年，总票数分别为 130 万，51 万和 580 万；社会主义选民投票率分别为 7％，18％和 32％；自由派选民投票率分别为 80％，56％和 35％。

英国：1906 年和 1918 年，总票数分别为 730 万和 2140 万；社会主义选民投票率分别为 5％和 21％；自由派选民投票率分别为 49％和 25％。

瑞典：1905 年、1911 年和 1921 年，投票总数分别为 20 万，60 万和 170 万；社会主义选民投票率分别为 9％，28％和36％；自由派选民投票率分别为 45％、40%和 19％。

荷兰：1888 年、1905 年和 1922 年，总投票数分别为 30 万，80 万和 330 万；社会主义选民投票率分别为 3％、17％和27％；自由派选民投票率分别为 40％，28％和 9％。

[119] The “tragedy of the commons” refers to the overutilization，waste，or depletion of resources held in common （as publicly owned goods）。See managing the Commons，ed.Garrett Hardin and John Baden （San Francisco：W.H.Freeman，1977）。

“公地悲剧”是指对公共资源（作为公有物品）的过度使用、浪费或耗竭。参见加勒特·哈丁（Garrett Hardin）和约翰·巴登（John Baden）编著的《公地管理》（旧金山：W.H.弗里曼出版社，1977年）。

[120] See on this Joseph A.Pechman，‘The rich，the Poor，and the Taxes They Pay，” Public Interest （Fall 1969）； Murray N.Rothbard，For a new Liberty （new York：Collier，1978），pp.157–62。

关于这方面，可参阅约瑟夫·A.佩奇曼（Joseph A. Pechman）的《富人与穷人及其所缴纳的税款》，《公共利益》（1969年秋季刊）；以及默里·N.罗斯巴德（Murray N. Rothbard）的《为了新自由》（纽约：科利尔出版社，1977年），第157至162页。

[121] See on this Edward C。Banfield，The Unheavenly City Revisited （Boston：Little，Brown，1974），esp.chap.3。Typically，Banfield explains，poverty is merely a transitory phase，restricted to the early stage in a person’s working career。“Permanent” poverty，by contrast，is caused by specific cultural values and attitudes：a person’s presentori entedness or，in economic terms，his high degree of time preference （which is highly correlated with low intelligence，and both of which appear to have a common genetic basis）。Whereas the former—temporarilypooryetupwardmoving—individual is characterized by futureorientation，selfdiscipline，and a willingness to forego present gratification in exchange for a better future，the latter—permanently poor—individual is characterized by presentorientation and hedonisM.Writes Banfield：

If [the latter] has any awareness of the future，it is of something fixed，fated，beyond his control：things happen to him，he does not make them happeN.Impulse governs his behavior，either because he cannot discipline himself to sacrifice a present for a future satisfaction or because he has no sense of the futurE.He is therefore radically improvident。He works only as he must to stay alive，and drifts from one unskilled job to another，taking no interest in his work。He is careless with his things and，even when nearly new，they are likely to be permanently out of order for lack of minor repairs.His body，too，is a thing “to be worked out but not repaired.” （pp.61–62）

关于这一点，可参阅爱德华·C.班菲尔德（Edward C. Banfield）的《重访非天国之城》（波士顿：利特尔&布朗出版社，1974年），尤其参见第三章。班菲尔德解释说，通常情况下，贫困仅仅是一个过渡阶段，仅限于一个人职业生涯的早期。相比之下，“永久性”贫困是由特定的文化价值观和态度造成的：一个人的当下导向，或者从经济学角度来说，他的高度时间偏好（这与低智商高度相关，而且两者似乎都有共同的遗传基础）。前者，即暂时贫困但处于上升期的个人，其特点是具有未来导向、自律，并且愿意为了更美好的未来而放弃当下的满足；而后者，即永久性贫困的个人，其特点是当下导向和享乐主义。班菲尔德写道：

如果（后者）对未来有任何认知的话，那也是某种固定的、命中注定的、超出他控制范围的东西：事情发生在他身上，而不是他让事情发生。冲动支配着他的行为，要么是因为他无法约束自己为了未来的满足而牺牲当下，要么是因为他对未来没有概念。因此，他极度缺乏远见。他只是为了活下去才去工作，从一个无需技能的工作漂泊到另一个，对自己的工作毫无兴趣。他对自己的东西很不在意，即使几乎是新的，也可能因为缺乏小修小补而永远无法正常使用。他的身体也是一件“只用来消耗而不维修”的东西。（第61 – 62页）

[122] See on this Armen Alchian，“The Economic and Social Impact of Free Tuition，” in idem，Economic Forces at Work （Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty Fund，1977）； Rothbard，For a new Liberty，chap.7。Other examples involving this type of redistribution are farm subsidies，favoring in particular large wealthy farmers，minimum wages，favoring higher paid skilled （and unionized） workers at the expense of unskilled （and nonunion ized） workers，and，of course，all forms of “business protection” laws （protective tariffs），favoring wealthy owners of corporations at the expense of the mass of comparatively poor consumers.

关于这方面，可参阅阿门·阿尔奇安（Armen Alchian）的《免学费的经济与社会影响》，收录于其《起作用的经济力量》（印第安纳波利斯，印第安纳州：自由基金，1977年）；罗斯巴德（Rothbard）的《为了新的自由》，第七章。涉及这种再分配类型的其他例子还有农业补贴，尤其对大型富裕农场主有利；最低工资规定，以牺牲非熟练（且未加入工会的）工人的利益为代价，使报酬较高的熟练（且加入工会的）工人受益；当然，还有所有形式的“商业保护”法律（保护性关税），以牺牲广大相对贫困的消费者的利益为代价，使富有的公司所有者受益。

[123] On the economics of redistribution see Ludwig von Mises，Socialism：An Economic and Sociological Analysis （Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty Fund，1981），esp.chap.34； Mur ray N.Rothbard，Power and Market：Government and the Economy （Kansas City：Sheed Andrews and McMeel，1977），pp.169ff.； idem，For a new Liberty，chap.8。

关于再分配的经济学问题，可参阅路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）的《社会主义：经济与社会学分析》（印第安纳波利斯，印第安纳州：自由基金，1981年），尤其参见第34章；默里·N·罗斯巴德（Murray N. Rothbard）的《权力与市场：政府与经济》（堪萨斯城：希德·安德鲁斯与麦克米尔出版社，1977年），第169页及以后内容；以及他的《为了新自由》，第8章。

[124] For a detailed empirical investigation of these and numerous related issues see Charles Murray，Losing Ground （new York：Basic Books，1984）。

关于对这些以及众多相关问题的详细实证研究，请参阅查尔斯·默里（Charles Murray）的《节节败退》（纽约：基础图书出版社，1984年）。

[125] Concerning the effect of “social security，” compulsory school attendance laws and the prohibition of child labor on the progressive destruction of families see Allan C。Carlson，What Has Government Done to Our Families？（Auburn，Ala.：Ludwig von Mises Institute，1991）； also Bryce J。Christensen，The Family vs.the State （Auburn，Ala.：Mises Institute，1992）。

关于“社会保障”、义务教育法以及禁止使用童工对家庭逐步造成破坏的影响，可参阅艾伦·C·卡尔森（Allan C. Carlson）的《政府对我们的家庭做了什么？》（阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，1991年）；也可参阅布莱斯·J·克里斯滕森（Bryce J. Christensen）的《家庭与国家》（阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，1992年）。

[126] For one of the earliest，most profound，and most farsighted analyses of this see Mises，Socialism，pp.429–32 and 438–41。Writing in the early 1920s，Mises described the effects of “social insurance” as follows：

By weakening or completely destroying the will to be well and able to work，social insurance creates illness and inability to work； it produces the habit of complaining In short，it is an institution which tends to encourage disease，not to say accidents，and to intensify considerably the physical and psychic results of accidents and illnesses.As a social institution it makes a people sick bodily and mentally or at least helps to multiply，lengthen，and intensify dis easE.（p.432）

Moreover，Mises proceeds to the heart of the matter and explains why insurance against most health and accident risks，and in particular against the risk of unemployment，is economically impossible：

The value of health and accident insurance becomes problematic by reason of the possibility that the insured person may himself bring about，or at least intensify，the condition insured against。But in the case of unemploy ment insurance，the condition insured against can never develop unless the insured persons so will。Unemployment is a problem of wages，not work。It is just as impossible to insure against unemployment as it would be to insure against，say，the unsaleability of commodities.Unemployment insurance is definitely a misnomer。There can never be any statistical foundation for such an insurancE.（ p.439）

On the logic of risk and insurance see further Ludwig von Mises，Human action：A Treatise on Economics，scholar’s edition （Auburn，Ala.：Mises Institute，1998），chap.6； on the dysgenic consequences of social “insurance” see Seymour W.Itzkoff，The Road to Equality：Evolution and Social Reality （Westport，ConN.：Praeger，1992）； idem，The Decline of Intelligence in America （Westport，ConN.：Praeger，1994）。

关于这方面最早、最深刻且最具远见的分析之一，可参阅米塞斯（Mises）的《社会主义》，第438至441页以及第429至432页。米塞斯在20世纪20年代初写道，他对“社会保险”的影响描述如下：

社会保险通过削弱或完全摧毁人们保持健康并能够工作的意愿，引发了疾病以及丧失工作能力的情况；它造就了人们抱怨的习惯。简而言之，它是一种往往会助长疾病（甚至可以说意外事故），并极大地加剧意外事故和疾病所造成的生理及心理后果的制度。作为一种社会制度，它会让一个民族在身体和精神上患病，或者至少会促使疾病增多、病程延长以及病情加重。（第432页）

此外，米塞斯切入问题的核心，解释了为何针对大多数健康和意外风险，尤其是针对失业风险的保险在经济上是不可能的：

健康和意外保险的价值由于被保险公司自身可能引发或至少加剧所投保的状况这一可能性而变得成问题。但就失业保险而言，所投保的状况除非是被保险公司有意为之，否则根本不可能出现。失业是工资问题，而非工作问题。为失业提供保险就如同要为比如说商品滞销提供保险一样是不可能的。失业保险这个名称绝对是名不副实的。这种保险永远不可能有任何统计基础。（第439页）

关于风险和保险的逻辑，可进一步参阅路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）的《人的行动：经济学专论》（学者版）（阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，1998年），第六章；关于社会“保险”的优生学负面后果，可参阅西摩·W·伊茨科夫（Seymour W. Itzkoff）的《通往平等之路：进化与社会现实》（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特：普雷格出版社，1992年）；以及他的《美国智力的衰退》（康涅狄格州韦斯特波特：普雷格出版社，1994年）。

[127] On crime and punishment see Murray N.Rothbard，The Ethics of Liberty （new York：new York University Press，1998），chap.13； Assessing the Criminal，ed.Randy E.Barnett and John Hagel （Cambridge，Mass.：Ballinger，1977）； Criminal Justice？ The Legal System vs.Individual Responsibility，ed.Robert J。Bidinotto （Irvingtonon Hudson，N.Y。：Foundation for Economic Education，1994）。

关于犯罪与刑罚，可参阅默里·N·罗斯巴德（Murray N. Rothbard）的《自由的伦理》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1998年），第13章；兰迪·E·巴尼特（Randy E. Barnett）和约翰·哈格尔（John Hagel）编著的《评估罪犯》（马萨诸塞州剑桥：巴林杰出版社，1977年）；罗伯特·J·比迪诺托（Robert J. Bidinotto）编著的《刑事司法？法律制度vs.个人责任》（纽约州欧文顿·哈德逊：经济教育基金会，1994年）。

[128] On the law and economics of “affirmative action” and discrimination see richard A.Epstein，Forbidden Grounds （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1992）； Discrimi nation，Affirmative action，and Equal Opportunity，ed.Walter Block and Michael Walker （Vancouver：Fraser Institute，1982）。

关于“平权运动”和歧视的法律与经济学问题，可参阅理查德·A·爱泼斯坦（Richard A. Epstein）的《禁地》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1992年）；以及沃尔特·布洛克（Walter Block）和迈克尔·沃克（Michael Walker）编著的《歧视、平权运动与平等机会》（温哥华：弗雷泽研究所，1982年）。

[129] On conservation and environmentalism see Murray N.Rothbard，“Conserva tion in the Free Market，” in idem，Egalitarianism as a Revolt against nature and Other Essays （Washington，D.C。：Libertarian Review Press，1974）； idem，Power and Market，pp.63–70； idem，“Law，Property Rights，and Air Pollution，” in idem，The Logic of Ac tion Two （Cheltenham，U.K.：Edward Elgar，1997）； Llewellyn Rockwell，Jr。，The Anti environmentalist manifesto （Burlingame，Calif。：Center for Libertarian Studies，1993）。

关于保护主义和环保主义，可参阅默里·N·罗斯巴德（Murray N. Rothbard）的《自由市场中的保护》，收录于其《作为对自然的反抗平等主义及其他论文》（华盛顿特区：自由意志主义评论出版社，1974年）；他的《权力与市场》，第63至70页；他的《法律、财产权与空气污染》，收录于其《行动的逻辑（二）》（英国切尔滕纳姆：爱德华·埃尔加出版社，1997年）；小莱韦林·罗克韦尔（Llewellyn Rockwell, Jr.）的《反环保主义宣言》（加利福尼亚州伯林盖姆：自由意志主义研究中心，1993年）。

[130] See on this Rothbard，Power and Market，chap.2，and pp.84ff。To recognize this important truth it is only necessary to raise the question “What would happen if all taxes were abolished？” Would this imply，for instance，that everyone’s income would increase from net （after tax） income to gross （beforetax） income？ The answer is clearly “No.” For something is currently done with the taxes collected.They are used，for in stance，to pay the salaries of government employees.Their salaries could not possibly rise if taxes were abolished.Rather，their salaries would fall to zero，which demonstrates that they are not paying any taxes at all。As Rothbard explains：“If a bureaucrat receives a salary of $5，000 a year and pays $1，000 in ‘taxes’ to the government，it is quite obvi ous that he is simply receiving a salary of $4，000 and pays no taxes at all。The heads of government have simply chosen a complex and misleading accounting device to make it appear that he pays taxes in the same way as any other men making the same income” （ibid.，p.278，also p.142）。Once this has been understood it becomes obvious why certain groups such as school teachers and university professors are almost always and uniformly in favor of higher taxes.They are not thereby generously accepting a greater burden imposed on themselves.Instead，higher taxes are the means by which they in crease their own taxfinanced salaries.On the issue of taxpayers versus taxconsumers （or taxeaters） see also John C。Calhoun，A Disquisition on Government （new York：Liberal Arts Press，1953），pp.16–18。

[131] On the fundamental errors involved in the standard national income accounting procedures，and a constructive alternative，see Murray N.Rothbard，America’s Great De pression （Kansas City：Sheed and Ward，1975），pp.296–304； idem，Power and Market，pp.199–202。

[132] For an instructive study using Rothbard’s suggestions for an alternative method of national income accounting see Robert Batemarco，“GNP，PPR，and the Standard of Living，” Review of Austrian Economics 1 （1987）。

[133] For a summary overview see Victoria Curzon Price，“The Mature Welfare State：Can It be Reformed？” in Nils Karlson，ed.，Can the Present problems of Mature welfare States Such as Sweden be Solved？（Stockholm：City University Press，1995），esp.pp.15–19。

[134] In the U.S.，for instance，between 1960 and 1990 the murder rate doubled，rape rates quadrupled，the robbery rate increased fivefold，and the likelihood of becoming the victim of an aggravated assault increased by 700 percent。See on this Seymour Itz koff，The Decline of Intelligence in America； Roger D.McGrath，“Treat Them to a Good Dose of Lead，” Chronicles （January 1994）。

[135] See on this Erik von KuehneltLeddihn，Leftism Revisited （Washington D.C。：Regnery Gateway，1990），esp.chap.6。Of the American founders，Alexander Hamilton was a monarchist。Likewise，the governor of Pennsylvania Robert Morris had strong monarchist leanings.George Washington expressed his profound distaste of democracy in a letter of September 30，1798，to James McHenry。John Adams was convinced that every society grows aristocrats as inevitably as a field of corn will grow some large ears and some small。In a letter to John Taylor he insisted，like Plato and Aristotle，that de mocracy would ultimately evolve into despotism，and in a letter to Jefferson he declared that “democracy will envy all，contend with all，endeavor to pull down all，and when by chance it happens to get the upper hand for a short time，it will be revengeful，bloody and cruel。” James Madison，in a letter to Jared Parks，complained of the difficulty “of protecting the rights of property against the spirit of democracy。” And even Thomas Jefferson，probably the most “democratic” of the founders，confessed in a letter to John Adams that he considered

the natural aristocracy…as the most precious gift of nature，for the instruc tion，the trusts and governments of society。And indeed，it would have been inconsistent in creation to have formed men for the social state，and not have provided virtue and wisdom enough to manage the concerns of society。May we not even say that that form of government is best，which provides most effectually for a pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of government？

Characterizing the general attitude of the founders，then，the most appropriate pro nouncement is that of John Randolph of Roanoke：“I am an aristocrat：I love liberty，I hate equality。”

[136] Rousseau’s Social Contract，which appeared in 1762，was actually meant to be a theoretical commentary on the political situation in his hometown of Geneva，then an independent city state of less than 30，000 inhabitants ruled，in effect，by a tiny he reditary oligarchy of the heads of Geneva’s leading aristocratic families in control of the Small Council and the Council of the Two Hundred.Rousseau’s appeal to the “people” and “popular sovereignty” was intended as an attack on this oligarchy，but by no means as a defense of direct democracy and universal political participation as it is nowadays understood.Rather，what Rousseau had in mind when he wrote in support of the “sov ereign people” were merely the members of Geneva’s other political body，the Grand Council，which was made up of some 1，500 members and included besides Geneva’s upper aristocratic crust also its lower hereditary aristocracy。

[137] Fortunately，despite the relentless propaganda spread by government funded and controlled school teachers—such as “democracy means that we all rule ourselves”—as well as by celebrated Nobel laureates such as James Buchanan and his “public choice” school of economics—such as “governments are voluntary institutions just as firms” （James M.Buchanan and Gordon Tullock，The Calculus of Consent [Ann Arbor：Uni versity of Michigan Press，1962]，p.19）—there is still enough common sense left，both in academia as well as among the general public，to find a sympathetic ear for such criticisms.As for academia，an economist as prominent as Joseph A.Schumpeter would note regarding views such as Buchanan’s that “the theory which construes taxes on the analogy of club dues or the purchase of the service of，say，a doctor only proves how far removed this part of the social sciences is from scientific habits of minds” Joseph A.Schumpeter，Capitalism，Socialism，and Democracy （new York：Harper，1942），p.198）。And as far as the general public is concerned，one can find consolation in the remarks of the great American journalist and writer H.L。mencken，who wrote：

The average man，whatever his errors otherwise，at least sees clearly that government is something lying outside him and outside the generality of his fellow men—that it is a separate，independent，and hostile power，only partly under his control，and capable of doing him great harM.Is it a fact of no significance that robbing the government is everywhere regarded a crime of less magnitude than robbing an individual，or even a corporation？ When a private citizen is robbed，a worthy man is deprived of the fruits of his industry and thrift； when the government is robbed，the worst that happens is that certain rogues and loafers have less money to play with than they had beforE.The notion that they had earned that money is never entertained； to most sensible men it would seem ludicrous.They are simply rascals who，by accident of law，have a somewhat dubious right to a share in the earnings of their fellow men.When that share is diminished by private enterprise the business is，on the whole，far more noble than not。” （A mencken Chrestomathy [new York：Vin tage Books，1949]，pp.146–47； see also H.L。mencken，Notes on Democracy [new York：Knopf，1926]。）

[138] See on this HansHermann Hoppe，A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism （Bos ton：Kluwer，1989）； idem，“Desocialization in a United Germany，” Review of Austrian Economics 5，no.2 （1991）； Murray N.Rothbard，“The End of Socialism and the Calcu lation debate Revisited，” in idem，The Logic of action one （Cheltenham，U.K.：Edward Elgar，1997）； idem，“How and How Not to Desocialize，” Review of Austrian Economics 6，no.1 （1992）。

[139] See on this Rothbard，The Ethics of Liberty； HansHermann Hoppe，The Econom ics and Ethics of Private Property （Boston：Kluwer，1993） esp.part 2； also Anthony de Jasay，Choice，Contract，Consent：A Restatement of Liberalism （London：Institute of Eco nomic Affairs，1991）。

[140] See on this also Murray N.Rothbard，Power and Market，pp.189ff。

[141] On the law and economics of secession see Secession，State and Liberty，David Gordon，ed.（new Brunswick，N.J。：Transaction Publishers，1998），with essays by Donald W.Livingston，Stephen Yates，Scott Boykin，Murray N.Rothbard，Clyde N.Wilson，Joseph R。Stromberg，Thomas DiLorenzo，James Ostrowski，HansHermann Hoppe，Pierre Desrochers and Eric Duhaime，and Bruce L。benson； also HansHer mann Hoppe，“The Western State as a Paradigm：Learning From History，” Politics and Regimes：Religion and Public Life 30 （1997）； Robert W.McGee，“Secession Reconsid ered，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 11，No.1（1994）。

霍普，《作为范例的西方国家：从历史中学习》，《政治与政权：宗教与公共生活》，1997年第30期；麦基：“对分离主义的再思考”，《自由主义研究》，1994年第1期。

* originally published on Mises Daily，mises.org，October 13，2011。

最初发表于米塞斯日报，mises.org， 2011年10月13日。

* A speech delivered at the Edelweiss Holdings Symposium held in Zurich，Switzerland，on September 17，2011。

在 2011 年 9 月 17 日于瑞士苏黎世举行的 Edelweiss Holdings 研讨会上的发言。

* The Franz Čuhel memorial lecture，Prague，April 24，2009。

弗朗茨-丘赫尔纪念讲座，布拉格，2009 年 4 月 24 日。

[142] William H.Hutt，“The Yield from Money Held，” in M.Sennholz，ed.，freedom and free Enterprise：Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises （Chicago：Van Nostrand，1956），pp.196–216。

威廉·H·赫特（William H. Hutt）所著《持有货币的收益》，收录于M·森霍尔茨（M. Sennholz）编著的《自由与自由企业：纪念路德维希·冯·米塞斯文集》（芝加哥：范诺斯特兰德出版社，1956年），第196至216页。

[143] John Maynard Keynes，The general Theory of Employment，Interest，and Money （new York：Harcourt，Brace，and World，1964），p.210。

约翰·梅纳德·凯恩斯，《就业、利息和货币通论》（纽约：Harcourt，Brace，and World出版社，1964），第210页。

[144] Roger Garrison，“Central Banking，free Banking，and Financial Crises，” review of Austrian Economics 9，No.2 （1996）：117； george Selgin and Lawrence White，“In defense of Fiduciary media，” review of Austrian Economics 9，No.2 （1996）：100–101。

罗杰·加里森（Roger Garrison），《中央银行、自由银行业与金融危机》，《奥地利经济学评论》第9卷第2期（1996年）：第117页；乔治·塞尔金（George Selgin）和劳伦斯·怀特（Lawrence White），《为信用媒介辩护》，《奥地利经济学评论》第9卷第2期（1996年）：第100 – 101页。

[145] For a detailed critique of Keynes see HansHermann Hoppe，“Theory of Employ ment，Money，Interest，and the Capitalist Process：The Misesian case against Keynes，” in idem，The Economics and Ethics of Private Property （Boston：Kluwer Academic Pub lishers，1993）； for a detailed critique of the free banking doctrine see idem，“How is Fiat Money Possible？” review of Austrian Economics 7，No.2 （1994）； and idem，“against Fiduciary media，” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 1，No.1 （1998）。These articles are collected in HansHermann Hoppe，The Economics and Ethics of Private Property，2^nd ed.（Auburn，Ala.：Ludwig von Mises institute，2006）。

关于对凯恩斯的详细批判，请参阅汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普的《就业理论、货币、利息和资本主义进程：米塞斯反对凯恩斯的理由》，同上，《私有财产的经济学和伦理学》（波士顿：Kluwer Academic Publishers，1993 年）；对自由银行理论的详细批判见同上，《法定货币如何可能？》这些文章收录于汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普《私有财产的经济学与伦理学》第二版（阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，2006 年）。

[146] Ludwig von Mises，Human action：A Treatise on Economics （Chicago：regnery，1966），p.249。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《人的行动：经济学专论》（芝加哥：regnery出版社，1966），第249页。

[147] Ludwig von Mises，Theory of Money and Credit （Irvington，N.Y。：Foundation for Economic Education，1971），pp.32–33。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises），《货币与信用理论》（纽约州欧文顿：经济教育基金会，1971年），第32 – 33页。

[148] Frank H.Knight，Risk，uncertainty and Profit （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1971）； Ludwig von Mises，Human action，chap.VI。See also HansHermann Hoppe，“The Limits of Numerical Probability，” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 10，No.1 （2007），reprinted chapter 15 herein； and idem； “on certainty and uncertainty，” review of Austrian Economics 10，No.1 （1997）。

F弗兰克·H·奈特（Frank H. Knight），《风险、不确定性与利润》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1971年）；路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises），《人的行动》第六章。另见汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe），《数值概率的局限》，《奥地利经济学季刊》第10卷第1期（2007年），本文重印为第15章；以及他的《论确定性与不确定性》，《奥地利经济学评论》第10卷第1期（1997年）。

* A speech given at the Ludwig von Mises institute Brazil，2011。

2011年在巴西路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院的演讲。

* Originally published in Journal of Libertarian Studies 14, no. 1 (Winter 1998-1999).

最初发表于《自由意志主义研究杂志》第 14 期第 1 号（1998 – 1999 年冬季刊）。

[149] James M.Buchanan and Gordon Tullock，The Calculus of Consent （Ann Arbor：University of Michigan Press，1962）； James M.Buchanan，The Limits of Liberty （Chi cago：University of Chicago Press，1975）； for a critique，see Murray N.Rothbard，“Bu chanan and Tullock’s Calculus of Consent，” in idem，The Logic of action，vol.2，Applica tions and Criticism from the Austrian School （Cheltenham，Eng。：Edward Elgar，1995）； idem，“The myth of neutral Taxation，” in The Logic of action，vol.2； HansHermann Hoppe，The Economics and Ethics of Private Property （Boston：Kluwer Academic Publish ers，1993），chap.1。

詹姆斯·M·布坎南（James M. Buchanan）与戈登·塔洛克（Gordon Tullock）合著的《同意的计算》（密歇根大学出版社，1962年，位于安阿伯市）；詹姆斯·M·布坎南所著的《自由的限度》（芝加哥市芝加哥大学出版社，1975年）；相关评论可参阅默里·N·罗斯巴德（Murray N. Rothbard）所著《布坎南与塔洛克的〈同意的计算〉》，收录于其《行动的逻辑》第二卷《奥地利学派的应用与批评》（英国切尔滕纳姆：爱德华·埃尔加出版社，1995年）；以及他所写的《中性税收的神话》，收录于《行动的逻辑》第二卷；还有汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe）所著的《私有财产的经济学与伦理学》（波士顿市克鲁维尔学术出版社，1993年），第一章。

[150] See on this particular point，Lysander Spooner，No Treason：The Constitution of No Authority （Larkspur，Colo。：Pine Tree Press，1996）。

关于这一具体观点，可参阅莱桑德·斯波纳（Lysander Spooner）所著的《无叛国罪：〈宪法〉并无权威》（科罗拉多州拉克斯珀市：松树出版社，1996年）。

[151] See HansHermann Hoppe，“The Trouble with Classical liberalism，” Rothbard Rockwell report 9，No.4 （1998）。

参阅汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe）所著《古典自由主义的问题》，载于《罗斯巴德·罗克韦尔报告》第9卷，第4期（1998年）。

[152] See HansHermann Hoppe，“Where The Right Goes Wrong，” RothbardRockwell report 8，No.4 （1997）。

[153] See John Denson，ed.，The Costs of War （new Brunswick，N.J。：Transaction Pub lishers，1997）。

参见约翰·丹森编，《战争的代价》（新泽西州新不伦瑞克：交易出版社，1997年）。

[154] Ludwig von Mises，Socialism （Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty Classics，1981）； Hans Hermann Hoppe，A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism （Boston：Kluwer Academic Pub lishers，1989），chap.6。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《社会主义》（印第安纳波利斯，印第安纳州：自由经典出版社，1981年）；汉斯·赫尔曼·霍普，《社会主义与资本主义理论》（波士顿：克吕韦尔学术出版社，1989年），第6章。

[155] Murray N.Rothbard，The Ethics of Liberty （new York：new York University Press，1998），esp.chaps.22 and 23。

默里·N·罗斯巴德，《自由的伦理》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1998年），尤其参见第22章和第23章。

[156] Murray N.Rothbard，Power and Market （Kansas City：Sheed Andrews and Mc meel，1977），p.2。

[157] Gustave de Molinari，The Production of Security （new York：Center for Libertarian Studies，1977）。

古斯塔夫·德·莫利纳里，《安全的生产》（纽约：自由意志主义研究中心，1977年）。

[158] Murray N.Rothbard，Power and Market，chap.1； idem，For A new Liberty （new York：Collier，1978），chaps，12 and 14。

默里·N·罗斯巴德，《权力与市场》，第一章；同作者，《为了新自由》（纽约：科利尔出版社，1978年），第十二章和第十四章。

[159] Morris Tannehill and Linda Tannehill，The Market for Liberty （new York：Laissez Faire Books，1984），esp.part 2。

莫里斯·坦尼希尔和琳达·坦尼希尔，《自由市场》（纽约：自由放任图书出版社，1984年），尤其参见第二部分。

[160] on the “logic” of insurance，see Ludwig von Mises，Human action （Chicago：regnery，1966），chap.6； Murray N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State （Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，1993），pp.498 ff。； HansHermann Hoppe，“on certainty and uncertainty，Or：How Rational Can Our Expectations be？” review of Austrian Economics 10，No.1 （1997），reprinted chapter 14 herein； also richard von Mises，Probability，Statistics，and truth （new York：Dover，1957）； Frank H.Knight，Risk，uncertainty，and Profit （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1971）。

关于保险的“逻辑”，可参阅路德维希·冯·米塞斯所著《人的行动》（芝加哥：雷格里出版社，1966年），第6章；默里·N·罗斯巴德所著《人、经济与国家》（阿拉巴马州奥本：米塞斯研究院，1993年），第498页及之后内容；汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普所著《论确定性与不确定性，或者：我们的预期能有多理性？》，载于《奥地利经济学评论》第10卷第1期（1997年），本文重印的第14章；还有理查德·冯·米塞斯所著《概率、统计与真理》（纽约：多佛出版社，1957年）；以及弗兰克·H·奈特所著《风险、不确定性与利润》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1971年）。

[161] on the relationship between state and war，and on the historical transformation from limited （monarchical） to total （democratic） war，see Ekkehard Krippendorff，Staat und Krieg （Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1985）； Charles Tilly，“War Making and State Mak ing as Organized Crime，” in Peter B。Evans，Dietrich Rueschemeyer，and Theda Skocpol，eds.，Bringing the State Back in （Cambridge：Cambridge University Press，1985）； John F.C.Fuller，The Conduct of War （new York：Da Capo Press，1992）； Michael Howard，War in European History （new York：Oxford University Press，1976）； HansHermann Hoppe，“Time Preference，Government，and the Process of Decivilization，” in John V。Denson，ed.，The Costs of War （new Brunswick，N.J。：Transaction Publishers，1997）； Erik von Kuehneltleddihn，leftism revisited （Washington，D.C。：regnery，1990）。

关于国家与战争之间的关系，以及从有限（君主制）战争到总体（民主制）战争的历史转变，可参阅以下著作：埃克哈德·克里彭多夫（Ekkehard Krippendorff）所著《国家与战争》（斯图加特/美因河畔：苏尔坎普出版社，1985年）；查尔斯·蒂利（Charles Tilly）所著《作为有组织犯罪的战争制造与国家制造》，收录于彼得·B·埃文斯（Peter B. Evans）、迪特里希·鲁舍迈耶（Dietrich Rueschemeyer）和西达·斯考切波（Theda Skocpol）主编的《找回国家》（剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，1985年）；约翰·F·C·富勒（John F.C. Fuller）所著《战争的实施》（纽约：达卡波出版社，1992年）；迈克尔·霍华德（Michael Howard）所著《欧洲历史上的战争》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1976年）；汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe）所著《时间偏好、政府与去文明化进程》，收录于约翰·V·丹森（John V. Denson）主编的《战争的代价》（新不伦瑞克，新泽西州：交易出版社，1997年）；埃里克·冯·库恩莱特-莱迪恩（Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn）所著《再探左派主义》（华盛顿特区：雷格纳里出版社，1990年）。

[162] on crime and punishment，past and present，see terry Anderson and P.J。Hill，“The American Experiment in AnarchoCapitalism：The Not So Wild，Wild West，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 3，No.1 （1979）； Bruce L。benson，“guns for Protection，and Other Private Sector responses to the Government’s failure to Control Crime，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 8，No.1 （1986）； Roger D.McGrath，gunfighters，highway men，and Vigilantes：Violence on the Frontier （berkeley：University of California Press，1984）； James Q.Wilson and richard J。Herrnstien，Crime and Human nature （new York：Simon and Schuster，1985）； Edward C。Banfield，The Unheavenly City revisited （Boston：Little，Brown，1974）。

关于犯罪与刑罚，过去和现在的情况，可参阅特里·安德森（Terry Anderson）和P.J.希尔（P.J. Hill）所著《无政府资本主义的美国实验：并不那么狂野的西部》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第3卷第1期（1979年）；布鲁斯·L.本森（Bruce L. Benson）所著《用于防卫的枪支及私营部门对政府管控犯罪不力的其他应对举措》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第8卷第1期（1986年）；罗杰·D.麦格拉思（Roger D. McGrath）所著《枪手、拦路强盗和治安维持会成员：边境地区的暴力行为》（伯克利：加利福尼亚大学出版社，1984年）；詹姆斯·Q.威尔逊（James Q. Wilson）和理查德·J.赫恩斯坦（Richard J. Herrnstien）所著《犯罪与人性》（纽约：西蒙与舒斯特出版社，1985年）；爱德华·C.班菲尔德（Edward C. Banfield）所著《重访非理想城市》（波士顿：利特尔·布朗出版社，1974年）。

[163] For an overview of the extent to which official—statist—statistics，in particular on crime，deliberately ignore，misrepresent，or distort the known facts for reason of so called public policy （political correctness），see J。Philippe Rushton，Race，Evolution，and behavior （new Brunswick，N.J。：Transaction Publishers，1995）； Michael levin，Why Race Matters （Westport，ConN.：Praeger，1997）。

若想了解官方（国家主义的）统计数据，尤其是有关犯罪方面的统计数据，在多大程度上出于所谓公共政策（政治正确）的原因，蓄意忽视、歪曲或篡改已知事实，可参阅J. 菲利普·拉什顿所著的《种族、进化与行为》（新不伦瑞克，新泽西州：交易出版社，1995年）以及迈克尔·莱文所著的《为什么种族问题很重要》（韦斯特波特，康涅狄格州：普雷格出版社，1997年）。

[164] See HansHermann Hoppe，“free immigration or forced integration，” Chronicles （July 1995）。

参阅汉斯-赫尔曼·霍普（Hans-Hermann Hoppe）所著《自由移民还是强制一体化》，刊载于《编年史》（1995年7月）。

[165] Etienne de La Boétie，The Politics of Obedience：The Discourse of Voluntary Ser vitude （new York：free life Editions，1975）； David Hume，“The First Principles of Government，” in idem，Essays：Moral，Political，and Literary （Oxford：Oxford University Press，1971）； Ludwig von Mises，liberalism：In the Classical Tradition （San Francisco：Cobden Press，1985）； Murray N.Rothbard，egalitarianism as a revolt against nature and Other Essays （Washington，D.C。：Libertarian review Press，1974）。

艾蒂安·德·拉博埃西，《服从的政治：论自愿为奴》（纽约：自由生活出版社，1975年）；大卫·休谟，《政府的首要原则》，收录于其《道德、政治和文学论文集》（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1971年）；路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《自由主义：古典传统》（旧金山：科布登出版社，1985年）；默里·N.罗斯巴德，《平等主义：对自然的反叛及其他论文》（华盛顿特区：自由意志主义评论出版社，1974年）。

* A speech delivered in Auburn，Alabama，on the occasion of Professor Hoppe’s receiving the Mises institute’s 2006 Gary G。Schlarbaum Liberty Prize.

在霍普教授荣获米塞斯研究院2006年加里·G·施拉鲍姆自由奖之际，于阿拉巴马州奥本发表的一篇演讲。

[166] Michael Howard，War in European History （new York：Oxford University Press，1976），p.73。

迈克尔·霍华德：《欧洲历史上的战争》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1976），第73页。

[167] Ludwig von Mises，Nationalökonomie：Theorie des Handelns und Wirtschaftens （Union genf，1940），pp.725–26。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《国民经济学：行动与经济的理论》（日内瓦联合出版社，1940年），第725—726页。

[168] Howard，War in European History，pp.75–76。

霍华德，《欧洲历史上的战争》，第 75-76 页。

[169] John F。C。Fuller，War and Western civilization （freeport，N.Y。：Books for Libraries，1969），pp.26–27。

约翰·F.C.富勒，《战争与西方文明》（纽约州弗里波特：图书馆书籍出版社，1969年），第26—27页。

[170] William A.Orton，The Liberal Tradition：A Study of the Social and Spiritual Conditions of freedom （new Haven，Conn.：Yale University Press，1945），pp.251–52。

威廉·A.奥顿，《自由主义传统：对自由的社会与精神状态的研究》（康涅狄格州纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1945年），第251—252页。

* originally published on Mises Daily，mises.org，October 13，2011。

最初发表于《米塞斯日报》，mises.org， 2011年10月13日。

[171] Ludwig von Mises，Theory and History （Auburn，Ala.：Ludwig von Mises institute，1985），p.203。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《理论与历史》（阿拉巴马州奥本：路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，1985），第203页。

[172] Ludwig Lachmann，“From Mises to Shackle：An Essay on Austrian Economics and the Kaleidic Society，” Journal of Economic Literature 14 （1976）：55–59。

路德维希-拉赫曼，《从米塞斯到沙克尔：一篇关于奥地利经济学和万花筒式社会的论文》，《经济文献杂志》第 14 期（1976 年）：55-59。

[173] See Oskar Morgenstern，“Perfect Foresight and Economic equilibrium，” in A.Schotter，ed.，Selected Economic Writings of Oskar Morgenstern （new York：new York University Press，1976），esp.p.175； Roger W.Garrison，“Austrian Economics as Middle Ground，” in Israel Kirzner，ed.，method，Process，and Austrian Economics （lexington，Mass.：lexington Books，1982）； idem，“From Lachmann to Lucas：on institutions，Ex pectations，and Equilibrating tendencies，” in Subjectivism，Intelligibility and Economic Understanding：Essays in Honor of Ludwig M.Lachmann （new York：new York Univer sity Press，1986）。

参见奥斯卡·摩根斯坦，《完美预见与经济均衡》，载于A.Schotter主编。《奥斯卡·摩根斯坦经济学著作选集》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1976年），第175页；罗杰·w·加里森，《作为中间立场的奥地利经济学》，以色列科兹纳主编，《方法，过程和奥地利经济学》（列克星敦，马萨诸塞州）。：列克星敦书籍，1982）；摘自《从拉赫曼到卢卡斯：关于制度、期望和平衡倾向》，摘自《主观主义、可理解性和经济理解：纪念路德维希·拉赫曼的论文》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1986年）。

[174] See richard von Mises，Probability，Statistics，and truth （London：george Allen and Unwin，1957），esp.chaps.1 and 3； Frank Knight，Risk，uncertainty，and Profit （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1971），esp.chap.7； Ludwig von Mises，Human action：A Treatise on Economics （Chicago：Henry regnery，1966），esp.chap.6。

见理查德·冯·米塞斯，《概率、统计与真理》（伦敦：乔治·艾伦和昂温出版社，1957年），第2章。1和3；弗兰克·奈特，《风险、不确定性和利润》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1971），第7章；路德维希·冯·米塞斯：《人的行动：经济学专论》（芝加哥：亨利·瑞格里尼出版社，1966），第6章。

[175] R.Mises，Probability，Statistics，and truth，p.109。

理查德·米塞斯：《概率、统计与真理》，第109页。

[176] See Ludwig Lachmann，The Market as an Economic Process （Oxford：Basil Black well，1986），chap.2，esp.pp.27–29； also gerald P.O’Driscoll，Jr。，and Mario J。Rizzo，The Economics of Time and Ignorance （Oxford：Basil Blackwell，1985），chap.2，esp.pp.24–26。

参见路德维希·拉赫曼，《作为经济过程的市场》（牛津：Basil Black well出版社，1986），第2章，pp.27 – 29；也叫杰拉尔德·p·奥德里斯科尔马里奥J。里佐，《时间与无知的经济学》（牛津：Basil Blackwell出版社，1985），第二章，第24 – 26页。

[177] See HansHermann Hoppe，Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung （Opladen：Westdeutscher verlag，1983）； idem，The Economics and Ethics of Private property （Boston：Kluwer Academic Publishers，1993），chap.7。

参见汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普，《社会发展的批判》（奥普登：西德出版社，1983）；出处同前，《私有财产的经济学和伦理学》（波士顿：Kluwer学术出版社，1993），第七章。

[178] Likewise，it would be selfcontradictory for me to state about my actions per formed over the course of time what would have to be assumed if I wanted to consider them instances of insurable events （class probability）：that I know nothing about any one of my actions except that they are my actions （in the same way as one may legiti mately say，for instance，that I know nothing about any singular outcome of a game of roulette except that each one is the outcome of the same roulette）。In fact，I do know more about each of them.I know that each action is influenced by my knowledge，and that my knowledge will be changed dependent on the outcome of each action，such that each action will be performed by a different me and must be considered a unique event （forming an entire class by itself ）。

同样，如果我对我在一段时间内的每一次行动都假定：除了它们是我的行动之外，我对我的任何一次行动都一无所知（就像人们可以合法地说，例如，除了每一次行动都是同一次轮盘赌的结果之外，我对任何一次轮盘赌的结果都一无所知一样），这将是自相矛盾的。事实上，我对他们每个都有更多的了解。我知道每个行动都受到我的知识的影响，而且我的知识会根据每个行动的结果而改变，因此每个行动都会由不同的我来完成，而且必须被视为一个独特的事件（每个行动自成一类）。

[179] on the methodological views of Frank Knight in particular，see his The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays （new York：Harper Bros.，1935）； and，idem，on the history and method of Economics （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1956）。

关于弗兰克-奈特的方法论观点，请参见他的《竞争伦理及其他论文》（纽约：哈珀兄弟公司，1935 年）；以及《经济学的理论与方法》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1956 年）。

[180] Lachmann，The Market as an Economic Process，p.32。

拉赫曼，《作为经济过程的市场》，第 32 页。

[181] Ibid.，quoted in G。L。S.Shackle，Time in Economics （Amsterdam：north Hol land，1958），p.105。

同上，转引自 G. L. S.沙克尔，《经济学的时代》（阿姆斯特丹：北荷兰出版社，1958），第105页。

[182] Austrians from Carl menger onward considered the german historicists as antieconomists and their intellectual foes.The historicists，in particular their leader Gustav Schmoller and his successor Werner Sombart，amply reciprocated this animosity。

从卡尔-门格尔（Carl menger）开始，奥地利学派就将德国历史主义者视为反经济学家，是他们思想上的敌人。历史主义者，尤其是他们的领袖古斯塔夫-施莫勒和他的继任者维尔纳-松巴特，对这种敌意做出了回应。

[183] L.Mises，Theory and History，pp.199，203–04。

米塞斯：《理论与历史》，第199，203 – 04页。

[184] Lachmann，The Market as an Economic Process，pp.30–31。

《作为经济过程的市场》，第30 – 31页。

[185] See also Hoppe，Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung，chap.3，esp.p.47。

参见Hoppe，Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung，第3章，第47页。

[186] See Paul Lorenzen，normative Logic and Ethics （mannheim：Bibliographisches institut，1969），chap.1。Lorenzen explains：I call a usage a convention if I know of another usage which I could accept in stead. However，I do not know of another behavior which could replace the use of elementary sentences.If I did not accept proper names and predicators，I would not know how to speak at all。Each proper name is a convention，… but to use proper names at all is not a convention：it is a unique pattern of linguistic behavior。Therefore，I am going to call it ‘logical’。The same is true with predicators.Each predicator is a convention.This is shown by the existence of more than one natural language.But all languages use predicators.（p.16）

See also Wilhelm Kamlah and Paul Lorenzen，Logische Propädeutik （mannheim：Bib liographisches institut，1968），chap.1。

见保罗-洛伦岑，《规范逻辑与伦理学》（曼海姆：书目文献研究所，1969 年），第 1 章。洛伦岑解释说：”如果我知道我可以接受的另一种用法，我就称这种用法为约定俗成。但是，我不知道有另一种行动可以取代基本句式的使用。如果我不接受专有名词和谓语，我就根本不知道如何说话。每个专有名词都是一种约定俗成的用法，……但使用专有名词却不是约定俗成的用法：它是一种独特的语言行动模式。每个谓语都是一个约定俗成的东西。不止一种自然语言的存在就证明了这一点。但所有语言都使用谓词。（第 16 页）参见威廉-卡姆拉（Wilhelm Kamlah）和保罗-洛伦岑（Paul Lorenzen）：《逻辑学预言》（Logische Propädeutik）（曼海姆：Bib liographisches institut，1968），第 1 章。

[187] Ludwig von Mises，The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science （Kansas City：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel，1978），pp.84–85。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《经济学的终极基础》（堪萨斯城：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel出版社，1978），页84 – 85。

[188] Lachmann，The Market as an Economic Process，p.31； for the similar views of Hayek see his “Economics and knowledge，” in Friedrich A.Hayek，Individualism and Economic Order （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1948）。

拉赫曼，《作为经济过程的市场》，第 31 页；哈耶克的类似观点见其《经济学与知识》，载于 Friedrich A.Hayek，《个人主义与经济秩序》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1948 年）。

[189] See Arthur Pap，Semantics and necessary truth （new Haven，ConN.：Yale Uni versity Press，1958）； Brand Blanshard，reason and Analysis （LaSalle，Ill。：open Court，1962）； Friedrich Kambartel，Erfahrung und Struktur （Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1968）； Hoppe，The Economics and Ethics of Private Property，chap.6。

参见Arthur Pap，《语义学和必定的真理》（纽黑文，康涅狄格州）。：耶鲁大学出版社，1958）；Brand Blanshard，reason and Analysis（拉萨尔，伊利诺伊州）：公开法庭，1962）；弗里德里希·坎巴特尔，《人的生命与命运》（法兰克福：苏尔坎普出版社，1968）；《私有财产的经济学和伦理学》，第6章。

[190] L。Mises，The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science，p.70。Equally incompre hensible as the charge that praxeology is empirically empty because its propositions are nonfalsifiable is the charge brought against Mises and menger by gerald P.O’Driscoll，Jr。，and Mario J。Rizzo that the belief in the existence of “apodictic praxeological theo rems” and “exact economic laws” implies the assumption of some sort of “rigid de terminism”! （The Economics of Time and Ignorance，Oxford：Basil Blackwell，1985，p.23） And would one also have to give up the belief in the existence of universal and unchanging laws of logic if one were to adopt O’Driscoll’s and Rizzo’s indeterministic “dynamic subjectivism”？

L.米塞斯，《经济科学的终极基础》，第 70 页。与 “行动学因其命题不可证伪而在经验上是空洞的 “这一指控同样不可理解的是，杰拉尔德-P-奥德利斯科尔，Jr.和马里奥-J-里佐对米塞斯和门格尔提出的指控，即相信存在 “行动学定理 “和 “精确的经济规律 “意味着假定某种 “僵化的终结论”！（《时间与无知的经济学》，牛津：Basil Blackwell，1985 年，第 23 页）那么，如果采用奥德里斯科尔和里佐的非决定论的 “动态主观主义”，是否也要放弃对存在普遍不变的逻辑规律的信念呢？

[191] Ludwig Lachmann，“The Role of Expectations in Economics as a Social Science，” in idem，Capital，Expectations，and the Market Process （Kansas City：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel，1977）。

路德维希-拉赫曼，《预期在作为社会科学的经济学中的作用》，同上，《资本、预期和市场过程》（堪萨斯城：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel，1977 年）。

[192] See Ludwig von Mises，“‘Elastic Expectations’ and the Austrian Theory of the trade Cycle，” Economica 10 （1943）：251–52； also george Selgin，“Praxeology and Un derstanding，” review of Austrian Economics 2 （1988）：54。

见路德维希·冯·米塞斯，“弹性预期”与奥地利学派商业周期理论”，《经济》10 （1943）：251-52；也见乔治·塞尔金，《行动学与理解》，《奥地利经济学评论》第2期（1988）：54页。

[193] L。Mises，The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science，p.49。

米塞斯：《经济科学的终极基础》，第49页。

[194] L。Mises，Theory and History，p.311。

米塞斯，《理论与历史》，第311页。

[195] For a similar assessment see Selgin，“Praxeology and Understanding。”

关于类似的评估，请参见塞尔金的《行动学与理解》。

[196] See L。Mises，Human action，p.107。

见米塞斯：《人的行动》，第107页。

[197] Ibid.，pp.107–10。Mises notes，that historical events have one common feature：they are human action.History comprehends them as human actions； it conceives their meaning by the instru mentality cognition and understands their meaning in looking at their indi vidual and unique features.What counts for history is always the meaning of the men concerned：the meaning that they attach to the state of affairs they want to alter，the meaning they attach to their actions，and the meaning they attach to the effects produced by the actions.（Ibid.，p.59）

如上pp.107-10。米塞斯指出，历史事件有一个共同特点：它们是人的行动。历史把它们理解为人的行动；历史通过认知工具来构想它们的意义，并通过观察它们各自独特的特征来理解它们的意义。对历史来说，重要的始终是有关的人的意义：他们对他们想要改变的事态所赋予的意义，他们对他们的行动所赋予的意义，以及他们对行动所产生的后果所赋予的意义。

[198] L。Mises，Theory and History，p.311。

米塞斯，《理论与历史》，第311页。

[199] L。Mises，The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science，pp.49–50； and he con tinues then to say：“Compared with the seemingly absolute certainty provided by some of the natural sciences，these assumptions and all the conclusions derived form them appear as rather shaky； the positivists may ridicule them as unscientific。Yet they are the only available approach to the problems concerned and indispensable for any action to be accomplished in a social environment。”

米塞斯，《经济科学的终极基础》，第 49-50 页；他接着说：”与某些自然科学所提供的看似绝对的确定性相比，这些假设以及从这些假设中得出的所有结论显得相当不可靠；实证主义者可能会嘲笑它们是不科学的。然而，它们是解决有关问题的唯一可用方法，也是在社会环境中采取任何行动都必不可少的。

[200] L。Mises，Theory and History，p.316。

米塞斯，《理论与历史》，第 316 页。

[201] L。Mises，The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science，p.48。

米塞斯，《经济科学的终极基础》，第 48 页。

[202] See Lachmann，The Market as an Economic Process，pp.34–42。

参见拉赫曼：《作为经济过程的市场》，第34 – 42页。

[203] originally published in The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 10，No.1 （Spring 2007）。

原载于《奥地利经济学季刊》第10期第1期（2007年春季）。

[204] Frank H.Knight，“Professor Mises and the Theory of Capital，” Economica，N.s.8，No.32 （1941）：409–27； idem，“The place of Marginalist Economics in a Collectivist System，” American Economic review：Supplement 26 （1936）：255–66； idem，“review of Ludwig von Mises，Socialism，” Journal of Political Economy 46 （1938）：267–68； Ludwig von Mises，Human action：A Treatise on Economics （Chicago：regnery，1966 [1949]），pp.490–93，848 f。

弗兰克·h·奈特：《米塞斯教授与资本理论》，《经济学》第8期，第32期（1941）：409–27； idem，《边际主义经济学在集体主义制度中的地位》，《美国经济评论》增刊26 （1936）：255-66；同上，《对路德维希·冯·米塞斯的评论，社会主义》，《政治经济学杂志》46 （1938）：267-68；路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《人的行动：经济学专论》（芝加哥：regy，1966[1949]），页。490 – 93，848f

[205] interestingly，however influential Knight and Mises otherwise have been in shap ing their respective schools，neither Knight nor Mises have been entirely successful in convincing their followers of this part of their doctrines.Similarly，while they were skep tical about the use of probability，Knight and Mises were also proponents of “a priori” economic theory，and in this regard，too，neither Knight nor Mises has been entirely successful with his students.See Knight，“review of T。W.Hutchison，The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory，” Journal of Political Economy 48，No.1 （1940）； and Mises，Human action，chap.2。

有趣的是，不管奈特和米塞斯在塑造各自学派方面有多大的影响力，奈特和米塞斯都没有完全成功地说服他们的追随者相信他们学说的这一部分。同样，虽然奈特和米塞斯对概率的使用持怀疑态度，但他们也是“先验”经济理论的支持者，在这方面，奈特和米塞斯都没有完全成功地说服他的学生。参见奈特的《T.W.评论》《经济学理论的意义与基本前提》，《政治经济学》第48期，第1期（1940）；米塞斯，《人的行动》，第二章。

[206] richard von Mises （1883–1953） was professor of mathematics at the University of Strassburg （1909–1919）。In 1921 he was appointed professor of mathematics and director of the institute of Applied Mathematics at the University of berliN.When the NationalSocialists dismissed him from this post in 1933，Mises went first to Istanbul，Turkey，and in 1939 he emigrated to the U.S.，where he finished his career as Gordon McKay Professor of Aerodynamics and Applied Mathematics at Harvard University。Mises’s groundbreaking works on the foundations of probability theory appeared in 1919 in two issues of the Mathematische Zeltschrift。His main work in this area，original ly published in german in 1928，is Probability，Statistics and truth； see also his Positivism：A Study in Human Understanding （Cambridge，Mass.：Harvard University Press，1951）。

理查德·冯·米塞斯（1883-1953）是斯特拉斯堡大学的数学教授（1909-1919）。1921年，他被任命为柏林大学数学教授和应用数学研究所所长。1933年，当国家社会主义者解除他的职务时，米塞斯首先去了土耳其的伊斯坦布尔，并于1939年移民到美国，在那里他以哈佛大学空气动力学和应用数学戈登·麦凯教授的身份结束了他的职业生涯。米塞斯关于概率论基础的开创性著作出现在1919年的两期《数学文献》上。他在这一领域的主要著作是《概率、统计和真理》（Probability，Statistics and truth），最初于1928年用德语出版；参见他的《实证主义：人类理解的研究》（剑桥，马萨诸塞州）。：哈佛大学出版社，1951）。

[207] There are a few references to F。Y。Edgeworth，whose views on probability are rather eclectic。

有几处提到了 F. Y. Edgeworth，他对概率的看法相当折衷。

[208] The two Mises brothers were long estranged and reconciled only during their common exile in the U.S.

米塞斯兄弟俩长期疏远，直到共同流亡美国时才和好。

[209] richard von Mises，Probability，Statistics and truth （new York：Dover Publications，1957），p.28。

理查德·冯·米塞斯，《概率、统计与真理》（纽约：多佛出版社，1957），第28页。

[210] richard von Mises，Probability，Statistics and truth，pp.28–29。

理查德·冯·米塞斯：《概率、统计与真理》，第28 – 29页。

[211] richard von Mises further explains the meaning of condition （ii）（randomness） by means of a contrary example：

Imagine，for instance，a road along which milestones are placed，large ones for whole miles and smaller ones for tenths of a mile.If we walk long enough along this road，calculating the relative frequencies of large stones，the value found in this way will lie around 1/10。The deviations from the value 0.1 will become smaller and smaller as the number of stones passed increases； in other words，the relative frequency tends towards the limiting value 0.1。（Ibid.，p.23）

That is，condition （i） is fulfilled.However，absent in this case is condition （ii），because

[t]he sequence of observations of large or small stones differs essentially from the sequence of observations，for instance，of the results of a game of chance，in that the first sequence obeys an easily recognizable law.Exactly every tenth observation leads to the attribute “large，” all others to the attribute “small。” （Ibid.，p.23）

The essential difference between the sequence of the results obtained by casting dice and the regular sequence of large and small milestones consists in the possibility of devising a method of selecting the elements so as to produce a fundamental change in the relative frequencies.

We begin，for instance，with a large stone，and register only every second stone passed.The relation of the relative frequencies of small and large stones will now converge to ward 1/5 instead of 1/10。 The impossibility of affecting the chances of a game by a System of selection，this uselessness of all Systems of gambling，is the characteristic and decisive property common to all sequences of observations or mass phenomena which form the proper subject of probability calculus. The limiting values of the relative frequencies in a collective must be independent of all possible place selections.（Ibid.，pp.24–25）

理查德·冯·米塞斯通过一个相反的例子进一步解释了条件（ii）（随机性）的含义：

例如，设想一下，沿着一条路设置路碑，大路碑每英里设一个，小路碑每0.1英里设一个。如果我们沿路走得足够远，计算大路碑的相对频率，用这种方法得出的数值约为0.1。随着路过的路碑数增加，偏离0.1的值会变得越来越小；换句话说，相对频率趋向于极限值0.1。（同上，第23页）

也就是说，条件（i）得到满足。但是，在这种情况下不存在条件（ii），因为[对大路碑或小路碑的观察序列与碰运气的游戏的结果等的观察序列有本质区别，因为前者遵循一个易于识别的规律。确切地说，每十次观察都会得出 “大 “的属性，而所有其他观察都会得出 “小 “的属性。（出处同上，p.23）

投掷骰子得出的结果顺序与大小里程碑的常规顺序之间的本质区别在于，是否有可能设计出一种选择元素的方法，从而使相对频率发生根本性的变化。

例如，我们从一块大路碑开始，只记录每经过的第二块石头。小路碑和大路碑的相对频率关系现在将收敛到 1/5 而不是 1/10。不可能通过选择系统来影响游戏的机会，这是所有赌博系统的无用性，是构成概率演算适当主题的所有观察序列或大量现象的共同特征和决定性属性。集合中相对频率的极限值必须与所有可能的位置选择无关（同上，第 24-25 页）。

[212] Ibid.，pp.17–18。

同上，pp.17-18。

[213] Ibid.，p.32。

同上，第 32 页。

[214] regarding subjectivist interpretations of probability，Mises first remarks that sub jectivists such as John Maynard Keynes，for instance，fail to recognize “that if we know nothing about a thing，we cannot say anything about its probability，” and he then notes that “[t]he peculiar approach of the subjectivists lies in the fact that they consider ‘I presume that these cases are equally probable’ to be equivalent to ‘These cases are equally probable，’ since，for them，probability is only a subjective notion.” （R。Mises，Probabil ity，Statistics and truth，pp.75–76）

关于主观主义对概率的解释，米塞斯首先指出，约翰-梅纳德-凯恩斯（John Maynard Keynes）等主观主义者没有认识到 “如果我们对某一事物一无所知，我们对其概率也无话可说“，然后，他提到“主观主义者的独特方法在于如下事实：他们认为“我假设这些案例是同等可能的”相当于“这些案例是同等可能”，因为对他们来说，概率只是一个主观概念。”（R. Mises，Probabil ity，Statistics and truth，pp.75-76）

[215] See also footnote 24 below.

又见下文脚注24。

[216] It is frequently held，explains Mises in this connection，that if one plays with a “perfect” （“correct”） coin heads or tails and makes sufficiently large numbers of throws，it is almost certain that the proportion of heads will deviate by less than 1 per mille from one half of all cases.with regard to this we only note：The transition from the arithmetic proposition to this empirical proposition can be made only in declaring a “perfect” coin to be one for which the probability of both outcomes is ½ and thus defining probability precisely in the way suggested by us，i.e.，as relative empirical frequency in long sequences.（lehrbuch des Positivismus，p.267）

“How is it possible to be sure，” Mises asks the proponents of a priori probability，“that each of the six sides of a die is equally likely to appear Our answer is of course that we do not actually know this unless the dice have been the subject of sufficiently long series of experiments to demonstrate this fact。” （R。Mises，Probability，Statistics and truth，p.71）

在这方面，米塞斯解释说，人们经常认为，如果用一枚 “完美的”（”均质的”）硬币玩投掷正反面的游戏，并且只要投掷的次数足够多，那么几乎可以肯定，正面的比例与所有情况的一半的偏差将小于 1‰。关于这一点，我们只注意到：从算术命题到这个经验命题的过渡，只能通过宣布一个 “完美的”硬币是一个正反两种结果的概率都是 ½ 的硬币，从而以我们建议的方式精确地定义概率，即作为长序列中的相对经验频率。（lehrbuch des Positivismus，第267页）

米塞斯问先验概率的支持者：”我们怎么可能确定骰子的六个面都同样有可能出现呢？”我们的答案当然是，我们实际上并不知道这一点，除非骰子经过足够长的一系列实验来证明这一事实。”（R.米塞斯，《概率、统计与真理》，第71页）

[217] Ibid.，p.33。

同上，p33

[218] Ibid.，p.37。

同上，p37

[219] Ibid.，p.38。

同上，p38

[220] Knight’s and Mises’s views concerning backward imputation （apportioning） differ significantly。In equilibrium，according to Knight each production factor is paid in ac cordance with its marginal value product，whereas according to Mises each production factor is paid in accordance with its discounted marginal value product，i.e.，its marginal value product discounted by the originary rate of interest。This difference does not affect any of the arguments presented here or below，however。

奈特和米塞斯关于逆向归算（分摊）的观点大相径庭。在均衡状态下，奈特认为每个生产要素都是按照其边际价值产品来支付报酬的，而米塞斯认为每个生产要素都是按照其贴现的边际价值产品来支付报酬的，也就是说，其边际价值产品是按照原始利率贴现的。这一差异并不影响本文或下文提出的任何论点。

[221] See section III below.

见下文第三节。

[222] Frank H.Knight，Risk，uncertainty and Profit （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1971），chaps.7 and 8； L。Mises，Human action，chap.6，and pp.289–94。

弗兰克·h·奈特，《风险、不确定性和利润》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1971年），第7和8章；L.米塞斯，《人的行动》，第6章第289 -294页。

[223] Risk，uncertainty and Profit，p.198。Similarly，Mises writes：

If everybody is correct in anticipating the future state of the market of a certain commodity，its price and the prices of the complementary factors of production concerned would already today be adjusted to this future state.neither profit nor loss can emerge for those embarking upon this line of business.（L。Mises，Human action，p.290）

风险、不确定性与利润》，第 198 页。同样，米塞斯写道：

如果每个人都能正确预测某种商品的未来市场状况，那么它的价格和相关辅助生产要素的价格今天就已经适应了这种未来状况。那么，从事这一行的人既不会盈利，也不会亏损。（米塞斯，《人的行动》，第290页）

[224] Knight，Risk，uncertainty and Profit，pp.198–99。

奈特《风险、不确定性与利润》，第198 – 199页。

[225] Ibid.，pp.212–13。Similarly，see L。Mises，Human action，pp.291–92。

同上，pp.212-13。类似地，参见L.米塞斯：《人的行动》，第291 – 292页。

[226] According to Knight， there are two fundamentally different ways of arriving at the probability judgment of the form that a given numerical proportion of X’s are also Y’s.The first method is by a priori calculation.As an illustration of the first type of probability we may take throwing a perfect diE.If the die is really perfect and known to be so，it would be merely ridiculous to undertake to throw it a few hundred thousand times to ascertain the probability of its resting on one face or another。（Knight，Risk，uncertainty and Profit，pp.214–15）

richard von Mises’s reply to this definition can be inferred from the quote provided in footnote 13 above：Precisely。But this definition only shows that there is no such thing as a priori probability。because in order to classify a die as perfect，one must first show this to be true and that cannot be done other than by means of longrun observations.

根据奈特的观点，有两种根本不同的方法可以得出这样的概率判断：给定数字比例的 X 也是 Y。如果骰子真的是完美的，而且我们也知道它是完美的，那么为了确定骰子落在正面或反面的概率而扔几十万次骰子就太可笑了（奈特，《风险、不确定性与利润》，第 214 – 215 页）

理查德-冯-米塞斯（richard von Mises）对这一定义的回答可以从上文脚注 13 中的引文中推断出来：”精确地说。但这一定义只能说明不存在先验概率，因为要把骰子归类为完美骰子，必须首先证明这是真的，而这只能通过长期观察才能做到。

[227] L.Mises，Human action，p.107。

L.米塞斯，《人的行动》，第107页。

[228] Ibid.，p.107。“let us assume，” Mises further clarifies，that ten tickets，each bearing the name of a different man，are put into a box。one ticket will be drawn，and the man whose name it bears will be liable to pay 100 dollars.Then an insurer can promise to the loser full indemnification if he is in a position to insure each of the ten for a premium of ten dollars.He will collect 100 dollars and will have to pay the same amount to one of the ten.But if he were to insure only one of them at a rate fixed by the calculus，he would embark not upon an insurance business，but upon gambling。 insurance，whether conducted according to business principles or according to the principle of mutuality，requires the insurance of a whole class or what can be reasonably considered as such. The characteristic mark of insurance is that it deals with the whole class of events.As we pretend to know everything about the behavior of the whole class，there seems to be no specific risk involved in the conduct of the business. neither is there any specific risk in the business of the keeper of a gambling bank or in the enterprise of a lottery。From the point of view of the lottery enterprise the outcome is predictable，provided that all tickets are sold.If some tickets remain unsold，the enterpriser is in the same position with regard to them as every buyer of a ticket is with regard to the tickets he bought。（Ibid.，pp.108–10）

同上，第 107 页。”让我们假设，”米塞斯进一步解释说，十张彩票，每张写着不同人的名字，被放进一个盒子里。那么，如果保险公司能够以 10 美元的保险费为这 10 张彩票中的每一张投保，他就可以向输家承诺全额赔偿。但是，如果他只为其中一个人投保，保费由计算确定，那么他就不是在做保险生意，而是在赌博。保险，无论是根据商业原则还是根据互助原则，都要求对整个类别或可被合理视为类别的东西进行保险。保险的特点是它涉及整个事件类别。由于我们似乎对整个类别的行为了如指掌，因此在开展业务时似乎不存在特定的风险。赌博庄家或彩票公司的业务也不存在任何特定风险。从彩票公司的角度来看，只要彩票全部售出，结果是可以预测的。

如果有些彩票仍未售出，面对这些这些，彩票公司与每个彩票购买者面对他所购买的彩票的处境是一样。（同上，第 108-10 页。）

[229] See section I。

见第一节。

[230] Ludwig von Mises was clearly aware of the advantage of this definition.Thus，he notes：

The definition of the essence of class probability as given above is the only logi cally satisfactory one.It avoids the crude circularity implied in all definitions referring to the equiprobability of possible events.In stating that we know nothing about actual singular events except that they are elements of a class the be havior of which is fully known，this vicious circle is disposed of。Moreover，it is superfluous to add a further condition called the absence of any regularity in the sequence of the singular events.（L。Mises，Human action，p.109）

路德维希·冯·米塞斯清楚地意识到这一定义的优势。因此，他指出：

上述关于类概率本质的定义是唯一在逻辑上令人满意的定义。它避免了所有关于可能事件等概率的定义中所隐含的粗糙的循环性。我们对实际的单一事件一无所知，只知道它们是一个类的元素，而这个类的行为是完全已知的，如此这种恶性循环就被消除了。此外，再加上一个条件，即在单一事件的序列中不存在任何规律性，也是多余的。

（L.米塞斯，《人的行动》，第109页）

[231] Knight，Risk，uncertainty and Profit，pp.223–24。

奈特，《风险、不确定性与利润》，第223 – 224页。

[232] Ibid.，p.226。

同上，第 226 页。

[233] Ibid.，pp.231–32。

同上，第 231-232 页。

[234] Knight is keenly aware of the unsatisfactory character of his explication of uncertaintyprobability （vs.riskprobability）。Thus，he notes that “[t]his form of probability is involved in the greatest logical difficulties of all，and no very satisfactory discussion of it can be given，but its distinction from the other types must be emphasized.” （Risk，uncertainty and Profit，p.225） Further，“[t]he ultimate logic，or psychology，of these deliberations is obscure，a part of the scientifically unfathomable mystery of life and mind.” （Ibid.，p.227） And yet，it is indisputable that this procedure is followed in fact to a very large extent and that an astounding number of decisions actually rest upon such a prob ability judgment，though it cannot be placed in the form of a definite statistical determination.That is，men do form，on the basis of experience，more or less valid opinions as to their own capacity to form correct judgments，and even of the capacities of other men in this regard.（Id.，p.228）

奈特敏锐地意识到，他对不确定性概率（相对于风险概率）的阐释并不令人满意。因此，他指出：”这种形式的概率涉及最大的逻辑难题，无法对其进行非常令人满意的讨论，但必须强调它与其他类型的区别”。（《风险、不确定性和利润》，第225页）这些讨论的最终逻辑或心理是模糊的，是科学上深不可测的生命和心灵之谜的一部分。”（同上，第 227 页）然而，毋庸置疑的是，这一程序实际上在很大程度上得到了遵循，而且有数量惊人的决定实际上是建立在这种概率判断之上的，尽管它不能以明确的统计形式确定下来。也就是说，人们确实会根据经验，对自己形成正确判断的能力，甚至对于其他人在这方面的能力，形成或多或少有效的意见（同上，第 228 页）。

[235] on case probability see section IV below.

关于个案概率见下文第四节。

[236] L。Mises，Human action，p.107。

L.米塞斯，《人的行动》，第107页。

[237] R.Mises，Probability，Statistics and truth，pp.17，33，28，12。

R.米塞斯：《概率、统计与真理》，第17、33、28、12页。

[238] Ibid.，p.24。

同上，第 24 页。

[239] Ibid.，pp.24–25； see also footnote 8 above.

同上，第 24-25 页；另见上文脚注 8。

[240] L。Mises，Human action，p.110，emphasis added.In fact，in some cases we know all of the factors determining its outcome.See footnote 44 below.

L.米塞斯，《人的行动》，110页，重点补充道。事实上，在某些情况下，我们知道决定其结果的所有因素。见下面脚注44。

[241] It is true that advocates of the positivistfalsificationist research program deny the categorical distinction drawn here between natural events （accidents） and actions and claim that one and the same methodology applies to both realms of phenomena （monism）。According to them，both natural events as well as human actions are to be explained by hypothetically valid （and hence empirically falsifiable） general，time and placeinvariantly effective causes.In both cases，we “explain” by formulating causal hypotheses，which are either confirmed or falsified by actual experiences.However，if actions could indeed be conceived of as governed by time and placeinvariantly operating causes just as natural events are，then it is certainly appropriate to ask：what then about explaining the actions of the explainers，i.e.，the causal researchers？ They are，after all，the persons who carry on the very process of first formulating causal hypotheses and of then assembling confirming or falsifying experience.In order to as similate confirming or falsifying experiences—to confirm，revise，or replace his initial hypothesis—the causal researcher must assumedly be able to learn from experience.Every positivistfalsificationist is forced to admit this.otherwise why engage in causal research at all？ However，if one can learn from experience in as yet unknown ways，then one admittedly cannot know at any given point in time what one will know at a later point in time and，accordingly，how one will act on the basis of this later knowledge.one can only reconstruct the “causes” of one’s actions after the event，as one can ex plain one’s knowledge only after one already possesses it。Indeed，no scientific advance could ever alter the fact that one must regard one’s knowledge and actions based on this knowledge as unpredictable on the basis of constantly operating causes.one might hold this conception of freedom to be an illusion.And this might well be correct from the point of view of a scientist with cognitive powers substantially superior to any hu man intelligence，or from the point of view of God.But we are not God，and even if our freedom is illusory from His standpoint and our actions follow a predictable path，for us this is a necessary and unavoidable illusion.We cannot predict in advance，on the basis of our previous state of knowledge our future state of knowledge and our ac tions manifesting this knowledge.We can only reconstruct them after the event。Thus，the positivistfalsificationist methodology is simply contradictory when applied to the field of knowledge and action—which contains knowledge as its necessary ingredient。The positivistfalsificationist who formulates a causal explanation （assuming time and placeinvariantly operating causes） for some action is simply engaged in nonsense.His activity of engaging in an enterprise—research，whose outcome he must admit he can not know in advance because he must admittedly be able to learn—proves that what he pretends to do cannot be done.See also Hoppe，Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung （Opladen：Westdeutscher，1987）； and idem，Economic Science and the Austrian method （Auburn，Ala.：Ludwig von Mises institute，2007 [1995]）。

诚然，实证证伪主义理论的拥趸们否认我们在这里对自然事件（意外）和行动所做的区分，并声称同一种方法论适用于这两个领域的现象（一元论）。根据他们的观点，无论是自然事件还是人的行动，都应该用假设有效（因而经验上可证伪）的一般原因，即非时空而变的有效原因来解释。在这两种情况下，我们都是通过提出因果假说来 “解释 “的，而这些假说要么被实际经验所证实，要么被实际经验所证伪。然而，如果行动真的可以像自然事件一样，被认为是受非时空而变的运行原因所支配的，那么我们当然应该问：那么，如何解释解释者（因果研究者）的行动呢？毕竟，他们是首先提出因果假设，然后收集证实或证伪经验的人。为了获得类似的证实或证伪经验——证实、修正或取代最初的假设——因果研究者必须能够从经验中学习。每个实证证伪主义者都不得不承认这一点。否则，为什么要从事因果研究呢？然而，如果一个人能够以尚且未知的方式从经验中学习，那么他就不可能在任何给定的时间点上知道他在以后的时间点上会知道什么，以及相应地，他将如何根据以后的知识采取行动。人们只能在事件发生之后才能重建行动的 “原因”，正如人们只能在拥有知识之后才能解释知识一样。的确，任何科学进步都不能改变这样一个事实：一个人必须把自己的知识和基于这些知识的行动视为不可预测的，是基于不断发生作用的原因。人们可能会认为这种自由概念是一种幻觉。从一个认知能力远超人类智慧的科学家的角度来看，或者从上帝的角度来看，这可能是正确的。但我们不是上帝，即使从上帝的角度来看，我们的自由是虚幻的，我们的行动遵循可预测的路径，但对我们来说，这是一种必然的、不可避免的幻觉。我们无法事先预测，基于我们先前的知识状态，我们未来的知识状态和应用这种知识的行动。我们只能在事件发生后重建它们。因此，实证证伪主义者的方法论在应用于知识与行动领域时是自相矛盾的，而行动领域的必要组成部分就是知识。实证证伪主义者为某种行动提出因果解释（假定存在非时空而变的因果关系），这纯粹就是胡说八道。

他所从事的事业——研究，他必须承认他无法预先知道其结果，因为他必须承认他能够学习——证明了他自诩要做的事情是做不到的。另见霍普，Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung（奥普登：西德，1987）；以及同上，《经济科学和奥地利学派的方法论》（奥本，阿拉巴马州）路德维希冯米塞斯研究院，2007[1995]）。

[242] Ludwig von Mises，The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science （Kansas City：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel，1978），pp.47–49。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《经济科学的终极基础》（堪萨斯城：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel出版社，1978），第47 – 49页。

[243] Obviously，one can communicate only with present entities； hence，the distinc tion between actual and virtual communication.As far as past—and to some extent also distant—entities are concerned，only virtual communication is possible.I cannot engage in actual communication with Caesar，for instance，in order to find out why he crossed the Rubicon.But I can study Caesar’s writings and those of his precursors and contemporaries in order to gain some understanding of his time，his personality，and the situation he faced when he made the decision in question.

显然，人们只能与现在的实体进行交流，因此，就有了实际交流和虚拟交流的区别。

就过去的实体——在某种程度上也包括遥远的实体——而言，只有虚拟交流才是可能的。我无法与恺撒进行实际交流，例如，无法了解他为什么要跨过卢比孔河。但我可以通过研究凯撒及其先辈和同时代人的著作，对他所处的时代、他的个性以及他在做出相关决定时所面临的形势有一些理解。

[244] Peter Winch，The idea of a Social Science and Its relation to Philosophy （London：Routledge and Kegan Paul，1970）

彼得·温奇，《社会科学的概念及其与哲学的关系》（伦敦：劳特利奇和基根·保罗出版社，1970年）。。

[245] in contrast to the behavior of noncommunicative entities，then，which is time invariant，human actors vary in time and we must communicate with them again and again in order to predict their actions.If man proceeds，as positivists say he does，to interpret a predictive success as a confirmation of his hypothesis such that he would，given the same circumstance，employ the same knowledge in the future，and if he interprets a predictive failure as a falsification such that he would not employ the same but a different hypothesis in the future，he can only do so if he assumes—even if only implicitly—that the behavior of the objects under consideration does not change over the course of time.otherwise，if their behavior were not assumed to be time invariant—if the same objects were to behave sometimes this way and at other times in a different way—no conclusion as to what to make of a predictive success or failure would follow.A success would not imply that one’s hypothesis had been temporarily confirmed，and hence，that the same knowledge should be employed in the future.Nor would any predictive failure imply that one should not employ the same hypothesis again under the same circumstances.But this assumption—that the objects of one’s research do not alter their behavior in the course of time—cannot be made with respect to the very subject engaging in research without thereby falling into selfcontradiction.For in interpreting his successful predictions as confirmations and his failed predic tions as falsifications，the researcher must necessarily assume himself to be a learning subject—someone who can learn about the behavior of objects conceived by him as nonlearning objects.Thus，even if everything else may be assumed to have a constant nature，man as a researcher cannot make the same assumption with respect to himself。He must be a different person after each confirmation or falsification than he was be fore，and it is his nature to be able to change over the course of time.See also footnote 39 above.

Consequently，whereas in the case of noncommunicative entities the meaning of predictive success and failure is unambiguous：success means “so far your hypothesis has not been falsified，thus apply it again” and failure means “your hypothesis as it stands is wrong，thus change it，” in the case of human actors the meaning of predictive success and failure is necessarily ambiguous.because the value judgments，knowledge，and property constraints of a given actor can change in the course of time，we might repeat a specific prediction even if it had proved wrong before or change it even if it had turned out right。That is，we can never rest on our past laurels but must always start again fresh and judge the applicability of our past knowledge anew； and hence，we can never accumulate a stock of knowledge that we may blindly rely upon in the future.See also Hoppe，“on certainty and uncertainty，” review of Austrian Economics 10，No.1 （1997）：60–61，73； reprinted chapter 14 hereiN.

非交流实体的行为是非时变的，与之相反，行动人是随时间变化的，为了预测他们的行动，我们必须一次又一次地与他们沟通交流。如果人类像实证主义者所说的那样，把预测的成功解释为对其假设的证实，这样，在同样的情况下，他将来就会使用同样的知识；如果他把预测的失败解释为对其假设的证伪，这样，他将来就不会使用同样的假设，而是使用不同的假设。只有当他假定（即使只是隐含地假定）所考虑的对象的行为不会随着时间的推移而改变时，他才能这样做。否则，如果不假定它们的行为是非时变的——同样的对象有时以这种方式行事，有时以另一种方式行事——就无法得出关于预测性成功或失败的结论。预测成功并不意味着假设得到了暂时的证实，因而今后应使用同样的知识。预测失败也不意味着在同样的情况下不应再使用同样的假设。但是，这种假设——研究对象不会随着时间的推移而改变它们的行为——不可能在不陷入自相矛盾的情况下，就从事研究的主体本身作出。因为在把成功的预言解释为证实，把失败的预言解释为证伪时，研究者必须假定自己是一个学习主体——一个能够学习他所认为的非学习客体的行为的人。因此，即使可以假定万物具有恒定的性质，作为研究者的人也不能对自己做出同样的假定。每一次证实或证伪之后，他都必须是一个与之前不同的人，而他的本性就是能够随着时间的推移而改变。另见上文脚注 39。

因此，在非交流实体的情况下，预测成功和失败的含义是明确的：成功意味着 “到目前为止，你的假设还没有被证伪，因此再次应用它”，失败意味着 “你目前的假设是错误的，因此改变它”，而在行动人的情况下，预测成功和失败的含义必然是模糊的。由于特定行动人的价值判断、知识结构和财产状况会随着时间的推移而改变，即使以前的预测被证明是错误的，我们也可能重复它，即使以前的预测被证明是正确的，我们也可能改变它。也就是说，我们永远不能满足于过去的成就，而必须重新开始，重新判断我们过去知识的适用性；因此，我们永远不能积累我们可以在未来盲目依赖的知识储备。另见霍普：《论确定性与不确定性》，《奥地利经济学评论》第 10 期（1997 年）：60-61，73；本文第 14 章转载。

[246] While Ludwig von Mises is exclusively concerned with probability statements and the categorical distinction between class probability （risk） and case probability （uncertainty），his analysis can be extended to deterministic propositions as well，i.e.，to statements regarding which our knowledge concerning their content is not deficient such that we do know everything which would be required for a definite decision between true and not true.In the same way as there exists a categorical distinction between class vs.case probability，so there also exists a categorical distinction between class determinism （event or accidentcertainty） vs.case determinism （actioncertainty）。For instance （in synchronic perspective），I am certain about what will happen if a stone is thrown into the air：that it will fall to the ground.In fact，every stone will do so，and insofar my certainty extends to every single stonethrowing event。Likewise （in diachronic perspective），I am certain that I will see the sun rise and set in the same constant pattern every day，and insofar my certainty also extends to particular events：to the sun on Monday，Tuesday，Wednesday，etc。However，despite my certainty regarding the outcome of particular events，it still holds true what Ludwig von Mises defines as the characteristicum specificum of class probability：namely，that nothing is known about any particular event except its membership in a given class，while everything is known about the behavior of the whole class of events.The objective probability of the events under consideration，based on longrun frequency observations，is 1； hence，my certainty regarding each singular event。I can be certain regarding each actual，singular event，because I am certain about the behavior of the class，but I have no means to distinguish between the singular events.They are homogeneous as far as the attributes in question are concerned.Each singular event is the outcome of the same general （deterministic） law.

In distinct contrast are the following examples：I am certain that my left arm will rise in a second.I am certain that I will drink a beer tonight。I am certain that I will get out of my bed tomorrow morning。As far as the certainty of these events is concerned，it is no less than that regarding the behavior of stones or the sun.Indeed，one might say that my certainty regarding the former events is even higher than that concerning the latter。After all，the validity of the deterministic laws on which the latter certainty rests is only a hypothetical one，whereas in the former cases it is what one might call a voluntaristconstructivist certainty：I am making the events in question certain； their occurrence depends solely on my will （plus the fact that I am not paralyzed，that I am in possession of a beer，that I own a bed，etc。）。

However，as Ludwig von Mises notes regarding probability statements，just as “case probability has nothing in common with class probability but the incompleteness of our knowledge” （Human action，p.110），so case determinism （actioncertainty） has nothing in common with class determinism （event or accidentcertainty） but the completeness of our knowledge.In every other regard the two are entirely different。For one，whereas I do not know why stones and the sun behave the way they do （I may say that they do so because of the law of gravitation or the newtonian laws of motion， but there is no further answer，then，as to the question why these laws are the way they are：they are the way they are without anyone understanding why this is so），regarding my own actions （lifting my arm，drinking a beer，getting out of bed） I do know their ultimate cause：they happen，because that is the way I want things to be.Moreover，whereas my certainty regarding the behavior of stones and the sun is based on longrun frequency observations （and the fact that these observations have so far revealed only one and the same result，without any exception），my certainty regarding my armlift ing，beerdrinking，and getting out of bed is solely based on my present understanding of myself and my present circumstances.However，from my certainty regarding this particular case of armlifting，beerdrinking，and getting out of bed nothing follows as regards my future acts of armlifting，beerdrinking，and getting out of bed.Rather，any certainty regarding any such future acts of mine must be based on another，future act of understanding myself and my circumstances.In contrast，from my certainty regarding the behavior of one particular stonethrow and the behavior of the sun on Monday it follows that I am just as certain about the result of the next stonethrowing event and the behavior of the sun on Tuesday。（Incidentally，apart from these two types of empirical [a posteriori] certainty，there also exists a third type：of logical and praxe ological [a priori] certainty。）

虽然路德维希·冯·米塞斯只关注概率陈述以及类概率（风险）和个案概率（不确定性）之间的绝对区别，但他的分析也可以扩展到确定性命题，即，我们对其内容的了解并不缺乏，以至于我们确实知道在真假之间做出明确决定所需的一切。就像类概率与个案概率之间存在绝对的区别一样，类决定论（事件或意外的确定性）与个案决定论（行动的确定性）之间也存在绝对的区别。例如（在共时视角下），我确信一块石头扔向空中会发生什么：它会落到地上。事实上，每块石头都会这样，到目前为止，我的确定性延伸到每一次扔石头的事件。同样地（从历时的角度来看），我确信我每天都会看到太阳以相同的恒定模式升起和落下，而且我的确信也会延伸到特定的事件：星期一、星期二、星期三的太阳，等等。然而，尽管我对特定事件的结果很有把握，但路德维希·冯·米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）所定义的类概率特性（characteristicum specificum of class probability）仍然是正确的：也就是说，对于任何特定事件，除了它在特定类中的成员身份之外，我们一无所知，而对于整个类事件的行为，我们却无所不知。基于长期的频率观测，所考虑的事件的客观概率为1；因此，我对每一件事都很确定。我可以确定每一个实际的、单一的事件，因为我确定类的行为，但我没有办法区分这些单一的事件。就所讨论的属性而言，它们是同质的。每一个单一事件都是相同的一般（确定性）规律的结果。与之形成鲜明对比的是以下例子：我确信我的左臂会在一秒钟内抬起。我今晚肯定要喝啤酒。我确信明天早上我一定会起床。就这些事件的确定性而言，它不亚于石头或太阳的行为。事实上，可以说我对前者的确定性甚至高于对后者的确定性。毕竟，后一种确定性所依据的决定论定律的有效性只是一种假设性的确定性，而在前一种情况下，人们可以称之为一种自愿建构主义的确定性：我使所讨论的事件具有确定性；它们的发生完全取决于我的意志（加上我没有瘫痪、我拥有一瓶啤酒、我拥有一张床等事实）。

然而，正如路德维希·冯·米塞斯关于概率陈述所指出的那样，正如”个案概率与类概率除了我们知识的不完整性之外没有任何共同之处”（《人的行动》，第 110 页）一样，个案决定论（行动的确定性）与类决定论（事件或意外的确定性）除了我们知识的完整性之外没有任何共同之处。在其他方面，两者是完全不同的。首先，虽然我不知道石头和太阳为什么会这样运动（我可以说它们之所以这样是因为万有引力定律或牛顿运动定律，但对于为什么这些定律是这样的问题，我没有进一步的答案：它们是这样的，没有人理解为什么会这样），但关于我自己的行动（抬起我的手臂，喝啤酒，起床），我确实知道它们的最终原因：它们发生了，因为那是我希望事情是这样的。此外，我对石头和太阳行为的确定性是基于长期的频率观察（而且这些观察迄今为止只揭示了一个相同的结果，没有任何例外），而我对自己举臂、喝啤酒和下床的确定性则完全基于我对自己和当前环境的理解。然而，从我对这次举臂、喝啤酒和下床活动的确定性来看，我对未来举臂、喝啤酒和下床活动的确定性并不存在。相反，任何关于我未来行为的确定性都必须建立在另一个未来行为的基础上，即了解我自己和我的情况。相反，从我对某一次扔石头的行为和太阳在星期一的行为的确定中可以得出，我对下一次扔石头事件的结果和太阳在星期二的行为是一样确定的。（顺便提一下，除了这两种经验的（后验的）确定性之外，还有第三种类型，即逻辑的和实践的（先验的）确定性。）

[247] review of Donald McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics.originally published in re view of Austrian Economics 3 （1989）。

对唐纳德·麦克洛斯基《经济学修辞学》的评论。最初发表于奥地利经济学3（1989）的回顾。

[248] Donald McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics (Madison：University of Wisconsin Press，1985)。

[249] 唐纳德·麦克洛斯基《经济学的修辞学》（Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985）。

[250] Richard Rorty，Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton，N.J。：Princeton University Press，1979)。

[251] Rorty，Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature，p.315。

[252] Ibid.，p.326。

[253] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，p.318。

[254] Ibid.，p.29。

[255] Ibid.，pp.37-38。

[256] Ibid.，p.XIX。

[257] Ibid.，pp.46–47。

[258] This is also the thesis of a book by Paul Feyerabend，Wissenschaft als Kunst (Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1984)。

[259] See the interview with McCloskey in the institute for Humane Studies newslet ter，Institute Scholar 6，No.1 (1986)：7。

[260] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，p.174。

[261] on this “Apriori of Argumentation,” see K。O。Apel，Transformation der Philoso phie，vol.II (Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1973)。

[262] in connection with the hermeneutical movement，the phrase intellectual permis siveness was coined by Henry veatch in his essay “Deconstruction in Philosophy：Has Rorty made It the Denouement of Contemporary Analytical Philosophy?” review of metaphysics 39 (December 1985)。

[263] McCloskey asks：“[Do we not] need something … besides the mere social fact that an argument proved persuasive?” No，he counters，“talk against talk is selfrefuting。The person making it [i.e.，raising the preceding question] appeals to a social，nonepis temological standard of persuasiveness by the very act of trying to persuade someone that mere persuasion is not enough.” (McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，pp.38–39) Ironically，however，this argument does not prove his point。on the contrary，the argument can be said to be persuasive only because a selfcontradictory position is considered to be false，and not regarded as false because it has been agreed upon.otherwise,if I did not agree，would not the argument have to be considered false?

[264] on the inseparable connection between language and action，see esp.Lud wig Wittgenstein，Philosophische Untersuchungen，in Schriften，vol.I (Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1963)。

[265] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，p.24。

[266] on this，see also H.veatch，“Deconstruction in Philosophy：Has Rorty made It the Denouement of Contemporary Analytical Philosophy？” esp.p.319 f。

[267] It is by no means an accident，then，that advocates of every conceivable political ideology can be found among the hermeneuticians.The creed goes with libertarianism and anarchism （McCloskey and Feyerabend），with socialism （Ricœur and Foucault），and with fascism （Heidegger） as well as with，in most cases，middleoftheroadisM.Gadamer—the special hero of Don Lavoie and the george Mason University herme neuticians and one of the murkiest “thinkers” of them all，who manages to fill hundreds of pages without saying anything and who rambles endlessly about interpreting with out ever actually interpreting any text in an intelligible way （witness his masterpiece，Wahrheit und methode，Tübingen：Mohr，1960，English trans.，1975）—successfully ad vanced his career under Nazism，communism，and liberal democracy。on his philoso phy and his life as a vivid illustration of the meaning of hermeneutics，see the brilliant essay by Jonathan Barnes，“A Kind of integrity，” London review of Books （November 6，1986）； see also David Gordon，“Hermeneutics vs.Austrian Economics，” Occasional Paper （Washington，D.C.：Ludwig von Mises institute，1986）。

[268] on the absolutist，a priori foundations of ethics，see HansHermann Hoppe，“From the Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics of libertarianism，” in Llewellyn H.Rockwell and Walter Block，eds.，man，Economy and Liberty （Auburn，Ala.：Ludwig von Mises institute，1988）； Hoppe，Eigentum，Anarchie und Staat （Opladen：Westdeutscher verlag，1986）。Ethical absolutism as much as methodological absolutism is very much in disrepute.T。W.Hutchison goes so far as to smear everyone committed to such a position as a dangerous，potential dictator—revealingly，without ever going to the trouble of explaining what the ethical or methodological principles are whose a priori grounding allegedly implies such a threat。（The Politics and Philosophy of Economics，new York：new York University Press，1981，esp.pp.196–97。） instead，pluralism—ethical and methodological—is what the enlightened person today professes.only such plural ism，it is said，permits tolerance and freedom.（See as another typical pluralist Bruce Caldwell，beyond Positivism，London：Allen and Unwin，1982，chap.13。） Must it be stressed that this doctrine is entirely fallacious？ without a priori foundation，pluralism is itself just another unfounded ideology and there is no reason to adopt it rather than any other one.only if a priori valid reasons could be given for adopting pluralism could it claim to safeguard tolerance and freedom.A pluralism that would be merely one of plural values would actually be destructive of both.See on this in particular Henry ve atch，Rational man：A Modern interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics （Bloomington，Ind.：Indiana University Press，1962），pp.37–46。As contrasted to our modern pluralists，benito Mussolini understood all this quite well。veatch cites him on p.41：“From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value 。。。the modern relativist infers that everybody has the right to create for himself his own ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable.”

[269] in defense of the idea of synthetic a priori propositions，see A.Pap，Semantics and necessary truth （new Haven：Yale University Press，1958）； B。Blanshard，rea son and Analysis （LaSalle，Ill。：open Court，1964）； P.Lorenzen，methodisches Denken （Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp 1968）； idem，normative Logic and Ethics （mannheim：Bib liographisches institut，1969）； F。Kambartel，Erfahrung und Struktur （Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1968）； F。Kambartel and J。Mittelstrass，eds.，Zum normativen fundament der Wissenschaft （Frankfurt/M.：Athenaeum，1973）； Ludwig von Mises，Human action：A Treatise on Economics （Chicago：Henry regnery，1966）； Murray N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State （Los Angeles：Nash，1971）。

[270] on the faulty reason for the use of such labels，see footnote 20。recently their use has also become increasingly popular among Austrians such as Mario Rizzo and Don Lavoie in order to characterize and distance themselves from the MisesRothbard school within the tradition of AustrianisM.

[271] Ludwig von Mises，Epistemological problems of Economics （new York：new York University Press，1981）； idem，Human action； idem，Theory and History （Washington，D.C。：Ludwig von Mises institute，1985）； idem，The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science （Kansas City：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel，1978）； Murray N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State； idem，Individualism and the Philosophy of the Social Sciences （San Francisco：Cato institute，1979）； idem，“Praxeology：The methodology of Austrian economics，” in Edwin Dolan，ed.，The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics （Kansas City：Sheed and Ward，1976）。

[272] Lionel Robbins，nature and Significance of Economic Science （London：Macmil lan，1932）。

[273] Marin Hollis and Edward J。nell，Rational Economic man （Cambridge，Eng。：Cambridge University Press，1975）。

[274] Lionel Robbins，just as the earlier Austrians Carl menger and Eugen von Böhm Bawerk，admittedly does not use the term a priori，but it should be sufficiently clear from his arguments as well as his frequent，approving references to Mises （who does） that Robbins actually means to provide an a priori justification of the basic propositions and theorems of economics.

The aprioristic character of economic propositions is explicitly stressed also by Frank H.Knight in “What Is truth in Economics，” in idem，on the History and method of Economics （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1956）。

For those familiar with the tradition of rationalist philosophy，it hardly needs to be shown that the claim of having produced an a priori true proposition does not imply a claim of being infallible.No one is，and rationalism has never said anything to the contrary。rationalism merely argues that the process of validating or falsifying a statement claiming to be true a priori is categorically different from that of validating or falsifying what is commonly referred to as an empirical proposition.However，since McCloskey does seem to think that rationalism assumes infallibility and，hence，that the fact （tri umphantly cited on pp.33–34） that even in as pure a science as mathematics some alleged watertight arguments have turned out to be inconclusive after all，constitutes proof of a fundamental flaw in rationalism—assuming here in McCloskey’s favor that something such as fundamental flaws can exist at all in the absence of any truly objective standard—this point needs to be stressed here.revisions of mathematical arguments are themselves a priori。They show only that an argument thought previously to be a priori true is not。

[275] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，pp.15，65。

[276] Ibid.，p.25。His description of Marxist economic methodology，on the same page，is not much better。

[277] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，pp.7–8。

[278] Karl R。Popper，in order to distinguish his falsificationism from the verification ism of the early Vienna Circle，prefers to label his philosophy “critical rationalism.” To do so，however，is highly misleading if not deceptive，much like the common U.S. practice of calling socialists or social democrats “liberals.” For in fact，Popper is in com plete agreement with the fundamental assumptions of empiricism （see the following discussion in the text） and explicitly rejects the traditional claims of rationalism，i.e.，of being able to provide us with a priori true empirical knowledge in general and an objectively founded ethic in particular。See，for example，his “Why Are the Calculi of Logic and Arithmetic Applicable to reality，” in Karl R。Popper，Conjectures and refuta tions （London：Routledge and Kegan Paul，1969），where he advances the traditional empiricist thesis that “only if we are ready to accept refutations do we speak about reality” （p.212），and “refutes” the idea of the rules of logic and arithmetic being laws of reality by pointing out that “if you put 2 + 2 rabbits in a basket，you may soon find seven or eight in it” （p.211）。For a correct placement of Popper’s philosophy within the general framework of empiricism，see the sovereign discussion by a leading analytical philosopher，W.Stegmueller，Hauptströmungen der gegenwartsphilosophie，vol.I （Stutt gart：Kroener，1965），chaps.9–10。

In fact，it is only fair to say that it is Popper who contributed more than anyone else to persuading the scientific community of the modernistic，empiricistpositivist worldvieW.In particular，it should be emphasized that it was Popper who is respon sible for Hayek’s and Robbins’ increasing deviations from their originally much more Misesian methodological position.See on this Lionel Robbins，An Autobiography of an Economist （London：Macmillan，1976）； Friedrich A.Hayek，“The Theory of Complex Phenomena，” in idem，Studies in Philosophy，Politics and Economics （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1964）； Hayek，“The Pretence of knowledge，” in idem，new Studies in Philosophy，Politics，Economics and the History of ideas （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1978），esp.p.31 f。See also Hayek’s “Einleitung” to Ludwig von Mises，Erin nerungen （Stuttgart：Fischer，1978），and his “Foreword” to Ludwig von Mises，Socialism （Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty fund，1981）。

[279] terrence W.Hutchison，The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory （London：MacMillan，1938）； Milton Friedman，“The methodology of Positive economics，” in idem，Essays in Positive Economics （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1953）； Mark Blaug，The methodology of Economics （Cambridge，Eng。：Cambridge Uni versity Press，1980）。

[280] See on this the excellent discussion in Martin Hollis and Edward J。nell，Rational Economic man，“Introduction.”

[281] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，p.14。

[282] Thomas Kuhn，Structure of Scientific revolutions （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1970）。

[283] Ibid.，p.15。

[284] See on this also the trenchant observations of Mises，Human action，p.872 f。，“Economics and the Universities.”

[285] The correct nomenclature is “Herr Professor Doktor。”

[286] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，p.163。

[287] See Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave，eds.，Criticism and the growth of knowledge （Cambridge，Eng。：Cambridge University Press，1970）。Empiricists such as Blaug argue that Popper actually realized the possibility of “immunizing stratagems” yet “solved” this problem and thus escaped relativism and skepticism.（The methodology of Economics，pp.17 ff。） Nothing could be further from the truth.It is correct that Popper has always been aware of the possibility of immunizing one’s hypotheses from falsification.（See his Logik der Forschung，Tübingen：Mohr，1969，chap.4，sections 19，20。） His answer to such a threat to his falsificationism，however，can hardly be accepted as a solution.For he actually admits that he cannot show such “conventionalism” to be wrong。He simply proposes to overcome it by adopting the methodological convention of not behaving as conventionalists do。Yet how can such methodological conventionalism （i.e.，a methodology without epistemological foundation） claim to establish science as a rational enter prise and to stimulate scientific progress？ For such an assessment of Popperianism，see A.Wellmer，methodologie als Erkenntnistheorie （Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1967）。Thus，the preceding classification of Popperianism as relativism and skepticism.

[288] See Paul Feyerabend，against method （London：new left Books，1975）； Feyera bend，Science in a free Society （London：NLB，1978）。

[289] on the complex relation between Feyerabend and Popper，see H.P.Duerr，ed.，ver suchungeN.Aufsätze zur Philosophie Feyerabends，2 vols.（Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1980）。

[290] Strictly speaking，such an empirical refutation would not be entirely decisive and other，a priori reasons would be required to bring empiricism down.（on such reasons，see the discussion in the following text。） For empiricists could in turn challenge the validity of one’s description of the facts as being indeed those of technological progress.They could，given their own framework，deny that one can know even simple facts，much less complex phenomena such as technological progress，to be so or so，because even the description of something as a fact would ultimately be hypothetical and hence one’s alleged empirical refutation could not be considered crucial in any strict sense.See on the hypothetical character of basic propositions Karl Popper，Logik der Forschung （Tübingen：Mohr，1969），chap.V and app.X。Ironically，the hypothetical character of basic propositions invalidates Popper’s claim，central to his entire falsificationist philoso phy，that an asymmetrical relationship between verification and falsification exists （i.e.，that one can never verify a hypothesis，but can falsify it）。See on this A.Pap，Analytische Erkenntnistheorie （Vienna，1955）。

[291] See also Jürgen Habermas，“Der Universalitätsanspruch der Hermeneutik，” in K。Apel et al。，Hermeneutik und ideologiekritik （Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1976），esp.pp.129–31。

[292] See HansHermann Hoppe，Handeln und Erkennen （bern：Lang，1976）。

[293] See on this W.Stegmueller，Hauptströmungen der gegenwartsphilosophie，vol.II （Stuttgart：Kroener，1975），chap.5，esp.pp.523ff。

[294] See on this also Jürgen Habermas，Erkenntnis und interesse （Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1968），esp.chap.II，sections 5–6； and K。O。Apel，Die Erkären：verstehen Kontroverse in Transzendentalpragmatischer Sicht （Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1979），esp.p.284。

[295] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，p.15。

[296] See on this also K。O。Apel，“Die Entfaltung der Sprachanalytischen Philosophie und das problem der geisteswissenschaften，” in idem，Transformation der Philosophie，vol.II （Frankfurt/M.：Suhrkamp，1973）； idem，Die Erkären：verstehen Kontroverse in Transzendentalpragmatischer Sicht。

[297] See on this also HansHermann Hoppe，Handeln und Erkennen，chap.3 and esp.pp.62–65； also Immanuel Kant，Kritik der reinen vernunft，in idem，Werke，vol.II，ed.by W.Weischedel （Wiesbaden：Insel，1956），esp.pp.226 ff。

[298] It is worth emphasizing here that these remarks on the skeptical，relativistic con clusions of empiricism regarding the possibility of prediction also fully apply to Popperi anisM.Popper，with great selfassurance，claims to have solved—through adopting his falsificationist methodology—the Humean problem of induction and thereby to have reestablished science as a rational enterprise.（See in particular Karl R。Popper，Objective knowledge，Oxford，Eng。：Oxford University Press，1972，pp.85ff。） Alas，this is simply an illusion.For how can it be possible to relate two or more observational experiences，even if they concern the relations between things that are perceived to be the same or similar，as falsifying （or confirming） each other，rather than merely neutrally record them as one experience here and one experience there，one repetitive of another or not，and leaving it at that （i.e.，regarding them as logically incommensurable） unless one presupposed the existence of timeinvariantly operating causes？ only if the existence of such timeinvariantly operating causes could be assumed would there by any logically compelling reason to regard them as commensurable and as falsifying or confirming each other。However，Popper，like all empiricists，denies that any such assumption can be given an a priori defense （there are for him no such things as a priori true propositions about reality such as the causality principle would have to be） and is itself merely hypothetical。Yet clearly，if the possibility of constantly operating causes as such is only a hypothetical one，then it can hardly be claimed，as Popper does，that any particular predictive hypothesis could ever be falsified or confirmed.For then the falsification （or confirmation） would have to be considered a hypothetical one：any predictive hypoth esis would only undergo tests whose status as tests were themselves hypothetical。And hence one would be right back in the muddy midst of skepticism.only if the causal ity principle as such could be unconditionally established as true，could any particular causal hypothesis ever be testable，and the outcome of a test provide rational grounds for deciding whether or not to uphold a given hypothesis.

[299] See on this （Kantian） idea F。Kambartel，Erfahrung und Struktur，chap.3，esp.pp.122f。，127，144； HansHermann Hoppe，chap.4，esp.p.98。

[300] See on this Ludwig von Mises，Human action，chap.1。5； Carl menger，Grundsä tze der Volkswirtschaftslehre （Vienna：Braumüller，1871），pp.3，7 ff。

[301] Though quite frequently mentioned as an empirical counterexample，it should be noted that quantum physics，or more precisely the indeterminacy or Heisenberg principle of quantum physics，correctly interpreted，is in accordance with this.What has been previously said does not preclude—and this is precisely the situation in quantum physics—that in order to experimentally produce a result，two or more measurement acts must be performed and that because any two separate actions can only be per formed sequentially，the performance of the latter act of measurement might change the results of the former one，so that if this proves to be unavoidable，the results in question can only be predicted statistically and a deterministic explanation proves im possible.But even here each separate measurement act presupposes the validity of the constancy principle—otherwise，neither of them would have been performed； and the sequence of acts，too，presupposes constantly operating causes as it would otherwise be simply impossible to repeat two experiments in the field of quantum physics and state this to be the case.Moreover，the experience of quantum physics is in exact line with the preceding conclusion regarding the characteristic of causality as an actionproduced phenomenon and as a necessary （known to be valid a priori） feature of reality。If causes can indeed only be measured and identified sequentially，by means of actions that have repercussions for each other，then they can，in principle，only be causes whose constant operation is of a probabilistic kind—and this，to be sure，can again be known to be true a priori。Quantum physics then only reveals that cases such as this are not merely conceivable，but do in fact exist。See on this F。Kambartel，Erfahrung und Struktur，pp.138ff。； also P.Mittelstaedt，Philosophische probleme der modernen Physik （mannheim：Bibliographisches institut，1968）。

[302] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，p.90。

[303] Ibid.，p.93。

[304] Ibid.，p.16。

[305] Ibid.，p.93f。

[306] Mises，Human action，pp.870–71。

[307] Mises correctly emphasizes that the decisive argument against causal predictions in economics must be the absence of “constant relations” in the field of human knowledge and actions.See，for instance，Human action，p.55 f。

[308] See on the following HansHermann Hoppe，Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung （Opladen：Westdeutscher verlag，1983）； idem，“Is research Based on Causal Scientific Principles Possible in the Social Sciences，” Ratio XXV，No.1 （1983）。

[309] on this，see footnote 50。

[310] interestingly，this proof has been first formulated by Popper in the preface of his The Poverty of historicism （London：Routledge and Kegan Paul，1957）。However，Popper failed to realize that such proof actually invalidates the idea of a methodological monism and demonstrates the inapplicability of his falsificationist philosophy in the field of human action and knowledge.See on this HansHermann Hoppe，Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung，pp.44–49； K。O。Apel，Die Erklaeren：verstehen Kontroverse，pp.44–46。

[311] See on this H.Albert，Traktat über kritische vernunft （Tübingen：Mohr，1969），esp.chap.5，V，VI。

[312] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，p.12。

[313] Ibid.，pp.3–5。

[314] Mises writes：

The essence of logical Positivism is to deny the cognitive value of a priori knowledge by pointing out that all a priori propositions are merely analytic。They do not provide new information，but are merely verbal and tautological。only experience can lead to synthetic propositions.There is an obvious objection against this doctrine，viz。，that this proposition is in itself a—as the present writer thinks，false—synthetic a priori proposition，for it can manifestly not be established by experience.（The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science，p.5）

It is remarkable to notice how utterly helplessly empiricists react to such arguments establishing the case for synthetic a priori propositions.Witness，for instance，Mark Blaug，The methodology of Economics，pp.91–93，where he engages in an allout smear attack on Mises （“Mises’ later writings on the foundations of economic science

are so cranky and idiosyncratic that we can only wonder that they have been taken seriously by anyone，” p.93） without presenting a single argument and without notic ing how strangely his selfassuredness and the apodicticity with which he presents his antiapriorist methodological pronouncements contrast with his very own professed falsificationisM.The same discrepancy between，on the one hand，a complete lack of argument and，on the other，apodictic arrogance，also marks his “discussion” of Hollis and nell’s Rational Economic man on pp.123–26。

[315] Empiricists，of course，would brand such definitions as tautological。Yet it should be perfectly clear that the preceding definition of action is of a categorically different nature than a definition such as “bachelor” meaning “unmarried man.” Whereas the lat ter is indeed a completely arbitrary verbal stipulation，the propositions defining action are most definitely not。In fact，while one can define anything as one pleases，one can not help but make the conceptual distinctions between goals and means and so on as “defining something by something” would itself be an action.It is thus contradictory to deny，as empiricismPositivism does，the existence of “real definitions.” Hollis and nell，Rational Economic man，observe “Honest definitions are，from an empiricist point of view，of two sorts，lexical and stipulative.” （p.177） But When it comes to justifying [this] view，we are presumably being offered a definition of definition.Whichever category of definition the definition falls in，we need not accept it as of any epistemological wortH.Indeed，it would not be even a possible epistemological thesis，unless it were neither lexical nor stipulative.The view [then] is both inconvenient and selfrefuting。A contrary opinion with a long pedigree is that there are “real” definitions，which capture the essence of the thing defined，（p.178）

See also B。Blanshard，reason and Analysis，p.268 f。

[316] Hollis and nell contend that not “action” but “reproduction of the economic System” is the primary concept on which economics，conceived of as an a priori science，rests.（Rational Economic man，p.243） Noticing this disagreement among apriorists has led Caldwell to the curious conclusion that something must be wrong with apriorism and to then advocate a donotcommityourselftoanything pluralisM.（beyond Positiv ism，pp.131ff。； see footnote 20） Yet such reasoning is about as conclusive （or，rather，inconclusive） as inferring from the fact that disagreements among people regarding the validity of certain empirical propositions exist，that no empirical facts exist and hence no empirical science is possible.Indeed，Caldwell’s conclusion is even more curious，given the fact that in the dispute at hand，the solution is as clear as daylight：What ever an economic “System” might be，it can certainly not exist or be able to reproduce itself without acting people.Moreover，to say that “reproduction of the System” is the primary concept for economic analysis is plainly contradictory—unless it were simply synonymous with saying that action is such a concept—because saying so would in fact presuppose an actor saying it。

[317] on the empiricist position regarding the law of demand，see Mark Blaug，The methodology of Economics，chap.6。

[318] McCloskey，The Rhetoric of Economics，pp.58–60。

[319] Ibid.，p.60。

[320] Moreover，why would the argument not also go the other way？ If，empirically，the law of demand does not seem to work for some goods，why would not analogy lead us to question it for those in which it does？（I owe this argument to David Gordon.）

[321] See on this Mises，Human action，p.124。

[322] Robert Nozick believes Austrians to be inconsistent in （1） claiming that actions invariably show preference （and never indifference） and （2） employing the idea of “homogeneity” and “equal serviceability” of goods in their formulation of the law of marginal utility。（“on Austrian methodology，” Synthese 36 （1977）：pp.37 ff。） How ever，such a charge would only be correct if “preference” and “indifference” were both considered categories of the same typE.This has been correctly pointed out by Wal ter Block，who insists that “indifference” is not，unlike “preference，” a praxeological category。（“on Robert Nozick’s ‘on Austrian methodology’” inquiry 23 （1980））。Yet his classification of indifference as a “psychological category” instead is also incorrect。（Ibid.，p.424） in fact，“sameness” is an epistemological category：humans are knowers and actors； they only act because they know，and they only know because they act。That something is the same （or different） than something else we know qua actors who know.（Indeed，“sameness” is a universal epistemological category in that one could not even say anything，for instance about actions，without the notion of something being an instance of some particular type of thing。） That something that is known to be the same can never actually be treated with indifference we know qua knowers who act。

The law of diminishing marginal utility then is a law regarding knowers who act。

[323] See Mises，Human action，p.125； M.N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State，pp.268 ff。

[324] Empiricists will complain that such a formulation of the law will make it tau tological and unfalsifiable.both classifications are false.Clearly，the discovery of a new，more highly valued use for，for instance，a unit of a given good，i.e.，the event “increase in demand，” and the event “a higher price is paid for it” are two conceptually distinct events，and to logically relate such events then is a categorically different thing than to stipulate that “bachelor means ‘unmarried man’。” （See also footnote 67） That the use of ceteris paribus clauses in economics implies an immunization strategy，on the other hand，would be true only if economic propositions were indeed concerned with contingent empirical causal laws.In the natural sciences，where laws do have this status，such complaint would be appropriate—yet there，interestingly enough，one hardly ever finds ceteris paribus clauses.In the natural sciences，predictive hypotheses of the form “If 。。。then” are in fact treated as applicable whenever the ifcondition is given，no matter what else is or is not the case.And it is only because this is done that such hypotheses can be validated at all。（There is only one way of testing hypotheses about contingent empirical causal relations：in and through factual applications.） If，contrary to this，one were to demand that in order to apply a hypothesis or to repeat its application，a full description of the world at the moment of application be given，or that everything be the same in the second application as in the first （beyond the same ness of the condition explicitly stated in the ifclause），the hypothesis would become inapplicable and thus empty for the practical reason that such a demand would literally involve describing all of the universe，and for the theoretical reason that no one at any point in time could possibly know what all the variables are that make up this universe （as this question remains open to new discoveries）。

The situation is entirely different in economics，and it is curious indeed that this should not have been realized—given the facts that the use of ceteris paribus clauses in the empirical sciences would render such sciences futile and that such clauses are none theless constantly employed in economics.Why，then，not give serious consideration to the idea that economics might be an altogether different science？ indeed，as we have seen，this is the case.Economic propositions can be validated independently of any fac tual application as implied （or not implied） in the incontestable axiom of action plus certain situations and situational changes described in terms of the categories of action.Yet then ceteris paribus clauses are completely harmless.In fact，their use simply serves to remind us that the deduced consequences only follow if the situation is indeed as described （and not a logically praxeologically different one），and that it is impossible in all actual applications of economic theorems （i.e.，whenever the situation analyzed can be identified as real） to hold the ceteris experimentally constant （as the “holding constant” then can，in principle，only be done logically，by means of thoughtexperi mentation）。See on this also HansHermann Hoppe，Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung，pp.78–81。

* originally published in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 3，No.4 （Winter 2005）：87–91。

原刊于《奥地利经济学季刊》第3期第4期（Winter 2005）： 87-91。

[325] Murray N.Rothbard，“Toward a reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” in idem，The Logic of Action，vol.1 (Cheltenham，Eng.：Edward Elgar 1997)，pp.225–26。

默里·罗斯巴德《重建效用与福利经济学》，《行动的逻辑》，第1卷(切尔滕纳姆,Eng。:Edward Elgar 1997)，页225 – 26。

[326] Robert Nozick，“on Austrian methodology,” Synthese 36 (1977)：353–92。

罗伯特·诺齐克，《论奥地利方法论》，综合（荷兰国际哲学杂志）36(1977):353-92。

[327] Bryan Caplan，“The Austrian Search for realistic Foundations,” Southern Economic Journal 65，No.4 (1999)：823–38。

布莱恩·卡普兰，《奥地利学派对现实主义基础的探索》，《南方经济杂志》65期，第4期(1999)：823–38

[328] Walter Block，“on Robert Nozick’s ‘on Austrian methodology,’” inquiry 23 (1980)：397–444; and idem，“Austrian Theorizing：recalling the Foundations,” Quar terly Journal of Austrian Economics 2，No.4 (1999)：21–39。

沃尔特·布洛克，“论罗伯特·诺齐克的‘奥地利学派的方法论’”，《探究》23 (1980):397-444;同上，“奥地利学派理论化:回顾基础”，《奥地利经济学季刊》第2期，第4期(1999)：21–39。

[329] Jörg Guido Hülsmann，“Economic Science and neoclassicism,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 2，No.4 (1999)：3–20。

Jörg Guido 许尔斯曼，“经济科学与新古典主义”，《奥地利经济学季刊》第2期，第4期(1999)：3–20。

[330] Block，“on Robert Nozick’s ‘on Austrian methodology,’” pp.423–25。

布洛克，“论罗伯特·诺齐克的‘奥地利方法论’”，第423 – 425页。

[331] Robert Nozick，“on Austrian methodology,” Synthese 36 (1977)：353–92。

罗伯特·诺齐克，“论奥地利学派的方法论”，综合36(1977):353-392。

[332] Ludwig von Mises，Human Action：A Treatise on Economics (Chicago：Henry reg nery，1966)。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《人的行动:经济学专论》(芝加哥:亨利·雷格里出版社，1966)。

[333] Murray N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State (Los Angeles：Nash，1962)。

默里·罗斯巴德:《人、经济与国家》(洛杉矶:纳什出版社，1962)。

[334] Nozick，“on Austrian methodology,” p.390。

诺齐克，《论奥地利学派方法论》，第390页。

[335] Block，“on Robert Nozick’s ‘on Austrian methodology’,” pp.424–25; and similarly Block，“Austrian Theorizing：recalling the Foundations,” pp.22–24。

布洛克，“论罗伯特·诺齐克的‘奥地利学派方法论’”，第424 – 25页；同样，布洛克，“奥地利理论:回顾基础”，第22 – 24页。

[336] Mises，Human Action，p.119。

米塞斯，《人的行动》，第119页。

[337] John Searle，Minds，Brains and Science (Cambridge，Mass.：Harvard University Press，1984)，pp.57–58。

约翰·塞尔，《心智，大脑与科学》(剑桥，马萨诸塞州，哈佛大学出版社，1984)，第57 – 58页。

[338] See also Hoppe，Economic Science and the Austrian method (Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，1995)，pp.40–44。

另见霍普，《经济科学与奥地利学派的方法》(奥本，阿拉巴马州)。:米塞斯研究院，1995)，第40 – 44页。

[339] Orginally published in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 3，no.4 (Winter 2005)。

原刊于《奥地利经济学季刊》第3期第4期(2005年冬)。

[340] My emphases.

我的重点。

* originally published in the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 7，No.4 （Winter 2004）。

原刊于《奥地利经济学季刊》第7期第4期（2004年冬）。

[341] Hoppe，A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (Boston：Kluwer Academic Publish ers，1987); and idem，The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (Boston：Kluwer Academic Publishers，1993)。

霍普：《社会主义与资本主义理论》（波士顿：克鲁瓦学术出版社，1987 年）；同上，《私有财产的经济学与伦理学》（波士顿：克鲁瓦学术出版社，1993 年）。

[342] Currently in the U.S.，in criminal cases proof beyond a reasonable doubt is re quired.In contrast，in tort cases it is sufficient to prove that something is more probable than not (preponderance of evidence)。

目前在美国，在刑事案件中，需要提供排除合理怀疑的证据；而在侵权案件中，只需证明事情的可能性大于不可能性（优势证据）即可。

[343] Murray N.Rothbard，“Law，Property Rights，and Air Pollution,” in idem，The Logic of Action，vol.II (Cheltenham，Eng。：Edward Elgar，1997)，p.137。

默里·罗斯巴德:《法律、产权与空气污染》，载于同上，《行动的逻辑》，第二卷（切尔滕纳姆，英国:爱德华·埃尔加，1997)，第137页。

[344] Ibid.，pp.140–41。

pp.140-41如上。

[345] Rothbard，The Ethics of Liberty (new York：new York University Press，1998)。

罗斯巴德，《自由的伦理》(纽约:纽约大学出版社，1998)。

[346] Adolf Reinach，“Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht,” in idem，Säm tliche Werke，vol.I。(Munich：Philosophia，1989)。

[347] Reinach，“Über den Ursachenbegriff im geltenden Strafrecht,” p.8:

Liegt der Tod eines menschen vor，so genügt es nicht，dass der Erfolg durch die Handlung eines Zurechnungsfähigen herbeigeführt wurde，sondern es muss als weitere Strafvoraussetzung Vorsatz und Überlegung，bzW.Vorsatz ohne Überlegung，bzW.Fahrlässigkeit，oder，wie wir umfassend sagen können，Schuld hinzutreten.Strafvoraussetzung ist stets verursachung des Erfolges und Schuld.—Schuld ist immer erforderlicH.

[348] Ibid.，p.29：Eine strafrechtlich relevante Handlung “muss etwas sein，das nicht hinwegfallen kann，ohne dass auch der Erfolg，soweit er rechtlich in betracht kommt，hinwegfallen müsste.”

[349] Ibid.，p.39：“‘Ursache’ eines Erfolges nennt man unter anderem diejenige bedingung，die zu dem einen Gliede eines gedachten Zusammen hinzugedacht werden muss，damit an Stelle des zweiten Gliedes der betreffende Erfolg als eintretend gedacht werden könne.”

[350] Ibid.，p.30:

Einen Erfolg verursachen heisst，durch eine Handlung eine bedingung des Er folges setzen; ihn vorsätzlich verursachen，heisst，durch eine Handlung eine bedingung setzen，damit sie den Erfolg herbeiführe.Etwas vorsätzlich ver

ursachen，heisst demnach：durch eine Handlung eine bedingung des Erfolges setzen，wollend，dass diese bedingung—natürlich im vereine mit anderen— den Erfolg herbeiführe.

[351] Ibid.，p.31：“Der Wollende muss (dabei) das bewusstsein haben，dass er zu dem gewollten Erfolg etwas beitragen kann 。。。(und) dass der Eintritt des Erfolges aus sei nem ‘beitrag’ und den übrigen ihm bekannten Faktoren möglich ist。”

[352] Ibid.，p.42：“Ähnlich verhält es sich mit der verantwortung für fahrlässige Vorge heN.Hier ist der Erfolg zwar nicht von mir gewollt; aber ich hätte ihn vermeiden kön nen und solleN.Insofern ist er doch etwas，dessen Dasein von mir abhing：auch er ist in besonderem Grade，mein’。”

[353] “Wollen mit dem objektiv geforderten bewusstsein der gewissheit。”

[354] Rothbard，“Law，Property Rights，and Air Pollution,” p.163。

罗斯巴德，《法律、产权与空气污染》，第163页。

* Originally published in 15 Great Austrian Economists，ed.by Randall Holcombe (Au burn，Ala.：Ludwig von Mises institute，1999)，pp.223–41。

最初发表于《15位伟大的奥地利经济学家》兰德尔·霍尔库姆(Randall Holcombe，阿拉巴马州奥本):路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，1999)，第223 – 241页。

[355] Among academia in general，currently Friedrich A.Hayek is by far the most prominent Austrian economist。It is worth emphasizing，then，that Hayek is not a representative of the rationalist mainstream of Austrian economics，nor does Hayek claim otherwise.Hayek stands in the intellectual tradition of British empiricism and skepticism，and he is an explicit opponent of the Continental rationalism espoused by menger，BöhmBawerk，Mises，and Rothbard.on this topic see further Joseph Saler no，“Ludwig von Mises as Social Rationalist,” review of Austrian Economics 4 (1990)：26–54; Jeffrey M.Herbener，“Introduction,” in idem，ed.，The meaning of Ludwig von Mises (Boston：Kluwer Academic Publishers，1993); HansHermann Hoppe，“Ein führung：Ludwig von Mises und der liberalismus,” in Ludwig von Mises，Liberalis mus (St.Augustine：Academia verlag，1993); idem,“F.A.Hayek on Government and Social Evolution,” review of Austrian Economics 7,no.1 (1994)：67–93，reprinted as chapter 20 herein; idem，“Die österreichische Schule und ihre bedeutung für die moderne Wirtschaftswissenschaft,” in Hoppe，Kurt leube，Christian Watrin，and Joseph Salerno，eds.，Ludwig von Mises’s “Die gemeinwirtschaft” (Düsseldorf：verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen，1996); Murray N.Rothbard，“The Present State of Austrian Economics,” in idem，The Logic of Action，vol.1 (Cheltenham，U.K.：Edward Elgar，1997)。

在整个学术界，目前弗里德里希·哈耶克是迄今为止最杰出的奥地利经济学家。因此，值得强调的是，哈耶克并不是奥地利经济学理性主义主流的代表，他也没有提出其他主张。哈耶克站在英国经验主义和怀疑主义的知识传统中，他是门格尔、庞巴维克、米塞斯和罗斯巴德所支持的大陆理性主义的明确反对者。关于这个话题，见约瑟夫·塞勒，“路德维希·冯·米塞斯作为社会理性主义者”，《奥地利经济学评论》第4期(1990):26-54页;Jeffrey M.Herbener，“导论”，idem，编辑。《路德维希·冯·米塞斯的意义》(波士顿:Kluwer学术出版社，1993);汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普，“在汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普:路德维希·冯·米塞斯和自由主义”，载于《路德维希·冯·米塞斯:自由主义》(圣奥古斯丁:学术出版社，1993);同上的,”粮农组织哈耶克论政府与社会演变>，《奥地利经济评论》第7期，第1期(1994): 67-93，转载为本文第20章;idem，“Die österreichische Schule und ihre bedeutung fr Die moderne Wirtschaftswissenschaft”，载于霍普，Kurt leube,Christian Watrin和Joseph Salerno主编。，路德维希·冯·米塞斯的《经济发展》(德国<s:1>塞尔多夫:经济发展基金，1996);默里·罗斯巴德:《奥地利经济学的现状》，《行动的逻辑》，第1卷(切尔滕纳姆,英国:爱德华·埃尔加，1997)。

[356] Ludwig von Mises，Human Action：A Treatise on Economics，3rd rev。ed.(Chicago：Contemporary Books，1949)。

米塞斯:《人的行动:经济学专著》，第3版。(芝加哥:当代图书，1949)。

[357] Murray N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State (Princeton，N.J.：D.Van Nostrand，1962); idem，Power and Market (menlo Park，Calif.：Institute for Humane Studies，1970)。

默里·罗斯巴德，《人、经济与国家》(普林斯顿，新泽西州:博士)Van Nostrand, 1962);idem,《权力与市场》加州门洛帕克：人文研究所，1970年)。

[358] Ludwig von Mises，“A new Treatise on Economics,” The new individualist review 2，No.3 (1962)：39–42。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《经济学新论》，《新个人主义评论》第2期，第3期(1962)：39–42。

[359] Murray N.Rothbard，The Ethics of Liberty (Atlantic highlands，N.J。：Humanities Press，

默里罗斯巴德，《自由的伦理》(大西洋高地，新泽西州:人文出版社，1982)。

[360] Ludwig von Mises，The Theory of Money and Credit，trans.by H.E.Batson (Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty fund，1980 [1912])。

路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《货币与信用理论》，英译作者:h.e.巴特森(印第安纳州印第安纳波利斯):Liberty fund,1980[1912])。

[361] Rothbard，man，Economy，and State，pp.270–71; emphasis in the original。

罗斯巴德,《人，经济和国家》pp.270 – 271;原文中的重点。

[362] Murray N.Rothbard，The Logic of Action，vol.1 (Cheltenham，U.K.：Edward Elgar，1997)，p.222。

默里罗斯巴德:《行动的逻辑》，第1卷(切尔滕纳姆,英国:爱德华·埃尔加，1997)，第222页。

[363] See Lionel Robbins，The Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London：Mac millan，1932)，chap.6。The impossibility of inter and intrapersonal utility comparisons does not imply that two individuals or time periods cannot be compared objectively，of course.In fact，every individual can determine objectively whether his quantitative supply of any particular good has increased，decreased，or remained the same.And if his supply of one good has increased (decreased) while the supply of his other goods has remained the same，surely it can be said objectively that this individual is better (worse) off and has attained a higher (lower) rank on his individual value scale.Likewise，every individual participating in a monetary economy can determine objectively whether the monetary value of his assets has increased，decreased，or remained constant。

见莱昂内尔·罗宾斯，《经济科学的性质和意义》(伦敦:麦克米兰出版社，1932)，第6章。当然，不可能进行个人之间和个人内部的效用比较，并不意味着不能客观地比较两个人或两个时间段。事实上，每个人都可以客观地判断他对某种物品的定量供给是增加了，减少了，还是保持不变。如果他的一种物品的供应量增加（减少）了，而其他物品的供应量却保持不变，那么客观上就可以说，这个人的境况更好（更差）了，在他的个人价值尺度上达到了更高的等级（更低的等级）。同样，参与货币经济的每一个人都可以客观地确定他的资产的货币价值是增加了，减少了，还是保持不变。

[364] Rothbard’s contributions to welfare economics are strewn throughout his entire body of work。They begin with his 1956 essay “Toward a reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” and reach their completion in 1982 with his Ethics of Liberty。See also HansHermann Hoppe，“review of man，Economy，and Liberty,” review of Austrian Economics 4 (1990)：257–58; idem，The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (Bos ton：Kluwer Academic Publishers，1993)，pp.232–33; Jeffrey Herbener，“The Pareto Rule and Welfare Economics,” review of Austrian Economics 10，no.1 (1997)：70–106。

罗斯巴德对福利经济学的贡献散见于他的全部著作中。这些贡献始于 1956 年的论文《重建效用和福利经济学》，并在 1982 年的《自由的伦理》中达到顶峰。参见汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普（HansHermann Hoppe），《人、经济与自由》评论，《奥地利经济学评论 4》（1990 年）：257-58；同上，《私有财产的经济学和伦理学》(波斯顿:Kluwer学术出版社，1993)，第232 – 33页;杰弗里·赫本纳:《帕累托法则与福利经济学》，《奥地利经济学评论》第10期，第1期(1997)：70–106。

[365] Rothbard，Ethics of Liberty，p.31。

罗斯巴德:《自由的伦理》，第31页。

[366] Rothbard，Logic of Action，vol.1，p.212。

罗斯巴德:《行动的逻辑》，第1卷，第212页。

[367] Ibid.，p.243。

p.243如上。

[368] Rothbard，Ethics of Liberty，p.171。

罗斯巴德:《自由伦理》，第171页。

[369] Rothbard，Logic of Action，vol.1，p.247。

罗斯巴德:《行动的逻辑》，第1卷，第247页。

[370] Rothbard，The Logic of Action，vol.1，p.244。

罗斯巴德:《行动的逻辑》，第1卷，第244页。

[371] Rothbard，Power and Market，p.2。

罗斯巴德:《权力与市场》第2页。

[372] Rothbard，man，Economy，and State，p.591。

罗斯巴德，《人、经济与国家》，第591页。

[373] Mises，Human Action，p.359。

米塞斯，《人的行动》，第359页。

[374] Rothbard，man，Economy，and State，pp.607，614，emphasis in the original。

罗斯巴德,《人，经济与国家》pp607，614，原文重点。

[375] Ibid.，pp.544–50。

pp.544-50如上。

[376] Rothbard，man，Economy，and State，p.585。

罗斯巴德，《人，经济与国家》，第585页。

[377] Murray N.Rothbard，What Has Government Done to Our Money? (Auburn，Ala.：Ludwig von Mises institute，1990)。

默里罗斯巴德《政府对我们的钱做了什么?》(奥本,阿拉巴马州。:路德维希·冯·米塞斯研究院，1990)。

[378] Murray N.Rothbard，For a new Liberty (new York：Macmillan，1973)。

默里罗斯巴德:《为了新自由》(纽约:麦克米伦出版社，1973)。

[379] Murray N.Rothbard，America’s Great Depression (new York：Richardson and Sny der，1983)。

默里罗斯巴德，《美国大萧条》(纽约:Richardson and Sny der出版社，1983)。

[380] Murray N.Rothbard，Conceived in Liberty，4 vols.(new Rochelle，N.Y。：Arling ton House，1975)。

默里罗斯巴德，《理解自由》，4卷。纽约州新罗谢尔:阿灵顿出版社，1975)。

[381] in 1998 the journal that Rothbard founded became the Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics，published by Transaction Publishers.

1998年，罗斯巴德创办的杂志更名为《奥地利经济学季刊》，由交易出版社出版。

* Keynote address presented at the Mises institute’s 35th Anniversary celebration in new York City on October 7，2017。

2017年10月7日，在纽约米塞斯研究院成立35周年庆典上的主题演讲。

* originally published in the review of Austrian Economics 7，No.1 （1994）。

原载于《奥地利经济评论》第7期第1期（1994）。

[382] The following essay does not consider Hayek’s achievements as an economist。As regards these，Hayek deserves great praisE.But Hayek’s economics is largely the one he adopted from his teacher and mentor Ludwig von Mises and thus is not original with him.What makes Hayek unique，and what fundamentally distinguishes him from Mises，is his political and social philosophy。It is this part of his work，not his contribution to economic theory，that has made Hayek famous.Unfortunately，as will be demonstrated in the following，this original part of Hayek’s work is entirely false，however。

下面这篇文章没有考虑哈耶克作为经济学家的成就。就这些成就而言，哈耶克值得高度赞扬。但是，哈耶克的经济学在很大程度上是他从自己的老师和导师路德维希-冯-米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）那里继承而来的，因此并非是他的原创。哈耶克的独特之处，以及他与米塞斯的根本区别，在于他的政治和社会哲学。正是这部分内容，而不是他对经济理论的贡献，使哈耶克声名鹊起。然而，不幸的是，正如下文将证明的那样，哈耶克著作的这一原创部分是完全错误的。

[383] See on the following in particular The Constitution of Liberty （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1960），chap.15 and part 3； Law，legislation，and Liberty，3 vols.（Chi cago：University of Chicago Press，1973–79），chap.14。

参见《自由宪章》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1960年），第15章和第3部分；法律，立法和自由，3卷。（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1973-79），第14章。

[384] Hayek，Law，legislation，and Liberty，vol.3，p.41。Compare this to John May nard Keynes’s statement：“The most important agenda of the state relate not to those activities which private individuals are already fulfilling but to those functions which fall outside the sphere of individuals，to those decisions which are made by no one if the state does not make them.The important thing for government is not to do things which individuals are doing already and to do them a little better or a little worse：but to do those things which are not done at all。” （The End of Laissez Faire，vol.9，Collected Writings [London：Macmillan，1973]，p.291。）

哈耶克，《法律、立法与自由》，第 3 卷，第 41 页。将其与约翰-梅纳德-凯恩斯的论述相比较：”国家最重要的议程不在于私人已经在从事的活动，而在于那些不属于个人范围的职能，在于那些如果国家不作出决定就没有人会作出决定的决定。对政府来说，重要的不是去做那些个人已经在做的事情，也不是把它们做得更好或更差一点：而是去做那些根本没有人做的事情”（《自由放任的终结》，第 9 卷，《文集》[伦敦：麦克米伦，1973 年]，第 291 页。）

[385] Hayek，Law，legislation，and Liberty，vol.3，p.44。

哈耶克：《法律、立法与自由》，第3卷，第44页。

[386] Ibid.，p.55。

同上，第 55 页。

[387] Ibid.，p.59。

同上，第 59 页。

[388] Ibid.，p.62。

同上，第 62页。

[389] Ibid.，pp.62–63。

同上，第 62-63 页。

[390] Ibid.，p.53。

同上，第 53 页。

[391] F。A.Hayek，Denationalization of Money：The Argument refined （London：Insti tute of Economics Affairs，1990）。

[392] Hayek，Constitution of Liberty，p.286。

[393] Ibid.，p.346。

[394] Ibid.，p.351。What about Hayek’s repeated pronouncements，qua economist，that all interpersonal comparisons of utility are scientifically invalid？

[395] Ibid.，p.375。

[396] Ibid.，p.222。

同上，第 222 页。

[397] Ibid.，p.143。

同上，第 143 页。

[398] See on the following Ronald Hamowy，“freedom and the rule of Law in F。A.Hayek，” Il Politico （1970–71）； idem，“Hayek’s Concept of freedom：A Critique，” new individualist review （April 1961）； idem，“Law and the Liberal Society：F。A.Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 2 （Winter 1978）； Murray N.Rothbard，“F。A.Hayek and the Concept of Coercion，” in idem，The Ethics of Liberty （Atlantic highlands，N.J。：Humanities Press，1981）。

参见 Ronald Hamowy，”哈耶克的自由与法治”，Il Politico（1970-1971）；同上，”哈耶克的自由概念：一种批判”，《新个人主义评论》new individualist review（1961 年 4 月）；同上，”法律与自由社会：哈耶克的《自由宪章》，J《自由意志主义研究杂志》第2期（1978年冬季）；默里·罗斯巴德，“哈耶克与强制的概念”，摘自《自由的伦理》（大西洋高地，新泽西州：人文出版社，1981年）。

[399] Hayek，Constitution of Liberty，pp.20–21。

哈耶克：《自由宪章》，第20 – 21页。

[400] Ibid.，p.133。

同上，第 133 页。

[401] Hayek，Law，legislation，and Liberty，vol.1，pp.55–56。

哈耶克：《法律、立法与自由》，第1卷，第55 – 56页。

[402] Hayek，Constitution of Liberty，p.135。

哈耶克，《自由宪章》，第135页。

[403] Ibid.，p.137。

同上，第 137 页。

[404] Ibid.，p.135。

同上，第 135 页。

[405] Hayek，Constitution of Liberty，p.136。

哈耶克，《自由宪章》，第136页。

[406] See also Murray N.Rothbard，Power and Market （Kansas City：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel，1977），pp.228–34； HansHermann Hoppe，“Von der Strafunwürdigkeit unterlassener Hilfeleistung，” in idem，Eigentum，Anarchie und Staat （Opladen：West deutscher verlag，1977）； idem，“on the indefensibility of Welfare Rights，” Austrian Economics newsletter 3 （1989）。

另见默里罗斯巴德，《权力与市场》（堪萨斯城：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel出版社，1977），第228 – 234页；汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普，“Von der strafunwrdigkeit unterlassener Hilfeleistung”，载于同上，Eigentum，Anarchie and state（奥普拉登：西德出版社，1977）；同上，“论福利权利的不可辩护性”，《奥地利经济学通讯》第3期（1989）。

[407] Hayek，Constitution of Liberty，p.21； also ibid.，p.141f。

哈耶克，《自由宪章》，第21页；也同上，第141页。

[408] The documentation of this parenthetical thesis will be kept to a minimum and relegated to footnotes.

on the fundamental difference between menger and Mises，on the one hand，and Hayek，on the other，see Joseph T。Salerno，“Ludwig von Mises as Social Rationalist，” review of Austrian Economics 4 （1990）：26–54； Jeffrey M.Herbener，“Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian School of Economics，” review of Austrian Economics 5，No.2 （1991）：33–50； Murray N.Rothbard，The Present State of Austrian Economics，speech deliv ered at the Mises institute’s tenth Anniversary Scholars’ Conference，9 October，1992，Auburn，Ala.

这个插入式论文的文件将保持在最低限度，并归入脚注。

关于门格尔和米塞斯与哈耶克之间的根本区别，见约瑟夫·T·萨勒诺：《路德维希·冯·米塞斯作为社会理性主义者》，《奥地利经济学评论》第4期（1990）：26-54页；Jeffrey M.Herbener，《路德维希·冯·米塞斯与奥地利经济学派》，《奥地利经济评论》第5期，第2期（1991）：33–50； 1992年10月9日，阿拉巴马州奥本，默里·罗斯巴德，《奥地利经济学的现状》，在米塞斯研究院十周年学者会议上的演讲。

[409] F。A.Hayek，The Fatal Conceit：The Errors of Socialism，ed.by W.W.Bartley III （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1988），p.20。

哈耶克，《致命的自负：社会主义的错误》，主编w.w.b etley III著（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1988），第20页。

[410] Ibid.，p.74。

同上，第 74 页。

[411] Hayek，Law，legislation，and Liberty，vol.3，p.169。

哈耶克：《法律、立法与自由》，第3卷，第169页。

[412] Fatal Conceit，p.33； see also the Constitution of Liberty，p.140。

《致命的自负》第33页；另见《自由宪章》，第140页。

[413] Fatal Conceit，p.34。

《致命的自负》第34页。

[414] Ibid.，p.35。

同上，第 35 页。

[415] See Ronald Coase，The firm，the Market，and the Law （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1988）； Harold Demsetz，ownership，Control，and the firm （Oxford：Blackwell，1988）； for a critique see Walter Block，“Coase and Demsetz on Private property Rights，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 1，No.2 （Spring 1977）。

参见罗纳德·科斯：《公司、市场与法律》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1988年）；哈罗德·德姆塞茨：《所有权、控制与公司》（牛津：布莱克威尔出版社，1988）；有关评论，请见沃尔特·布洛克：《科斯与德姆塞茨论私有产权》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第1期，第2期（1977年春）。

[416] F。A.Hayek，new Studies in Philosophy，Politics，Economics and the History of ideas （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1978），p.9。

f.a.哈耶克，《哲学、政治、经济和思想史研究》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1978年），第9页。

[417] Hayek，Law，legislation，and Liberty，vol.2，p.5。

哈耶克：《法律、立法与自由》，第2卷，第5页。

[418] Law，legislation，and Liberty，vol.3，p.155。

《法律、立法与自由》，第3卷，第155页。

[419] Ibid.，p.163。

同上，第 163 页。

[420] Ibid.，p.164。

同上，第 164 页。

[421] Hayek，Fatal Conceit，p.6。

哈耶克，《致命的自负》，第 6 页。

[422] Hayek，Fatal Conceit，p.10。

哈耶克，《致命的自负》，第 10 页。

[423] Hayek，Fatal Conceit，p.21。

哈耶克，《致命的自负》，第 21 页。

[424] See on the following also David Ramsey Steele，“Hayek’s Theory of Cultural Group Selection，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 8，No.2 （1987）。

参见大卫·拉姆齐·斯蒂尔，《哈耶克的文化群体选择理论》，《自由主义研究杂志》第 8 期，第 2 号（1987 年）。

[425] See Hayek，The Fatal Conceit，p.25。

参见哈耶克，《致命的自负》，第25页。

[426] See Ludwig von Mises，Human action：A Treatise on Economics （Chicago：Henry regnery，1966），chap.8。

见路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《人的行动：经济学专论》（芝加哥：亨利·瑞格里尼出版社，1966），第8章。

If and as far as labor under the division of labor is more productive than iso lated labor，and if and as far as man is able to realize this fact，human action itself tends toward cooperation and association； man becomes a social being not in sacrificing his own concerns for the sake of a mythical Moloch，society，but in aiming at an improvement in his own welfare.Experience teaches that this condition—higher productivity achieved under the division of labor—is present because its cause—the inborn inequality of men and the inequality in the geographical distribution of the natural factors of production—is real。Thus we are in a position to comprehend the course of social evolution.（Ibid.，pp.160–61）

如果分工合作的劳动比孤立的劳动更有成效，如果人类能够认识到这一事实，人的行动本身就会趋向合作与联合；人之所以成为社会人，不是为了神话中的魔洛神——社会而牺牲自己的利益，而是为了改善自己的福利。经验告诉我们，这种情况——在劳动分工下实现的更高生产率——之所以存在，是因为它的原因——人与人之间天生的不平等和自然生产要素在地理分布上的不平等——是真实存在的。因此，我们能够理解社会演化的过程。（同上，第 160-161 页）

“liberalism 。。。regards all social cooperation as an emanation of rationally recognized utility。” （Ludwig von Mises，Socialism [Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty fund，1981]，p.418）

“自由主义认为所有社会合作都是理性认识到的效用的体现。（路德维希-冯-米塞斯，《社会主义》[印第安纳波利斯：自由基金，1981 年]，第 418 页。）

Hayek rejects this explanation.According to him，to regard as Mises does all social cooperation as an emanation of rationally recognized utility 。。。is wrong。The extreme rationalism of this passage 。。。seems to me factually mistaken.It certainly was not rational insight into its general benefits that led to the spreading of the market economy。（“Foreword” to Socialism，p.xxiii）

哈耶克拒绝这种解释。他认为，像米塞斯那样把所有社会合作都看作是理性认识到的效用的产物是错误的。在我看来，这段话的极端理性主义在事实上是错误的。市场经济的推广当然不是因为理性地认识到了市场经济的普遍益处。（社会主义前言》第23 页）。

one is wondering how else to explain the phenomenon，but Hayek does not say— except through reference to “spontaneous evolution.” Still more wondrous must appear the fact that there existed no human society whatsoever that had no private property and no exchange at all。（Hayek’s “primordial bands，” epilogue to Law，legislation，and Liberty，vol.3，“Epilogue”； Fatal Conceit，chap.1，are a myth，similar to the Morgan Engels myth of primitive communism，for which not a shred of anthropological evidence exists.And the transition from the facetoface society to the anonymous，face less economy was not at all a traumatic event，which required fundamentally different motives and habits.The world market is nothing else but the sum of all interpersonal transactions and as such not much more difficult to grasp than a simple bilateral ex change of goods.）

人们不禁要问，除了提到 “自发演化”，还能用什么来解释这一现象，但哈耶克没有说。更令人惊奇的是，根本就不存在没有私有财产和交换的人类社会。（哈耶克的 “原始地带 “是一个神话《法律、立法与自由》后记，第3卷，《致命的自负》第一章，类似于摩根-恩格斯关于原始共产主义的神话，人类学对此没有一丝一毫的证据。从 “面对面 “的社会过渡到 “匿名 “的、”更少面对面 “的经济体，根本不是一个需要从根本上改变动机和习惯的创伤性事件。世界市场只不过是所有人际间交换的总和，因此并不比简单的双边商品交换更难理解）。

Instead，Hayek then engages in an outright falsification when，despite all historical records to the contrary，he appoints Mises to the position of a somewhat less than fully evolved predecessor of his own （Hayek’s） theory。

相反，哈耶克不顾所有与此相反的历史记录，将米塞斯任命为他自己（哈耶克）理论的前身，而米塞斯的理论发展得并不完全，此时，他从事了一种彻底的伪造。

It seems to me that the thrust of Mises’s teaching is to show that we have not adopted freedom because we understood what benefits it would bring：that we have not designed，and certainly were not intelligent enough to design，the order which we now have learned partly to understand long after we had plenty of op portunity to see how it worked.It is greatly to Mises’s credit that he largely emancipated himself from that rationalistconstructivist starting point，but that task is still to be completed.（Ibid.，pp.xxiii–xxiv）

在我看来，米塞斯学说的主旨是要说明，我们之所以接受自由，并不是因为我们了解自由会带来什么好处：我们并没有设计出，而且当然也没有足够的智慧来设计出这种秩序。而在我们有足够的机会看到它是如何运作的很长时间之后，我们现在已经学会了部分地理解这种秩序。米塞斯在很大程度上摆脱了这种理性主义-建构主义的出发点，这是值得称道的，但这项任务仍有待完成。（出处同上，第 23至 24 页。）

In fact，Mises never said anything even remotely similar to what Hayek insinuates； and if credit must be given where it is due，Mises must be credited not for having eman cipated himself from his rationalism but for never having abandoned it。

事实上，米塞斯从未说过任何与哈耶克所暗示的类似的话；如果说应该归功于米塞斯的话，那就不是因为他从理性主义中摆脱出来，而是因为他从未放弃过理性主义。

[427] See Carl menger，Principles of Economics （new York：new York University Press，1976），chap.8； Ludwig von Mises，Theory of Money and Credit （Irvingtonon Hudson，N.Y。：Foundation for Economic Education，1971），chap.1。

见卡尔·门格尔，《经济学原理》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1976），第8章；路德维希·冯·米塞斯，《货币与信用理论》（欧文顿·哈德逊出版社，纽约：《经济教育基础》，1971），第1章。

[428] F。A.Hayek，Studies in Philosophy，Politics，and Economics （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1967），chap.6。

哈耶克，《哲学、政治学和经济学研究》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1967），第6章。

[429] Thus Hayek writes that it is “perverted rationalism 。。。which interpreted the law of nature as the deductive constructions of ‘natural reason.’” Law instead is “the undesigned outcome of growth.” （Ibid.，p.101）

因此哈耶克写道，这是“误入歧途的理性主义”……它将自然法则解释为“自然理性”的演绎建构。”相反，法律是“生长出来的非设计的结果”。（同上，第 101 页）

[430] Ibid.，p.97。

同上，第 97 页。

[431] At this point，one may want to compare Hayek to his alleged predecessor Carl menger。For Hayek law is “the undesigned outcome of growth.” “Our values and in stitutions are determined not simply by preceding causes but as part of a process of unconscious selforganization of a structure or pattern.” （Fatal Conceit，p.9）

在这一点上，我们不妨将哈耶克与他所谓的前辈卡尔-门格尔（Carl menger）相比较。对哈耶克来说，法律是 “生长的非设计的结果”。”我们的价值观和制度不是简单地由先前的原因决定的，而是作为结构或模式的无意识自我组织过程的一部分。”（《致命的自负》，第 9 页）

In sharp contrast，Carl menger considers all references in social science explanations to Hayekian categories such as “natural growth，” “spontaneous evolution，” “primordial nature” or “unconscious selforganization” as sheer mysticism.To explain a social phenomenon through forces such as these is not to explain anything at all—a scientific imposture：

与此形成鲜明对比的是，卡尔-门格尔（Carl menger）认为，社会科学解释中提到的所有哈耶克范畴，如 “自然生长”、”自发演化”、”原始自然 “或 “无意识的自组织”，都是纯粹的神秘主义。通过诸如此类的力量来解释一种社会现象，根本就不是在解释任何东西——一种科学骗局：

The origin of a phenomenon is by no means explained by the assertion that it was present from the very beginning or that it developed originally 。。。a social phenomenon，at least in its most original form，must clearly have developed from individual factors.The [organicist，Hayekian] view here referred to is merely an analogy between the development of social institutions and that of natural organisms，which is completely worthless for the purpose of solving our problem.It states，to be sure，that institutions are unintended creations of the human mind，but not how they came about。These attempts at interpretation are comparable to the procedure of a natural scientist who thinks he is solving the problem of the origin of natural organisms by alluding to their “original ity，” “natural growth，” or their “primeval nature” … attempts to interpret the changes of social phenomena as “organic processes” are no less inadmissible than…theories which aim to solve “organically” the problem of the origin of un intentionally created social structures.There is hardly any need to remark that the changes of social phenomena cannot be interpreted in a socialpragmatic way，insofar as they are not the intended result of the agreement of members of society or of positive legislation，but are the unintended product of social development。But it is just as obvious that not even the slightest insight into the nature and the laws of the movement of social phenomena can be gained either by the mere allusion to the “organic” or the “primeval” character of the processes under discussion，nor even by mere analogies between these and the transformations to be observed in natural organisms.The worthlessness of the above orientation of research is so clear that we do not care to add anything to what we have already said.（Carl menger，Investigations into the method of the So cial Sciences with Special reference to Economics [new York：new York University Press，1985]，pp.149–50）

一种现象的起源绝不能用它从一开始就存在或最初发展的断言来解释 …… 一种社会现象，至少就其最原始的形式而言，显然必须是从个体因素发展而来的。这里提到的[有机论，哈耶克的]观点只是将社会制度的发展与自然有机体的发展相类比，对于解决我们的问题毫无价值。它指出，可以肯定的是，制度是人类思想非意图的创造，但没有说明它们是如何产生的。这些解释的尝试与自然科学家认为他通过暗示自然有机体的“原始性”、“自然生长”或“原始性质”来解决自然有机体起源问题的过程是相似的……试图将社会现象的变化解释为“有机过程”，与旨在“有机地”解决无意图地创造的社会结构起源问题的理论一样，都是不可接受的。毋庸赘言，社会现象的变化不能以社会实用主义的方式来解释，因为它们不是社会成员协议或积极立法的非意图的结果，而是社会发展的非意图的产物。但是，同样显而易见的是，仅仅提到所讨论的过程的“有机的”或“原始的”性质，甚至仅仅把这些过程与在自然有机体中观察到的变化作类比，都不能对社会现象的性质和运动规律有丝毫的了解。上述研究方向的毫无价值是如此明显，以至于我们不想对我们已经说过的话再做任何补充。（卡尔-门格尔，《社会科学方法论探究：经济学》[纽约：纽约大学出版社，1985 年]，第 149-150 页）

[432] Since Hayek essentially denies the existence （or the importance） of ideas in the course of social evolution，he also （at least in his later writings） gives no mention to public opinion.

由于哈耶克从本质上否认了观念在社会演化过程中的存在（或重要性），他也（至少在他后来的著作中）没有提及公众舆论。

In distinct contrast，David Hume，whom Hayek himself claims as his precursor，at taches fundamental importance to ideas and public opinion.

与此形成鲜明对比的是，哈耶克自称为其先驱的大卫·休谟（David Hume），对观念和公众舆论给予了根本性的重视。

Nothing appears more surprising to those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye，than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few，and the implicit submission，with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers.When we inquire by what means this wonder is effected we shall find，that as force is always on the side of the governed，the governors have nothing to support them but opinion.It is，therefore，on opinion only that government is founded，and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments，as well as to the most free and most popular。The soldan of Egypt，or the emperor of Rome，might drive his harmless subjects，like brute beasts，against their sentiments and inclination.But he must，at least，have led his mamalukes or praetorian bands，like men，by their opinion.（David Hume，Essays：Moral，Political and Literary，Oxford：University of Oxford Press，1971，p.19）

对于那些用哲学眼光审视人类事务的人来说，最令人惊讶的事情莫过于少数人轻松统治多数人，以及人们将自己的情感和热情无条件地屈从于统治者的情感和热情。当我们探究这一奇迹是如何实现的时候，我们就会发现，由于武力总是站在被统治者一边，统治者除了舆论之外没有任何东西可以支持他们。因此，政府只能建立在舆论的基础上，这句格言适用于最专制、最军事化的政府，也适用于最自由、最受大众欢迎的政府。埃及的苏丹或罗马的皇帝可能会像驱赶野兽一样驱赶他无害的国民，毫不顾忌他们的情感和意愿。但他必须，至少，像对待人一样来对待他领导的马马鲁克或禁卫军，尊重他们的意见。（大卫·休谟：《论文集：道德、政治与文学》，牛津大学出版社，1971年，第19页）

See also É.de LaBoétie，The Politics of Obedience：The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude， ed.and with an intro。by Murray N.Rothbard （new York：free life Editions，1975）。

也可参见É.de labotie，《服从的政治：自愿奴役的论述》，默里·罗斯巴德编辑并附介绍（纽约：自由生活版，1975年）。

[433] Hayek，Law，legislation，and Liberty，vol.3，pp.154，156。

As David Ramsey Steele correctly notes，“if cultural group selection is to be relied upon，human culture would evolve much more slowly than human biology。For the selection of groups is a slower process than the selection of individuals，and group selec tion according to culture cannot be expected to proceed any faster than group selection according to genes.” （“Hayek’s Theory of Cultural Group Selection，” p.179）

哈耶克，《法律、立法与自由》，第 3 卷，第 154、156 页。

正如大卫·拉姆齐·斯蒂尔（David Ramsey Steele）正确指出的那样，”如果依靠文化群体选择，人类文化的进化速度将比人类生物学的进化速度慢得多，因为群体选择比起个体选择是一个缓慢的过程，根据文化进行群体选择的速度不可能比根据基因进行群体选择的速度快。”（《哈耶克的文化群体选择理论》，第179页）

[434] besides，this form of extinction also does not fit Hayek’s explanatory scheme，for a person or group that would forego all appropriation，production，etc。，would die out on account of its own stupidity，not in the course of cultural group selection.

此外，这种形式的消亡也不符合哈耶克的解释框架，因为一个人或一个群体如果放弃所有的占有、生产等行为，就会由于自身的愚蠢而消亡，而不是在文化群体选择的过程中消亡。

[435] Although Hayek notices some obvious differences between biological and cul tural evolution （Fatal Conceit，p.25），he does not recognize the categorical difference between social cooperation and biological competition.Rather，he writes that biological and cultural evolution both rely on the same principle of selection：survival or reproductive advantage.Variation，adaptation and competition are essentially the same kind of process，however different their particular mechanism，particularly those pertaining to propagation.Not only does all evolution rest on competition； continuing competition is necessary even to preserve existing achievements.（Ibid.，p.26）

尽管哈耶克注意到了生物演化与文化演化之间的一些明显差异（《致命的自负》，第 25 页），但他并没有认识到社会合作与生物竞争之间的本质区别。相反，他写道，生物演化和文化演化都依赖于相同的选择原则：生存或繁殖优势。变异、适应和竞争本质上是同一种过程，无论其具体机制如何不同，尤其是与传播有关的机制。不仅所有的演化都依赖于竞争；甚至为了保持现有的成就，持续的竞争也是必要的。

In contrast，Ludwig von Mises sharply distinguishes between cooperation and com petition.He writes：

Society is concerted action，cooperation.Society is the outcome of conscious and purposeful behavior。This does not mean that individuals have concluded contracts by virtue of which they have founded human society。The actions which have brought about social cooperation and daily bring it about anew do not aim at anything else than cooperation and coadjuvancy with others for the attainment of definite singular ends.The total complex of the mutual relations created by such concerted actions is called society。It substitutes collaboration for the—at least conceivable—isolated life of individuals.Society is division of labor and combination of labor。In his capacity as an acting animal man becomes a social animal。（Human action，p.143）

与此相反，路德维希-冯-米塞斯（Ludwig von Mises）对合作与竞争进行了明确区分。他写道：

社会是一致行动，是合作。社会是有意识和有目的的行为的结果。这并不意味着个人已经签订了契约，并据此建立了人类社会。带来社会合作并每天带来新的社会合作的行动，其目的无非是为了实现明确的单一目标而与他人合作和协同。这种协调一致的行动所产生的相互关系的总复合体称为社会。它以协作取代了个人的——至少是可以想象的——孤立的生活。社会就是劳动的分工和组合。作为行动的动物，人类成为社会动物。（《人的行动》，第143页）

What makes friendly relations between human beings possible is the higher productivity of the division of labor。It removes the natural conflict of interests.For where there is division of labor，there is no longer question of the distribution of a supply not capable of enlargement。Thanks to the higher productivity of labor performed under the division of tasks，the supply of goods multiplies.A preeminent common interest，the preservation and further intensification of social cooperation，becomes paramount and obliterates all essential collisions.Catallactic competition is substituted for biological competition.It makes for harmony of the interests of all members of society。The very condition from which the irreconcilable conflicts of biological competition arise—viz。，the fact that all people by and large strive after the same things—is transformed into a factor making for harmony of interests.because many people or even all people want bread，clothes，shoes，and cars，largescale production of these goods be comes feasible and reduces the costs of production to such an extent that they are accessible at low prices.The fact that my fellow man wants to acquire shoes as I do，does not make it harder for me to get shoes，but easier。（Ibid.，p.673）

人类之所以能够建立友好关系，是因为分工提高了生产力。它消除了自然的利益冲突。因为有了分工，就不再存在无法扩大的供给的分配问题。由于分工提高了劳动生产率，商品的供给成倍增加。维护并进一步加强社会合作，成为最重要的共同利益，并消除了一切本质上的冲突。交换性竞争取代了生物竞争。它使社会所有成员的利益和谐一致。生物竞争中不可调和的冲突所产生的条件

——即所有人都在努力追求同样的东西——而这一事实却转化为促进利益和谐的因素。因为许多人甚至所有人都想要面包、衣服、鞋子和汽车，所以这些商品的大规模生产是可行的，并且降低了生产成本，以至于可以以低廉的价格获得这些商品。我的同胞和我一样想买鞋，这并没有使我更难买到鞋，反而使我更容易买到鞋（同上，第 673 页）。

[436] Writes Mises：

History is a struggle between two principles，the peaceful principle，which ad vances the development of trade，and the militaristimperialist principle，which interprets human society not as a friendly division of labor but as the forcible repression of some of its members by others.The imperialist principle continu ally regains the upper hand.The liberal principle cannot maintain itself against it until the inclination for peaceful labor inherent in the masses shall have struggled through to full recognition of its own importance as a principle of social evolution.（Socialism，p.268）

米塞斯写道：

历史是两种原则之间的斗争，一种是促进贸易发展的和平原则，另一种是军国主义的帝国主义原则，它把人类社会解释为不是一种友好的劳动分工，而是另一些成员对其中一些成员的暴力镇压。在人民大众充分认识到固有的和平劳动倾向是社会演化原则的重要性之前，自由主义原则是无法与之抗衡的（社会主义，第 268 页）。

liberalism is rationalistic。It maintains that it is possible to convince the im mense majority that peaceful cooperation within the framework of society better serves the rightly understood interests than mutual battling and social disintegration.It has full confidence in man’s reason.It may be that this optimism is unfounded and that the liberals have erred.But then there is no hope left for mankind’s future.（Human action，p.157）

自由主义是理性主义的。它认为，有可能使绝大多数人相信，在社会框架内的和平合作比相互争斗和社会解体更符合正确理解的利益。它对人类的理性充满信心。也许这种乐观是没有根据的，也许自由主义者犯了错误。但如此一来，人类的未来也就不再有希望。（人行动，第 157 页）

The body of economic knowledge is an essential element in the structure of human civilization； it is the foundation upon which modern industrialism and all the moral，intellectual，technological，and therapeutical achievements of the last centuries have been built。It rests with men whether they will make proper use of the rich treasure with which this knowledge provides them or whether they will leave it unused.But if they fail to take the best advantage of it and disregard its teachings and warnings，they will not annul economics； they will stamp out society and the human racE.（Ibid.，p.885）

经济知识体系是人类文明结构中的一个基本要素；它是现代工所有者义和上个世纪所有道德、知识、技术和医疗成就的基础。是妥善利用这些知识所提供的丰富宝藏，还是将其弃置不用，这取决于人类。但是，如果他们不能充分利用这些知识，无视这些知识的教诲和警告，他们消灭的不是经济学；他们将消灭的是社会和人类。（同上，第 885 页）。

* originally published in Politics and regimes，vol.30，religion and Public life，ed.Paul Gottfried （Piscataway，N.J。：Transaction Publishers，1997）。

最初发表于《政治与制度》，第30卷《宗教与公共生活》，主编保罗·戈特弗里德（新泽西州皮斯卡塔韦：Transaction Publishers，1997）。

[437] See also R。Nisbet，History of the idea of Progress （new York：Basic Books，1980）；

L。v。Mises，Theory and History （Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，1985）； M.N.Rothbard，Economic Thought before Adam Smith，vol.1 of An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought （Aldershot，U.K.：Edward Elgar，1995）； idem，Classical Economics，vol.2 of An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought （Aldershot，U.K.：Ed.ward Elgar，1995）。

参见R。尼斯比特，《进步思想的历史》（纽约：Basic Books，1980）；

米塞斯，《理论与历史》（奥本，阿拉巴马州）：米塞斯研究院，1985年）；罗斯巴德：《奥派视角的经济思想史：亚当·斯密之前的经济思想》，卷1（英国奥尔德肖特）1：经院，1995）；同上，卷2，《奥派视角的经济思想史：古典经济学》（英）主编。ward Elgar，1995）。

[438] on the theory of the state，see M.N.Rothbard，For a new Liberty （new York：Macmillan，1978）； idem，The Ethics of Liberty （Atlantic highlands，N.J：Humanities Press，1982）； idem，Power and Market （Kansas City，Kans.：Sheed Andrews and Mc meel，1977）； H.H.Hoppe，Eigentum，Anarchie und Staat （Opladen：Westdeutscher verlag，1987）； idem，A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism （Boston：Kluwer，1989）； idem，The Economics and Ethics of Private Property （Boston：Kluwer，1993）； also A.J。Nock，Our Enemy，the State （Delevan：Hallberg Publishing，1983）； F。Oppenheimer，The State （new York：Vanguard Press，1914）； idem，System der Soziologie 2：Der Staat （Stuttgart：G。Fischer，1964）。

关于国家理论，见m.n.罗斯巴德：《为了新自由》（纽约：麦克米伦出版社，1978年）；idem，《自由的伦理》（大西洋高地，N。J：人文出版社，1982）；idem，电力与市场（堪萨斯城，堪萨斯州）（Sheed Andrews and mcmeel，1977）；h.h.h Hoppe，《本质、无政府与国家》（奥普拉登：西德出版社，1987）；idem，《社会主义与资本主义理论》（波士顿：Kluwer出版社，1989）；idem，《私有财产的经济学和伦理学》（波士顿：Kluwer出版社，1993年）；也叫A.J.。诺克：《我们的敌人，国家》（Delevan：Hallberg Publishing，1983）；F。奥本海默，《国家》（纽约：先锋出版社，1914年）；《社会科学体系2：国家》（斯图加特：G）。费舍尔，1964）。

[439] on the political economy of centralization and decentralization，see also J。Baechler，The origins of Capitalism （new York：St。Martin’s，1976），esp.chap.7； H.H.Hoppe，“against Centralization，” Salisbury review （June 1993）； idem，“Migrazione，centralismo e secessione nell’Europa contemporanea，” Biblioteca della libertà，No.118 （1992）。

关于集权和分权的政治经济学，也见J·贝赫勒，《资本主义的起源》（纽约：圣马丁出版社，1976），特别是第7章；霍普，“反对国家主义”，索尔兹伯里评论（1993年6月）；[m]，“迁移、国家主义和分离——当代欧洲”，《自由图书馆》，第118期（1992）。

[440] Political competition is a far more effective device for limiting a government’s natural desire to expand its exploitative powers than are internal constitutional limitations.Indeed，the attempts of some public choice theorists and of “constitutional economics” to design model liberal constitutions must strike one as hopelessly naïve.For constitutional courts are part and parcel of the government apparatus whose powers they are supposed to limit。Why in the world should they want to constrain the power of the very organization that provides them with jobs，money，and prestige？ To assume so is theoretically inconsistent，that is，incompatible with the assumption of selfinterest。The naïve constitutional approach is equally without historical foundation.Despite the explicit limitation of the power of the central government contained in the tenth Amendment of the U.S.Constitution，the U.S.Supreme Court has rendered the amendment essentially null and void.

与宪法的内部限制相比，政治竞争是限制政府扩大其剥削权力的自然欲望的有效手段。事实上，一些公共选择理论家和 “宪政经济学 “试图设计出自由主义宪法范本的做法让人觉得天真得无可救药。因为宪法法院是政府机构的一部分，而政府机构的权力本应受到宪法法院的限制。他们为什么要限制这个为他们提供工作、金钱和声望的组织的权力呢？这样的假设在理论上是不一致的，也就是说，不符合自利的假设。天真的宪法方针同样缺乏历史依据。尽管美国宪法第十修正案明确限制了中央政府的权力，但美国最高法院已使该修正案基本失效。

[441] on this theme，see P.Johnson，Modern Times （new York：Harper & Row，1983）；R。Nisbet，The Present age （new York：Harper & Row，1988）。

关于这一主题，参见P.Johnson，《摩登时代》（纽约：Harper & Row出版社，1983）；尼斯贝特，《当代》（纽约：Harper & Row出版社，1988）。

[442] on the problem of immigration，see M.N.Rothbard，“Nations by Consent：De composing the NationState，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 11，No.1 （1994）； H.H.Hoppe，“free immigration or integration？” Chronicles （June 1995）。

关于移民问题，见m . n .罗斯巴德：《同意的国家：民族国家的解体》，《自由意志主义研究杂志》第11期，第1期（1994）；h.h.h 霍普，《自由移民或一体化？》编年史（1995年6月）。

[443] See M.N.Rothbard，The case for a 100 Percent Gold Dollar （Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，1991）； idem，The case against the Fed （Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，1995）；

Hoppe，“How is Fiat Money Possible？—or，The Devolution of Money and Cred it，” review of Austrian Economics 7，No.2 （1994）。

参见M.N.罗斯巴德，《100%黄金美元的理由》（奥本，阿拉巴马州）。：米塞斯研究院，1991年）；《反对美联储的理由》（阿拉巴马州奥本）。：米塞斯研究院，1995年）；霍普，《法定货币何以可能？》——或者，《货币和信用的倒退》，《奥地利经济学评论》第7期，第2期（1994）。

[444] on the following，see H.H.Hoppe，“Time Preference，Government，and the Process of Decivilization.From Monarchy to Democracy，” Journal des economistes et des etudes humaines 5，No.4 （1994）。

关于以下内容，见霍普，”时间偏好、政府和去文明化进程：从君主制到民主制》，《经济学家和人类研究杂志》第 5 期（1994 年）。

[445] See G。Ferrero，peace and War （freeport，N.Y。：Books for Libraries Press，1969），chap.3； idem，Macht （bern：A.Francke，1944）； B。de Jouvenel，on Power （new York：Viking，1949）； E.v。Kuehneltleddihn，leftism revisited （Washington D.C。：Henry regnery，1990）； R。bendix，Kings or People （berkeley：University of California Press，1978）； R。R。Palmer and J。Colton，A History of the Modern World （new York：A.Knopf，1992），esp.chaps.14 and 18。

参见G.费列罗，《战争与和平》（自由港，纽约：图书图书馆出版社，1969），第3章；同上的，马赫特（伯尔尼：A.Francke， 1944）；Jouvenel，《论权力》（纽约：Viking出版社，1949）；汽车集团。库内尔特雷丁，左翼主义卷土重来（华盛顿特区：亨利regnery， 1990）；R。bendix，《君主或人民》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，1978）；R。R。帕默和J。科尔顿：《现代世界史》（纽约：A. knopf出版社，1992），特别章。14和18。

[446] See Rothbard，Power and Market，chap.5； G。Hardin and J。Baden，eds.，manag ing the Commons （San Francisco：W.H.freeman，1977）。

见罗斯巴德《权力与市场》第五章；G。哈丁和j .巴登编，管理公共资源（旧金山：W.H.freeman，1977）。

[447] on the theory of time preference，see in particular L。v。Mises，Human action （Chicago：Henry regnery，1966），chaps.18，19； also W.St。Jevons，Theory of Politi cal Economy （new York：Augustus M.Kelley，1965）； E.v。BöhmBawerk，Capital and interest （South Holland，Ill。：Libertarian Press，1959）； F。Fetter，Capital interest，and rent （Kansas City，Kans.：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel，1977）； M.N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State （Los Angeles：Nash，1970），chaps.5–7。

关于时间偏好理论，具体见L。v。米塞斯，《人的行动》（芝加哥：亨利·瑞格纳里出版社，1966），第18、19章；也作w.s.t。杰文斯：《政治经济学理论》（纽约：奥古斯都m .凯利出版社，1965）；汽车集团。庞巴维克，《资本和利息》（南荷兰，伊利诺伊州）：自由意志主义出版社，1959）；费特，《资本利息和租金》（堪萨斯城，堪萨斯州）（Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel，1977）；m.n.罗斯巴德，《人，经济与国家》（洛杉矶：纳什出版社，1970），第5 – 7章。

[448] See Rothbard，Power and Market，chap.4； A.T。Smith，Time and Public Policy （Knoxville：University of tennessee Press，1988）； Hoppe，“Time Preference，government，and the Process of Decivilization.From Monarchy to Democracy。”

见罗斯巴德《权力与市场》第4章；A.T.史密斯，《时间与公共政策》（诺克斯维尔：田纳西大学出版社，1988）；霍普，《时间偏好、政府与去文明化进程：从君主制到民主制》

[449] C。M.Cipolla，before the industrial revolution：European Society and Economy，1000–1700 （new York：W.W.Norton，1980），p.48。

卡洛-西波拉，工业革命前的欧洲社会与经济，1000年-1700年（纽约：W.W.Norton，1980），第48页。

[450] See P.Flora，State，Economy and Society in Western Europe，vol.l （Campus：Frank furt，1983）：258–59。

见p .弗洛拉：《西欧国家、经济和社会》，第一卷。[j]（校园：弗兰克福特，1983）：258-59。

[451] Flora，State，Economy and Society in Western Europe，chap.8。

弗洛拉《西欧国家、经济与社会》，第八章。

[452] See B。R。Mitchell，Abstract of British Historical Statistics （Cambridge，U.K.：Cam bridge University Press，1962），468ff。； idem，European Historical Statistics 1750–1970 （new York：Columbia University Press，1978），388ff。

[453] See M.N.Rothbard，What Has Government Done to Our Money？（Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，1990）； idem，The Mystery of Banking （new York：richardson & Sny der，1983）； idem，The case against the Fed； R。Paul and L。lehrman，The case for Gold： A Minority report to the U.S.Gold Commission （Washington，D.C。：Cato institute，1982）。

罗斯巴德：《政府对我们的钱做了什么？》（奥本，阿拉巴马州。：米塞斯研究院，1990年）；idem，《银行的秘密》（纽约：richardson & Sny der出版社，1983）；idem，《反对美联储的理由》；R。保罗和L。《黄金的理由：给美国黄金委员会的少数派报告》（华盛顿特区）：卡托研究所，1982）。

[454] See M.Friedman and A.Schwartz，A Monetary History of the United States，1867– 1960 （Princeton，N.J。：Princeton University Press，1963），pp.702–22； Economic report of the President （Washington D.C。：Government Printing Office，1992）。

参见M.弗里德曼和A. schwartz，《美国货币史，1867 – 1960》（Princeton， N.J.）：普林斯顿大学出版社，1963），第702 – 22页；总统经济报告（华盛顿特区（政府印刷局，1992年）。

[455] See S.Homer and R。Sylla，A History of interest Rates （new Brunswick，N.J。：Rutgers University Press，1991），pp.188，437； J。Hughes，American Economic History （Glenview，Ill。：Scott，Foresman，1990），pp.432，498，589。

参见荷马和西拉，《利率史》（new Brunswick， N.J.）：罗格斯大学出版社，1991），页188，437；J. Hughes，《美国经济史》（Glenview， illinois）：斯科特，有限，1990），pp.432，498，589。

[456] See B。de Jouvenel，Sovereignty （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1957）； also F。Kern，Kingship and Law in the Middle ages （Greenwich，N.Y。：Greenwood Press，1985）； B。rehfeld，Die Wurzeln des rechts （berlin，1951）。

见B.de Jouvenel，《主权》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1957年）；亦作F. Kern，《中世纪的王权与法律》（格林威治，纽约）：格林伍德出版社，1985年）；B。rehfeld，《技术的发展》（柏林，1951）。

[457] See A.V。Dicey，lectures on the relation between Law and Public Opinion in Eng land during the Nineteenth Century （London：Macmillan，1903）； also F。A.Hayek，Law legislation，and Liberty 1 （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1973），chaps.4 and 6；B。leoni，freedom and the Law （Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty fund，1991）。

参见a.v。戴西：《19世纪英国法律与公众舆论的关系》（伦敦：麦克米伦出版社，1903年）；也作f.a。哈耶克，《法律、立法与自由》1（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1973年），第四章和第六章；《自由与法律》（印第安纳州印第安纳波利斯）：自由基金，1991年）。

[458] See also R。Nisbet，Community and Power （new York：Oxford University Press，1962），chap.5。

另见R. Nisbet，《社区与权力》（纽约：牛津大学出版社，1962），第5章。

[459] See D.Boudreaux，“The World’s Biggest Government，” free Market （November 1994）。

见 D.Boudreaux，”世界上最大的政府”，《自由市场》（1994 年 11 月）。

[460] See Homer and Sylla，History of interest Rates，pp.557–58。

参见荷马和西拉，《利率史》，第557 – 558页。

[461] Ibid.，pp.554–55； Cipolla，before the industrial revolution，p.39。

pp.554-55出处同上；Cipolla，《工业革命前》，第39页。

[462] Cipolla，before the industrial revolution，pp.54–55； Flora，State，Economy and Society in Western Europe，chap.8 and p.454。

Cipolla，《工业革命前》，第54 – 55页； Flora《西欧的国家、经济和社会》，第八章和第454页。

[463] See Mitchell，European Historical Statistics 1750–1970，pp.16ff。

参见Mitchell：《欧洲历史统计1750-1970》，第16页。

[464] See A.C。Carlson，Family Questions （new Brunswick，N.J。：Transaction Publish ers，1992）； idem，The Swedish Experiment （new Brunswick，N.J。：Transaction Publish ers，1993）； idem，“What Has Government Done to Our Families？ Essays in Political Economy，vol.13 （Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，1991）； C。Murray，Losing Ground：American Social Policy，1950–1980 （new York：Basic Books，1984）； also J。A.Schum peter，Capitalism，Socialism，and Democracy （new York：Harper，1942），chap.14。

参见a.c. Carlson，《家庭问题》（new Brunswick， N.J.）：交易出版社，1992年）；《瑞典实验》（new Brunswick， N.J.）：交易出版社，1993年）；题目是“政府对我们的家庭做了什么？”政治经济论文集，vol.13（奥本，阿拉巴马州。：米塞斯研究院，1991年）；C。默里：《节节败退：1950-1980年的美国社会政策》（纽约：Basic Books出版社，1984）；也叫J.A.。《资本主义、社会主义与民主》（纽约：哈珀出版社，1942），第14章。

[465] See J。Q。Wilson and R。J。Herrnstein，Crime and Human nature （new York：Simon & Schuster，1985），pp.408–09； on the magnitude of the increase in criminal ac tivity brought about by democratic republicanism and welfarism in the course of the last one hundred years，R。D.McGrath，gunfighters，highwaymen，and Vigilantes （berkeley：University of California Press，1984），esp.chap.13。

参见j.q Wilson和RJ Herrnstein：《犯罪与人性》（纽约：Simon & Schuster出版社，1985），第408 – 09页；在过去的一百年中，民主共和主义和福利主义所带来的犯罪活动的增长幅度，R.D.《枪手、拦路强盗和治安维持者》（伯克利：加州大学出版社，1984），第13章

[466] on the relationship between high time preference and crime，see E.C。Banfield，The Unheavenly City revisited （Boston：Little，Brown & Company，1974），esp.chaps.3 and 8； idem，“PresentOrientedness and Crime，” Assessing the Criminal，ed.R。E.Bar nett and J。Hagel （Cambridge，Mass.：Ballinger，1977）； Wilson and Herrnstein，Crime and Human nature，pp.414–24。

关于高时间偏好与犯罪之间的关系，见E.C.班菲尔德，《重返罪恶之都》（波士顿：利特尔，布朗公司，1974年），特别章3和8；[m]，“现在取向与犯罪”，《犯罪评估》，美国教育硕士。巴奈特和J。哈格尔（剑桥，麻：博林格，1977）；《犯罪与人性》，第414 – 24页。

[467] See H.H.Hoppe，“The Political Economy of Monarchy and Democracy and the idea of a Natural Order，” Journal of Libertarian Studies 11，No.2 （1995）。

参见h.h.h Hoppe：《君主政体、民主政体的政治经济学与自然秩序》，《自由意志主义研究》第11期，第2期（1995）。

[468] See Rothbard，Economic Thought before Adam Smith，chap.1。

见罗斯巴德《亚当·斯密之前的经济思想》第一章。

[469] See Lord Acton，Essays in the History of Liberty （Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty fund，

，2； Rothbard，Economic Thought before Adam Smith，chaps.2–4； R。Nisbet，Prejudices （Cambridge，Mass.：Harvard University Press，1982），110ff。

参见阿克顿勋爵，《自由史随笔》（印第安纳波利斯，印第安纳自由基金会，1985年），第2章；罗斯巴德：《亚当·斯密之前的经济思想》，第2 – 4章；R.尼斯贝特《偏见》（Cambridge， massachusetts）：哈佛大学出版社，1982），第110页。

[470] See L。v。Mises，Theory and History （Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，1985），pp.44ff。； E.Cassirer，The myth of the State （new Haven，ConN.：Yale University Press），chap.VII。

见米塞斯，《理论与历史》（奥本，阿拉巴马州）：米塞斯研究院，1985），44页；卡西尔：《国家的神话》（康涅狄格州纽黑文）（耶鲁大学出版社），第七章。

[471] See A.Rüstow，freedom and Domination：A Historical Critique of civilization （Princeton，N.J。：Princeton University Press，1980），pp.256–67； Nisbet，Prejudices，pp.261ff。； Rothbard，Economic Thought before Adam Smith，chap.6； Q。Skinner，The Foun dations of Modern Political Thought，vol.1 （Cambridge，U.K.：Cambridge University Press，1978）。

参见a.r <e：1>斯托：《自由与统治：对文明的历史批判》（普林斯顿，新泽西）：普林斯顿大学出版社，1980年），pp.256-267；尼斯贝特，《偏见》，第261页；罗斯巴德：《亚当·斯密之前的经济思想》，第6章；Q.斯金纳，《现代政治思想的基础》，第1卷（剑桥，英国：剑桥大学出版社，1978）。

[472] See Rüstow，freedom and Domination，pp.267–87。

见 Rüstow，《自由与统治》，第 267-287 页。

[473] See J。F。C。Fuller，The Conduct of War （new York：Da Capo，1992），chap.1。

参见J.F.C.富勒，《战争的行为》（纽约：达卡波出版社，1992），第一章。

[474] Rothbard，Economic Thought before Adam Smith，chap.5。

罗斯巴德：《亚当·斯密之前的经济思想》，第五章。

[475] See Rüstow，freedom and Domination，pp.301–26； Cassirer，The myth of the State，chap.XIV。

参见《自由与统治》，第301 – 326页；卡西尔：《国家的神话》第十四章。

[476] See Cassirer，The myth of the State，chap.XIII； Rüstow，freedom and Domination，pp.301–26。

见卡西尔《国家的神话》第十三章；Rüstow《自由与统治》，第301 – 26页。

[477] See also J。Tuck，Natural Rights Theories （Cambridge，U.K.：Cambridge University Press，1979）； Rothbard，Economic Thought before Adam Smith，esp.pp.369ff。

参见J.塔克，《自然权利理论》（剑桥，英国：剑桥大学出版社，1979）；罗斯巴德：《亚当·斯密之前的经济思想》，第369页。

[478] See W.Röpke，Die gesellschaftskrisis der gegenwart （Erlenbach：E.rentsch，1942），chap.4，esp.74ff。； also Mises，Theory and History，pp.47f。

参见W.Röpke，Die gesellschaftskrisis der gegenwart （Erlenbach：E.rentsch，1942），第4章，特别是74页；也见米塞斯，《理论与历史》，第47页。

[479] See Rüstow，freedom and Domination，pp.343–46ff。； Cassirer，The myth of the State，chap.XIV； Mises，Theory and History，chap.40。

参见Rüstow《自由与统治》，第343 – 346页；卡西尔：《国家的神话》第十四章；米塞斯，《理论与历史》，第40章。

[480] L v。Mises，Socialism （Indianapolis，Ind.：Liberty fund，1981），esp.pp.419ff。； M.N.Rothbard，freedom，Inequality，primitivism，and the Division of Labor （Auburn，Ala.：Mises institute，1991）。

米塞斯《社会主义》（印第安纳波利斯，印第安纳州。：自由基金，1981），pp.419ff；罗斯巴德：《自由、不平等、原始主义与劳动分工》（奥本，阿拉巴马州）：米塞斯研究院，1991）。

[481] See L.Kolakowski，Die Philosophie des Positivismus （München：Piper，1971）； H.H.Hoppe，Kritik der kausalwissenschaftlichen Sozialforschung （Opladen：Westdeutscher verlag，1983）； idem； The Economics and Ethics of Private Property，pt。II； Mises，Theory and History，chap.11； idem，The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science （Kansas City，Kans.：Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel，1978）； B。Blanshard，reason and Analysis （LaSalle，Ill。：open Court，1964）。

参见L.Kolakowski，《实证哲学》（m.nchen：Piper，1971）；h.h.h Hoppe，《社会发展的批判》（奥普拉登：西德出版社，1983）；同上的；《私有财产的经济学与伦理学》，第2期；米塞斯：《理论与历史》，第11章；《经济科学的终极基础》（堪萨斯城，堪萨斯州）。（Sheed Andrews and Mcmeel，1978）；B。布兰夏德，《理性与分析》（拉萨尔，伊利诺伊州）：公开法庭，1964年）。

[482] Strictly speaking，even this impression is fallacious.For how can it be possible to see two or more observational experiences as falsifying or confirming each other rather than as mere isolated experiences？

严格地说，即使这种印象也是错误的。因为怎么可能把两个或更多的观察经验看作是相互证伪或相互证实，而不仅仅是孤立的经验呢？

[483] See H.H.Hoppe，“Austrian rationalism in the age of the Decline of Positivism，”Journal des economistes et des etudes humaines 2，No.2/3 （1991）。

参见霍普，《实证主义衰落时代的奥地利理性主义》，《经济学与人文研究》第2期。2/3 （1991）。

[484] See M.N.Rothbard，Individualism and the Philosophy of the Social Sciences （San Francisco：Cato institute，1979）； H.H.Hoppe，Praxeology and Economic Science （Au burn，Ala.：Mises institute，1988）。

见m.n.罗斯巴德，《个人主义与社会科学哲学》（旧金山：卡托研究所，1979）；霍普，《行动学与经济科学》（阿拉巴马州奥本）：米塞斯研究院，1988）。

[485] See H.H.Hoppe，A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism （Boston：Kluwer，1989），chap.6。

见霍普，《社会主义与资本主义理论》（波士顿：Kluwer出版社，1989），第6章。

[486] See Mises，Human action，pt。7； idem，The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Sci ence，esp.chaps.5–8，which conclude with the verdict：

As far as the empiricist principle of logical Positivism refers to the experimental methods of the natural sciences，it merely asserts what is not questioned by anybody。As far as it rejects the epistemological principles of the sciences of hu man action，it is not only entirely wrong。It is also knowingly and intentionally undermining the intellectual foundations of Western civilization.（p.133）

见米塞斯，《人的行动》，第7页；《经济学的终极基础》，第5-8章，最后得出结论：逻辑实证主义的经验主义原则是指自然科学的实验方法，它只是断言了没有人质疑的东西。就它拒绝人的行动科学的认识论原则而言，它不仅是完全错误的。它还有意识地破坏了西方文明的思想基础。

[487] See Cassirer，The myth of the State，p.172； Rothbard，Economic Thought before Adam Smith，p.72。

参见卡西尔：《国家的神话》，第172页；罗斯巴德：《亚当·斯密之前的经济思想》，第72页。

[488] See W.Röpke，Jenseits von Angebot und Nachfrage （bern：P.Haupt，1979），pp.191–99； idem，Die gesellschaftskrise der gegenwart，pp.52f。； Jouvenel，on Power，chap.17； Hoppe，“The Political Economy of Monarchy and Democracy and the idea of Natural Order。”

参见W.Röpke，Jenseits von Angebot and Nachfrage （bern：P.Haupt，1979）， pp.191-99；idem，Die gesellschaftskrise der gengenwart，第52页；chap.17 Jouvenel，《论权力》；霍普，《君主制与民主制的政治经济学以及自然秩序的理念》。

[489] on Friedman’s pronouncements，see M.Friedman，“Say No to intolerance，” liberty 4，No.6 （July 1991）； also J。D.Hammond，“An interview with Milton Friedman on methodology，” research in the History of Economic Thought and methodology，vol.10 （Grenwich，ConN.：JAI Press，1992），esp.pp.100–02； for another prominent pro ponent of the same view see，T。W.Hutchison，The Politics and Philosophy of Economics （new York：new York University Press，1981），esp.pp.196–97。

关于弗里德曼的声明，见弗里德曼，“对不宽容说不”，《自由》第4期，第6期（1991年7月）；哈蒙德：《对米尔顿·弗里德曼方法论的访谈》，《经济思想史与方法论研究》，第10卷（Grenwich康涅狄格州。：洁出版社，1992），esp.pp.100-02；另一位持相同观点的著名支持者见T.W.哈奇森，《政治与经济学哲学》（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1981），第196 – 97页。

[490] It is Milton Friedman，and not the targets of his attacks，the “extremist” and “intolerant” Ludwig von Mises and Murray N.Rothbard，who finds himself in the company of dictators.Thus wrote benito Mussolini in 1921：

If relavitism signifies contempt for fixed categories and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective，immortal truth.。。then there is nothing more relativistic than Fascist attitudes and activity From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value，that all ideologies are mere fictions，the modern relativist infers that ev erybody has the right to create for himself his own ideology and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable.

Quoted in H.B。veatch，Rational man：A Modern interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics （Bloomington：Indiana University Press，1962），p.41。

是米尔顿-弗里德曼，而不是他攻击的对象，”极端主义者 “和 “不宽容者 “路德维希-冯-米塞斯和默里-罗斯巴德，发现自己与独裁者为伍。墨索里尼在 1921 年写道：

如果相对主义意味着蔑视固定的范畴和那些声称自己承载着客观的、不朽的真理的人……。那么，没有什么比法西斯主义的态度和活动更相对主义的了。现代相对主义者从 “所有意识形态都具有同等价值”（即所有意识形态都是虚构的）这一事实中推断出，每个人都有权为自己创造自己的意识形态，并试图以自己所能发挥的全部能量来推行这种意识形态。

引用自H.B veatch《理性人：亚里士多德伦理学的现代诠释》（布卢明顿：印第安纳大学出版社，1962），第41页。

[491] on intellectual modesty of rationalism，see E.Cassirer，The myth of the State，chap.13。

关于理性主义的知识谦虚，见e .卡西尔，《国家的神话》，第13章。

[492] Illustrative of the works of the two outstanding social rationalists of the twentieth century，see Mises，Human action and Theory and History，and M.N.Rothbard，man，Economy，and State （Los Angeles：Nash，1972），The Ethics of Liberty； Economic Thought before Adam Smith； and Classical Economics.

关于20世纪两位杰出的社会理性主义者的著作，可以参考米塞斯的《人的行动》和《理论与历史》以及罗斯巴德的《人、经济与国家》（洛杉矶：纳什出版社，1972年出版）《自由伦理》；《亚当·斯密之前的经济思想古典经济学》。

* originally published in the Mises Wire，November 5，2018。Presented at The Property and freedom Society，16 September 2018。

原载于《米塞斯通讯社》，2018年11月5日，在财产与自由协会发表，2018年9月16日。

[493] Friedrich A.Hayek，Capitalism and the Historians （Chicago：University of Chicago Press，1954），pp.3–8。

哈耶克，《资本主义与历史学家》（芝加哥：芝加哥大学出版社，1954），第3 – 8页。

[494] （Note：I am not denying here the possibility of periods of regression in the development of science.But I would explain any such regression as the consequence of a prior loss of practical engineering knowledge.“Harmlessly” in the normal course of economic development，certain skills may die out and be forgotten，because there is no longer any demand for their products.This does not necessarily imply a step back in engineering knowledge，however。Indeed，such loss can be more than made up by the development of different skills required for the manufacturing of different，more highly demanded products.Loss here is the springboard of technological progress.Old tools and machines are replaced by better new ones.But another，less “harmless” development is possible as well，and has indeed taken place at certain times and places.Due to a pestilence，for instance，the population size，and with it also the division of labor，might dramatically shrink and lead to a huge and widespread loss of accumulated engineering knowledge and skills，so as to require a return to earlier and more primitive modes of production.Or a population might simply become less bright，for whatever reason，than its fore bears and unable to maintain a given （inherited） level of technological advancement。

（注：在此，我并不否认科学发展出现倒退的可能性。但我会把任何这种倒退解释为先前实用工程知识丧失的后果。在正常的经济发展过程中，某些技能可能会 “无伤大雅 “地消亡和被遗忘，因为对其产品不再有需求。然而，这并不一定意味着工程知识的倒退。事实上，这种损失可以通过开发不同的技能来弥补，这些技能是制造不同的、需求更高的产品所必需的。在这里，损失是技术进步的跳板。旧的工具和机器被更好的新工具和新机器所取代。但是，另一种不那么 “无伤大雅 “的发展也是可能的，而且确实在某些时间和地点已经发生了。例如，由于一场瘟疫，人口规模以及随之而来的劳动分工可能会急剧萎缩，导致积累的工程知识和技能大量而广泛地丧失，从而需要回到更早、更原始的生产方式。又或者，无论出于何种原因，一个种群的聪明才智可能会不如前人，无法保持既有的（继承的）技术进步水平。

[495] Viking Books，2011。

维京图书，2011年。

[496] See on the following also Stefan Blankertz，https：//wwW.lewrockwell。com/2018/05/ no_author/pinkerversusanarchyaretyrantsthelesserevil/。请参阅一下内容Stefan Blankertz，https：//wwW.lewrockwell.pinkerversusanarchyaretyrantsthelesserevil/。

* originally published in The Daily bell，sunday，March 27，2011。

最初发表于2011年3月27日星期日的《贝尔日报》。

* originally published on www.hansHoppe.com。

最初发表于www.hansHoppe.com。

* originally delivered as the introductory speech at the Property and freedom Society’s 2009 annual meeting in Bodrum，Turkey，May 21，2009。

原为 2009 年 5 月 21 日在土耳其博德鲁姆举行的财产与自由学会 2009 年年会上的开场白。

* originally published in the Libertarian Standard.

最初发表于《自由意志主义标准》。

* This talk was delivered November 23，2019，at the Palais Coburg in Vienna，Austria，at an event commemorating the seventieth anniversary of the publication of Ludwig von Mises’s Human action.Translated from the german by Robert Grözinger。

这篇演讲于2019年11月23日在奥地利维也纳的科堡宫举行的纪念路德维希·冯·米塞斯《人的行动》出版70周年的活动上发表。罗伯特-格罗辛格译自德文。

* originally published in the Austrian 6，No.2 （2020）。

原刊于《奥地利人报》第6期第2期（2020）。

* Stephan Kinsella is an attorney in Houston and was founder and executive editor of Libertarian Papers （2009–2018； libertarianpapers.org）。

斯蒂芬·金塞拉（Stephan Kinsella）是休斯敦的一名律师，曾是《自由意志主义论文》的创始人和执行编辑（2009-2018；libertarianpapers.org）。

[497] “Austrians and the PrivateProperty Society：An interview with HansHermann Hoppe，” The Austrian Economics newsletter 18，No.1 （Spring 1998）。

《奥地利经济学家与私有财产学会：对汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普的访谈》，《奥地利经济学通讯》18期，第1期（1998年春季）。

[498] See www.hansHoppe.com/translations

见www.hansHoppe.com/translations

[499] Here I am borrowing from a vivid metaphor from Shael Herman，“Detrimental reliance in Louisiana Law–Past，Present，and Future （？）：The Code Drafter’s Perspec tive，” Tulane Law review 58：3 （1984），pp.707–57，at 708–09，which observes that legal principles staked out by articles of a civil code embody a “plasma that bathes and nour ishes an entire code and its institutions.The obligations articles are traditionally rich in analogies，making them，in Portalis’ famous phrase，‘fertile in effects.’” See also idem，“Minor Risks and Major rewards：Civilian Codification in north America on the Eve of the TwentyFirst Century，” Tulane Eur。& Civ。L。Forum 8 （1993），63，at 67 N.11； idem，The Louisiana Civil Code：A European legacy for the United States （Louisiana Bar Foundation，1993）。From note 6 of Herman’s Detrimental reliance article：“Professor J。L。Baudouin applied this term to the Civil Code as a whole.‘A code is apparently complete in itself，but it is drafted in such a way that，in spite of its separation or division into books，chapters，and sections，there is a plasma that permeates it totally。’ [Citing Louis Baudouin，The influence of the Code Napoleon，Tulane Law review 33：21，at 22 （1958）。] My argument here is that the provisions on obligations are more like plasma than those on other subjects because obligations provisions generally express legal relations at their most abstract level。on the role of obligations provisions in civil codes of Roman derivation，see generally [Shael Herman & David Hoskins，“Perspectives on Code Structure：Historical Experience，Modern formats，and Policy Considerations，” 54 Tulane Law review 987，1022–41 （1980）]。

在这里，我借用了谢尔-赫尔曼（Shael Herman）的一个生动的比喻，”路易斯安那州法律中的有害依赖——过去、现在和未来（？……）：法典起草者的视角”，《杜兰法律评论》58：3 （1984），第707-757页，708-709条，其中指出，民法典条款所确定的法律原则体现了 “沐浴和滋润整部法典及其制度的血浆。另见同上，”小风险与大回报：二十一世纪前夕北美的民法典编纂”，Tulane Eur。同上，《路易斯安那州民法典：欧洲留给美国的遗产》（路易斯安那州律师基金会，1993 年）。摘自赫尔曼的《有害的依赖》一文注释 6：”J.L.Baudouin 教授将这一术语用于整个民法典。一部法典本身表面上是完整的，但它的起草方式使它尽管分立或划分为书、章、节，但仍有一种等离子体完全渗透其中”[引自路易-博杜安，《拿破仑法典的影响》，《杜兰法学评论》：33，21，at 22 （1958）]。我在这里的论点是，关于义务的条款比关于其他主题的条款更像血浆，因为义务条款通常在最抽象的层次上表达法律关系。关于义务条款在罗马衍生民法典中的作用，一般参见[谢尔-赫尔曼和大卫霍斯金，“对法典结构的看法：历史经验，现代格式和政策考虑”，54杜兰法律评论987，1022-1041（1980）]。

[500] Published in Murray N.Rothbard，The Logic of action one （Edward Elgar，1997），pp.100–108。

发表于默里罗斯巴德，《行动的逻辑1》（爱德华·埃尔加，1997），第100 – 108页。

[501] HansHermann Hoppe，“Murray N.Rothbard and the Ethics of Liberty，” intro duction to Murray N.Rothbard，The Ethics of Liberty （new York：new York University Press，1998）。

汉斯-赫尔曼-霍普，《默里-罗斯巴德与自由的伦理》，默里-罗斯巴德《自由伦理学》导言（纽约：纽约大学出版社，1998 年）。

[502] See my blog post，Hoppe on intellectual Property，C4SIF Blog （Dec.27，2010），http：//c4sif.org/2010/12/Hoppeonintellectualproperty

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Previous post: A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism in Chinese

The Great Fiction in Chinese

目录

前言

序

第一辑：人类发展、财产和政治

1 知识分子和反知识分子的知识分子[1]

2 私有财产的伦理学与经济学

I.社会的秩序问题

II.解决方案：私有财产和先占

III.误解和澄清

IV.私有财产经济学

V.古典渊源

VI.芝加哥转向

3 私有财产和家庭的起源*

I.背景：历史

II.问题：理论

III.解决方案：理论与历史

4 从马尔萨斯陷阱到工业革命：对社会进化的一种解释*

I. 经济理论

II. 经济史：问题

III. 历史的解释

IV. 结论与展望

5 论共有、公有和私有财产以及全面私有化的基本原理*

I. 理论初步

II. 私有财产、共有财货和公有财产

III. 私有化原理

IV. 附录 私有化：原则与应用

6 自然秩序、国家和移民问题*

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

7 自由贸易和限制移民的理由*

I. 自由贸易的理由

II. 贸易与移民

III.“开放边境”、入侵和强制一体化

IV. 无政府资本主义模式

V. 纠正和预防

VI. 结论

8 论人、自然、真理和公正*

9 论民主、再分配和对财产的破坏*

第二辑： 货币、国家和安保

10 国家为何要求控制货币*

11利用法定财产和法定货币的企业家精神*

12 持有货币的收益*

13 国家或私法社会？*

I. 社会秩序问题

II. 解决方案：私有财产的观念

III. 社会秩序的执行和私有财产的保护：国家

IV.“国家主义”的根基性错误

V. 错上加错：民主国家

VI. 解决之道：以私法社会代替国家

14 防卫的私人生产*

I. 经验证据

II. 剖析国家主义者的反应

III. 支持私人安保的理由

IV. 进一步讨论侵犯保险

V. 政治边界与保险

VI. 民主国家与全面战争

VII. 保险与激励

VIII. 防范国家侵犯

IX. 重获自我防卫的权利

15 关于国家与战争的反思*

I. 国家、战争和帝国主义

II. 从君主制和军队战争到民主制和全面战争

III. 附录：民主和平论

IV. 让世界远离民主而安全，或如何抵御美国

第三辑 经济学理论

16 关于确定性和不确定性*

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

17 数字概率的局限性[203]

I.

IV. 附录私有化：原则与应用

第二辑：货币、国家和安保

第三辑经济学理论

第四辑知识分子及其历史

第五辑自传

后记 *